ML20116N470

Refueling Cavity Water Seal, Summary Rept in Response to IE Bulletin 84-03

ML20116N470
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	04/30/1985
From:	ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
Shared Package
ML20116N457	List: ML20116N452 ML20116N470
References
IEB-84-03, IEB-84-3, NUDOCS 8505070216
Download: ML20116N470 (22)

Text

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1 ARIZONA NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1,.2 & 3 RESPONSE TO NRC IE BULLETIN 84-03 i REFUELING CAVITY WATER SEAL i

SUMMARY

REPORT' APRIL 30, 1985 l

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RESPONSE TO NRC IE BULLETIN 84-03

~ TABLE OF CONTENTS r

SECTION TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

.1 ' SCOPE 1 2 '

SUMMARY

1 3 INTRODUCTION 1 4 POSTULATED FAILURES 3 5 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 5 6 GROSS SEAL FAILURE 5 7 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE LEAK DETERMINATION 5 8 MAKEUP CAPACITY - MITIGATING TECHNIQUES 6 9 TIME TO CIADDING DAMAGE WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION 6 10 POTENTIAL EFFECT ON STORED FUEL AND FUEL IN TRANSFER 8 11 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES 8 12 SYSTEM ADDITIONS & MODIFICATIONS 8 13 FIGURES 10-17 h

Appendix A'- Combustion Engineering Test Summary 18 (1) - Reactor Pool Seal Load Test (2) - Reactor Pool Seal Proof Test (3) - Reactor Pool Seal Proof Test (4) - Reactor Vessel Pool Seal- Pin Pullout Test l (5) - Reactor Pool Seal Penetration Test I 3.

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l TITLE FIGURE #

Fuel Handling Arrangement 1 Reactor Cavity Pool General Arrangement 2 Spent Fuel Pool General Arrangement 3 Schematic of Reactor Cavity 4 Reactor Cavity. Seal Assembly 5 4

Reactor Cavity Seal Details 6 Reactor Cavity Seal Installation 7 l . Plan View of Reactor Cavity Pool Seal With Dropped Fuel Assembly 8 1

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RESPONSE TO IE BULLETIN NO. 84-03:

REFUELING CAVITY WATER SEAL

SUMMARY

REPORT 1.0 SCOPE 4 This summary report evaluates the potential for and consequences of a t

refueling cavity : water seal failure, as required by NRC Inspection and '

Enforcement Bulletin No. 84-03. Consideration has been given to: gross seal failure; maximum leak rate due to failure of active components such

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as inflated seals; makeup capacity; time to cladding damage without operator action; potiential effect on stored fuel and fuel in transfer;

.and emergency operating procedures.

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i 2.0

SUMMARY

The considerations- of the I&E Bulletin have been addressed by this summary report. A conservative. estimate of the seal failure events that

! could potentially lead . to the uncovering of spent fuel assemblies was found < to . be less than 1x10 /RY (Reactor Year) even without operator l 3

4 action.

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3.0 INTRODUCTION

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, 3.1 General Arranaement The general arrangement of-the System 80 containment and~ spent fuel building is shown on Figure 1. . The Lapacific details of . the - FVNGS 4 reactor. cavity pool and the spent fuel pool are shown.on Figures 2, 3, and 4. The pools are connected ~ by a fuel . transfer tube through i-which the fuel assemblies from the fuel building are transported to the containment building. The locations of the fuel transfer , tube i

valve, fuel transfer system canal, intermediate fuel storage racks, .

! .etc..are also defined for reference.  ;

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3.2 ~ Reactor Cavity Pool Seal The reactor cavity pool seal assembly at PVNGS (Figure 5) consists of a circular stainless steel seal plate from which two inflatable pneumatic seals are supported (inner and' outer). The assembly . is

installed on and seals to the two 2 inch annular gaps between the

! reactor vessel flange and the reactor cavity embedment ring. This -;

permits the reactor cavity pool . to be flooded during refueling operations. The reactor cavity pool seal assembly - ' weighs approximately 15,000 pounds and supports a head of approximately 24  !

feet of water under normal static conditions.

Two 1-7/16 inch diameter alignment- pins on the embedment ring ,

ensure correct positioning of the reactor cavity pool ; seal assembly. The seal plate is supported by twenty four , stainless f l- steel ribs. These ribs provide structural support and provide .

) . correct positioning of the elastomer seals.

