Text

Forwards Summary of PP&L Quantitative Evaluation of Impact of LOCA Induced Hydrodynamic Loads on Fuel Pool Cooling & Service Water Piping
	ML18026A257
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	12/08/1993
From:	Byram R; PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Chris Miller; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	PLA-4057, NUDOCS 9312140056
	Download: ML18026A257 (173)
	v • d • e

ENCLOSURE 3

Pennsylvania Power &. Light Company Two North Ninth Street ~Allentown, PA 18101.1179 ~ 215/774-5151 1

Robert G. Byram Senior Vice President Nuclear 215/774-7502 DEC 08 1993 Director ofNuclear Reactor Regulation ATTENTION: Mr. C.L. Miller,Project Director Project Directorate I-2 Division ofReactor Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION TRANSMITTALOF PIPING STRESS EVALUATION FOR FUEL POOL COOLING HYDRODYNAMICLOADS PLA-4057 FILES R41-2/SO35 Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388

Dear Mr. Miller:

In response to a request from the NRR sttdE attached please Gnd a summary ofPP&L's quantitative evaluation ofthe impact ofLOCAinduced hydrodynamic loads on Fuel Pool Cooling and Service Water piping. Any questions should be directed to Mr. R. R. Sgarro at (215) 774-7914.

Very truly yours, Attachment cc:

NRC Document Control Desk (original)

NRC Region I Mr. G.S. Barber, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector - SSES Mr. R.J. Clark, NRC Sr. Project Manager - Rockville

'P I

Summary of Analyses: Impact of LOCA Hydrodynamic Loads on Fuel Pool Cooling and Service Water Piping in the Reactor Building BACKGROVND As a result ofEDR G20020 a preliminary assessment of the ability of Fuel Pool Cooling piping to withstand seismic and hydrodynamic loads was performed in October 1992.

The conclusions reached at that time were that there was a high risk to syst'm function during a seismic event and a low to moderate risk to the system during hydrodynamic events (LOCA). These conclusions were reached based on reviews ofpiping isometrics, pipe support drawings, response spectra and existing piping calculation results.

In order to further address concerns raised by the EDR originators regarding the adequacy of the FPC system during LOCA loads, a more quantitative evaluation of the FPC piping was requested to be made.

EVALUATIONSCOPE Sections of the Unit 2 Fuel Pool Cooling System and the Unit 1 Service Water System were selected as representative samples of piping. The piping selected consists of various pipe sizes, contains equipment terminations such as pumps and heat exchangers, contains in-line anchors, spans various building elevations and is supported using different types of hangers.

ANALYSISRESULTS The following summarizes the analytical results obtained from the three piping analyses performed.

Summary calculation sheets with the actual computed results are also attached.

1)

~Pi e Stress-Allcomputed stresses were well below code allowables.

The maximum stress increase due to LOCA loads was 1527 psi on the Service Water calculation.

The total stress including deadweight and pressure was still only 18% of the code allowable.

2)

Pi Su rt Loads - Pipe support load increases were relatively low in magnitude.

All of the affected pipe supports were evaluated for the increased loads due to LOCA.

Some of the original design loadings bounded the new loads generated here due to past conservatisms in computing loads (non-computerized).

Allof the pipe supports evaluated can be qualified in accordance with the original design allowables and vendor capacities.

3)

E ui ment Loads-The nozzle loads due to a combination ofdeadweight, thermal and LOCA loads were evaluated for the fuel pool coolmg pumps and heat exchangers, All equipment loadings were within the design criteria allowables utilized in the original equipment qualifications.

Page 1

4)

Pi e Di lacement Due to LOCA-Pipe movement due to LOCA loads is minimal.

The largest LOCA pipe displacement is =0.080" on the service water system.

Most displacements are <1/32" and as such will not result in pipe hanger problems such as binding or loss of support.

In addition, the vertical LOCA loads do not create an up-lift on vertical type pipe supports since in all cases the LOCA load magnitude does not overcome the larger deadweight load in the vertical direction.

CONCLUSIONS Based on the analytical results presented here, it can be concluded that the overall affect of Hydrodynamic (LOCA) Loads on the Fuel Pool Cooling and Service Water Piping is not significant. The results support the conclusions reached during the preliminary assessment ofthe Fuel Pool Cooling and Service Water systems for their ability to withstand LOCA loadings.

The increases in pipe stress, pipe support loads, equipment loads and pipe displacements can be shown to be acceptable using the original design criteria and code allowables.

RRS:tah HydroLds.SA Page 2

~

0

~4 SUSQUEHANNA STERH ELECTRIC STATIDN CQ CQ ATEON Sf%ET 5-9 ORICMlTCR ue gooL CoOL H'C Euh LuhPoJ oF t=P G pl P)dC-LoGt LoAOS b'av. w). ~

sazr~

ra~~

nave~~"

rum~<<<<

~~

Pl pE s THE'ss EUALU17700 FVG.

POOL COOuA z ChLCV(ATSO4 I

(ASR Z9-68)

PIPING STRESS SUMHMK CHECK AND COVER SHEET ASME SECT+

IZING CLASSES 2 fc 3 JOB NO PLANT DESI'ROUP SYSTEM FUEL POOL COOXMIQ LAN SUBCE TANK TO Hz'XT CALC NO ABR 2968 ISO NO DESIGN CONDITION LOCATION MAXIMUM ALLORABLE COMPUTED OF MAXIMUM COMPUTED STRESS LEVEL END ELEMENT STRESS(

PSZ)

(

PSI)

ALIA7RABLE SUSTAINED LOADS EQN.

8 102 100h 102 1168 15000 0 078 OCCASICIthL LOADS EQN~

9 OCCASICIQIL LOADS EQN 9

7A E 7h M 7h E 7A E 7A M 7A E 1582 1582 i+8 SH 27000 2~4 SH 36000 0.059

0. 044 TfKRMAL EXPANSION EQN Il 5

5FA Sh+SH 24130 37500

0. 643 REPXZKHCE CALCULATIONS:

WEZarr W~ )

SEISMIC-ZamnZA PORTZON THERHAI EXP ~+~

SEISMIC-ANCHOR MOVEMENT DYNAMIC gpt g QP

$p/5go/$ p/ $~

~

~4 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION CN CLARION SMET m.c. te.

PL5-993o asv. ra.

as@'~ a:~

oecvenm ~

mm~~~ am'm~~

I OO etP t.]l/g KUALUh7700 Op

Qpc,

) gag g Lo~

Lp~g C

STRE'S PV LU od FuEL PooL cooLlvcr GILcUL47iod ~ p (pc~ - p)po)

PZPZNO STRESS SUlQIART CHECK MID COVER SHEET ASME SECT ZIZZ CL'kSSES 2

fc 3 JOB lIOo PLhlIT DESZON ONXJP STSTEM tUEL POOL CON~ PUMPS DZSCHh1NE LINE ChLC lIO ABR 2970 ZSO NO DESION CONDITION LOCATZCN MM(ZNNI MJARABLE CCNPUTED OF MAXZMilM COMPUTED STlESS LEVEL END ELEMElIT STRESS(

PSZ)

(

PSZ)

MJANRHLE SUSTAZllED LOADS EQN. 8 70B 126 SH 2846 15000 0 190 OCCASICKhL LOADS EQN 9

OCCASIIXIAL LOhDS Egl. 9 THEINAL EXPANSZON EQN 10 70B 126 70B 126 55 B 55 B 55 M 3190 3227 5830 1~8 SH 27000 2.4 SH 36000 22500

0. 118 0 090 0+ 259 REFERENCE ChZAKLhTZONSc IIEZOHT lh/7 0]

SEISMIC;INERTIA PORTION THERMAL EXP ~g p ~

SEISMIC-ANCRSt NWEMENT DTNhMIC g Pl 9Cjf +t gfg g~ g Lp

I

ENCLOSURE 4

~

December 21, 1993 TO:

FROM:

Joseph Shea James Kenny FSAR CHANCE FOR SBGT INLET AIR TEMPERATURE Attached is the Licensing group's record on the change from 180'F to 125'F for the inlet to the Standby Gas Treatment System.

This change is consistent with Bechtel's calculation for the SGTS charcoal filters which Steve Jones reviewed in our office.

This'inlet temperature was used to size the SGTS heaters.

It is my understanding the SGTS are capable of handling the 180'F inlet and function in this

,environment.

Attachment

f 'I

~4 r

~r

~

rr ~

c

~4

)

~

4

~'rf

'4 4

r 4

1 ~

C 1'

~

44 r

'l ~

4,

',4 1

4 pi~

fr 4 4 4

a

\\

~382307 I 026 FSAR CHANGE RE ST FORM t

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION ER 100450 FILE 841-1 I.

ORIG INATION Originating Group or Section Class of Change:

Technical Corr ti n Portions of FSAR Affected N

Commi tment Description of Change or Deviation Suggested Disposition Justification for Change Technical Specification Change Required Yes Submitted by Re Iieved 4y Revieved by (Originator)

(Section or Group Supv..)

(Cost Area Head)

Date Date Date II.

APPROVAL Senior Licensing Specialist Manager-Nuclear Lic.

(.

V.P.-Nuclear Operations

+'d V.P.-E&C - Nuclear Date ~8'P7/ZR Date Date Date FOR LICENSING GROUP USE ONLY Date Ret'd

'uned.

FSAR Change Annual FSAR Update Suhndtted ln Rev.

Request Re)ected for the folloving reason:

Senior Licensing Specialist Manager - Nuclear Licensing Date Date

8 g

8 U

7 l

0 2

b Date FSAR CHANGE NOTICE SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION "

6

'OB N0 8858 Engineering Group Referenced Sections of FSAR:

Originator Change Required u

m ig+u r~4c p~v~ Q'

\\to f i~5' Referenced Design or Equipment Specifications, or Drawings:

PP - Q-lg+//(5'~

Justification:

~~

c ~~a 9 0-'M-I5'y/'l54- ~~ +Q I"~ (

p Submitted Reviewed by (Nuc L si ngr)

~, 529r4 (Grou pervisor)

~

date ~"

INTERFACING DISCIPLINE REVIEW (Delete those not required) rch Electri Ciw nical gn Ar.proved by (P

roject Eng>neer aaaa oA 0 I4/aoI

~ )

DISTRIBUTION Originating Group 2.

Nuc Licensing Engr 3.

PP&L~~

4.

PQAE 5.

LQAE-SFHO 6.

GE 7.

W. Barberich (Original)

9823 UI'>IL0270

.. <<b86c!

7 SSES"FS:R o

<~9 P a)

Each train is sixed d specified for treating incoming air-steam mixture at and containing fission products and incoming particulates equivalent to 1.0 volume percent per day of the fission products available in the Rev.

25, 7/81

PPaL aZVIZW Or DOCmZZrS Rev. exing Functional Units (Category):

J

(/)

(l)()

2.

Date Sent:

(l)

(

)

( )

Return To/Location/Date E(3

(

~(()()

3.

Pert'nent RevieM Information:

4.

Document Originator:

5.

Safety Related ftStfE 6,

Document Status:

Prelim"Fatal ev 7.

References Attached:

Pire Prot.

File No.

Other Comment 10.

Resolution Submitted Date Resolved Date

)R?f NDI-QA-8.1.3.A

~

Page of

p>.boa((n PPSL 'REVIEV OF DOCUHEHTS Reviewing Functional Units (Category):

(/)

(f)()

Date Sent:

(I)

(

)()

Return To/Location/Date 3.

Pertinent Reviev information:

4e Document Originator:

5.

S fatyeRelated ASlK 6.

Document Status:

Prelim-FQul ev'3 Pire Prot.

Pile No.

Other 7.

References Attached:

8.

Comment 10.

Resolution 9.

Submitte z/r]yr<

Date Resolved Date FORM NDI-QA-8.1.3.A

~

Page of

0

Reviewing Punc-ional Unit g

g Z

g U j' 0

2 7

cument Under Review 8.,

Comment 10.

Resolution

.".0 5 !iDI-(A-8.1. 3. A Page of

X>~

'C.

~

~'

cdo ionv r

~

oa Remewing Functional Units (Category):

A (t):

-.(I)

(t)

()

(/)

(

).

2.

Date Sent:

Re rn o

cation ate 3.

Pertinent Reviev Information:

4.~ Document Originator:

5.

Sat>>7 R>1st>d 6.

Document Status:

Prelim Fhhal v

7.

References Attached:

Coaxaent Fire Prot File No.

10.

Resolution I

Q2 g,g ~ Q -gc&h'~

.j>

&~ill Il,)

~o A~> "

N~iA 05'~-~z +f~

8'a 2 H v'm oM~g

~(cA.> 'e

/

C7p~~ 8~i) cp i'~. fb o-i<'>Mr" c

~

/, ~

r>,s Y Q ra~<>>rQ eh>

c i"

)gl17~ Q f'd4~

0

/CHjPOl 1

L ';)

g<~~go> o Il io c"

~-g-~ P

~4~ r~g>> r'~~J "

c.r~

'+i~>>

C 4j Jf g fJ

'~ly 4rrr ~

/oS'4 red

,Y( W.l ~~~" + i +i-p r A

.w g scrS P<)r.jji~'

d4~~4

+ c logic rsvp.t cgi4ew e'4~rcou( rS~4rs)eg.

rp lg~.gi>>

c a SCr w>>, Ws'rtF"c~

I

+~~@7 I

g~/C Submitte~d FOR NDI-(A-8.1.3.A ate solved I

Dae

>>p Page

'"of 40-:

4 ~

a

~ '-

823u 7

t 0270

~

~ a

~ al ~

"PPSI REVIZV OF DOCUMENTS PM" Remedying Functional Units (Category):

h

~

(/)

(l)()

(I)

(

)()

2.

Date Sent:

Return To/Location/Date 3.

Pertinent Review Information:

4.

Document Originator:

PPGL 5.

Saf tyeRelated 6.

Document S tatus:

Prelim-FQul ev 7.

References Attached:

8.

Comment Fire Pret.

Pile No.

10.

Resolution Other mitted

r. A I~

ate Resolved Date FORM NDI-gA-8.'3.A Page of

~If',

N.

r

~ ~

8k"REVXEMWP-g: 5&L>iL'

~ a a

~

I ~

I

'eo.'a p

'je '<<e

.II~

a Re~eving Functional Units (Category):

(I)

(()

0

()

... (l)()()

~

'T I ~

a (j

" --</m

()()

2.

Date ent:

Pertinent Reviev Information:

Return To Location Date f

4a 5.

6.

7.

PAL Document Originator:

dafet Related ANNE a

Doc nt Status:

Prel+-FQtal ev I

I Refer aces Attached:

e Prot.

File No.

Other 8.

Comment ra<ac d/r w/Re.

I

~

10.

Re olution

~ a

, R<eevpy.

JUAZ6

]9'aouhfhhtT GOI

',:. g@g@

ffPma 4:

e

~ ~

J1 r

> ~

a ri

,'Y.

1 ubmitted FORM NDI-gA-8.1.3.A 11.

.tD te Re olved Date Page,'.. of ~:;-it";".

'a'.oR

~+

. I C.

a R KP'"':..., a

~a, Renewing Functional Units (Category):

~ Q

~ sl \\at7Q 4f)()()

2.

Date Sent:

Return To/Location/Date I

3.

Pertinent Review Information:

I R ECElVEg 5.

I 6.

I Document Originator:,

Raiety Related RRRR Document S tatus:

Prelim-Fhhal v

References Attached:

ydk Pzot ydle Ho.

18m Other~

Hi'.';'.

~

Comment 10.

Res lntion Cw

"':>Yt'+Gloat:

~ a Q~~ eyaf 7p a 'C

~$

~,

~:5

,. t I

a a

p I

I J Jta"

~a

~f iaaaJ rJO g.

ae e'l~H)(

o 4a ubmitted FORM NDI-gA-8.1.3.A Reso ved i

~

)c~

ate

, P.j Page of

'30i

6. 6 PASSION PRQggCT ggHQV/Ji QND CQ~lggQJg S$ gT~~RS 6

S.

1 g NGT 8 QEREQ Qhf~g fghgURg QESQQ fI/QER SXS'FEHS

6. ~,1.

1 St.andh)(

Gas Tggagmr g~

Systom gS.">>1'Sg

6. 5, 1. 1.

1 D~qign Bases The SGTS is de" iqned to accomplish the follovinq saf:..tr rcl..~ ted nhgect ive.:

Exhaust sufficient filtered air from the rosctor huildinq to maintain a neqative pressure oF about 0.75 in.

vq in the af fected volumes fol]nvinq secondary cont~ inmcnt isolation (see Subito.ction 9.4.2 fo th~

socondarv containment isolation siqnals) for tho follovinq desiqn basi" events:

(1) soen'.

fuel handlinq accident, in the refuelinz floor a:Qa (2)

LOCA Pilt.ir the exhausted air to remove radioactive oarticnlates and both radioactire and nonradioactive fnrms'of iodine to limit the offsite dose.t1 the q j i 4 e lin s o f 10CPR100.

c)

Pi ltor and exhaust discharqe from thc aain

.steam iso la tion va lve lea k con trol s y.-t ea Nnnss fewer rolated obgoctives For desiqn of the sciTs are as fol lo v.,:

a)

Pi}tor and exhaust ~ir from thc primary containment for pur qinq and ven

..i la'. inq b)

Pil ter and o.xhaust discharqe from the HECT harnmotric condenser

=)

Pilter and exhaust from the primary cont~inment pr~ssure reli~f line 0)

Pilter and exhaust nitroqoq from the primary conte inment for ni t".oqen purqinq

>he desiqn bases employed for sizinq the fil,.mrs, fans<

end associa+od ductvorh a=e a. follovs:

Rev.

29, 3/82 6 5-1

ggf, "9i-gn+'p g S'

a)"

Ra t rai is s~ized d specified for'tdo'it'iraq incoainq air~~ mixture a<<, gpoP, and containinq fission prof)ucts and inromitiq particulates equivalent

<<o 1.0 volume perce~t 55.r Ray of the fission products available in tPe-o'leary containment as dete" mined in accordance Reaulatory Guifle

1. 3 and 7ZD-1QBQQ.

h)

Sy tern capacity

'.o match the maximum ai" flow:ate reauired for the primary containment purqe.

c) 7he system capacity to be aa!.nt~ined vith all filt.rs fully loaded tdirtv).

0)

Po HEPA filters, maximum free velocity not to excee:)

')00 f pm, vith maximum air flov resistance of 1 in.

va when clean and 3 in.

vq vhen dirty, an%

minimum efficiency of 99.97 percent by DOP 'est method.

to-. prefil'.e:s, maximum face velocity not to exceed 300 fpmn with maximum airflov resistance of 0.~ in.

wq vhen clean, and 1 ~ 0 in.

vq vhen flirty.

A.-.f;ociateP ductwork is desiqnef) using the ezaal friction m.thod at a rate of approximately

.06 in. vz/100 ft. ~

Charcoal adsorber is rated for 99 percent trappi of "adioactive iodine as elemental iodine (Ig), and 99 percent trappinq of radioactive iof)ine as a~thy) oui/e (cH l) when passinq throuqh cha"coal at 70 nero. t cnl)vive honfdfty nnrl 25oc.

