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Category:GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
MONTHYEARML17300B3071999-03-31031 March 1999 Seismic Portion of Submittal-Only Screening Review of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units Ipeee. ML17312A7631996-05-0808 May 1996 Calculation Summary of Radiological Doses for SG Tube Rupture W/Loss of Offsite Power & Stuck Open Adv. ML20117J0491996-05-0808 May 1996 At&T Round Cell Nuclear Util User'S Council Charter ML20113E1631996-05-0808 May 1996 PVNGS Unit 3 SG Eddy Current Exam Fifth Refueling Outage Nov 1995 ML17311A2031994-08-11011 August 1994 Forwards Unit 2 SG IR from Last Mid Cycle Outage.Aps Stated That It Would Present,Within Four & One Half Months of Breaker Closure,Final Regulatory Guide 1.121 Evaluation Results of Pulled Tube Analyses & Statistical Treatment ML20062M5111993-12-31031 December 1993 1993 Certification Submittal Simulation Facility Simulator Training Suite a ML20058N7161993-09-21021 September 1993 Independent Safety & Quality Engineering GL-89-01 Motor Operated Valve Programmatic Assessment ML17306A9361992-08-20020 August 1992 Rev 1 to JCO-91-02-01, Justification for Continued Operation Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis Concerns. ML17305B3381991-01-18018 January 1991 Justification for Continued Operation - Potential for Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Due to Tube Rupture in Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Cooler. ML17305A9811990-07-31031 July 1990 Conceptual Design for Palo Verde Nuclear Generator Station for Diverse Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Sys (Dafas). ML17305A3351989-10-20020 October 1989 Rev 3 to Justification for Continued Operation Control Element Assembly (CEA) Drop Events. ML17305A3211989-10-0505 October 1989 Procedure 43OP-3ZZ16,RCS Drain Operations,Not Appropriate for Circumstances. ML17305A3401989-07-18018 July 1989 Unit 3 Steam Generator Eddy Current Exam,First Refueling Outage Apr 1989, NDE Summary Rept ML17304B2941989-06-0909 June 1989 Justification for Continued Operation,Control Element Assembly Drop Events. ML17304B2321989-06-0101 June 1989 Essential & Emergency Lighting Sys Rept. ML17304B2151989-05-22022 May 1989 Revised Electrical Distribution Sys Design Assessment. ML17304B2141989-05-19019 May 1989 Unit 3 Reactor Trip Following Large Load Reject. ML20247L6851989-05-0808 May 1989 Compressed Gas Sys Evaluation & Analysis Rept ML20244B0961989-05-0808 May 1989 Rev 0 to Compressed Gas Sys Evaluation & Analysis for Palo Verde Units 1,2 & 3 ML20247L6921989-05-0808 May 1989 Electrical Distribution Sys Design Assessment ML17304B2051989-05-0606 May 1989 Steam Bypass Control Sys Overall Final Rept. ML20247L7271989-04-30030 April 1989 Atmospheric Dump Valve Engineering Analysis ML17304B0121989-01-31031 January 1989 Final Rept on Pressure-Temp Limits for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Stations. ML17304A7551988-11-0707 November 1988 Analysis of Equipment Functionality W/Essential Chiller Sys Inoperable. ML20082D9761988-10-30030 October 1988 EE580 Field Verification Suppl to Final Rept Ref NRC Allegation RV-87-A-047 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Oct 1988 ML17304A7601988-10-13013 October 1988 Loss of Qualified Life & Functionality of Electrical Equipment Due to Loss of Essential Cooling Sys in Unit 1. ML17304A2211988-06-0909 June 1988 Justification for Continued Operation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. ML20082D9991988-05-30030 May 1988 EE580 Field Verification Final Rept Ref NRC Allegation RV-87-A-047 ML17303A8871988-02-16016 February 1988 Special Plant Event Evaluation Rept 87-02-019 & Mods to Valves Sga Uv 134 & Sga Uv 138 Render 2AFA-P01 on 871127 ML17303A6291987-09-24024 September 1987 Arizona Nuclear Power Project Metallurgical Investigation Rept,Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Emergency Diesel Generator 3B Number 9L Piston Pin. ML17303A4541987-06-0404 June 1987 Unit 1 Steam Generator Eddy Current Exam,Feb 1987, NDE Summary Rept ML17303A3571987-03-12012 March 1987 Torsional Vibration Analysis KSV-20-T SN-7183-88 SO-0391. ML17303A3071987-02-28028 February 1987 Rev 0 to Rept on Steam Generator Tube Leak at Unit 1. ML20215G2981987-02-24024 February 1987 Technical Evaluation Rept for SPDS for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1,2 & 3 ML17300A8211987-02-0606 February 1987 Torsional Vibration Analysis of Repaired Crankshaft, KSV-20-T & SN-7187. ML17303A3551987-02-0606 February 1987 Torsional Vibration Analysis of Repaired Crankshaft KSV-20-T SN-7187 Arizona Public Svc Co,Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Diesel Generator III-B. ML17303A2421987-01-22022 January 1987 Rev 0 to 