ML19212A687
ML19212A687 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Westinghouse |
Issue date: | 07/31/2019 |
From: | Eric Michel NRC/RGN-II/DFFI/FFB2 |
To: | Annacone M Westinghouse |
References | |
IR 2019003 | |
Download: ML19212A687 (16) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 July 31, 2019 Mr. Mike Annacone Vice President, Columbia Fuel Operations and Manager, Columbia Plant Westinghouse Electric Company 5801 Bluff Road Hopkins, SC 29061
SUBJECT:
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER 70-1151/2019-003
Dear Mr. Annacone:
This letter refers to inspections conducted from April 1 through June 30, 2019, at the Westinghouse Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility in Hopkins, SC. The purpose of this inspection was to determine whether activities authorized under the license were conducted safely and in accordance with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. The enclosed inspection report presents the results of this inspection.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to public health and safety, the common defense and security, and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations as well as the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that no violations of more than minor significance were identified.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of NRCs Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter and enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, or from the NRCs Agencywide
M. Annacone 2 Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), which is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you have any questions, please contact Tom Vukovinsky of my staff at (404) 997-4622.
Sincerely
/RA/
Eric C. Michel, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Fuel Facility Inspection Docket No. 70-1151 License No. SNM-1107
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 70-1151/2019-003 w/
Attachment:
Supplemental Information cc: (See page 3)
M. Annacone 3 cc:
Nancy Parr Manager, Licensing Westinghouse Electric Company 5801 Bluff Road Hopkins, SC 29061
ML19212A687 SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII:DFFI RII:DFFI RII:DFFI RII:DFFI RII:DFFI RII:DFFI SIGNATUR Per Feeder Per Feeder Per Feeder Per Per Feeder Per Feeder NAME TVukovinsk NPitoniak RWomack PGlenn KMcCurry PStartz DATE 07/31/2019 07/31/2019 07/31/2019 07/31/201 07/31/2019 07/31/2019 E-MAIL YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docket No.: 70-1151 License No.: SNM-1107 Report No.: 70-1151/2019-003 EPID No.: 1-2019-003-0054 Licensee: Westinghouse Electric Company Facility: Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility Location: Hopkins, SC 29061 Dates: April 1 through June 30, 2019 Inspectors: P. Glenn, Fuel Facility Inspector (Paragraph B.1)
N. Pitoniak, Senior Fuel Facility Inspector, (Paragraph B.2)
P. Startz, Fuel Facility Inspector (Paragraph A.1, C.2)
T. Vukovinsky, Senior Fuel Facility Inspector (Paragraphs B.2, C.1)
R. Womack, Fuel Facility Inspector (Paragraph B.2)
Approved by: E. Michel, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Fuel Facility Inspection Enclosure
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Westinghouse Electric Company Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility Nuclear Regulatory Commission Integrated Inspection Report 70-1151/2019-003 April 1 through June 30, 2019 The inspection was conducted by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regional inspectors during normal shifts in the areas of safety operations, facility support, and other. The inspectors performed a selective examination of licensed activities that were accomplished by direct observation of safety-significant activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, and a review of facility records. No violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.
Safety Operations
- In the area of Fire Protection, no violations of more than minor significance were identified. (Paragraph A.1)
Facility Support
- In the area of Emergency Preparedness, no violations of more than minor significance were identified. (Paragraph B.1)
- In the area of Emergency Exercise, no violations of more than minor significance were identified. (Paragraph B.2)
Other
- (CLOSED) Confirmatory Order Section V, Item 10(b), Westinghouse shall conduct effectiveness reviews of corrective actions to prevent recurrence as specified in their RCA. (Paragraph C.1)
- Review of damaged Sea-Land Containers. (Paragraph C.2)
Attachment:
Key Points of Contact List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed Inspection Procedures Used Documents Reviewed Acronyms and Initialisms 2
REPORT DETAILS Summary of Plant Status The Westinghouse Facility converts uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into uranium dioxide using a wet conversion process and fabricates fuel assemblies for use in commercial nuclear power reactors. During the inspection period, normal production activities were ongoing.
