Text

Attachment 3 - EP-AA-1013, Addendum 4, Revision 1, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 Emergency Classification Technical Bases.
	ML17158B259
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	05/30/2017
From:	; Exelon Generation Co
To:	; Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML17158B254	List: ML17158B258; ML17158B259; ML17158B260; NMP1L3161, Submittal of Radiological Emergency Plan Addendum and Implementing Procedure Revisions;
References
	NMP1L3161 EP-AA-1013, Addendum 4, Rev 1
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Attachment 3 EP-AA-1013, Addendum 4, Revision 1, "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 Emergency Classification Technical Bases" Emergency Plan Addendum Revision

irWilJrf

,, IB"' ..

EP-AA~1013 Addendum 4

- - - .. ~ Exelon G*enerat1on Revision 1 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station*

Unit 2

- Emergency Classification Technical Bases

. .. *':~. : . __J

.UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum. 4 Revision 1 Page 2 of 264 TABLE OF CONTENTS .

SECTION .**.*.. TITLE PAGE

. 1.0 . INTRODUCTION .................... '..'"'."*********** ........ ,.: .............. ;....................................................... 3 .

1.. 1. . Purpose .... ,.............. ,.:.* ...... *:.. ~ ........... ,.......*..... *, ...... ,........................... ;.................... ;........ 3 2.0 .REFERENCES ..... :....... :.........*...... *...................... ~ ..... :..... ;................ :................................... :....... 3 *.*

2.1. . Developmental References ............. : .. :........*.............................................. :................ 3 2.2. Performance References ....... :............................. ,: ...... ;........................................... :.~ 3

3.0 DEFINITIONS.: .... ,......... ;.................... :., ....... *........ *... *..... :..... :....... ,.......................................... ,:..........4.

4.9.. RESPONSIBILITIES~ .. ~ .* ,............ ;...... :.......... ,..................... :........... :...................... :.................... 8 5.0 ' PROCESS .......... :........ :: ............ :.. :...........*..... :............................................................................ 8 5.1. Emergency Preparedness Group ~ ............ ;.: ........... :u ...... ,. :................... ,.................... 8 5.2, .. SM/ED and ED/RM ......... ,...... ,.....................*........... :...........:......................................-.. :8

.*.' 6.0' .BA.SES**... .-.. *..........*.* .. :............ :.. :........ *... ,:*... :......... ,: .. ,........................................ *........................... 19 7.0 - RECORDS ....... ~ ............. :.......... ;., ............... :: .. :........ :.:., ............................................. ,............... 19

- . , Attachmenf1, Emergency Action Level Te.chnical Bases., ....................... :.... ,.. '. ................................... 20

Attachment2, Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential LossMatrix And Basis ..................................... 205

..*,/ . Attachment), j\bpreviations I Acronyms ......... :... :.... :.'.. :................... ,..... :.... :; ..................................... 263 1

\~ :.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BA$ES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 3of264

- - - 1.0

INTRODUCTION 1.1. J>urpose

A.*. This document provides an explanationandrationaleJor each Emergency Action Level

.(EAL) included in th~ EAL UpgradeProjectfor Nine Mile Point Nuclear-Station Uriit2

(NMP2}. It should be used to facilitate review of the NMP2 EALs and provide historical documentation for future reference. Decision..:makers responsible for implementation of EPIP-EPP-02, "Classification of Emergency Conditions at Unit 2," and the Emergency Action Level Matrices;. may use this. document as a technical reference in support of EAL

.. interpretation. This informationmay assist the Emergency Director in making

classifications,*particularly those involving judgment or multiple events. The basis

information may. also be useful in training, for explaining event classifications to offsite officials, and facilitates regulatory review and approval of the classification* scheme ..

B: *.

0 e

Th expectation .is.*that emergency cla~sific~tions are to be _made as soon as conditions

are present and recognizable for the classification,' but within 15 minutes in all cases of conditions presenf Use of this document for assistance is not .intended to delay the 13m~rgency classification. * * * **

1.2..

Scope /Applicability ..

. A..*. **.*.* This procedure ap~liesto all personnel assighed to the Emergency Response

. Organization atNine Mile Point Nuclear Station. *. * * *

' _.-'::. *2.0 ,* i REFE~ENCES .. *.

2~1; [)~~el~~lllental Ref~reriries** *.. , ' ....***. . . *.. .* . . .

A. *** <NE.199-'01 Rev.5 Fin~l;M~thodology forDevelo'pmeritof Emerge~*cyAttion Levels,**

*- . . :February

' . . . - 2008, ADAMS -.. ;

Accession ' -._. . . . ..

Number ML080450149.. *.. ~

- * * * . 1

. . B. ** cNRC Regulatory ls~Je $ummary (RIS) 2003"'18, Supplement 2, Use of Nuclear t=nergy *.* * * .** *

- **..**

h1stitute (NEI) 99,.of:Methodologyfor Developmenfof Emergency Actio.n Levels.* * *

Revision 4; Dated January 2003 (December 1.2, 2b05)

. ~ . ' * * .. . .: ; ; ; * '" . * *: " **.. *. '. *I.

c: RIS .2001.:0Zc1arification o( NRC' Guidan:ce_ ior Erhergency Nofific~tions quring:QuicklY.

.*. . Changii-lg Events* -** * * * * * *. ' * * . .. .

D. * ' Nine Mile PointSite.Emergen~y Pia~ .*

-<:E;-:> .*>NflA.PlJni!2"£AL~¢.q;,,parl's;n . ,~atrii*'..

Perlo~m~nce R~f~renc~s

. . y*_ .. --- * . .

2.2. . * , _

A. ... * * , EPIP~~pp::()2 <;;lassincatiori*Of Eme.rgericy G,pnditions at Unif2 .

)'*<~.

.. ...,,: .* .- *. *. *.*' *~

.*. ~.<:.: '*...

.. :: : ~ ....

F i::.*

. UNrr 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA~1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 4of264 3.o* DEFINITiONS .

3.1. AFFECTl~G SAFE S~UTDOWN *.

Event inprogress has adversely affected functi.ons that are necessary to bring the plant to and maintain it iri the applicable hot or cold shutdown condition. Plant condition applicability is determined by Technical Specification LCOs in effect.

... Example 1: Event causes damage that resu.lts in entry into an LCO that requires the plant to be

placed in hot shutdown. Hot shutdown is achievable, but cold shutdown is not. This event is not

. "AFFECTING SAFE. SHUTDOWN." .

Example 2: E~ent causes.damage 'that results in entry into an LCO that requires .the plant to be

.* . placed iri cold shutdown.Hofshutdown is achievable, but cold shutdown is not. This event is "AFFECTING SAFESHUTDOWN." . . .

' 3.2. . AIRLINER/LARGE AIRCRAFT Any size brtype of aircr~ff with the pot~ntialfor causing significant damage to the plant (referto

the Security Plan for moie detailed definition). . a . . . . *.

3.3~ *BOMB

R~fers to' an explosive device suspected of having suffident force to damage plant systems or

. structures.** * * * ** * *

3~4: CIVIL DISTURBANCE

A.group of p~ople violently protesting station operaticins or activities* at the site.

3~5. ~ONFINEMENT BOUNDA~Y

,*The barrier(s) between areas containing radioacti~e substances. and the ~nvironment .

3.6 ..'. * .' .CONTAl~MENT CLOSUf(t;

.* Th~*.procedurally defined acU6nsJ8:ke11. tosecurecontainmeht. (primary*or seconda~y) . *and its.

asso~iated structures; systems, and c9mpo11ents .as a*functioilal barrier t9 fission product'

.. *re.lease under existi~g .planfcotic:mioh~E -*

' 3.7. *** . . EXPLOSION.**

A*rCJ.pid,* violent; uricpnfin~q"c;ciMbustion, or' ccit~st~bphicJailure 6f pres,surized/energized ,'

eq'uipment that imparts.*emergy ofsuffiCient Jorceto.poteritially, damage permcinenl structures,'

$ySt~~S, Or.* ~Qrnp9.n~nts~,.. *~ -- . .. *.* .., . ,.

3:8; ' EXttlRTIO'.N ,' ' ' ' ., ' -' ' .*',**

An*atlemp{foc~us~~wrac.tion a.t.the station bycthrJat ....

~fforce,

.*. 3.9. FIRE .

combustioncharacterize~ byheatand light,S6urc$s ofsriloke su'chas slipping.drive belts or'.

ov~rtfoated electrical eguiprnentdo not constitut~FJBEs, :Observ(itioh of flame i~ pr~ferred but

.*is *not requir~c:I iflarge quantities of smoke a11d heafare obs~erved'; . -

. ' : ..~ * *,'.'*/*

-_.. ~ -... : : ~ "..' * -..

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 5 of 264 3.10 .. HOSTAGE A person(s) held as leverage against the stationto ensure that dem~hds will be met by the station. * * * * * * *

3.11. HOSTILE ACTION:

An act toward NMP2,or its personnel th.at inciudes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGEs, and/or intimidate the licensee to .achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles; or other devices used to deliver.

destructive force. Other acts that satisfy tlie overall Intent may be included. -

. HOSTILE ACTION should n~tbe constrµed t~ include acts of civil disobedience ~r felonious.

acts. that are not part: of a concerted attack on. NMP2. Non-terrorisni-.based EALs should be

.used to address such activities, (for example, Violent acts between individuals in the owner:.

coritroiled area). *

3.12. HOSTILE FORCE 6neormore individualswho a*re engaged ina det~rniined assault; overtly or py stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of kiUing, maiming.or cau,sing destruction.

3.13. IMMINENT

.. Mitigation actions have been ineffective, additional actions are not expected to be successful,

. and trended information indicatesthat the event or condition will: occur. Where IMMINENT timeframes are specified, they shall apply. - . .. * .* .

3.14; INTACT

.*.The RCS should be consid.ered INTACT w~en the RCS pressure boundary is in its norllla1 ...

condition for the cold shutdown mode of operation (for example, no freeze seals or nozzle

danis). - ' * **. *

3~ 15..* .INTRUSION .

sp~cified area is indication

' The actof entering with9uf authorization. Discovery ofaBOMB* iri a of INTRUSi9f\I into that area by a HOSTIL.-E FORCE. . . -

. 3;16 ... INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAG.E INST~l.LATION (ISFSI) -

. -A. compl~xthat is designed arid constructed for the. interim storage of spen-t nuclear tue1 and other radioactive materials associated:wit~ speritfuel storage. .* .. .. .

