Text

Proposed Tech Specs Removing Five Tables of Component Lists Per GL-91-08
	ML17310B409
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	06/17/1994
From:	; ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	;
Shared Package
ML17310B408	List: ML17310B407; ML17310B409;
References
	GL-91-08, GL-91-8, NUDOCS 9407070187
	Download: ML17310B409 (68)
	v • d • e

DEFINITIONS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 1.6 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:

a. Analog channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor" as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

b. Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the sensor to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

c. Digital computer channels - the exercising of the digital computer hardware using diagnostic programs and the injection of simulated process data into the channel to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

d. Radiological effluent process monitoring channels - the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, over lapping, or total channel steps such that the entire channel is functionally tested.

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include adjustment, as necessary, of the alarm, interlock and/or trip setpoints such that the setpoints are within the required range and accuracy.

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or 2.. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic d d 1 d d id' d.d.

b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed, C. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3. 6. 1.3,

d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6. 1.2, and

e. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows or u-rings) is OPERABLE.

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE 1.8 Not Applicable.

CORE ALTERATION 1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fue) the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

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3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4. 6. 1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAIHMEHT INTEGRITY, restore COHTAINMEHT INTEGRITY within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLO SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.6. 1. 1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

C'o At least once per capable valves closed secured 31 days by verifying that all penetrations" not of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation and required to be closed during accident conditions are by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves in their positions except Specification 3.6.3.

b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.

C. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seal with gas at P 49.5 psig and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specifica-tion 4.6.1.2d. for all other Type B and C penetrations, the cpmbined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60 L .

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~;<fi at(yC, CnOtIOJ Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed, pr ptherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed. during each COLO SHUTDOWN except that such verificatipn need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 3/4 6-1 AMEHDMEHT HO. 17

)'.q i':pl=.~aviv('4. lbN:, r",ILy CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4. 6. 3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3 gach containment- isolation-Yalve- shall be,.

OPERABL APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

1. With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and either:

Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or

b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position",+

or

c. Isolate the affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange~ or

d. in at least HOT STANDBY within the next

( hours and in Be 6 COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

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SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS Eac Qp in+en '

4.6.3.1 ~~isolation valve/ shall be demonstr ated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair, or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control, oI'owQP C'IPCUlt.

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I shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during tne COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Ve<ifying that cn a CIAS, CSAS or SIAS test signal, each isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

b. Verifying that on a CPIAS test signal, all containment purge valves actuate to thei r isolation position.

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+"The inoperable isolation valve(s) may be part of a system(s) affected penetration(s) may affect the use of the system(s). Consider technical specification requirements on the affected system(s) and act accordingly.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 3/4 6-19 AMENDMENT NO. 37

CONTAINMENT SYSTEHS SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS Continued)

Msgr J zn C g b$ t pEA5, o ( CSAS 4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic valv shall be determined to be within its limit

.when tested pursuant to Specification 4. 0.5.

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4.6.3.4 Thekcheck valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE pursuant to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, with the exception of those check valves footnoted as "Not Type C Tested."

con%(nment 4.6.3.5 Thefisolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE as required by Specification 4.0.5 and the Surveillance Requirements associated with those Limiting Conditions for Operation pertaining to each valve or system in which it is installed. Valves secured"" in their actuated position are considered operable pursuant to this

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4.6.3.6 The manoa14isolation be demonstrated OPERABLE pursuant to Surveillance Requirement 4.6. 1. l. a valves'hall of Specification 3.6.1.1.

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PALO VEROE - UNIT 1 3/4 6-20

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL E UIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.4.1 R~p y~ pjp$ (neer<

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the above required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices inoperable:

Restore the protection device(s) to OPERABLE status or deenergize the circuits(s) by tripping the associated backup circuit breaker or racking out or removing the inoperable device within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and declare the affected system or component inoperable and verify the backup circuit breaker to be tripped or the inoperable circuit breaker racked out at least once per 7 days thereafter; the provi-sions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent devices in circuits which have their backup circuit breakers tripped, or,

b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS any~ 00~e~ P(imPg md bacKup 4.8.4. 1 ~

(except fuses)

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containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months:

1. By verifying thai the medium voltage (4-15 kV) circuit breakers are OPERABLE by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10~ of the circuit breakers of each voltage level, and performing the following:

(a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protection relays, and (b) An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed, PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 3/4 8-17

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION AND BYPASS DEVICES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION eence bp/<fs eve'res,internee sseeN u< nseto<sIeeeen 3.8.4.2 The thermal overload protection of each valve ~ ~

APPLICABILITY: Whenever S

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ACTION:

Mith the thermal overload protection for one or more of the above required valves not bypassed continuously or under accident conditions, as applicable, by an OPERABLE integral bypass device, take administrative action to continuously bypass the thermal overload within 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months s or declare the affected valve(s) inoperable and apply the appropriate ACTION Statement(s) for the affected valve(s).

