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Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
MONTHYEARML17300B3791999-10-0808 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Waiving Requirement to Perform SR 3.8.4.8 for Unit 1 Channels A,B & C on One Time Basis ML17300B3521999-09-29029 September 1999 Revised Bases Pages,Providing Addl Discussion of Options Available to Exit Required Action G of TS 3.8.1 & Revised Page for TS 3.3.7 ML17300B3321999-09-14014 September 1999 Marked-up Tech Specs Pages to TS 5.5.2 & 5.6.2,making Noted Administrative Changes ML17313B0601999-08-31031 August 1999 Rev 1 to PVNGS TS Bases Implemented Between Aug 1998 & Jul 1999 ML17313A9571999-05-26026 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Reducing Spurious Reactor Trip Hazards Associated with Setpoints While Maintaining Plant Protection ML17313A4181998-06-0909 June 1998 Proposed Improved Tech Specs Sections 3.5.1 & 3.5.2,revising Safety Injection tanks-operating & Safety Injection Tanks Shutdown ML17313A1141997-11-0707 November 1997 Improved TS Pages for Section 3.0, LCO & SR Applicability, Section 3.1, Reactivity Control & Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits. Generic Change to NUREG-1432,Rev 1 Incorporated Into Section 3.0 & 3.1 ML17312B6411997-08-28028 August 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing one-time Extension of Required Surveillance Interval for Msi Sys Portion Only of ESFAS Logic ML20217Q6801997-08-22022 August 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Clarifying Wording in TS Bases 3/4.6.1.4, Internal Pressure ML20141H7831997-07-18018 July 1997 Proposed Improved Tech Specs Section 3.8, Electrical Power Sys ML20141H7461997-07-18018 July 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Addl Info Re Improved TS Section 3.4, Rcs ML17312B0311996-11-0606 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.8.1.1 Re A.C. Sources - Operating ML17300B2651996-06-17017 June 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Changing Section 1.10 & 3.2.8 & Associated Bases for Obtaining Thyroid Dcfs Used in Definition of Dose Equivalent I-131 ML17312A6491996-04-0101 April 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising TS 3/4.9.6 to Temporarily Allow Use of Hoist Instead of Refueling Machine for Movement of Fuel Assembly at Core Location A-07 ML17312A6401996-03-26026 March 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.9.6,increasing Refueling Machine Overload Cut Off Limit to 2,000 Lb,In 50 Lb Increments,For Removal of Stuck Fuel Assembly from Core Location A-06 ML17312A6321996-03-26026 March 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising TS 3/4.9.6 to Relocate Refueling Machine Overload Cut Off Limit from TS 3/4.9.6 to Plant UFSAR Per Criteria in 10CFR50.36 & Rev 1 of NUREG-1432 STS for C-E Plants. ML17312A6371996-03-23023 March 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising TS SR 4.8.2.1.e, DC Sources, to Suspend Provision of TS 4.0.1 & 4.0.4 for Battery Capacity Testing Requirements Until Entry Into Mode 4 Following Sixth Refueling Outage ML17312A5011996-01-17017 January 1996 Revised Page 5-1 Changing Section 5.2.2 to Include Description of Material Used for Control Element Assemblies ML17311B3221995-12-20020 December 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Reducing Setpoint for MSIS & Rt on Low SG Pressure ML17311B0301995-07-0303 July 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Temp Method to Respond to Sustained Degraded Switchyard Voltage ML17311A9771995-06-21021 June 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Modifying Tables 3.3-4 & 3.3-5 of Section 3/4.3.2 of Esfa Sys Instrumentation ML17311A8651995-05-0202 May 1995 Proposed TS 3.1.2.6,Figure 3.1-1, Min Borated Water Vols, Relocating Elevations That Correspond to Min Required Water Vols for Spent Fuel Pool Into Site Procedures ML17311A8231995-04-18018 April 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3/4.4.4 Re Sleeving Process for SG Tube Repair ML17311A5631994-12-28028 December 1994 Proposed TS Sections 3.9.6 & 4.9.6.1 Re Refueling Machine ML17311A5021994-12-0707 December 1994 Proposed Tech Specs,Changing Note 5 to Table 4.3-1 of TS 3/4.3.1 to Allow Verification of Shape Annealing Matrix Elements Used in Core Protection Calculators ML17311A4341994-11-30030 November 1994 Proposed TS 