3.17. NORMAL LEVELS

. As applied to radiological IC/EALs,the highest reading in the past twenty-four hours excluding ....

the current peak value. * * *

3.18.* -**NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS Activiti.es.at the plant site associated with routine testing, maintenance, or equipment

operations, iri accqrdance wit.h normal operating or administrative procedures. Entry into

abnormal or emergency operating procedures, ordeviation from.normal security or radiological

. ~ontrols postu~e; is a departure from NORMAL PLANT OPERATl.ONS. * * **

- .J**

. - '... ": . *-**,. .. *'1

., . . ~ ... ; -

... ;~ .', : . : "~; .

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 .

Revision 1.

Page 6 of 264.

3.19. PROJECTILE An 'object directed toward NMP2 that could cause concern for its continued operability,

.. reliability; or personnel safety.

3.20. PROTECTED AREA The areawhich normally encompassesall controlled areas within the security PROTECTED AREA fence. NMP1 and NMP2 share a common PROTECTED AREA border. NMP1 andNMP2 PROTECTED AREA boundaries are illustrated in USAR Figure 1.2-1. ,

3.21.. SABOTAGE Deliberate damage, mis~alignment, or mis~operation bf plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable. Equipment found tampered with or damaged due to malicious "I '

mischiefmay not meet the definition of SABOTAGE until this determination is made by security supervision.

3.22. SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTUREs, SYSTEMs and COMPONENTs (as defined in**.

10CFR50.2) . . .. . . .

. Those structures, systems and components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following design b~sis events to assure: . * * . *

1: The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;

. 2. *... **The .capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown .

..... :.*'.**, condition;. * *

The capabilityto prevent or mitig~tethe con~equences bfactidents which 3.. could result in potential .offsite exposures. .

.* - . 3.23. s*ECURITY CONDITION :

~ny s~cur'ity event asiisted in the approved sec~rity contingency pla~ that constitutes a .

threatfcompromise to site security;Jhreat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to toe 1!3Vel ofs(ifety oqheplant. A SECURITYCONDITION does not involve*a HOSTILE ACTION.*

~.24/ SIT~ BOUNDARY * . *. **.

P~r. ODCM Figure DJ.()~1-;'theline C)round the Nine' Mile Point .Nucl~ar.Station*beyond whic~ .. '.- .

-~ .: . . .the land is11ot*owned; leased.or otherwise Qontrolled by the.owners and operators of Nine Mile_ .

Point .Nuclear Station and JaniesA: Fitzpatrick t\J.ud~ar Power Plant. * * *

',,. > . 3.25. STRIKE ACTION *

. ~ .-* . .;. .: Work stoppage Within the PROTECTED AREAby a body of workers enforce compliance with .. to demands made on NMP2. The STRIKI;: ACTION- must threaten to interrupt NORMAL' PLANT OPERATIONS. . - - . .* . . .

3.26. ~UNISOLABLE

>. :-

A brea*~h or l<?ak thafc;anqot be promptly *isolated~ *

. *:1.

Aparamete(change ora~ event,thereasonsforwhich may be known or unknown, thatis oot * .

the/esult o(anint~ndecfevollition or expected pla'n.t respon'se to 'a t~C:rnsient. . - .

.f*

-~ :*.:

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 7 of 264 3.28 .. VALID

. An indication, report, ~r condition, is considered to be VALID when it is verified by (1) an

**instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct

. observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the .

condition's existence, or the.report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the rieed forJimely assessment. * * * * * * *

.3.29. VISIBLE DAMAGE Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern .regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURE, SYSTEM or COMPONENT. Example damage

.in~ludes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint

. blistering. Surface blemishes (for example, paint chipping, scratches) should not be included ..

. 3.30.. VITAL AREA Any areas, normally within the NMP2PROTECTED AREA, that contains equipment, systems;.*.

components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or'indirectly endanger the public health and safoty by exposure to radiation. **

' ., *. . ~:- . .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1

Page 8 of 264 4.0 *. RESPONSIBILITIES .

4.1. Emergency Preparedness Group

Monitor/solicit any changes to the Technical Basis of eachEmergency Action Level '

.Assess these changes for potential impact on th~ Emergency Action Level ..

.*. . MAINTAIN the Emergency Action Le~el (EAL) Technical Basis; EPIP-EPP-02, and the Emergency Action Levei Matrix/Uni.t 2~. *

4.2. . **Shift Mariager/Emergen.cy Directors (SM/ED).and Emergency Director/Recovery .

Managers (ED/RM) .*

.. .

Evaluates/compares abnormal plant conditions with criteria established within this procedure to determine IF emergency action levels have been met or exceeded,

.* .ciassifies the emergency asrequirect by EPIP-EPP~02.

5.0 PROCESS 5.1 ..

Emergency Prepa~ednesiGroup ** . ..... * * *... .* . . . . _ . _ .*

A.** . *:*MAINTAINa matrixofTechnical Basi~ refem~nces for each Emergency ActionLevel.

B. *** *E:valuate each Technical Basis* Reference Change for impact on the Affected EniergericyAction LeveL * *> * * * .. : .*. * ** . . * *. .*

C. *. ModifyEPIP-EPP-'02,Emergency AttioriLeVelMatrix/Unit ?;andAttachment tofthis *

' . *. procedure, a9 ne~~ed, . ' ' .* ' . . '* .** '

5.2.

SM/E:C) and ED/RM

' A.. / :J>rior to classifying any ev~nt; compareleva1uc:ite*i:i1ant parameters/conditions with: .

EALs* and ensur~ they match or~xc~ed the .conditl~11s ~pecified ...

.. c * ***. Appro~riate:t.~qhnicalb~sis.iqfo~mati~n con,tai[ledwi.thinAttachmentt. .

B; *.. Qlassify the d~enfpe(EPIP~EPP-.02 ~h~n "the. plant**~arameter~/coqditioris 111atch or: .* * *

exceed the EAL as*described above. . . .. . . . .. . . . . . .

is

. This.crass-refere.nee .prc)Vided: tofaci,litate assoCiation and l9catibn of a. NMP2 EAL .

* * ** \IYithin th~_NEi 99-0j IC/i;:AL itj~htification sc~eme. furt~er, i11fqrmation n~gardingthe

. . developniemtof the NMP2 EALS' based qn the NEJguidance can be found in.the EAL .

.

cotiipari~mri Matrix; : ** , * * * *. * * ** * * * * *

. ~* ' .. . .* . - . I~

r--~~-,------,-,~-.--'o'--~---',-~,--~,-----,

. *NMP2.

.** N1;:1 99-01

. *. ~

... -** ~-: ::- * *. EAL .* ;'

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 9 of 264

5.2.C.(Continued)

NMP2 NEI 99-01

. Example IC

.EAL RG1.3 AG1 4 RS1.1

AS1* 1.

.*

RS1.2 AS1 2

..RSt.3..

AS1 4

. AA1 1.

RA1.2 *.AA1 2

*'RA1.3 *AA1 3 RUt.1 AU1 1

.. RU1.2 AU1

-~ .'*

2

.. . HU1 .3 .*.

AlJ1 3

., RAZ1 . '

. *AA2 RA2.2 AA2 .*. .1

'.):

RU2.1

- AU2 .1

. RU2.2 Au2* 2

.*. HA1.2 .* HA1*c.***.***** 2* ..

.**.. ** . :~P.1 .. 3.*.

HA1. ' .

- . . HA'1:4 ' HA1 . '4

'i : -- -~ .:*~ . -~ ,.

. c: :'HA1.6.* HA1*** .** 5

. ., - .,... ---~

HUh1

>HU1 . .

HU1 : .. .*.*

HUf>

1 *. HU1:3 .< *.-*-. '.

. UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICALBASES EP-AA'."1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 1o of 264

. 5.2.C (Continued)

NMP2 NEI 99-01 Example EAL IC EAL HU1.4 .. HU1 4 HU1.S HU1 .

s HA2.1 HA2 1 HU2.1 HU2 1 HU2.2 HU2 2 HA3.1 HA3 1 HU3.1 HU3 1 HU3.2 HU3 2

.HG4.1 'HG1 .. t HG4.2 HG1 2 HS4.1 HS4 1 HA4.1

. . . . **. HA4 1, 2 HU4.1* .

HU4 1, 2, 3 HSS.1 HS2 1 HAS.1 HAS* . 1 HG6.1 .. HG2 1 HS6.1* *HS3 1*

HA6.1 HA6 .1 HU6.1 HUS 1 EU1.1 E-HU1 1 CA1.1 CA3 .

1 CU1.1 : CU3 1

.* **.*cu2.1 *cl)? 1

.. :'. : *. -.. ,~* . ~

.*> CG3:1

- co1 .*

1

.. ~ *..

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum4.

Revision1

Page 11 of 264 .

s:2.c (Continued) .

NMP2 NEI 99-01 Example EAL IC EAL CG3.2 CG1 2 CS3.1 CS1 1 CS3.2 CS1 2 CS3.3. CS1 3.

CA3.1 CA1 1, 2 CU3.1. .

CU1 1 CU3.2 CU2 1.

CU3.3 CU2 2

. CA4.1 CA4 1, 2 CU4.1 CU4 1 cu4:2 CU4 2

,~ ... *..

cu5.1 CU8 1 CU6.1 ; CU6 1, 2.

SG1.1 .. SG1 1

. .... ' . . '. . ~ SS1.1 SS1 1

SA1.1.*. *-** SA5 1 SU1 ~1' SU1 -.* .*

1 ss2,1 SS3 .. .. 1 SG3.1 SG2**. ..

1 SS3.'1 SS2. ..

1

'SA3.1 **SA2 ~

-*1* .. *

.*. SU3.,1. . sue. 1

.. ***SU2 1 SU4.1 *.** .. . .*: **.,,

ss5.1 SS6 .. 1* .,

. :_*/ .:J.'