10CFR50,App R Safe Shutdown Evaluation.Outside Control Room Fire Spurious Actuation Study for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3. ML17303A2331987-01-21021 January 1987 Loose Part Monitoring Sys,Loose Part Detection Program Rept. ML17300A6181986-10-31031 October 1986 Description of Proposed Enhancements to Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Control Bldg Elevation 74-Ft 0-Inches Masonry Walls for Units 1,2 & 3. ML17300A5861986-09-30030 September 1986 Evaluation of Block Masonry Walls at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Technical Rept ML17300A5301986-09-18018 September 1986 Factors Influencing Deflections in Grouted Hollow Unit Concrete Masonry Walls. ML20212A7011986-07-31031 July 1986 Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 (Sys 80 Nonprototype - Category 1),Evaluation of Precore Hot Functional Insp Program, Final Rept ML17303A3141986-07-29029 July 1986 Suppl to 860610 Application Re Sale & Leaseback Transactions by Public Svc Co of New Mexico ML20215E9291986-05-23023 May 1986 Observations & Comments,Initial Reactor Startup & Low Power Reactor Physics Tests,Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2,NRC Region V Insp ML17299A5771985-08-30030 August 1985 Rev 0 to 10CFR50,App R Safe Shutdown Evaluation,Outside Control Room Fire Spurious Actuation Study. ML20137A6691985-06-21021 June 1985 Observations & Comments,Initial Reactor Startup & Low Power Reactor Physics Tests,Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Unit 1,NRC Region V Enhanced Insp ML20116N4701985-04-30030 April 1985 Refueling Cavity Water Seal, Summary Rept in Response to IE Bulletin 84-03 ML17298B9321985-02-28028 February 1985 SPDS Sar. ML20107H5181984-12-31031 December 1984 Assessment of Bolting Integrity at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1,2 & 3 ML17298B6851984-12-17017 December 1984 Bechtel Study 13-ES-600, Reg Guide 1.75 Low Energy Circuit Analysis. 1999-03-31
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17300B3811999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 991007 Ltr ML17300B3271999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3 ML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0611999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990810 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17300B3151999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990714 Ltr ML17313A9921999-06-21021 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990525,RMS mini-computer Was Removed from Service to Implement Yr 2000 Mod & Was OOS Longer than 72 H Allowed.Caused by Planned Y2K Mods.Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program Was Initiated ML17313A9911999-06-18018 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990510,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 2 Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Mineral Cable Connector to Accelerometer.Licensee Will Implement Modifications Which Will Enhance loose-part Detection Sys ML17313A9731999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990608 Ltr ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A9201999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990512 Ltr ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17300B3071999-03-31031 March 1999 Seismic Portion of Submittal-Only Screening Review of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units Ipeee. ML17313A8801999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990412 Ltr ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML20207H7471999-03-10010 March 1999 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise 99-E-AEV-03003 ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A8501999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.With 990311 Ltr ML17313A7791999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Rev to Emergency Plan That Would Result in Two Less Radiation Protection Positions Immediatelu Available During Emergencies ML17313A8061999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990218 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML20206H2101998-12-31031 December 1998 SCE 1998 Annual Rept ML17313A7381998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990113 Ltr ML17313A7031998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Pvngs,Unit 1,2 & 3. with 981209 Ltr ML17313A6701998-11-0404 November 1998 Rev 2 to PVNGS Unit 2 Colr. ML17313A6741998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 981109 Ltr ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A6561998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for PVNGS Units 1,2 & 3.With 981007 Ltr ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML20151S0941998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 