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.8.4.2. 1 The thermal overload protection for the above required valves shall be verified to be bypassed continuously or under accident conditions, as applicable, by an OPERABLE integral bypass device by the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the bypass circuitry for those thermal overloads which are normally in force during plant operation and bypassed under accident-conditions and by verifying that the thermal overload protection is bypassed for those thermal overloads which are continuously bypassed and temporarily placed in force only when the valve motors are undergoing periodic or maintenance testing:

a. At least once per 18 months, and

b. Following mainten'ance on the motor starter.

4.8.4.2.2 The thermal overload protection for the above required valves which are continuously bypassed shall be verified to be bypassed following testing during which the thermal overload protection was temporarily placed in force.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 3/4 8"40

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INSTRUMENTATION REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.5 The remote shutdown system disconnect switches, power, controls and monitoring instrumentation channels shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

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a~ With the number of OPERABLE remote utdown monitoring channels less than required by Table 3.3-9 C restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in HOT STANDBY

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within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b. Mith one or more remote shutdown system disconnect switches or power or control circuits inoperable, restore the inoperable switch(s)/circuit(s) to OPERABLE status or issue procedure changes per Specification 6.8.3 that identifies alternate, disconnect methods or power or control circuits for remote shutdown within 7 days, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

C. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.3.5 The Remote Shutdown System shall be demonstrated operable:

a~ By performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-6 for each remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation channel.

b. By operation of each remote shutdown system/disconnect switch and power and control circuit including the actuated components at least once per 18 months.

~ . tr PALO VERDE " UNIT 1 3/4 3-48 AMENDMENT NO, 54-"c ~j'.-'.

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'=iud ii'hFG'rsiiil~ i'zQN 0< iQ CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4. 6. 3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment automatic isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 through GDC 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that, the release of radioactive material to the environ-gag (gPERAggL-VVy ~

ment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses -for a LOCA.

d main steam safety valves, main steam atmospheric dump valves, and main steam isolation valves The main steam safety valves have very high pressure setpoints to actuate and re covered 'by Specification 3/4.7-1.1. The atmospheric dump valves and the ma steam isola-tion valves are covered by Specifications 3/4.7.1.6 and'/4.7.1.5, respectively.

3/4. 6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL LX CP/erzd papaya f~

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit (or the purge system) is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," March 1971.

The use of ANSI Standard N509 (1980) in lieu of ANSI Standard N509 (1976) to meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide -1:52, Revision 2, Positions C.6.a and C.6.b, has been found acceptable as documented in Revision 2 to Section 6.5.1 of the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800).

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PALO VEROE - UNIT 1 8 3/4 6-4 AHENOHENT NO. 27

DEFINITIONS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 1.6 shall be:

'.A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Analog channels the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY

including alarm and/or trip functions.

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b. Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the sensor to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

c. Digital computer channels - the exercising of the digital computer hardware using diagnostic programs and the injection of simulated process data into the channel to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

d. Radiological effluent process monitoring channels " the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps such that the entire channel is functionally tested.

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include adjustment, as necessary, of the alarm, interlock and/or trip setpoints such that the setpoints are within the required range and.accuracy.

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

a. 'All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or 2.

di ti Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactji rated automatic 1 dp Specification 3.6.3.

b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed, C. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3,

d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2, and

e. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows or 0-rings) is OPERABLE.

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE 1.8 Not Applicable.

CORE Al TERATION 1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

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PALO VERDE " UNIT 2

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3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4. 6. 1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING"CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions except Specification 3.6.3.

By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3. 6. 1.3.

C. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seal with gas at P a 49.5 psig and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specifica-tion 4.6. 1.2d. for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60 L .