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 12 of 264 5.2.C (Continued)

NMP2 NEI 99-01 Example EAL IC EAL SA5.1 SA4 1 SU5.1 SU3 1 SU6.1 SU6 1, 2 SU7.1 SU4 2 SU7.2 SU4 1 SUB.1 SUS 1, 2 FG1.1 FG1 1 FS1.1 FS1 1 FA1.1 FA1 1 FU1.1 FU1 1 5.3. Discussion

A. Background

.1.

EALs are the plant-specific indications, conditions or instrument readings that are utilized to classify emergency conditions defined in the Nine Mile Point Site Emergency Plan.

2~ In 1992, the NRC endorsed NUMARC/NESP-007 "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels" as an alternative to NUREG-0654 EAL .guidance.

3. NEI 99-01 (NUMARC/NESP-007) Revision 4 was subsequently issued for industry implementation. Enhancements over earlier revisions included:

Consolidating the system malfunction initiating conditions and example emergency action levels which address conditions that may be postulated to occur during plant shutdown conditions.

Initiating conditions and example emergency action levels that fully address conditions that may be postulated to occur at permanently Defueled Stations and INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATIONS (ISFSls).

- Simplifying the fission product barrier EAL threshold for a Site Area

Emergency.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page*13of 264 5.2.A (Continu~d) .* .

4. Subsequently; Revision 5 of.NEI 99'-01 has been.issued which incorporates resolutions to numerous implementation issues* including the NRC EAL FAQs .

. Using NEI 99-01 Revision 5 Final, February 2008 (ADAMS Accession Number

ML080450149}, NMP2 conducted an EAL implementation upgrade project that

- produced the EALs discussed herein.

B. . Fission Product Barriers

1. Mariy of the EALs derived fromthe NEI methodology are fission product barrier based. That is, the conditions that define the EALs are based upon loss or

. potential loss of one or more of the three fission product barriers. "Loss" and

. "Potential Loss" signify the relative damage and threat of damage to the barrier, "Loss" means the barrier no longer assures containment of radioactive materials; "potential loss"implies an increased probability of barrier loss and decreased certainty of maintaining the barrier. . .

2. The primaryfission produdbarriers are:

a. Fuel Clad (FC): Zircdnium tubes which house the ceramic uranium oxide pellets along with the end plugs which are. welded into each end of the

fuel rods' comprise the FC barrier. .

b. . Reactor Coolant System (RCS): The reactorvessel shell,.vessel tiead,

CRD housings, vessel' nozzles and p~netrations, arid all priinar{systems .*

directly connectedto the RPVup to.the outermost Primary Containment***

.* isolation valve comprise the R.CS barrier. : ** * *.. * * * .*. *

c. * . Cont~inme~UPC): The;drywell, toe suppression chamb~r/pool; 'their**

.. ,. : respective interconnecting paths; arid*other connections up to ancf

.*; inch.iaing the 'outermost contafnment isolation valves comprise the

.. .. Prirfi9ry Ccmtainment barrier. * * *- **

c..;.** E:mergericy 9assific~tion Based on Fission Prnduc~Harrier Deg:radation

1*. . * *. .The following criteria are the bas~s for event clc:issificatk.ln related to fission

'* -** prodµct bcirrier- loss or potential lqss: .. **. * * ** *

(Jnusual Event: _ . .

Any (oss or~nypote~tial l~ss.of Containment:** . ._..:-.'

.': Ale~:.*_::. . . *. . .. !' / * . -

'/

. Any)oss or any potential loss of~either Fuel Clad or*RCS ..

Site* A~ecf Emergencyf ..

. L~ss,o('poteritial. loss bf any tWo barri'.ers.

G~neral *E1mfrg~n~y:

- ... *' *.. . Lo~.s;of a~ytwo barHe~s and* lo~s ~ip~tenti~1'1oss .8f t~ird. barrier

, ......*. :.*:;,,....;* * ,* - >* *.* ~ * . . . ~, \~ .

.'.. . . :-.* . **** 1

. ~*. .

-~.

. .' ~ *, .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA:-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1

- - - .* o.

EALRelationshiptoEOPs. .. . .

. Page 14 of 264

*1.

Where possible~ the EALs have beeri made consistent with and utilize the conditions*deifined in the NMP2 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). While

. the symptoms that drive operator ac;tions specified in the EOPs are riot indicative of all possible conditions which warrant emergency cla$sification, they define the symptoms, indeperident of initiating events, for which reactor plant safety and/or fission produd barrier integrity are threatened. When these symptoms are clearly representative of one of the NEI Initiating Conditions, they have been utilized as

.an E.AL This permits rapid classification of emergency situations based on plant conditions without the need for additional evaluation or event diagnosis. Although some of the EALs presented here are based on conditions defined in the EOPs,

.classification .of emergencie$ using these EALs is not dependent upori EOP entry or.execution.The EALs can be utilized independently or in conjunction with the EOPs. . .

Symptom-Based. vs. Everit"'Based Approach*

1 ** *Toth~ e~t~*ntpossible, theEALsare symptom~based. Thatis, the action.level*.

threshold is defined by values of key plant operating.parameters that identify emergency or potential emergency conditions. This approach i.s appropriate

. because it allows.the full scope of variations in the types of events to be**

classified* as emergencies>Howe\ler, a purely symptorn-based approach is not

sufficient to add.rE3ssall events fof which emergency classification is appropriate.*

Particular events to which no pretjetermined symptoms can be ascribed have

'. * .. also been* utiliz:edas EALs since they may be indicative of potentially rnore

serious conditions not yet fully realized. . .. ..

. F; * * *: EAL organization

1.*

The NMP2 i;ALscheme . .

inclu.des the following features:'

a .. *rnvisi6n~f the EAL.setint~three broad groups:.**.

'.J1 f:** . EALs applicable.under air ~lantoperating modes _,:This group.

- - .**. woolq*~erevieweq:bythe.EAL-useranytime emergency .

' .classificatioh.is considered. . .. . .. .

. (2) *EALsapplicable onl~:underhotoper~ting modes- Thisgrbup

* <would only. be revle\fll~d by the EAL-user when the plant is in Hot

. S.hutdown, Startup>orPoW,er Operatiori rnode. .

(3) . :,* EALs applit~ble C)nly ~nder cold *6peratirig modes._.:_. This gro,up . * .

* . *.. Would only *be. reviewed by* the EAL-Liser when the plant is ih Cold

- Shutdown; Refuelor Defueied moqe. * * **

. -- .... "* :*,* ...,. ..,.-, ....... b .. * .** Th~. purpose ofth.~ groups is to avoid re~i,ew. of.h'otconditioh E,l\Ls when .

. th~ pl8,riris in a Co id conditi9n and avoid reVieW' of cOld coriditi6n. EALs. * * .

.** wbehJIJe.plarit is in a hotcond.ition, This. approac;h significantly rfiinimizes .* *.

- ** ***.

ihe tot~I numb~r o(EALs thafmu~tl:>e reviewed by the EAL.;userfor a . *

.*. gi\.t~fl. plant condition;~reduces ~Akus~rre~ding .burden and, thE;)r~by',

$pet:ias identifioation:ofthe: EAL that applies to the emergency. *

* *'.c*",* "' * *. : *'" .. **: * ' *

.-*-~' <.

. *, .. ~. . '.* '

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 15 of 264

.5.2.i=.1 (Continued) . . .* . *. . ..... - ...

c. . Within eachoftheabove three grou'ps, assignment ofEALsto *.

categories/subcategories ..,.. Category and subcategory titles are selected to represent conditions that are operationally significant to the EAL~user.

Subcategories are used as n~cessary to furtherdivide*the EAU; of a category into logical sets of possible emergency classificatio'n thresholds.

Th.e NMP2 EAL. categqries/subcategories. and their relationship to N El 99-.

01 Rev. 5 Recognition Categories are listed below. *. * ** **

EAL Gr6ups; Categories anc:i Subcategories .*

,EAL Group/Category * *

E.AL Subcategory Any .. Operating. Mode: .

R*._: Abnorm.al Radiation Levels I 1 __: Offsite Rad Conditions Radiological Effl!Jents 2 - Onsite Rad Coriditicms & ~pent Fuel Events 3 - CR/CAS . . Rad . .

H - Hazards and Other Conditions 1 - Natural or*Destructive Phenomena Affecting Plant Safety 2 .:_ FIRE or-EX-PLOSION 3 - Hazardous Gas 4-'-' Security .

5 - Control Room Evacuation .*

5.'._ Judgment E -=ISFSI None Cold Conditions: * .

c'~ Cold Shutdown I Refueling System.** ' *. 1*- Loss of AC.Power * .*

Malfunction . . .* * *

2 ~ Loss* of DC Power *

3....:RPVLevel *, . '

4 .:.:.RCS Temperature

~ ' .

. 5-lnadvertent Criticality 6 - Comn'lunications HotCoriditioils: .

S ~ Syst~in Malfunction .*

1.- Loss of AC Power**

2 ~ Loss of DC Power

. 3 "'-Criticality & RPS Failure .* * .. * .

4 - Inability to'Reach or Maintain S_hutdown Conditions

5 - Instrumentation 6 '-- Communi~ations 7 .:....Fuel Clad.Degradation

~

. a...,. R.cs Leakage.

F.:.... fission Product Barrier Degradation None

'G.* Th.e primary tool for determinirlg the emergency classification level is the EAL .....

Classification Matrix. The user of: the.EAL Classification Matrix may (but is not required ..

. *to) consultJheEALT)chnical.BasesDoc:ument in.ordertoobfain*additional information

- .. *.. conc.erning thl f:At;:s ur'ldlr*classificatiori co*nsideration. The user should cqnsult . . .

- - * ...

Sections 2.7 and 2,8, and Aftachmerits 1 and 2 of this documl.nt for such information:*.*.*

.:. .... ~ . .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013Addendum 4.

Revision 1 Page 16 of 264

H. . *.* Technical Bases Information

1. EAL technical bases are provided in Attachment 1 for each EAL according to .

EAL group (Any, Hot, Cold), EAL category(R *. H, E, C, S and*F) and EAL subcatemxy. A summary explanation of each category and subcategory is given at the beginning of the technical bases discussions of the EALs included in the ..

category: For each EAL, the following information is provided: *

Category Letter & Title Subcategory Number & Title lriitiating Condition (IC) . . . . -

Site-specific description of the generic IC given in NEI 99-01 Rev. s~

EAL Identifier (enclosed in rectangle)

Each EAL is assigned a unique identifier to support a*ccurate communication of the emergenQy classification to onsite and offsite personnel. Four characters

. define each EAL identifier:* * *

a.

