Text

Forwards Summary of PP&L Quantitative Evaluation of Impact of LOCA Induced Hydrodynamic Loads on Fuel Pool Cooling & Service Water Piping
	ML18026A257
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	12/08/1993
From:	Byram R; PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Chris Miller; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	PLA-4057, NUDOCS 9312140056
	Download: ML18026A257 (173)
	v • d • e

ENCLOSURE 3 Pennsylvania Power &. Light Company Two North Ninth Street ~Allentown, PA 18101.1179 ~ 215/774-5151 1

Robert G. Byram Senior Vice President Nuclear 215/774-7502 DEC 08 1993 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTENTION: Mr. C.L. Miller, Project Director Project Directorate I-2 Division of Reactor Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION TRANSMITTALOF PIPING STRESS EVALUATION FOR FUEL POOL COOLING HYDRODYNAMICLOADS Docket Nos. 50-387 PLA-4057 FILES R41-2/SO35 and 50-388

Dear Mr. Miller:

In response to a request from the NRR sttdE attached please Gnd a summary of PP&L's quantitative evaluation of the impact of LOCA induced hydrodynamic loads on Fuel Pool Cooling and Service Water piping. Any questions should be directed to Mr. R. R. Sgarro at (215) 774-7914.

Very truly yours, Attachment cc: NRC Document Control Desk (original)

NRC Region I Mr. G.S. Barber, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector - SSES Mr. R.J. Clark, NRC Sr. Project Manager - Rockville

'P I

Summary of Analyses: Impact of LOCA Hydrodynamic Loads on Fuel Pool Cooling and Service Water Piping in the Reactor Building BACKGROVND As a result of EDR G20020 a preliminary assessment of the ability of Fuel Pool Cooling piping to withstand seismic and hydrodynamic loads was performed in October 1992. The conclusions reached at that time were that there was a high risk to syst'm function during a seismic event and a low to moderate risk to the system during hydrodynamic events (LOCA). These conclusions were reached based on reviews of piping isometrics, pipe support drawings, response spectra and existing piping calculation results. In order to further address concerns raised by the EDR originators regarding the adequacy of the FPC system during LOCA loads, a more quantitative evaluation of the FPC piping was requested to be made.

EVALUATIONSCOPE Sections of the Unit 2 Fuel Pool Cooling System and the Unit 1 Service Water System were selected as representative samples of piping. The piping selected consists of various pipe sizes, contains equipment terminations such as pumps and heat exchangers, contains in-line anchors, spans various building elevations and is supported using different types of hangers.

ANALYSIS RESULTS The following summarizes the analytical results obtained from the three piping analyses performed. Summary calculation sheets with the actual computed results are also attached.

1) ~Pi e Stress- All computed stresses were well below code allowables. The maximum stress increase due to LOCA loads was 1527 psi on the Service Water calculation. The total stress including deadweight and pressure was still only 18% of the code allowable.

2) Pi Su rt Loads - Pipe support load increases were relatively low in magnitude.

All of the affected pipe supports were evaluated for the increased loads due to LOCA. Some of the original design loadings bounded the new loads generated here due to past conservatisms in computing loads (non-computerized). All of the pipe supports evaluated can be qualified in accordance with the original design allowables and vendor capacities.

3) E ui ment Loads- The nozzle loads due to a combination of deadweight, thermal and LOCA loads were evaluated for the fuel pool coolmg pumps and heat exchangers, All equipment loadings were within the design criteria allowables utilized in the original equipment qualifications.

Page 1

4) Pi e Di lacement Due to LOCA- Pipe movement due to LOCA loads is minimal. The largest LOCA pipe displacement is =0.080" on the service water system. Most displacements are <1/32" and as such will not result in pipe hanger problems such as binding or loss of support.

In addition, the vertical LOCA loads do not create an up-lift on vertical type pipe supports since in all cases the LOCA load magnitude does not overcome the larger deadweight load in the vertical direction.

CONCLUSIONS Based on the analytical results presented here, it can be concluded that the overall affect of Hydrodynamic (LOCA) Loads on the Fuel Pool Cooling and Service Water Piping is not significant. The results support the conclusions reached during the preliminary assessment of the Fuel Pool Cooling and Service Water systems for their ability to withstand LOCA loadings. The increases in pipe stress, pipe support loads, equipment loads and pipe displacements can be shown to be acceptable using the original design criteria and code allowables.

RRS:tah HydroLds.SA Page 2

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I ENCLOSURE 4

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December 21, 1993 TO: Joseph Shea FROM: James Kenny FSAR CHANCE FOR SBGT INLET AIR TEMPERATURE Attached is the Licensing group's record on the change from 180'F to 125'F for the inlet to the Standby Gas Treatment System. This change is consistent with Bechtel's calculation for the SGTS charcoal filters which Steve Jones reviewed in our office.

This'inlet temperature was used to size the SGTS heaters. It is my understanding the SGTS are capable of handling the 180'F inlet and function in this

,environment.

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SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION ER 100450 FILE 841-1 I. ORIG INATION Originating Group or Section Class of Change: Technical Corr ti n N Commi tment Portions of FSAR Affected Description of Change or Deviation Suggested Disposition Justification for Change Technical Specification Change Required Yes Submitted by Date (Originator)

Re Iieved 4y Date (Section or Group Supv..)

Revieved by Date (Cost Area Head)

II. APPROVAL Senior Licensing Specialist Date ~8'P7/ZR Manager-Nuclear Lic. (. Date V.P.-Nuclear Operations +'d Date V.P.-E&C - Nuclear Date FOR LICENSING GROUP USE ONLY Date Ret'd 'uned. FSAR Change Annual FSAR Update Suhndtted ln Rev.

Request Re)ected for the folloving reason:

Senior Licensing Specialist Date Manager - Nuclear Licensing Date

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6. 6 PASSION PRQggCT ggHQV/Ji QND CQ~lggQJg S$ gT~~RS 6 S. 1 g NGT 8 QEREQ Qh f~g fghgURg QESQQ f I/QER SXS'FEHS

6. ~,1. 1 St.andh)( Gas Tggagmr g~ Systom gS.">>1'Sg

6. 5, 1. 1. 1 D~qign Bases The SGTS is de" iqned to accomplish the follovinq saf:..tr rcl..~ ted nhgect ive.:

Exhaust sufficient filtered air from the rosctor huildinq to maintain a neqative pressure oF about 0.75 in. vq in the af fected volumes fol]nvinq secondary cont~ inmcnt isolation (see Subito.ction 9.4.2 fo th~

socondarv containment isolation siqnals) for tho follovinq desiqn basi" events:

(1) soen'. fuel handlinq accident, in the refuelinz floor a:Qa (2) LOCA Pilt.ir the exhausted air to remove radioactive oarticnlates and both radioactire and nonradioactive fnrms'of iodine to limit the offsite dose.t1 the q j i4 e lin s o f 10CPR100.

c) Pi ltor and exhaust discharqe from thc aain .steam i so la t ion va lve lea k con t rol t s y.- ea Nnnss fewer rolated obgoctives For desiqn of the sciTs are as f ol lo v.,:

a) Pi}tor and exhaust ~ir from thc primary containment for pur qinq and ven i la'. inq b) Pil ter and o.xhaust discharqe from the HECT harnmotric condenser

=) Pilter and exhaust from the primary cont~inment pr~ssure reli~f line

0) Pil ter and exhaust nitroqoq from the primary conte inment for ni t".oqen purqinq

>he desiqn bases employed for sizinq the f il,.mrs, fans< end associa+od ductvorh a=e a. follovs:

6 5-1 Rev. 29, 3/82

gg "9i-gn+'p g S' .:

rai is s~ized specified for'tdo'it'iraq incoainq a)"

air~~

Ra t d mixture a<<, gpoP, and containinq fission prof)ucts and inromitiq particulates equivalent <<o 1.0 volume perce~t 55.r Ray of the fission products available in tPe-o'leary containment as dete" mined in accordance Reaulatory Guifle 1. 3 and 7ZD-1QBQQ.

h) Sy tern capacity '.o match the maximum ai" flow:ate reauired for the primary containment purqe.

c) 7he system capacity to be aa!.nt~ined vith all filt.rs fully loaded tdirtv) .

0) Po HEPA filters, maximum free velocity not to excee:)

')00 f pm, vith maximum air flov resistance of 1 in. va when clean and 3 in. vq vhen dirty, an% minimum efficiency of 99.97 percent by DOP 'est method.

to-. prefil'.e:s, maximum face velocity not to exceed 300 fpmn with maximum airflov resistance of 0.~ in. wq vhen clean, and 1 ~ 0 in. vq vhen flirty.

A.-.f;ociateP ductwork is desiqnef) using the ezaal friction m.thod at rate of approximately .06 in. vz/100 f t.

a Charcoal adsorber is rated for 99 percent trappi of

~

"adioactive iodine as elemental iodine (Ig), and 99 percent trappinq of radioactive iof)ine as a~thy) oui/e (cH l) when passinq throuqh cha"coal at 70 nero. t cnl)vive honfdfty nnrl 25oc.

>ach equipment train contains the smoun<<of ch~"coal required to absorb the inven.ory of fissiun products loakina from the primary containment, based on a one uni <<LOCA.

acedia coolinq arranqement for each SGTS train is f)esiqned <<o remove heat qenerated by fission p "odu.".t de"av on the HEPA filters and charcoal adso."bere du=inq shutdown of the train.

5) P~lative humidity at charcoal adsorber is limitod to maximum of 70 percent by removinq moisture ent rained in thy ai. stream and by preheatinq '.he sir.

Failure of any component of the filtration train, as-uminq lo"s of of fsi te pover, cannot impair the ability of the svstea to oo focn fto nvfo.v fonc fons '

7he system remains intact and functional in the event of a Safe Shutdown Fa +hauake (SS>) .

6 '5-2 Rev. 29, 3/82

I' Farh of >he t vn redundant SGTs .rai ns consists of a mi~t limine.or. an electric air heater, a hank of prefilt~rs,handtvo r

hank". of HEPh fil ters, >>p"tream and dovnstream of charco~ l

~>l~>orhor, and a vert ical 8 in. deep charroal cdsorber bod vith f i.-c 4~ oc. ion temperature s nsors, vate" spray sy-tern for fit

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nrnt ~c+ inn, and assoriat ed dz mpcrs, duct s, inst rumen~ s, ron'rnl=. The airflnv diaqraa for the SGTS i. "..hovn on ~iq ir e The instruments and control. s are shown on Fiaurr 9.'1-9.

. h~ -..vst cm desiqn parameters ate pr ovid~ i in Table 6.'5-1.

~h> vo".k, . oui pmcnt and mate: 'ls conform tn =h . applic ihle r~nuir>>ments and rernamendztions of the qui4es, codes, ~>>d t ~nhards listed in Section 3. 2.

".omr 1 i~nc~ nf t).~ system desiqn vith Raqulatory ""uido 1.52, is Ae~c.- ibad in >ection 3. 13. K leo .-.,ee Table 6.5-2.

Fact': <!>>n 1> nt SGTS train has a controllable capacity 3, 00". F m ~ 10, 500 c fm, and each is capable of treating require l amn>>nt nf zi" f 'om both Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor building vnl>>m><'. (sce Suhsction 6.S. 3) . Comnnn~nts f or each S >TS inner as oxplainod in the . ollovinq paragraphs.

are'es Thn ~ z n v~r.'nrma nce a nd mot or sel~'t ion is ha -.ed on . he maxim>> n air densi+v and +he maximum system pressure drop, that is, 70 P

'.erne.-~t>>re at he fan (55aF air at the inlet of th~ SGTS train ales aooroximatcly 15op constant t.mporature pick in acrnss h~a~ c';>, and +he pressure drop i7 based on maximum pressure

".".ons a eros'.-'i= . y f ilt>rs.

. hc charcoal adsorher i.. a qesketless, v tded seam typo, fill~0 Mi'h YT, imn-.oqnated coronut shell charcoal. Tnc hxnk hold.", a

+o'.al of ~oproximately 6,920 lb of charcoal of 28 lb/f-. 'ens'ty, hav inc ar lani tinn tcmper~ture of nnt less than 3')Oo".. Tho cbzrroa l ad~nrber i~ designed for a maximum foaling raoaritv of

2. 5 ma of tots l iodine (radioactive plus stable) mer qram of ac ive charcnal.

six >vs+ ranistr rs are provided for each adsorber. The.-~

c~niste" s .".on!a' +he same death of the .-.arne cha. roal .ha'. 's in

>>~~rh~r. The canistors are mounted, so .ha-. a owrallel flov net h i s c"~at d be+ veen c'ach canistor ant th adsorb.'r. >

t'o- i~dica llv nnn of ~ he canisters is -.emove6 and labors.~rv tc"..~oh o v~rifv thc adsorbent ef ficien.".y.

hi-.> y hv f if> y orovido1 in >he cquipmest in. acco.ss doors into each train housing.

filt~r comportment The Boors.have

. ~n-.nor~at portholes to allov inspection o~ components vithout viol~ tinq the t.".ain inteqrity 6~ ~-3 Rev. 29, 3/82

T~i hou.. inq is of. all veldcd construction.

(:ws iah+ interior liqhts vith external Liqht svitch. s in' i

t x'>>-.o access are provided hetveenRefall train fil"e banks o

'neil it ~ ~e inspection, testinq, and replacement of rnaponont s.

Fit+or ho>>sinqs, includinq vater draini, are in accordance <<ith r ocnm mensa t ions of Section 4. 3 of . 6. 5-1.

~

Duct<<ork is designed'n accordance vith recnaaend~tions nF soc ion 2 8 of Reference 6 S-1, except for sheet aotal gnqo; aro sLinh> lv loss, and the round duc> reinforceaonts. The

". )c vnrk,

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hove vc r, has been seisa ical ly quali fied hy ana l.vs i and ~

I o"-.t inq oF duct spociaens.

">>'4nor makeup air 'uppleaents lov xhaust ai=flnv rat~". fo; ao=t

~f tho SCTS OperatiOnal mOdeS tn SatiSfV the SGTS Fan minim>>a

~i: f1 o<<:eauirement, vhich is approxiaat.l.y 1000 cfa. The.

nut~nor makoup air is also used, at a rate of 3000 c~m, For r:hwrcnal bed cool'inq af te. a cha" coal pro-ignition t.mp~rwtnro is det ec mi~'liminator is designed to prev..nt, blinding of .he .'IEI A

~il te" <<ho.n npe atod at 200oF vith steaa-air aix+ure nontaininq qal nF <<a.er droplets actually entrained in tho ai;strnaa per

~000 cpm ~irflnv.

The e loc:. ic h ow t er educe" t he z clat ive humHi t y o f '. he en t er ing a ir to b lov '10 oercent for charcoal adsorber operation, by m~in aininq z cnnstan,. teape".+ture rise erron" the he~'or. An anal vsis oF heater capabilities for ~ious enterinq saturated ai" cond i'ions "anginq From 5>oF ~o 180 v eld- a po.~k hearing ~

r auiremont nf 180,000 Btu/hr, at aax ua 10,500 cfm zirflo<<. In

~dpi" 'inn, S<,400 Otu/hr heat loss is calcnla.ed From .thr se".t ion

~f S TS hnu"-.inq hetveen +ho heather and +he charcoal beR. nv~rall

.i aui re% canaci~v is 23S,400 Otu/ht. A '10 kd heater .is prov: 5ed.

>ho cha:coal. t ed is provided vith an intoqral va or =.orav svstea cnnnoc. rd tn the station fire protection ~ystea. A deluqe valve

,~rd ceismic Category I hackup valve ar~ aount.d in m ries adiac~n n the charcoal adsorher. Th backup valve i." provident

+o rrevo>>'. rharcnal flooding if the del'ug~ valve fails in zn open nosi'ion. Fire protection for the SGTS filte= train~ is al o

'. i scu .sod in Suhsoc~ ion 9.5 1.

A nnn.in>>n>>s tvpe theraister is provided on the inlo~ and o>>tarot

~ f '. ho ch~ rcoa l bed.

<ho Si:T". -" ac tun ted ei- h.r ~>> tnaaP ical ly ("-.a fetv r ala'. ed ~ ide),

menus ll v (nonsafoty rolatod mode). Th~ wutoaa+ic a" taction is n-. iai na e1 b v the rr a ctn: buildinq isolation ..iqnal, nr hv do ec ion of pre-ignition to.aperat u=e in the charcnal adsorher

6. 5-4 Rev. 29, 3/82

C I ENCLOSURE 5 SA- TS Y-001, Rev . 0 Page i~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

l. Introduction

2. Assumptions

3. Methodology

4. Analysis

4. I Evaluation of Initiating Events 4.2 Case Selection 4.3 Input Information

5. Results Summary

6. Conclusions and Discussion

7. References Figures Appendix A Sample Input and Output Appendix B Block Diagrams and Components Appendix C Support System Data Source Appendix 0 Details of Result Appendix E Estimate of Fuel Pool Boiling Probability for Licensing Basis Case

1. Introduction.

Paae ~

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 The Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleaning (FPCC) System cools the fuel storage pool water by transferring the decay heat of the irradiated fuel through heat exchangers to the service water system. Water clarity and quality in the fuel storage pools, transfer canals, reactor wells, dryer-separator pools, and shipping cask pit are maintained by filtering and demineralizing.

The FPCC system consists of fuel pool cooling pumps, heat exchangers, skimmer surge tanks, filter demineralizers, associated piping, valves, and instrumentation. A simplified diagram of this system is shown in Figure 1.

The FPCC system is designed to maintain the fuel pool water temperature below 125'F at a Maximum Normal Heat Load (MNHL). The HNHL is based upon filling the pool with 2840 fuel assemblies from normal refueling discharges and transferred to the fuel pool within 160 hours0.00185 days 0.0444 hours 2.645503e-4 weeks 6.088e-5 months after shutdown (Ref. 1). For the Emergency Heat Load (EHL) condition, the RHR system is available for fuel pool cooling. The RHR cooling system using one pump and one heat exchanger will maintain the fuel pool water temperature at or below 125'F with or without assistance from the FPCC system. The EHL is defined as a full core offload 250 hours0.00289 days 0.0694 hours 4.133598e-4 weeks 9.5125e-5 months after a shutdown following a typical fuel cycle discharge schedule.