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~J~ini5 "Except valves, blind flanges and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position. These $ enetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-1

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~OR sÃlr GiRMA7IGlilONgf CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4. 6. 3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3 OPERABL

~ F~ch containment isolation valvep shall be APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

1. With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and either:

a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to 'OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or r

b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position*,~

or

c. Isolate the affected penetration within/ hours by use of ai least

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one closed manual valve or blind flange; or

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

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SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 6ac.h '

4.6.3.1 ~pisolation valve@' - . shall be demonstrated prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair, or

'5gg OPERABLE replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control, or power circuit. t~ joyibinmq~tiogaRoA, con@if3~e /pe g g 4.6;3.2 Each isolation valve COyt~WA Iftrt~p P4(+ +

shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLO SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that on a CIAS, CSAS or SIAS test signal, each isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

b. Verifying that on a CPIAS test signal, all containment purge valves actuate to their iso/ation position.

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I'~~r~<ghml'usi's "The. inoperable isolation valve(s) may b'e part of a system(s). Isolating the affected penetration(s) may affect the use of the system(s). Consider the tech-nical specification requirements on the affected system(s) and act accordingly.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-19

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Continued ufg3 ('n Clr95 Cpsw>, <y C5+g 4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic valvell shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pUrsuant to Sp~ification 4.0.5.

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4. 6. 3. 4 Theee'check val ves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE pursuant to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, with the exception of those check vylves footnoted as "Not Type C Tested."

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4.6.3.5 The%isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE as required by Specification 4.0.5 and the Surveillance Requirements associated with those Limiting Conditions for Operation pertaining to each valve or system in which it is installed. Valves secured"" in their actuated position are conyidered operable pursuant to this specification. z . w. ~>of~ogE) ijosef/~5fofccc'cfonf+p5fg pal/qy) yXdfld61 g~ L 4.6.3.6 The manuaklisolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE .pursuant to Surveillance Requirement 4.6. 1. l.a of Specification 3.6.1.1.

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""Locked, sealed, or otherwise prevented from unintentional operation.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-20

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL E UIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.4.1 tA inser t' APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, ACTION:

With one or more of the above required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices inoperable:

a ~ Restore the protection device(s) to OPERABLE status or deenergize the ci rcuits(s) by tripping the associated backup circuit breaker or racking out or removing the inoperable device within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and declare the affected system or component inoperable and verify the backup circuit breaker to be tripped or the inoperable circuit breaker racked out at least once per 7 days thereafter; the provi-sions of Specification 3.0. 4 are not applicable to overcur rent devices in circuits which have their backup circuit breakers tripped, or

b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS

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ag Q ~ / Fv'(Wali'y pqQ b~ c/<~p coh FP /6~AD~ 0 +4ndEr'Pdro~ <"and<<cfav ouerc<rrrq ~g"r,p,raL~rf< u'<<..Jsu< c'esa,ssao<a<Led.w,<'(g earA re<nga<'nn ec<C Ar~r< ca<4'pe<<arro~Laq c(ceca<1 5APA bw gF'Ek'/I SL n c- . 7 Ac scop>>... Prese. pvafeoC m'8z u<h s , <<<<~, L<rcgu cb'ps zr<asa c<'( car< Lp /ar ~AIL c<-aJ<bg /pug( 6'<r< < <<nf5 +a<ltd c<abex,c eel( Z<c egg(ts'cgggzYI8lr o f<'an ~esrI n ea 0.i'~p P /gag g/q ~-( p~h r'g>gp, $ /g E uJ'4'4 . I 4 t ELECTRICAL POSER SYSTEMS MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION AND BYPASS DEVICES o g )>~as>'~d<< u's, 'ye~~'~> LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 50QP 4l-3.8.4.2 The thermal overload protection of each valve APPLICABILITY: Mhenever the motor-operated valve is required to be OPERABLE. g'fg gyyfeots 5h~~ b8 uPFNA S<E ACTION: Mith the thermal overload protection for one or more of the above required valves not bypassed continuously or under accident conditions, as applicable, by an OPERABLE integral bypass device, take administrative action to continuously bypass :he thermal overload within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or declare the affected valve(s) inoperable and apply the appropriate ACTION Statement(s) for the affected valve(s). SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.8.4.2.1 The thermal overload protection for the above required valves shall be verified to be bypassed continuously or under accident conditions, as applicable, by an OPERABLE integral bypass device by the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the bypass circuitry for those thermal overloads which are normally in force during plant operation and bypassed under accident conditions and by verifying that the thermal overload protection is bypassed for those thermal overloads which are continuously bypassed and temporarily . placed in force only when the valve motors are undergoing periodic or maintenance testing:

a. At least once per 18 months, and

b. Following maintenance on the motor starter.