3/4.4.2,changing Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Lift Setting from 2,500 Psia to 2,475 Psia in LCOs 3.4.2.1 & 3.4.2.2 ML17311A3851994-10-31031 October 1994 Proposed Tech Spec Sections 3.9.6 & 4.9.6.1, Refueling Machine. ML17311A3341994-10-0909 October 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Suspending TS 4.0.1 & 4.0.4 for Battery Capacity Testing Requirements Until Mode 4 Following Fifth Refueling Outage ML17311A2171994-08-18018 August 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Adding Analytical Method Suppl Entitled, Calculative Methods for CE Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model for Analysis of CE & W Designed Nsss. ML17310B4511994-07-12012 July 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Amend to Add One Action Statement to Table 3.3-3,entry 8 ML17310B4151994-07-0101 July 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactor Coolant Cold Leg Temperature Vs Core Power Level of TS 3.2.6 ML17310B4331994-06-20020 June 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Sections 5.3.1 & 5.6.1, & New TS Section 3/4.9.13 & Bases 3/4.9.13 ML17310B4091994-06-17017 June 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Removing Five Tables of Component Lists Per GL-91-08 ML17310B1661994-03-28028 March 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re Min Condensate Storage Tank Indicated Level ML17310B0611994-02-18018 February 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Figure 3.2-1,Section 3/4.1.1.4 & Bases 3/4.1.1.4,establishing Min Temp for Criticality at 545 F for Facilities ML17310B0001994-01-19019 January 1994 Proposed Tech Specs of AF Automatic Actuation Logic Surveillance Frequency Extension ML17310A8361993-11-16016 November 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Table 4.2-4, Min Staffing Requirements for PVNGS Emergencies, in Support of Proposed Rev to Emergency Plan ML17310A7351993-10-26026 October 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Changing Maximum Nominal Enrichment of Fuel Allowed to Be Used in Reactor Core ML17310A6161993-09-0808 September 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Section 6.9.1.10 Re Sys 80 Inletflow Distribution to List of Methods Used to Determine Core Operating Limits ML17310A5211993-08-0505 August 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Requesting to Change Word Pressurizer to RCS for Item #4 in Both Tables 3.3-10 & 4.3-7 ML17310A5151993-08-0505 August 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Changing Surveillance Frequency from Monthly to Quarterly for Channel Functional Tests for RPS & ESFAS Instrumentation ML17310A4211993-06-30030 June 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Requesting Addl Operating Margin in Time Response of Turbine Driven AF Pump to SG Low Level Signal ML17310A2981993-05-20020 May 1993 Proposed TS 4.7.9 Re SR to Ensure Operability of Snubbers ML17306B2671993-01-25025 January 1993 Proposed Tech Specs,Reflecting Revised Train a Kw Value to Be Rejected & Load Designation & Incorporation of Provisions Discussed in 920508 Ltr Re DG Full Load Rejection Testing ML17306B1451992-11-20020 November 1992 Proposed Tech Specs Revising TS 3.2.1 Lhr, & TS 3.2.4, DNBR Margin, Increasing Action from 1 H to 4 H for COLSS Allowed Out of Svc Time Before Requirements Based on More Restrictive Core Protection Calculator Limits Apply ML17306A6491992-04-13013 April 1992 Proposed TS 3.4.8.3 Re RCS - Overpressure Protection Sys ML17306A4731992-02-14014 February 1992 Proposed Tech Specs Re Implementation of Generic Ltr 89-01, Implementation of Programmatic Controls for Radiological Effluent TS in Administrative Controls Section of TS & Relocation of Procedural Details of RETS to Odcm.... ML17306A4031992-01-16016 January 1992 Proposed Tech Specs Amend to TS Section 3.6.3,table 3.6-1 Deleting Type C Testing Requirements for Eight Valves ML17306A3701991-12-30030 December 1991 Proposed Tech Spec Table 6.2-1 Re Min Shift Crew Composition ML17306A3781991-12-30030 December 1991 Proposed Tech Spec Section 3.6.1.7 Re Containment Purge Supply & Exhaust Valves 1999-09-29