The purpose of this calculation is to estimate the probability of fuel pool boiling in a loss of fuel pool cooling event. The loss of fuel pool cooling event is initiated by postulated accidents (initiating events) at Susquehanna SES. All initiating events listed in Susquehanna IPE (Ref. 2) were evaluated to identify those which will cause loss of fuel pool cooling. For each identified initiating event, the probability of fuel pool boiling was calculated using the PRA methodology presented in Ref. 2. The probability of fuel pool boiling for licensing basis case was also estimated.

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page 3 Assumptions 2.1 ,The fuel pool in Unit 1 is isolated.

2.2 Mhen water temperature in fuel pool reaches 200'F, pool boiling is imminent.

2.3 The decay heat added to the fuel pool from the spent fuel is 10.24 HBtu/hr (Ref. 3).

2.4 During outage all three fuel pool cooling pumps are needed. Two pumps are required for normal plant operation.

2.5 The FPCC system components and piping in Unit 1 can be affected by the hydrodynamic loads of a large break LOCA in Unit 2.

2.6 The confidence level for the FPCC system to remain operable after a large break LOCA is 80K (Ref. 21).

2.7 Only one Division of RHR can be used for fuel pool cooling assist.

Either Pump A or Pump C of RHR Division I can be used in fuel pool cooling assist mode. (See Paragraph 6.5).

2.8 The ECCS keepfill system is not required to start the RHR system.

2.9 During the mission time of a loss of fuel pool cooling event, the Filter Demineralizers are not required and fuel pool cooling pump flush is not necessary.

Nethodol ority Page ~

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 The PRA methodology presented in Susquehanna IPE (Ref. 2) was used in this calculation. This methodology consists of the following steps:

(I) Identify a set of initiating events. The initiating events used in this calculation are loss of offsite power (LOOP), large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA), LOCA with LOCA induced LOOP, and station blackout (SBO).

(2) Establish the success criterion. For a loss of fuel pool cooling event, the success criterion is to maintain fuel pool water temperature below 200'F.

(3) Identify mitigating functions, in terms of plant equipment and operator actions, which are used to satisfy the success criterion .

in response to each initiating event.

(4) Construct the logical relationships between each initiator and those specific mitigating functions whose failure results in propagatin'g the accident sequence.

(5) Develop the logical relationships between primary mitigating functions and the support systems on which they rely.

(6) Based upon the success criterion established, define a set of plant damage states which accident sequences will be grouped into.

The plant damage states in this calculation are the thresholds of fuel pool water temperature.

For accident sequence quantification, plant-specific data was used, whenever it was available. When plant-specific data was not available, generic data was used. After complete input information was gathered, the in-house Probabilistic Risk Assessment Code (PRAC) was used to perform the computation. The output of this calculation is the probability of fuel pool water temperature reaching certain threshold.

L SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page 5 Analysis

4. 1 Evaluation of Initiating Events Among all the initiating events presented in Ref. 2, seven of them may affect the operation of FPCC system in addition to the seismic event. A discussion on whether a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) analysis needs to be performed for each of these initiators follows.

4.1.1 Seismic Event In Appendix 9A of Ref. 4, it was assumed that a seismic event causes the loss of cooling to spent fuel pools in both units and results in fuel pool boiling. It was concluded that offsite dose resulting from fuel pool boiling is well below the allowed limits. Since the effects of this initiating event has been studied in Ref.

4, no PRA analysis is needed.

4.1.2 Loss of 125V DC Bus Event The 125V DC bus provides power to annunciators in the control room for the FPCC system. During a loss of fuel pool cooling event, operators will constantly monitor indications on Fuel Pool Cooling Control Panel 1C206 and/or 2C206 (Ref. 5). The power source for these panels is the 208/120V Instrument AC Distribution Panel IY219 (Ref. 6). Therefore, the FPCC system will remain operable with the loss of 125V DC bus. Thus, PRA analysis was not performed for this initiator.

4. 1.3 Loss of Offsite Power Event The power for operating fuel pool cooling pumps is from 480V Load Center Buses B250, B260, and B270 (Ref. 6). The 13.8 KV buses supply power to these load centers (Ref. 7).

During a loss of offsite power (LOOP) event, all 13.8 KV buses are lost. Therefore, LOOP results in loss of fuel pool cooling pumps. Because LOOP also results in loss of service water pumps (Ref. 2), the fuel pool cooling heat exchangers become inoperable. Since LOOP will cause the loss of normal fuel pool cooling, a PRA analysis for this initiating event is required.

4.1.4 LOCA Event During a LOCA event, the availability of the normal Fuel Pool Cooling System will depend upon the extent hydraulic loads affect the piping and components in the FPCC system.

Because a LOCA event may result in loss of fuel pool cooling, a PRA analysis was performed for this initiator.

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page 4.1.5 Loss of Instrument Air Event There are valves in the fuel pool filter demineralizer system operated by instrument air. The filter demineralizers will be inoperable upon loss of instrument air. However, the flow discharged from fuel pool cooling pumps can bypass the filter demineralizers (Ref. 3). So a loss of instrument air event will not lead to loss of fuel pool cooling. Hence, no PRA analysis is needed for this initiating event.

4.1.6 Station Blackout Event This initiating event is worse than LOOP for fuel pool cooling because a station blackout (SBO) event causes the RHR system inoperable in addition to loss of normal fuel pool cooling system. The RHR fuel pool cooling assist mode will not be available until the diesel source is recovered. A PRA analysis was performed for this initiator.

4.1.7 Loss of 4160V AC Bus Event The 208/120V Instrument AC Distribution Panel IY219 provides power for instrument and control of the FPCC system. The power source for this distribution panel is either the ESS-4.16KV Bus 1A201 or Bus lA203 (Ref. 8).

Loss of both ESS busses may occur if both busses fail on their own or the loss of diesel sources DG 501A and DG501C takes place during a LOOP event. A PRA analysis for this event can be covered by the analysis for SBO event.

4.1.8 LOCA/LOOP Event When the LOCA event occurs and the reactor is successfully shutdown, there is the possibility that the LOCA (with scram) could cause a grid instability and a LOOP to occur.

A PRA analysis was performed because it is part of the Susquehanna design basis.

Based on the above discussions, it was concluded that PRA analyses are required for four initiating events, i.e., LOOP, LOCA, LOCA/LOOP, and SBO.

4.2 Case Selection Among the four initiating events identified in Section 4.1, the frequency of LOOP is orders of magnitude higher than other three initiators. Therefore, many more cases 'initiated by LOOP weretime analyzed than by other initiating events. Because the total failures are to be considered during power operation is much longer than that during refueling operation, they must be treated separately. In order to facilitate collection of plant specific data, the most recent complete fuel cycle between Unit 1 fifth and

SA-TSv-001, Rev. 0 Page 7 sixth refueling outages was selected for cases of normal operation condition. The Unit 1 fifth refueling outage was chosen for cases of outage condition. A brief description of each analyzed case is given below.

Case 1 - LOOP during normal operation of fuel cycle after Ul-5th refueling outage with recovery of LOOP and diesel generators.

Valves HV-11210A and HV-11215A (Support System No. 21) and Valve F048A (Support System No. 59) can be manually operated.

Case. 1.1 - Based on Case 1, with the maintenance hours for valve 151060 (from FPCC system to RHR system) and valve 153071A (fuel pool fill check valve from RHR line) reduced to zero.

Case 1.2 - Similar to Case 1, except that valves F048A (RHR heat exchanger bypass valve), HV-11210A (heat exchanger inlet valve for RHRSN), and HV-11215A (heat exchanger cooling flow outlet valve) can not be manually operated.

Case 2 - LOOP during Unit 1 fifth refueling outage.

Case 2.1 - Similar to Case 2, except valves F048A, HV-11210A, and HV-11215A can not be manually-operated.

Case 3 - LOCA during normal operation of fuel cycle after Unit 1 fifth refueling outage with recovery of LOOP and diesel generators.

Case 4 - LOCA in Unit 2 during Unit 1 fifth refueling outage with recovery of LOOP and diesel generators.

Case 5 - LOCA/LOOP during normal operation of fuel cycle after Unit 1 fifth refueling outage with recovery of LOOP and diesel generators.

Case 6 - Station Blackout during normal operation of fuel cycle following Unit 1 fifth refueling outage with recovery of LOOP and diesel generators.

4.3 Input Information The Input data listing of Case 1 is presented in Appendix A as a sample. The input listings of all other cases are similar except some minor changes. These changes will be discussed along with the discussion of the individual input control type data. The discussions of input control type data presented below follow the path of input information development instead of the control type number sequence.

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page Contrql Type 2 The mission time is taken to be 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months , because the results in Ref. 3 indicate that for an isolated fuel pool the water temperature will exceed 200'F from 110'F in approximately 29 hours3.356481e-4 days 0.00806 hours 4.794974e-5 weeks 1.10345e-5 months upon loss of fuel pool cooling.

The total time failures are to be considered (TFACT) is 11376 hours (474 days) for the fuel cycle after Unit 1 fifth outage (Ref. 9). For Cases 2, 2A and 4, TFACT is 1584 hours0.0183 days 0.44 hours 0.00262 weeks 6.02712e-4 months (66 days) for the fifth refueling outage of Unit 1 (Ref. 9).

Control Type 9 and 23 Input data in these two control types describes the plant state partition event tree, which is shown in Figure 2.

Control Type 10 and 27 Input data in these two control types describes two plant damage state disposition event trees shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4.

Control Type 5 The input data for two functional fault trees, which are presented in Figure 5 and Figure 6, is provided in this control type. The block diagrams in Appendix 8 were constructed for all top events in event trees. Then, the functional fault trees were developed.

Control Type 7 All frontline systems in the fault trees and the failure probability of each system are presented in this control type.

According to Assumption 2.6, the failure probability of Pipe Failure Switch (PIPES) is 0.2.

Control Type 4 The frontline system vs. support system dependency matrix was constructed using information in Appendix 8 and Ref. 2.

Control Type 3 The support system versus support system dependenty matrix was developed using information in References 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 15. In all cases, except Cases 1.2 and 2.1, Support System No. 21 (Valves HV-11210A and HV-11215A) and Support System No. 59 (Valve F048A) do not depend on Support System No. 3 (18237), because these valves are considered to be manually operable during a loss of fuel pool cooling event. For all LOOP related cases the 4160V buses depend on DC power to operate the breakers. This dependency is not needed in Cases 3 and 4.

SA-TSY-OQ1, Rev. p Page Control Type 8 Support system related input data is in this control type. A list of all support systems input data and detailed discussion are given in Appendix C.

Control Type 11 The initiating event frequency of LOOP {1, ) is .071 per cycle (10957 hrs) (Ref. 2). Because the length of, the fuel cycle following Unit 1 fifth refueling outage is 11376 hours, lL~ .071 x 11376/10957 .074 for Cases 1, lA and 1.1.

The length of the fifth refueling outage fs 1584 hours0.0183 days 0.44 hours 0.00262 weeks 6.02712e-4 months . Thus, during this refueling outage, l,~ .071 x 1584/10957 .01 for cases 2 and 2.1.

For the input data of l~ the highest frequency, 1.7 x 10 /15 months, among cases of large break LOCA in reactor recirculation system was chosen (Ref. 2) l,~ 1.7 x 10 x 11376/10957 1.8 x 10 (Case 3) l,~ 1.7 x 10 x 1584/10957 2.5 x 10 (Case 4)

The probability of LOOP caused by a LOCA event is 1 x 10 s/demand (Ref. 2). For Case 5 l~~~~ 1.8 x 10 x 1 x 10 1.8 x 10 The initiating event frequency of SBO given in Ref. 2 is 1.63 x 10 /cycle. For Case 6 1 ~ 1.63 x 10 x 11376/10957 ~ 1.7 x 10 "

Control Type 28 The frontline system No. 20 LOCA switch is affected by the initiating event for Cases 3, 4, and 5.

Control Type 22 The initiating events, LOOP (all case 1's and Case 2's) and LOCA/LOOP (Case 5), affect Support System No. 36 (Offsite Power).

The initiating event, SBO (Case 6), affects Support System Ko. 36 (Offsite Power), No. 40, 41, 42, and 43 (Diesel Generators).

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page ~o Control Type 1Z The support systems eligible for recovery are No. 36 (Offsite Power), No. 40, 41, 42, and 43 (Diesel Generators) for all cases.

Control. Type I3 There are two recovery data tables in this control type. The first table is for offsite power and the second for diesel generators (Ref. 2) ~

Control Type l4 The first recovery table is to be used for support system No. 36.

The second recovery table is to be used for support systems No.

40, 41, 42, and 43.

0 SA- SY-001, Rev. 0

>598 II

5. Results S~ry The results of PRAC computer runs are summarized below.

Case No. Description Probabflit

~

LOOP durfng normal operation with recovery of LOOP 9.4 x 10 and diesel generators, heat exchanger valves may be manuall o crated.

1.1 LOOP during normal operation, support systea 5.3 x 10 maintenance hours reduced.

1.2 LOOP during normal operation, heat exchanger valves 3.5 x 10 not be manuall o crated.

'a LOOP during refueling outage with recovery of LOOP 2.8 x 10 and diesel generators, heat exchanger valves may be manuall o crated.

2.1 LOOP during refueling outage, heat exchanger valves 1.6 x 10 ma not be manuall o crated.

LOCA durfn normal o eratfon. 1.1 x 10 LOCA durin refuel fn outa c. 3.5 x LOCA LOOP durfn normal o eration.

10'.9 x 10 "

Station Blackout durin normal o eratfon 1.0 x 10'ased on the ¹1 Support State information listed in Appendix D, the dominant cause of failure for each case was assessed as follows.

Case 1 fuel pool fillfailure The frequency of Support System RHRFPIV, which is the lines from state failure frequency.

RHR system, contributes 23% of the support The high failure frequency of RHRFPIV is caused by the long maintenance time of 230 hours0.00266 days 0.0639 hours 3.80291e-4 weeks 8.7515e-5 months during the fuel cycle following Unit 1 fifth refueling outage.

Case 1.1 - The failure probability of Support System 2D61i, Unit 2 Channel A 125V DC power, accounts For 21% of the support state failure frequency.

Case 1.2 - The sum of the failure rates of Diesel Generator C and 1D633, Unft 1 Channel C 125V DC power, fs equal to 7t5 of the support state failure frequency.

Case 2 - The failure rate of Support System RSWXHI, Dfv. I RHR heat exchanger and RHR Service Water valves, contributes 20% of the support state failure frequency.

SA- SY-001, ~ev. ".

Page Case 2.1 - The sum of the failure frequencies of Oiesel Generator C and Support System RSQHXI accounts for 85% of the support state failure frequency.

Case 3 - The failure rate of Support System RHRFPIV contributes 55K of the support state failure frequency.

Case 4 - The failure probability of Support System RSXHXI is equal to 58K of the support state failure frequency.

Case 5 - The support states of this case are identical to those in case 1. The failure rate of Support System RHRFPIV accounts for 23K of the support state failure frequency.

Case 6 - The dominant cause of failure is the loss of all AC pmer, onsite and offsite.

a SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page ~P

6. Conclusions and Discussion Based on the results presented in Section 5, the following conclusions can be drawn:

6.1 The probability of fuel pool boiling is much higher in loss of fuel pool cooling events initiated by LOOP than in those initiated by LOCA, LOCA/LOOP, and station blackout. The primary reason is that the initiating event frequency of LOOP is orders of magnitude higher than the other initiators.

6.2 Reduction in out of service hours, including maintenance hours, of systems, equipment, and components needed for restoring fuel pool cooling will lower the probability of fuel pool boiling. For example, in Case 1 the maintenance hours of valve 151060 and check valve 153071A are 73 and 230, respectively. In Case lA these two .

valves have not been taken out of service during the fuel cycle.

The probability of fuel pool boiling for Case 1A is 76K lower than for Case 1.

6.3 If motor operated valves F048A (RHR heat exchanger bypass valve),

cold side inlet valve), and HV-HV-11210A (RHR heat exchanger 11215A (heat exchanger outlet valve) can be manually operated during a loss of fuel pool cooling event, the probability will be reduced significantly. This is the only reason that the probability of fuel pool boiling of Case 1 is only about 27% of that for Case 1.2. The benefit of manually stroking a motor operated valve is that it eliminates the valve dependency on AC power and its associated support string. In addition, the low failure rate of manual valve can be assigned to this particular valve.

6e4 By comparison with the frequency of plant damage states presented in the Susquehanna IPE report (Ref. 2), the frequency of fuel pool boiling during a LOOP initiated loss of fuel pool cooling event is very high, i.e., in the order of 10 in a fuel cycle. This may be attributed to the fact that for all the cases analyzed in Ref.

2, the plant is brought to safe state by cooling the reactor.

Many systems may be used for cooling the reactor. In a loss of fuel pool cooling event only two systems, the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup Systems and the RHR system in Fuel Pool Cooling Assist, can possibly be used to cool the fuel pool. However, a fuel pool boiling incident does not have the kind damaging consequence as does core damage accident. In Appendix 9A of Ref. 4, it has been concluded that a fuel pool boiling incident is of little or no consequence with regard to radioactivity release.

6.5 In this calculation only one Division of RHR was considered available for fuel pool cooling assist (Assumption 2.7), because the other Division must be reserved for reactor vessel injection and/or suppression pool cooling during power operation. During refueling outage, there is good chance that one Division of RHR is out of service due to maintenance. If the limited availability is included in the analysis, the probability of fuel pool boiling is expected to decrease slightly.

SA- SY-001, Rev. 0 Page References (1) SY017 L-2, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup.

(2) Susquehanna SES Individual Plant Evaluation.

(3) Calculation SA-KWB-003, Best Estimate Model for Fuel Pool Thermal Response.