! The elastomer seals provide two separate seals ,as shown in figures - I l

6 and 7. First; the seal wedge lodges securely between . the seal plate and either the reactor vessel :or embedment, ring. Secondly, the bulb seal = inflates to seal : the lower edges - of the gap between the vessel and the seal plate (inner' seal). - ' In- addition, the gap

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l between the seal' plate' and the embedment; ring l(outer' seal) is also

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sealed. Inflating the bulb also. pulls the upper. wedge portion into the gap, thereby effecting a double seal. This arrangement: permits

, testing of both primary and secondary' seals - prior ito filling the i

[ , reactor. cavity pool. _

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The elastomer seals -are fabricated from fabric reinforced EPDM (an

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' ethylene propylene compound) by the Presray Corporation of Bawling NY. ~ Reinforcing pins are . incorporated in the elastomer seal' flange at 3"' intervals to -provide seal ; rigidity during handling,-

!, installation . and.- postulated seismic events. The elastomar seal-

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[ . design has been successfully tested to withstand ' loads equivalent i

of 100 foot : head of water even with gap widths! in ~ excess of the .;

- design' criteria.=

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, ' 3.3 Differences between PVNGS and Haddam Neck Seals

'Several significant differences exist between the PVNGS reactor cavity pool seal assembly and that utilized at Haddam Neck. -These include:

Ites PVNGS Haddam Neck

1) Elastomer Compound - Flange Durometer Rating 60 Durometer Rating 40 l

- Bulb Durometer Rating 40 Durometer Rating 40

2) Annulus Gap Width 2" Nominal 2-1/8" Nominal

3) Air Pressure Requirements 25 psi 40 psi

!- 4) Seal Assembly Alignment Alignment Locating Requires adjustment pins for fixed and is subject to

! positioning misalignment t

5) Rib Supports 24 9

6) Seal Support Pin Spacing 3 inches on center None j

These differences represent an improved design in. that there is a  :

much greater amount of' structural support and seal assembly.

i alignment at PVNGS.

l 4.0 POSTUIATED FAILURES Design .. bases have been established to ensure that the PVNGS reactor

cavity pool seal will function properly even during postulated failure l conditions.

4.1 Desian Bases

! The reactor cavity pool seal shall withstand overinflation, underinflation, puncture, a seismic . event, or a load drop without-gross seal failure. .

4.2 'Desisa Evaluetion 4.2.1 Overinflation - A pressure relief . valve of ' adequate size -is installed to preclude overpressurization.

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a 4.2.2 Underinflation/ Puncture - The wedge seal ensures adequate sealing even in the event that air- pressure is lost after the pool-is filled - since the hydrostatic presure on top of the seal keeps the wedge in position.

4.2.3 . Seismic Event - he maximum gap between the vessel and seal plate (or the ~ seal plate 'and the embedment ring) was

. calculated - for maximum seismic movement due to the 0.2g

-PVNGS Safe Shutdown Earthquak.e. Testing has-. shown . that the cavity seal held an equivalent of 100 ft. head of water even with the most adverse seal alignment possible by plant

' layout. '(Refer to Appendix A, Test. Summary No. 2 & 3).

4.2.4 Load Drop -

he following objects or equipment that are carried or move over the cavity seal assembly were reviewed:

4.2.4.1 he refueling machine and control element assembly (CEA)- change platform are designed such that they, or any portion thereof, will not fail and~ fall-into the_ pool during _a seismic event. Also, the refueling machine is designed = not _ to _ drop a fuel assembly during a seismic event.

4.2.4.2 Upper guide structure (UGS) lift rig, reactor vessel head, CEA transport containers and incore instrumentation transport containers are moved over the seal ' assembly. However, there is no fuel

< assembly in the refueling machine being transferred at this time and the fuel transfer valve is closed.

4.2.4.3 If a fuel assembly were dropped upon the seal, the maximum seal displacement would be limited ^ by the

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seal support pins spaced every three inches. _For a

- PVNGS element, at most three ~ pins could be. damaged '

(refer to figure .8). Eis. would result in, at t

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most, a .12 inch . sectional gap. As the ' plate to )

ring gap.is 2 inches, the _ leak would be limited to

24 square ; inches. This does not- constitute gross  !

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seal failure. %e event- consequences of- this I l

amount of leakage are described in Section 9.0 and ,

10.0.