[Table view] Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML17300B3791999-10-0808 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Waiving Requirement to Perform SR 3.8.4.8 for Unit 1 Channels A,B & C on One Time Basis ML17300B3521999-09-29029 September 1999 Revised Bases Pages,Providing Addl Discussion of Options Available to Exit Required Action G of TS 3.8.1 & Revised Page for TS 3.3.7 ML17300B3321999-09-14014 September 1999 Marked-up Tech Specs Pages to TS 5.5.2 & 5.6.2,making Noted Administrative Changes ML17313B0601999-08-31031 August 1999 Rev 1 to PVNGS TS Bases Implemented Between Aug 1998 & Jul 1999 ML17313B0081999-07-14014 July 1999 Rev 2 to Inservice Insp Program Summary Manual for PVNGS Unit 1. ML17313A9571999-05-26026 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Reducing Spurious Reactor Trip Hazards Associated with Setpoints While Maintaining Plant Protection ML17313A7511998-12-16016 December 1998 Rev 2 to ISI Program Summary Manual, for PVNGS Unit 3 ML17313A4181998-06-0909 June 1998 Proposed Improved Tech Specs Sections 3.5.1 & 3.5.2,revising Safety Injection tanks-operating & Safety Injection Tanks Shutdown ML17313A1141997-11-0707 November 1997 Improved TS Pages for Section 3.0, LCO & SR Applicability, Section 3.1, Reactivity Control & Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits. Generic Change to NUREG-1432,Rev 1 Incorporated Into Section 3.0 & 3.1 ML17312B6411997-08-28028 August 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing one-time Extension of Required Surveillance Interval for Msi Sys Portion Only of ESFAS Logic ML20217Q6801997-08-22022 August 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Clarifying Wording in TS Bases 3/4.6.1.4, Internal Pressure ML20141H7831997-07-18018 July 1997 Proposed Improved Tech Specs Section 3.8, Electrical Power Sys ML20141H7461997-07-18018 July 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Addl Info Re Improved TS Section 3.4, Rcs ML17312B0311996-11-0606 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.8.1.1 Re A.C. Sources - Operating ML17300B2651996-06-17017 June 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Changing Section 1.10 & 3.2.8 & Associated Bases for Obtaining Thyroid Dcfs Used in Definition of Dose Equivalent I-131 ML17312A9451996-05-14014 May 1996 Rev 3 to Significant Condition Investigation. ML17312A6491996-04-0101 April 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising TS 3/4.9.6 to Temporarily Allow Use of Hoist Instead of Refueling Machine for Movement of Fuel Assembly at Core Location A-07 ML17312A6401996-03-26026 March 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.9.6,increasing Refueling Machine Overload Cut Off Limit to 2,000 Lb,In 50 Lb Increments,For Removal of Stuck Fuel Assembly from Core Location A-06 ML17312A6321996-03-26026 March 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising TS 3/4.9.6 to Relocate Refueling Machine Overload Cut Off Limit from TS 3/4.9.6 to Plant UFSAR Per Criteria in 10CFR50.36 & Rev 1 of NUREG-1432 STS for C-E Plants. ML17312A6371996-03-23023 March 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising TS SR 4.8.2.1.e, DC Sources, to Suspend Provision of TS 4.0.1 & 4.0.4 for Battery Capacity Testing Requirements Until Entry Into Mode 4 Following Sixth Refueling Outage ML17312A5691996-03-0505 March 1996 Revised Pages to ISI Program Summary Manual ML17312A5011996-01-17017 January 1996 Revised Page 5-1 Changing Section 5.2.2 to Include Description of Material Used for Control Element Assemblies ML17311B3221995-12-20020 December 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Reducing Setpoint for MSIS & Rt on Low SG Pressure ML17311B3181995-12-20020 December 1995 Revised Pages to ISI Program Summary Manual ML17311B0301995-07-0303 July 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Temp Method to Respond to Sustained Degraded Switchyard Voltage ML17311A9771995-06-21021 June 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Modifying Tables 3.3-4 & 3.3-5 of Section 3/4.3.2 of Esfa Sys Instrumentation ML17311A8651995-05-0202 May 1995 Proposed TS 3.1.2.6,Figure 3.1-1, Min Borated Water Vols, Relocating Elevations That Correspond to Min Required Water Vols for Spent Fuel Pool Into Site Procedures ML17311A8231995-04-18018 April 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3/4.4.4 Re Sleeving Process for SG Tube Repair ML17312A9381995-02-0303 February 1995 Corrective Action Program. ML17311A5631994-12-28028 December 1994 Proposed TS Sections 3.9.6 & 4.9.6.1 Re Refueling Machine ML17311A5021994-12-0707 December 1994 Proposed Tech Specs,Changing Note 5 to