(4) Susquehanna SES FSAR.

(5) ON-235-001, Loss of Fuel Pool Cooling/Coolant Inventory.

(6) PPSL Drawing No. D107316 (E167).

(7) PP8L Drawing No. E107150 (E-l).

(8) PPEL Drawing No. E107159 (E-10).

(9) Outage Date, from A. M. Yu, dated 5/6/93.

(10) PPLL'rawing No. D107302 (E-153).

(11) PPEL Drawing No. E107157 (E-B).

(12) PAID, M-'151.

(13) PAID, M-153.

(14) PALLID, M-109.

(15) PS ID, M-110.

(16) Susquehanna System Status File.

(17) NUREG-0492, Fault Tree Handbook.

(18) Calculation No. RA-B-NA-033, Analysis of Component Outage and Failure Data for Use in the SSES IPE.

(19) NUREG/CR-1363, Rev. 1, Data Summaries of Licensee Event Reports of Valves at U.S. Coneercial Nuclear Power Plants, by C. F. Miller, lf. H. Hubble, et al.

(20) PALLID, M-112.

(21) Telephone Call Record, from Tien Yih to Chuck Dvorscak, 8/30/93.

~ ~

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EVENT COOl.1 NO PLANT STATE SEQ. DESCRlPOON TOP EVLNTNO.

FUEL POOL COOL1NG - I FtGURE 2 PLANT STATE PARTmON EVENT TREE M C/l ED I ID CII I

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TRANSFER FPC PLANT SE().

NO. DAMAGE SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION STATE PLANT FIGURE 3 PLhNT DAMAGESThTE DAMAGE DESCRIPTION SThTE DISPOSITION EVENT TREE N I T<I IO F

No Cooling FPC RHR FPC RI I R,FPC RHR FPC RHR Seq. Plant Sequence Transfer No. Damage Description State 2 I I;2 1,2,-1 1,2,1;2 1,2,1,2,-1 1,2,1,2,1;2 1,2,1,2,1,2,-1 1,2,1,2,1,2,1,-2 1,2,1,2,1,2,1,2 Plant Damage Description State T(I IO F O C/l Ot FIGURE 4 PLANT DAMAGESTATE El' 110 FR<125 F lO ill DISPOSITION EVENT TREE N2 125 Fcj(150 F ~~ O I

I 50 FW<200 F X7 Boiling fl O

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Pl SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page APPENDIX A SNPLE INPUT AND OUTPUT The input data listing of Case 1, which is the base case, is placed in this appendix as a sample. The differences between the input data of Case 1 and that of other cases are described in Section l.3 and Appendix C. The computer output of Case 1 is also included in this. appendix.

s Rev. 0 D: QSTOREQCAN1. ZNP 9/2/93 Page g 2.

1 3 mmmww~~~~~~&wmmum~

FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 A)OP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS 2

'A-TSY-001, 1.0E-8 30 ~ 0 8~0 11376 ~

YYYYYYYYY 8 65 -

0 0. 0

~ OE-4 73 ~ 00 11376 ~ STDRHR SURGE TANK TO RHR DRAIN(BLOCK A) 0 2. 4E-7 0. 0 00 ~ 00 11376 ~ 1B216 480V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B210 0 2. 4E-7 0. 0 00. 00 11376 ~ 1B237 480V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B230 0 6 'E-8 0.0 00. 00 11376 F047A DZV Z RHR HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VALVE 2 0~0 1 ~ OE 3 32 50 '1376 ~ RHR A RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL CHANNEL A EQUIPMENT 0 0.0 7 ~ 2E-6 00 ~ 00 11376 1A201 4160V ClOLNNEL 1A BUS(FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG A) 2 0~0 4 ~ 8E 3 116 00 11376 ESW A EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER CHA?INEL EQUZPMiBiT 2 0.0 4. 8E-3 96. 50 11376 ~, ESW C 024E70 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER CHANNEL 125V DC CHANNEL 1A

~ 0 00. 00 C EQUZPMK2iT 11376 ~ 1D614 0 1 2E-6 0.0 ~ 00. 00 11376 2D614 2 ClDQiNEL A 125V DC POWER 0 0 1.0E-3 05 00 11376 RHR C HEAT REMOVAL CHANNEL C EQUIPMENT 'ESIDUAL 2 0.0 4.8E 3 48 00 11376. ESW B EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER CHANNEL B EQUIPMENT 2 ~ 0 0 4. 8E-3 32 20 11376 ~ ESW D EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER ClQQOKL D EQUIPMENT 0 0. 0 . 7. 2E-6 00. 00 11376. 1A202 024E700 4160V CHANNEL 1B BUS(FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG B) 125V DC CHANNEL 1B 00 00 11376 1D624 0 0.0 7. 2E-6 00. 00 11376 ~ 1A203 4160V CHANNEL 1C BUS(FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG C) 0 2. 4E-7 0. 0 00 ~ 00 11376 1D634 125V DC CHANNEL 1C 0 1.2E-6 0' 00 00 11376 2D634 125V DC CHANNEL 2C,U2 0 0~0 1. OE-4 00 ~ 00 11376 ~ RHRRFV RHR RETURN FLOW VALVE 151070(BLOCK E) 0 0 0 4 ~ 2E-4 230 0 11376 ~ RHRFPZV RHR RETUiQi FUEL POOL INLET VALVES (BLOCKS F 4 G )

0 0.0 4 2E-4 49 80 11376 RSWHXI DZV I RHR HEAT EXCHANGER AND RHRSW VALVES (BLOCK C)

RHRSW 1A 2 0.0 3. 1E-3 6 ~ 50 11376 ~

. RHR SERVICE WATER CHANNEL 1A EQUIPMENT (BLOCK A) 2 0.0 3. 1E-3 13 ~ 20 11376. RHRSW 2A SERVICE WATER CHANNEL 2A EQUIPMENT (BLOCK B) 0~0 7. 2E-6 08 ~ 50 11376 ~ 2A201 4160V CHAlQKL 2A BUS (FED FROM OFFSZTE OR DG A) 0 0~0 2.0E-4 00.00 11376 FPCitPV Page 1

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 D:iSTOREiCAN1 ZNP 9/2/93 Page FUEL POOL COOLING RETURN FLOW VALVES(BLOCK H) 0 0' 4 2E 4 00. 00 11376. FPCFPZV UEL POOL COOLING FUEL POOL ZNLET VALVES(BLOCKS I AND J) 0.0 1.0E-4 00 F 00 11376. FPCSTD FUEL POOL COOLING SURGE TANK DRAIN(BLOCK A) 0 0 0 3 'E-5 00.40 11376 FPCPF FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP FLOW(BLOCKS E,F, AND G) 0 0 0 ~ 6. OE 4 00. 00 11376 ~ FPCHXF FUEL POOL COOLING HEAT EXCHANGE FLOW(BLOCKS B,C iDiE) 0 0~0 OE-4 00. 00 11376 ~ FPCHTX FUEL POOL COOLING HEAT EXCHANGERS (BLOCKS D,E,F) 2 0.0 6. 9E 5 00. 00 11376. SER.WATER SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (BLOCKS A,B, AND C) 0 0.0 1.0E-4 00 00 11376 CIRCULATION WATER RETURN FLOW(BLOCK G) 0 3 'E-6 0.0 00.00 11376 1B251 480V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B250 0 3 'E-6 0 0 00.00 11376 1B261 MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B260 '80V 0 3 'E-6 0.0 00 F 00 11376 1B271 MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B270 '80V 1 6 SE-6 0.0 00.00 11376 OFFSZTE POWER OA103 OR OA104 'FFSZTE 0 0~0 7. 2E-6 00 00 11376 1A204 4160V CHANNEL 1D BUS(FED FROM OFFSZTE OR DG D) 0 2 OE-6 0.0 00. 00 11376 ~ 1B210 480V CHANNEL 1A LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1A201 0 2. OE-6 0. 0 00 ~ 00 11376 ~ 1B230 80V CHANNEL 1C LOAD CENTER FED "FROM 1A203

0. 0 2. 3E-2 60. 90 11376 ~ DIESEL A DIESEL GENERATOR A WITH AUXILIARIES EXCEPT ESW 2, 0.0 2 ~ 3E-2 41 10 11376. DIESEL B DIESEL GENERATOR B WITH AUXILIARIES EXCEPT ESW 2 0.0 9 'E-2 70.10 11376 DIESEL C DIESEL GENERATOR C WITH AUXILIARIES EXCEPT ESW 2 0.0 2 3E-2 48 ~ 10 11376 ~ DIESEL D DIESEL GENERATOR D WITH AUXILIARIES EXCEPT ESW 0 2 'E-7 0 0 01. 00 11376. 1D610 125V DC BATTERY FOR CHANNEL 1A 0 2.4E-7 0~0 01.00 11376. 1D620 125V DC BATTERY FOR CHANNEL 1B 0 2 'E-7 0 0 01. 00 11376. 1D630 024E700 125V DC 125V BATTERY DC CPGQlNEL 1D FOR CHANNEL

00. 00 1C 11376 ~ 1D644 1 7.9E-6 0~0 09.20 11376 1D613 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER FOR CHANNEL lA 1 7 9E-6 0 ~ 0 01 30 11376 1D623 DC BATTERY CHARGER FOR CHANNEL 1B '25V 1 7 'E-6 0 0 01.00 11376. 1D633

~ '029E700 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER 480V FOR CHANNEL 1C 00.00 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER A FED FROM 1B210 11376. OB516

'l 2.9E-7 0 ' 00.00 11376 OB526 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER B FED FROM 1B220 '80V 0 2 'E-7 0.0 00 F 00 11376 OB536 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER C FED FROM 1B230 '80V Page 2

SA-TSY-001, Rey. 0 D: QSTOREQCAN1. INP 9/2/93 Page 0 2 ~ OE 6 0.0 00 00 11376. 1B220 480V ViANNEL 1B LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1A202

2. 9E-7 0. 0 00.00 11376. OB546 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER D FED FROM 1B240 '80V 0 2 OE-6 0~0 00.00 11376. 1B240 480V CHANNEL 1D LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1A204 2 0~0

- l. E-20 00 ~ 00 11376.

I ESMFLPTl DZV I ESW FLOW PATH 1-E-20 t USED TO REPRESENT 11376.

DZV PUMPS 2 0.0 00 F 00 ESWFLPT2

.DZV ZZ ESW FLOWPATHg USED TO REPRESENT DZV ZZ PUMPS 0

DZV 0.0 I 'E-8 1.0E-4 18 '0 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS VALVE 11376. F048A 0 6 0.0 00. 00 11376 ~ F003A DZV I RHR HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET VALVE 0 0.0 7.2E-6 4 '0 11376 2A202 4160V CHANNEL 2B BUS(FED 0 0~0 7 ~ 2E-6 4160V CHANNEL 2C BUS(FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG C) 11376 'A203 FROM OFFSZTE OR DG B)

0. 0 0 0.0 7.2E-6 0~0 11376. 2A204 4160V CHANNEL 2D BUS(FED FROM OFFSZTE OR DG D)

'0 1.2E-6 0' 0~0 11376 2D624 U2 CHANNEL B 125V DC POWER 0 1 2E 6 0' 0.0 11376 2D644 CHANNEL D 125V DC POWER

'2 7 2 3 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

FPCRFVS 0. 0 0 FUEL POOL COOLING RE1%JEN FLOW VALVES SWITCH FPCFPZVS 0.0 0 FPC FUEL POOL INLET VALVES SWITCH FPCSTDS 0.0 0 FPC SURGE TANK DRAIN SWITCH-

'PCPFS 0. 0 0 FPC PUMP FLOW SWITCH r'PCHXFS 0~0 0 FPC HEAT EXCHANGER FLOW SMITCH FPCHTXS 0. 0 0 FPC HEAT EXCHANGER SWITCH SERMATS 0.0 0 S'ERVICE WATER SYSTEM SWITCH CWRFS 0.0 0 CIRCULATION WATER RETK% FLOW SWITCH STDRHRS 0.0 '

SURGE TANK DRAIN TO RHR SMITCH F047AS 0.0, 0 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VALVE SWITCH RHRPAS 0.0 0 RHR PUMP A SWITCH RHRPCS 0.0 0 RHR PUMP C SWITCH RHRRFVS 0' 0 RHR RETURN FLOW VALVE SWITCH RHRFPZVS 0.0 0 RHR FUEL POOL INLET VALVE SWITCH RHRHXI 0.0 0 RHR DZV I HEAT EXCHANGER SMITCH RHRSWP1S 0 0 0 DIV I RHRSW PUMP SWITCH SSTLLS 0. 0 0 SKIMMER SURGE TANK LOW LEVEL SWZTCH F04 8AS 0. 0 0 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS VALVE SWITCH F003AS 0. 0 0 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VALVE SWITCH LOCAS 0~0 0 LOCA SWITCH PIPES 0 2 0 PIPE FAILURE SWITCH DC614S 0. 0 0 '1D614 AND 2D614 SWITCH DC634S 0.0 0 1D634 AND 2D634 SWITCH 6 0 3 65~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

10000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

.01000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00100000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 i0010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 i0001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00001110000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000 00000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000 Page 3

D: QCALCSHELQPRAC>PRACFOR- OUT 9/3 o/93 PPPPP RRRRR AA CCCC PROBALISTZC RISK ASSESSMENT CODE PP PP RR RR AA AA CC C PROBALISTZC RISK ASSESSMENT CODE PPPPP RRRRR AAAAAA CC PROBALISTZC RISK ASSESSMENT CODE PP RR RR AA Ah CC C PROBALISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT CODE PP RR RR AA AA CCCC VERS ZON 1, REV. 0 ( 03/19/9 1)

SUKGLRY OF PRA (VERSION 1 REV. 4) PROGRAM MAXIMA:

MAX. 4 OF SUPPORT SYSTEMS: 99 MAX. g OF SUPPORT STATES 50 MAX. 4 OF CONTAINMENT EVENT FUNCTIONS: 50 MAX. 4 OF RECOVERABLE SUPPORT STATES: 99 MAX. 4 OF INITIATING EVENTS: 30 MAX. 4 OF FRONT-LINE EVENTS: 101 MAX. 4 OF FRONTLINE FUNCTIONS: 101 MAX. 4 OF ACCIDENT SEQUENCES: 150 MAX. 4 OF FRONTLINE SYSTEMS: 100 MAX. 4 OF DAMAGE CLASSES: 20 MAX. 4 OF RECOVERY TIME TABLES: 25 MAX. 4 OF GATES PER FRNTLINE FCTN FAULT TREE: 50 MAX. 4 OF INPUTS PER EVENT GATE 5 MAX. 4 OF 'OMMON MODE FAILURE GROUPS: 20 MAX. 4 OF TITLE/COMMENT CARDS: 10 MAX. 4 OF CONTAINMENT SEQUENCES/EVENT TREE: 40 MAX. 4 OF FAILURE STRINGS PER STATE: 320 MAX. 4 OF TIME RANGES: 25 PROBABILITY AT WHICH SUPPORT SYSTEM FAILURE COMBINATIONS ARE NO LONGER CONSIDERED ~ 100E-07 TIME EQUIPMENT ZS REQUIRED TO OPERATE FOLLOWING AN INITIATOR~30F 00 HRS TIME PLANT ZS ALLOWED TO OPERATE WITH MULTIPLE FAILURE OF EQUIPMENT COVERED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION~ 8.00 HRS TIME THE PLANT ZS EXPOSED TO THE INITIATING EVENTS~ 11376.00 HOURS CASE TITLE:

FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED Page 1

D: QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93 INITIATING EVENT: EVENT WHICH RESULTS ZN A PLANT SCRAM SIGNAL EITHER AUTOMATICALLYOR MANUALLY~ EVENT IS INPUT FOR ANALYSIS (ZE, LOOP) .

SUPPORT SYSTEM: A COMPONENT OR SET OF COMPONENTS WHICH MAY SUPPORT A FRONTLZNE FUNCTION AND/OR HAVE AN ASSOCIATED ALLOWED OUTAGE TIME.

FAILURE STRING: A SET OF SUPPORT SYSTEM FAILURES CALCULATED BY RESOLVING THE SUPPORT VS. SUPPORT AND INZTIATZNG EVENT VS.

SUPPORT SYSTEM MATRIX.

4 SUPPORT STATE: A GROUP OF FAILURE STRINGS WHICH RESULT IN THE FAILURE OF THE SAME PLANT EQUIPMENT.

SUPPORT STATE FREQUENCY: THE FREQUENCY OF THE SUPPORT STATE, CALCULATED BY SUMMING THE STRING CONTRIBUTIONS ZN THAT SUPPORT STATE PLANT STATE PARTITIONING EVENT TREE: THE ZNPUT TO THIS EVENT TREE ZS A SUPPORT STATE NUMBER. ALL SUPPORT STATES GO THROUGH TH1S TREE. THE EVENT TREE SEQUENCES DENOTE WHICH PLANT DAMAGE EVENT TREE IS USED.

PLANT STATE: THE COMBINATION OF THE SUPPORT STATE AND AN EVENT SEQUENCE.

ACCIDENT FREQUENCY: FREQUENCY OF THE PLANT STATE.

FRONTLINE FUNCTION: A DECISION POINT ZN AN EVENT TREE. SOMETIMES CALLED A TOP EVENT. EACH FRONTLINE FUNCTION HAS AN ASSOCIATED FAULT TREE.

FRONTLZNE FUNCTION FAULT TREE: FAULT TREE USED TO IDENTIFY SUCCESS CR1TERIA FOR EACH FUNCTION. FAULT TREES CONSIST OF FRONTLINE SYSTEMS OR SWITCHES FOR SUPPORT SYSTEMS. BOTH ARE ALSO KNOWN AS BASIC EVENTS FRONTLINE SYSTEM: A COMPONENT OR SET OF COMPONENTS USED TO SATZSFY THE SUCCESS CRITERIA FOR A FUNCTZON-BASIC EVENT SWITCH: USED TO LINK A SUPPORT SYSTEM TO THE FAULT TREE. THE PROBABILITY IS EITHER 1.0 OR 0.0.

