ML17250A891

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LER 89-007-00:on 890619 & 21 Safety Injection Pumps B & C Inoperable Due to Assessed Design Flow Delivery Concerns. Caused by Recirculation Valves Being Full Open.Orifice Plates in Flow Loops Verified to Be correct.W/890719 Ltr
ML17250A891
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 07/19/1989
From: Backus W, Mecredy R
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-007, LER-89-7, NUDOCS 8907280303
Download: ML17250A891 (12)


Text

A,CCELERATED Dl BUTION DEMONS TION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RXDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8907280303 DOC.DATE: 89/07/19 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MECREDY,R.C. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

BACKUS,W.H. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 89-007-00:on 890619,safety injection pumps inoperability concerns due to flow meter calibration errors.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPXES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event: Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). 05000244 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPXENT COPIES XD CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD1-3 LA 1 1 PD1-3 PD 1 1 JOHNSON,A 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE 1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 DEDRO 1 1 IRM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADE 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 7E 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/PEB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 1 NRR DREP/RPB 10 2 2 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 egREC 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RES/DSR/PRAB 1 1 RGN1 FILE 01 1 1 R EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS,S 4 4 FORD BLDG HOY,A. 1 1 I L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 l.

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July 19, 1989 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

LER 89-007, Safety In) ection Pumps Inoperability Concerns Due To Flow Meter Calibration Errors Could Be Of Generic Concern To Nuclear Industry R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, which permits and encourages Licensees to report signi-ficant, events that may be of generic interest or concern even though they may not meet the criteria contained in 10 CFR 50.73, the attached Licensee event report LER 89-007 is hereby submitted.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Very truly yours, Robert C. Me General Manager Nuclear Production xco U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 475 I

Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector 3907280303 890719 rDFl ODOCK 0~000244 S PDC

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YCS (H tre, CerVNr>> CXttCTCD SVSMISSIOH DATCI X ND AACTAAOT ILervc Io le00 ieec>>, le,. ettroeerN>>lt IHIuo vetreetue ctteorlr>>e xe>>I llsl On June 19, 1989 at 1440 EDST with the reactor at approximately 994 full power- the <<B" and <<C<< Safety In)ection (SI) pumps were declared inoperable due to assessed design flow delivery concerns.

Declaring two (2) SI pumps inoperable placed the plant outside the Technical Specifications requiring a plant shutdown. While in the process of plant shutdown the SI pump flows were returned to the required flow rates by pump minimum flow recirculation line valve throttling.

On June 21, 1989 at 1401 a similar problem occurred with the <<B<<

and <<C<< SI pumps and plant management decided to shut the plant down until the SI pump flow concerns were resolved. The plant was shutdown and subsequently cooled down to less than 350 F.

Original calibration data provided by the plant design was incorrect for the installed application. The underlying cause of the event resulted from incorrect original calibration data, provided by the plant designer for the installed system.

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant IICIC Axtx ~'ll l17l 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4 8 9 0 07 00 0 2 of 0 7 PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The unit was at approximately 994 steady state full power with no major activities in progress. Results and Test (R&T) personnel were in the Control Room discussing changes to periodic test procedure PT-2.1 (Safety Injection System Pumps) with the Control Room operators. These changes to PT-2.1 were necessary to reflect modifications made to the Safety Injection (SI) pumps minimum flow recirculation lines during the recent annual refueling and maintenance outage. This modification in part increased the size of the SI pumps recirculation lines to increase the recirculation flow for better pump reliability. During the post modification testing of the SZ pumps, the "B" and.

"C" SI pumps exhibited problems meeting the design flow rates to the reactor coolant system as indicated on SI flow indicator FZ-925. Because of the above indicated design flow rate delivery problems, the "B" and "C" SZ pump minimum flow recirculation valves were throttled to 50 gpm to achieve the required design flow rates to the reactor coolant system. As the "A" SX pump did not exhibit problems achieving design flow rates to'he Reactor Coolant System (RCS), its recirculation valve was locked full open.

II ~ DESCRIPTION OP .ER"NT A. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES FOR MAJOR OCCUEKENCES o June 19, 1989, 1440 EDST: Event date and time.

o June 19, 1989, 1440 EDST: Discovery date ynd time.

o June 19, 1989, 1440 EDST: Started unit load reduction.

o June 19, 1989, 1515 EDST: Unusual Event declared.