A. Safety Operations
- 1. Fire Protection Annual (Inspection Procedure 88055)
- a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the Licensees fire protection program to evaluate compliance with the Licensees NRC License application, primarily Chapter 8 Fire Safety Program.
Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the Licensees fire safety procedures, maintenance/testing programmatic documentation, and applicable National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards. To complete the program assessment, the inspectors performed direct observation of the facility, activities, and related fire protection equipment associated with the most safety-significant uranium processing activities. The inspectors reviewed recent changes to fire protection equipment, revised policies and procedures, and samples of routine documented maintenance and testing records of equipment and apparatus. The inspectors conduced physical examinations of the following production areas: uranium hexafluoride vaporization, precipitation, drying, sintering, rod fabrication, recovery/recycling, and incineration. Inspections of other peripheral areas included: the hot oil room, plating area, emergency diesel generator rooms, new fire sprinkler installation projects, and the two fire water storage tanks.
The inspectors evaluated samples of fire detection and suppression systems including:
heat and smoke detectors, fire alarm pull stations, visual and audible alarms, fire extinguishers, water sprinkler stand pipes and systems, and the fire water supply system. Most of the system inspections were focused in or near uranium production areas to determine if the systems were being maintained in compliance with Licensee procedures and referenced National Fire Protection Association standards. Water sprinkler systems including stand pipes, branch piping, and sprinklers appeared to be in good condition and fully functional. Samples of maintenance records were reviewed to determine if periodic inspections, tests, and maintenance were being performed in accordance with procedures and standards. Passive fire protection features including fire walls, fire doors, ventilation systems, and fire dampers were assessed to determine compliance with Chapter 8.
The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection and emergency preparedness programs to verify safety controls would not be adversely affected by fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems, as required in Chapter 8. Inspectors evaluated the fire suppression systems to determine whether they were installed and maintained in a manner that was consistent with nuclear safety criticality control concepts listed in paragraph 6.1.3.2 (4) of the License Application.
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The inspectors also reviewed the licensees processes, systems, and equipment, specific to areas protected by water-based fire suppression systems, to evaluate the adequacy of drainage and environmental protection for managing the release of hazardous effluents in the event of a suppression system activation. The inspectors focused on the following production areas: nuclear fuel fabrication, Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber (IFBA) fuel, Erbia Fuel, incineration, hot oil room, and storage areas for materials awaiting incineration.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees testing and inventory procedure for emergency equipment and supplies as specified in procedure SEP-004, Emergency Equipment and Supplies. The inspectors walked down and physically inspected a sample of fire hydrant supply enclosures to evaluate whether the equipment matched the inventory list.
The licensees programs and procedures were evaluated to assess if portable radio communications and fixed emergency communications systems were available, operable, and reliable for their required performance in fire response activities.
The inspectors reviewed samples of the licensees procedures, training materials, and records associated with emergency responder training to evaluate the adequacy of the licensees programs and procedures for maintaining fire response capabilities in accordance with Chapter 8. The inspectors reviewed selected training records and training materials associated with fire brigade qualifications and training to assess whether the licensees training program met the requirements of the license with regards to fire brigade members. The inspectors evaluated if the licensee had a method for ensuring all industrial fire brigade members received training and participated in a drill at least annually. The inspectors reviewed the licensees process to verify emergency response team members maintained required qualifications to perform the duties of emergency response positions.
Through a review of training records and interviews with emergency preparedness staff, the inspectors evaluated whether offsite fire support organizations were offered the opportunity for annual site orientations. An additional review of the orientation program for offsite emergency responders was documented as part of the emergency preparedness inspection.
The inspectors interviewed several emergency preparedness staff and reviewed emergency response team training records to assess whether the licensees emergency response team training met the requirements of paragraph 7.11 of the License Application.
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated samples of corrective action reports associated with the fire protection program to verify fire protection issues were properly being identified and evaluated at the appropriate threshold, and corrective actions were being implemented in accordance with paragraphs 3.7 and 3.8 of the License Application.