PLANT DAMAGE EVENT TREE: EVENT TREE USED TO CALCULATE CORE DAMAGE, VESSEL FAILURE, AND CONTAINMENT FAILURE PROBABILITIES.

THE INPUT TO THIS TREE IS EACH PLANT STATE ASSIGNED ZN THE PARTITION EVENT TREE.

EVENT SEQUENCE FREQUENCY: ~QUENCY OF THE COMBINATION OF A PLANT STATE AND A PLANT DAMAGE SEQUENCE DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED Page 2

D XCALCSHELQPRACXPRACFOR OUT 9/30/9>

SUPPORT SYSTEMS MATRIX: MATRIX USED TO IDENTIFY DEPENDANCY OF SUPPORT SYSTEMS ON SUPORT SYSTEMS'RONTLZNE SYSTEMS MATRIX: MATRIX USED TO IDENTIFY THE DEPENDANCY OF FRONTLZNE FUNCTION BASIC EVENTS ON SUPPORT'SYSTEMS'NITIATING EVENT SUPPORT SYSTEM MATRIX: MATRIX USED TO IDENTIFY THE DEPENDANCY OF SUPPORT. SYSTEMS ON INITIATING EVENTS.

INITIATING EVENT FRONTLINE SYSTEM MATRIX: MATRIX USED TO 1DENTZFY THE DEPENDANCY OF FRONTLINE FUNCTION BASIC EVENTS ON INITIATING EVENTS.

INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY: FREQUENCY OF THE INITIATING EVENT OVER THE EXPOSURE TIME.

EXPOSURE TIME'IME OVER WHICH ACCIDENTS ARE PROJECTED TO OCCUR, USUALLY 1 YEAR OR 1 CYCLE.

MISSION TIME: TIME EQUIPMENT ZS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO SATISFY ZTS FUNCTION FOLLOWING AN INITIATING EVENT.

FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYS1'S, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERAT1ON OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT SYSTEM DEFINITIONS SUP SUPPORT SYSTEM SYS NAME DESCRIPTION 1 STDRHR SURGE TANK TO RHR DRAIN(BLOCK A) 2 1B216 480V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B210 3 1B237 480V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B230 4 F047A DZV I RHR HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VALVE 5 RHR A RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL CHANNEL A EQUIPMENT 6 1A201 4160V CHANNEL 1A BUS(FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG A) 7 ESW A EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER CHANNEL EQUIPMENT 8 ESW C EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER CHANNEL C EQUIPMENT 9 1D614 125V DC CHANNEL 1A 10 2D614 U2 CHANNEL A 125V DC POWER ll 12 RHR C ESW B RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL CHANNEL C EQUIPMENT EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER CHANNEL B EQUIPMENT 13 ESW D .EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER CHANNEL D EQUIPMENT 14 1A202 4160V CHANNEL 1B BUS(FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG B) 15 1D624 125V DC CHANNEL 1B 16 1A203 4160V CHANNEL 1C BUS(FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG C) 17 1D634 125V DC CHANNEL 1C 18 2D634 125V DC CHANNEL 2C,U2 19 iQGGQV RHR RETURN FLOW VALVE 151070(BLOCK E) 20 RHRFPZV RHR RETURN FUEL POOL INLET VALVES (BLOCKS F 4 G )

Page 3

QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR OUT 9/3 0/93 p 21 RSWHXI DIV I RHR HEAT EXCHANGER AND RHRSW VALVES (BLOCK C) 22 RHRSW 1A RHR SERVICE WATER CHANNEL 1A EQUIPMENT (BLOCK A) 23 RHRSW 2A RHR SERVICE WATER CHANNEL 2A EQUIPMENT (BLOCK B) 24 2A201 4160V CHANNEL 2A BUS (FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG A) 25 FPCRFV FUEL POOL COOLING RETURN FLOW VALVES(BLOCK H) 26 FPCFPZV FUEL POOL COOLING FUEL POOL INLET VALVES(BLOCKS I AND J) 27 FPCSTD FUEL POOL COOLING SURGE TANK DRAIN(BLOCK A) 28 FPCPF FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP FLOW ( BLOCKS E ~ F ~ AND G )

29 FPCHXF FUEL POOL COOLING HEAT EXCHANGE FLOW ( BLOCKS B J C J D ~ E) 30 FPCHTX FUEL POOL COOLING HEAT EXCHANGERS(BLOCKS D,E,F) 31 SER.WATE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (BLOCKS A,B, AND C) 32 CWRF CIRCULATION WATER RETURN FLOW(BLOCK G) 33 1B251 480V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B250 34 1B261 480V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1B260 35 1B271 480V MOTOR LOAD CENTER FED FROM-1B270 36 OFFSZTE OFFSITE POWER OA103 OR'A104 37 1A204 4160V CHANNEL 1D BUS(FED FROM OFFSZTE OR DG D) 38 1B210 480V CiiA5MEL 1A LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1A201 39 1B230 480V CHANNEL 1C LOAD CENTER FED FROM lA203 40 DIESEL A DIESEL GENERATOR A WITH AUXILIARIES EXCEPT ESW 41 DIESEL B DIESEL GENERATOR B WITH AUXILIARIES EXCEPT ESW 42 DIESEL C DIESEL GENERATOR C WITH AUXILIARIES EXCEPT ESW 43 DIESEL D DIESEL GENERATOR D WITH AUXILIARIES EXCEPT ESW 44 1D610 125V DC BATTERY FOR CHANNEL lA 45 1D620 125V DC BATTERY FOR CHANNEL 1B 46 1D630 125V DC BATTERY FOR CHANNEL 1C 47 1D644 125V DC CHANNEL 1D 48 1D613 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER FOR CHANNEL 1A 49 1D623 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER FOR CHANNEL 1B 50 1D633 125V DC BATTERY CHARGER FOR CHANNEL 1C 51 OB516 480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER A FED FROM 1B210 52 OB526 480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER B FED FROM 1B220 53 OB536 480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER C FED FROM 1B230 54 1B220 480V CHANNEL 1B LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1A202 55 OB546 480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER D FED FROM 1B240 56 1B240 480V CHANNEL 1D LOAD CENTER FED FROM 1A204 57 ESWFLPT1 DZV I- ESW FLOW PATH ; USED TO REPRESENT DIV II I PUMPS 58 ESWFLPT2 DZV ZI ESW FLOWPATHg USED TO REPRESENT DZV PUMPS 59 60 F048A F003A DZV II RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS VALVE DIV RHR HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET VALVE 61 2A202 4160V CHANNEL 2B BUS(FED FROM OFFSZTE OR DG B) 62 2A203 4160V CHANNEL 2C BUS(FED FROM OFFSZTE OR DG C) 63 2A204 4160V CHANNEL 2D BUS(FED FROM OFFSITE OR DG D) 64 2D624 Ui CHANNEL B 125V DC POWER 65 2D644 U2 CHANNEL D 125V DC POWER FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS DEFINITION OF TERMS-OPERATING FAILURE RATE (OP FAIL RATE) - THE PROBABILITY PER UNIT TIME THAT A COMPONENT FAILS AT A GIVEN INSTANT OF TIME.

Page 4

D: QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93 STAND-BY FAILURE RATE (SB FAIL RATE) - THE PROBABILITY THAT A STAND-BY SYSTEM WILL FAIL TO RESPOND WHEN IT ZS CALLED UPON.

EXPOSURE TIME - THE TIME THE PLANT IS EXPOSED TO THE INITIATING EVENTS ~

MAINTENANCE TIME (MAZNT TIME) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF HOURS THE SUPPORI SYSTEM ZS ZN MAINTENANCE DURING THE EXPOSURE TIME.

ALLOWED OUTAGE TINE (ALLOWD OUTGE) TOTAL HOURS A SZNGLZ PIECE OF EQUIPMENT CAN BE OUT OF SERVICE WITHOUT'REQUIRING A FORCED SHUTDOWN AN ASTERISK (*) MEANS THAT PLANT SPECIFIC DATA WAS USED; ADDITIONALLY MAINT TIME AND ALLOWD OUTGE ARE OBTAINED FROM SSES SPECIFIC DATA.

SUPPORT SYSTEM DATA SUP OP FAIL RATE SB FAIL RATE MAZNT TIME ALLOWD OUTGE SYS NAME (PER HOUR) (PER DEMAND) (HOUR) (HOUR) 1 STDRHR OK+00 2. OE-04 73.0 11376.

2 1B216 ~

2.4E-07 O.OE+00 0 11376.

3 1B237 2 'E-07 O.OE+00 ~ 0 11376.

4 F047A 6.0E-08 O.OE+00 ~ 0 11376.

5 RHR A O.OE+00 *1. OE-03 32.5 11376.

6 1A201 a.oE+oo 7.2E-06 0 11376.

7 ESW A O.OK+00 *4 'E-03 116. 0 11376.

8 ESW C O.OE+00 *4 'E-03 96.5 11376.

'E-07 11376.

9 1D614 2 O.OE+00 ~ 0 10 2D614 1.2E-06 O.OK+00 .0 11376.

11 RHR C O.OE+00 *1. OE-03 5.0 11376.

12 ESW B O.OE+00 *4.8E-03 48 0 11376.

13 ESW D O.OE+00 *4.8E-03 32 2 11376.

14 1A202 O.OE+00 7.2E-06 ~ 0 11376.

15 1D624 2 4E-07 O.OK+00 ~ 0 11376.

16 1A203 O.OE+00 7.2E 06 .0 11376.

17 1D634 2 'E-07 O.OK+00 ~ 0 11376.

18 2D634 1.2E-06 0 OE+00 0 11376.

19 KGGQV O.OE+00 1.0E-04 0 11376.

20 RHRFPZV 0 OE+00 4 'E-04 230 ~ 0 11376.

21 RSWHXZ O.DE+00 4 'E-04 49 8 11376.

22 RHRSW 1A 0 AL OE+00 *3.1E-03 6.5 11376.

23 RHRSW 2A 0 AL OE+00 *3.1E-03 13 ' 11376.

24 2A201 O.OE+00 7.2E-06 8.5 11376.

25 FPCRFV 0 AL OE+00 2.0E-04 ~ 0 11376.

26 FPCFPZV O.OE+00 4 'E-04 .0 11376.

27 FPCSTD 0 AL 1.0E-04 .0 11376.

28 FPCPF OE+00'.OE+00 3.9E 05 4 11376.

29 FPCHXF O.OK+00 6.0E-04 0 11376.

30 FPCHTX 0 ~ OK+00 9 'E-04 .0 11376.

31 SER.WATE 0 OE+00 *6.9E-05 ~ 0 11376.

32 CWRF 0 OR+00 1.0E 04 0 11376.

Page 5

SA-TSY-001, Rey, 0 D: QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/3 0/93 Page Z~

33 lB251 3.5E-06 O.OE+00 .0 11376.

34 1B261 3.5E-06 O.OE+00 .0 11376.

35 1B271 3.5E-06 O.OE+00 .0 11376.

36 OFFSZTE *6.5E-06 O.OE+00 ~ 0 11376.

37 lA204 O.OK+00 7.2E-06 ~ 0 11376.

38 lB210 2 'E-06 O.OE+00 .0 11376.

39 lB230 2 'E-06 O B OE+00 0 11376.

40 DIESEL A O B OE+00 *2 3E-02 60.9 11376.

41 DIESEL B O B OE+00 *2 3E 02 41.1 11376.

42 DIESEL C O.OE+00 *9 3E-02 70 1 F 11376.

43 DIESEL D O OE+00 *2 'E-02 48 ' 11376.

'E B

44 1D610 2 07 0 OE+00 1.0 11376.

45 1D620 2 'E-07 O.0K+00 1.0 11376.

46 1D630 2 'E-07 O.OE+00 1.0 11376.

47 1D644 2 'E 07

7.9E-06 O.OE+00 0 OE+00

..0 9'

11376.

48 1D613 49 1D623 *7 'E-06 O.OE+00 1' 11376 50 1D633 *7.9E-06 O.OE+00 1.0 '1376 51 OB516 2 'E-07 O.OE+00 ~ 0 '1376-52 OB526 2 9E-07 O.OE+00 ~ 0 11376.

53 OB536 2 'E-07 O.OE+00 ~ 0 11376.

54 1B220 2.0E-06 O.OK+00 ~ 0 11376.

55 OB546 2 'E 07 OE-06 0 OK+00 O.OE+00 0 11376 11376

~

56 1B240 2 ~ 0 ~

57 ESWFLPT1 O.OE+00 *1. OE 20 0 11376.

58 ESWFLPT2 O.OE+00 *1. OE-20 0 11376 59 F048A ~

0. OE+00 1 ~ OE-04 18 ' 11376.

60 F003A 6.0E-08 0. 0K+00 ~ 0 11376.

61 2A202 O.OE+00 7.2E-06 4 ' 11376 62 2A203 O.OK+00 7.2E-06 ~ 0 '1376.

63 2A204 0 OE+00 7.2E 06 ~ 0 11376-64 2D624 1 2E-06 0 OE+00 ~ 0 11376 ~

65 2D644 1 ~ 2E-06 O.OE+00 .0 11376.

FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FRONTLINE SYSTEM DEFINITION FRONTLZNE SYSTEMS ARE BASIC EVENTS ZN THE FUNCTIONAL FAULT TREES (TOP EVENT FAULT TREES) ~

FAILURE PROBABILITY IS THE PROBABILITY THAT THE FRONTLINE SYSTEM ZS FAILED ZN THE FUNCTIONAL FAULT TREE.

CCDFg ZS THE COMPLEMENTARY CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION USED TO DESCRIBE THE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITY IN TIME.

A SWITCH (USUALLY DENOTED ZN THE NAME WITH AN AS) AS THE LAST LETTER) IS USED TO LINK THE IDENTICAL SUPPORT SYSTEM TO THE FRONTLZNE SYSTEM Page 6

D:XCALCSHELQPRAC~PRACFOR.OUT 9/30/93 SYS FRONTLINE SYSTEM NUM NAME DEFINITION 1 FPCRFVS FUEL POOL COOLING RETURN FLOW VALVES SWITCH 2 FPCFPIVS FPC FUEL POOL INLET VALVES SWITCH 3 FPCSTDS FPC SURGE TANK DRAIN SWITCH 4 FPCPFS FPC PUMP FLOW SWITCH 5 FPCHXFS FPC HEAT EXCHANGER FLOW SWITCH 6 FPCHTXS FPC HEAT EXCHANGER SWITCH 7 SERWATS SERVICE WATER SYSTEM SWITCH 8 CWRFS CIRCULATION WATER RETtDQi FLOW SWITCH 9 STDRHRS SURGE TANK DRAIN TO RHR SWITCH 10 F047AS RHR HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VALVE SWITCH 11 RHRPAS RHR PUMP A SWITCH 12 RHRPCS RHR PUMP C SWITCH 13 RHRRFVS RHR RETURN FLOW VALVE SWITCH 14 RHRFPZVS RHR FUEL POOL INLET VALVE SWITCH 15 RHRHXI RHR DZV I HEAT EXCHANGER SWITCH 16 RHRSWPZS DZV I RHRSW PUMP SWITCH 17 SSTLLS SKIMMER SURGE TANK LOW LEVEL SWITCH 18 F04 8AS RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS VALVE SWITCH 19 F003AS RHR HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VALVE SWITCH 20 LOCAS LOCA SWITCH 21 PIPES PIPE FAILURE SWITCH 22 DC614S 1D614 AND 2D614 SWITCH 23 DC634S 1D634 AND 2D634 SWITCH FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FRONTLINE SYSTEM DATA THE STATUS TABLE IS USED TO DISABLE THE CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION.