6 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 3 ML20151S0901998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 1 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 2 ML20151S0861998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 1 ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML17313A5401998-08-13013 August 1998 Special Rept:On 980715,declared PASS Inoperable.Caused by Failure of Offgas Flush/Purge Control Handswitch HS0101. Handswitch Replaced & Post Maintenance Retesting Was Initiated ML17313A5301998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Pvgns,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980812 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A5791998-07-0707 July 1998 to PVNGS SG Tube ISI Results for Seventh Refueling Outage Mar & Apr 1998. ML17313A5001998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980710 Ltr ML17313A4501998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4521998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 5 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A4211998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980609 Ltr ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3691998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for PVNGS.W/980412 Ltr ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 1999-09-30
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Text
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS 1, 2, & 3 ELECTRICAL TRAIN AND CHANNEL SEPARATION STUDY SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
REPORT August 28, 1981 I
8i09020i00 8i083i PDR ADOCK 05000528, PDR)'
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
- 1. Summary
- 2. Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown
- 3. Electrical Circuits Required for Safe Shutdown
- 4. Selected Cables by Raceway
- 5. Color Coded Raceway Drawings
- 6. Problem Areas
- 7. Field Walkdowns
- 8. Recommended Solutions
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ELECTRICAL TRAIN AND CHANNEL SEPARATION STUDY SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS
- 1.
SUMMARY
An intensive study was conducted to determine the capability to safely shut down the plant in the event of an exposure fire whose zone of influence could impact redundant equipment, cables, or components necessary for safe shutdown. All safety-related plant areas except the control room and containment building were considered in this study. The control room fire study is part of a separate effort.
Access to the containment is limited during operations by strict admini-strat1ve control wh1ch min1mizes the possibility of transient combustibles accumulating in the containment. Further, before significant access could occur for refueling, the plant would be placed in a cold shutdown condition.
The only source of substantial flammable exposure f1re material is the reactor coolant pump lube oil and this is contained by a leak collect1on system which will remain functional after an SSE. The system is designed to preclude leakage onto hot surfaces'he study began with the development of a comprehensive list of equipment required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. All electrical cables connected to the respective equipment were identified . Raceways contain-ing safe shutdown cables were color coded on electrical layout drawings.
Criteria for adequate separation were based on 10CFR50, Appendix R, and were used to identify problem areas. Problem areas were identified where adequate separation was not maintained . Each problem area was resolved by providing adequate separation as identified below.
For structures other than the containment building, adequate separation is maintained by providing early warning fire detection and manual fire protection and separating redundant equipment, cables, or components by one of the following:
a ~ 3-hour rated fire barrier, wall, or floor slab,
- b. 1-hour rated fire barrier for one division and automatic fire suppression,
- c. 1/2-hour rated fire barrier for both d1visions and automatic fire suppression,
- d. Twenty feet minimum separation with no intervening combustibles and automatic fire suppression,
- e. Alternate or dedicated shutdown and automatic fire suppression.
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As a result of field walkdowns, problem areas were and are being resolved by providing adequate separation of safe shutdown raceways'pecific problem area solutions for all areas are expected to be completed by late November 1981.
The study concludes that PVNGS can achieve and maintain a safe plant shutdown in the event of a fire, with or without available offsite power.
This complies with 10CFR50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2.