' 5.0 RET.TARILITY EVALUATION

-5.1 An analysis was performed to' highlight the various failure modes and establish a logical sequence of events which could lead:to seal

! failure and ultimately expose irradiated fuel to the environment.

l The failure mode established was the dropping of a fuel assembly onto the elastomer seal followed by no corrective operator action.

The results. indicate that the probability of seal failure and resulting fuel assembly. damage from this condition is 8.5x10~7/RY.

1 5.2. With the current cavity seal design, _ gross failure of the cavity ,

seal has been determined to be quite ' improbable. Testing at C-E (Refer to Appendix A Test Summary No. .:5) has disclosed that, even if a fuel assembly. is dropped directly onto - the elastomer seal, l

gross seal failure would 'not -result. In addition,~the .most j: effective way to : minimize the : probability..-for . fuel damage is to have emergency procedures in place and operators trained such that,

! in the unlikely event of a seal failure, (a) _ fuel in the ' refueling l machine can be placed into a safe _ condition, (b) the transfer tube b

. valve can be' closed, and (c) equipment-is available to add water to the refueling cavity and fuel poo1~if needed.- '

i 6.0 GROSS SEAL FAILURE Gross seal failure is . precluded byL the J PVNGS.L design f as . described in" p Section 4.2.

( 7.0 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE LEAK DETERMINATION The maximum initial: leak rate which results fros' the 24 square inch leak path is'approximately 3000 syn.' -

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4 8.0 MAKEUP CAPACITY - MITIGATING TECHNIQUES 1

- 8.1. 'Given a seal ~ failure leak Lpath of 24 square inches, operator actions can. be taken to maintain the required water level in the refueling ' cavity. pool.- Water can be added to the pools from the condensate Latorage tank, or the- safety injection tanks. The condensate transfer pumps each have a. capacity of 100 gps. Each of the 'four Safety ' Injection Tanks ccasist of 1900 cubic feet of i

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borated . water. After a-' leak has been' identified, the LPSI, containment ~ spray - (CS) ;and' HPSI pumps could be aligned - to take suction from the containment recirculation sump.

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Recirculation can'.be est'ablished 'by any: of the following:. 2-LPSI 1

pumps at 4000 gpa each, . 2-Containment Spray - (CS) Pumps at 3500 spa

=each and 2-HPSI pumps at approximately 1000 gpa each. Normally one i- LPSI -pump is in operation during.' r'efueling . operation. The Technical Specifications (Section 3/4.9.8) require at least one

' shutdown cooling loop shall. be OPERABLE'and in operation. 'However,

'the Technical Specifications , also allow up ; to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per ,8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />

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period removal of the loop-from operation.: If a leak event- took place during one of the. temporary outages, fit is, estimated that the time to properly-align the valves and start the LPSI pump' to be no more than 5 minutes from the time of notification.- It is estimated that - the operator 'would - beiable = to react to the: signals due to the leak'within'10 minutes of the' event. Thus, total ' reaction time is t

estimated at'15 minutes. Pp t.fic guidelites for maintaining -water

-inventory will- be 1 W c. ed into th'e! appropriate . operating procedures-prior to t o W ,.als use. s y 9.0 TIME TO CLADDING DAMAGE WITHOUT OPERATOR ACTION 9.1- In the' event-of a. failure of the reactor cavity seal as a result of

'a . dropped fuel assembly followed by no correctiv e operator action, tb water level; will drop in both 'the reactor cavity pool; andL in the spent' fuel pool.(unless the-transfer tube valve is closed).

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Such a drop in water level will lead to increased dose rates due to a reduction in water shield thickness. This section addresses the i time . span, following an' assumed seal failure of 24 square inches, l to uncover-the active fuel. The analysis is summarized below: l REFUELING POOL TIME'FOR CLADDING DAMAGE i

(FUEL TRANSFER VALVE CLOSED) l l l CUMUIATIVE l l

'i EVENT HOURS l HOURS I I I I I l 1. Maximum credible 14ak to Cavity' Seal 1 4.3 l 4.3 l l- Elevation- l l l 1 I l 1 l l 93.7 l

. l 2. Boil off to' top of fuel

.98.0 l l 1- 1 I l'3.. Fuel Uncovery and Damage I (Est) l 0.2- l 98.2 l l- I l -l REFUELING POOL TIME FOR CLADDING DAMAGE.