FRONTLINE SYSTEM SYS FAILURE STATUS NUM NAME PROBABILITY TABLE 1 FPCRFVS . OE+00 0 2 FPCFPZVS . OE+00 0 3 FPCSTDS .OK+00 0 4 FPCPFS .OE+00 0 5 FPCHXFS .OE+00 0 6 FPCEiTXS AL OE+00 0 Page 7

D: QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR. OUT SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page 7 SERWATS AL OE+00 0 8 CWRFS .OE+00 0 9 STDRHRS .OE+00 0 10 F047AS .OE+00 0 11 RHRPAS ~ QE+00 0 12 RHRPCS .OE+00 0 13 gQGQQVS .OE+00 0' 14 RHRFPIVS .OE+00 15 RHRHXZ .OE+00 0 16 RHRSWPZS .0K+00 0 17 SSTLLS .OE+00 0 18 F048AS .OE+00 0 19 F003AS .OE+00 0, 20 LOCAS .OE+00 0 21 PIPES ~ 2E+00 0 22 DC614S .OE+00 0 23 DC634S .OE+00 0 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FIRST ORDER SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENANCZES SUPPORT SYSTEM NUMBER SUP 00000000011111111112222222222333333333344444444445 SYS NAME 12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890 STDRHR 10000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 1B216 01000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 1B237 00100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 F047A 00010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 RHR A 00001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 1A201 00001110000000000000000000000000000001000000000000 ESW A 00000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ESW C 00000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 1D614 00000122100000000000020000000000000000010000000000 10 2D614 00000022010000000000021100000000000000000000000000 11 RHR C 00000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000 12 ESW B 00000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000 13 ESW D 00000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000 14 1A202 00000000000101000000000000000000000000000000000000 15 1D624 00000000000221100000000000000000000000001000000000 16 1A203 00000001001000010000010000000000000000100000000000 17 1D634 00000000000000011000000000000000000000000100000000 18 2D634 00000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000 19 KG&FV 00000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000 20 RHRFPZV 00000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000 21 RSWHXZ 00000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000 22 RHRSW 00000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000 Page 8

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 D: gCALCSHEL~PRAC<PRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93 Page 54 1B220 pppppppoooopppppppppppp 55 OB546 ppppppp0000000000000000 56 1B240 pppppppp000000000000000 57 ESWFLPT1 pppppppp001000000000000 58 ESWFLPT2 OOOoOOOOOOO1OOOoOOOOOOO 59 FO48A 00000000000000000100000 60 F003A 00000000000000000010000 61 . 2A202 00000000000000000000000 62 2A203 00000000000000000000000 63 2A204 00000000000000000000000 64 2D624 00000000000000000000000 65 2D644 00000000000000000000000 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS~ CASE 1 17 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE APTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT SYSTEM RECOVERY PRIORITY AND TABLE ASSIGNMENTS SUPPORT TABLE PRIORITY SYSTEM NAME ASSIGNMENT 36 OFFSZTE 40 DIESEL A 41 DIESEL B 42 DIESEL C 43 DIESEL D FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 18 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT SYSTEM RECOVERY TABLE ASSIGNMENT TBLg 1 EQPT ASGN TBLN 2 EQPT ASGN 36 40 41 42 43 TIME PROBABILITY TIME PROBABILITY (HR) (HR) 0 0 ~ OOOOOE+00

~ 0 0.00000E+00 Page 16

D: XCALCSHELXPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93

.5 6.92000E 01

.5 1. 40000E-01 1.0 7.94400E-01 1~0 2. 00000E-01 2 ' 8 '3500K-01 2' 3 00000E-01 3 0 8.92700E 01

2. 1 6. 00000E-01 5.5 9.35100E-01 3~0 6. 60000E-01 9.8 9.70500E 01 5.0 7.00000E-01 12 0 9.79600E-01 10.0 8.20000E-01 24 ' 9 '5300E-01 12 ~ 0 8. 40000K-01 60.0 9.99230E-01 24 ~ 0 9 ~ 20000E 01 75.0 9.99530E-01 30.0 9i30000E-01

40. 0 9 ~ 40000E-01

72. 0 9 ~ 70000E 01 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 19 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul 5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FRONTLINE FUNCTION DESCRIPTIONS FAULT TREE FRNTLINE NUM FUNCTION FRONTLXNE FUNCTION DESCRIPTION 1'UEL POO THIS ZS THE DESCRIPTION 2 RHR FUEL THIS ZS THE DESCRIPTION FUEL POOL COOLXNG ANALYSIS, CASE 1 20 Page 17

0 D: XCALC HELXPRACXPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FRONTLINE FUNCTION FAULT TREES FRONTLINE FUNCTION GATE GATE INPUTS (Gf4 REFER TO SUBSEQUENT GATES)

NUM NAME NUM TYPE 1 2 3 1 FUEL POO 1 OR G2 G3 2 AND LOCAS PIPES 3 OR G4 G5 G6 4 OR FPCRFVS FPCFPZVS 5 OR FPCHTXS SERWATS CWRFS 6 OR FPCSTDS FPCPFS FPCHXFS 2 RHR FUEL 1 OR G2 SSTLLS 2 OR G3 G4 ,

GS 3 OR STDRHRS G6 G7 4 OR RHRHXI RHRSWPZS 5 ~ OR RHKRFVS RHRFPZVS 6 AND G8 G9 7 OR F04 7AS F048AS F003AS 8 OR RHRPAS DC614S 9 OR RHRPCS DC634S FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul 5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS ZNZT1ATING EVENT LOOP INITIATING EVENT SS OF OFFSZTE POWER FREQUENCY~7.4E-02 SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCIES 00000000011111111112222222222333333333344444444445 12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890 00000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000 555555555666666 123456789012345 Page 18

J p:ypaLpsHELyppapypRapFpR.ppg e/apyea SA-TSY-001. Rev. 0 Page 000000000000000 FRONTLZNE SYSTEM DEPENDENCIES 00000000011111111112222 12345678901234567890123 00000000000000000000000 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 22 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AETER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT STATE TOP EVENT FREQUENCY RANGE FRNTLZNE LOWER UPPER FUNCTION BOUND. BOUND FUEL 10000 .90000K+01 RHR F 10000 .90000E+01 ZF A SUPPORT STATE HAS TOP EVENT FREQUENCIES, ALL OF WHICH FALL WITHIN THE RATIO RANGE DEFINED ABOVE FOR ANOTHER SUPPORT STATE, THE TWO SUPPORT STATES MAY BE COMBINED.

THIS DEVICE IS USED TO ACCOMODATE VERY LOW FREQUENCY SUPPORT STATES WHILE MINIMIZING THE COMPLEXITY OF THE ANALYSIS.

FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 23 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE 'AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS PLANT STATE DEFINITIONS (PARTITION EVENT TREE END POINTS)

THE PLANT STATE NUMBER DEFINES THE CONTAINMENT EVENT TREE EVALUATED FOR THAT PARTICULAR ENDPOINT PLANT STATE NAME PLANT STATE DESCRIPTION Page 19

D: QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/9>

FUEL POOL FUEL POOL COOLING IS WORKING 2 NO FUEL POOL NO FUEL POOL COOLING FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS'ASE 1 24 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER U1-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS E E PS V ZV FRONTLZNE LT ES NE FUNCTION AA NE IN 00 NT TQ TT 12 TE 1 1 SX 2 1FX FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS~ CASE 1 25 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER U1-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS PLANT DAMAGE STATE DESCRIPTION PLANT DAMAGE STATE NAME DESCRIPTION 1 T<110F POOL TEMP. BELOW ADM. LIMIT 2 '110FcT<125F POOL TEMP. BELOW FSAR LIMIT 3 125F<T<150F POOL TEMP. BELOW FILTER/DEMIN. LIMIT 4 150F<TC200F POOL TEMP BELOW BOILING POINT 5 T>200F POOL IS TO BOIL FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, 'CASE 1 26 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul 5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS PLANT DAMAGE STATE NUMBER IDENTIFIES THE STATE OF THE PLANT DUE TO A PARTICULAR PLANT DAMAGE EVENT TREE SEQUENCE SEQUENCE ZS THE LOGICAL COMBINATION OF FRONTLZNE FUNCTION FAILURES WHICH RESULT ZN A PARTICULAR PLANT DAMAGE STATE.

RECOVERY TIME IS TIME AT WHICH EQUIPMENT MUST BE RECOVERED TO PREVENT A PARTICULAR EVENT IN THE ACCIDENT TRAJECTORY-AN UNDERLINED RECOVERY TIME DENOTES A SUCCESSFUL FRONTLINE Page 20

D: QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93 FUNCT1ON ~

FRONTLZNE FUNCTION TIMING CONSTRAINTS (PLANT DAMAGE EVENT TREE)

EVENT TREE 4 1: FUEL POOL

'VT SEQ FRONTLINE FUNCTION NUM PDS 1 1 1 1.0 1.0 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 27 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul 5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FRONTLINE FUNCTION TIMING CONSTRAINTS (PLANT DAMAGE EVENT TREE)

EVENT TREE~FUEL POOL EVT SEQ NUM PDS FRONTLINE FUNCTION 1 1 FUEL POO SUCCESS 2 2 FUEL POO FAILED FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 28 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FRONTLINE FUNCTION TIMING CONSTRAINTS (PLANT DAMAGE EVENT TREE)

EVENT TREE 4 2: NO FUEL POOL EVT SEQ FRONTLINE FUNCTION NUM PDS 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 Page 21

D: gCRLCSHRLQPRRCQPRRCPOR. ODT 9/30/93 Page 4 '

Qs'. 12.2 12 2 29 ~ 0 29.0 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSZSP CASE 1 29 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE ARITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FRONTLINE FUNCTION TIMING CONSTRAINTS (PLANT DAMAGE EVENT TREE)

EVENT TREE~NO FUEL POOL SEQ NUM PDS FRONTLINE FUNCTION 1 1 FUEL POO SUCCESS 2 1 FUEL POO FAZLEDe RHR FUEL SUCCESS 3 2 FUEL POO FAILED RHR FUEL FAILED; FUEL POO SUCCESS 4 2 FUEL POO FAZLEDe RHR FUEL FAILEDe FUEL POO FAZLEDe RHR FUEL 'SUCCESS 5 3 FUEL POO FAILED; RHR FUEL FAILEDe FUEL POO FAILEDe'HR FUEL FAILED; FUEL POO SUCCESS 6 3 FUEL POO FAZLEDe RHR FUEL FAZLEDe FUEL POO FAZLEDe RHR FUEL FAILEDe FUEL POO FAILEDe RHR FUEL SUCCESS 7 4 FUEL POO FAILED; RHR FUEL FAILED; FUEL POO FAILED'HR FUEL FAILED; FUEL POO FAILEDe RHR FUEL FAILED; FUEL POO SUCCESS 4 FUEL POO FAILED RHR FUEL FAILED'UEL POO FAILED; RHR FUEL FAILEDe FUEL POO FAILEDe RHR FUEL FAILED; FUEL POO FAILEDe RHR FUEL SUCCESS 5 FUEL POO FAILED; RHR FUEL FAILED'UEL POO FAZLEDe RHR FUEL FAILEDe FUEL POO FAILED; RHR FUEL FAILEDe FUEL POO FAZLEDe RHR FUEL FAILED TYPE 18: CONTROL FLAGS SET; RESULTS FLAG 1, OUTPUT FLAG 0, INITIATING DOCUMENTATION LIST FLAG 0, DIAG.41~ 0, DIAG.42~ 0, DZAGC3>

FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 30 Page 23

D: QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS TYPE 19: ASE ANALYSIS OUTPUT FLA~D RESULTS FLAG 1 STRING GENERATION COMPLETE 134124 STRINGS SCANNED FROM (2** 65) COMBINATIONS (INCLUDING THE "EVERYTHING WORKS" STRING) 7115 SUPPORT STRINGS PROCESSEDt 2 SUPPORT STATES GENERATED.

PROCESSING INITIATING EVENT: LOOP CODE: 1 72 CONTAINMENT LOGIC TREES EVALUATIONS IN THIS PASS 9 CONTAINMENT TREES g 2 SUPPORT STATES 2 ACCIDENT SEQUENCES EVALUATED WITH AND WITHOUT RECOVERY)

END OF INPUT DATA REACHED, INPUT/ANALYSIS PHASE COMPLETE PRAC REPORT GENERATOR (VERSION 1 REV. 1) INITIATED 1

FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT STATE 4 1 FREQUENCY~ 4 '3E 02 NUM FREQ SUPPORT SYSTEM 1 (1. 05E-02) RHRFPZV Page 24

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 D: iCALCSHELXPRACXPRACFOR OUT 9/30/93 P598 (6.86K-03) 2D614 (4 24E 03) DIESEL C 1D613 (4.21E-03) DIESEL C 1D633 (3 ~ 4 1K-03) STDRHR (2. 61E-03)

(2.46E-03) DIESEL A DIESEL C 8 (1 37E-03) 1D634 (1. 37E 03) 1D614 10 (1. 06E 03) 1B210 DIESEL C (1.04E-03) DIESEL A 1D633 12 (9 '5K-04) ESW A DIESEL C (9. 22E 04) F048A 14 (8 '6E-04) ESW C DIESEL C 15 (3. 52E 04) RHRSW 2A DIESEL C 16 (3.43E-04) F003A 17 (3.43E-04) F047A 18 (2 ~ 29E-04) RHR A, DIESEL C 19 (2 19E-04) ESW B 1D613 20 (2. 19E-04) ESW D 1D613 21 (2 ~ 19E-04) ESW A 1D633 22 (2.18E-04) ESW C 1D633 23 (1 72E-04) ESW B DIESEL A (1 58E-04) DIESEL A 2D624 25 (1.56E-04) ESW D DIESEL A 26 (1. 54E-04) DIESEL C OB516 27 (I. 40E 04) RHRSW 2A 1D633 28 (1.32E 04) DIESEL C 1D630 29 (1 '2E-04) DIESEL C 1D610 30 (1.00E-04) REGQtFV Page 25

D QCALCSHELQPRACQPMCPOR O~ 9/ 3 0/ 9 3 p 31 (8.62E 05) RHRSW 1A DIESEL A 32 (5.76E 05) ESW A ESW B 33 (5.43E 05) ESW A ESW D 34 (5. 35E-05) ESW C ESW B 35 (5- 02E-05) ESW C 'ESW D 36 (4 ~ 56E-05) RHR A 1D633 37 (4 ~ 56E-05) RHR C 1D613 38 (3.82E 05) DIESEL A OB526 39 (3 '2E-05) DIESEL A OB536 40 (3 ~ 54E-05) 2A201 DIESEL C 41 (3.32E-05) ESW A 2D624 42 (3.31E-05) ESW C 2D624 43 (3 '6E-05) DIESEL A 1D630 44 (3 '6E-05) DIESEL A 1D644 45 (3.16E-05) 1D624 DIESEL A 46 (3 07E-05) RHR C DIESEL A 47 (2 '2E-05) 1D613 1D633 48 (2-41E-05) DIESEL B DIESEL D 1D613 49 (2 '0K-05) DIESEL A DIESEL D 1D623 50 (2 '0E-05) DIESEL A DIESEL B 1D623 51 (1 '7K-05) DIESEL A DIESEL B DIESEL D 52 (1 ~ 38E-05) RHR A ESW B 53 (1.31E-05) RHR A ESW D 54 (1 ~ 23E-05) RHRSW 1A RHRSW 2A 55 (1.10E-05) ESW A 56 (1 ~ 01E-05) ESW C RHR C 57 (8.02E-06) ESW A OB526 58 (8.02E 06) ESW A OB536 Page 26

tl SA-TSV-001, Rev. 0 D:XCALCSHELQPRACXPRACFOR.OUT 9/30/93 Page 59 (8. OIE-06) ESW C OB536 60 (8 ~ 01K-06) ESW C OB526 61 (7 '8E-06) ESW B OB516 62 (7 '8K-06) ESW D OB516 63 (7.20E-O6) 1A203 64 (6. 93E 06) RHR A 2D624 65 (6.85E 06) IB210 ID633 66 (6 '4E-06) ESW A 1D630 67 (6.84E-06) ESW C 1D630 68 (6. 82E-06) ESW B ID610 69 (6 ~ 81E-06) ESW D ID610 70 (6. 63E 06) ESW A ID624 71 (6 ~ 63E-06) ESW A ID644 72 (6.63E-06) ESW C 1D644 73 (6.63E-06) ESW C ID624 (6.06E-06) DIESEL A DIESEL D 1B220 75 (5 67E-06) ESW A DIESEL B DIESEL D 76 (5.22E-06) ESW C DIESEL B DIESEL D 77 (5. 15E-06) RHRSW 2A OB536 78 (5.14E-06) RHRSW IA OB516 79 (5. 03E-06) ESW A DIESEL D ID623 80 (5.03E-06) ESW A DIESEL B ID623 81 (5.03E-06) ESW C DZESEL D ID623 82 (5.03E-06) ES'W C DIESEL B ID623 83 (4 ~ 40E-06) RHRSW 2A ID630 84 (4.12E-06) ID613 2D624 85 (2.65E-06) RHR A 86 (1. 67E-06) RHR A OB526 87 (1 '7E-06) RHR A OB536 Page 27

D:!!,CALC HELQPRACQPRACFOR.OUT 9/30/ Page .!-

88 (1.66E-06) RHR C OB516 89 (1. 43E 06) RHR A 1D630 90 (1.42E-06) RHR C 1D610 91 (1 39E-06) RHR A 1D644 92 (1 39E 06) RHR A lD624 93 (1. 37E-06) RHR A DIESEL B DIESEL D 94 (1 27E 06) ESW A DIESEL, D 1B220 95 (1 27E-06) ESW C DIESEL D 1B220 96 (1. 18E-06) RHRSW 1A 2A201 i

(1 05E 06)

~ RHR A DIESEL D 1D623 98 (1. 05E-06) RHR A DIESEL B 1D623 99 (9 97E-07) 1D613 OB526 100 (9 ~ 97E-07) 1D613 OB536 101 (9. 93E-07) 1D633 OB516 102 (8. 78E-07) DIESEL A DIESEL B OB546 103 (8 '8E-07) DIESEL B DIESEL D OB516 104 (8 38E-07) 1D630 1D613 105 (8. 38E-07) 1D610 1D613 106 (8 35E 07) 1D610 1D633 107 (8.35E-07) 1D630 1D633 108 (8 '5E-07) 1D624 1D613 109 (8. 25E 07) 1D644 1D613 110 (7.50E-07) DIESEL A DIESEL D 1D620 111 (7.50E-07) DIESEL A DIESEL B 1D620 112 (7.50E-07) DIESEL B DIESEL D 1D610 113 (6 '2E-07) 1A201 DIESEL C 114 (6.25E-07) DIESEL D 1D613 1D623 115 (6.25E-07) DIESEL B 1D613 1D623 Page 28

0 D: XCALCSHELQPRACQPRA~FOR. OUT 9/3 0/ p 116 (4 ~ 38E 07) 2A201 1D633 117 (3. 28K-07) 1A202 1D613 118 (3 ~ 28E 07) 1A204 1D613 119 (3 ~ 26E-07) 1A201 1D633 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT STATE 4 1 FREQUENCY~ 4 '3E-02

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~SUPPORT SYSTEM~

120 (2 ~ 66E-07) RHR A DIESEL D 1B220 121 (2 ~ 51E-07) 1B230 OB516 122 (2 ~ 51E-07) 1B210 OB536 123 (2. 11E 07) 1B210 1D630 124 (1. 85E-07) 1A202 DIESEL A 125 (1. 85E-07) 1A204 DIESEL A r

126 (1. 84E-07) ESW A DIESEL B OB546 127 (1.84E-07) ESW C DIESEL B OB546 128 (1 58E-07) 1B230 DIESEL A 1D613 129 (1 ~ 58E 07) DIESEL D 1D613 1B220 130 (1. 58E-07) ESW A DIESEL D 1D620 131 (1.58E 07) ESW A DIESEL B 1D620 132 (1. 57E-07) ESW C DIESEL D 1D620 133 (1.57E 07) ESW C DIESEL B 1D620 134 (1. 51E-07) 2D634 OB516 135 (1. 51E-07) OB516 2D624 Page 29