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant WC'IrrI~'11 Im o s o o o 2 4 4 007 00 03 OF 1 0 June 19, 1989, 1615 EDST: "B" and "C" SI pumps declared operable.

June 19, 1989, 1615 EDST: Stopped unit load reduction.

0 June 19, 1989, 1626 EDST: Unusual Event ter-minated.

0 June 21, 1989, 1401 EDST: Started PT-2.1 on the SI pumps.

0 June 21, 1989, 1728 EDST: Declared the "C" SI pump inoperable.

0 June 21, 1989, 1915 EDST: Started unit load reduction.

0 June 22, 1989, 0707 EDST: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cold leg temperatures less than 350 F and RCS pressure less than 1600 psig.

B. EVENT:

On June 19, 1989 at 1440 EDST the reactor was at approximately 994 full power. During discussions in the Control Room between R&T personnel and Control Room operators concerning proposed changes to procedure PT-2.1, it became apparent that the "B and "C" SI pump minimum flow recirculation line valves were locked full open rather than the recpxired throttled position.

The Operations Shift Supervisor determined at this time that if the "B" and "C SI pumps were not aligned as per design, then the pumps were inoperable and this placed the plant operations outside of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1.C and 3.3.1.4 which state the following:

o 3.3.1.1.C: At or above a reactor coolant system pressure and temperature of 1600 psig and 350oFg except during performance of RCS Hydro Test, three safety injection pumps are operable.

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant A9K'IAAA~'AlIITl o 5 o o o 24 489 00 7 00 040' 3.3.1.4: The requirements of 3.3.1.1.C may be modified to allow one .safety injection pump to be inoperable for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Because more than one SI pump was declared inoperable, this placed the plant - in a condition covered by Technical Specification 3.0.1 which states the following:

o In the event a Limiting Condition for operation and/or associated action requirements cannot be satisfied because of circumstances in excess of those addressed in the specification, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action shall be initiated to place the unit in at least hot shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (i;e., a total of seven hours), and in at least cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> (i.e., a total of 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />) unless corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the permissible action statements for the specified time interval as measured from initial discovery or until the reactor is placed in a mode in which the specification is not applicable.

Because of the above specification a unit load reduction to hot shutdown was started June 19, 1989 at 1440 EDST.

At approximately 1515 EDST, June 19, 1989, the Operations Shift Supervisor declared an Unusual Event in accordance with SC-100, "Ginna Station Event Evaluation and Classification" EAL: Loss of Engineered Safety Features: exceeding a Limiting Condition for QADI operation on a safety system requiring a plant shutdown; Tech Spec section 3.3 Emergency Core Cooling System. All offsite notifications were made per SC-601, "Unusual Event Notifications".

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant NIC IINLI~'ll117) o s o o o 2 4 4 8 9 0 0 7 0 0 0 5 OF 1 0 At approximately 1615 EDST, June 19, 1989 subsequent to the satisfactory testing and throttling of the "B" and "C" safety injection pumps minimum flow recircula-tion valves to 50 gpm, the "B" and "C" safety in)ection pumps were declared operable and the load reduction stopped.

With the "B" and "C" safety in)ection pumps declared operable and the load reduction stopped, the Operations Shift Supervisor," with approval and concurrence from the Plant Manager Ginna Station, and PORC declared the Unusual Event terminated at 1626 EDST, June 19, 1989 in accordance with SC-110, "Ginna Station Event Evaluation For Reducing the Classification". All offsite notifications were made of the Unusual Event termination and the plant was subsequently returned to approximately full power.

On June 21, 1989 at 1401 EDST with the reactor at approximately full power, periodic test procedure PT-2.1 (Safety Injection Pumps) was started for the monthly test of the safety injection pumps. The following is a sequence of important events that happened:

The "A" SI pump was tested satisfactorily.

first and tested At approximately 1544 EDST, upon starting the "B" SI pump for the test, the pump minimum flow recirculation flow rate was found to be 70 gpm.