The inspectors toured plant areas containing safety controls and items relied on for safety (IROFS) to assess the material condition of fire protection equipment, systems, and features to determine compliance with Chapter 8. The inspectors assessed whether the cutting, welding, and hot work programs were being implemented in accordance to Licensee procedures. The inspectors also assessed whether flammable materials were properly stored in certified flammable storage cabinets as specified in approved procedures and whether housekeeping and the control of combustible materials met procedural requirements.
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b. Conclusion
No violations of more than minor significance were identified.
B. Facility Support
- a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees emergency management program to evaluate compliance with the Licensees NRC License application, primarily Chapter 9 Emergency Management Program. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed licensee staff and reviewed procedural revisions to verify no changes to the Emergency Preparedness (EP) program were made that decrease the effectiveness of the Site Emergency Plan (SEP) as required by 10 CFR 70.32(i). The inspectors reviewed changes made to the EP program to determine whether it still met current licensing commitments under License Condition S-2 of SNM-1107 and the SEP. The inspectors toured areas designated as Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs) to verify current plans and procedural revisions were available for use as required by Section 6.1 of the SEP.
The inspectors reviewed the SEP to verify firefighting precautions for NCS were included in procedures and coordinated with offsite agencies as required by Section 5.3.1 of the SEP. The inspectors toured EOC sites to verify current pre-fire plans were available in field locations as required by Section 6.1 of the SEP. The inspectors also conducted the review to verify reentry and recovery to areas following an emergency event and evacuation were governed by specific procedures as required by Sections 5.5 and Chapter 9.0 of the SEP.
The inspectors reviewed training records and interviewed licensee staff regarding emergency preparedness training in the past year. The inspectors conducted this review to verify the licensee provided training for designated emergency response personnel in accordance with Section 7.2 of the SEP. The inspectors also reviewed the training topics and records for fire brigade members to verify that training complied with 29 CFR 1910.156 and that training sessions were held within the frequency as specified by Section 7.2.3 of the SEP. The inspectors interviewed senior licensee staff members including the emergency preparedness manager and an emergency director to verify emergency response officials were familiar with expected emergency situations consistent with the SEP.
The inspectors reviewed the written agreements with the offsite agencies to determine whether the organizations designated in Section 4.26 of the SEP had up-to-date agreements. The inspectors reviewed records to verify the licensee invited the off-site organizations for training and drill participation as described in Section 7.3 of the SEP.
The inspectors also reviewed drill schedules and post incident analyses to verify that items identified during critiques and events were being captured and addressed in the corrective action program and that drills were conducted within the timeframe required by Section 7.3 of the SEP.
The inspectors observed the storage of emergency equipment in Conference Room 200, the Emergency Brigade Building, the Station Meeting Room, the Pavilion, and the Gate 5
1 Guard Station to verify that equipment was maintained as required by Chapter 6 of the SEP.
The inspectors reviewed the most recent licensee conducted audit of the EP program to verify that the audit covered the scope, independence, and other requirements of section 7.8 in the SEP. The inspectors reviewed corrective actions from the audit results as well as other corrective action program entries related to the EP program to verify that findings and recommendations were being identified and addressed in accordance with the licensees corrective action program.
The inspectors reviewed documentation of events that have occurred since the last EP inspection that required the implementation of the Emergency Plan to verify that problems or deficiencies associated with the Emergency Plan or implementing procedures were corrected.
b. Conclusion
No violations of more than minor significance were identified
- 2. Evaluation of Exercises and Drills (Inspection Procedure 88051)
- a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees biennial emergency response drill to evaluate compliance with the Licensees NRC License application, primarily Chapter 9 Emergency Management Program. The inspectors reviewed the emergency drill scenario and discussed the exercise objectives with licensee personnel at an off-site pre-exercise meeting on May 7, 2019. The inspectors discussed exercise evaluation criteria and control of simulated exercise activities with the exercise coordinator. The inspectors walked down the plant to assess the effectiveness of the visual aids and simulations used in the drill to verify that the licensee had not pre-staged equipment in anticipation of the exercise.