D ~CALCSHELXPRACQPRACFOR.OUT 9/30/93 SA-TSY-OOl, Rev. 0 Page F 136 (1. 27E 07) 1D610 2D624 137 (1. 09E-07) D1ESEL A DIESEL D 2A202 138 (9 49E-08) 2D634 DIESEL A 1D613 139 (7 ~ 13E-08) ESW A 1A204 140 (7. 13E 08) ESW A 1A202 141 (6. 51E-08) ESW C lA202 142 (6. 51E 08) ESW C 1A204 143 (4. 97E 08) 1A201 ESW B 144 (4.94E-08) 1A201 2D624 145 (4 '7E-08) 1A201 ESW D 146 (3 '5E-08) RHR A DIESEL B OB546 147 (3 '4E-08) OB516 OB536 148 (3 64E 08) OB516 OB526 149 (3 '9E-08) RHR A D1ESEL D 1D620 150 (3 '9E-08) RHR A DIESEL B 1D620 151 (3 ~ 06E-08) 1D630 OB536 152 (3 '6E-08) 1D610 OB516 153 (3.06E-OS) 1D610 OB526 154 (3 '6K-08) 1D610 OB536 155 (3 06E-08) 1D630 OB516 156 (3 '1K-08) 1D624 OB516 157 (3 ~ 01E-08) 1D644 0B516 158 (2.57E-08) 1D610 1D630 159 (2 53E-08) 1D 610 1D644 160 (2 53E-08) 1D624 1D610 161 (2 39E-08) 2D634 1B230 DIESEL A 162 (2 35E-08) ESW A DIESEL D 2A202 163 (2 34E-08) ESW C DIESEL D 2A202 164 (2 '9E-08) DIESEL B 1D613 OB546 Page 30

E I

1

D: QCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93 Page

. ~

165 (2 '8E-08) DIESEL A 1D623 OB546 166 (2 '8E-08) DIESEL D 1D623 OB516 167 (2 28E-08) DIESEL B 1D623 OB516 168 (2 ~ 13E-08) RHRSW 2A 1B230 1D613 169 (2 ~ 13E-08) RHRSW 1A 1B210 1D613 170 (1. 93E-08) DIESEL D 1D620 1D613 171 (1. 93E 08) DIESEL B 1D620 'D613 172 (1.92E-08) DIESEL A 1D620 1D623 173 (l. 92E 08) DIESEL D 1D610 1D623 174 (1. 92E-08) DIESEL B 1D610 1D623 175 (1. 75E-08) RHR A lA204 176 (1. 75E-08) RHR A 1A202 177 (1. 61E-08) 2A201 OB536 178 (l. 36E 08) 2A201 1D630 179 (1. 28E-08) 2D634 RHRSW 2A 1D613 180 (1. 19E 08) lA204 OB516 181 (1.19E-08) 1A201 OB526 182 ( 1 19E-08) 1A201 OB536 183 (1.19E-08) 1A202 OB516 184 (1.19E-08) OB516 2A203 185 (l. 02E-08) 1A201 1D630 186 (1 02E 08) 1A204 1D610 187 (1 02E 08) 1A202 1D610 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT Page 31

D: QCALCSHELQHQCQPRACFOR. OUT 9/30/93 SUPPORT STATE .0 2 FREQUENCY~ 9 ~ 54E 01 SUPPORT SYSTEM-(5.18E 01) "EVERYTHZNG WORKS>>

(9. 61E-02) DZESEL C (4 ~ 56E-02) 1D613 (4 '2E-02) 1D623 (4.52E-02) 1D633 (2 '7E 02) DZESEL A (2 '1E-02) DZESEL D (2 '8E 02) DZESEL B (1. 14E 02) 1B210 10 (1.14E 02) 1B220 (1.14E 02) 1B2I 0 12 (1 14E-02) 1B230 13 (9.90E 03) ESW A 14 (9. 04E-03) ESW C 15 (6.91E-03) ESW B 16 (6. 86E 03) 2D624 17 (6. 86E-03) 2D64I 18 (6 86E 03) 2D63I 19 (6 '2E-03) ESW D 20 (3 '8E-03) KGtSW 2A 21 (3. 39E-03) RHRSW 1A (2.43E-03) RHR A 23 (1.66E-03) OB526 24 (1. 66E-03) OB536 25 (1.66E-03) OB516 Page 32

SA-TSV-001, Rev. 0 D. gCALCSHEZ,gPRACQPRACFOR. OUT 9/3 0/9 3 Page (1 ~ 66E-03) OB546 27 ( 1 ~ 42E 03) 1D610 28 (1 42E 03) 1D620 29 (1.42E-03) 1D630 30 (1 37E 03) 1B237 31 (1. 37E 03) 11216 32 (l. 37E-03) 1D624 33 (1. 37E-03) 1D644 34 (1.22E 03) RHR C 35 (9 ~ OOE-04) FPCHTX 36 (6 ~ OOE 04) FPCHXF 37 (4. 20E 04) FPCFPZV 38 (3 ~ 81E 04) 2A201 39 (2 '5E-04) 2A202 40 (2.00E-04) FPCRFV 41 (1.00E 04) CWRF 42 (1.00E-04) FPCSTD 43 (7 20E-06) 2A203 44 (7.20E-06) 2A204 45 (7.20E-06) 1A204 46 (7 20E 06) 1A202 47 (7.20E-06) 1A201 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul 5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FRONTLINE FUNCTION PROBABILITIES (FRONTLINE FUNCTION AND PLANT DAMAGE EVENT TREES)

Page 33

D: XCALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR OUT 9/30/93 SUPPORT - -- -FRONTLZNE FUNCT1ON STATE FUEL POO RHR FUEL 1 ~ 10E+01 .10E+Ol' 10E+Ol 00K+00 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS CONTAINMENT CSEALLENGE 4 1: FUEL POOL EVNT SE{} SUPPORT STATE FREQUENCY (PER YEAR)

NUM 1 2 1 .OOE+00 .OOE+00 2 OOE+00 ~ OOE+00 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS CONTAINMENT CHALLENGE 4 2 : NO FUEL POOL EVNT SEQ SUPPORT STATE FREQUENCY (PER YEAR)

NUM 1 2 1 .27E 02 .56E 01 2 .51E-04 15E 01 3 40E 03 OOE+00 4 .48E 04 OOE+00 5 . 15E-03 . OOE+00 6 12E-04 OOE+00 7 .37E-04 OOE+00 8 .14E-05 OOE+00 9 ~ 94E-05 ~ OOE+00 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS FREQUENCY FOR PLANT DAMAGE STATES Page 34

3 CALCSHELQPRACQPRACFOR-OUT 9/30/93 PLANT DAMAGE ~ ~m m m m m m mmmm m m m ~ ~ m m m I N IT ZATORm m m w mmmm' m m ~ m m w mme m NAME T<110F 7 3E 02 ( 4) 99 F 1 110F<T<125F 4.4E-04 ( 4)

~ 60 125F<T<150F 1.6E-04 ( \)

~ 22 150F<T<200F 3.8E-05 ( 4) 05

'E F

T>200F 9 06 ( 4)

F 01 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER U1-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS ACCIDENT SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION ACCIDENT SEQUENCE 4 1:

PLANT DAMAGE TREE FUEL POOL INITIATING EVENT LOOP FUEL POO SUCCESS SUP PLANT DAMAGE STATE ST. 1 2 1 O.OE+00 0 OE+00 2 O.OE+00 0 AL OE+00 TOT O.OE+00 0 OE+00 ACCIDENT SEQUENCE 4 2:

PLANT DAMAGE TREE NO FUEL POOL, INITIATING EVENT LOOP FUEL POO FAILED SUP PLANT DAMAGE STATE --

ST. 1 2 3 4 5 1 2.8E-03 4 'E-04 1.6E-04 3.8E-05 9.4E-06 2 7 'E-02 OBOE+00 O-OK+00 0 AL OE+00 O.OE+00 TOT 7.3E-02 4 'E-04 1.6E-04 3 8E-05 9.4E-06 Page 35

CALCSHEZXPRACQPRACFOR OUT 9/30/93 SA"TSY-ool, Rev. 0 Page FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS ACCIDENT SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION ACCIDENT SEQUENCE 4 1:

PLANT DAMAGE TREE FUEL FUEL POO SUCCESS POOL, INITIATING EVENT LOOP SUP - -PLANT DAMAGE STATE ST. 1 2 1 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 2 0 OE+00 O.OE+00 TOT O.OE+00 0 OK+00 ACCIDENT SEQUENCE 4 2 PLANT DAMAGE TREE NO FUEL POOL, INITIATING EVENT LOOP FUEL POO FAILED SUP PLANT DAMAGE STATE--

ST. 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 1 2 7E-03 5.1E-05 4 'E-04 4.8E-05 1 5E-04 1.2E-05 3.7E-05 1.4E-06 2 5..6E-02 1.5E-02 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 O.OE+00 TOT 5.9E-02 1 SE-02 4.0E 04 4.8E-OS 1.5E-04 1 2E-05 3 7E-05 1.4E-06 SUP -PLANT DAMAGE STATE- -

ST. 5 1 9 'E 06 2 0 ~ OE+00 TOT 9.4E-06 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS Page 36

I 1

11

SA-TSY-QQ1, Rey. 0 Page APPENDIX 8 BLOCK DIAGRAl5 AND CNPONENTS The information presented in this appendix is collected from References 12, 13, 14, 15, and 20. The block diagrams in Figures B.l and B.2 and the associated block-component lists represent the Fuel Pool Cooling System. The blocks and components needed for operating RHR system in the fuel pool cooling assist mode are shown by Figures B.3 and 8.4 along with their block-component lists.

From Skimmcr To Surge A H Spent Tank Fuel Pool G

FIGURE B. I FUEL POOL COOLING FLOW BLOCK DIAGRAM

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 P898 07 Fuel Pool Cooling Flat Block Component Name(s) Component ID Letter Sur e Tank Drain Valve 153001 Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve 153002A Heat Exchan er Outlet Valve 153004A Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve 153002B Heat Exchan er Outlet Valve 153004B Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve 153002C Heat Exchan er Outlet Valve 153004C Pump A Suction Valve 153006A FPC Pump A 1P211A Pump A Discharge Check Valve 153009A Pum Discha e Valve 153010 A Pump B Suction Valve 153006 B FPC Pump B 1P211B Discharge Check Valve 153009B Discha e Valve 153010 B Pump C Suction Valve 153006C FPC Pump C 1P211C Discharge Check Valve 153009C Dischar e Valve 153010C FD Bypass Valve 153013 Filter Demineralizer Outlet Valve 153017 Fuel Pool Inlet Valve 153018A Inlet Check Valve 153019A Fuel Pool Inlet Valve 153018 B Inlet Check Valve 153019 B

From To Circ. Water Circ. Water Suction B

Return Header Line F

tl C/l Dl I

FIGURE B.2 SERVICE WATER FLOW BLOCK DIAGRAM Ib C/1 oI gO

SA-TSY-001, Rev. p page be Service Mater Flaw Bl ock Component Name(s) Component ID Letter Pump A Suction Valve 109001 S.M. Pump A 1P502A Discharge Check Valve 109009 Discha e Valve 109001 Pump B Suction Valve 109002 S.M." Pump 8 1P502B Discharge Check Valve 109008 Discha e Valve 109005 Pump C Suction Valve 109003 S.M. Pump C 1P502C Discharge Check Valve 10900'I Discha e Valve 109006 Heat Exchanger A Inlet Valve 110094 FPC Heat Exchanger A 1E202A Heat Exchan er A Outlet Valve 110095 Heat Exchanger B Inlet Valve 110092 FPC Heat Exchanger B 1E202B Heat Exchan er B Outlet Valve 110093 HX C Inlet Valve 110090 FPC Heat Exchanger C 1E202C HX B Outlet Valve 110091 Circ. Mater Return Valve 109114

From Skimmer TQ Surge D

Spent Tank Fuel Pool M C/J ID I FIGURE B.3 RHR FUEl. POOL COOLING ASSIST BLOCK DIAGRAM lD tel

~o 0 o I

X7 ID

~W

0 SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page RHR Fuel Pool Cooling Assist Node Block Component Name(s) Component ID Letter Surge Tank Drain Valve 153021 To RHR Valve 151060 Suction Valve HV-151-F006A RHR Pump A 1P202A Min Flow Valve HV-151-F018A Min Flow Check Valve HV-151-F046A Isolation Valve HV-151-F034A Discha e Check Valve HV-151-F031A Suction Valve HV-151-F006C RHR Pump C 1P202C Min Flow Valve HV-151-F018C Min Flow Check Valve HV-151-F046C Discharge Check Valve HV-151-F031C Isolation Valve HV-151-F034C Heat Exchanger Bypass Valve HV-151-F048A HX Inlet Valve HV-151-F047A HX Outlet Valve HV-151-F003A To Fuel Pool Valve 151070 Fuel Pool Inlet Valve A 153070A Inlet Check Valve A 153071A Fuel Pool Inlet Valve B 153070B Inlet Check Valve B 153071B

0 From To Spray C Pond Spray Pond 8

FIGURE B.4 RHR SERVICE WATER FLOW BLOCK DIAGRAM

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page 73 RHR Service Water Flow Block Component Name(s) Component ID Letter U-1 RHR Service Water Pump A 1P506A Discharge Check Valve 1-12-001 Discha e Valve 1-12-002 U-2 RHR Service Water Puap A 2P506A Discharge Check Valve 2-12-001 Discha e Valve 2-12-002 U-1 RHR Heat Exchanger A 1E205A HX Inlet Valve HV-11210A HX Outlet Valve HV-11215A HX Check Valve 112009

SA-TSY-OOl, Rev. O Page APPENDIX C SUPPORT SYSTBI DATA SOURCE If the data of out of service (OOS) a hours is not from Ref. 16, then it is from Ref. 2 adjusted by multiplier. For Cases 1,

1. 1, 1.2, 3, 5, and 6, this multiplier is equal to 1.038, which is the ratio of the length of the fuel cycle following Unit 1 fifth refueling outage, 11376 hours, and the standard fifteen month cycle, 10957 hours. For Cases 2, 2.1, and 4, this multiplier is equal to 0.145, the ratio of the, Unit 1 fifth refueling outage, 1584 hours0.0183 days 0.44 hours 0.00262 weeks 6.02712e-4 months , and 10957 hours.

The fuel pool cooling PRA model is not affected by reactor condition. The allowed outage time of support systems is set to equal the exposure time.

SA-TSY QQ), Rey. Q Page ?=

1. STDRHR - There are two manual valves, 153021 and 151060, in this block.

From Ref. 17 the failure rate per demand is 1.0 x 10 . For this block the failure rate is 1 ~ 2 x 1.0 x 10 2.0 x 10 /demand

'rom Ref. 16 the maintenance hour of valve 151060 is 73 hours8.449074e-4 days 0.0203 hours 1.207011e-4 weeks 2.77765e-5 months (fuel cycle).

2. 1B216 - Froal Section R of Ref. 18 the failure rate of this load center is 2.4 x 10 /hr.

3. 1B237 - From Section R of Ref. 18 the failure rate is 2.4 x 10 "/hr.

4. F047A - From Ref. 19 the failure rate is 6.0 x 10 /hr, because this valve is normally open.

RHR A - From P.A-148 of Ref. 2, the demand failure rate is 5.3 x 10 the failure rate per hour is 1.4 x 10 . Therefore, the equivalent demand failure rate is 5.3 x 10 + 1.4 x 10 x 30 ~ 1.0 x 10 The 00S hrs 31.3 x 1.038 32.5 (fuel cycle)

The OOS hrs 31.3 x 0.145 4.5 (outage)

6. )A201 - From Table C.1-6a of Ref. 2 the failure rate of bus is 2.4 x 10

/hr.

1 30 x 2.4 x 10 7.2 x 10 /demand

7. ESW A - From Ref. 2 the demand failure rate is 3.4 x 10 and the operating failure rate is'4.8 x 10 /hr.

s 1 30 x 4.8 x 10 + 3.4 x 10 4.8 x 10 s/demand OOS hrs 112.2 x 1.038 116 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 112.2 x 0.145 16.3 (outage)

8. ESW C - Similar to ESW A, l 4.8 x 10 /demand OOS hrs 93 x 1.038 96.5 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 93 x 0.145 13.5 (outage)

9. 1D614 - From P.A-277 of Ref. 2, 1 2.4 x 10 /hr.

10. 2D614 - Assuming the moor cause is fuse failure, from P.C-45 and P.F-47 of Ref. 2, 1 1.2 x 10 /hr.

RHR C - Similar to RHR A, 1 1.0 x 10 /demand'0S hrs 4.8 x 1.038 5.0 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 4.8 x 0.145 0.7 (outage)

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page

12. ESW 8 - Similar to ESlt A, I 4.8 x 10 /demand OOS .hrs 46.3 x 1.038 48.0 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 46.3 x 0.145 6.7 (outage)

13. ESM D - Similar to ESN A, 1 4.8 x 10 /demand OOS hrs 31 x 1.038 32.2 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 31 x 0.145 4.5 (outage)

14. 1A202 - From P.A-258 of Ref. 2 the failure rate/pooled is 2.4 x 10 /hr.

30 x 2.4 x 10 7.2 x 10 /demand

15. 10624 - Similar to 1D614, 1 2.4 x 10 ~/hr.

16. 1A203 - Similar to 1A202, 1 7.2 x 10 /demand.

17. 1D634 - Similar to 1D614, l 2.4 x 10 /hra

18. 2D634 - Similar to 2D614, 1 1.2 x 10 /hr.