This was contrary to the'required 50 gpm maximum flow rate. The recirculation flow rate was reset to 45 gpm per PT-2.1.

0 At approximately 1637 EDST, upon starting the "C" SI pump for the test, the pump minimum flow recirculation flow rate was found to be 56 gpm.

This was contrary to the required 50 gpm maximum flow rate. The recirculation flow rate was reset to 45 gpm per PT-2.1.

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o At approximately 1728 EDST the "C" SZ pump was declared inoperable.

o At approximately 1900 EDST a meeting between shift operations and plant staff was conducted and the following course of action was decided upon:

1) Shutdown the plant to less than 350 F and less than 1600 psig, until the problem with the "C" SI pump minimum flov recirculation line flov repeatability is found and corrected.
2) Reset the "C" SI pump minimum flow xecircu-lation flov.
3) Test repeatability of the "C" SZ pump minimum flow recirculation flov.
4) Correct the cause of pump minimum flow recirculation flow problem.

On June 22, 1989 at approximately 0707 EDST the reactor coolant system cold leg temperatures were less than 350 F and RCS pressure was less than 1600 pSige C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES P COMPONENTS P OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:

None.

D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

None.

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R.E. Ginna NUclear Power Plant ASIC Ireaa ~'ll I ITI 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4 8 9007 00 07 OF 1 0 E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY'he first event was discovered during discussions between RET personnel and the Control Room operators, concerning proposed changes to PT-2.1.

The second event was discovered during the monthly test of the safety in)ection pumps.

F. OPERATOR ACTION:

The ma)or operator action during the events was to reduce plant load and subsequently take the unit off line and cool down to less than 350 F.

G. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:

None.

III CAUS OP A. IMMEDIATE CAUSE:

The <<B<< and <<C<< SI pumps were thought to be inoperable because they could not meet their design flow rates to the RCS due to their recirc valves being rather than throttled as required.

full open B. INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:

0 The <<B<< and <<C<< SI pump minimum flow recirculation valves were positioned full open rather than throttled as required.

0 With the pump minimum flow recirculation valves restored to the throttled position, subsequent.

pump testing failed to achieve repeatable pump recirculation flow results.

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The underlying cause of the event resulted from incorrect calibration data, provided by the plant designer for the installed system. The calibration data provided for flow transmitters FT-924 and FT-925 did not correlate accurately with the installed flow orifice plates, .FE-924 and FE-925.

ALYSIS 0 The event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 Licensee Event Report System, which permits and encourages Licensees to report significant events that may be of generic interest or concern even though they may not meet the criteria contained in 10 CFR 50.73.

An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and . implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:

There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the deemed to be inoperable "B" and "C" SI pumps because:

o An analysis was performed using current calibration data, and it was determined that even with the "B" and "Cll SI pumps minimum flow recirculation valves full open, the SI design flow rates to the RCS were still achieved. Thus the 'TBTT and "C" SI pumps were never truly inoperable.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.

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~ XWAES EnIIEE EACILITYNAME lll OOCEEY NV~EE IEI LEi NVMEE1 IN ~ A4E 101 vEAA EEOVENYIAL VoeN H M N M R.E. Ginna Nuclem Power Plant o s o o o2 44 89 007 00 0 90' 0 TEXr IIY~ ~ 4 NeeeC ~ ~AEEC asa ~'u Im V. CO CTIVE ACTION A. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

0 The orifice plates installed in SI flow loops F-924 and F-925 were verified to be correct.

0 Flow transmitters FT-'924 and FT-925 were correctly calibrated to the installed orifice plates.

0 The three sa fety in) ection pumps were tested with the pump minimum flow recirculation line throttling valves full open, and the required SI design flow to the RCS was achieved.

o All installed safety-related flow orifice plates were assessed for correct installation and calibration. Correct, calibration data was confirmed for each orifice/flow transmitter combination.

0 Affected calibration procedures were changed to reflect correct calibration data.

0 The nuclear industry will be notified via NUCLEAR NETWORK of the generic concerns of correct calibration data for flow orifice/flow transmitter combinations.

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A. FAILED COMPONENTS:

None.

B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:

A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar LER events with the same root cause at Ginna Station could be identified.

C. SPECIAL COMMENTS:

'one.

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