>ach equipment train contains the smoun<<of ch~"coal required to absorb the inven.ory of fissiun products loakina from the primary containment, based on a

one uni <<LOCA.

acedia coolinq arranqement for each SGTS train is f)esiqned

<<o remove heat qenerated by fission p "odu.".t de"av on the HEPA filters and charcoal adso."bere du=inq shutdown of the train.

5)

P~lative humidity at charcoal adsorber is limitod to maximum of 70 percent by removinq moisture ent rained in thy ai. stream and by preheatinq

'.he sir.

Failure of any component of the filtration train, as-uminq lo"s of offsi te pover, cannot impair the ability of the svstea to oo focn fto nvfo.v fonc fons 7he system remains intact and functional in the event of a Safe Shutdown Fa

+hauake (SS>).

Rev.

29, 3/82 6 '5-2

I'

Farh of >he t vn redundant SGTs

.rai r limine.or.

an electric air heater, hank". of HEPh filters,

>>p"tream and

~>l~>orhor, and a vert ical 8 in.

deep f i.-c 4~ ~ oc. ion temperature s nsors, nrnt ~c+ inn, and assoriat ed dz mpcrs, ron'rnl=.

The airflnv diaqraa for The instruments and control.

. h~

-..vst cm desiqn parameters ate pr ns consists of a mi~t a hank of prefilt~rs, tvo dovnstream of charco~ l charroal cdsorber bod vith vate" spray sy-tern for fit ~

duct s, inst rumen~ s, hand the SGTS i.

"..hovn on ~iq ir e s are shown on Fiaurr 9.'1-9.

ovid~ i in Table 6.'5-1.

~h> vo".k,

. oui pmcnt and mate: 'ls conform tn

=h

. applic ihle r~nuir>>ments and rernamendztions of the qui4es,

codes,

~>>d t ~nhards listed in Section

3. 2.

".omr 1 i~nc~ nf t).~ system desiqn vith Raqulatory

""uido 1.52, is Ae~c.- ibad in

>ection

3. 13.

K leo

.-.,ee Table 6.5-2.

Fact': <!>>n 1> nt SGTS train has a controllable capacity 3, 00".

F m

~

10, 500 c fm, and each is capable of treating require l amn>>nt nf zi" f 'om both Unit 1

and Unit 2 reactor building vnl>>m><'.

(sce Suhsction 6.S. 3).

Comnnn~nts for each S >TS are'es inner as oxplainod in the

. ollovinq paragraphs.

Thn

~ z n v~r.'nrma nce a nd mot or sel~'tion is ha -.ed on

. he maxim>> n air densi+v and

+he maximum system pressure drop, that is, 70 P

'.erne.-~t>>re at he fan (55aF air at the inlet of th~

SGTS train ales aooroximatcly 15op constant t.mporature pick in acrnss h~a~ c';>,

and

+he pressure drop i7 based on maximum pressure

".".ons a eros'.-'i=

. y filt>rs.

. hc charcoal adsorher i..

a qesketless, v tded seam typo, fill~0 Mi'h YT, imn-.oqnated coronut shell charcoal.

Tnc hxnk hold.",

a

+o'.al of ~oproximately 6,920 lb of charcoal of 28 lb/f-.'ens'ty, hav inc ar lani tinn tcmper~ture of nnt less than 3')Oo"..

Tho cbzrroa l ad~nrber i~ designed for a

maximum foaling raoaritv of

2. 5 ma of tots l iodine (radioactive plus stable) mer qram of ac ive charcnal.

six

>vs+ ranistr rs are provided for each adsorber.

The.-~

c~niste" s.".on!a'

+he same death of the

.-.arne cha. roal

.ha'. 's in

>>~~rh~r.

The canistors are

mounted, so

.ha-.

a owrallel flov net h i s c"~at d

be+ veen c'ach canistor ant th > adsorb.'r.

t'o-i~dica llv nnn of

~ he canisters is -.emove6 and labors.~rv tc"..~oh o v~rifv thc adsorbent ef ficien.".y.

hi-.> y hv fif> y in. acco.ss doors into each filt~r comportment orovido1 in

>he cquipmest train housing.

The Boors.have

. ~n-.nor~at portholes to allov inspection o~ components vithout viol~ tinq the t.".ain inteqrity Rev.

29, 3/82 6 ~ ~-3

T~i hou.. inq is of. all veldcd construction.

(:ws t iah+ interior liqhts vith external Liqht svitch. s in' i x'>>-.o access are provided hetveen all train fil"e banks o

'neil i t ~ ~e inspection,

testinq, and replacement of rnaponont s.

Fit+or ho>>sinqs, includinq vater draini, are in accordance

<<ith r ocnm mensa t ions of Section

4. 3 of Ref

6. 5-1.

~

Duct<<ork is designed'n accordance vith recnaaend~tions nF soc ion 2

8 of Reference 6 S-1, except for sheet aotal gnqo; aro sLinh> lv loss, and the round duc> reinforceaonts.

The I

~)c vnrk, hove vc r, has been seisa ical ly quali fied hy ana l.vs i ~

and o"-.t inq oF duct spociaens.

">>'4nor makeup air 'uppleaents lov

. xhaust ai=flnv rat~". fo; ao=t

~f tho SCTS OperatiOnal mOdeS tn SatiSfV the SGTS Fan minim>>a

~i: f1 o<<:eauirement, vhich is approxiaat.l.y 1000 cfa.

The.

nut~nor makoup air is also used, at a rate of 3000 c~m, For r:hwrcnal bed cool'inq af te.

a cha" coal pro-ignition t.mp~rwtnro is det ec mi~'liminator is designed to prev..nt, blinding of

.he

.'IEI A

~ilte"

<<ho.n npe atod at 200oF vith steaa-air aix+ure nontaininq qal nF <<a.er droplets actually entrained in tho ai;strnaa per

~000 cpm ~irflnv.

The e loc:. ic h ow t er educe" t he z clat ive humHi t y o f

'. he en t er ing a ir to b lov

'10 oercent for charcoal adsorber operation, by m~in aininq z cnnstan,.

teape".+ture rise erron" the he~'or.

An anal vsis oF heater capabilities for ~ious enterinq saturated ai" cond i'ions "anginq From 5>oF

~o 180 v ~ eld-a po.~k hearing r auiremont nf 180,000 Btu/hr, at aax ua 10,500 cfm zirflo<<.

In

~dpi" 'inn, S<,400 Otu/hr heat loss is calcnla.ed From.thr se".t ion

~f S

TS hnu"-.inq hetveen

+ho heather and

+he charcoal beR.

nv~rall

.i aui re% canaci~v is 23S,400 Otu/ht.

A

'10 kd heater.is prov: 5ed.

>ho cha:coal.

t ed is provided vith an intoqral va or =.orav svstea cnnnoc. rd tn the station fire protection

~ystea.

A deluqe valve

,~rd ceismic Category I hackup valve ar~ aount.d in m ries adiac~n n the charcoal adsorher.

Th backup valve i." provident

+o rrevo>>'. rharcnal flooding if the del'ug~ valve fails in zn open nosi'ion.

Fire protection for the SGTS filte= train~ is al o

'. i scu.sod in Suhsoc~ ion 9.5 1.

A nnn.in>>n>>s tvpe theraister is provided on the inlo~

and o>>tarot

~ f

'. ho ch~ rcoa l bed.

<ho Si:T".

-" ac tun ted ei-h.r

~>> tnaaP ical ly

("-.a fetv r ala'. ed

~ ide),

menus ll v (nonsafoty rolatod mode).

Th~ wutoaa+ic a" taction is n-. iai na e1 b v the rr a ctn: buildinq isolation..iqnal, nr hv do ec ion of pre-ignition to.aperat u=e in the charcnal adsorher Rev.

29, 3/82

6. 5-4

C I

ENCLOSURE 5

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page i~

TABLE OF CONTENTS l.

Introduction 2.

Assumptions 3.

Methodology 4.

Analysis

4. I Evaluation of Initiating Events 4.2 Case Selection 4.3 Input Information 5.

Results Summary 6.

Conclusions and Discussion 7.

References Figures Appendix A Appendix B

Appendix C

Appendix 0 Appendix E

Sample Input and Output Block Diagrams and Components Support System Data Source Details of Result Estimate of Fuel Pool Boiling Probability for Licensing Basis Case

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Paae~

1.

Introduction.

The Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleaning (FPCC)

System cools the fuel storage pool water by transferring the decay heat of the irradiated fuel through heat exchangers to the service water system.

Water clarity and quality in the fuel storage pools, transfer canals, reactor wells, dryer-separator

pools, and shipping cask pit are maintained by filtering and demineralizing.

The FPCC system consists of fuel pool cooling pumps, heat exchangers, skimmer surge tanks, filter demineralizers, associated piping, valves, and instrumentation.

A simplified diagram of this system is shown in Figure 1.

The FPCC system is designed to maintain the fuel pool water temperature below 125'F at a Maximum Normal Heat Load (MNHL).

The HNHL is based upon filling the pool with 2840 fuel assemblies from normal refueling discharges and transferred to the fuel pool within 160 hours0.00185 days 0.0444 hours 2.645503e-4 weeks 6.088e-5 months after shutdown (Ref. 1).

For the Emergency Heat Load (EHL) condition, the RHR system is available for fuel pool cooling.

The RHR cooling system using one pump and one heat exchanger will maintain the fuel pool water temperature at or below 125'F with or without assistance from the FPCC system.

The EHL is defined as a full core offload 250 hours0.00289 days 0.0694 hours 4.133598e-4 weeks 9.5125e-5 months after a

shutdown following a typical fuel cycle discharge schedule.

The purpose of this calculation is to estimate the probability of fuel pool boiling in a loss of fuel pool cooling event.

The loss of fuel pool cooling event is initiated by postulated accidents (initiating events) at Susquehanna SES.

All initiating events listed in Susquehanna IPE (Ref. 2) were evaluated to identify those which will cause loss of fuel pool cooling.

For each identified initiating event, the probability of fuel pool boiling was calculated using the PRA methodology presented in Ref. 2.

The probability of fuel pool boiling for licensing basis case was also estimated.

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page 3

Assumptions 2.1

,The fuel pool in Unit 1 is isolated.

2.2 2.3 Mhen water temperature in fuel pool reaches 200'F, pool boiling is imminent.

The decay heat added to the fuel pool from the spent fuel is 10.24 HBtu/hr (Ref. 3).

2.4 During outage all three fuel pool cooling pumps are needed.

Two pumps are required for normal plant operation.

2.5 2.6 The FPCC system components and piping in Unit 1 can be affected by the hydrodynamic loads of a large break LOCA in Unit 2.

The confidence level for the FPCC system to remain operable after a large break LOCA is 80K (Ref. 21).

2.7 Only one Division of RHR can be used for fuel pool cooling assist.

Either Pump A or Pump C of RHR Division I can be used in fuel pool cooling assist mode.

(See Paragraph 6.5).

2.8 The ECCS keepfill system is not required to start the RHR system.

2.9 During the mission time of a loss of fuel pool cooling event, the Filter Demineralizers are not required and fuel pool cooling pump flush is not necessary.

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page~

Nethodol ority The PRA methodology presented in Susquehanna IPE (Ref. 2) was used in this calculation.

This methodology consists of the following steps:

(I)

Identify a set of initiating events.

The initiating events used in this calculation are loss of offsite power (LOOP), large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA), LOCA with LOCA induced

LOOP, and station blackout (SBO).

(2)

Establish the success criterion.

For a loss of fuel pool cooling

event, the success criterion is to maintain fuel pool water temperature below 200'F.

(3)

Identify mitigating functions, in terms of plant equipment and operator actions, which are used to satisfy the success criterion in response to each initiating event.

(4)

Construct the logical relationships between each initiator and those specific mitigating functions whose failure results in propagatin'g the accident sequence.

(5)

Develop the logical relationships between primary mitigating functions and the support systems on which they rely.

(6)

Based upon the success criterion established, define a set of plant damage states which accident sequences will be grouped into.

The plant damage states in this calculation are the thresholds of fuel pool water temperature.

For accident sequence quantification, plant-specific data was used, whenever it was available.

When plant-specific data was not available, generic data was used.

After complete input information was gathered, the in-house Probabilistic Risk Assessment Code (PRAC) was used to perform the computation.

The output of this calculation is the probability of fuel pool water temperature reaching certain threshold.

L

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page 5

Analysis

4. 1 Evaluation of Initiating Events Among all the initiating events presented in Ref. 2, seven of them may affect the operation of FPCC system in addition to the seismic event.

A discussion on whether a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) analysis needs to be performed for each of these initiators follows.

4.1.1 Seismic Event In Appendix 9A of Ref. 4, it was assumed that a seismic event causes the loss of cooling to spent fuel pools in both units and results in fuel pool boiling. It was concluded that offsite dose resulting from fuel pool boiling is well below the allowed limits.

Since the effects of this initiating event has been studied in Ref.

4, no PRA analysis is needed.

4.1.2 Loss of 125V DC Bus Event The 125V DC bus provides power to annunciators in the control room for the FPCC system.

During a loss of fuel pool cooling event, operators will constantly monitor indications on Fuel Pool Cooling Control Panel 1C206 and/or 2C206 (Ref. 5).

The power source for these panels is the 208/120V Instrument AC Distribution Panel IY219 (Ref. 6).

Therefore, the FPCC system will remain operable with the loss of 125V DC bus.

Thus, PRA analysis was not performed for this initiator.

4. 1.3 Loss of Offsite Power Event The power for operating fuel pool cooling pumps is from 480V Load Center Buses

B250, B260, and B270 (Ref. 6).

The 13.8 KV buses supply power to these load centers (Ref. 7).

During a loss of offsite power (LOOP) event, all 13.8 KV buses are lost.

Therefore, LOOP results in loss of fuel pool cooling pumps.

Because LOOP also results in loss of service water pumps (Ref. 2), the fuel pool cooling heat exchangers become inoperable.

Since LOOP will cause the loss of normal fuel pool cooling, a

PRA analysis for this initiating event is required.

4.1.4 LOCA Event During a LOCA event, the availability of the normal Fuel Pool Cooling System will depend upon the extent hydraulic loads affect the piping and components in the FPCC system.

Because a

LOCA event may result in loss of fuel pool

cooling, a

PRA analysis was performed for this initiator.

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page 4.1.5 Loss of Instrument Air Event There are valves in the fuel pool filter demineralizer system operated by instrument air.

The filter demineralizers will be inoperable upon loss of instrument air.

However, the flow discharged from fuel pool cooling pumps can bypass the filter demineralizers (Ref. 3).

So a

loss of instrument air event will not lead to loss of fuel pool cooling.

Hence, no PRA analysis is needed for this initiating event.

4.1.6 Station Blackout Event This initiating event is worse than LOOP for fuel pool cooling because a station blackout (SBO) event causes the RHR system inoperable in addition to loss of normal fuel pool cooling system.

The RHR fuel pool cooling assist mode will not be available until the diesel source is recovered.

A PRA analysis was performed for this initiator.

4.1.7 Loss of 4160V AC Bus Event The 208/120V Instrument AC Distribution Panel IY219 provides power for instrument and control of the FPCC system.

The power source for this distribution panel is either the ESS-4.16KV Bus 1A201 or Bus lA203 (Ref. 8).

Loss of both ESS busses may occur if both busses fail on their own or the loss of diesel sources DG 501A and DG501C takes place during a

LOOP event.

A PRA analysis for this event can be covered by the analysis for SBO event.

4.1.8 LOCA/LOOP Event When the LOCA event occurs and the reactor is successfully

shutdown, there is the possibility that the LOCA (with scram) could cause a grid instability and a

LOOP to occur.

A PRA analysis was performed because it is part of the Susquehanna design basis.

Based on the above discussions, it was concluded that PRA analyses are required for four initiating events, i.e.,

LOOP, LOCA, LOCA/LOOP, and SBO.

4.2 Case Selection Among the four initiating events identified in Section 4.1, the frequency of LOOP is orders of magnitude higher than other three initiators.

Therefore, many more cases 'initiated by LOOP were analyzed than by other initiating events.

Because the total time failures are to be considered during power operation is much longer than that during refueling operation, they must be treated separately.

In order to facilitate collection of plant specific

data, the most recent complete fuel cycle between Unit 1 fifth and

SA-TSv-001, Rev.

0 Page 7

4.3 sixth refueling outages was selected for cases of normal operation condition.

The Unit 1 fifth refueling outage was chosen for cases of outage condition.

A brief description of each analyzed case is given below.

Case 1 -

LOOP during normal operation of fuel cycle after Ul-5th refueling outage with recovery of LOOP and diesel generators.

Valves HV-11210A and HV-11215A (Support System No. 21) and Valve F048A (Support System No. 59) can be manually operated.

Case. 1.1 - Based on Case 1, with the maintenance hours for valve 151060 (from FPCC system to RHR system) and valve 153071A (fuel pool fill check valve from RHR line) reduced to zero.

Case 1.2 -

Similar to Case 1, except that valves F048A (RHR heat exchanger bypass valve),

HV-11210A (heat exchanger inlet valve for RHRSN),

and HV-11215A (heat exchanger cooling flow outlet valve) can not be manually operated.

Case 2 -

LOOP during Unit 1 fifth refueling outage.

Case 2.1 -

Similar to Case 2, except valves F048A, HV-11210A, and HV-11215A can not be manually-operated.

Case 3 -

LOCA during normal operation of fuel cycle after Unit 1

fifth refueling outage with recovery of LOOP and diesel generators.

Case 4 - LOCA in Unit 2 during Unit 1 fifth refueling outage with recovery of LOOP and diesel generators.

Case 5 - LOCA/LOOP during normal operation of fuel cycle after Unit 1 fifth refueling outage with recovery of LOOP and diesel generators.

Case 6 - Station Blackout during normal operation of fuel cycle following Unit 1 fifth refueling outage with recovery of LOOP and diesel generators.

Input Information The Input data listing of Case 1 is presented in Appendix A as a

sample.

The input listings of all other cases are similar except some minor changes.

These changes will be discussed along with the discussion of the individual input control type data.

The discussions of input control type data presented below follow the path of input information development instead of the control type number sequence.

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page Contrql Type 2 The mission time is taken to be 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months , because the results in Ref.

3 indicate that for an isolated fuel pool the water temperature will exceed 200'F from 110'F in approximately 29 hours3.356481e-4 days 0.00806 hours 4.794974e-5 weeks 1.10345e-5 months upon loss of fuel pool cooling.

The total time failures are to be considered (TFACT) is 11376 hours (474 days) for the fuel cycle after Unit 1 fifth outage (Ref. 9).

For Cases 2,

2A and 4, TFACT is 1584 hours0.0183 days 0.44 hours 0.00262 weeks 6.02712e-4 months (66 days) for the fifth refueling outage of Unit 1 (Ref. 9).

Control Type 9 and 23 Input data in these two control types describes the plant state partition event tree, which is shown in Figure 2.

Control Type 10 and 27 Input data in these two control types describes two plant damage state disposition event trees shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4.

Control Type 5 The input data for two functional fault trees, which are presented in Figure 5 and Figure 6, is provided in this control type.

The block diagrams in Appendix 8 were constructed for all top events in event trees.

Then, the functional fault trees were developed.

Control Type 7 All frontline systems in the fault trees and the failure probability of each system are presented in this control type.