19. RHR RFV - From P.C-46 of Ref. 2, t5e failure rate per demand is 1.0 x 10

20. RHR FPIV - There are two manual valves and two check valves in these two blocks. From P.C-46 of Ref. 2 2 (1.0 x 10 + 1.1 x 10 ) 4.2 x 10 /demand From Ref. 16, OOS hrs 230 (fuel cycle)

21. RSWHXI - There are two normally closed motor operated valves and one ch'eck valve in this block in addition to the heat exchanger. The, demand failure rate for the motor operated valves would equal to 1 x 10'f considering they can be myually operated'(P.A-174 of Ref. 2).

Otherwise, it is 5.6 x 10 /demand (P.C-46 of Ref. 2). The failure rate of check vale is 1.1 x 10 (P.C-46 of Ref. 2). The failure rate of heat exchanger is 1 x 10'Section L of Ref. 18). The operating failure rate for this block is 3.8 x 10 /hr (P.A-174 of Ref. 2).

For Cases 1.1 and 2.1, 1 ~ 1 x 10 + 2 x 5.6 x 10 + 1.1 x 10

+ 3.8 x 10 x 30 1.1 x 10 /demand For all other cases, 1 x 10 + 2 x 1 x 10 + 1.1 x 10

+ 3.8 x 10 x 30 4.2 x 10 OOS hrs 48 x 1.038 49.8 (fuel cycle) (P.F-46 of Ref. 2)

OOS hrs 48 x 0.145 7.0 (outage)

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page

22. RHRSM1A - From P.A-174 of Ref. 2, demand failure 2.7 x 10 , operating failure 1.4 x 10 s/hr.

l 2.7 x 10 + 30 x 1.4 x 10-s ea 3 1 x 10 s/demand OOS hrs 6.3,x 1.038 6.5 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 6.3 x 0.145 0.9 (outage)

23. RHRSW2A - Similar to RHRSMIA, l 3.1 x 10 /demand 00S hrs 12.7 x 1.038 13.2 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 12.7 x 0.145 1.8 (outage)

24. 2A201 - Similar to 1A201, l 7.2 x 10 /demand OOS hrs 8.2 x 1.038 8.5 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 8.2 x 0.145 1.2 (outage)

25. FPCRFV - From P.C-46 of Ref. 2, the failure rate of manual valve is 1 x 10 /demand. There are two manual valves in this block.

2 x 1 x 10 am 2.0 x 10 /demand

26. FPCFPIV - There are two manual valves and two check valves in these two blocks. From P.C-46 of Ref. 2.

l 2 (1.0 x 10 + 1.1 x 10 ) 4.2 x 10 /demand

27. FPCSTD - The failure rate of manual valve is 1 x 10 /demand (P.C-46, Ref. 2).

28. FPCPF (Blocks E, F, and G)

Ig each of the three blocks there are one pump, two manual valves and one check valve. These valves have never been clogged, they are open in running mode and the water is clean. Therefore, the operating failure rate should be smaller than 1.4 x 10 . Thus, they are negligible. The check valve may fail to open on demand. Its demand failure rate, ).1 x 10 , should be lumped with the pump demand failure rate, 3.5 x 10 For each block the failure rate is l, 1.1 x 10 + 3.5 x 10 3.6 x 10 /demand For normal operation in a fuel cycle, only two of the -three blocks are needed. Thus, lz 3 x (3.6 x 10 ) 3.9 x 10 /demand The total maintenance hours from Ref. 16 are 26 + 28 + 53 am 107

0 SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page 7Y The equivalent out of service hours should be 3

OOS hrs 107 x 3.6 x 10 0.4 During outage all three blocks are required to be operable.

3 x 3.6

~ x 10 1.1

~ x 10 /demand S hrs 0 (Ref. 16)

29. FPCHXF - In each of the three blocks there are two manual valves, 2 x 1.0 x 10 2.0 x 10 (P.C.-46 of Ref. 2) j$ 3 x 2.0 x 10 6.0 x 10

30. FPCHTX - There are two manual valves and one heat exchanger in each block. The failure rate of each component is 1 x 10 (P.C-46 of Ref. 2 .

and Section L of Ref. 18).

l 3 x 3 x 1 x 10 9.0 x 10 /demand

31. SER WATER - According to information on P.A-203 and P.F-47 of Ref. 2 and Section V of Ref. 18, the operating failure rate of this system is 2.3 x 10 /hr.

1 30 x 2 3 x 10-a 6 9 x 10-s/

32. CWRF - The failure rate for a manual valve in this block is 1 x 10

'/demand (P.C-46, Ref. 2).

33. 1B251 - Power for this load center originates from 13.8 KV Bus lA101 through a transformer and two breakers then reaches Bus B251 (Re.f 6 and ll). using the data in Section R of Ref. 18, 6 x 10 + 2 x 1.2 x 10 + 2.4 x 10 3.2 x 10 /hr.

34. 1B261 - Similar to 1B251, 1 3.2 x 10 /hr.

35. 1B271 - Similar to 1B251, 1 3.2 x 10 4/hr.

36. OFFSITE - From P. F-5 of Ref. 2, the LOOP frequency is .071 per cycle.

0.71/10957 hr 6.5 x 10 /hr.

37. 1A204 - Similar to 1A201, 1 ~ 7.2 x 10 /demand.

38. 1B210 - From P.A-263 of Ref 2, 1 2.0 x 10 ~/hr.

39. 18230 - Similar to 1B210, 1 2.0 x 10 ~/hr.

40. DIESEL A - From Section DD of Ref. 18, 1 2.3 x 10 /demand OOS hrs 58.7 x 1.038 60.9 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 58.7 x 0.145 8.5 (outage)

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page 7R

41. DIESEL B -.Similar to Diesel A, 1 2.3 x'10 a/demand OOS hrs 39.6 x 1.038 41.1 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 39.6 x 0.145 5.7 (outage)

42. DIESEL C - From Section DD of Ref. 18, 1 9.3 x 10 a/demand 00S hrs 67.5 x 1.038 70.1 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 67.5 x 0.145 9.8 (outage)

43. DIESEL D - Similar to Diesel A, 1 2.3 x 10 /demand OOS hrs 46.3 x 1.038 48.1 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 46.3 x 0.145 6.7 (outage)

44. 1D610 - From P.F-46 of Ref. 2, l 2.4 x 10 /hr OOS hrs 1.0 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 0.0 (outage)

45. 1D620 - Similar to 1D610, 1 2.4 x 10 /hr OOS hrs 1.0 (fuel cycle) . ~

OOS hrs 0.0 (outage)

46. 1D630 - Similar to lD610, l 2.4 x 10 /hr OOS hrs 1.0 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 0.0 (outage)

47. 1D644 - Similar to 1D614, 1 2.4 x 10 /hr

48. 1D613 - From P.F-46 of Ref. 2, 1 7.9 x 10 /hr OOS hrs 8.9 x 1.038 9.2 (fuel cycle)

OOS hrs 8.9 x 0. 145 1.3 (outage)

49. 1D623 - Similar to 1D613, 1 7.9 x 10 /hr OOS hrs 1.3 x 1.038 1.3 (fuel cycle)

50. 1D633 - Similar to 1D613, i 7.9 x 10 /hr 00S hrs 1.0 (fuel cycle)

51. OB516 - From P.A-263 of Ref. 2, 1 2.9 x 10 /hr.

52. OB526 - Similar to OB516, l 2.9 x 10 /hr.

53. OB536 - Similar to OB516, 1 2.9 x 10 /hr.

54. IB220 - Similar to 1B210, 1 2.0 x 10 ~/hr.

55. OB546 - Similar to OB516, 1 2.9 x 10 /hr.

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page 'KO

56. 18240 - Similar to 1B210, 1 2.0 x 10 /hr.

57. ESQFLPTI - Because this support system consists of piping only, a very low failure rate of 1 x 10 is assumed.

58. ESWFLPT2 - Similar to ESNFLPTl, l ~ 1 x 10 ~.

59. F048A - From P.C-46 of Ref. 2, 1 5.6 x 10 /demand 00S hrs 18 x 1.038 18.7 (fuel cycle) (Section H of Ref. 18) 00S hrs 18 x 0.145 2.6 (outage)

60. F003A - Similar to F047A, 1 6.0 x 10 a/hr.

61. 2A202 - Similar to 2A201, l ~ 7.2 x 10 ~/demand 00S hrs 4.3 x 1.038 4.5 (fuel cycle) (P.F-47 of Ref. 2) 00S hrs 4.3 x 0.145 0.6 (outage)

62. 2A203 - Similar to 2A201, 1, 7.2 x 10 ~/demand

63. 2A204 - Similar to 2A201, l 7.2 x 10 ~/demand

64. 2D624 - 1 Q 1.2 x 10 /hr (P.F-47 of Rcf. 2).

65. 2D644 - Similar to 2D624, l 1.2 x 10 ~/hr.

rp1132i.tsy:law

SA-TSY-OOl, Rev. 0 Page APPENDIX D DETAILS OF RKSLlLT

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 C - QPEPEQCAM1. PRT 10/1/93 Page ~g FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NOPMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT STATE 4 1 FREQUENCY~ 4.63E-02 SUPPORT SYSTEM--

1 (1.05E-02) RHRFPIV 2 (6.86E-03) 2D614 3 (4 '4E-03) DIESEL C 1D613 4 (4.21E-03) DXESEL C 1D633 5 (3 '1E-03) STDRHR 6 (2.61E-03) RSWHXZ 7 (2.46E-03) DIESEL A DIESEL C 8 (1.37E-03) 1D634 9 (1. 37E-03) 1D614 10 (1.06E-03) 1B210 DIESEL C 11 (1.04E-03) DIESEL A 1D633 12 (9.35E-04) ESW A DIESEL C 13 (9.22E-04) F048A 14 (8.56E-04) ESW C DIESEL C 15 (3 '2E-04) RHRSW 2A DIESEL C 16 (3.43E-04) F003A 17 (3.43E-04) F047A 18 (2 '9E-04) RHR A DIESEL C 19 (2. 19E-04) ESW B 1D613 Page 1

SA-TSY-OOl, Rev. 0 Page ZS C: yPEPEXCAM1. PRT 10/1/93 20 (2. 19E-04) ESW D 1D613 21 (2.19E-04) ESW A 1D633 22 (2. 18E 04) ESW C 1D633 23 (1 '2E-04) ESW B DIESEL A 24 (1 58E-04) DIESEL A 2D624 25 (1 '6K-04) ESW D DIESEL A 26 (1.54E-04) DIESEL C OB516 (1. 40E-04) RHRSW 2A 1D633 28 (1 '2E-04) DIESEL C 1D630 29 (1 32E-04) DIESEL C 1D610 30 (1.00E-04) iUGGQV 31 (8 ~ 62E-05) RHRSW 1A DIESEL A 32 (5 76E-05) ESW A ESW B 33 (5 '3E-05) ESW A ESW D 34 (5 '5E-05) ESW C ESW B 35 (5.02E-05) ESW C ESW D 36 (4 56E-05) RHR A 1D633 37 (4:56E-05) RHR C 1D613 38 (3 '2E 05) DIESEL A OB526 39 (3 '2K-05) DIESEL A OB536 40 (3 '4E-05) 2A201 DIESEL C 41 (3.32E-05) ESW A 2D624 (3 31E-05) ESW C 2D624 43 (3 '6E-05) DIESEL A 1D630 44 (3 '6E-05) DIESEL A 1D644 (3 '6E-05) 1D624 DIESEL A 46 (3 '7E-05) DIESEL A 47 (2 72E-05) 1D613 1D633 Page 2

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page 2+

C. $ PEPEX~1 ~ PRT 10/1/93 48 (2.41E-05) DIESEL B DIESEL D 1D613 49 (2. 40E 05) DIESEL A DIESEL D 1D623 50 (2 '0E-05) DIESEL A DIESEL B 1D623 51 (1.57E-05) DIESEL A DIESEL B DIESEL D (1. 38E-05) RHR A ESW B 53 (1.31E-05) RHR A ESW D 54 (1.23E-OS) RHRSW 1A RHRSW 2A 55 (1. 10E-05) ESW A RHR C 56 (1. 01E-05) ESW C RHR C 57 (8 '2E-06) ESW A OB526 58 (8 '2E-06) ESW A OB536 59 (8.01E-06) ESW C OB536 60 (8 ~ 01E-06) ESW C OB526 61 (7. 98E-06) ESW B OB516 62 (7.98E-06) ESW D OB516 63 (7.20E-06) 1A203 64 (6.93E-06) RHR A 2D624 (6.85E-06) 1B210 1D633 66 (6 84E-06) ESW A 1D630 67 (6.84E-06) ESW C 1D630 68 (6 82E-06) ESW B 1D610 69 (6 ~ 81E-06) ESW D 1D610 70 (6. 63E-06) ESW A 1D624 71 (6 ~ 63E-06) ESW A 1D644 (6 ~ 63E-06) ESW C 1D644 73 (6 ~ 63E 06) ESW C 1D624 74 (6.06E-06) DIESEL A DIESEL D 1B220 75 (5.67E-06) ESW A DIESEL B DIESEL D 76 (5 ~ 22E 06) ESW C DIESEL B DIESEL D Page 3

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page C: XPEPEQCAM1. PRT 10/1/93 g5'7 (5 '5E-06) RHRSW 2A OB536 78 (5 ~ 14E-06) RHRSW 1A OB516 79 (5. 03E-06) ESW A DIESEL D 1D623 80 (5 ~ 03E-06) ESW A DIESEL B 1D623 81 (5.03E-06) ESW C DIESEL D 1D623 82 (5.03E-06) ESW C DIESEL B 1D623

, 83 (4 '0E-06) RHRSW 2A 1D630 84 (4.12E 06) 1D613 2D624 85 (2.65E-06) RHR A RHR C 86 (1. 67E-06) RHR A OB526 87 (1. 67E-06) RHR A OB536 88 (1. 66E-06) RHR C OB516 89 (1.43E-06) RHR A 1D630 90 (1.42E-06) RHR C 1D610 91 (1 39E-06) RHR A 1D644 92 (1.39E-06) RHR A 1D624 93 (1. 37E-06) RHR A DIESEL B DIESEL D 94 (1: 27E-06) ESW A DIESEL D 1B220 95 (1 ~ 27E-06) ESW C DIESEL D 1B220 96 (1 ~ 18E-06) RHRSW lA 2A201 97 (1.05E 06) RHR A DIESEL D 1D623 98 (1.05E 06) RHR A DIESEL B 1D623 99 (9 '7E-07) 1D613 OB526 100 (9 '7E-07) 1D613 OB536 101 (9.93E-07) 1D633 OB516 102 (8 '8E 07) DIESEL A DIESEL B OB546 103 (8.78E-07) DIESEL B DIESEL D OB516 104 (8.38E-07) 1D630 1D613 Page 4

C: XPEPEXCAM1 PRT

~ 10/1/93

't SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page 105 (8.38E-07) 1D610 lD613 106 (8.35E-07) 1D610 1D633 107 (8 '5E-07) 1D630 lD633 108 (8.25E-07) 1D624 1D613 109 (8 '5E-07) 1D644 1D613 110 (7. 50E-07) DIESEL A DIESEL D 1D620 111 (7. 50E-07) DIESEL A DZESEL 8 1D620 112 (7. 50E-07) DIESEL 8 DIESEL D 1D610 113 (6.92E-07) lA201 DIESEL C 114 (6.25E-07) DIESEL D 1D613 1D623 115 (6. 25E-07) DIESEL 8 1D613 1D623 116 (4 '8E-07) 2A201 1D633 117 (3.28E 07) 1A202 1D613 118 (3 '8E-07) lA204 1D613 119 (3 26E-07) 1A201 1D633 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT STATE 4 1 FREQUENCY~ 4 63E-02

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<SU P PORT SYSTEM<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

120 (2 66E-07) RHR A DIESEL D 18220 121 (2 ~ 51E-07) 18230 08516 122 (2 51E-07) 18210 08536 123 (2. 11E 07) 18210 1D630 124 (1 85E-07) 1A202 DIESEL A Page 5

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page Ea C'PEPEXCAM1. PRT 10/1/93 125 (1. 85E-07) 1A204 DIESEL A 126 (1. 84E-07) ESW A DIESEL B OB546 127 (1 ~ 84E-07) ESW C DIESEL B OB546 128 (1 ~ 58E-07) 1B230 DIESEL A 1D613 129 (1 58E-07)

~ DIESEL D 1D613 1B220 130 (1. 58E-07) ESW A DIESEL D 1D620 131 (1. 58E-07) ESW A DIESEL B 1D620 132 (1. 57E-07) ESW C DIESEL D 1D620 133 (1.57E-07) ESW C DIESEL B 1D620 134 (1.51E-07) 2D634 OB516 135 (1 '1E-07) OB516 2D624 136 (1.27E-07) 1D610 2D624 137 (1.09E-07) DIESEL A DIESEL D 2A202 138 (9 49E-08) 2D634 DIESEL A 1D613 139 (7. 13E-08) ESW A 1A204 140 (7 ~ 13E-08) ESW A 1A202 141 (6 '1E-08) ESW C 1A202 142 (6,51E<<08) ESW C 1A204 a

143 (4 '7E-08) 1A201 ESW B 144 (4 ~ 94E-08) 1A201 2D624 145 (4. 47E-08) 1A201 ESW D 146 (3 ~ 85E-08) RHR A DIESEL B OB546 147 (3. 64E 08) OB516 OB536 148 (3. 64E-08) OB516 OB526 149 (3 29E-08) RHR A DIESEL D 1D620 150 (3. 29E-08) RHR A DIESEL B 1D620 151 (3. 06E-08) 1D630 OB536 152 (3.06E-08) ID610 OB516 153 (3.06E-08) 1D610 OB526 Page 6