The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensees graded biennial exercise conducted on May 8, 2019. The scenario involved a leaking flange on the new boiler which allowed for natural gas buildup inside the boiler house. An ignition source was introduced by hot work resulting in an explosion that took out part of the south wall of the boiler house and the north side of the Waterglass building. In addition, an ammonia line was damaged resulting in a small ammonia leak in the vicinity. The explosion resulted in one fatality and two injured workers.
At the initiation of the emergency drill, the inspectors observed the licensee assess the accident, analyze the plant condition, and classify the event. The event was classified as an alert in accordance with the Emergency Plan (E-Plan). The inspectors observed the activation of the EOC to verify all required positions were staffed in accordance with the E-Plan.
The inspectors observed initial and subsequent off-site notifications to verify they were completed within the time specified in the E-Plan. Personnel accountability was conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
The inspectors observed the Emergency Director (ED) to verify they maintained command and control of the EOC, as well as utilized the radiation survey, chemical, and environmental monitoring results during the assessment of the accident scenario.
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The inspectors observed members of the licensees emergency response team (ERT),
including the Incident Commander (IC), assemble at the designated assembly area and the arrival of the off-site emergency responders. The inspectors observed the ERTs assessment of the affected area and response to additional emerging situations. The inspectors observed these participants to verify that the ERT activities were appropriate for the exercise scenario and were appropriate in meeting the drill objectives.
The inspectors observed the staff critiques of the emergency exercise to verify that the critiques were effective at identifying areas of improvement and that the licensee-initiated items discussed after the emergency exercise into the corrective actions program, as needed, including Corrective Action Program (CAP) entries 2019-7983 and 2019-7994.
b. Conclusion
No violations more than minor significance were identified.
C. Other Topics
- 1. Review of Confirmatory Order Items (Inspection Procedures 92703 and 88020)
- a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees actions regarding Confirmatory Order (CO)
Section V, Item 10(b) (ML17221A112), which required the licensee to conduct effectiveness reviews of corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPRs) as specified in their Root Cause Analysis (RCA).
Specifically, the inspectors reviewed ER-2018-19 (for CAP IR-2016-43, aka Corrective Action Program and Learning (CAPAL) 100397353), Uranium Mass Exceedance from S-1030. This ER reviewed each CAPR specified in the RCA. The inspectors noted that the corrective actions developed by the licensee successfully prevented a consequential recurrence of the event, and that these effectiveness reviews were completed as specified by their corrective action program and on time as required by the CO.
b. Conclusion
The licensee has completed the effectiveness reviews of the CAPRs identified in their RCA as required by CO Section V, Item 10(b). Based on the review of effectiveness reviews for each individual CAPR, the NRC concludes that Westinghouse has met the requirements stated in CO Section V, Item 10(b) and this item is considered closed.
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- 2. Review of damaged Sea-Land Containers (Inspection Procedure 88045 and 88075)
- a. Inspection Scope Inspectors reviewed an issue concerning the discovery and initiation of corrective actions involving rainwater leaking from a rusted 55-gallon drum. The leaking drum was one of many drums, loaded onto pallets, that were being stored in Sea-Land containers awaiting reprocessing of their contents. Reprocessing operations included incineration of the combustible materials contaminated with low levels of uranium, processing the resulting ash through the licensees uranium recycling and purifications facility, and the ultimate reuse of the uranium in their normal uranium fuel production activities. The licensee reported that rainwater setting on top of the Sea-Land container roof had caused a hole to form over time. The rainwater accumulated on top of the drums, eventually rusting through the drum lids, and finally rusted through the bottom of the drum. Contaminated rainwater then accumulated on the floor of the container causing the wood floor to break down. As of the date of this NRC report, the Licensees corrective actions included the following:
(1) notification of state and federal regulators, (2) the transfer of all affected drums into the facility for evaluation and repackaging as necessary, (3) removal and disposal of the defective Sea-Land container, (4) evaluations of contamination around and under the affected Sea-Land container, (5) current and planned removal of contaminated materials and soils, (6) ongoing evaluation of other drums in neighboring Sea-Land containers/removal and relocation of drums to allow 100% inspections of the drums and internal evaluation of the container, (7) enhancement of their 6-month inspections to require the staggered removal of all drum pallets allowing 100% inspection of the drums and containers, (8) planned improvements to the container storage yard that will include replacement of deteriorated containers with newer ones, and (9) refurbish the entire container storage yard with compacted gravel to allow heavy equipment to complete the enhanced drum/container inspection program.