According to Assumption 2.6, the failure probability of Pipe Failure Switch (PIPES) is 0.2.

Control Type 4 The frontline system vs. support system dependency matrix was constructed using information in Appendix 8 and Ref. 2.

Control Type 3 The support system versus support system dependenty matrix was developed using information in References 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 15.

In all cases, except Cases 1.2 and 2.1, Support System No. 21 (Valves HV-11210A and HV-11215A) and Support System No. 59 (Valve F048A) do not depend on Support System No. 3 (18237),

because these valves are considered to be manually operable during a loss of fuel pool cooling event.

For all LOOP related cases the 4160V buses depend on DC power to operate the breakers.

This dependency is not needed in Cases 3 and 4.

SA-TSY-OQ1, Rev.

p Page Control Type 8 Support system related input data is in this control type.

A list of all support systems input data and detailed discussion are given in Appendix C.

Control Type 11 The initiating event frequency of LOOP {1,

) is

.071 per cycle (10957 hrs)

(Ref. 2).

Because the length of,the fuel cycle following Unit 1 fifth refueling outage is 11376 hours, lL~

.071 x 11376/10957

.074 for Cases 1, lA and 1.1.

The length of the fifth refueling outage fs 1584 hours0.0183 days 0.44 hours 0.00262 weeks 6.02712e-4 months .

Thus, during this refueling outage, l,~

.071 x 1584/10957

.01 for cases 2 and 2.1.

For the input data of l~ the highest frequency, 1.7 x 10

/15

months, among cases of large break LOCA in reactor recirculation system was chosen (Ref. 2) l,~

1.7 x 10 x 11376/10957 1.8 x 10 (Case 3) l,~

1.7 x 10 x 1584/10957 2.5 x 10 (Case 4)

The probability of LOOP caused by a LOCA event is 1 x 10 s/demand (Ref. 2).

For Case 5

l~~~~

1.8 x 10 x

1 x 10 1.8 x 10 The initiating event frequency of SBO given in Ref.

2 is 1.63 x

10 /cycle.

For Case 6

1

~ 1.63 x 10 x 11376/10957

~ 1.7 x 10 "

Control Type 28 The frontline system No. 20 LOCA switch is affected by the initiating event for Cases 3, 4, and 5.

Control Type 22 The initiating events, LOOP (all case 1's and Case 2's) and LOCA/LOOP (Case 5), affect Support System No. 36 (Offsite Power).

The initiating event, SBO (Case 6), affects Support System Ko. 36 (Offsite Power),

No. 40, 41, 42, and 43 (Diesel Generators).

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page ~o Control Type 1Z The support systems eligible for recovery are No. 36 (Offsite Power),

No. 40, 41, 42, and 43 (Diesel Generators) for all cases.

Control. Type I3 There are two recovery data tables in this control type.

The first table is for offsite power and the second for diesel generators (Ref. 2) ~

Control Type l4 The first recovery table is to be used for support system No. 36.

The second recovery table is to be used for support systems No.

40, 41, 42, and 43.

0

SA-SY-001, Rev.

0

>598 II 5.

Results S~ry The results of PRAC computer runs are summarized below.

Case No.

Description Probabflit LOOP durfng normal operation with recovery of LOOP 9.4 x 10 ~

and diesel generators, heat exchanger valves may be manuall o crated.

1.1 LOOP during normal operation, support systea maintenance hours reduced.

5.3 x 10 1.2 LOOP during normal operation, heat exchanger valves 3.5 x 10

'a not be manuall o crated.

LOOP during refueling outage with recovery of LOOP 2.8 x 10 and diesel generators, heat exchanger valves may be manuall o crated.

2.1 LOOP during refueling outage, heat exchanger valves 1.6 x 10 ma not be manuall o crated.

LOCA durfn normal o eratfon.

LOCA durin refuel fn outa c.

LOCA LOOP durfn normal o eration.

Station Blackout durin normal o eratfon 1.1 x 10 3.5 x 10'.9 x 10 "

1.0 x 10'ased on the ¹1 Support State information listed in Appendix D, the dominant cause of failure for each case was assessed as follows.

Case 1 - The failure frequency of Support System RHRFPIV, which is the fuel pool fill lines from RHR system, contributes 23% of the support state failure frequency.

The high failure frequency of RHRFPIV is caused by the long maintenance time of 230 hours0.00266 days 0.0639 hours 3.80291e-4 weeks 8.7515e-5 months during the fuel cycle following Unit 1 fifth refueling outage.

Case 1.1 - The failure probability of Support System 2D61i, Unit 2 Channel A 125V DC power, accounts For 21% of the support state failure frequency.

Case 1.2 - The sum of the failure rates of Diesel Generator C and

1D633, Unft 1 Channel C 125V DC power, fs equal to 7t5 of the support state failure frequency.

Case 2 - The failure rate of Support System RSWXHI, Dfv. I RHR heat exchanger and RHR Service Water valves, contributes 20% of the support state failure frequency.

SA-SY-001,

~ev.

Page Case 2.1 - The sum of the failure frequencies of Oiesel Generator C and Support System RSQHXI accounts for 85% of the support state failure frequency.

Case 3 - The failure rate of Support System RHRFPIV contributes 55K of the support state failure frequency.

Case 4 - The failure probability of Support System RSXHXI is equal to 58K of the support state failure frequency.

Case 5 - The support states of this case are identical to those in case 1.

The failure rate of Support System RHRFPIV accounts for 23K of the support state failure frequency.

Case 6 - The dominant cause of failure is the loss of all AC pmer, onsite and offsite.

a SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page ~P 6.

Conclusions and Discussion Based on the results presented in Section 5, the following conclusions can be drawn:

6.1 6.2 6.3 The probability of fuel pool boiling is much higher in loss of fuel pool cooling events initiated by LOOP than in those initiated by LOCA, LOCA/LOOP, and station blackout.

The primary reason is that the initiating event frequency of LOOP is orders of magnitude higher than the other initiators.

Reduction in out of service hours, including maintenance hours, of

systems, equipment, and components needed for restoring fuel pool cooling will lower the probability of fuel pool boiling.

For

example, in Case 1 the maintenance hours of valve 151060 and check valve 153071A are 73 and 230, respectively.

In Case lA these two.

valves have not been taken out of service during the fuel cycle.

The probability of fuel pool boiling for Case 1A is 76K lower than for Case 1.

If motor operated valves F048A (RHR heat exchanger bypass valve),

HV-11210A (RHR heat exchanger cold side inlet valve),

and HV-11215A (heat exchanger outlet valve) can be manually operated during a loss of fuel pool cooling event, the probability will be reduced significantly.

This is the only reason that the probability of fuel pool boiling of Case 1 is only about 27% of that for Case 1.2.

The benefit of manually stroking a motor operated valve is that it eliminates the valve dependency on AC power and its associated support string.

In addition, the low failure rate of manual valve can be assigned to this particular valve.

6e4 6.5 By comparison with the frequency of plant damage states presented in the Susquehanna IPE report (Ref. 2), the frequency of fuel pool boiling during a

LOOP initiated loss of fuel pool cooling event is very high, i.e., in the order of 10 in a fuel cycle.

This may be attributed to the fact that for all the cases analyzed in Ref.

2, the plant is brought to safe state by cooling the reactor.

Many systems may be used for cooling the reactor.

In a loss of fuel pool cooling event only two systems, the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup Systems and the RHR system in Fuel Pool Cooling

Assist, can possibly be used to cool the fuel pool.

However, a

fuel pool boiling incident does not have the kind damaging consequence as does core damage accident.

In Appendix 9A of Ref. 4, it has been concluded that a fuel pool boiling incident is of little or no consequence with regard to radioactivity release.

In this calculation only one Division of RHR was considered available for fuel pool cooling assist (Assumption 2.7),

because the other Division must be reserved for reactor vessel injection and/or suppression pool cooling during power operation.

During refueling outage, there is good chance that one Division of RHR is out of service due to maintenance.

If the limited availability is included in the analysis, the probability of fuel pool boiling is expected to decrease slightly.

SA-SY-001, Rev.

0 Page References (1)

SY017 L-2, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup.

(2)

Susquehanna SES Individual Plant Evaluation.

(3)

Calculation SA-KWB-003, Best Estimate Model for Fuel Pool Thermal Response.

(4)

Susquehanna SES FSAR.

(5)

ON-235-001, Loss of Fuel Pool Cooling/Coolant Inventory.

(6)

PPSL Drawing No. D107316 (E167).

(7)

PP8L Drawing No. E107150 (E-l).

(8)

PPEL Drawing No.

E107159 (E-10).

(9)

Outage Date, from A. M. Yu, dated 5/6/93.

(10)

PPLL'rawing No. D107302 (E-153).

(11)

PPEL Drawing No.

E107157 (E-B).

(12)

PAID, M-'151.

(13)

PAID, M-153.

(14)

PALLID, M-109.

(15)

PS ID, M-110.

(16)

Susquehanna System Status File.

(17)

NUREG-0492, Fault Tree Handbook.

(18)

Calculation No. RA-B-NA-033, Analysis of Component Outage and Failure Data for Use in the SSES IPE.

(19)

NUREG/CR-1363, Rev.

1, Data Summaries of Licensee Event Reports of Valves at U.S. Coneercial Nuclear Power Plants, by C. F. Miller, lf. H. Hubble, et al.

(20)

PALLID, M-112.

(21)

Telephone Call Record, from Tien Yih to Chuck Dvorscak, 8/30/93.

~ ~

s

lHlTIATINO EVENT TOP EVLNTNO.

FlJEL IOOI.

COOl.1 NO PLANT STATE SEQ. DESCRlPOON FUELPOOL COOL1NG - I FtGURE 2 PLANTSTATE PARTmON EVENTTREE M C/l ED I

ID CII IlD Cl

TRANSFER FPC SE().

NO.

PLANT DAMAGE STATE SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION PLANT DAMAGE SThTE DESCRIPTION FIGURE 3 PLhNT DAMAGESThTE DISPOSITION EVENTTREE N I T<I IO F

No Cooling Transfer FPC RHR FPC RIIR,FPC RHR 2

I FPC RHR Seq.

No.

Plant Damage State Sequence Description Plant Damage State Description T(IIO F 110 FR<125 F 125 Fcj(150 F I 50 FW<200 F Boiling FIGURE 4 PLANTDAMAGESTATE DISPOSITION EVENTTREE N2 I;2 1,2,-1 1,2,1;2 1,2,1,2,-1 1,2,1,2,1;2 1,2,1,2,1,2,-1 1,2,1,2,1,2,1,-2 1,2,1,2,1,2,1,2 O C/l Ot El' lO ill I

~~ O X7fl O

SA-TSY-001, fey.

0 Page I9 (4iJ t ss.t4 Ftf'EtuJ-S'PC ~ca

~ls I DcA

+ %~MA Te ~l 4o Hot Cxe4 F(a Gent gysl

~

++

Ta H

4 Wack Wo fig l)o Hcavyg~

fr He fm tg ~4cra

>~I.

~ce w S '4~

AZc.

Wl&vREs 7-Nlc7/N(g. FAL/~7 vxEE FuR F~Ir.uRK oF PAL AeC. CH~HC SrSrZ W

001.

Rev.

0 Page Po RHR T-i)Yoni Cpulin

<'4 Fa't RN, M7~> cat~

&4k $~4 ISk'~ Su.ryg

~++k Lee L typal f~ To g~t &g gr iLo ~m $Q Tn feel, /ye(

go34aie jn

~t "faedC go g'X Fl~

gcWri QNJ Wee Fa,hy F~l, iso'fa~

ao rPQ Pt% PA pc a+

5 tt.

RW P~C F~'Ls l4d ~ar fae tuse Sa cr oa/ty ApB

%OfSAS

%OfAS

'FO03AS pc ~

u~l~~

fait 4+VcL y

C tL Fl&URE 6 FUCTlONAL FAULj 77KE F0R gHR FUEL PNQ CCeudc Ass!S7 FAlc.ups

Pl

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page APPENDIX A SNPLE INPUT AND OUTPUT The input data listing of Case 1, which is the base

case, is placed in this appendix as a sample.

The differences between the input data of Case 1 and that of other cases are described in Section l.3 and Appendix C.

The computer output of Case 1 is also included in this. appendix.

s D: QSTOREQCAN1. ZNP 9/2/93 Ul-5 RS STDRHR 1B216 1B237 F047A RHR A 1A201 ESW A ESW C 1D614 2D614 RHR C ESW B ESW D 1A202 1D624 1A203 1D634 2D634 RHRRFV 00 00 RHRFPZV

)

RSWHXI C)

RHRSW 1A RHRSW 2A 2A201 FPCitPV 3 mmmww~~~~~~&wmmum~

1 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 A)OP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATO 21.0E-8 30 ~ 0 8 ~ 0 11376 ~

YYYYYYYYY 8

65-0

0. 0

~ OE-4 73 ~ 00 11376 ~

SURGE TANK TO RHR DRAIN(BLOCK A) 0

2. 4E-7

0. 0 00 ~ 00 11376 ~

480V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B210 0

2. 4E-7

0. 0

00. 00 11376 ~

480V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B230 0

6 'E-8 0.0

00. 00 11376 DZV Z RHR HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VALVE 2

0 ~ 0 1 ~ OE 3

32 50

'1376

~

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL CHANNEL A EQUIPMENT 0

0.0 7 ~ 2E-6 00 ~ 00 11376 4160V ClOLNNEL 1A BUS(FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG A) 2 0 ~ 0 4 ~ 8E 3

116 00 11376 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER CHA?INEL EQUZPMiBiT 2

0.0

4. 8E-3

96. 50 11376 ~,

EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER CHANNEL C EQUZPMK2iT 024E70

~ 0

00. 00 11376 ~

125V DC CHANNEL 1A 0

1 2E-6 0.0

~00. 00 11376 2 ClDQiNEL A 125V DC POWER 0

0 1.0E-3 05 00 11376

'ESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL CHANNEL C EQUIPMENT 2

0.0 4.8E 3

48 00 11376.

EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER CHANNEL B EQUIPMENT 2

~

0 0

4. 8E-3 32 20 11376

~

EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER ClQQOKL D EQUIPMENT 0

0. 0

. 7. 2E-6

00. 00 11376.

4160V CHANNEL 1B BUS(FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG B) 024E700 00 00 11376 125V DC CHANNEL 1B 0

0.0

7. 2E-6

00. 00 11376 ~

4160V CHANNEL 1C BUS(FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG C) 0

2. 4E-7

0. 0 00 ~ 00 11376 125V DC CHANNEL 1C 0

1.2E-6 0 '

11376 125V DC CHANNEL 2C,U2 0

0 ~ 0

1. OE-4 00 ~ 00 11376 ~

RHR RETURN FLOW VALVE 151070(BLOCK E) 0 0

0 4 ~ 2E-4 230 0

11376 ~

RHR RETUiQi FUEL POOL INLET VALVES (BLOCKS F 4 G

0 0.0 4 2E-4 49 80 11376 DZV I RHR HEAT EXCHANGER AND RHRSW VALVES (BLOCK 2

0.0

3. 1E-3 6 ~ 50 11376 ~

. RHR SERVICE WATER CHANNEL 1A EQUIPMENT (BLOCK A) 2 0.0

3. 1E-3 13 ~ 20 11376.

SERVICE WATER CHANNEL 2A EQUIPMENT (BLOCK B) 0 ~ 0

7. 2E-6 08 ~ 50 11376 ~

4160V CHAlQKL 2A BUS (FED FROM OFFSZTE OR DG A) 0 0 ~ 0 2.0E-4 00.00 11376

'A-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page g 2.

Page 1

D:iSTOREiCAN1 ZNP 9/2/93 SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page 11376.

FUEL POOL COOLING RETURN FLOW VALVES(BLOCK H) 0 0 '

4 2E 4

00. 00 11376.

UEL POOL COOLING FUEL POOL ZNLET VALVES(BLOCKS 0.0 1.0E-4 00 F 00 11376.

FUEL POOL COOLING SURGE TANK DRAIN(BLOCK A) 0 0

0 3 'E-5 00.40 11376 FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP FLOW(BLOCKS E,F, AND G) 0 0

0

~ 6. OE 4

00. 00 11376

~

FUEL POOL COOLING HEAT EXCHANGE FLOW(BLOCKS B,C 0

0 ~ 0 OE-4

00. 00 11376

~

FUEL POOL COOLING HEAT EXCHANGERS (BLOCKS D,E,F) 2 0.0

6. 9E 5

00. 00 11376.

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (BLOCKS A,B, AND C) 0 0.0 1.0E-4 00 00 11376 CIRCULATION WATER RETURN FLOW(BLOCK G) 0 3 'E-6 0.0 00.00 11376 480V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B250 0

3 'E-6 0

0 00.00 11376

'80V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B260 0

3 'E-6 0.0 00 F 00 11376

'80V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B270 1

6 SE-6 0.0 00.00 11376

'FFSZTE POWER OA103 OR OA104 0

0 ~ 0

7. 2E-6 00 00 11376 4160V CHANNEL 1D BUS(FED FROM OFFSZTE OR DG D) 0 2 OE-6 0.0

00. 00 11376 ~

480V CHANNEL 1A LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1A201 0

2. OE-6

0. 0 00 ~ 00 11376 ~

80V CHANNEL 1C LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1A203

0. 0

2. 3E-2

60. 90 11376

~

DIESEL GENERATOR A WITH AUXILIARIES EXCEPT ESW 2,

0.0 2 ~ 3E-2 41 10 11376.

DIESEL GENERATOR B WITH AUXILIARIES EXCEPT ESW 2

0.0 9 'E-2 70.10 11376 DIESEL GENERATOR C WITH AUXILIARIES EXCEPT ESW 2

0.0 2 3E-2 48 ~ 10 11376

~

DIESEL GENERATOR D WITH AUXILIARIES EXCEPT ESW 0

2 'E-7 0

0

01. 00 11376.

125V DC BATTERY FOR CHANNEL 1A 0

2.4E-7 0 ~ 0 01.00 11376.

125V DC BATTERY FOR CHANNEL 1B 0

2 'E-7 0

0

01. 00 125V DC BATTERY FOR CHANNEL 1C 024E700

00. 00 11376

~

125V DC CPGQlNEL 1D 1

7.9E-6 0 ~ 0 09.20 11376 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER FOR CHANNEL lA 1

7 9E-6 0 ~ 0 01 30 11376

'25V DC BATTERY CHARGER FOR CHANNEL 1B 1

7 'E-6 0

0 01.00 11376.

125V DC BATTERY CHARGER FOR CHANNEL 1C

~'029E700 00.00 11376.

480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER A FED FROM 1B210

'l 2.9E-7 0 '

00.00 11376

'80V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER B FED FROM 1B220 0

2 'E-7 0.0 00 F 00 11376

'80V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER C FED FROM 1B230 FPCFPZV I AND J)

FPCSTD FPCPF FPCHXF iDiE)

FPCHTX SER.WATER 1B251 1B261 1B271 OFFSZTE 1A204 1B210 1B230 DIESEL A DIESEL B DIESEL C DIESEL D 1D610 1D620 1D630 1D644 1D613 1D623 1D633 OB516 OB526 OB536 Page 2

SA-TSY-001, Rey.