Table 4.3-1 of TS 3/4.3.1 to Allow Verification of Shape Annealing Matrix Elements Used in Core Protection Calculators ML17311A4341994-11-30030 November 1994 Proposed TS 3/4.4.2,changing Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Lift Setting from 2,500 Psia to 2,475 Psia in LCOs 3.4.2.1 & 3.4.2.2 ML17311A3851994-10-31031 October 1994 Proposed Tech Spec Sections 3.9.6 & 4.9.6.1, Refueling Machine. ML17311A3341994-10-0909 October 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Suspending TS 4.0.1 & 4.0.4 for Battery Capacity Testing Requirements Until Mode 4 Following Fifth Refueling Outage ML17311A2171994-08-18018 August 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Adding Analytical Method Suppl Entitled, Calculative Methods for CE Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model for Analysis of CE & W Designed Nsss. ML17310B4511994-07-12012 July 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Amend to Add One Action Statement to Table 3.3-3,entry 8 ML17310B4151994-07-0101 July 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactor Coolant Cold Leg Temperature Vs Core Power Level of TS 3.2.6 ML17310B4331994-06-20020 June 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Sections 5.3.1 & 5.6.1, & New TS Section 3/4.9.13 & Bases 3/4.9.13 ML17310B4091994-06-17017 June 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Removing Five Tables of Component Lists Per GL-91-08 ML17310B1661994-03-28028 March 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re Min Condensate Storage Tank Indicated Level ML17310B0911994-03-0202 March 1994 SG Tube Insp Plan. ML17310B0771994-02-24024 February 1994 PVNGS Unit 1 Cycle 5 Startup Rept. ML17310B0611994-02-18018 February 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Figure 3.2-1,Section 3/4.1.1.4 & Bases 3/4.1.1.4,establishing Min Temp for Criticality at 545 F for Facilities ML17310B0251994-01-27027 January 1994 Unit 2 Steam Generator Tube Insp Plan Addendum. ML17310B0001994-01-19019 January 1994 Proposed Tech Specs of AF Automatic Actuation Logic Surveillance Frequency Extension ML17310A8361993-11-16016 November 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Table 4.2-4, Min Staffing Requirements for PVNGS Emergencies, in Support of Proposed Rev to Emergency Plan ML17310A7421993-10-27027 October 1993 Revised Unit 1 SG Tube Insp Plan. ML17310A7351993-10-26026 October 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Changing Maximum Nominal Enrichment of Fuel Allowed to Be Used in Reactor Core ML17310A6501993-09-17017 September 1993 Unit 1 SG Tube Insp Plan. ML17310A6161993-09-0808 September 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Section 6.9.1.10 Re Sys 80 Inletflow Distribution to List of Methods Used to Determine Core Operating Limits 1999-09-29
[Table view] |
Text
D..SAFETY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AMENDMENT The proposed amendment to Sections 3.9.6 and 4.9.6.1 would revise the refueling machine overload cut off limit to be appropriate for the increase in the fuel assembly weight. The increase in the fuel assembly weight results from modifications which include denser fuel pellets, laser welded GUARDIAN~ grids, and laser welded spacer grids. The following is a brief description of these modiTications:
Denser Fuel Pellets - The fuel pellet was physically modified which resulted in a slightly larger outside diameter, with a reduced dish volume and reduced chamfer height to provide more energy per unit volume and reduce the propensity of end capping and chipping.
Laser Welded GUARDIAN' Grids - The previous Inconel Grid Assembly is replaced with a redesigned Inconel Spacer Grid Assembly called the GUARDIAN~.
The GUARDIAN~, with its design features, improves the Inconel spacer grid assembly's ability to entrap debris.
Laser Welded Spacer Grids - The spacer grid assemblies were redesigned to improve the coolant flow between the fuel rods located along the periphery of the fuel bundle. Laser welding also produces a smaller and more uniform nugget.
This smaller weld nugget reduces the grid's pressure drop coefficients thereby producing greater thermal margin.
These modifications were evaluated, separate from this proposal, and found to be acceptable in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. The weight of the fuel is not identified in the Technical Specifications.