- 2. EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN The list of equipment required for safe shutdown was developed from existing lists of systems or equipment required for safe shutdown taken from:
A. CESSAR-F, Section 7 ', Systems Required for Safe Shutdown B. PVNGS FSAR, Section 7.4, Systems Required for Safe Shutdown C. PVNGS Fire Protection Evaluation Report, Table A-l, Equipment Required for Cold Shutdown Without Offsite Power Available r
Support systems (e-g., essential cooling water, essential HVAC, etc.)
were also included.
Consistent with 10CFR50, Appendix R, the following criteria were used to finalize a list of safe shutdown systems and safe shutdown functions:
A. Achieve and maintain a safe plant shutdown in the event of a fire, with or without available offsite power.
B. Achieve and maintain hot standby from the main control room.
C. Achieve and maintain cold shutdown within 72 hours from either the main control room or locally.
The following list of safe shutdown systems and safe shutdown functions was developed:
Functions Necessary Safe Shutdown S stem to Achieve Safe Shutdown Reactor Protection Insert Control Rods Auxiliary Feedwater Feedwater to Steam Generators Condensate Storage Tank Level Instrumentation Main Steam System Atmospheric Dump Valves Main Steam Isolation Steam Generator Level Indication Steam Generator Pressure Indication
Functions Necessary Safe Shutdown System to Achieve Safe Shutdown Reac tor Coolant Sys tern Pressurizer Pressure Indication Pressurizer Level Indication Pressurizer Heaters RCS Temperature Indication Isolation of RCPB Essential Chilled Water Essential Equipment Rooms Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rooms LPSI Pump Rooms ECW Pump Rooms Essential HVAC Control Building Equipment Essential Cooling Water Cooling for Essential Chilled Water Essential Spray Pond Ultimate Heat Sink Diesel Generator and Support Emergency Electric Power CVCS RCS Makeup (Includes Charging Pumps)
Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Emergency Lighting Control Room Emergency Lighting Shutdown Cooling RCS Cooldown With the list of functions itemized, PGIDs and electrical elementary drawings were used to develop a specific list of equipment, by tag number, required to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown configuration.
- 3. ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN To determine which electrical circuits were required for safe shutdown, the electrical elementary diagram containing a given piece of equipment required for safe shutdown (see Section 2) was selected. Electrical power, control, and instrument circuits terminating at that piece of equipment were identified by unique scheme numbers. Each scheme was traced back through panels, motor control centers, load centers, and switchgear equipment to the main Class IE 13.8 kV bus, 4.16 kV switchgear bus, 480V MCC bus, or 125 V-dc bus, as appropriate, for the respective electrical separation group. Any additional equipment or electrical circuitry considered as related were also identified. This process was done for each piece of equipment required for safe shutdown.
4, SELECTED CABLES BY RACEWAY The circuits identified in Section 3 as required for safe shutdown were assigned a,code letter R to denote "Required for Safe Shutdown."
This information was inserted into an existing computerized data base.
Ordinarily, the data is used to provide cable routing information indicating all electrical cables contained 1n a given electrical raceway. In this case, the code letter clearly identifies each safe shutdown cable.
A computer sort entitled "Selected Cables by Raceway" was made to iden-tify the raceways containing safe shutdown cables. The sort identifies raceway numbers, electrical separat1on groups, and electrical cables, including safe shutdown (Code R) cables in each raceway for each raceway drawing. Raceway drawings are div1ded according to building, level, and area. The separation groups consist of Trains A or B for ac power and control cables, Trains A, B, C and D for dc power and control cables, and Channels A, B, C, and D for instrumentation cables.
- 5. COLOR CODED RACEWAY DRAWINGS Using the computer sort entitled "Selected Cables by Raceway" (see Section 4) to identify raceways containing safe shutdown cables, raceway layout drawings were selected and individual raceways were color coded according to the following scheme:
AC Power and Control Cables: Train A RED Train B GREEN DC Power, Instrumentation, and Channel A RED Control Cables: Channel B GREEN Channel C YELLOW Channel D BLUE The drawings show the physical layout of each electrical raceway. Care was taken to note noncontiguous colored raceways, which would imply omission or coding errors.