0 Page 2D624 2D644 D: QSTOREQCAN1. INP 9/2/93 0

2 ~ OE 6

0.0 00 00 11376.

1B220 480V ViANNEL 1B LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1A202

2. 9E-7

0. 0 00.00 11376.

OB546

'80V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER D FED FROM 1B240 0

2 OE-6 0 ~ 0 00.00 11376.

1B240 480V CHANNEL 1D LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1A204 2

0 ~ 0 l.E-20 00 ~ 00 11376.

ESMFLPTl DZV I - ESW FLOW PATH t USED TO REPRESENT DZV I PUMPS 2

0.0 1-E-20 00 F 00 11376.

ESWFLPT2

.DZV ZZ ESW FLOWPATHg USED TO REPRESENT DZV ZZ PUMPS 0

0.0 1.0E-4 18'0 11376.

F048A DZV I RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS VALVE 0

6 'E-8 0.0

00. 00 11376 ~

F003A DZV I RHR HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET VALVE 0

0.0 7.2E-6 4'0 11376 2A202 4160V CHANNEL 2B BUS(FED FROM OFFSZTE OR DG B) 0 0 ~ 0 7 ~ 2E-6

0. 0 11376'A203 4160V CHANNEL 2C BUS(FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG C) 0 0.0 7.2E-6 0 ~ 0 11376.

2A204 4160V CHANNEL 2D BUS(FED FROM OFFSZTE OR DG D)

'0 1.2E-6 0 '

0 ~ 0 11376 U2 CHANNEL B 125V DC POWER 0

1 2E 6

0 '

0.0 11376

'2 CHANNEL D 125V DC POWER 7

2 3 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

FPCRFVS

0. 0 0

FUEL POOL COOLING RE1%JEN FLOW VALVES SWITCH FPCFPZVS 0.0 0

FPC FUEL POOL INLET VALVES SWITCH FPCSTDS 0.0 0

FPC SURGE TANK DRAIN SWITCH-

'PCPFS

0. 0 0

FPC PUMP FLOW SWITCH r'PCHXFS 0 ~ 0 0

FPC HEAT EXCHANGER FLOW SMITCH FPCHTXS

0. 0 0

FPC HEAT EXCHANGER SWITCH SERMATS 0.0 0

S'ERVICE WATER SYSTEM SWITCH CWRFS 0.0 0

CIRCULATION WATER RETK% FLOW SWITCH STDRHRS 0.0 SURGE TANK DRAIN TO RHR SMITCH F047AS 0.0, 0

RHR HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VALVE SWITCH RHRPAS 0.0 0

RHR PUMP A SWITCH RHRPCS 0.0 0

RHR PUMP C SWITCH RHRRFVS 0 '

0 RHR RETURN FLOW VALVE SWITCH RHRFPZVS 0.0 0

RHR FUEL POOL INLET VALVE SWITCH RHRHXI 0.0 0

RHR DZV I HEAT EXCHANGER SMITCH RHRSWP1S 0

0 0

DIV I RHRSW PUMP SWITCH SSTLLS

0. 0 0

SKIMMER SURGE TANK LOW LEVEL SWZTCH F04 8AS

0. 0 0

RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS VALVE SWITCH F003AS

0. 0 0

RHR HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VALVE SWITCH LOCAS 0 ~ 0 0

LOCA SWITCH PIPES 0 2 0

PIPE FAILURE SWITCH DC614S

0. 0 0

'1D614 AND 2D614 SWITCH DC634S 0.0 0

1D634 AND 2D634 SWITCH 6

0 3

65~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

10000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

.01000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00100000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 i0010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 i0001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00001110000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000 00000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000 Page 3

D: QCALCSHELQPRAC>PRACFOR-OUT 9/3 o/93 PPPPP RRRRR AA CCCC PP PP RR RR AA AA CC C

PPPPP RRRRR AAAAAA CC PP RR RR AA Ah CC C

PP RR RR AA AA CCCC PROBALISTZC RISK ASSESSMENT CODE PROBALISTZC RISK ASSESSMENT CODE PROBALISTZC RISK ASSESSMENT CODE PROBALISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT CODE VERS ZON 1,

REV.

0 (03/19/9 1)

SUKGLRY OF PRA (VERSION 1 REV. 4)

PROGRAM MAXIMA:

MAX.

4 OF SUPPORT SYSTEMS:

99 MAX.

g OF SUPPORT STATES 50 MAX.

4 OF CONTAINMENT EVENT FUNCTIONS:

50 MAX. 4 OF RECOVERABLE SUPPORT STATES:

99 MAX.

4 OF INITIATINGEVENTS:

30 MAX.

4 OF FRONT-LINE EVENTS:

101 MAX.

4 OF FRONTLINE FUNCTIONS:

101 MAX.

4 OF ACCIDENT SEQUENCES:

150 MAX.

4 OF FRONTLINE SYSTEMS:

100 MAX. 4 OF DAMAGE CLASSES:

20 MAX.

4 OF RECOVERY TIME TABLES:

25 MAX.

4 OF GATES PER FRNTLINE FCTN FAULT TREE:

50 MAX.

4 OF INPUTS PER EVENT GATE 5

MAX.

4 OF 'OMMON MODE FAILURE GROUPS:

20 MAX.

4 OF TITLE/COMMENT CARDS:

10 MAX.

4 OF CONTAINMENT SEQUENCES/EVENT TREE:

40 MAX.

4 OF FAILURE STRINGS PER STATE:

320 MAX.

4 OF TIME RANGES:

25 PROBABILITY AT WHICH SUPPORT SYSTEM FAILURE COMBINATIONS ARE NO LONGER CONSIDERED

~ 100E-07 TIME EQUIPMENT ZS REQUIRED TO OPERATE FOLLOWING AN INITIATOR~30F 00 HRS TIME PLANT ZS ALLOWED TO OPERATE WITH MULTIPLE FAILURE OF EQUIPMENT COVERED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION~ 8.00 HRS TIME THE PLANT ZS EXPOSED TO THE INITIATINGEVENTS~ 11376.00 HOURS CASE TITLE:

FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED Page 1

D: QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93 INITIATINGEVENT:

EVENT WHICH RESULTS ZN A PLANT SCRAM SIGNAL EITHER AUTOMATICALLYOR MANUALLY~

EVENT IS INPUT FOR ANALYSIS (ZE, LOOP).

SUPPORT SYSTEM:

A COMPONENT OR SET OF COMPONENTS WHICH MAY SUPPORT A FRONTLZNE FUNCTION AND/OR HAVE AN ASSOCIATED ALLOWED OUTAGE TIME.

FAILURE STRING:

A SET OF SUPPORT SYSTEM FAILURES CALCULATED BY RESOLVING THE SUPPORT VS.

SUPPORT AND INZTIATZNG EVENT VS.

SUPPORT SYSTEM MATRIX.

4 SUPPORT STATE:

A GROUP OF FAILURE STRINGS WHICH RESULT IN THE FAILURE OF THE SAME PLANT EQUIPMENT.

SUPPORT STATE FREQUENCY:

THE FREQUENCY OF THE SUPPORT

STATE, CALCULATED BY SUMMING THE STRING CONTRIBUTIONS ZN THAT SUPPORT STATE PLANT STATE PARTITIONING EVENT TREE:

THE ZNPUT TO THIS EVENT TREE ZS A SUPPORT STATE NUMBER.

ALL SUPPORT STATES GO THROUGH TH1S TREE.

THE EVENT TREE SEQUENCES DENOTE WHICH PLANT DAMAGE EVENT TREE IS USED.

PLANT STATE:

THE COMBINATION OF THE SUPPORT STATE AND AN EVENT SEQUENCE.

ACCIDENT FREQUENCY:

FREQUENCY OF THE PLANT STATE.

FRONTLINE FUNCTION:

A DECISION POINT ZN AN EVENT TREE.

SOMETIMES CALLED A TOP EVENT.

EACH FRONTLINE FUNCTION HAS AN ASSOCIATED FAULT TREE.

FRONTLZNE FUNCTION FAULT TREE:

FAULT TREE USED TO IDENTIFY SUCCESS CR1TERIA FOR EACH FUNCTION.

FAULT TREES CONSIST OF FRONTLINE SYSTEMS OR SWITCHES FOR SUPPORT SYSTEMS.

BOTH ARE ALSO KNOWN AS BASIC EVENTS FRONTLINE SYSTEM:

A COMPONENT OR SET OF COMPONENTS USED TO SATZSFY THE SUCCESS CRITERIA FOR A FUNCTZON-BASIC EVENT SWITCH:

USED TO LINK A SUPPORT SYSTEM TO THE FAULT TREE.

THE PROBABILITY IS EITHER 1.0 OR 0.0.

PLANT DAMAGE EVENT TREE:

EVENT TREE USED TO CALCULATE CORE DAMAGE, VESSEL FAILURE, AND CONTAINMENT FAILURE PROBABILITIES.

THE INPUT TO THIS TREE IS EACH PLANT STATE ASSIGNED ZN THE PARTITION EVENT TREE.

EVENT SEQUENCE FREQUENCY:

~QUENCY OF THE COMBINATION OF A PLANT STATE AND A PLANT DAMAGE SEQUENCE DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED Page 2

D XCALCSHELQPRACXPRACFOR OUT 9/30/9>

SUPPORT SYSTEMS MATRIX:

MATRIX USED TO IDENTIFY DEPENDANCY OF SUPPORT SYSTEMS ON SUPORT SYSTEMS'RONTLZNE SYSTEMS MATRIX:

MATRIX USED TO IDENTIFY THE DEPENDANCY OF FRONTLZNE FUNCTION BASIC EVENTS ON SUPPORT'SYSTEMS'NITIATING EVENT SUPPORT SYSTEM MATRIX:

MATRIX USED TO IDENTIFY THE DEPENDANCY OF SUPPORT. SYSTEMS ON INITIATINGEVENTS.

INITIATINGEVENT FRONTLINE SYSTEM MATRIX:

MATRIX USED TO 1DENTZFY THE DEPENDANCY OF FRONTLINE FUNCTION BASIC EVENTS ON INITIATINGEVENTS.

INITIATINGEVENT FREQUENCY:

FREQUENCY OF THE INITIATING EVENT OVER THE EXPOSURE TIME.

EXPOSURE TIME'IME OVER WHICH ACCIDENTS ARE PROJECTED TO OCCUR, USUALLY 1 YEAR OR 1 CYCLE.

MISSION TIME:

TIME EQUIPMENT ZS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO SATISFY ZTS FUNCTION FOLLOWING AN INITIATINGEVENT.

FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYS1'S, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERAT1ON OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT SYSTEM DEFINITIONS SUP SYS NAME SUPPORT SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 1 STDRHR 2 1B216 3 1B237 4 F047A 5 RHR A 6 1A201 7

ESW A 8

ESW C

9 1D614 10 2D614 ll RHR C 12 ESW B 13 ESW D

14 1A202 15 1D624 16 1A203 17 1D634 18 2D634 19 iQGGQV 20 RHRFPZV SURGE TANK TO RHR DRAIN(BLOCK A) 480V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B210 480V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B230 DZV I RHR HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VALVE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL CHANNEL A EQUIPMENT 4160V CHANNEL 1A BUS(FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG A)

EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER CHANNEL EQUIPMENT EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER CHANNEL C EQUIPMENT 125V DC CHANNEL 1A U2 CHANNEL A 125V DC POWER RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL CHANNEL C EQUIPMENT EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER CHANNEL B EQUIPMENT

.EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER CHANNEL D EQUIPMENT 4160V CHANNEL 1B BUS(FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG B) 125V DC CHANNEL 1B 4160V CHANNEL 1C BUS(FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG C) 125V DC CHANNEL 1C 125V DC CHANNEL 2C,U2 RHR RETURN FLOW VALVE 151070(BLOCK E)

RHR RETURN FUEL POOL INLET VALVES (BLOCKS F 4 G

)

Page 3

21 RSWHXI 22 RHRSW 1A 23 RHRSW 2A 24 2A201 25 FPCRFV 26 FPCFPZV 27 FPCSTD 28 FPCPF 29 FPCHXF 30 FPCHTX 31 SER.WATE 32 CWRF 33 1B251 34 1B261 35 1B271 36 OFFSZTE 37 1A204 38 1B210 39 1B230 40 DIESEL A 41 DIESEL B 42 DIESEL C 43 DIESEL D 44 1D610 45 1D620 46 1D630 47 1D644 48 1D613 49 1D623 50 1D633 51 OB516 52 OB526 53 OB536 54 1B220 55 OB546 56 1B240 57 ESWFLPT1 58 ESWFLPT2 59 F048A 60 F003A 61 2A202 62 2A203 63 2A204 64 2D624 65 2D644 QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR OUT 9/3 0/93 p

DIV I RHR HEAT EXCHANGER AND RHRSW VALVES (BLOCK C)

RHR SERVICE WATER CHANNEL 1A EQUIPMENT (BLOCK A)

RHR SERVICE WATER CHANNEL 2A EQUIPMENT (BLOCK B) 4160V CHANNEL 2A BUS (FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG A)

FUEL POOL COOLING RETURN FLOW VALVES(BLOCK H)

FUEL POOL COOLING FUEL POOL INLET VALVES(BLOCKS I AND J)

FUEL POOL COOLING SURGE TANK DRAIN(BLOCK A)

FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP FLOW ( BLOCKS E ~ F ~

AND G )

FUEL POOL COOLING HEAT EXCHANGE FLOW ( BLOCKS B J C J D ~ E)

FUEL POOL COOLING HEAT EXCHANGERS(BLOCKS D,E,F)

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (BLOCKS A,B, AND C)

CIRCULATION WATER RETURN FLOW(BLOCK G) 480V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B250 480V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B260 480V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM-1B270 OFFSITE POWER OA103 OR'A104 4160V CHANNEL 1D BUS(FED FROM OFFSZTE OR DG D) 480V CiiA5MEL 1A LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1A201 480V CHANNEL 1C LOAD CENTER FED FROM lA203 DIESEL GENERATOR A WITH AUXILIARIES EXCEPT ESW DIESEL GENERATOR B WITH AUXILIARIES EXCEPT ESW DIESEL GENERATOR C WITH AUXILIARIES EXCEPT ESW DIESEL GENERATOR D WITH AUXILIARIES EXCEPT ESW 125V DC BATTERY FOR CHANNEL lA 125V DC BATTERY FOR CHANNEL 1B 125V DC BATTERY FOR CHANNEL 1C 125V DC CHANNEL 1D 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER FOR CHANNEL 1A 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER FOR CHANNEL 1B 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER FOR CHANNEL 1C 480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER A FED FROM 1B210 480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER B FED FROM 1B220 480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER C FED FROM 1B230 480V CHANNEL 1B LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1A202 480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER D FED FROM 1B240 480V CHANNEL 1D LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1A204 DZV I - ESW FLOW PATH ;

USED TO REPRESENT DIV I PUMPS DZV ZI ESW FLOWPATHg USED TO REPRESENT DZV II PUMPS DZV I RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS VALVE DIV I RHR HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET VALVE 4160V CHANNEL 2B BUS(FED FROM OFFSZTE OR DG B) 4160V CHANNEL 2C BUS(FED FROM OFFSZTE OR DG C) 4160V CHANNEL 2D BUS(FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG D)

Ui CHANNEL B 125V DC POWER U2 CHANNEL D 125V DC POWER FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1

LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS DEFINITION OF TERMS-OPERATING FAILURE RATE (OP FAIL RATE) - THE PROBABILITY PER UNIT TIME THAT A COMPONENT FAILS AT A GIVEN INSTANT OF TIME.

Page 4

D: QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93 STAND-BY FAILURE RATE (SB FAIL RATE) - THE PROBABILITY THAT A STAND-BY SYSTEM WILL FAIL TO RESPOND WHEN IT ZS CALLED UPON.

EXPOSURE TIME - THE TIME THE PLANT IS EXPOSED TO THE INITIATING EVENTS ~

MAINTENANCE TIME (MAZNT TIME)

THE TOTAL NUMBER OF HOURS THE SUPPORI SYSTEM ZS ZN MAINTENANCE DURING THE EXPOSURE TIME.

ALLOWED OUTAGE TINE (ALLOWD OUTGE)

TOTAL HOURS A SZNGLZ PIECE OF EQUIPMENT CAN BE OUT OF SERVICE WITHOUT'REQUIRING A FORCED SHUTDOWN AN ASTERISK (*) MEANS THAT PLANT SPECIFIC DATA WAS USED; ADDITIONALLY MAINT TIME AND ALLOWD OUTGE ARE OBTAINED FROM SSES SPECIFIC DATA.

SUPPORT SYSTEM DATA SUP SYS NAME OP FAIL RATE SB FAIL RATE MAZNT TIME ALLOWD OUTGE (PER HOUR)

(PER DEMAND)

(HOUR)

(HOUR) 1 STDRHR 2 1B216 3 1B237 4 F047A 5 RHR A 6 1A201 7

ESW A 8

ESW C

9 1D614 10 2D614 11 RHR C 12 ESW B

13 ESW D

14 1A202 15 1D624 16 1A203 17 1D634 18 2D634 19 KGGQV 20 RHRFPZV 21 RSWHXZ 22 RHRSW 1A 23 RHRSW 2A 24 2A201 25 FPCRFV 26 FPCFPZV 27 FPCSTD 28 FPCPF 29 FPCHXF 30 FPCHTX 31 SER.WATE 32 CWRF OK+00

~ 2.4E-07 2 'E-07 6.0E-08 O.OE+00 a.oE+oo O.OK+00 O.OE+00 2 'E-07 1.2E-06 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 2 4E-07 O.OE+00 2 'E-07 1.2E-06 O.OE+00 0 OE+00 O.DE+00 0 AL OE+00 0 AL OE+00 O.OE+00 0 AL OE+00 O.OE+00 0 AL OE+00'.OE+00 O.OK+00 0 ~ OK+00 0 OE+00 0 OR+00

2. OE-04 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00

1. OE-03 7.2E-06

4'E-03

4'E-03 O.OE+00 O.OK+00

1. OE-03

4.8E-03

4.8E-03 7.2E-06 O.OK+00 7.2E 06 O.OK+00 0 OE+00 1.0E-04 4 'E-04 4 'E-04

3.1E-03

3.1E-03 7.2E-06 2.0E-04 4 'E-04 1.0E-04 3.9E 05 6.0E-04 9 'E-04

6.9E-05 1.0E 04 73.0 0

~ 0

~ 0 32.5 0

116. 0 96.5

~ 0.0 5.0 48 0

32 2

~ 0

~ 0.0

~ 0 0

0 230 ~ 0 49 8

6.5 13 '8.5

~ 0.0

.0 4

0.0

~ 0 0

11376.