4.8.4.2.2 The thermal overload protection for the above required valves which are continuously bypassed shall be verified to be bypassed following testing during which the thermal overload, protection was temporarily placed in force. 'PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 3/4 8-40 AMENDMENT NO. 39 lE h \ 0 I 1 papS.. ggc/ g-g( zlfou h 3/y g-V 7 6f ~ nof tZS4d =GR INFQRMATIQi~l QNI~ INSTRUMENTATION REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.5. The remote shutdown system disconnect switches, power, controls and monitoring instrumentation channels shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2. ACTION: a0 With the number of OPERABLE remote hutdown monitoring channels less than required by Table 3.3-9 restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, r be in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b. With one or more remote shutdown system disconnect switches or power or control circuits inoperable, restore the inoperable switch(s)/circuit{s) to OPERABLE status or issue procedure changes per Specification 6.8.3 that identifies alternate disconnect methods or power or control circuits for remote shutdown within 7 days, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.3.5 The Remote Shutdown System shall be demonstrated operable: a~ By performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-6 for each remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation channel.

b. By operation of each remote 'shutdown system disconnect switch and power and control circuit including the actuated components at least once per 18 months.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-48 AMENDMENT NO 39 h I ~ ~ pages g/g 3- WW dArougp 3/y 7 5's @r e fizz Q ~ ~ CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4. 6. 3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment automatic isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or the'event, pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GOC 54 through GOC 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactiv'e material ta the environ-ment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA. oPeawxw~v og ~ ~ main steam safety valves, main steam atmospheric dump valves, and main steam isolation valves The main steam ~ safety valves have very high pressure setpoints to actuate and ar covered by Specification 3/4.7.1.1. The atmospheric dump valves and the main steam isola-tion valves are covered by Specifications 3/4.7.1.6 and 3/4.7.1.5, espectively. 1 3/4. 6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions; Either recombiner unit (ar the purge system) is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," March 1971. The use of ANSI Standard N509 (1980) in lieu of ANSI Standard N509 (1976) to meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Positions C.6.a and C.6.b, has been found acceptable as dacumented in Revision 2 to Section 6.5. 1 of the Standard Peview Plan (NUREG-0800). yhc ci(ene'nq isg pocced or sedate cased con5inmenf isogQon <>/~os (nferniic&t be>>si sunde'r oidnii'ni'sfrn L v'onfi 'og 'i'ocpudes Co>>Si ero oni j ~ ht.ci'on<<g oi>> iopero'5r, ~ho is i'n cons ron/ c Sin c I/s&c Mr> iogS om ol( fJ (nstjuuf('n t'/gi's odor ( g ~ >c<<dt'~~ 5 ( duo 4i'on pcev'e~E r~d.'o~ ~Y ~g o fs,'+ f@ PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-4 AHEHDMENT NO. 9 DEFINITIONS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 1.6 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:

a. Analog channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

b. Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the sensor to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

c. Digital computer channels - the exercising of the digital computer hardware using diagnostic programs and the injection of simulated process data into the channel to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

d. Radiological effluent process monitoring channels - the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of'sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps such that the entire channel is functionally tested.

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include adjustment, as necessary, of the alarm, interlock and/or trip setpoints such that the setpoints are within the required range and accuracy. CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when: a.. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or

2. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic

b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed,

c. 'ach air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6. 1.3,

d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2, and

e. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows or 0-rings) is OPERABLE.

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE 1.8 Not Applicable. CORE ALTERATION 3 ..9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fue) the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position. g~ vnA~~ /ha~<<~ +/"" ~ndu~ p5' ~ Pj'yg cog difpl m(<~'5 (<< PALO VERDE - UNIT 3 pgpyvl I' t q I h ~ l' 'I v l" GFi iiMFGRNiATiGNGiiV 3/4. 6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6. 1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLO SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . SURYEI LLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated: At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations" not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions except Specification 3.6.3.

b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.

C. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type 8 testing, except containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seal with gas at P a 49.5 psig and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specifica-tion 4.6. 1.2d. for all othe~ Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60 La . <<< 'P ~ Vatic'e~ at,~iTI5 ~ dlaP I p$ PTITII FFAd "Except valves, blind flanges and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days. PALO YEROE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-1 J'4 h "A L } W g ~ i' p q f a e

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Qini's'ONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4. 6. 3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION gFach 3.6.3 ~vtontainment isolation valvsL6r shall be OPERABLE, APPLICABILITY; MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and either:

a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or C'. b.

c. Isolate one or each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position" Isolate the affected penetration within g hours by use of at least ~ one closed manual valve or blind flange~ or

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

+))e proVi'5(one o/5pf!Ct/6(3ACf'on g, 8 (sf g(T floe ~f'tg. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS Cost art'rl~4n ' 4.6.3.1 ~~isolation valv . shall be demonstrated prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair, or 'PERABLE replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control, or power circuit. <~<g <<con&<'nm~gd r'5vlaCi'vn, CCon6inynpnt SPf~g, +r My3Q.(oman pMP~ 4.6.3.2 Each isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that on a CIAS, CSAS or SIAS test signal, each isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

b. Verifying that on a CPIAS test signal, all containment purge valves actuate to thej.r isolation position, m" d or sespeJ c46eo( tzgyo> fvfote( bz ~perfect on ass (md( nvf'end &y~

vnJW wdrncH< gfy a P&'e Con CPo ( A6 *The inoperable isolation valve(s) may be part of a system(s). )solating tne affected penetration(s) may affect the use of the system(s). Consider the tech-nical specification requirements on the affected system(s) and act accordingly. PALO VERDE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-19 A N h I I ll N e F (" II C CONTAINHENT SYSTEHS s- CS85 ~g4g (~ CZARS p SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS Continued} 4.6.3.3 when The isolation time of each power operated or automatic valve shall be determined to be within its tested pursuant po Specificatiog 4.0.5. ~ limit ~c'~ning'nmg~ g'ga+cygg+~ 4.6.3.4 Thefcheck valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE pursuant to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, with the exception of those check valves footnoted as "Not Type C Tested." (4MWe ~ 4.6.3.5 Thefisolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE as required by Specification 4.0.5 and the Surveillance Requirements associated with those Limiting Conditions for Operation pertaining to each valve or- system in which it is installed. Valves secured"" in their actuated position are considered operable pursuant to this specification. cups isinontnC t esse~seSi (npgsnmllg ~ d f eggy ipse os ops vee~ 4.6.3.6 The manual /isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE pursuant to 'Surveillance Requirement 4.6. l. l.a of Specification 3.6.1.1. sC 0)ZA 504v 0 <~ R s eui zd ~< th) cas j sp f'u.YU ""Locked, sealed, or otherwise prevented from unintentional operation. PALO VERDE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-20 t I II E J t A N' / aped ..31K.. g=Z../., lkr~vgh 3/g 6-Z5 nod .....vs~8.. i II ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL E UIPMEHT PROTECTIVE DEVICES CONTAIHMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURREHT PROTECTIVE DEVICES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: With one or more of the above required containment penetrati'bn conductor overcurrent protective devices shown in Table 3.8-2 inoperable: a~ Restore the protection device(s) to OPERABLE status or deenergize the circuits(s) by tripping the associated backup circuit breaker or racking out or removing the inoperable device within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and declare the affected system or component inoperable and verify the backup circuit breaker to be tripped or the inoperable circuit breaker racked out at least once per 7 days thereafter; the provi-sions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent devices in circuits which have their backup circuit breakers tripped, or

b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMEHTS 4.8.4.1 ~ (except fuses) h~ above ngCzJ Pr"C~ar"y Pn4 Aa.C~VP ontainment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months:

1. By verifying that the medium voltage (4-15 kV) circuit breakers are OPERABLE by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10K of the circuit breakers of each voltage level, and performing the following:

(a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protection relays, and (b) An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed PALO VERDE - UNIT 3 3/4 8-17 ~ a o 5 .3...8, / /... ~~i~Pr'y. 2nd. baCKuP c-On(a/<~a< C. P~nglrpE c~~ conductor. ovzrcc<rr+nE",proach'<'u<<-. Dv'i oe's o..ssoc<o<C<d, w<'(g each wnPa<'nnnent MrCr< co'<X penoCrz<i'on,o< <co'<<'f SABA bw dtr<s~ pr oLaoC va '8e u<ces gPEEk3L c=, e<ccEud'es zoos< 7ho sco<o>>, c< r'cccc Ls g '/or '/a<<gt ~I<<CQ cn~d< hg <JYr ends <uaucd no( < xc oed c,'c<< etc(rYzup penelro L< fp 0tH on'[85'(' e 1 o gags g/q A=<q~8~<xgh .s/v ..Z- Ã~ .. g CC ~PL CIST~ 4 S' ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION AND BYPASS DEVICES IIy b PMEARP'LCP5, Ln~~qga LIMITING CONDITION FDR OPERATION m~~v S@r Wl i 3.8.4.2 The thermal overload protection of each valve - APPLICABILITY: Whenever the motor-operated valve is required to be OPERABLE. ACTION: With the thermal overload protection for one or more of the above required valves not bypassed continuously or under accident conditions, as applicable, by an OPERABLE integral bypass device, take administrative action to continuously bypass the thermal overload within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or declare the affected valve(s) inoperable and apply the appropriate ACTION Statement(s} for the affected valve(s). SURVEII LANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.8.4.2.1 The thermal overload protection for the above required valves shall be verified to be bypassed continuously or under accident conditions, as applicable, by an OPERABLE integral bypass device by the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the bypass circuitry for those thermal overloads which are normally in force during plant operation and bypassed under accident conditions and by verifying that the thermal overload protection is bypassed for those thermal overloads which are continuously bypassed and temporarily placed in force only when the valve motors are undergoing periodic or maintenance testing:

a. At-least once per 18 months, and

b. Following maintenance on the motor starter.

4. 8.4.2. 2 The thermal over load protection for the above required valves which are continuously bypassed shall be verified to be bypassed following testing during which the thermal overload protection was temporarily placed in force.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 3 3/4 8-40 I ~' IH H H ~ H '1 ~ II I 1 l ) f) p~p~.. 5/g S-V( z~r~~ > . 5/y S-.~..-7 nog uSgd...,, II 4 '"GR INFGRMAYIGN GNQI'NSTRUMENTATION REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.5 The remote shutdown system disconnect switches, power, controls and monitoring instrumentation channels shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2. ACTION: ao With the number of OPERABLE remote shutdown monitoring channels less than required by Table 3.3-9A, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 2 days, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b. With one or more remote shutdown system disconnect switches or power or control circuits inoperable, restore the inoperable switch(s)/circuit(s) to OPERABLE status or issue procedure changes per Specification 6.8.3 that identifies alter-nate disconnect methods or power or control circuits for remote shut-down within 7 days, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

C. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.3.5 The Remote Shutdown System shall be demonstrated operable:

a. By performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-6 for each remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation channel.

b. By operation of each remote shutdown system disconnect. switch and power and control circuit including the actuated components at least once per 18 months.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-48 v I P a. page s g/c/ 3- 5 ~ ~Arough c7r e flaf u'SeA I ~ ~ CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4. 6. 3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment automatic isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 through GDC 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environ-ment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA. whq opERASXL-~Y u main steam safety valves, main steam atmospheric dump valves, and main steam isolation valves The main steam safety valves have very high pressure setpoints to actuate and re covered by Specification 3/4.7.1.1. The atmospheric dump valves and the m in steam isola" tion valves are covered by Specifications 3/4,7. 1.6 and 3/4.7.. 1. , respectively. 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner, unit (or the purge system) is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," March 1971. The use of ANSI Standard N509 (1980) in lieu of ANSI Standard N509 (1976) to meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Positions C.6.a and C.6.b, has been found acceptable as documented in Revision 2 to Sec-tion 6.5. 1 of the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800). l he Cspencnq d( Jocced or sed4h c/oscar conhinrnent Cso8pc'on y'aloes on a <ning s'n berm;tj4f bass sanoe'r adnfi ni stiaGcvconfr'oR i nc~~oier 'e'o< ~o/A~n +P Ow'i'~ Certgb Pjg sly>con(noh an oppraSor, w'ho js t'n cons~ p c~~~~n. Jl naca ('n mcl'A coneronoro a$ dhe. v'opPv'c coneroRr tn c,s w gJ i'nspraoe<no (pro