First *character (letter): Corresponds to the EAL category as described

.~*

above (R,. H, E, C, S or F) .

b. *

Second character (letter): The emergency classification (G, S, Aor U)

G = General Emergency s =Site Area Emergency A= Alert .

=

U Unusual Event

~ ..: *.. c: * . Thfrd character (number): Subcategory number within the given category.

Subcategories are sequerjtially numbered beginning with the number. orie. *

.. *, *. * (1J lfa category does riothave asubcategory; t~is character.is assigned the number one (1 ). . * *

d. .. *.* F,ourth char~c;ter {number): The numerical sequence ofttie EAL within the, .

EAL*subcategdry.' If the subcategory has only one EAL, it is given the number one. (1). * * *

Classifi~~ti~n (e~closed in rectangle): .*

.... *. .UnUsual.E,verit*(U),Alert.(A), site Area Emer~ency (S) 'or General Emergency (G) . . ...

- ...

EAl (enclosed in r~~tangle)

Wordihg ~ndosed in the r~ctangle appears* as it is displayed in the EAL Classification ryiatrix. Selected t~rms are highlighted for emphasis:*

.. Bold, uppercase print)s assigned to: "ANY," EAL identifiers, and logic .

terms such as AND, OR, EITHER, and soJc:>rth'. (When used as .** *

conjunbti6ns, t.hewords."and'j and'ioi'" are not highlighted.) ., . .

. * .....

Bqld, mi~edcase p(intis;assig.ned to: all," "only," ,;both,"table titl~sand

... : . .column heC!dings,.numbers following the word i'ANY," and negative*tentis (for.example,*"noi," "canriot," and so forth) *

** ** **

ljpp~rc~se print is assigned to acron~Jils, abbreviations, a~d. terms **. . **

defined in Section4.0 .

.*:" -- : -~-* ..

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 17 of 264 5.2.H.1 (Continued)

Mode Applicability .

One or mqre of the following plant operating conditions comprise the mode to which each EAL is applicable: 1 - Power Operation, 2 - Startup, 3 - Hot Shutdown, 4 -:- Cold Shutdown, 5 ;:. Refuel, D - Defueled, or All. (See Section 2:8 for operating mode definitions.)

Basis:

A Generic basis section provides a description of the rationale for the EAL as provided in NEI 99~01 .Rev. 5. This is followed by a Plant-Specific basis section that provides NMP2-:-relevant information concerning the EAL.

NMP2 Basis Reference{s):

Site-specific sourc~ documentation from which the EAL is derived

I. . Operating Mode Applicability* (Technical Specifications Table 1.1-1)

1. Power Operation

a. Reactor mode switch is in RUN 2.. startup

e* a. . The mode switch is in STARTUP/HOT STANDBY or REFUELwith all reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned

$. ** *.. HofShutdown .. .

a. ** . The mode switch is in SHUTDOWN, average reactor coolanttemperature

. is :> 200°F, and all reactor v~~sel head closure bolts are fully tensioned

- .. 4. Cold Shutdown

. a. .

The mode switch is in SHUTDOWN, average reactor coolant temperature *

. is ;s; 200°F, ahd all reactor vessel.head closure bolts are fully tensioned

. 5. *Refuel a.. The mode switch is in SHUTDOWN or REFUEL, and one or more reactor vessel head closure bolts are less than fully tensioned

6. Defueled

a. All reactor fuel is removed from the RPV (full core off load during refueling or extended outage) . . .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA.:1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1

Page 18 of 264 J. Validation of Indications; Reports and Ccmditioils

1. All emergency classifications shall be ba~ed upon VALID indications, reports or conditions. An indication, report, or condition, is considered to be VALID when it is verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related cir .

redundantindicators; or(3) by dired observation by plant personnel, such that

doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely .

assessment.

K Planned vs. UNPLANNED . Events . . .. '

.*1.. Planned evolutions involve preplanning to address the limitations imposed by the

. condition, the.performance of required surveillance testing, and the implementation of specific coritrols prior to knowingly entering the condition in accordance with the specific requirements.ofthe site's Technical Specifications.

Activities.which cause the site to operatebeyond that allowed by the site's tec~nicalSpe,cifications, planned or UNPLANNED, may result in an EAL threshold being met or exc~eded. P*lanned evoh.1tions to test, manipulate, repair, perform maintenance or modifications to systems and equipment that result in an EAL value being.met or exceeded are notsubject to classification and activation .

requirements as lorig 13s the.evolution proceeds as planned and is within the*

.

operational limitations imposed by the specific operating license. However, these

- *L

Classifying

1..

condi~ions may.pe subject to the.reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72:

TransientEvent~ *

Forsome ~vents, th~ conditi~n m~y becorr~cted beforeadeclaration hcis.beEm * '"I

. *. ~* -.* .* :., :* ***.

made. The key consideration inthis l?ituatioh i~ to determiri~ whether or not . . I

..... 1 fL1rtherplanf dainageoccum~d while t_he coiTE~ctive actions were beirig taken. In

~OITIE3 sitL1ations, .this can be.readily.determined, in* other ~ituations, further .

analyses may. be riecessary (for example, cc>olanfradiothemistry following an

ATWS everit;c plant structural.examination following ari. earthquake, and. so forth).

GlasS:ify the eventas im:Jicat~d and terminate.the emergency.once assessment*

' shows that.there w~re no consecjuences from the event and other: termination

.. :- ' ... ' crite~ia are met ' ' .' '

- - 2: ..

E)$isting guid~nc~ for¢1a~~ifyingJrarislenfe~ents ~ddresses:the* period of time of.*

--, ..- - e\leiitrecogrjition arid :c;la~slficatioh (f5. minutes)~ Hoyveyeir;*in cases when EAL .*.*

d~cl1:1ration cri~eria may' b.e m,et fnom~htari ly. du ring* the norrncil expected*. * : *.' ' ,. .*.

- response of the pla'nf.declaration. requirei:rfonts should not be considered to* be,**.*

., . niet'when the ,c;6nditions are apart 6fthe designed plant respon~e, or result from '* '

.appropriate_Oper~for.action_s. * * . * * **

Theremaybe*¢a~esjn:whicha planlconditibn th~t exceeded ctn EAL was llo(

.. recogni:zec:I at the time qfocGufrence but-is ioentified well after the. condition has

_,*._ .. '. dccurred ~(for example; as a result of rou.tine log or recqrd review), and:'the *.. ' . ' *..

.. c6nditiofr rl6 longer,exists.* lh th$Se G8$es'; $n emergency should not be declared.**

. ,Reporting.re.quirements _of*tOCFR SQ.72 areapplicab.le andt~egujdarice.of: ...*.

. :,., . NLJREG.;102.2.,'EventHeporting Guidelines.16 CFR.5(h('2 .and *Q0.73, should be ...

applied.* * * -*** -* ** - * *

':.:_* ~

. "*'.*<-*. ~: ,. .

.. ' .:~. ,:

--~~- - *.*

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 19 of 264

M. *

Multiple Simultaneoljs Events and IMMINENT EAL Thresholds

. 1.

When multiple simultaneous events occur, the emergency classification level is .

based on the highest EAL reached. For example, two Alerts remain in the.Alert category. Or,. an Alert and aSite Area Emergency is a Site Area Emergency.

Fµrther guiqance is provided in HIS 2007:-02, Clarification of NRG Guidance for Emergency Notifications During Quickly Changing Events.

2. Since NMP2 is at a multi-unit site, emergency classification level upgrading must also consider the effects of a loss of a common system on more than one unit (for example, potential for radioactive release from more than one core).

3, Although the !Tlajority the EALs ~rovidevery.specific thresholds, the*

of Emergency Director (E;D) must remain alert to events or conditions that lead to

. the conclusion that exceeding the EAL threshold is IMMINENT. If, in the judgment of the ED, an IMMINENT situatJon is af hand; the classification should

b13 made. as if the threshold has b~en exceeded, While th.is is particularly prudent at .the. higher emergency cla.sses (the early Classification may permit more .

effective implementation of protedive measures), it is nonetheless applicable to all ernergency classes. . . ' . .

N .. *** Emergency Classification Level Downgrading 1.* . Another important a~pect of usable*.EALguidance is the ~onsideration of. what to do when the risl< posed by an emerg,ency is clearly decreas.ing. A* combination *

' - : .. ' .. approach involving recovery from G¢rieral Emergencies cmd some Site Area. .

.. * .*Emergencies and termination from Unusual Events, Alerts, and certain Site Area Emergencies *causing no long term plant damage appears to be the best choice ...

.*Qowngradingto lower.emergency classification levels apds notifications but may have merit unqer certain circumstances. .. . .,

6.0 . BA$ES ** **

None*** * ...... :.-

7.0 . RECORDS 7 .1*: . *The fbHowing record~' ge~~r~t~d *by th is :proce~ure ~s* a result of an ~ctu~r qeclared. emergency shalFbe maintained _by Record~ Management forthe Perrl1anentPlanf pile per CNG~PR,.3.01::: ..

JOOO, ReccirdsManageri1~nt ** ** . :' * * * * * *. * * * *

*.. None ; .

7:2.

Th~:f611owing(ecords* ge:n~~ated by tbis proc.edur~ 'th~t are not 'the ~esult of an actual declared .

. *. e1T1ergenc;y are nritrequlred for retention in the Pe.rmanent Plaritflle: .* * * , * .. .

None . * * . . * . _. * * ** .*

. . . *~..: .-.. .- . . ' :- ..:

-' *.(

~ ;: .::.--- - .

. UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 **

Page 20 of 264

.. Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases**

Categ'ory R - Abnormal Radiation Levels I Radiological Effluents

. EAL (3roup:

ANY (EALs ih this category are applic~ble fo any plant condition, hot or ..

cold.) * * * * * * ** ** * **

Many EALs are based 'on actual or potential degradation of fission product barriers because of

the elevated potential for offsite radioactivity release: Degradation of fission product parriers .