Page 5

33 lB251 34 1B261 35 1B271 36 OFFSZTE 37 lA204 38 lB210 39 lB230 40 DIESEL A 41 DIESEL B 42 DIESEL C 43 DIESEL D 44 1D610 45 1D620 46 1D630 47 1D644 48 1D613 49 1D623 50 1D633 51 OB516 52 OB526 53 OB536 54 1B220 55 OB546 56 1B240 57 ESWFLPT1 58 ESWFLPT2 59 F048A 60 F003A 61 2A202 62 2A203 63 2A204 64 2D624 65 2D644 3.5E-06 3.5E-06 3.5E-06

6.5E-06 O.OK+00 2 'E-06 2 'E-06 O B OE+00 O B OE+00 O.OE+00 O B OE+00 2'E 07 2 'E-07 2 'E-07 2'E 07

7.9E-06

7'E-06

7.9E-06 2 'E-07 2 9E-07 2 'E-07 2.0E-06 2'E 07 2 OE-06 O.OE+00 O.OE+00

~ 0. OE+00 6.0E-08 O.OE+00 O.OK+00 0

OE+00 1 2E-06 1 ~ 2E-06 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 7.2E-06 O.OE+00 O B OE+00

2 3E-02

2 3E 02

9 3E-02

2'E-02 0

OE+00 O.0K+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 0 OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OK+00 0 OK+00 O.OE+00

1. OE 20

1. OE-20 1 ~ OE-04

0. 0K+00 7.2E-06 7.2E-06 7.2E 06 0 OE+00 O.OE+00

.0

.0.0

~ 0

.0 0

60.9 41.1 70 F 1 48 '1.0 1.0 1.0

..0 9 '

1 '1.0

~ 0

~ 0 0

0 18 '

~ 0 4 '

~ 0

~ 0.0 D: QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/3 0/93 SA-TSY-001,

Rey, 0

Page Z~

11376.

11376

'1376

'1376-11376.

11376.

11376

~

11376

~

11376.

11376 11376.

11376.

11376

'1376.

11376-11376

~

11376.

FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1

LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FRONTLINE SYSTEM DEFINITION FRONTLZNE SYSTEMS ARE BASIC EVENTS ZN THE FUNCTIONAL FAULT TREES (TOP EVENT FAULT TREES)

~

FAILURE PROBABILITY IS THE PROBABILITY THAT THE FRONTLINE SYSTEM ZS FAILED ZN THE FUNCTIONAL FAULT TREE.

CCDFg ZS THE COMPLEMENTARY CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION USED TO DESCRIBE THE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITY IN TIME.

A SWITCH (USUALLY DENOTED ZN THE NAME WITH AN AS)

AS THE LAST LETTER) IS USED TO LINK THE IDENTICAL SUPPORT SYSTEM TO THE FRONTLZNE SYSTEM Page 6

D:XCALCSHELQPRAC~PRACFOR.OUT 9/30/93 SYS NUM NAME 1

FPCRFVS 2 FPCFPIVS 3

FPCSTDS 4

FPCPFS 5 FPCHXFS 6 FPCHTXS 7

SERWATS 8

CWRFS 9

STDRHRS 10 F047AS 11 RHRPAS 12 RHRPCS 13 RHRRFVS 14 RHRFPZVS 15 RHRHXI 16 RHRSWPZS 17 SSTLLS 18 F04 8AS 19 F003AS 20 LOCAS 21 PIPES 22 DC614S 23 DC634S FRONTLINE SYSTEM DEFINITION FUEL POOL COOLING RETURN FLOW VALVES SWITCH FPC FUEL POOL INLET VALVES SWITCH FPC SURGE TANK DRAIN SWITCH FPC PUMP FLOW SWITCH FPC HEAT EXCHANGER FLOW SWITCH FPC HEAT EXCHANGER SWITCH SERVICE WATER SYSTEM SWITCH CIRCULATION WATER RETtDQi FLOW SWITCH SURGE TANK DRAIN TO RHR SWITCH RHR HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VALVE SWITCH RHR PUMP A SWITCH RHR PUMP C SWITCH RHR RETURN FLOW VALVE SWITCH RHR FUEL POOL INLET VALVE SWITCH RHR DZV I HEAT EXCHANGER SWITCH DZV I RHRSW PUMP SWITCH SKIMMER SURGE TANK LOW LEVEL SWITCH RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS VALVE SWITCH RHR HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VALVE SWITCH LOCA SWITCH PIPE FAILURE SWITCH 1D614 AND 2D614 SWITCH 1D634 AND 2D634 SWITCH FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1

LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FRONTLINE SYSTEM DATA THE STATUS TABLE IS USED TO DISABLE THE CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION.

SYS NUM NAME FRONTLINE SYSTEM FAILURE STATUS PROBABILITY TABLE 1 FPCRFVS 2 FPCFPZVS 3

FPCSTDS 4

FPCPFS 5 FPCHXFS 6 FPCEiTXS

. OE+00

.OK+00

.OE+00

.OE+00 AL OE+00 0

0 0

0 Page 7

D: QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR. OUT SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page 7

SERWATS 8

CWRFS 9

STDRHRS 10 F047AS 11 RHRPAS 12 RHRPCS 13 gQGQQVS 14 RHRFPIVS 15 RHRHXZ 16 RHRSWPZS 17 SSTLLS 18 F048AS 19 F003AS 20 LOCAS 21 PIPES 22 DC614S 23 DC634S AL OE+00

.OE+00

~ QE+00

.OE+00

.0K+00

.OE+00

~ 2E+00

.OE+00

.OE+00 0

0 0

00' 0

0 0

00, 0

0 0

0 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1

LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1

LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FIRST ORDER SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENANCZES SUP SYS SUPPORT SYSTEM NUMBER 00000000011111111112222222222333333333344444444445 NAME 12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 STDRHR 1B216 1B237 F047A RHR A 1A201 ESW A ESW C

1D614 2D614 RHR C ESW B ESW D

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age 8

54 1B220 55 OB546 56 1B240 57 ESWFLPT1 58 ESWFLPT2 59 FO48A 60 F003A 61 2A202 62 2A203 63 2A204 64 2D624 65 2D644 D: gCALCSHEL~PRAC<PRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93 pppppppoooopppppppppppp ppppppp0000000000000000 pppppppp000000000000000 pppppppp001000000000000 OOOoOOOOOOO1OOOoOOOOOOO 00000000000000000100000 00000000000000000010000 00000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000 SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS~ CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE APTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS 17 SUPPORT SYSTEM RECOVERY PRIORITY AND TABLE ASSIGNMENTS SUPPORT PRIORITY SYSTEM NAME TABLE ASSIGNMENT 36 40 41 42 43 OFFSZTE DIESEL A DIESEL B DIESEL C DIESEL D FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1

LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS 18 SUPPORT SYSTEM RECOVERY TABLE ASSIGNMENT TBLg 1 EQPT ASGN TBLN 2 EQPT ASGN 36 40 41 42 43 TIME PROBABILITY TIME PROBABILITY (HR)

(HR) 0 0 ~ OOOOOE+00

~ 0 0.00000E+00 Page 16

D: XCALCSHELXPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93

.5 6.92000E 01 1.0 7.94400E-01

. 5 1. 40000E-01 1 ~ 0 2. 00000E-01 2 '

8 '3500K-01 3

0 8.92700E 01 5.5 9.35100E-01 9.8 9.70500E 01 12 0 9.79600E-01 24 '

9 '5300E-01 2 '

3 00000E-01

2. 1 6. 00000E-01 3 ~ 0 6. 60000E-01 5.0 7.00000E-01 10.0 8.20000E-01 12 ~ 0 8. 40000K-01 60.0 9.99230E-01 24 ~ 0 9 ~ 20000E 01 75.0 9.99530E-01 30.0 9i30000E-01

40. 0 9 ~ 40000E-01

72. 0 9 ~ 70000E 01 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1

LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul 5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS 19 FRONTLINE FUNCTION DESCRIPTIONS FAULT TREE FRNTLINE NUM FUNCTION FRONTLXNE FUNCTION DESCRIPTION 1'UEL POO THIS ZS THE DESCRIPTION 2

RHR FUEL THIS ZS THE DESCRIPTION FUEL POOL COOLXNG ANALYSIS, CASE 1 Page 17 20

0

D: XCALC HELXPRACXPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FRONTLINE FUNCTION FAULT TREES FRONTLINE FUNCTION GATE GATE INPUTS (Gf4 REFER TO SUBSEQUENT GATES)

NUM NAME NUM TYPE 1

2 3

1 FUEL POO 1

2 3

4 5

6 2

RHR FUEL 1

2 3

4 5

~

6 7

8 9

OR G2 AND LOCAS OR G4 OR FPCRFVS OR FPCHTXS OR FPCSTDS OR G2 OR G3 OR STDRHRS OR RHRHXI OR RHKRFVS AND G8 OR F04 7AS OR RHRPAS OR RHRPCS G3 PIPES G5 G6 FPCFPZVS SERWATS CWRFS FPCPFS FPCHXFS SSTLLS G4 GS G6 G7 RHRSWPZS RHRFPZVS G9 F048AS F003AS DC614S DC634S FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1

LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul 5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS ZNZT1ATING EVENT LOOP INITIATINGEVENT SS OF OFFSZTE POWER FREQUENCY~7.4E-02 SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCIES 00000000011111111112222222222333333333344444444445 12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890 00000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000 555555555666666 123456789012345 Page 18

J

p:ypaLpsHELyppapypRapFpR.ppg e/apyea SA-TSY-001.

Rev.

0 Page 000000000000000 FRONTLZNE SYSTEM DEPENDENCIES 00000000011111111112222 12345678901234567890123 00000000000000000000000 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AETER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS 22 SUPPORT STATE TOP EVENT FREQUENCY RANGE FRNTLZNE LOWER FUNCTION BOUND.

UPPER BOUND FUEL 10000

.90000K+01 RHR F 10000

.90000E+01 ZF A SUPPORT STATE HAS TOP EVENT FREQUENCIES, ALL OF WHICH FALL WITHIN THE RATIO RANGE DEFINED ABOVE FOR ANOTHER SUPPORT

STATE, THE TWO SUPPORT STATES MAY BE COMBINED.

THIS DEVICE IS USED TO ACCOMODATE VERY LOW FREQUENCY SUPPORT STATES WHILE MINIMIZINGTHE COMPLEXITY OF THE ANALYSIS.

FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1

LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE 'AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS 23 PLANT STATE DEFINITIONS (PARTITION EVENT TREE END POINTS)

THE PLANT STATE NUMBER DEFINES THE CONTAINMENT EVENT TREE EVALUATED FOR THAT PARTICULAR ENDPOINT PLANT STATE NAME PLANT STATE DESCRIPTION Page 19

D: QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/9>

FUEL POOL 2

NO FUEL POOL FUEL POOL COOLING IS WORKING NO FUEL POOL COOLING FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS'ASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER U1-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS 24 E

E PS V

ZV FRONTLZNE LT ES NE FUNCTION AA NE IN 00 NT TQ TT 12 TE 1

1 SX 2

1FX FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS~ CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER U1-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS 25 PLANT DAMAGE STATE DESCRIPTION PLANT DAMAGE STATE NAME 1

T<110F 2 '110FcT<125F 3

125F<T<150F 4

150F<TC200F 5

T>200F DESCRIPTION POOL TEMP.

BELOW ADM. LIMIT POOL TEMP.

BELOW FSAR LIMIT POOL TEMP.

BELOW FILTER/DEMIN. LIMIT POOL TEMP BELOW BOILING POINT POOL IS TO BOIL FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, 'CASE 1

LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul 5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS 26 PLANT DAMAGE STATE NUMBER IDENTIFIES THE STATE OF THE PLANT DUE TO A PARTICULAR PLANT DAMAGE EVENT TREE SEQUENCE SEQUENCE ZS THE LOGICAL COMBINATION OF FRONTLZNE FUNCTION FAILURES WHICH RESULT ZN A PARTICULAR PLANT DAMAGE STATE.

RECOVERY TIME IS TIME AT WHICH EQUIPMENT MUST BE RECOVERED TO PREVENT A PARTICULAR EVENT IN THE ACCIDENT TRAJECTORY-AN UNDERLINED RECOVERY TIME DENOTES A SUCCESSFUL FRONTLINE Page 20

FUNCT1ON ~

D: QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93 FRONTLZNE FUNCTION TIMING CONSTRAINTS (PLANT DAMAGE EVENT TREE)

EVENT TREE 4 1:

FUEL POOL

'VT SEQ FRONTLINE FUNCTION NUM PDS 1

1 1

1.0 1.0 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul 5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS 27 FRONTLINE FUNCTION TIMING CONSTRAINTS (PLANT DAMAGE EVENT TREE)

EVENT TREE~FUEL POOL EVT SEQ NUM PDS FRONTLINE FUNCTION 1

1 FUEL POO SUCCESS 2

2 FUEL POO FAILED FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS 28 FRONTLINE FUNCTION TIMING CONSTRAINTS (PLANT DAMAGE EVENT TREE)

EVENT TREE 4 2:

NO FUEL POOL EVT SEQ FRONTLINE FUNCTION NUM PDS 1

2 1

2 Page 21

Qs'.

D: gCRLCSHRLQPRRCQPRRCPOR.

ODT 9/30/93 Page 4 '

12.2 12 2

29 ~ 0 29.0 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSZSP CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE ARITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS 29 FRONTLINE FUNCTION TIMING CONSTRAINTS (PLANT DAMAGE EVENT TREE)

EVENT TREE~NO FUEL POOL SEQ NUM PDS FRONTLINE FUNCTION 1

1 FUEL POO SUCCESS 2

1 FUEL POO FAZLEDe RHR FUEL SUCCESS 3

2 FUEL POO FAILED RHR FUEL FAILED; FUEL POO SUCCESS 4

2 FUEL POO FAZLEDe RHR FUEL FAILEDe FUEL POO FAZLEDe RHR FUEL 'SUCCESS 5

3 FUEL POO FAILED; RHR FUEL FAILEDe FUEL POO FAILEDe'HR FUEL FAILED; FUEL POO SUCCESS 6

3 FUEL POO FAZLEDe RHR FUEL FAZLEDe FUEL POO FAZLEDe RHR FUEL FAILEDe FUEL POO FAILEDe RHR FUEL SUCCESS 7

4 FUEL POO FAILED; RHR FUEL FAILED; FUEL POO FAILED'HR FUEL FAILED; FUEL POO FAILEDe RHR FUEL FAILED; FUEL POO SUCCESS 4 FUEL POO FAILED RHR FUEL FAILEDe FUEL POO FAILEDe 5 FUEL POO FAILED; RHR FUEL FAILEDe FUEL POO FAZLEDe RHR FUEL FAILED'UEL POO FAILED; FUEL POO FAILEDe RHR FUEL FAILED; RHR FUEL SUCCESS RHR FUEL FAILED'UEL POO FAZLEDe FUEL POO FAILED; RHR FUEL FAILEDe RHR FUEL FAILED TYPE 18:

CONTROL FLAGS SET; RESULTS FLAG 1,

OUTPUT FLAG 0,

INITIATING DOCUMENTATION LIST FLAG 0, DIAG.41~

0, DIAG.42~

0, DZAGC3>

FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 30 Page 23

D: QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS TYPE 19:

ASE ANALYSIS OUTPUT FLA~D RESULTS FLAG 1 STRING GENERATION COMPLETE 134124 STRINGS SCANNED FROM (2** 65)

COMBINATIONS (INCLUDING THE "EVERYTHING WORKS" STRING) 7115 SUPPORT STRINGS PROCESSEDt 2

SUPPORT STATES GENERATED.

PROCESSING INITIATINGEVENT:

LOOP CODE:

1 72 CONTAINMENT LOGIC TREES EVALUATIONS IN THIS PASS 9

CONTAINMENT TREES g 2

SUPPORT STATES 2 ACCIDENT SEQUENCES EVALUATED WITH AND WITHOUT RECOVERY)

END OF INPUT DATA REACHED, INPUT/ANALYSIS PHASE COMPLETE PRAC REPORT GENERATOR (VERSION 1 REV.

1) INITIATED 1

FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1

LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT STATE 4

1 FREQUENCY~ 4 '3E 02 NUM FREQ 1 (1. 05E-02)

RHRFPZV SUPPORT SYSTEM Page 24

(6.86K-03)

D: iCALCSHELXPRACXPRACFOR OUT 9/30/93 2D614 SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 P598 8

10 (4 24E 03)

(4.21E-03)

(3 ~ 4 1K-03)

(2. 61E-03)

(2.46E-03)

(1 37E-03)

(1. 37E 03)

(1. 06E 03)

DIESEL C DIESEL C STDRHR DIESEL A 1D634 1D614 1B210 1D613 1D633 DIESEL C DIESEL C 12 14 15 16 17 (1.04E-03)

(9 '5K-04)

(9. 22E 04)

(8 '6E-04)

(3. 52E 04)

(3.43E-04)

DIESEL A 1D633 ESW A DIESEL C F048A ESW C

DIESEL C RHRSW 2A DIESEL C F003A F047A 18 (2 ~ 29E-04)

RHR A, DIESEL C 19 (2 19E-04)

ESW B 1D613 20 21 22 23 25 26 27 28 29 30 (2. 19E-04)

(2 ~ 19E-04)

(2.18E-04)

(1 72E-04)

(1 58E-04)

(1.56E-04)

(1. 54E-04)

(I.40E 04)

(1.32E 04)

(1 '2E-04)

(1.00E-04)

ESW D 1D613 ESW A 1D633 ESW C

1D633 ESW B DIESEL A DIESEL A 2D624 ESW D DIESEL A DIESEL C OB516 RHRSW 2A 1D633 DIESEL C 1D630 DIESEL C 1D610 REGQtFV Page 25

D QCALCSHELQPRACQPMCPOR O~ 9/ 30/ 9 3 p

31 (8.62E 05)

RHRSW 1A DIESEL A 32 (5.76E 05)

ESW A ESW B 33 (5.43E 05)

ESW A 34 (5. 35E-05)

ESW C

ESW D

ESW B 35 (5- 02E-05)

ESW C

'ESW D 36 (4 ~ 56E-05)

RHR A 1D633 37 (4 ~ 56E-05)

RHR C 1D613 38 (3.82E 05)

DIESEL A OB526 39 (3 '2E-05)

DIESEL A OB536 40 (3 ~ 54E-05) 2A201 41 (3.32E-05)

ESW A DIESEL C 2D624 42 (3.31E-05)

ESW C

2D624 43 (3 '6E-05)

DIESEL A 1D630 44 (3 '6E-05)

DIESEL A 1D644 45 (3.16E-05) 1D624 46 (3 07E-05)

RHR C 47 (2 '2E-05) 1D613 DIESEL A DIESEL A 1D633 48 (2-41E-05)

DIESEL B DIESEL D 1D613 49 (2 '0K-05)

DIESEL A DIESEL D 1D623 50 (2 '0E-05)

DIESEL A 51 (1 '7K-05)

DIESEL A DIESEL B 1D623 DIESEL B DIESEL D 52 (1 ~ 38E-05)

RHR A ESW B

53 (1.31E-05)

RHR A ESW D

54 (1 ~ 23E-05)

RHRSW 1A RHRSW 2A 55 (1.10E-05)

ESW A 56 (1 ~ 01E-05)

ESW C

RHR C 57 (8.02E-06)

ESW A 58 (8.02E 06)

ESW A OB526 OB536 Page 26

tl

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 (8. OIE-06)

(8 ~ 01K-06)

(7 '8E-06)

(7 '8K-06)

(7.20E-O6)

(6. 93E 06)

(6.85E 06)

(6 '4E-06)

(6.84E-06)

(6. 82E-06)

(6 ~ 81E-06)

(6. 63E 06)

(6 ~ 63E-06)

(6.63E-06)

(6.06E-06)

(5 67E-06)

(5.22E-06)

(5. 15E-06)

(5.14E-06)

(5. 03E-06)

(5.03E-06)

(4 ~ 40E-06)

(4.12E-06)

(2.65E-06)

(1. 67E-06)

(1'7E-06)

D:XCALCSHELQPRACXPRACFOR.OUT 9/30/93 ESW C

OB536 ESW C OB526 ESW B OB516 ESW D

OB516 1A203 RHR A 2D624 IB210 ID633 ESW A 1D630 ESW C

1D630 ESW B ID610 ESW D ID610 ESW A ID624 ESW A ID644 ESW C 1D644 ESW C

ID624 DIESEL A DIESEL D 1B220 ESW A DIESEL B DIESEL D ESW C

DIESEL B DIESEL D RHRSW 2A OB536 RHRSW IA OB516 ESW A DIESEL D ID623 ESW A DIESEL B ID623 ESW C

DZESEL D ID623 ES'W C

DIESEL B ID623 RHRSW 2A ID630 ID613 2D624 RHR A RHR A OB526 RHR A OB536 Page 27 SA-TSV-001, Rev.