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ig v 4 PCCbe uV U ( 4C vy t-pgl.'0ACC V t ~g gul5l( vk C4c. on Con@In f PALO VERDE " UNIT 3 B 3/4 6-4 il v y-OR iblii.oiRWilA"i!Qi> Q INOEX i LIST OF TABLES PAGE FREQUENCY NOTATION...............................-...-.. 1-8 1.2 ~ OPERATIONAL MODES..... 1-9 2.2-1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINT LIMITSo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 2-3

3. 3-1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION...................... 3/4 3-3 3.3-2 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIMES....... 3/4 3"11

4. 3-1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS........................................ 3/4 3-14

3. 3-3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH INSTRUMENTATION............... 3/4 3"18 3.3-4 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES ............................ 3/4 3"25

3. 3-5 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES. 3/4 3-28

4. 3-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS........... 3/4 3-31

3. 3-6 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION................ 3/4 3-38

4. 3-3 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS........................................ 3/4 3-40

3. 3-7 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION... 3/4 3-43

4. 3-4 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREHENTS........................................ 3/4 3"44

3. 3-8 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION........... 3/4 3-46

4. 3-5 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS........................... 3/4 3-47

3. 3-9A REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION..................... 3/4 3"49 PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 XX AMENDMENT NO. 27,'9

( ~ ~ I 0 ~ I L p i) i OR %FORMATION ONg'" INDEX PAGE 4.3-6 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS . 3/4 3"56

3. 3-10 POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION................ 3/4 3"58

4. 3-7 POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS... 3/4 3"60 3.3"ll LOOSE PARTS SENSOR LOCATIONS 3/4 3-62 3-3-12 EXPLOSIVE GAS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION................ 3/4 3-64 4.3-8 EXPLOSIVE GAS MONITORING INSTRUHENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4 3-65 4.4-1 MINIMUM NUMBER OF STEAM GENERATORS TO, BE INSPECTED DURING INSERVICE INSPECTION............................. 3/4 4-16 4.4-2 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTION...................... 3/4 4-17 3.4"1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES..... 3/4 4-21 3.4-2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM CHEMISTRY........................ 3/4 4"23 4,4-3 REACTOR- COOLANT SYSTEM CHEMISTRY LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS............................................ 3/4 4-24 4.4-4 PRIMARY COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM.................................... 3/4 4-27

3. 4" 3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE HEATUP AND COOLDOWN RATES................. . ... .... 3/4 4-28a 4 '-5 REACTOR VESSEL MATERIAL SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE............................... 3/4 4-31

4. 6-1 TENDON SURVEILLANCE " FIRST YEAR..................... 3/4 6-12

4. 6-2 TENDON LIFT-OFF FORCE - FIRST YEAR............... 3/4 6-13

3. 7-1 STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOPS............. 3/4 7 PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 XXI AMENDMENT NO. SZ, 62

s,b L INDEX I LIST OF TABLES PAGE 3~7 2 HAXIHUH ALLOWABLE STEADY STATE POMER LEVEL AND MAXIMUM VARIABLE OVERPOWER TRIP SETPOINT MITH INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES 3/4 7-3

4. 7-1 SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM SPECIFIC ACTIVITY SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM. 3/4 7-8

4. 7-2 SNUBBER VISUAL INSPECTION INTERVAL. 3/4 7-25a

4. 8" 1 DIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE.. 3/4 8"7

3. 8-1 D.C. ELECTRICAL SOURCES....... 3/4 8-11 4 ~ 8-2 BATTERY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS . 3/4 8-12 B 3/4.4-1 REACTOR VESSEL TOUGHNESS................. B 3/4 4"8 5.7-1 COMPONENT CYCLIC OR TRANSIENT LIMITS 5-7 5.7-2 PRESSURIZER SPRAY NOZZLE USAGE FACTOR.......... 5-9 6.2-1 MINIMUM SHIFT CREM COMPOSITION.......................... 6-5 PALO VERDE " UNIT 1 XXII AMENDMENT NO. IA, i7, 62

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ML17310B409

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