.though is not always apparent via non-radiological symptoms. Therefore, direct indication of.*

. elevated radiological effluents or area radiation levels are appropriate symptoms for emergency

classification. * * *

At lower levels, abnorrn~I radioactivity releases may be fndicativeof afailure of containment

systems or precursors to more significant releases. At higher release rates, offsite radiqlogi9al conditions may resulfwhich require offsite,protective adions. Elevated area radiation levels in plant niay also be. indicative of the failure of containment systems or precll!de access to :plant

. vital equipment necessary to ensure plant safety. .*. * *

Events of this category.pertain.tothe following subcategories:

1, Offsite'Rad Conditions* .

Direct indication of effluent radiation monitoring systeriis provides a rapid assessment mechanism to determine releases in excess of classifiable limits. Projectedoffsite doses;.

actual offsite field measurements or measured release rates via sampling indicate doses or dose rates above classifiable limits. * * * * *

. 2.*onsiteRad Conditions & Spent Fuel Events Sustained general area radiation levels .in excess of those Indicating loss of control of .*.

.radioactive materials or thos,e levels which may preclude access to. vital plant areas also warrant emergency .classification. . .** . .

3. CR/CAS Rad' 1.*

I

. Sustained general area radiation levels which may preclude access to areas requiring I c;bntinubus occupancy also warrant emergency classification.. *. .' ..

I I

~ *.: -

.~?~: ...

EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES Revision 1*

Page 21 of264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: R ...:. Abnormal Radiation Levels I Radiological Effluents

1. .

Subcategory:

1- OffsiteRad Conditions Initiating ConditiOn: Offsite dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous

.radioactivity> 1,000 mRem TEDE or 5,000 mRem thyroid COE for the actualor projected duration of the release using actual meteorology EAL:

RG1 .1 General Emergency .

ANY monifor rec:1cjing. > Table R-1 "GE" column for~ 15 min .. (Note 1)

.. Do not delay declaration awaiting dose assessment results

.* If dose assessment results are available; declaration should be based on dose

.**. assessmentinstead of radiation monitor values (see EAL RG1 .2)

.. Note 1 :* ..**. The ED should not wait until the applicable time. has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is

_determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time

- Mo~itor Table R-1 GE Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds SAE Alert UE Gaseou*s.*

Hadwaste/RB Vent Effluent. 5.5E+ 7 µCils 5,5E+6 µCils 200 x Ala.rm 2xAlarm Main stack Effluent .. . 1.0E+10 µCils 1._0E+9 µCils 200 xAlarm 2xAl.arni Liquid Service Water Effluent

NIA ..

NIA 200 xDRMSHigh(red) 2 x DRMS.H.lgh(red)

Liquid RadvVaste Effluent NIA NIA NIA 2 x ORMS High(re(j)'

Cooling Tower_ Bloitdown

NIA NIA 200 x ORMS f-i_igh(red) 2 xORMS High( red) * .

.-. :~ : .

Mode Applical)ility:

. .. *All

:' .., . ; ~ .. ,

~ -.*

. *.. -~. .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 22 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

RGt.1 General Emergency (Continued)

Basis: .

. Plant-Specific The DRAGON com.puter code has been used to determine the threshold values in Table R-1 for the GE

. classification level.The methodcilOgy develops an isotopicconcentration in the secondary containment

. that, whenreleasedthrough the Radwaste/RB Ventor the Main Stack, achieves 1,000 mRem TEDE or 5,000 mRem.thyroid COE at the SITE BOUNDARY. The nuclide inventory in the secondary

containment was artificially created by postulating a source term in secondary containment based on main steam design isotopic distribution and adjusting the release.rate fr~m secondary containment until either the whole body or child thyroid dose limit at the SITE BOUNDARY is reached. This isotopic distribution is not intended to specify a particular accident as the initiating event.*

Values have b~en calculated for the GEMs noble gas channel only since this is the reading that is readily available to the operatoL Realistic, accident atmospheric dispersion (X/Q) factors ha~e been applied. (ref. 1)

The . SITE BOUNDARY is the iinebeyond

~ : ' . .

which.

the .land is not owned, leased, nor otherwise controlled

by constellatio'n fret. 2).

Liquid effluent ra~i~tion monitors _are not addressed in Table .R-1 at the Site Area Emergency and .

Generai Emergency levels becaus*e the dose assessment code used to calculate these Table R-1 readings only considers a release through 'the Radwaste/RB Vent or the Main Stack .

. .

A radiation monitor reading is VALi D when a rele~se path is established .. If the release. path to the*

en~ironment has been.isolated;the radiation monitor readingis*notVALIDfor classification.

Generic This EALaddresses radioactivity releases that result.in doses at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY that exceed the EPA Protective Actiqn Guides (PAGs). Public protective actions will be necessary. _ *_

.'Releases ofthis magnitude are associated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the_ public and .likely involve fuel damage. .

- The monitorli~fin Table R-1 includes effluent monitors on *a11 potential release pattiways .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1 Page 23 of 264

- Attachment 1, Emergency Action LevejTechnical Bases (Continued)

RG1 .1 General Emergency Generic (Continued) . . .

Since dose asseissment is based on actual meteorology, whereas the monitor reading EAL is not, the results from these assessments may indicate that the classification is not warranted, or may indicate that a higher classification is warranted~ For this reason, emergency implementing procedures should call for the timely performance of dose assessments using actual meteorology and release information.

If the results* of these .dose assessments are available when the classification is made (for example,

initiated* at a lower . ..

classification level)~ the dose assessment .

results . override the. monitor .

reading EAL.

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):.

1.. -Calculation

. ' . PR-C-24-X

2. NMP2 Offsite base Calculatio'n Manual Figure DJ .0-1

3. NEi 99-01 JC AG1 '. '

. - *-~- : - -.- :,

- ~-:f .*: ..

. :,.; '. : " -~ '

~ ..* ..

.* l_

" .*,*.*.- ' .~ ..

.. -*~ .

L___,

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 24 of 264

- - Category:

. Attachment 1, *Emergency .Action Le~el Technical Bases (Continued)

R - Abhqrmal -.

Radiation Levels I Radiological Effluents Subcategory: *1 ..:.. Offsite Rad Conditions

. lnltiati~g Condition:

Offsite dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENTrelease of gaseous radioactivity > 1,000 mRem TEDE or 5,000 mRem thyroid COE for the actual

or projected duration of the* release using actual meteorology EAL:

RG1 ;2 Gen'eral Emergency Dose assessment us*ing actual meteorology indicates doses > 1,000 mRem TEDE or 5,000 mRem thyroid COE afor beyond the SITE BOUNDARY * * . . .

Mode Appli~ability:

All Basis:

Plant-Specific

.. \ .'

. The 1,0op mRem TEDE dose is set-af100% of the EPA PAG, while the 5,000 mRem thyroid COE was.

established in consideration oftjle 1:5 ratio of the EPA Dose asse.ssment is perfmmed in accordance with EPIP-EPP-08 "Offsite DoseAssessmeht and PAR" (ref. 1). :

P~G forTEDE ahd thyroid COE.

.The 'SITE BOUNDARY is the line beyond which the land is ~ot owned,-leased~ nor otherwise controlled by Ccmsteilation (ref. 2). *.. . , . . . .

GeM~ric: - .**

.. This EAL addresses radioactivity reieases that'resultin d6ses ator beyond the SITE .BOLIN DARY that exceed:th~ ~PA PrptectiveActioh .<3Lildes(PAGs}: Publipprotective adionswill be necessary,. * .

Releases. of.this m:agnitude a_re associcifed with th~: faih.ire *91 pl_ant systems* heeded for the protection of

the publl9*and likelyinvolye*fu~fdarfiag~. . * * * * ** * * * * .* * * * ** * **

. Since do~e, assessrtient. is based ,()6 actual rl1etec)rol9gy;* where~s the mqnitor re:ading EAL is' not the resµlts.frohl:Jtiese assessments may indii:;atethat the ¢1a'sslficati_oh is:not w9rranted; ortnay indicate .**

that a higher classificatfon is warranted.- For this reason; emergehcy implen:ientirig procedures should .

call.for the fi111elyperforrilance of dose asses~ments using ai:;tual meteorology and release information.* ,.

.. lfthe result~ 'of the.SEf dose assess'm~nts. aJJ: qyailable:wheri the. ~lassificcitionJl5 made (fOr exam pl~, .*.. . .

initlc~ted ala lowerclassificatiorflevei}, the dose :c:issessmerit re~ults override the h1onitor reading EAL *.

.~* ~_. . . .. - - .

NMP:ts~~i~ Ref~renC:e'(s): .: . . .. . * * *** -**

.. . .

1.'. EPIP-l;PP-08C>ffsiteDoseAssesshienf and PAR

.

2. NMP2 OffsiteDose Calculat!onManual _figµreJ;>.1.0.:1 .

. 3 .. NEf 99-01 IC AGt . . '. . .. ,* . ..

~ . - -.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revis.ion 1 Page 25 of 264

. Attachment 1, Emergency Action Le~el Technical Bases (Continued).*.

Category: R- Abnormal Radiation Levels I Radiological Effluents Subcategory: 1 - Offsite Rad Conditions Initiating Condition: Offsite dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous*

radioactivity > 1,000 rnRem TEDE or 5,000 niRem thyroid COE for the actual or projected duration of the release using actual* meteorology *

EAL:

RG1.3 * -General Emergency . .

Field survey results indicate closed window dose rate~r> 1;000 mRem/hr expected to*

Continue for ~-50 min. at or beyOnd the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 1)

OR of Analyses field survey samples indicate thyroid COE > 5;000 mRem for 1 hr of inhalation ator beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 1)

Note 1: The ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed; but should.declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicabletime .

Mode Applicability:

All.

Basis:**

. Plant.-Specific '

. Real time field-Surveys and sarnple analysis is performed by offsi~e field monitoring teams per EPIP-I: EPP~Q7, "Downwind Radiol~gi~ai Monitoring'; (ref. 1) and assessed for radiological dose consequences *.* *.

per EPIP-EPP-08 "Offsite.Dose Assessment and PAR" (ref. 2).