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page C:XPEPEQCAM1 ~ PRT 10/1/93 154 (3.06E-08) -1D610 OB536 155 (3.06E-OS) 1D630 OB516 156 (3 '1E-08) 1D624 OB516 157 (3. 01E-08) 1D644 OB516 158 (2.57E-OS) 1D610 1D630 159 (2 '3E-08) 1D610 1D644 160 (2.53E-OS) 1D624 1D610 161 (2.39E 08) 2D634 1B230 DIESEL A 162 (2.35E-OS) ESW A DIESEL D 2A202 163 (2. 34E-08) ESW C DIESEL D 2A202 164 (2 '9E-08) DIESEL B 1D613 OB546 165 (2.28E-08) DIESEL A 1D623 OB546 166 (2 '8E-08) DIESEL D 1D623 OB516 167 (2 '8E~OS) DIESEL B 1D623 OB516 168 (2 '3E-08) RHRSW 2A 1B230 1D613 169 (2.13E-08) RHRSW 1A 1B210 1D613 170 (1 '3K-08) DIESEL D 1D620 1D613 171 (1 '3E-08) DIESEL B 1D620 1D613 172 (1.92E-OS) DIESEL A 1D620 1D623 173 (1.92E-OS) DIESEL D 1D610 1D623 174 (1 '2E-08) DIESEL B 1D610 1D623 175 (1.75E-OS) RHR A 1A204 176 (1. 75E-08) RHR A 1A202 177 (1.61E-OS) 2A201 OB536 178 (1 ~ 36E-08) 2A201 1D630 179 (1.28E-OS) 2D634 RHRSW 2A 1D613 180 (1.19E-OS) 1A204 OB516 181 (1. 19E-08) 1A201 OB526 Page 7

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Page Sg C- QPEPEXCAM1 ~ PRT 10/1/93 182 (1.19E 08) 1A201 OB536 183 (1 19E-08) 1A202 OB516 184 (1.19E-08) OB516 2A203 185 (1 ~ 02E-08) 1A201 1D630 186 (1. 02E-08) 1A204 1D610 187 (1.02E-08) 1A202 1D610 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSZSP CASE 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGE WITH RECOVERY OF LOOP AND DIESEL GENERATORS SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT STATE 4 2 FREQUENCY~ 9.54E-01

- -SUPPORT SYSTEM 1 (5. 18E-01) "EVERYTHING WORKS" 2 (9. 61E-02) D1ESEL C 3 (4.56E-02) 1D613 4 (4 '2E-02) 1D623 5 (4.52E-02) 1D633 6 (2.57E-02) DIESEL A 7 (2.51E-02) DIESEL D 8 (2.48E-02) DIESEL B 9 (1 ~ 14E-02) 1B210 10 (1. 14E-02) 1B220 11 (1. 14E-02) 1B240 12 (1. 14E-02) 1B230 13 (9 90E-03) ESW A 14 (9 04E-03) ESW C Page 8

SA-TSY-001, Roy. 0 Page 9o C-'PEPEXCAH1 ~ PRT 10/1/93 15 (6 '1E-03) ESW B 16 (6 '6E-03) 2D624 17 (6 '6E-03) 2D644 18 (6 '6E-03) 2D634 19 (6 '2E-03) ESW D 20 (3 ~ 68E-03) RHRSW 2A 21 (3 ~ 39E-03) RHRSW 1A 22 (2 '3E-03) RHR A 23 (1.66E-03) OB526 24 (1 ~ 66K-03) OB536 25 (1.66E-03) OB516 26 (1.66E-03) OB546 27 (1 '2E-03) 1D610 28 (1 ~ 42E-03) 1D620 29 (1.42E-03) 1D630 30 (1 37E-03) 1B237 31 (1 '7E-03) 1B216 32 (1 '7E-03) 1D624 33 (1.37E-03) 1D644 34 (1.22E-03) RHR C 35 (9.00E-04) FPCHTX 36 (6.00E-04) FPCHXF 37 (4 '0E-04) FPCFPIV 38 (3 '1E-04) 2A201 39 (2.05E-04) 2A202 40 (2 ~ OOE-04) FPCRFV (1 OOE-04) 42 (1 OOE-04) FPCSTD 43 (7. 20E 06) 2A203 Page 9

, SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 Phg8 C: gPEPEQCAMl PRT 10/1/93 44 (7 ~ 20E-06) 2A204 45 (7 ~ 20E-06) 1A204 46 (7 '0E-06) 1A202 47 (7.20E-06) 1A201 FREQUENCY FOR PLANT DAMAGE STATES PLANT DAMAGE - - ZNETZATOR-NAME LOOP

~ T<110F 7. 3E-02 ( 4) 99 1 110F<T<125F 4.4E-O4 ( i)

~ 60 125F(T<150F 1. 6E-04 ( \)

22 150F<T<200F 3.8E-OS ( 4)

.05 T>200F 9 'E-06 ( t)

F 01 Page 10

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 C: XPEPEXCAM11. PRT 10/1/93 Page FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSZSP CASE 1 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER Ul-5 OUTAGEP SUPPORT SYSTEM MAINTENANCE HOURS REDUCED SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT STATE 4 1 FREQUENCY~ 3.29E-02 NUM FREQ -SUPPORT SYSTEM--

1 (6 86E-03) 2D614

~

2 (4 24E-03)

~ DIESEL C 1D613 3 (4 ~ 21E-03) DIESEL C 1D633 4 (2 ~ 61E-03) RSWHXZ 5 (2.46E-03) DIESEL A DIESEL C 6 (1.37E-03) 1D634 7 (1.37E-03) 1D614 8 (1.06E-03) 1B210 DIESEL C 9 (1.04E-03) DIESEL A 1D633 10 (9.35E-04) ESW A DIESEL C ll (9.22E-04) F048A 12 (8 56E-04) ESW C DIESEL C 13 (4 ~ 20E-04) RHRFPZV 14 (3 ~ 52E-04) RHRSW 2A DIESEL C 15 (3 '3E-04) F003A 16 (3 '3E-04) F047A 17 (2.29E-04) RHR A DIESEL C 18 (2 ~ 19E-04) ESW B 1D613 19 (2 ~ 19E-04) ESW D 1D613 Page 1

C: QPEPEQCAN11. PRT 10/1/93 SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 page 'IS 20 (2. 19E-04). ESW A 1D633 21 (2. 18E-04) ESW C 1D633 (2 ~ DDE-04) STDRHR (1. 72E-04) ESW B DIESEL A 24 (1.58E-04) DIESEL A 2D624 25 (1. 56E-04) ESW D DIESEL A (1.54E-04). DIESEL C OB516 (1.40E 04) RHRSW 2A 1D633 (1. 32E-04) DIESEL C 1D630 29 (1. 32E-04) DIESEL C 1D610 30 (1.00E-04) i'FV 31 (8.62E-05) RHRSW 1A DIESEL A 32 (5.76E-05) ESW, A ESW B 33 (5 '3E-05) ESW A ESW D 34 (5.35E 05) ESW C ESW B 35 (5.02E-05) ESW C ESW D 36 (4 56E-05) RHR A 1D633 37 (4.56E-05) RHR C 1D613 38'(3.82E-05) DIESEL A OB526 (3.82E-05) DIESEL A DB536 40 (3.54E-05) 2A201 DIESEL C (3.32E-OS) ESW A 2D624 42 (3 '1E-05) ESW C 2D624 43 (3.26E 05) DIESEL A 1D630 44 (3.16E DS) 1D624 DIESEL A (3 ~ 16E-05) DIESEL A 1D644 46 (3 '. 07E-05) DIESEL A (2 72E 05) 1D613 1D633 Page 2

0 C:QPEPEQCAM11 ~ PRT 10/>/9> SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 P198 48 (2.41E-O5) DIESEL B DIESEL D 1D613 49 (2.40E 05) DIESEL A DIESEL D 1D623 50 (2 '0E-05) DIESEL A DIESEL B 1D623 (1 '7E-05) DIESEL A DIESEL B DIESEL D 52 (1 38E-05) RHR A ESW B 53 (1.31E-05) RHR A ESW D 54 (1.23E-OS) RHRSW 1A RHRSW 2A 55 (1. 10E-05) ESW A RHR C 56 (1. 01E-05) ESW C RHR C 57 {8. 02E-06) ESW A OB526 58 (8 '2E-06) ESW A OB536

'9 (8 '1E 06) ESW C OB536 60 (8 '1E-06) ESW C OB526 61 (7.98E-06) ESW B OB516 I

62 (7.98E-06) ESW D OB516 63 (7.20E-06) 1A203 64 (6 '3E-06) RHR A 2D624'5 (6.85E-06) 1B210 1D633 (6.84E-06) ESW A 1D630 67 (6.84E-06) ESW C 1D630 68 (6.82E 06) ESW B 1D610 69 (6 '1E-06) ESW D 1D610 70 (6.63E-06) ESW A 1D624 71 (6.63E-06) ESW A 1D644 72 (6.63E-06) ESW C 1D624 73 (6. 63E-06) ESW C 1D644 74 (6. 06E-06) DIESEL A. DIESEL D 1B220 75 (5 '7E-06) ESW A DIESEL B DIESEL D 76 (5 22E-06) ESW C DIESEL B DIESEL D Page 3

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 C- QPEPEQCAM11 ~ PRT 10/1/93 Page 77 (5.15E-06) RHRSW 2A OB536 78 (5 ~ 14E-06) RHRSW 1A OB516 79 (5.03E-06) ESW A DIESEL D 1D623 80 (5 '3E 06) ESW A DIESEL B 1D623 81 (5.03E-06) ESW C DIESEL D 1D623 82 (5.03E 06) ESW C DIESEL B 1D623 83 (4.40E-06) RHRSW 2A 1D630 84 (4. 12E-06) 1D613 2D624 85 (2 '5E-06) RHR A RHR C 86 (l. 67E-06) RHR A OB536 87 (1. 67E-06) RHR A OB526 88 (1 66E-06) RHR C OB516 89 (1. 43E-06) RHR A 1D630 90 (1.42E-06) RHR C 1D610 91 (1.39E-06) RHR A 1D624 92 (1. 39E-06) RHR A 1D644 93 (1.37E-06) RHR A DIESEL B DIESEL D 94 (1.27E-06) ESW A DIESEL D 1B220 95 (1.27E-06) ESW C DIESEL D 1B220 96 (1. 18E-06) RHRSW 1A 2A201 97 (1 ~ 05E-06) RHR A DIESEL D 1D623 98 (l. 05E-06) RHR A DIESEL B 1D623 99 (9 ~ 97E-07) 1D613 . OB526 100 (9. 97E 07) 1D613 OB536 101 (9. 93E 07) 1D633 OB516 102 (8.78E-07) DIESEL A DIESEL B OB546 103 (8.78E-07) DIESEL B DIESEL D OB516 104 (8.38E-07) 1D610 1D613 Page 4

0 0

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 C: XPEPEQCAM11 ~ PRT 10/1/93 PagB R4 105 (8 38E 07) 1D630 1D613 106 (8 ~ 3SE-07)'D630 1D633 107 (8 ~ 3SE 07) 1D610 1D633 108 (8 25E-07) 1D624 1D613 109 (8 ~ 25E-07) 1D644 1D613

'10 (7 ~ 50E-07) DIESEL A DIESEL D 1D620 111 (7 ~ 50E-07) DIESEL A DIESEL B 1D620 112 (7. 50E-07) DIESEL B DIESEL D 1D610 113 (6 ~ 92E 07) 1A201 DIESEL C 114 (6.25E 07) DIESEL D 1D613 1D623 115 (6 25E-07) DIESEL B 1D613 1D623 116 (4.38E-07) 2A201 1D633 117 (3.28E-07) 1A202 1D613 118 (3 '8E-07) 1A204 1D613 119 (3.26E 07) 1A201 1D633 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS, CASE 1.1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER U1-5 OUTAGE, SUPPORT SYSTEM MAINTENANCE HOURS REDUCED SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT STATE 4 1 FREQUENCY~ 3 '9E 02 SUPPORT SYSTEM - ----

120 (2 ~ 66E-07) RHR A DIESEL D 1B220

'121 (2 ~ 51E-07) 1B210 OB536 122 (2 ~ 51E-07) 1B230 OB516 123 (2. 11E-07) 1B210 1D630 124 (1.85E 07) 1A202 DIESEL A Page 5

SA-TSY-001, Rev. 0 C: iPEPEX+Qfll PRT 10/1/93 Page t7 125 (1. 85K-07) 1A204 DIESEL A 126 (1.84E-07) ESW A 'IESEL B OB546 127 (1. 84E-07) ESW C DIESEL B OB546 128 (1.58E-07) 1B230 DIESEL A 1D613 129 (1.58E-07) DIESEL D 1D613 1B220 130 (1.58E-07) ESW A DIESEL D 1D620 131 (1.58E-07) ESW A DIESEL B 1D620 132 (1.57E-07) ESW C DIESEL D 1D620 133 (1.57E 07) ESW C DIESEL B 1D620 134 (1.51E-07) OB516 2D624 135 (1. 51E-07) 2D634 OB516 136 (1. 27E 07) 1D610 2D624 137 (1.09E-07) DIESEL A DIESEL D 2A202 138 (9 '9E-08) 2D634 DIESEL A 1D613 139 (7 '3E-08) ESW A 1A202 0

140 (7 ~ 13E-08) ESW A 1A204 141 (6. 51E-08) ESW C 1A204 142 (6 '1E-08) ESW C 1A202 143 (4.97E-08) 1A201 ESW B 144 (4.94E-08) 1A201 2D624 145 (4 ~ 47E-08) 1A201 ESW D 146 (3 '5E-08) RHR A DIESEL B OB546 147 (3 ~ 64E 08) OB516 OB526 148 (3. 64E-08) OB516 OB536 149 (3. 29E-08) RHR A DIESEL D 1D620 150 (3. 29E 08) RHR A DIESEL B 1D620 151 (3 '6E-08) 1D630 OB536 152 (3. 06E-08) 1D610 OB536 153 (3 '6E-08) 1D610 OB526 Page 6

SA-TSY-OOl, Rev. 0 g: ypEPEQCAM11 ~ PRT 10/1/93 Page ~F 154 (3 '6E-08) 1D610 OB 516 155 (3 ~ 06E 08) 1D630 OB516 156 (3 01E-08) 1D644 PB516 157 (3 01K-OS) 1D624 OB516 158 (2.57E-08) 1D610 1D630 159 (2.53E-08) 1D610 1D644 160 (2.53E-OS) 1D624 1D61 0 161 (2 '9K 08) 2D634 1B230 DIESEL A 162 (2.35E 08) ESW A DIESEL D 2A202 163 (2.34E-OS) ESW C DIESEL D 2A202 164 (2.29E-08) DIESEL B 1D613 OB546 165 (2 '8E-08) DIESEL A 1D623 OB546 166 (2 28E-08) DIESEL D 1D623 OB516 167 (2 ~ 28E 08) DIESEL B 1D623 OB516 168 (2 '3E-08) RHRSW 2A 1B230 1D613 169 (2.13E-OS) RHRSW 1A 1B210 1D613 170 (1.93E-OS) DIESEL D 1D620 1D613 171 (1 93E-08) DIESEL B 1D620 1D613 172 (1. 92E-08) DIESEL A 1D620 1D623 173 (1.92E-08) DIESEL D 1D610 1D623 174 (1. 92E-08) DIESEL B 1D610 1D623 175 (1.75E-OS) RHR A 1A202 176 (1.75E-OS) RHR A 1A204 177 (1. 61E-08) 2A201 OB536 178 (1. 36E-08) 2A201 1D630 179 (1. 28E-08) 2D634 RHRSW 2A 1D613 180 (1. 19E-08) lA201 OB536 181 (1 ~ 19E-08) OB516 2A203 Page 7

SA-TSY-OOl, Rev. 0 QPEPEQCAM11 ~ PRT 10/1/93 Page 9't 182 (1 ~ 19E-08) 1A202 OB516 183 (1. 19E 08) 1A201 OB526 184 (1. 19E 08) 1A204 OB516 185 (1 '2E-08) 1A202 1D610 186 (1 '2K 08) 1A204 1D610 187 (1.02E 08) 1A201 1D630 FUEL POOL COOLING ANALYSIS'ASE 1 1 LOOP DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FUEL CYCLE AFTER U1 5 OUTAGE~ SUPPORT SYSTEM MAINTENANCE HOURS REDUCED SUPPORT STATE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT STATE 4 2 FREQUENCY~ 9.67E-01

-SUPPORT SYSTEM 1 (5 '1K 01) "EVERYTHING WORKS" 2 (9 '1E 02) DIESEL C 3 (4.56E-02) 1D613 4 (4 '2E-02) 1D623 5 (4.52E-02) 1D633 6 (2.57E-02) DIESEL A 7 (2. 51E-02) DIESEL D 8 (2 ~ 48E-02) DIESEL B 9 (1. 14E-02) 1B210 10 (1.14E-02) 1B220 11 (1.14E 02) 1B240 12 (1 14E-02) 1B230 13 (9 '0E-03) ESW A 14 (9.04E-03) ESW C Page 8

0 SA-TSY-OQ1, Rev. 0 c QPEPEX~11 ~ PRT 10/1/93 /<0 Ping&

(6.91K-03) ESN B 16 (6 ~ 86E-03), 2D624 17 (6 '6E-03) 2D644 (6 86E-03) 2D634 19 (6 22E-03) ESW D 20 (3. 68E 03) RHRSW 2A 21 (3.39E-03) RHRSW 1A 22 (2. 43E 03) RHR A 23 (1.66E-03) OB526 24 (1.66E 03) OB536 25 (1 ~ 66E 03) OB516 26 (1.66E-03) OB546 27 (1. 42E 03) 1D610 28 (1.42E 03) 1D620 29 (1 ~ 42E 03) 1D630 30 (1.37E-03) 1B237 31 (1 ~ 37E 03) 1B216 32 (1 '7E 03) 1D624 (X.37E-03) 1D644 AROSE (1 22E 03) RHR C 35 (9 OOE-04) 'FPCHTX (6.00E-04) FPCHXF 37 (4 ~ 20E-04) FPCFPZV 38 (3 '1E 04) 2A201 39 (2 04) 2A202 40 (2 OOE 04) FPCRFV (1 OOE-04)

(1 ~ OOE-04) FPCSTD (7 ~ 20E 06) 2A203 Page 9

ML18026A257

Text

Dear Mr. Miller:

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