The overload cut off limit was incorporated on the refueling machine hoist to protect the core internals and pressure vessel from possible damage in the event the fuel assembly becomes mechanically bound as it is withdrawn from the reactor vessel. The proposed overload cut off limit was determined as follows:
Overload Cut Off limit = (Hoist Wet Weight) + (Grapple Wet Weight) +
(Max Wet Fuel Weight) + 90 lbs.
Where: a) Hoist and Grapple Wet Weight = 176 lbs.
b) Maximum Wet Fuel Weight = 1334 lbs.
The basis for the 90 pounds had two considerations: (1) to be large enough to account for friction loads during fuel assembly withdrawal; and, (2) to be small enough to ensure that while lifting a minimum weight fuel assembly, the loads Page1 of5 9501040272 94i228 PDR ADOCK 05000528 P PDR
0
.imposed on a mechanically bound fuel assembly are below the design limit specified by the fuel manufacturer. The maximum value for the existing overload cut off limit was specified by the fuel manufacturer to be 1602 pounds. There is some conservatism in the calculation of the 1602 pound upper limit since the fuel manufacturer's calculation is based on fuel assemblies with a 14 x 14 pin arrangement where Palo Verde fuel assemblies have a 16 x 16 pin arrangement, which contains more welds. There are approximately 15% more welds, especially along the periphery, of fuel assemblies with a 16 X 16 pin arrangement. The additional weld geometry was reviewed and estimated to allow the increase of the maximum value for the overload cutoff limit by 20 pounds (i.e., up to 1622 pounds). However, since the proposed 1600 pound overload cut off limit is bounded by the fuel manufacturer's existing maximum value of 1602 pounds, the use of this conservatism was not necessary.
In order to prevent challenging of the overload cut off, the refueling machine normal operating procedures caution the operator to stop the hoist if the indicated load exceeds a prescribed administrative limit. The administrative limit is more restrictive than the proposed overload cutoff limit. The fuel assembly grids have also been designed with lead-in features to minimize the potential for mechanical binding. The revised overload cut off limit does not decrease, the factor of safety for the refueling machine hoist below the Crane Manufacturer's Association of America (CMAA) Standard 70 required value of 5/1.
Based upon the above it can therefore be concluded that the integrity of the fuel assemblies, core internals and the pressure vessel will be maintained with the proposed change.
E. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment, would not:
(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. A discussion of these standards as they relate to this amendment request follows:
Standard 1 Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The'proposed Technical Specification amendment to Sections 3.9.6 and 4.9.6.1 provides a revised refueling machine hoist overload cut off limitthat is appropriate Page 2 of 5
.'for the increased weight of the fuel assemblies. The increased weight of fuel assemblies results from design and fabrication improvements such as denser fuel pellets, laser welded GUARDIAN'grids, and laser welded spacer grids. The weight of a fuel assembly is identified in the UFSAR as a parameter in the analysis for a Fuel Handling Accident. The radiological consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident were re-evaluated in order to incorporate fuel assembly design changes including increases in the fuel assembly weight and increases of the maximum fuel enrichment. The analysis used a fuel assembly enriched to 4.3 weight percent and the power assigned to the assembly was 1.65 times the average power per assembly. The accident is assumed to occur 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after reactor shutdown and it is also assumed that all 236 fuel rods fail. The resultant thyroid dose at the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> exclusion area boundary is 71.5 rem which meets the Standard Review Plan 15.7.4 limit of 75 rem. The conclusions for the radiological consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident remain consistent with the results in the Safety Evaluation Report. The increased weight of the fuel assemblies was reviewed, separate from this proposal, in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 and found to be acceptable, as described above.
The increase in the refueling machine overload cut off limit does not impact the manner in which the refueling machine is operated or the manner in which the fuel assemblies are engaged and lifted. The overload cut off limit is not a parameter used in the analysis of a Fuel Handling Accident. The overload cut off limit was incorporated on the refueling machine hoist to protect the core internals and pressure vessel from possible damage in the event the fuel assembly becomes mechanically bound as it is withdrawn from the reactor vessel. The proposed overload cut off limit was determined as follows:
Overload Cut Off limit = (Hoist Wet Weight) + (Grapple Wet Weight) +
(Max Wet Fuel Weight) + 90 lbs.