Any Dose Assessment usi~g actual meteorological conditions should be ~ssesse~ usirig*R.1.2 series.*

EAL's and NOT 1.3 series EAL's.

The .

SITE BOUNDARY is the .line beyond which the land isnot

\ . owned, leased, nor otherwise controlled by Constellatiori (ref. 3).

. . . . - -~- ;

' --~*

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 26 of264 Atta'chment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

RG1 .3 General Emergency (Continued)

Generic

_This EAL addresses radioactivity releases that result in doses at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY that exceed ttie EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). Public protective actions will be necessary:

Releases ofthis magnitude are associated with the failure of piant syst~ms needed for the protection of

the public and likely involve fuel damage~ * *

Since dose assessment is based on actual meteorology, whereas the monitor reading EAL is not, the results froih these assessments may indicate that the classification is not warranted. For this. reason, emergency implementing procedures should call for the timely performance of dose assessments using actual meteorology and release information. If the results ofthese dose assessments are available -

whem the classification is made (for example, initiated at a lower classification level); the dose

assessm~nt results- override the monitor reading EAL. * * *- * - *

-NMP2 Ba.sis Reference(s): *

-1. - EPIP-EPP~07 Downwind R~diological Monitoring

2. *EPIP-EPP-08 Offsite Dose Assessment and PAR

3. NMP20ffsite Pose Calculation Manual Figure D.1.0-1

- 4. NEI 9~.:0110 AG1

-_ ~ - '. :. .

. :... /., ... *:

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 27 of 264

Attachment 1, Emergency Action Levei Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: R ...;__Abnormal Radiation Levels /Radiological Effluents Subcategory: . 1 -'- Offsite Rad Conditi~ns Initiating Condition: Offsite dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release ofgaseous

radioactivity exceeds 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem thyroid COE for the actualor projected duration of the release using actual meteorology EAL:

RS1.1

. ANY monitor reading >T_able R-1 "SAE" column for~ 15 min. (Note 1)

Do notdelay declaration awaiting dose assessment results

*If oose assessmentresults are available, declaration should be based on dose assessment instead of radiation monitor values (see EAL RS1 .2)

Note 1: The Eb should notwait until the applicable time has elapsed~ but should declare the e~ent as soon as it is *

,* determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time

Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Monitor . .. GE SAE .Alert UE Gaseous Radwaste/RB Vent Effluent 5.5E+ 7 µCi/s

5.5E+6 µCi/s 200 xAlarm 2 xAlarm

. MainSta,ck Effluent.: 1.0E+10 µCi/s . 1.0E+9 µCi/s 200 xAla~m 2xAlarm Liquid ServiceWater Effluent N/A N/A 200 xORMS High(red) 2 x ORMS High(red)

Liquid RadWaste.Effluent

NtA* N/A N/A 2 x ORMS High(red)

Cooling* Tower Slowdown N/A N/A

200 x ORMS High(re_d) 2 x ORMS High(red).

Mode Applicability:

All

.- . ~* *.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page*2a of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)*

RS1 .1 (Continued)

Basis:

Plant-Specific

- The DRAGON computer code has been used to determine the threshold values in Table R-1 for the SAE Classification. level. The methodology develops an isotopic concentration in the secondary containment that, when released through theHadwaste/RB Vent or the Main Stack, achieves 100 mRemTEDE or 500 mRem thyroid CDE at the SITE BOUNDARY. The nuclide inventory in the secondary containment was artificially created by postulating a source term in secondary containment based on main steam design isotopic distribution and adjusting the release rate from secondary containment uritifeither the whole body dr child thyroid dose limitat the SITE BOUNDARY is reached.

This isotopic distribution is not int~nded to specify a particular accident as the initiating event.

Values have been calculated for the GEMs noble ga~ charin~lonly since this is thereading that is

readily available to the operator.-Realistic, acddent atmospheric dispersion*(X/Q) fa~tors have been applied, (ref. 1) *

The SITE BOUNDARY is the line beyond which the land is not owned, leased, nototherwise controlled

. by Constellation (t~f. 2). *** * ***** * *

Liquid efflueritradiation monitors are notaddress~d in Table R-1 at the Site Area Emergency and

General Emergency levels becaus'e the dose assessment' code used to calculate these Table R~ 1 readings only ', . :

considers a' .release . --*.

through the .

Radwaste/RB .- *,

Vent or the,MC!in stack..

a

A radiation 'monitor reading is VALi Dwhen release. path is established, 'If the release. path to the .

eiivironmenthas :'.*

been isolated, the radiation monitorreading iS n6t VALID . for classification Generic

. This.EAL addr~sses radioadivity r~IE}ases that result in.*dCJses at or beyond the-.SITE BOUNDARY that ..

of

.. exceedt0% the EPA Protective.Action Guides (PAGs). Releases of fhi~fmaghitude are associated

. . _ : with.the failure oi plant system$11e~ded *for theprotetti611 ofthe public; * . . ** .*. - * '

The site specific monitor list in Table R'.'.1 in.eludes ~ffh.1er1t mprii~ors on all potential release pathways .

. . <C since):Jose"~s5e$smentlsba~~crdn actb~trneteorOlogy; vvhereas the m~hitpr ~eading EAL is not,'the *.** ..

results.frointheseasse~srnents.mayindidatelhat'ttiedassffi~ation*is'notwarranted,or-may indicate**.*

that a highe(classificatiori.is warranted. Fbrthis reason, emergency implementing*procedures.sho:Uld*.

call for the tirTI'ely_performa11ce 9f dgse' a,ssess111ents using actual meteorology and'i'elease information ..

If the results: c>f th~e!?e,d.ose asses~ments arE3. available when the classification is m,ade (for example, . .

initiated at~ lqwerdassification'level), the c:lose.assessment r~sults override the monitor reading_.EAL,. ..

. - ** '.=* * * * --. :-

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 29 of 264

-Attachment1; Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

RS1 .1 (Continued)

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. Calculation PR-C-24~X

2. NMP2 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Figure D.1.0..:1 3; * *NEI 99.:01 IC AS1

. ,* . .* ~ ... *.*.,

- :.~ *...

~ .. . . . . .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1

- Category:

Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

R - Abnormal Radiation Levels I Radiological Effluents

Page 30 of 264 Subcategory:.* 1 - Offsite Rad Conditions . . . . . . . .

Initiating Condition: Offsite dose resulting froman actual or. IMMINENTrelease ofgaseous radioactivity exceeds 100 mRehl TEOE or 500 mRem thyroid COE for the actual or projected duration ofthe release using. actual* meteorology.

EAL.:

.RS1.2 Site Area Emergency Dose assessment using actuai meteorology indicates doses > 100 [l,Rem TEDE or

~)OO mRem thyroid COE at or be*yond the SITE BOUNDARY Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Plant.. Specific

. The 100 mRe~TEOE .dose is set at 10% of the EPAPAG, while the 500 mRem thyroid*COE was established in consideration ofthe 1:5ratio of the EPA PAGforTEOE andthyroid COE.

Dose assessment is perform~d in accordariC!3 with EPIP-EPP-08 "Offsite Dose Assessment .and PAR;;

*(ref; J) * ** * * * * ** *

Th.a SffE E3()UNOARY.is.the line be.yorid which the land is not owned, I.eased, .nor oth~rwise controiled.

by Consteilation (ret 2). ** * * * * - * *

:derieriC ****

This FAL addresses radioacti~ity releases thatresult in doses at or beyondthe $1TE BOUNDARY that .

exceed 10% onhe EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). Releases cif this magnitude are associated.**.

\Nith*ttie failure ofplant systems needed for the protection bf the public. *

Since dose assessment-i~ based~n actual meteorology; whereas the monitor r~ading EAL is not, the results fromtheseassessments may indicate that the. classification is not warranted, or may indicate that a* higher Classification is warrarited. For this reason, emergency implementing procedures should .

call for the timely performance of do.se assessments using actual meteorology and release information, Ifthe results of these dose assessments are availablewhen the classification is made (for example,

initiated at a lower classification level), the dose assessment results override the monitor reading EAL.

NMP2 Basis R~ference(s):

-1. EPIP-EPP.,08 OffsiteDoseAssessmenUmd.PAR .

2. NMP2 Offsite Dose Cah::ulation Manual Figure O:t.0.::1 3; NEH39:-01 IC AS1 . -*. . - .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 31 of264 Attachment 1, E_mergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: R- Abnormal Radiation Le.vels I Radiological Effluents Subcategory: 1 - Offs.ite Rad Conditions Initiating Condition: Offsite dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous .

radioactivity exceeds 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem thyroid COE for the*

actual or projected duration of the release using actual meteorology EAL:

RS1 .3 *

Site Area Emergency Field survey results indicate closed window dose rates> 100 *mRem/hr expected td continue*for~ 60 min. at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Note 1)

OR Ancilyse~ offieldsunley samples indicate thyroid COE> 500 .mRem fort hr of inhalation at or beyondthe SITE BOUNDARY (Note .1).

Note 1: The ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is . .

determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time * ** * *

.*.* : *.* *.*. > Mode Applicability:

. *. All

Basis:

Plant-Spe~ific .

Heal tim~ field surveys an~ sampl~ ~naiy~is is performed .by offsite fie.Id monitofing teams per*,EPIP- .

.. . EPP-07, ;,_Downwind Radiologital Monitoring" (ref.: 1)and as$essed for radiol~gical dose consequencE3s

. > per EPl~~EPP"'.oa "OffsiteDosE3 Assessment a*nd PAR"* (ret 2) ..

- .*.Any Dose ;Assessrrient using adual meteorologicar conditions should be assessed using R l-4 seiie~ .

EAL's and NOTi ,3 series EAL's .. * . .. . .. . . . -.

.* * * . The SITE BOUNDARY is the llne beyond which the laMd is not ow~ed, leased, nor otherwisec~ntrolled .

by~Gonsteilafion(ref. 3). * .* . .. . .. . . ..

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 32 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

RS1 .3 Site Area Emergency (Continued)

. Generic This EAL addresses radioactivity releases that result in doses at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY that

. exceed-10% of the EPA Protective Action Guides. (PAGs). Releases of this magnitude are associated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the public.