- 6. PROBLEH AREAS The color coded raceway drawings from Section 5 were checked to determine whether adequate separation was maintained between all redundant raceways with the exception that RED did not have to be separated from YELLOW, and GREEN did not have to be separated from BLUE. Th1s exception was based on the electrical separation groups established at PVNGS. Safety channels A and C are cons1dered part of safety train A, while safety channels B and D are part of safety train B.
Consistent with lOCPR50, Appendix R, .for structures other than the con-tainment building, adequate separation is maintained by providing early
warning fire detection and manual fire protection and separating redundant equipment, cables, or components by one of the following:
- a. 3-hour rated fire barrier, wall, or floor slab,
- b. l-hour rated fire barrier for one division and automatic fire suppression,
- c. 1/2-hour rated fire barrier for both divisions and automatic fire suppression,
- d. Twenty feet minimum separation with no intervening combustibles and automatic fire suppression,
- e. Alternate or dedicated shutdown and automatic fire suppression.
Each drawing was designated as a problem area if was not maintained between redundant safe shutdown raceways.
adequate separation Buried or embedded conduit 1n concrete were exempted from problem area consider-ations.
- 7. FIELD WALKDOWNS Beginning in April 1981 and continuing through July 1981, approximate, weekly walkdowns were conducted at the PVNGS jobsite. The purpose of these walkdowns was twofold:
- 1. To review all raceways that contain safe shutdown cables,
- 2. To ensure compliance with separation requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R.
The walkdowns involved tracing and follow1ng the installed configuration of safe shutdown raceways and comparing with color-coded. raceway drawings. The walkdown checklist consisted of the following:
- a. 20 -0" separat1on (with no intervening combustibles) between trains A and B raceways containing shutdown cables
- b. Reroute raceways (if possible) to meet 20 -0" separation
- c. Reroute cables (1f possible) to elim1nate need to reroute raceways.
- d. When insufficient space exi.sts between trains A and B raceways, review the poss1bility of wrapping both tra1ns with an approved material (e.g., junction boxes one inch apart)
- e. Identify raceways to be wrapped with an approved material for tra1ns A or B raceways that do not meet 20 W" separation and cannot be rerouted
- f. When 1t is determined to wrap raceways, it must be checked and verified that sprinklers will be installed in the area
- g. Identify possibility of installing fire barrier with 3-hour rating
- h. Check walkdown against physical color-coded drawings Mark any major and significant differences between the physical drawings and actual installation that would affect the installation drawings Document observations and recommendations after jobsite walkdown.
The walkdowns were a vital part in analyzing a problem area (see Section 8),
drawing correct conclusions, and selecting optimum solutions.
- 8. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS In conjunction with the weekly plant walkdown effort (see Section 7),
consideration was given to selecting the most practical alternative in view of the advanced stage of construction at PVNGS. Considerations included:
a ~ Space availability
- b. Installation status of existing equipment
- c. Cost and schedule impact of implementation
- d. Operating and maintenance concerns
- e. Percent completion of pulled cable.
- f. Existing or potential fire barriers.
Each problem area was resolved by providing adequate separation of redundant safe shutdown raceways in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix R, as specified in Section 6.
As a result of this study, it was determined that approximately 3000 feet of wrapped electrical raceways and approximately18 zones needing additional fixed water suppression were necessary for simply separating Train A from Train B. However, a detailed functional analysis is being performed to determine whether a safe shutdown can be achieved with the loss of all safe shutdown circuits in the affected fire zone. It is expected that this analysis will result in a reduced amount of wrapping and a reduced amount of additional sprinkler'his study did not specifically address the separation of equipment.
However, the results of the study apply to all electrically operated safe shutdown equipment since the study covered all safe shutdown cabling. In the Palo Verde design, redundant components are located in separate rooms.
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