Where: a) Hoist and Grapple Wet Weight = 176 lbs.
b) Maximum Wet Fuel Weight = 1334 lbs.
The basis for the 90 pounds had two considerations: (1) to be large enough to account for friction loads during fuel assembly withdrawal; and, (2) to be small enough to ensure that while lifting a minimum weight fuel assembly, the loads imposed on a mechanically bound fuel assembly are below the design limit specified by the fuel manufacturer. The maximum value for the existing overload cut off limit was specified by the fuel manufacturer to be 1602 pounds.
The revised overload cut off limit does not decrease the factor of safety for the refueling machine hoist below the Crane Manufacturer's Association of America (CMAA) Standard 70 required value of 5/1.
Page 3 of 5
,, Therefore, the for the machine overload cut off limitwill
'ot significantlyproposed change refueling increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated and will remain bounded by the accident analysis of Chapter 15 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
Standard 2 Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
The proposed Technical Specification amendment to Sections 3.9.6 and 4.9.6.1 would provide a revised refueling machine hoist overload cut off limit that is appropriate for the increased weight of the fuel assemblies. The increased weight of fuel assemblies results from design and fabrication improvements such as denser fuel pellets, laser welded GUARDIAN'grids, and laser welded spacer grids. The fuel overload cut off limit was incorporated on the refueling machine hoist to protect the cole internals and pressure vessel from possible damage in the event the fuel assembly becomes mechanically bound as it is withdrawn from the reactor vessel. The proposed overload cut off limit was determined as follows:
Overload Cut Off limit = (Hoist Wet Weight) + (Grapple Wet Weight) +
(Max Wet Fuel Weight) + 90 lbs.
Where: a) Hoist and Grapple Wet Weight = 176 lbs.
b) Maximum Wet Fuel Weight = 1334 lbs.
The basis for the 90 pounds had two considerations: (1) to be large enough to account for friction loads during fuel assembly withdrawal; and, (2) to be small enough to ensure that while lifting a minimum weight fuel assembly, the loads imposed on a mechanically bound fuel assembly are below the design limit specified by the fuel manufacturer. The maximum value for the existing overload cut off limit was specified by the fuel manufacturer to be 1602 pounds to limit the potential for damage to the fuel assemblies.
The accident of concern related to the change in the refueling machine overload cut off limit is the Fuel Handling Accident. This accident occurs when a fuel bundle becomes disengaged from the refueling machine grapple. The change of the refueling machine overload cut off limit does not change the way in which the refueling machine grapple engages the fuel assemblies. Since fuel handling is the subject of the change, no new or different kinds of accidents are created.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the proposed change to Sections 3.9.6 and 4.9.6.1 will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
Page 4 of 5
~.
'P
/4
. 'Standard 3 Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
'argin of safety.
The proposed Technical Specification amendment to Sections 3.9.6 and 4.9.6.1 would provide a revised refueling machine hoist overload cut off limit that is appropriate for the increased weight of the fuel assemblies. The increased weight of fuel assemblies results from design and fabrication improvements such as denser fuel pellets, laser welded GUARDIAN'grids, and laser welded spacer grids. The overload cut off limit was incorporated on the refueling machine hoist to protect the core internals and pressure vessel from possible damage in the event the fuel assembly becomes mechanically bound as it is withdrawn from the reactor vessel. The proposed overload cut off limit was determined as follows:
Overload Cut Off limit = (Hoist Wet Weight) + (Grapple Wet Weight) +
(Max Wet Fuel Weight) + 90 lbs.
Whei'B: a) Hoist and Grapple Wet Weight = 176 lbs.
b) Maximum Wet Fuel Weight = 1334 lbs.
The basis for the 90 pounds had two considerations: (1) to be large enough to account for friction loads during fuel assembly withdrawal; and, (2) to be small enough to ensure that while lifting a minimum weight fuel assembly, the loads imposed on a mechanically bound fuel assembly are below the design limit specified by the fuel manufacturer. The maximum value for the existing overload cut off limit was specified by the fuel manufacturer to be 1602 pounds.
The overload cut off limit is not a parameter used in the analysis of a Fuel Handling Accident. The conclusions regarding the radiological consequences of the Fuel Handling Accident remain valid, and there is no decrease in the margin of safety.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the proposed change will maintain the integrity of the fuel assemblies and reactor vessel internals and does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Page 5 of 5
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