Since dose assessment is based on actual meteorology, whereas the monitor reading EAL is not, the

results from thes'e assessments may indicate that the classification is not warranted, or may indicate that a higher classification is warranted. For this reason, emergency implementing procedures should call for the timely performance of dose assessments using actual meteorology and release information.

If the results of these dose assessments are available when the classification is made (for example, initiated at a lower classification level), the dose assessment results override the monitor reading EAL.

.- NMP2 Basis Reference(s): -.

1. EPIP-EPP,07 Downwind Radiological Monitoring.

2 .. EPIP~EPP-080ffsite Dose Assessment arid PAR 3: NMP2 Offsite Dose Calculation Man*ual Figure D.1.0-1 4 .. NEI 99-01 IC AS1

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICALBASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 33 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Actiqn Level Technical Bases (Continued)* .

Category: R -:-Abnormal Radiation Levels l Radiological Effluents Subcategory: 1 - Offsite Rad Conditions

~ . - . -

Initiating Condition: . ANY release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment

> 200 times the ODCM for 1S minutes or longer EAL:

RA1.1 - . -

. * . Alert ANY gaseous monitor reading> Table R-1 "Alert;, column for~ 15 min. (Note 2)

Note 2: *The ED should not wait until the appli~able time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon. as it is

.* . determined that the release duratiOfl has e?<Ceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. In the absence of

.* data to the contrary, assume that the rele_ase du.ration ha!>"exceeded the applicable time if an ongoing release is detected and the release start tinie is unknown: ** *

R-1 *.

Table Effluent Monitc>rClassification Thresholds

Milnitor . . GE* SAE . Alert UE Gaseous* . - -.-* .::

RadwastelRB Vent Effluent* *..... 5,5E+ µi:;vs 1 .

5.5E+6 µ~ils ..

200 x Alarm ** 2x.Alarm

Main Stack Effluent . . 1.0E+1b µCils * * . 1.0E.+9 µCi/~ 200 x Alarrri . *2 xAlarm Liquid.

Service vvat.er Etfluent. *.NIA*** '*NIA 200 x ~RMS High(red) . . 2 x ORMS High(red)

Liquid RadW~st~ Effluent . NIP,. ...

NIA .. *

NI~ . . . 2 x ORMS High(red)

Cooling Tbwer Bi.Oidowri .. . . NJA: ' *.* N/A . :200 x ORMS Hig~(red). 2x PRMS Hi~h(red)

Mod~ Applic~bmty: All . .

,-.:. - .*...~ ..* :

. *,._._\**.

~ >.

.. -* ~

-*-** .. ~~:.

. . .. ' J

--~ .' ..,

-*-~:. ,

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 34 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

RA1.1 Alert (Continued)

Basis:

Plant-Specific The value shown for each monitorin Table R-1 is two hundred times the high (red) alarm setpoint for the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (ORMS). The ORMS high (red) alarm setpoints for the listed monitqrs are conservatively ~et to* ensure ODCM radioactivity release limits are not exceeded (ref. 1).

lnstr~mentation that may be used,to assess this EAL is listed below (ref. 2}:

Radvitaste/Reactor Building Vent Effluent Monitoring System

.* monitor: 2RMS-PNL 180C.

. recorder: 2RMS.:.RR170/180 an~unciator: 851248 ...

Mai~ .

Stack- Effluent -Monitoring System

- monitor: 2RMS:.PNL170C - . . **. : . *.*

.* . r~~order: 2RMs.:R~ 170/180 .*.

annunciator: 851256

Aradiaticin

. ~ . .- ,~

ril~nitb(reading is VALID ~hen a relea~'e ~~th is establish~d; If the release path to the environment has*'been .

isolated,-. -. .

the.radiationJTIO~iforr~ading

.is not -. .

VALi D- for. - classification.

..:. ~ :..

-,_/: ..*_.

.* . -: ~ ." ,._

-*~ ' ...

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 35 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Le~el Technical Bases' (Continued).

RA1 .1 Alert (Continued)

Generic . . .

The Emergency Director should not wait until the applicable tinie has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condi_tion will likely exceed the applicabletiine.

This 'EAL addresses an aCtual or substantial potential decrease in the level of safety of the plant as . .

a indicated by radiological re_lease that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time.*

Nuclear powerplants. incorporate features intended to control the release of radioactive effluents to the . *

environment. Further, there are administrative controls established to prevent unintentional releases,-*or

control and monitor intentional releases. The occurrence of extended, uncontrolled radioactive releases to the environment is indicative bf a degradation in these features and/or controls.

I I. . The 200 x DRMS high (red) multiples are specified only to distinguish between non-emergency .*

1 . .

conditions: While these multiples obviously correspond to-an-off-site dose or dose rate, the ~mphasis in classifying these events is the degradation in the level of safety of the Releases should not be prorated

or averaged. For example, a release exceeding 600x ODCfv1 Jor 5 minutes does not meet the threshold .

This'EAL includes any release for which a radioactivity discharge permit was not prepared, or a*release

. that exceeds the conditions {forexample, minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm

. setppints, and*so forth) on the applicable permit. . *

.This. EAL is intended for shes that have est~blishedeffluent monitoring on non.:routine release

. pathwciys for which a*discharg.e permh would not normally be prepared. * *

. NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. NMP2 Off-Site Dose Cal~ulatioh Manual SectionsD;3.1.1, D.32.1, D.3.3~ 1;.D~3.3.2

z .. *N2-0P:-79 Radiation Monitoring System .* * * * .* .

3 .. NEI 99-01 IC AA1. .

. *~ - .. : . .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 36 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category:** R- Abnormal Radiation Levels I Radiological Effluents Sul:>category: 1 - Offsite Rad Conditions Initiating Condition: ANY release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment

> 200 times the ODCM for 15 minutes or longer EAL:

RA1.2 *Alert

.ANY liquid monitor reading> Table R-1 ;,Alert" column for;;::: 15 min. (Note 2)

Note 2: The ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event.as soon as it is detern:iined that the release duration has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. In the absence of .

-*..data to the contrary, assume that the release duration has exceeded the applicable time If an ongoing release is.*

detected and the release start time is unknown. * **

Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Monitor GE SAE Alert UE Gaseous RadlJ\(aste/RB Vent Effluent . 5.5E+ 7 µCi/s

s.5E+6 µCits 200. xAlarm 2 xAlarm Main .Stack Effluent

1.0E:10 µCi/s 1~OE+9 µCi/s 200xAlarm

2 xAlarm Liquid**

service Water Effluent N/A NIA 200-x ORMS High(red) 2 x ORMS High(ied)

'.' . u~uid Radwa:ste ~ff:1uer.it . N/A. NIA. N/A 2 x ORMS High(red).

Cooling TOwer Slowdown ..

. NIA NIA 200 x ORMS Higfl(red_) 2 x ORMS High(red)

. . M6de ApJ:)lic;:abillt~:

AIL

.:.\*

. -~- .. - ..

. . / -. .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP.;,AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 37 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

RA1.2 Alert (Continued)*

Basis:

Plant-Specific The value shown for each monitor in Table R-1 is two hundred times the high (red) alarm setpoint for the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (ORMS). The ORMS high (red) alarm setpoints for the listed monitors are conservatively set to ensure ODCM radioactivityrelease limits are not exceeded (ref. 1).

Instrumentation thatmay be used to assess this EAL is listed below (ref. 2):

Service Water EffluentLoop A/B Radiation monitor: 2SWP*RE146A/B recorder: 2SWP*RR146A/B annunciator: 851258

Cooling Tower Slowdown Line monitor:. cws:.RE 157 annunciator: 851258 The designatiori "N/A" in Table R-1 indicatesthatthe listed instrument range is insufficient to indicate th.e specified value and therefore no value is usec:f.

A radiation monitor reading is VALID when a release path is established. If the release path to the environ~ent has been isolated, the radiation monitor reading is not VALID for classification .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICALBASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 38 of 264

!\ttachment 1, Emergency Action ~evel Technical Bases (Continued} .

RA1 ~2 Aler,:t (Continued}

Generic - * - ' -

The Emergency Director should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the

event as soon as it is determinedthatthe condition will Hkely exceed the applicable time .

.This EAL addresses an actual or* substantial potential decrease in the level of safety of the plant as

indicated by a radiological relea~e that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time.

Nuclear power plants incorp~rate featur~s intended t~ control. the release of radioactive effluents to the*

environment. Further, there are administrative controls established tb prevent unintentional releases, or control ahd. mb'nitor intentional releases. The occurrence of extended, uncontrolled radioactive releases to the environment is indicative*t>ra degradation in these features and/or controls.

The 200 x ORMS high (red) multiples' are specifiedo11ly to distinguish between non-emergency conditions. WhileJhese multiples obviously correspond to ah off*site dose or dose rate~ the empfi'asis in is

' classifying these events _the degradation in the level of safety of the plant, not th.e magnitude of the associated dose or dose rate. * * ** * ** * * * * * *

-.. , .. .. . - .~ ~ :'

1*. * :*:... * .. :

.*: (.:'**.

. *.. ;: .* -.:': :~; :*,::*

--.. ~ .:.~ .

.. *~*,.

. .. ~-- -.

. -. -~*

. . :.: .".'.--*_-; . ._.:-. *-.~ : .

-.1 _

- - ~'.' *.-*

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA;.1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 39 of 264

Attachment 1, EmE!rgency Action Level.Technical Bases (Continued)

. RAt.2 Alert (Continued)

Releas~s should not be prorated or averaged. Forexample, a release exceeding 600x ODCMfor 5 miriutes does not meet the threshold.

. . ~ . . . . .

This EAL includes any r~lease for which aJadioactivity discharge permit was not prepared, or a release

. thatexce~ds the conditions (for example, minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm

. setpoints;cind so forth) ortthe applicable permit.

This EAl addresses radioactivity releases, that for ~hateverreason, cause effluent radiation monitor read in gs to exceed the thresh Old identified in the EAL established by the radioactivity discharge permit.

_This value.may be associated with a planned batch release, or a continuous release path.

NMP2 Basis.Reference(s): ** *.*. . * .. ... . . * .