0 Page

D:!!,CALC HELQPRACQPRACFOR.OUT 9/30/

Page 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 98 99 100 (1.66E-06)

(1. 43E 06)

(1.42E-06)

(1 39E-06)

(1 39E 06)

(1. 37E-06)

(1 27E 06)

(1 27E-06)

(1. 18E-06)

(1 ~ 05E 06)

(1. 05E-06)

(9 97E-07)

(9 ~ 97E-07)

RHR C OB516 RHR A 1D630 RHR C 1D610 RHR A 1D644 RHR A lD624 RHR A DIESEL B DIESEL D ESW A DIESEL, D 1B220 ESW C

DIESEL D 1B220 RHRSW 1A 2A201 i

RHR A DIESEL D 1D623 RHR A DIESEL B 1D623 1D613 OB526 1D613 OB536 101 (9. 93E-07) 1D633 OB516 102 103 104 105 106 107 (8. 78E-07)

(8 '8E-07)

(8 38E-07)

(8. 38E-07)

(8 35E 07)

(8.35E-07)

DIESEL A DIESEL DIESEL B DIESEL 1D630 1D613 1D610 1D613 1D610 1D633 1D630 1D633 B OB546 D OB516 108 (8 '5E-07) 1D624 1D613 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 (8. 25E 07)

(7.50E-07)

(6 '2E-07)

(6.25E-07)

(6.25E-07) 1D644 1D613 DIESEL A DIESEL D 1D620 DIESEL A DIESEL B 1D620 DIESEL B DIESEL D 1D610 1A201 DIESEL C DIESEL D 1D613 1D623 DIESEL B 1D613 1D623 Page 28

0

D: XCALCSHELQPRACQPRA~FOR. OUT 9/3 0/

p 116 (4 ~ 38E 07) 2A201 1D633 117 (3. 28K-07) 1A202 1D613 118 (3 ~ 28E 07) 1A204 1D613 119 (3 ~ 26E-07) 1A201 1D633 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT STATE 4

1 FREQUENCY~ 4 '3E-02

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~SUPPORT SYSTEM~

120 (2 ~ 66E-07)

RHR A DIESEL D 1B220 121 (2 ~ 51E-07) 1B230 122 (2 ~ 51E-07) 1B210 123 (2. 11E 07) 1B210 OB516 OB536 1D630 124 (1. 85E-07) 125 (1. 85E-07) r 126 (1. 84E-07) 1A202 DIESEL A 1A204 DIESEL A ESW A DIESEL B OB546 127 (1.84E-07)

ESW C

DIESEL B OB546 128 (1 58E-07) 1B230 DIESEL A 1D613 129 (1 ~ 58E 07)

DIESEL D 1D613 1B220 130 (1. 58E-07)

ESW A DIESEL D 1D620 131 (1.58E 07)

ESW A DIESEL B 1D620 132 (1. 57E-07)

ESW C

133 (1.57E 07)

ESW C

DIESEL D 1D620 DIESEL B 1D620 134 (1. 51E-07) 2D634 OB516 135 (1. 51E-07)

OB516 2D624 Page 29

136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 (1. 27E 07)

(1. 09E-07)

(9 49E-08)

(7 ~ 13E-08)

(7. 13E 08)

(6. 51E-08)

(6. 51E 08)

(4. 97E 08)

(4.94E-08)

(4 '7E-08)

(3 '5E-08)

(3 '4E-08)

(3 64E 08)

(3 '9E-08)

D ~CALCSHELXPRACQPRACFOR.OUT 9/30/93 1D610 2D624 D1ESEL A DIESEL D 2A202 2D634 DIESEL A 1D613 ESW A 1A204 ESW A 1A202 ESW C

lA202 ESW C

1A204 1A201 ESW B 1A201 2D624 1A201 ESW D RHR A DIESEL B OB546 OB516 OB536 OB516 OB526 RHR A D1ESEL D 1D620 RHR A DIESEL B 1D620 SA-TSY-OOl, Rev.

0 Page F

151 (3 ~ 06E-08) 1D630 OB536 152 153 154 155 (3 '6E-08)

(3.06E-OS)

(3 '6K-08)

(3 06E-08) 1D610 OB516 1D610 OB526 1D610 OB536 1D630 OB516 156 (3 '1K-08) 1D624 OB516 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 (3 ~ 01E-08)

(2.57E-08)

(2 53E-08)

(2 39E-08)

(2 35E-08)

(2 34E-08)

(2 '9E-08) 1D644 0B516 1D610 1D630 1D610 1D644 1D624 1D610 2D634 1B230 DIESEL A ESW A DIESEL D 2A202 ESW C DIESEL D 2A202 DIESEL B 1D613 OB546 Page 30

E 1 I

D: QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93

~

Page 165 (2 '8E-08)

DIESEL A 1D623 166 (2 '8E-08)

DIESEL D 1D623 OB546 OB516 167 (2 28E-08)

DIESEL B 1D623 OB516 168 (2 ~ 13E-08)

RHRSW 2A 1B230 169 (2 ~ 13E-08)

RHRSW 1A 1B210 1D613 1D613 170 (1. 93E-08)

DIESEL D 1D620 1D613 171 (1. 93E 08)

DIESEL B 1D620 'D613 172 (1.92E-08)

DIESEL A 1D620 173 (l.92E 08)

DIESEL D 1D610 1D623 1D623 174 (1. 92E-08)

DIESEL B 1D610 1D623 175 (1. 75E-08)

RHR A lA204 176 (1. 75E-08)

RHR A 1A202 177 (1. 61E-08) 2A201 OB536 178 (l. 36E 08) 2A201 179 (1. 28E-08) 2D634 180 (1. 19E 08) lA204 181 (1.19E-08) 1A201 182

( 1 19E-08) 1A201 1D630 RHRSW 2A 1D613 OB516 OB526 OB536 183 (1.19E-08) 184 (1.19E-08) 1A202 OB516 OB516 2A203 1D630 1D610 1D610 185 (l.02E-08) 1A201 186 (1 02E 08) 1A204 187 (1 02E 08) 1A202 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1

LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT Page 31

D: QCALCSHELQHQCQPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93 SUPPORT STATE.0 2

FREQUENCY~ 9 ~ 54E 01

SUPPORT SYSTEM-10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 23 24 25 (5.18E 01)

(9. 61E-02)

(4 ~ 56E-02)

(4 '2E-02)

(4.52E-02)

(2 '7E 02)

(2 '1E-02)

(2'8E 02)

(1. 14E 02)

(1.14E 02)

(1 14E-02)

(9.90E 03)

(9. 04E-03)

(6.91E-03)

(6. 86E 03)

(6. 86E-03)

(6 86E 03)

(6'2E-03)

(3 '8E-03)

(3. 39E-03)

(2.43E-03)

(1.66E-03)

(1. 66E-03)

(1.66E-03)

"EVERYTHZNG WORKS>>

DZESEL C 1D613 1D623 1D633 DZESEL A DZESEL D DZESEL B 1B210 1B220 1B2I 0 1B230 ESW A ESW C ESW B 2D624 2D64I 2D63I ESW D KGtSW 2A RHRSW 1A RHR A OB526 OB536 OB516 Page 32

D. gCALCSHEZ,gPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/3 0/9 3 (1 ~ 66E-03)

OB546 27

( 1 ~ 42E 03) 1D610 28 (1 42E 03) 1D620 29 (1.42E-03) 1D630 30 (1 37E 03) 1B237 31 (1. 37E 03) 11216 32 (l.37E-03) 1D624 33 (1. 37E-03) 1D644 34 (1.22E 03)

RHR C 35 (9 ~ OOE-04)

FPCHTX 36 (6 ~ OOE 04)

FPCHXF 37 (4. 20E 04)

FPCFPZV 38 (3 ~ 81E 04) 2A201 39 (2 '5E-04) 2A202 40 (2.00E-04)

FPCRFV 41 (1.00E 04)

CWRF 42 (1.00E-04)

FPCSTD SA-TSV-001, Rev.

0 Page 43 (7 20E-06) 44 (7.20E-06) 2A203 2A204 45 (7.20E-06) 1A204 46 (7 20E 06) 1A202 47 (7.20E-06) 1A201 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1

LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul 5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FRONTLINE FUNCTION PROBABILITIES (FRONTLINE FUNCTION AND PLANT DAMAGE EVENT TREES)

Page 33

D: XCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR OUT 9/30/93 SUPPORT

-FRONTLZNE FUNCT1ON STATE FUEL POO RHR FUEL 1

~ 10E+01

.10E+Ol' 10E+Ol 00K+00 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS CONTAINMENT CSEALLENGE 4 1:

FUEL POOL EVNT SE{}

SUPPORT STATE FREQUENCY (PER YEAR)

NUM 1

2 1

.OOE+00

.OOE+00 2

OOE+00

~ OOE+00 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS CONTAINMENT CHALLENGE 4 2

NO FUEL POOL EVNT SEQ SUPPORT STATE FREQUENCY (PER YEAR)

NUM 1

2 1.27E 02

.56E 01 2.51E-04 15E 01 3

40E 03 OOE+00 4.48E 04 OOE+00 5. 15E-03

. OOE+00 6

12E-04 OOE+00 7.37E-04 OOE+00 8.14E-05 OOE+00 9

~ 94E-05

~ OOE+00 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FREQUENCY FOR PLANT DAMAGE STATES Page 34

3

CALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR-OUT 9/30/93 PLANT DAMAGE NAME T<110F 110F<T<125F 125F<T<150F 150F<T<200F T>200F

~~mmmmm mmmmm mmm~~ mm mIN IT ZATORm m m wmmmm' mm~ mmwmme m 7 3E 02

(

4) 99 F 1 4.4E-04

(

4)

~ 60 1.6E-04

(

\\)

~ 22 3.8E-05

(

4)

F 05 9'E 06

(

4)

F 01 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER U1-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS ACCIDENT SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION ACCIDENT SEQUENCE 4

1:

PLANT DAMAGE TREE FUEL POOL FUEL POO SUCCESS INITIATINGEVENT LOOP SUP PLANT DAMAGE STATE ST.

1 2

1 O.OE+00 0 OE+00 2 O.OE+00 0 AL OE+00 TOT O.OE+00 0 OE+00 ACCIDENT SEQUENCE 4

2:

PLANT DAMAGE TREE NO FUEL POOL, INITIATINGEVENT LOOP FUEL POO FAILED SUP PLANT DAMAGE STATE--

ST.

1 2

3 4

5 1 2.8E-03 4 'E-04 1.6E-04 3.8E-05 9.4E-06 2

7 'E-02 OBOE+00 O-OK+00 0 AL OE+00 O.OE+00 TOT 7.3E-02 4 'E-04 1.6E-04 3 8E-05 9.4E-06 Page 35

CALCSHEZXPRACQPRACFOR OUT 9/30/93 SA"TSY-ool, Rev.

0 Page FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS ACCIDENT SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION ACCIDENT SEQUENCE 4

1:

PLANT DAMAGE TREE FUEL POOL, INITIATINGEVENT LOOP FUEL POO SUCCESS SUP -

-PLANT DAMAGE STATE ST.

1 2

1 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 2

0 OE+00 O.OE+00 TOT O.OE+00 0 OK+00 ACCIDENT SEQUENCE 4

2 PLANT DAMAGE TREE NO FUEL POOL, INITIATINGEVENT LOOP FUEL POO FAILED SUP PLANT DAMAGE STATE--

ST.

1 1

2 2

3 3

4 4

1 2 7E-03 5.1E-05 4 'E-04 4.8E-05 1 5E-04 1.2E-05 3.7E-05 1.4E-06 2 5..6E-02 1.5E-02 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 TOT 5.9E-02 1 SE-02 4.0E 04 4.8E-OS 1.5E-04 1 2E-05 3 7E-05 1.4E-06 SUP ST.

5 1

9'E 06 2

0 ~ OE+00 TOT 9.4E-06

-PLANT DAMAGE STATE--

FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1

LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS Page 36

I 1

11

SA-TSY-QQ1, Rey.

0 Page APPENDIX 8 BLOCK DIAGRAl5 AND CNPONENTS The information presented in this appendix is collected from References 12, 13, 14, 15, and 20.

The block diagrams in Figures B.l and B.2 and the associated block-component lists represent the Fuel Pool Cooling System.

The blocks and components needed for operating RHR system in the fuel pool cooling assist mode are shown by Figures B.3 and 8.4 along with their block-component lists.

From Skimmcr A

Surge Tank H

To Spent Fuel Pool G

FIGURE B. I FUEL POOL COOLING FLOW BLOCKDIAGRAM

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 P898 0 7 Fuel Pool Cooling Flat Block Letter Component Name(s)

Sur e Tank Drain Valve Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve Heat Exchan er Outlet Valve Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve Heat Exchan er Outlet Valve Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve Heat Exchan er Outlet Valve Pump A Suction Valve FPC Pump A

Pump A Discharge Check Valve Pum Discha e Valve Pump B Suction Valve FPC Pump B

Discharge Check Valve Discha e Valve Pump C Suction Valve FPC Pump C

Discharge Check Valve Dischar e Valve FD Bypass Valve Filter Demineralizer Outlet Valve Fuel Pool Inlet Valve Inlet Check Valve Fuel Pool Inlet Valve Inlet Check Valve Component ID 153001 153002A 153004A 153002B 153004B 153002C 153004C 153006A 1P211A 153009A 153010 A 153006 B 1P211B 153009B 153010 B 153006C 1P211C 153009C 153010C 153013 153017 153018A 153019A 153018 B 153019 B

From Circ. Water Suction Header B

To Circ. Water Return Line F

FIGURE B.2 SERVICE WATER FLOW BLOCK DIAGRAM tl C/l Dl I

Ib C/1 Io g O

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

p page be Service Mater Flaw Block Letter Component Name(s)

Pump A Suction Valve S.M.

Pump A

Discharge Check Valve Discha e Valve Pump B Suction Valve S.M." Pump 8

Discharge Check Valve Discha e Valve Pump C Suction Valve S.M.

Pump C

Discharge Check Valve Discha e Valve Heat Exchanger A Inlet Valve FPC Heat Exchanger A

Heat Exchan er A Outlet Valve Heat Exchanger B Inlet Valve FPC Heat Exchanger B

Heat Exchan er B Outlet Valve HX C Inlet Valve FPC Heat Exchanger C

HX B Outlet Valve Circ. Mater Return Valve Component ID 109001 1P502A 109009 109001 109002 1P502B 109008 109005 109003 1P502C 10900'I 109006 110094 1E202A 110095 110092 1E202B 110093 110090 1E202C 110091 109114

From Skimmer Surge Tank D

TQ Spent Fuel Pool FIGURE B.3 RHR FUEl. POOL COOLING ASSIST BLOCK DIAGRAM M C/J ID I

lD tel I

~o 0 o X7 ID

~W

0

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page RHR Fuel Pool Cooling Assist Node Block Letter Component Name(s)

Surge Tank Drain Valve To RHR Valve Suction Valve RHR Pump A Min Flow Valve Min Flow Check Valve Isolation Valve Discha e Check Valve Suction Valve RHR Pump C

Min Flow Valve Min Flow Check Valve Discharge Check Valve Isolation Valve Heat Exchanger Bypass Valve HX Inlet Valve HX Outlet Valve To Fuel Pool Valve Fuel Pool Inlet Valve A Inlet Check Valve A Fuel Pool Inlet Valve B

Inlet Check Valve B

Component ID 153021 151060 HV-151-F006A 1P202A HV-151-F018A HV-151-F046A HV-151-F034A HV-151-F031A HV-151-F006C 1P202C HV-151-F018C HV-151-F046C HV-151-F031C HV-151-F034C HV-151-F048A HV-151-F047A HV-151-F003A 151070 153070A 153071A 153070B 153071B

0

From Spray Pond C

To Spray Pond 8

FIGURE B.4 RHR SERVICE WATER FLOW BLOCKDIAGRAM

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page 73 RHR Service Water Flow Block Letter Component Name(s)

U-1 RHR Service Water Pump A Discharge Check Valve Discha e Valve U-2 RHR Service Water Puap A

Discharge Check Valve Discha e Valve U-1 RHR Heat Exchanger A

HX Inlet Valve HX Outlet Valve HX Check Valve Component ID 1P506A 1-12-001 1-12-002 2P506A 2-12-001 2-12-002 1E205A HV-11210A HV-11215A 112009

SA-TSY-OOl, Rev.

O Page APPENDIX C SUPPORT SYSTBI DATA SOURCE If the data of out of service (OOS) hours is not from Ref.

16, then it is from Ref.

2 adjusted by a multiplier.

For Cases 1,

1. 1, 1.2, 3, 5, and 6, this multiplier is equal to 1.038, which is the ratio of the length of the fuel cycle following Unit 1 fifth refueling outage, 11376 hours, and the standard fifteen month

cycle, 10957 hours.

For Cases 2, 2.1, and 4, this multiplier is equal to 0.145, the ratio of the,Unit 1 fifth refueling outage, 1584 hours0.0183 days 0.44 hours 0.00262 weeks 6.02712e-4 months , and 10957 hours.

The fuel pool cooling PRA model is not affected by reactor condition.

The allowed outage time of support systems is set to equal the exposure time.

SA-TSY QQ),

Rey.

Q Page

?=

1.

STDRHR - There are two manual

valves, 153021 and 151060, in this block.

From Ref.

17 the failure rate per demand is 1.0 x 10 For this block the failure rate is 1 ~ 2 x 1.0 x 10 2.0 x 10

/demand

'rom Ref.

16 the maintenance hour of valve 151060 is 73 hours8.449074e-4 days 0.0203 hours 1.207011e-4 weeks 2.77765e-5 months (fuel cycle).

2.

1B216 - Froal Section R of Ref.

18 the failure rate of this load center is 2.4 x 10 /hr.

3.

1B237 - From Section R of Ref.

18 the failure rate is 2.4 x 10 "/hr.

4.

F047A - From Ref.