The inspectors performed physical inspections of the affected Sea-Land containers on June 10, 2019, discussed the status and radiological evaluation results from the Licensees ongoing response actions, and reviewed the licensees planned corrective actions. The inspectors also reviewed the Licensees 6-month inspection reports dating back to 2014 to evaluate the results and effectiveness of those inspections.
Inspectors interviewed Licensee personnel and reviewed spreadsheets concerning the status and ongoing progress. The inspectors noted that the licensee had entered the event into their corrective action program and an investigation into the event was initiated.
b. Conclusion
Westinghouse continues to coordinate with SC DHEC on the disposition and remediation of the Sea-Land containers which are include in their Remedial Investigation Work Plan as part of their Consent Agreement with SC DHEC. The NRC will continue to monitor the licensees efforts as they coordinate with SC DHEC.
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D. Exit Meeting The inspection scope and results were presented to members of the licensees staff at various meetings throughout the inspection period and were summarized on June 14, 2019, to M. Annacone and staff. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. Proprietary information was discussed but not included in this report.
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
- 1. KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Name Title L. Berry Fire Protection Engineer S. Carver Emergency Preparedness Manager G. Couture Licensing Engineer L. Herring Assistant Incident Commander N. Parr Licensing Manager J. Stewart Incident Commander J. Williams Fire Protection Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, production staff, and office personnel.
- 2. LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Closed CO Section V, Item 10(b) CO Westinghouse shall conduct effectiveness reviews of corrective actions to prevent recurrence as specified in their RCA. (Paragraph C.1)
- 3. INSPECTION PROCEDURES (IP) USED IP 88020 Operational Safety IP 88045 Effluent Control and Environmental Protection IP 88050 Emergency Preparedness IP 88051 Evaluation of Exercises and Drills IP 88055 Fire Protection Annual IP 88075 Event Follow-up IP 92703 Follow-up of Confirmatory Action Letters or Orders Attachment
- 4. LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Records:
Rope History Log 2019 SEPF-004-2, Emergency Response Van Inventory Sheet, Rev. 28, March/April/May/June 2019 SEPF-004-007, Rescue Jump Bag Checklist, Rev. 5, April 2019 SEPF-004-10, Monthly Inspection of Emergency Radios and Telephones, Rev 18, April 2019 SEPF-004-13, Inspections of First Responder O2 Bags, Rev. 7, April 2019 Work Order 746994, 2/8/17 SYF-306-5, Impairment of sprinkler system in Oil House, 1/13/2018 SYF-306-5, Impairment of Incinerator Fire Barrier, 4/9/2018 SYF-306-5, Impairment of Fire Water Tank 1 and Pump 1, 4/25/2018 SYF-306-5, Impairment of sprinkler system, URRS Cyl. Wash Sprinklers, 5/15/2018 Fire Pump #1 Acceptance Test, new replacement diesel pump, 9/8/2017 Sketch 836038-1, URRS-Area Safety Significant Controls, Revision 116, 5/23/2019 Training Records Forms SYF-207-3 for various Fire Safety Team Members MCP-203643 (SSC INCIN-907), SSC Interlock Verification on the Incinerator Red Book 75008, Fire within Insulation on exit stack on 2C Hydrogen Furnace, IR-2019-7422 Procedures:
CA-002, Columbia Plant Electronic Training and Procedure System (ETAPS), Rev. 63 CA-006, Columbia Plant Training Delivery System (TDS), Rev. 20, 08-17-17 CA-007, Corrective and Preventative Action, Rev. 43 CA-043, CFFF ETAPS Document Change Process, Rev. 0 SEP-001, Emergency Response Organization, Rev. 8 SEP-002, Classification, Rev. 6 SEP-003, Emergency Response Team, Rev. 5 SEP-004, Emergency Equipment and Supplies, Rev. 14 SEP-005, Evacuation, Accountability and General Response, Rev. 11 SEP-007, Notification Guidelines for NRC and other Agencies, Rev. 48 SEP-009, Emergency Response Organization Check Sheets, Rev. 16 SEP-013, Post Incident Analysis, Rev. 2 SEP-018, Emergency Operations Center Operations, Rev. 3 SEP-021, Sluice Value Management, Rev. 2 SEPF-004-10, Monthly Inspection of Emergency Radios and Telephones, Rev 19 SEPF-009-30, Incident Command Check Sheet - Explosion, Rev. 0 SEPS-009-09, Incident Action Plan, Rev. 1 SYP-311, Pre-Fire Plans, Rev. 0 SYP-122, Hydrogen & Natural Gas Safety, Rev. 0 SYP-207, Cutting, Welding, and Hot Work, Rev. 34 SYP-300, Housekeeping, Rev. 26 SYF-303, Portable Fire Extinguisher Inspection & Maintenance, Rev. 12 SYP-305, Fire Watch Safety, Rev. 10 SYP-306, CFFF Fire/Criticality System Impairment, Rev. 17 SYP-312, Use of Plastic Sheeting Materials in SNM Areas, Rev. 1 MCP-202082, Excess Flow Valves (Natural Gas) 2
Condition Reports Reviewed:
IR 2018-10747, IR 2018-15330, IR 2019-104, IR 2019-5106, IR 2019-7983, IR 2019-7994, 2019-7422 Condition Reports Written as a Result of the Inspection:
2019-9539, 2019-9552, 2019-9554, 2019-9556, 2019-9413, 2019-9272, 2019-9496 Other Documents:
After Action Report Westinghouse CFFF Biennial Exercise 2019 EHS-AUDIT-19-4, Emergency Preparedness Audit, March 21, 2019 Hazmat Training 8-Hour Refresher, May 2019 Incident Safety Officer Training 2019 May 2019 Interior Burn Refresher Training Memorandum of Understanding with Columbia Fire Department, May 2018 Memorandum of Understanding with South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, March 2015 Memorandum of Understanding with Richland County Emergency Services Department, April 2018 Memorandum of Understanding with Richland County Sheriffs Department, July 2017 Site Emergency Plan, Rev. 18, November 28, 2016 Work Order 820937, Pre-Fire Plans Annual PM Work Orders: 838453-Fire Extinguisher Inspections 4-10-2019; 843186-Fire Extinguisher Inspections 6-5-2019, 839687-Fire Extinguisher Inspections 5-8-2019, 764897-Hot Oil Room Integrity Inspection-6/2/2017; 8003637/21/2018, -Hot Oil Room Integrity Inspection-6/2/2017 SSC ID CHEM-407, PM20209, H2 Excess Flow Shutoff Valve SSC ID INCIN -401, PM85009, Incinerator Room Wall Fire Barrier, Inspections SSC ID INCIN -403, PM20189, 20288, Incinerator Room Fire Dampers and doors, Inspections
- 5. ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS ADAMS NRCs on-line, public document system CAP Corrective Action Program CAPAL Corrective Action Program and Learning CAPR Corrective Action to Prevent Reoccurrence CFR Code of Federal Regulations CO Confirmatory Order EHS Environmental, Health, & Safety E-Plan Emergency Plan ED Emergency Director EOC Emergency Operation Center EP Emergency Preparedness ERT Emergency Response Team IC Incident Commander IP Inspection Procedure IROFS Items Relied on for Safety NFPA National Fire Protection Association NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission RCA Root Cause Analysis Rev. Revision SEP Site Emergency Plan 3