ML17252B493

LER 78-030/01-1 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re During Startup Operations the a LPCI and Core Spray Subsystems Were Inadvertently Rendered Inoperable

ML17252B493
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	08/25/1978
From:	Stephenson B Commonwealth Edison Co
To:	James Keppler NRC/RGN-III
References
BBS LTR 78-1220 LER 78-030/01X-1
Download: ML17252B493 (3)

Text

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Common91th Edison Dresden Nuclear Power Station R.R. #1 Morris, Illinois 60450 Telephone 815/942-2920 August 25, 1978 BBS LTR 1178-1220 fl :

c James G. Keppler, Regional Director Directorate of Regulatory Operations ,- Region III . I\.)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 CJ C>

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1 Reportable Occurrence i*update Report"* t178-030/01X-l, Docket #050_;."'2 37 is hereby submitted to your office to report the corrective actions which have been taken to prevent recurrence.of an error thc,:tt resulted in the inoperabilityof the "A" LPCI and Core.Spray Subsystems. This event was reported to your office under Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6~B.l.(f), personnel error which prevents or could prevent, by itself,* the fulfillment of the functional re-quirements of- systems required to cope with accidents analyzed in the S.A.R.

BBS/deb.

Enclosure cc: .Director of Inspection and Enforcement Director of Man~gement Information & Program Control File/NRC I 781500288 l J

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 17-~"7)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT Update Report:

. .evious Report Date 5/12/78

'*-CONTROL BLOCK: ._I_*. _I_..____..__..___...____.IQ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPc ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1 6

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~ I During Unit 2 startup operations the "A" LPCI.and Core Spray Subsystems were in-advertantly rendered inoperable. At this time preparations were in progress on Unit 3 for the ECCS Undervoltage Functional Test .. Subsequentiy at 0405.hours it was determined. that the equipment attendant had* closed the "A" and "B'.' LPCI pump and "A"

~- . Core. Spray Pump Manual Discharge Valves on Unit 2 instead of Unit 3. There are no

• ~ I previous similar events.

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33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 . 47 CAUSE* DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS @

I Upon discovery of the personnel error at 0405 hours0.00469 days <br />0.113 hours <br />6.696429e-4 weeks <br />1.541025e-4 months <br /> the*pump discharge valves were returned to their normally locked open position and verified by 0420 hours0.00486 days <br />0.117 hours <br />6.944444e-4 weeks <br />1.5981e-4 months <br />. In addition the* "A" LPCI and "A" Core Spray Subsystems were satisfactorily flow tested*.

Normal Unit 2 startup then continued. Personnel involved were admonished for their . 1*

error.

80 FACILITY STATUS  % POWER OTHER STATUS

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METHOD OF.

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NAMEOFPREPARER--R_._,,Ra_l~p_h--------------~ PHONE: __ X_-'--_2_6_5_-'--------- .~

' .... -tP ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 78~030/0lX-l

. COMMONWEALTH EDISON. COMPANY (CWE)

DRESDEN UNI'F-2 (ILDRS-2)

DOCKET #050-237 During normal Unit 2 startup operations at 0005 lours on April 28, 1978 the "A" Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) and "A" Core Spray Sub-systems were. inadvertantly rendered inoperable. At the time of the event preparations were in progress (DOS 6600~6) on Unit 3 while in the shutdown condition for the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) undervoltage Functional Test. Following initiation of the test, at 0405 hours0.00469 days <br />0.113 hours <br />6.696429e-4 weeks <br />1.541025e-4 months <br /> it was dete.rmined that the Equipm~nt Attendant (EA) had closed* the "A" and -

"B".LPCI pump and "A" Gore Spray Pump Manual Discharge Valves on Unit 2 instead of Unit 3. At 0420 hours0.00486 days <br />0.117 hours <br />6.944444e-4 weeks <br />1.5981e-4 months <br /> the Unit 2 manual discharge valves were returned to their normally locked ope~ position and verified, In addition the "A" LPCI and "A" Core Spray Subsystems were satisfactorily .

flow tested. Unit 2 startup operations continued. During the *approximate four (4) hour interval when the "A" LPCI and Core Spray Subsystems were inoperable the remaining two (2) LPCI pumps were available to fulfill the Containment Cooling Function. In addition the redundant 100%

capacity Core Spray System was available to provide sufficient core cooling in the unlikely event of a loss of coolant accident. There are no previous events of a similar nature at Dresden.

A subsequent review of the event with the appropriate operations personnel revealed that the Equipment Attendant. (EA) assigned to Unit 3 for specific valving operations-.involving the ECCS test mistakenly closed the three.

discharge valves discussed previously on Unit 2. The* personnel involved were* admonished regarding their errors.

An investigative committee reviewed the event, and as a result of their recommendations the station has begun a major effort to replace existing valve labels with larger embossed plastic tags attached with_.stai_nless steel wires. Additionally the importance of good operating practices has been emphasized during Operating Department meetings in January and May and will be reviewed again during training for licensed.personnel in the second half of 1978. These operating practices include: (1) proper and complete identification of equipment involved in any operations; (2).the need to maintain an accurate knowledge of plant equipment status by the- Shift Foreman; (3) the requirement to conduct pre-shift briefings; (4). the requirement for the NSO to more closely monitor switching and valving operations as soon as practicable; (5) the need to instruct personnel clearly and ensure their understanding of the evolution; (6) the responsibility- of the regularly assigned Shift to completely c.ontrol plant operating activities.