19 the failure rate is 6.0 x 10 /hr, because this valve is normally open.

RHR A - From P.A-148 of Ref. 2, the demand failure rate is 5.3 x 10 the failure rate per hour is 1.4 x 10 Therefore, the equivalent demand failure rate is 5.3 x 10

+ 1.4 x 10 x 30 ~ 1.0 x 10 The 00S hrs 31.3 x 1.038 32.5 (fuel cycle)

The OOS hrs 31.3 x 0.145 4.5 (outage) 6.

7.

8.

)A201 - From Table C.1-6a of Ref.

2 the failure rate of bus is 2.4 x 10

/hr.

1 30 x 2.4 x 10 7.2 x 10

/demand ESW A - From Ref.

2 the demand failure rate is 3.4 x 10 and the operating failure rate is'4.8 x 10 /hr.

1 30 x 4.8 x 10 s + 3.4 x 10 4.8 x 10 s/demand OOS hrs 112.2 x 1.038 116 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 112.2 x 0.145 16.3 (outage)

ESW C - Similar to ESW A, l 4.8 x 10

/demand OOS hrs 93 x 1.038 96.5 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 93 x 0.145 13.5 (outage) 9.

1D614 - From P.A-277 of Ref. 2, 1

2.4 x 10 /hr.

10.

2D614 - Assuming the moor cause is fuse failure, from P.C-45 and P.F-47 of Ref. 2, 1 1.2 x 10 /hr.

RHR C - Similar to RHR A, 1 1.0 x 10

/demand'0S hrs 4.8 x 1.038 5.0 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 4.8 x 0.145 0.7 (outage)

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page 12.

ESW 8 - Similar to ESlt A, I 4.8 x 10

/demand OOS.hrs 46.3 x 1.038 48.0 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 46.3 x 0.145 6.7 (outage) 13.

ESM D - Similar to ESN A, 1 4.8 x 10

/demand OOS hrs 31 x 1.038 32.2 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 31 x 0.145 4.5 (outage) 14.

1A202 - From P.A-258 of Ref.

2 the failure rate/pooled is 2.4 x 10 /hr.

30 x 2.4 x 10 7.2 x 10

/demand 15.

10624 - Similar to 1D614, 1

2.4 x 10 ~/hr.

16.

1A203 - Similar to 1A202, 1

7.2 x 10

/demand.

17.

1D634 - Similar to 1D614, l 2.4 x 10 /hra 18.

2D634 - Similar to 2D614, 1

1.2 x 10 /hr.

19.

RHR RFV - From P.C-46 of Ref. 2, t5e failure rate per demand is 1.0 x 10 20.

RHR FPIV - There are two manual valves and two check valves in these two blocks.

From P.C-46 of Ref.

2 2 (1.0 x 10

+ 1.1 x 10

)

4.2 x 10

/demand From Ref.

16, OOS hrs 230 (fuel cycle) 21.

RSWHXI - There are two normally closed motor operated valves and one ch'eck valve in this block in addition to the heat exchanger.

The, demand failure rate for the motor operated valves would equal to 1 x 10'f considering they can be myually operated'(P.A-174 of Ref. 2).

Otherwise, it is 5.6 x 10

/demand (P.C-46 of Ref. 2).

The failure rate of check vale is 1.1 x 10 (P.C-46 of Ref. 2).

The failure rate of heat exchanger is 1 x 10'Section L of Ref. 18).

The operating failure rate for this block is 3.8 x 10 /hr (P.A-174 of Ref. 2).

For Cases 1.1 and 2.1, 1 ~

1 x 10

+ 2 x 5.6 x 10

+ 1.1 x 10

+ 3.8 x 10 x 30 1.1 x 10

/demand For all other cases, 1 x 10

+ 2 x 1 x 10

+ 1.1 x 10

+ 3.8 x 10 x 30 4.2 x 10 OOS hrs 48 x 1.038 49.8 (fuel cycle) (P.F-46 of Ref. 2)

OOS hrs 48 x 0.145 7.0 (outage)

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page 22.

RHRSM1A - From P.A-174 of Ref. 2, demand failure 2.7 x 10

, operating failure 1.4 x 10 s/hr.

l 2.7 x 10

+ 30 x 1.4 x 10-s ea 3 1 x 10 s/demand OOS hrs 6.3,x 1.038 6.5 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 6.3 x 0.145 0.9 (outage) 23.

RHRSW2A - Similar to RHRSMIA, l 3.1 x 10

/demand 00S hrs 12.7 x 1.038 13.2 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 12.7 x 0.145 1.8 (outage) 24.

2A201 - Similar to 1A201, l 7.2 x 10

/demand OOS hrs 8.2 x 1.038 8.5 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 8.2 x 0.145 1.2 (outage) 25.

FPCRFV - From P.C-46 of Ref. 2, the failure rate of manual valve is 1 x 10

/demand.

There are two manual valves in this block.

2 x 1 x 10 am 2.0 x 10

/demand 26.

FPCFPIV - There are two manual valves and two check valves in these two blocks.

From P.C-46 of Ref. 2.

l 2 (1.0 x 10

+ 1.1 x 10

)

4.2 x 10

/demand 27.

FPCSTD - The failure rate of manual valve is 1 x 10

/demand (P.C-46, Ref. 2).

28.

FPCPF (Blocks E, F, and G)

Ig each of the three blocks there are one pump, two manual valves and one check valve.

These valves have never been clogged, they are open in running mode and the water is clean.

Therefore, the operating failure rate should be smaller than 1.4 x 10 Thus, they are negligible.

The check valve may fail to open on demand.

Its demand failure rate,

).1 x

10

, should be lumped with the pump demand failure rate, 3.5 x 10 For each block the failure rate is l,

1.1 x 10

+ 3.5 x 10 3.6 x 10

/demand For normal operation in a fuel cycle, only two of the -three blocks are needed.

Thus, lz 3 x (3.6 x 10

)

3.9 x 10

/demand The total maintenance hours from Ref.

16 are 26 + 28 + 53 am 107

0

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page 7Y The equivalent out of service hours should be OOS hrs 107 x 3.6 x 10 3 0.4 During outage all three blocks are required to be operable.

~

3 x 3.6 x 10 1.1 x 10

/demand S hrs 0 (Ref.

16) 29.

FPCHXF - In each of the three blocks there are two manual valves, 2 x 1.0 x 10 2.0 x 10 (P.C.-46 of Ref. 2) j$

3 x 2.0 x 10 6.0 x 10 30.

FPCHTX - There are two manual valves and one heat exchanger in each block.

The failure rate of each component is 1 x 10 (P.C-46 of Ref.

2.

and Section L of Ref. 18).

l 3 x 3 x 1 x 10 9.0 x 10

/demand 31.

32.

33.

SER WATER - According to information on P.A-203 and P.F-47 of Ref.

2 and Section V of Ref.

18, the operating failure rate of this system is 2.3 x 10 /hr.

1 30 x 2 3 x 10-a 6 9 x 10-s/

CWRF - The failure rate for a manual valve in this block is 1 x 10

'/demand (P.C-46, Ref. 2).

1B251 - Power for this load center originates from 13.8 KV Bus lA101 through a transformer and two breakers then reaches Bus B251 (Re.f 6 and ll).

using the data in Section R of Ref.

18, 6 x 10

+ 2 x 1.2 x 10

+ 2.4 x 10 3.2 x 10 /hr.

34.

1B261 - Similar to 1B251, 1

3.2 x 10 /hr.

35.

1B271 - Similar to 1B251, 1

3.2 x 10 4/hr.

36.

37.

38.

OFFSITE - From P.

F-5 of Ref. 2, the LOOP frequency is.071 per cycle.

0.71/10957 hr 6.5 x 10 /hr.

1A204 - Similar to 1A201, 1 ~ 7.2 x 10

/demand.

1B210 - From P.A-263 of Ref 2, 1 2.0 x 10 ~/hr.

39.

18230 - Similar to 1B210, 1

2.0 x 10 ~/hr.

40.

DIESEL A - From Section DD of Ref.

18, 1

2.3 x 10

/demand OOS hrs 58.7 x 1.038 60.9 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 58.7 x 0.145 8.5 (outage)

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page 7R 41.

DIESEL B -.Similar to Diesel A, 1 2.3 x'10 a/demand OOS hrs 39.6 x 1.038 41.1 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 39.6 x 0.145 5.7 (outage) 42.

DIESEL C - From Section DD of Ref.

18, 1

9.3 x 10 a/demand 00S hrs 67.5 x 1.038 70.1 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 67.5 x 0.145 9.8 (outage) 43.

DIESEL D - Similar to Diesel A, 1 2.3 x 10

/demand OOS hrs 46.3 x 1.038 48.1 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 46.3 x 0.145 6.7 (outage) 44.

1D610 - From P.F-46 of Ref. 2, l 2.4 x 10 /hr OOS hrs 1.0 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 0.0 (outage) 45.

1D620 - Similar to 1D610, 1

2.4 x 10 /hr OOS hrs 1.0 (fuel cycle)

~

OOS hrs 0.0 (outage) 46.

1D630 - Similar to lD610, l 2.4 x 10 /hr OOS hrs 1.0 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 0.0 (outage) 47.

1D644 - Similar to 1D614, 1

2.4 x 10 /hr 48.

1D613 - From P.F-46 of Ref. 2, 1

7.9 x 10 /hr OOS hrs 8.9 x 1.038 9.2 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 8.9 x 0. 145 1.3 (outage) 49.

1D623 - Similar to 1D613, 1

7.9 x 10 /hr OOS hrs 1.3 x 1.038 1.3 (fuel cycle) 50.

1D633 - Similar to 1D613, i 7.9 00S hrs 1.0 (fuel cycle) x 10 /hr 51.

OB516 - From P.A-263 of Ref. 2, 1

2.9 x 10 /hr.

52.

OB526 - Similar to OB516, l 2.9 x 10 /hr.

53.

OB536 - Similar to OB516, 1

2.9 x 10 /hr.

54.

IB220 - Similar to 1B210, 1

2.0 x 10 ~/hr.

55.

OB546 - Similar to OB516, 1

2.9 x 10 /hr.

SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page

'KO 56.

18240 - Similar to 1B210, 1

2.0 x 10 /hr.

57.

ESQFLPTI - Because this support system consists of piping only, a very low failure rate of 1 x 10 is assumed.

58.

ESWFLPT2 - Similar to ESNFLPTl, l ~

1 x 10 ~.

59.

F048A - From P.C-46 of Ref. 2, 1

5.6 x 10

/demand 00S hrs 00S hrs 60.

F003A - Similar 61.

2A202 - Similar 00S hrs 00S hrs 62.

2A203 - Similar 63.

2A204 - Similar 64.

2D624 - 1 Q 1.2 65.

2D644 - Similar 18 x 1.038 18.7 (fuel cycle) (Section H of Ref.

18) 18 x 0.145 2.6 (outage) to F047A, 1

6.0 x 10 a/hr.

to 2A201, l ~ 7.2 x 10 ~/demand 4.3 x 1.038 4.5 (fuel cycle)

(P.F-47 of Ref. 2) 4.3 x 0.145 0.6 (outage) to 2A201, 1,

7.2 x 10 ~/demand to 2A201, l 7.2 x 10 ~/demand x 10 /hr (P.F-47 of Rcf. 2).

to 2D624, l 1.2 x 10 ~/hr.

rp1132i.tsy:law

SA-TSY-OOl, Rev.

0 Page APPENDIX D DETAILS OF RKSLlLT

C - QPEPEQCAM1. PRT 10/1/93 SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page ~g FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1

LOOP DURING NOPMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT STATE 4

1 FREQUENCY~ 4.63E-02 SUPPORT SYSTEM--

1 (1.05E-02)

RHRFPIV 2 (6.86E-03) 2D614 3

(4 '4E-03)

DIESEL C 1D613 4 (4.21E-03)

DXESEL C 1D633 5

(3 '1E-03)

STDRHR 6 (2.61E-03)

RSWHXZ 7 (2.46E-03)

DIESEL A DIESEL C 8 (1.37E-03) 1D634 9 (1. 37E-03) 1D614 10 (1.06E-03) 1B210 DIESEL C 11 (1.04E-03)

DIESEL A 1D633 12 (9.35E-04)

ESW A DIESEL C 13 (9.22E-04)

F048A 14 (8.56E-04)

ESW C

DIESEL C 15 (3 '2E-04)

RHRSW 2A DIESEL C 16 (3.43E-04)

F003A 17 (3.43E-04)

F047A 18 (2 '9E-04)

RHR A DIESEL C 19 (2. 19E-04)

ESW B 1D613 Page 1

C: yPEPEXCAM1. PRT 10/1/93 SA-TSY-OOl, Rev.

0 Page ZS 20 21 (2. 19E-04)

(2.19E-04)

ESW D

1D613 ESW A 1D633 22 (2. 18E 04)

ESW C

1D633 23 24 25 26 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 (1 '2E-04)

(1 58E-04)

(1 '6K-04)

(1.54E-04)

(1. 40E-04)

(1 '2E-04)

(1 32E-04)

(1.00E-04)

(8 ~ 62E-05)

(5 76E-05)

(5 '3E-05)

(5 '5E-05)

(5.02E-05)

(4 56E-05)

(4:56E-05)

(3 '2E 05)

(3 '2K-05)

(3 '4E-05)

(3.32E-05)

ESW B DIESEL A DIESEL A 2D624 ESW D

DIESEL A DIESEL C OB516 RHRSW 2A 1D633 DIESEL C 1D630 DIESEL C 1D610 iUGGQV RHRSW 1A DIESEL A ESW A ESW B ESW A ESW D ESW C

ESW B ESW C

ESW D

RHR A 1D633 RHR C 1D613 DIESEL A OB526 DIESEL A OB536 2A201 DIESEL C ESW A 2D624 (3 31E-05)

ESW C 2D624 43 44 46 47 (3 '6E-05)

(3 '6E-05)

(3 '7E-05)

(2 72E-05)

DIESEL A 1D630 DIESEL A 1D644 1D624 DIESEL A DIESEL A 1D613 1D633 Page 2

48 49 50 51 53 54 55 56 (2.41E-05)

(2. 40E 05)

(2 '0E-05)

(1.57E-05)

(1. 38E-05)

(1.31E-05)

(1.23E-OS)

(1. 10E-05)

(1. 01E-05)

C. $PEPEX~1

~ PRT 10/1/93 DIESEL B DIESEL D 1D613 DIESEL A DIESEL D 1D623 DIESEL A DIESEL B 1D623 DIESEL A DIESEL B DIESEL D RHR A ESW B RHR A ESW D

RHRSW 1A RHRSW 2A ESW A RHR C ESW C

RHR C SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page 2+

57 (8 '2E-06)

ESW A OB526 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 (8 '2E-06)

(8.01E-06)

(8 ~ 01E-06)

(7. 98E-06)

(7.98E-06)

(7.20E-06)

(6.93E-06)

ESW A OB536 ESW C

OB536 ESW C OB526 ESW B OB516 ESW D

OB516 1A203 RHR A 2D624 (6.85E-06) 1B210 1D633 66 (6 84E-06)

ESW A 1D630 67 (6.84E-06)

ESW C 1D630 68 69 70 71 73 74 75 76 (6 82E-06)

(6 ~ 81E-06)

(6. 63E-06)

(6 ~ 63E-06)

(6 ~ 63E 06)

(6.06E-06)

(5.67E-06)

(5 ~ 22E 06)

ESW B 1D610 ESW D 1D610 ESW A 1D624 ESW A 1D644 ESW C

1D644 ESW C

1D624 DIESEL A DIESEL D 1B220 ESW A DIESEL B DIESEL D ESW C DIESEL B DIESEL D Page 3

C: XPEPEQCAM1. PRT 10/1/93 SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page g5'7 (5 '5E-06)

RHRSW 2A OB536 78 (5 ~ 14E-06)

RHRSW 1A OB516 79 (5. 03E-06)

ESW A 80 (5 ~ 03E-06)

ESW A DIESEL D 1D623 DIESEL B 1D623 81 (5.03E-06)

ESW C

DIESEL D 1D623 82 (5.03E-06)

ESW C

DIESEL B 1D623

, 83 (4 '0E-06)

RHRSW 2A 1D630 84 (4.12E 06) 1D613 85 (2.65E-06)

RHR A 86 (1. 67E-06)

RHR A 2D624 RHR C OB526 87 (1. 67E-06)

RHR A OB536 88 (1. 66E-06)

RHR C 89 (1.43E-06)

RHR A 90 (1.42E-06)

RHR C 91 (1 39E-06)

RHR A 92 (1.39E-06)

RHR A 93 (1. 37E-06)

RHR A 94 (1: 27E-06)

ESW A OB516 1D630 1D610 1D644 1D624 DIESEL B DIESEL D DIESEL D 1B220 95 (1 ~ 27E-06)

ESW C

DIESEL D 1B220 96 (1 ~ 18E-06)

RHRSW lA 2A201 97 (1.05E 06)

RHR A DIESEL D 1D623 98 (1.05E 06)

RHR A DIESEL B 1D623 99 (9 '7E-07) 1D613 100 (9 '7E-07) 1D613 101 (9.93E-07) 1D633 OB526 OB536 OB516 102 (8 '8E 07)

DIESEL A DIESEL B OB546 103 (8.78E-07)

DIESEL B DIESEL D OB516 104 (8.38E-07) 1D630 1D613 Page 4

105 (8.38E-07) 1D610 106 (8.35E-07) 1D610 107 (8 '5E-07) 1D630 108 (8.25E-07) 1D624 109 (8 '5E-07) 1D644 C: XPEPEXCAM1 ~ PRT 10/1/93 lD613 1D633 lD633 1D613 1D613 SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page 't 110 (7. 50E-07)

DIESEL A DIESEL D 1D620 111 (7. 50E-07)

DIESEL A DZESEL 112 (7. 50E-07)

DIESEL 8 DIESEL 8 1D620 D 1D610 113 (6.92E-07) lA201 DIESEL C 114 (6.25E-07)

DIESEL D 1D613 115 (6. 25E-07)

DIESEL 8 1D613 1D623 1D623 116 (4 '8E-07) 2A201 117 (3.28E 07) 1A202 118 (3 '8E-07) lA204 119 (3 26E-07) 1A201 1D633 1D613 1D613 1D633 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1

LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT STATE 4

1 FREQUENCY~

4 63E-02

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<SU PPORT 120 (2 66E-07)

RHR A DIESEL D 18220 SYSTEM<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

121 (2 ~ 51E-07) 18230 122 (2 51E-07) 18210 123 (2. 11E 07) 18210 124 (1 85E-07) 1A202 08516 08536 1D630 DIESEL A Page 5

125 (1. 85E-07) 1A204 C'PEPEXCAM1. PRT 10/1/93 DIESEL A SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page Ea 126 (1. 84E-07)

ESW A 127 (1 ~ 84E-07)

ESW C

128 (1 ~ 58E-07) 1B230 DIESEL B OB546 DIESEL B OB546 DIESEL A 1D613 129 (1 ~ 58E-07)

DIESEL D 1D613 1B220 130 (1. 58E-07)

ESW A DIESEL D 1D620 131 (1. 58E-07)

ESW A DIESEL B 1D620 132 (1. 57E-07)