.(FUEL TRANSFER VALVE OPEN)-

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l EVENT l HOURS l HOURS l 1 -l- 1 I

. l 1. Maximum credible Leak to Cavity Seal 'l 6.0 l 6.0 l' i ' Elevation l l' l

< l . . 1 -1 . I I I 2.' Boil off to top of' fuel l~94.8 l 100.'8 l l' i: . l 1 -l 1:

'l 0.2 l l 3. Fuel Uncovery and Damage.(Est)- 101.0 .l l

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SPENT FUEL POOL TIME FOR CLADDING DAMAGE (FUEL TRANSFER VALVE OPEN)

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, 1 -EVENT ~ l HOURS HOURS l 1 -1 I I i 1. Maximum credible Leak to Cavity Seal l 6.0 l 6.0 I l~ Elevation l l 1

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10.0 POTENTIAL EFFECT ON STORED FUEL AND FUEL IN TRANSFER l

10.1 Fuel in the reactor vessel, intermediate- fuel storage racks, transfer system fuel carrier, and the spent fuel storage racks will 1 remain covered with water and adequately cooled following ~ a - pool seal'~ failure and subsequent leak down to the reactor vessel

-flange. .By use of the mitigating techniques described _.in Section 8.0, _ operator action can assure that these assemblies- remain q covered.

i 11.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES 111.1 Emergency. operating procedures will be -revised or written as necessary based upon the overall' PVNGS review conducted in response to the Haddam Neck pool seal failure event. - These~ procedures will

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be -in place 90 days prior to the first-; scheduled refueling outage 1

for Unit 1. If .it should become necessary to utiise _ the pool _ seal in Unit 1 prior to then, these procedures will be completed 'and ~ ,

approved prior to pool seal use.

12.0 SYSTM ADDITIONS AND MODIFICATIONS I

12.~ 1 The pneumatic seals -have been modified by the addition .of -the 3/16

' inch diameter reinforcing' pins in the top, flange'(see Figures l6 and -l

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' 12.2 - An audible alarm is being added to the fuel building to alert any personnel to a reduction in water level.

12.3 Based upon the review of the I&E Bulletin, Combustion Engineering is revising " Guidelines for Reactor Vessel Pool Seal Ring Installation, Test, Operation .and Removal" ' Procedure.- ANPP Operating, Inspection and Maintenance Procedures will be . reviewed and revised accordingly. These procedures will be in place.90 days prior to the first scheduled refueling outage for Unit 1 or prior to any unscheduled use of the seals.

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APPENDIX A ,

COMBUSTION ENGINEERING TEST SUhMARY ,

(1) Reactor -Pool Seal Ioad Test

Purpose:

Determine push through force of cavity seal elastomer with reinforcing pins and without reinforcing pins at gap variations

, of 2 inch, 2-1/8 inch, and 2-1/4 inch.

1 Summary: The unreinforced seal yielded at an equivalent of 73 ft. head of water when the gap was 2 inch and at 29.5 f t. head of water when the gap was 2-1/4 inches. The reinforced seal held at an j ' equivalent of 100 f t. head of water regardless of the gap width.

! (2) -Reactor Pool Seal Proof Test

Purpose:

. Determine push through force of cavity seal elastomer with reinforcing pins at gap variations of 2-1/2 inches and 2-5/8 l inches and elevation variations of 1/4 inch.

l Summary: The reinforced cavity seal held at an equivalent of 100 f t.

head of water. ,

j (3) Reactor Pool Seal Proof Test

Purpose:

Determine push through force of cavity seal elastomer with reinforcing pins at a gap of 2-5/8 inch and elevation variation l of 1/4 inch. This test differed from . test number (2), above,

, in that 'the force was applied to the seal with a 1" diameter rod rather than a 1/2 inch diameter rod. .

Summary: The reinforced seal held at an equivalent of 100 f t. head of water.

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' (4) Reactor Vessel Pool Seal Pin Pull Out Test 4 .

Purpose:

Determine push through force of cavity seal elastomer with reinforcing pins at a gap of 2-5/8 inch. Instead of pushing down on the seal the load was applied up through the air i bladder.

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Summary

The reinforced seal held at an equivalent of 100 f t. head of .

water. The bladder and wedge separated at a equivalent of 112 ft. head of water.

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j (5) Reactor Pool Seal Penetration Test 1

Purpose:

Determine the push ,through force of the cavity seal elastomer

] with reinforcing pins when loaded with a System 60 fuel bundle lower end fitting. The gap was set at 2-1/4 inches.

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! Summary: " The seal was not ' pushed through the gap. However, the seal was i damaged and the pins were bent.

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