ESW C

DIESEL D 1D620 133 (1.57E-07)

ESW C 134 (1.51E-07) 2D634 135 (1 '1E-07)

OB516 136 (1.27E-07) 1D610 DIESEL B 1D620 OB516 2D624 2D624 137 (1.09E-07)

DIESEL A DIESEL D 2A202 138 (9 49E-08) 2D634 139 (7. 13E-08) 140 (7 ~ 13E-08)

ESW A ESW A 141 (6 '1E-08)

ESW C

142 (6,51E<<08)

ESW C

143 (4 '7E-08) 1A201 144 (4 ~ 94E-08) 1A201 DIESEL A 1D613 1A204 1A202 1A202 1A204 a

ESW B 2D624 145 (4. 47E-08) 1A201 ESW D

146 (3 ~ 85E-08)

RHR A DIESEL B OB546 147 (3. 64E 08)

OB516 148 (3. 64E-08)

OB516 149 (3 29E-08)

RHR A 150 (3. 29E-08)

RHR A 151 (3. 06E-08) 1D630 152 (3.06E-08)

ID610 153 (3.06E-08) 1D610 OB536 OB526 DIESEL D 1D620 DIESEL B 1D620 OB536 OB516 OB526 Page 6

C:XPEPEQCAM1 ~ PRT 10/1/93 SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page 154 (3.06E-08)

-1D610 OB536 155 (3.06E-OS) 1D630 OB516 157 (3. 01E-08) 1D644 156 (3 '1E-08) 1D624 OB516 OB516 158 159 (2.57E-OS)

(2 '3E-08) 1D610 1D630 1D610 1D644 160 161 (2.53E-OS)

(2.39E 08) 1D624 2D634 1D610 1B230 DIESEL A 162 163 (2.35E-OS)

(2. 34E-08)

ESW A DIESEL D 2A202 ESW C

DIESEL D 2A202 164 (2 '9E-08)

DIESEL B 1D613 OB546 165 166 (2.28E-08)

(2 '8E-08)

DIESEL A 1D623 OB546 DIESEL D 1D623 OB516 167 (2 '8E~OS)

DIESEL B 1D623 OB516 168 169 170 171 (2 '3E-08)

(2.13E-08)

(1 '3K-08)

(1 '3E-08)

RHRSW 2A 1B230 1D613 RHRSW 1A 1B210 1D613 DIESEL D 1D620 1D613 DIESEL B 1D620 1D613 172 (1.92E-OS)

DIESEL A 1D620 1D623 173 174 175 176 177 (1.92E-OS)

(1 '2E-08)

(1.75E-OS)

(1. 75E-08)

(1.61E-OS)

DIESEL D 1D610 1D623 DIESEL B 1D610 1D623 RHR A 1A204 RHR A 1A202 2A201 OB536 178 179 (1 ~ 36E-08)

(1.28E-OS) 2A201 2D634 1D630 RHRSW 2A 1D613 180 181 (1.19E-OS)

(1. 19E-08) 1A204 OB516 1A201 OB526 Page 7

182 (1.19E 08) 1A201 183 (1 19E-08) 1A202 C-QPEPEXCAM1 ~ PRT 10/1/93 OB536 OB516 SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page Sg 184 (1.19E-08)

OB516 2A203 185 (1 ~ 02E-08) 1A201 186 (1. 02E-08) 1A204 187 (1.02E-08) 1A202 1D630 1D610 1D610 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSZSP CASE 1

LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT STATE 4

2 FREQUENCY~ 9.54E-01

-SUPPORT SYSTEM 1 (5. 18E-01)

"EVERYTHING WORKS" 2 (9. 61E-02)

D1ESEL C

3 (4.56E-02) 1D613 4

(4 '2E-02) 1D623 5 (4.52E-02) 1D633 6 (2.57E-02)

DIESEL A 7 (2.51E-02)

DIESEL D 8 (2.48E-02)

DIESEL B 9

(1 ~ 14E-02) 1B210 10 (1. 14E-02) 1B220 11 (1. 14E-02) 1B240 12 (1. 14E-02) 1B230 13 (9 90E-03)

ESW A 14 (9 04E-03)

ESW C Page 8

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 (6 '1E-03)

(6 '6E-03)

(6 '2E-03)

(3 ~ 68E-03)

(3 ~ 39E-03)

(2 '3E-03)

(1.66E-03)

(1 ~ 66K-03)

(1.66E-03)

(1 '2E-03)

(1 ~ 42E-03)

(1.42E-03)

(1 37E-03)

(1 '7E-03)

(1.37E-03)

(1.22E-03)

(9.00E-04)

(6.00E-04)

(4 '0E-04)

(3 '1E-04)

(2.05E-04)

(2 ~ OOE-04)

(1 OOE-04)

C-'PEPEXCAH1 ~ PRT 10/1/93 ESW B

2D624 2D644 2D634 ESW D RHRSW 2A RHRSW 1A RHR A OB526 OB536 OB516 OB546 1D610 1D620 1D630 1B237 1B216 1D624 1D644 RHR C FPCHTX FPCHXF FPCFPIV 2A201 2A202 FPCRFV SA-TSY-001, Roy.

0 Page 9o 42 43 (1 OOE-04)

(7. 20E 06)

FPCSTD 2A203 Page 9

C: gPEPEQCAMl PRT 10/1/93

, SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Phg8 44 (7 ~ 20E-06) 2A204 45 (7 ~ 20E-06) 1A204 46 (7 '0E-06) 1A202 47 (7.20E-06) 1A201 FREQUENCY FOR PLANT DAMAGE STATES PLANT DAMAGE NAME

~ T<110F 110F<T<125F 125F(T<150F 150F<T<200F T>200F

--ZNETZATOR-LOOP

7. 3E-02

(

4) 99 1

4.4E-O4

(

i)

~ 60

1. 6E-04

(

\\)

22 3.8E-OS

(

4)

.05 9 'E-06

(

t)

F 01 Page 10

C: XPEPEXCAM11. PRT 10/1/93 SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSZSP CASE 1 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGEP SUPPORT SYSTEM MAINTENANCE HOURS REDUCED SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT STATE 4

1 FREQUENCY~ 3.29E-02 NUM FREQ 1

(6 ~ 86E-03) 2D614 2

(4 ~ 24E-03)

DIESEL C 1D613 3

(4 ~ 21E-03)

DIESEL C 1D633 4

(2 ~ 61E-03)

RSWHXZ 5 (2.46E-03)

DIESEL A DIESEL C 6 (1.37E-03) 1D634 7 (1.37E-03) 1D614

-SUPPORT SYSTEM--

8 (1.06E-03) 9 (1.04E-03) 1B210 DIESEL C DIESEL A 1D633 10 (9.35E-04)

ESW A DIESEL C ll (9.22E-04)

F048A 12 (8 56E-04)

ESW C

DIESEL C 13 (4 ~ 20E-04)

RHRFPZV 14 (3 ~ 52E-04)

RHRSW 2A DIESEL C 15 (3 '3E-04)

F003A 16 (3 '3E-04)

F047A 17 (2.29E-04)

RHR A DIESEL C 18 (2 ~ 19E-04)

ESW B 1D613 19 (2 ~ 19E-04)

ESW D 1D613 Page 1

C: QPEPEQCAN11. PRT 10/1/93 SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 page

'IS 20 21 (2. 19E-04).

(2. 18E-04)

(2 ~ DDE-04)

ESW A ESW C

STDRHR 1D633 1D633 24 25 (1. 72E-04)

(1.58E-04)

(1. 56E-04)

ESW B DIESEL A ESW D (1.54E-04). DIESEL C DIESEL A 2D624 DIESEL A OB516 29 30 31 (1.40E 04)

(1. 32E-04)

(1.00E-04)

(8.62E-05)

RHRSW 2A 1D633 DIESEL C 1D630 DIESEL C 1D610 i'FV RHRSW 1A DIESEL A 32 (5.76E-05)

ESW, A ESW B 33 34 35 36 37 (5 '3E-05)

(5.35E 05)

(5.02E-05)

(4 56E-05)

(4.56E-05)

ESW A ESW D

ESW C

ESW B ESW C

ESW D

RHR A 1D633 RHR C 1D613 38'(3.82E-05)

DIESEL A OB526 40 42 43 44 46 (3.82E-05)

(3.54E-05)

(3.32E-OS)

(3 '1E-05)

(3.26E 05)

(3.16E DS)

(3 ~ 16E-05)

(3 '. 07E-05)

(2 72E 05)

DIESEL A DB536 2A201 DIESEL C ESW A 2D624 ESW C 2D624 DIESEL A 1D630 1D624 DIESEL A DIESEL A 1D644 DIESEL A 1D613 1D633 Page 2

0

48 49 50 52 53 54 55 56 57 58'9 60 (2.41E-O5)

(2.40E 05)

(2 '0E-05)

(1'7E-05)

(1 38E-05)

(1.31E-05)

(1.23E-OS)

(1. 10E-05)

(1. 01E-05)

{8.02E-06)

(8 '2E-06)

(8 '1E 06)

(8 '1E-06)

C:QPEPEQCAM11

~ PRT 10/>/9>

DIESEL B DIESEL D 1D613 DIESEL A DIESEL D 1D623 DIESEL A DIESEL B 1D623 DIESEL A DIESEL B DIESEL D RHR A ESW B

RHR A ESW D RHRSW 1A RHRSW 2A ESW A RHR C ESW C

RHR C ESW A OB526 ESW A OB536 ESW C

OB536 ESW C

OB526 SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 P198 61 (7.98E-06)

ESW B OB516 I

62 63 64 (7.98E-06)

(7.20E-06)

(6 '3E-06)

ESW D

OB516 1A203 RHR A 2D624'5 (6.85E-06) 1B210 1D633 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 (6.84E-06)

(6.84E-06)

(6.82E 06)

(6 '1E-06)

(6.63E-06)

(6. 63E-06)

(6. 06E-06)

(5 '7E-06)

(5 22E-06)

ESW A 1D630 ESW C

1D630 ESW B 1D610 ESW D 1D610 ESW A 1D624 ESW A 1D644 ESW C

1D624 ESW C

1D644 DIESEL A. DIESEL D 1B220 ESW A DIESEL B DIESEL D ESW C

DIESEL B DIESEL D Page 3

C-QPEPEQCAM11

~ PRT 10/1/93 SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page 77 (5.15E-06)

RHRSW 2A OB536 78 (5 ~ 14E-06)

RHRSW 1A OB516 79 (5.03E-06)

ESW A 80 (5'3E 06)

ESW A DIESEL D 1D623 DIESEL B 1D623 81 (5.03E-06)

ESW C

DIESEL D 1D623 82 (5.03E 06)

ESW C DIESEL B 1D623 83 (4.40E-06)

RHRSW 2A 1D630 84 (4. 12E-06) 1D613 2D624 85 (2 '5E-06)

RHR A RHR C 86 (l. 67E-06)

RHR A 87 (1. 67E-06)

RHR A OB536 OB526 88 (1 66E-06)

RHR C OB516 89 (1. 43E-06)

RHR A 90 (1.42E-06)

RHR C 1D630 1D610 91 (1.39E-06)

RHR A 1D624 92 (1. 39E-06)

RHR A 93 (1.37E-06)

RHR A 94 (1.27E-06)

ESW A 1D644 DIESEL B DIESEL D DIESEL D 1B220 95 (1.27E-06)

ESW C

DIESEL D 1B220 96 (1. 18E-06)

RHRSW 1A 2A201 97 (1 ~ 05E-06)

RHR A DIESEL D 1D623 98 (l.05E-06)

RHR A DIESEL B 1D623 99 (9 ~ 97E-07) 1D613

. OB526 100 (9. 97E 07) 1D613 101 (9. 93E 07) 1D633 OB536 OB516 102 (8.78E-07)

DIESEL A DIESEL B OB546 103 (8.78E-07)

DIESEL B DIESEL D OB516 104 (8.38E-07) 1D610 1D613 Page 4

0 0

C: XPEPEQCAM11 ~ PRT 10/1/93 SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 PagB R4 105 (8 38E 07) 1D630 106 (8 ~ 3SE-07)'D630 107 (8 ~ 3SE 07) 1D610 108 (8 25E-07) 1D624 109 (8 ~ 25E-07) 1D644 1D613 1D633 1D633 1D613 1D613

'10 (7 ~ 50E-07)

DIESEL A DIESEL D 1D620 111 (7 ~ 50E-07)

DIESEL A DIESEL B 1D620 112 (7. 50E-07)

DIESEL B DIESEL D 1D610 113 (6 ~ 92E 07) 1A201 DIESEL C 114 (6.25E 07)

DIESEL D 1D613 115 (6 25E-07)

DIESEL B 1D613 116 (4.38E-07) 2A201 1D633 1D623 1D623 117 (3.28E-07) 1A202 118 (3 '8E-07) 1A204 119 (3.26E 07) 1A201 1D613 1D613 1D633 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1.1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER U1-5

OUTAGE, SUPPORT SYSTEM MAINTENANCE HOURS REDUCED SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT STATE 4

1 FREQUENCY~

3 '9E 02

SUPPORT SYSTEM-----

120 (2 ~ 66E-07)

RHR A DIESEL D 1B220

'121 (2 ~ 51E-07) 1B210 OB536 122 (2 ~ 51E-07) 1B230 OB516 123 (2. 11E-07) 1B210 1D630 124 (1.85E 07) 1A202 DIESEL A Page 5

C: iPEPEX+Qfll PRT 10/1/93 SA-TSY-001, Rev.

0 Page t7 125 (1. 85K-07) 1A204 DIESEL A 126 127 (1.84E-07)

(1. 84E-07)

ESW A 'IESEL B OB546 ESW C

DIESEL B OB546 128 (1.58E-07) 1B230 DIESEL A 1D613 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 (1.58E-07)

(1.58E-07)

(1.57E-07)

(1.57E 07)

(1.51E-07)

(1. 51E-07)

(1. 27E 07)

(1.09E-07)

(9 '9E-08)

DIESEL D 1D613 1B220 ESW A DIESEL D 1D620 ESW A DIESEL B 1D620 ESW C DIESEL D 1D620 ESW C

DIESEL B 1D620 OB516 2D624 2D634 OB516 1D610 2D624 DIESEL A DIESEL D 2A202 2D634 DIESEL A 1D613 139 140 (7 '3E-08)

(7 ~ 13E-08)

ESW A ESW A 1A202 0

1A204 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 (6. 51E-08)

(6 '1E-08)

(4.97E-08)

(4.94E-08)

(4 ~ 47E-08)

(3 '5E-08)

(3 ~ 64E 08)

(3. 64E-08)

(3. 29E-08)

(3. 29E 08)

(3 '6E-08)

ESW C

1A204 ESW C

1A202 1A201 ESW B OB516 OB526 OB516 OB536 RHR A DIESEL D 1D620 RHR A DIESEL B 1D620 1D630 OB536 1A201 2D624 1A201 ESW D

RHR A DIESEL B OB546 152 (3. 06E-08) 1D610 OB536 153 (3 '6E-08) 1D610 OB526 Page 6

g: ypEPEQCAM11 ~ PRT 10/1/93 SA-TSY-OOl, Rev.

0 Page ~F 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 (3 '6E-08)

(3 ~ 06E 08)

(3 01E-08)

(3 01K-OS)

(2.57E-08)

(2.53E-08)

(2.53E-OS)

(2 '9K 08)

(2.35E 08)

(2.34E-OS)

(2.29E-08)

(2 '8E-08)

(2 28E-08) 1D610 OB516 1D630 OB516 1D644 PB516 1D624 OB516 1D610 1D630 1D610 1D644 1D624 1D61 0 2D634 1B230 DIESEL A ESW A DIESEL D 2A202 ESW C

DIESEL D 2A202 DIESEL B 1D613 OB546 DIESEL A 1D623 OB546 DIESEL D 1D623 OB516 167 (2 ~ 28E 08)

DIESEL B 1D623 OB516 168 (2 '3E-08)

RHRSW 2A 1B230 1D613 169 (2.13E-OS)

RHRSW 1A 1B210 1D613 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 (1.93E-OS)

(1 93E-08)

(1. 92E-08)

(1.92E-08)

(1. 92E-08)

(1.75E-OS)

(1. 61E-08)

(1. 36E-08)

(1. 28E-08)

(1. 19E-08)

(1 ~ 19E-08)

DIESEL D 1D620 1D613 DIESEL B 1D620 1D613 DIESEL A 1D620 1D623 DIESEL D 1D610 1D623 DIESEL B 1D610 1D623 RHR A 1A202 RHR A 1A204 2A201 OB536 2A201 1D630 2D634 RHRSW 2A 1D613 lA201 OB536 OB516 2A203 Page 7

182 (1 ~ 19E-08) 1A202 183 (1. 19E 08) 1A201 184 (1. 19E 08) 1A204 185 (1 '2E-08) 1A202 186 (1'2K 08) 1A204 187 (1.02E 08) 1A201 QPEPEQCAM11

~ PRT 10/1/93 OB516 OB526 OB516 1D610 1D610 1D630 SA-TSY-OOl, Rev.

0 Page 9't FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS'ASE 1 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER U1 5 OUTAGE~

SUPPORT SYSTEM MAINTENANCE HOURS REDUCED SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT STATE 4

2 FREQUENCY~ 9.67E-01

-SUPPORT SYSTEM 1

(5 '1K 01)

"EVERYTHING WORKS" 2

(9 '1E 02)

DIESEL C 3 (4.56E-02) 1D613 4

(4 '2E-02) 1D623 5 (4.52E-02) 1D633 6 (2.57E-02)

DIESEL A 7 (2. 51E-02)

DIESEL D 8

(2 ~ 48E-02)

DIESEL B 9 (1. 14E-02) 1B210 10 (1.14E-02) 1B220 11 (1.14E 02) 1B240 12 (1 14E-02) 1B230 13 (9 '0E-03)

ESW A 14 (9.04E-03)

ESW C Page 8

0

16 17 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 (6.91K-03)

(6 ~ 86E-03),

(6 '6E-03)

(6 86E-03)

(6 22E-03)

(3. 68E 03)

(3.39E-03)

(2. 43E 03)

(1.66E-03)

(1.66E 03)

(1 ~ 66E 03)

(1.66E-03)

(1. 42E 03)

(1.42E 03)

(1 ~ 42E 03)

(1.37E-03)

(1 ~ 37E 03)

(1'7E 03)

(X.37E-03)

(1 22E 03) c QPEPEX~11

~ PRT 10/1/93 ESN B 2D624 2D644 2D634 ESW D RHRSW 2A RHRSW 1A RHR A OB526 OB536 OB516 OB546 1D610 1D620 1D630 1B237 1B216 1D624 1D644 RHR C SA-TSY-OQ1, Rev.

0 Ping&

/<0 35 (9 OOE-04)

'FPCHTX 37 38 39 40 (6.00E-04)

(4 ~ 20E-04)

(3 '1E 04)

(2 AROSE 04)

(2 OOE 04)

(1 OOE-04)

(1 ~ OOE-04)

(7 ~ 20E 06)

FPCHXF FPCFPZV 2A201 2A202 FPCRFV FPCSTD 2A203 Page 9

ML18026A257

Text

Dear Mr. Miller:

Navigation menu

Search