1.* NMP2 Off:-Site Dose Calc1.1lat_i~n .Manual Sections 0.3.1.1, D.3.2.1, D.3.3.: 1, D.3.3.2

2. N2-0P~79 Radiation Monitoring *System *

3. NEI 99.;01 IC_AA1

.\:**-

~:.-. ~ *_.. :. .

' ~*.

. :,/ . ***.,*.. ' ...

.. ,.-.. .**. ~ .

\'. .

-::.*. -~ " ..

I.*

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA~1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 40 of 264 Attachment 1, Emer~ency Action Leve.I Technical Bases* (Contin~ed) *..

Category: R-Abnormal Radiation Levels l Radiological Effluents Subcategory: 1- Offsite Rad Conditions . ; - .. *. .*

Initiating Condition: ANY release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment

> 200Jimes the ODCM for 15 minutes or longer. *

EAL:

RA1.3 Alert Confirmed s*ample analyses for gaseous orHqukl releases indicate concentrations or release.rates ::>200x ODCMliniitsJor ~** 15 min. (Noter2) .

Note 2: The ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as ~oon as it is . .

determined that the reiease duration has exceeded, :or will likely exceed, the applicable. time. In the absence cif * *

. data to the contrary, assume that the r~lease duration has exceeded the applicable time if an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown. ** * * *

. . Mode Applicability:

- - - - .*.* All*

Basis:

Plant~Sbecific .**

. Co~firmed'.sample arialysesin exces~ of two hundr~d times the sjte Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

'(ODCM) lhhits that ~Qnti~Lle for 15 mi_~ute~ ~r longerre~resent an uncontrolled sitl1citi~narid hence, a *.

. potential degradatiqnjn the level of safety. This event escalates from.the Unusual Eve.nt by raising the***.* *.

mag~itude of ..the r~lease bya... factor .of 100 over the Unusual Event level (thatis, 200 times ODCM).

proratingthe500~Rem/yr basisofthe.10 CFH20 . non-occupational MPClimits for both time (8766 *

' hrly~) and the 200 m~ltiplier, theassociated*Exclusion Area~Boundary dose rate ~ould be

. *. appr~ximately. 10 mRem/hr. If sample analysis indicates the threshold is met arid nothing is done within 15 min~tes to effect a release reduction, th~ ED can conclude that the EAL threshold is met without second.sample results .

' ~- . .. ..

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4.

Revision 1 Page 41of264

Attachment 1, .Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

RA1 ;3 Alert (Continued)

Generic The Emergency Director should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the

. event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time.

This EAL.addresses an actual or substantial potential decrease in the level of safety of the.plant as indicated by a radiological rel.ease that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time.

.* Nuclear power plc,mts incorporate features intended to control the release of radioactive effluents to the environment. Further, there are administrative controls established to prevent unintentional releases, or control and monitor intentional releases. The occurrenc~ of extended, uncontrollec;I radioactive releases to the environment is indicative of a degradation in these features and/or controls.

- .: ~ ... -.' . . . ~. . - . - .

x

. The 200 ODGM limit are specified only to distinguish between non:.emergency conditions. While .

these multiples obviously correspond to an off-site dose. or d.ose rat~, the emphasis in classifying these

events is the degradation in. the level of safety of the plant, not the magnitude of the associated dose or

. dose rate, **

Releases should not beprorated or averaged. For* example, a release exceeding 600x ODCM for 5 minutes does not_ meet the threshold. *

.* *. *This EAL includ~s any release for which a radioactivity discharge permitwas not prepared, or a releas~

that exceed~ the conditions (for example, minimum dilut_ion flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm

. . .

setpoints, and so forth) on the applicable permit. ... * *** * *

addres~e~ sarnpl~analyses, This EAL uncontrollec;I releases thatare detected by particular.ly on . , ..

~~monito~ed_p'athw<;iys, e.g., spills ofradioactiye l'iquids into storm drains, hea(exchanger lea~age~

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. *NMP2. Off.:.Site Dose Calculation Manual**

. 2. NEI 99-0f ICAA1

i,;

-r* . . ; *.

'*,, r* ", o*

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP~AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 42 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: R ""'.""Abnormal Radiation Levels /Radiological Effluents Subcategory: 1-0ffsite Rad Conditions Initiating Condition:

ANY release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment

> 2 times the ODCM for 60 minutes or longer

EAL:

RU1.1 Unusual Event ANY gaseo1,.1s*monitor reading>.

Table. R-1. . ".UE" colurnnfor

. ~ 60 min. (Note 2)

Note 2: The ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determinedthat the release duration has exceeded, or will likely exi:;eed; the applicable time. In the absence of

data tc:ithe contrary, assume that the release duration has exceeded the applicable time if an ongoing release is

detected and the _release start time is unknown.

Table R-1 . Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds.

Monitor GE SAE Alert UE Gaseous Radwaste/RB Vent Effluent 5~5E+7 µCi/s 5.5E+6 µCi/s 200 xAlarm 2 xAlarm l\/lain Stack Effluent 1 :oE'.~1 o µCits 1.0E+9 µCi/s 200 x Alarm 2 xAlarm Liquid Service Water Effluent:. *N/A . N/A 200 x DRMS High(red) 2 x DRMS High(red)

Liquid RadWaste Effluent N/A N/A N/A 2 x DRMS High(red)

Cooling Tower Blowciow~ .. . N/A N/A 200 x DRMS High(red) 2 x DRMS High(red)

Mode Applicability:

All

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TEC.HNICALBASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1

Page 43 of 264

. Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

RU1.1 Unus.ual Event (Continued)

Basis:

Plant-Specific.

The value shown for each monitor in Table R-1 is two times the high (red) alarm setpoint for the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (ORMS). The ORMS high (red) alarm setpoints for the listed monitors are conservatively set to ensure ODGM radioactivity release limits are not exceeded (ref. 1).

Instrumentation that may be used to assess .this EAL is listed below (ref. 2):

Radwaste/Reactor Building Vent Effluent Monitoring System

. rilohitor: 2RMS-PNL 180C recorder: 2RMS-RR170/180.

annunciator: 851248

Main Stack Effluent Mor:iitoring System monitor: 2RMS-PNL 170C

.recorder: 2RMS-RR 170/180

annunciator: 851256 A radiation mo'nitor

' ., . ~eading isVAL:fD wheh a release path is estc;ibiished:

If'* the*r~lease path to.the environmeht has been isplated, i~eradiation n19nitdrreading is notVAUDfor ~l.assification.

Generic The Emergericy. Director st:iouid not wait Uhtllthe applit~ble time has elapsed, but should de9lare the event as soon as it is determined t~aqhe :conditlOn \."Jill likely exceed t~e applicable time.

This.EALaddresses ~ pot(3ntial d~creasein the l~vel of saf~ty ofthe plant as indicated by aradioldgital release that e~ceeds regulatory commitments for.an extended period oftinie. .

Nuclear powe(plants incorporate fe*atures intendec(fo co.ntrol the release of radioactive effluents to the

.environrtlerlt. FLirt~er, ~he.re are administrative controls established.to prevent unintentionctl releases, or control andmonitor intentional releases. The occurrence ofe~tended; uncontrolled radioactive releases

**to the enVironment is indicative ofa c:tegradation *ih th~Se features and/or controls.

The 2 x ORMS. (red) multip.les are sp'ecified.only to distinguistfbetw'eeri non~etnergency conditio.ns ..

While these multiples pbviously correS'pc:inct to an off,.-sife* dose or dose rate, tbe emph:asis in classifying .

these events i~:dhe degradation in the leveJ of safety. 'of the plant, not the magnitude ofthe associated dose or dose rate. * * * * * * **

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA*1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1 Page 44 of 264

.**.*. Attachment1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases.(Continued)

RU1 .1 Unus.ual Event (Continued)

. Release~ should not be prorated* or averaged; For exam pl~, a release exceedi~g Ax ODCM for 30 minutes.does not meet the threshold.

a Th.is EAL includes any release for which radioactivity discharge permit was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (for example, minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm setpoints,' and so forth) on the applicable permit ...

This EAL addresses radioactivitY releases, thatfor whatev~r reason, cause effluent radiation monitor

-readings to exceed the threshold identified in the IC.

. This EAL is intended for sites that have established effluent monitoring on non-routine release pathways for which a discharge permitwo'uld not normally be prepared. .

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1.

NMP2 Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual Sections .D,3~ 1.1, D.3.2.1, D.3.3.1, D.3.3.2 2,. N2-0P~79Hadiation fVlonitoringSysteni

3. NEI 99.:.01 ICAU1 *

. 1-,:

' ~ . ,:* .'

.' ~- ..

. .*/.**

. <*-~.: _-

', -~ *.

.:I *'

. UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum.4 Revision 1 *

Page 45 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Le~el Te~hnical Bases* (Contin~ed) ..

Category: R- Abnormal Radiation Levels/ Radiological Effluents**

Subcategory: 1 - Offsite Rad Conditions Initiating Condition: ANY release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment

> 2 times. the ODCM for 60 minutes or longer EAL:

RU1 .2 Unusual° Event . . .

ANY liquid monitor reading> Table R-1 "UE" c()lumn for~ 60*min. (Note 2) *

. Note 2:.

The ED should riotv~1aituntil the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release duration has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time.1.n the absence of data to the contrary, assume thatthe release duration has exeeeded the applieable time if an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown~

Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds

Monitor* . GE *sAE Alert UE.

Gaseous

Raqwaste/RB Vent*. 5:5E+ 7 µCi/s _ 5.5E+6 µCi/s 200 xAlarm ** 2xAlarm Effluent

200.xAlarrri 1.0E+10 µ9i/s 1.0E+9 µCi/s 2 xAlarm Mciin Stack.Effluent .*

Lig~id NIA.: N/A* 200 x ORMS High(red) *2 x ORMS High(red) s~rvice Water.Effluent*

- *.*_NIA N/A N/A *. 2 x DRMS High(red)

Liquid RadWaste Effluent *.

_. . - *. ' N/A N/A . . 200 xORMS High(redf 2 xORMS High(red)

Cooling Tow.er Slowdown l\Jlode Applicability:

AIL

-.,.. -.*c ... ,

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4.

Revision 1

Page 46 of 264, Attachment 1,. Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued) . . .

RU1 ._2 Unusual Event (Continued)

Basis:

Plant-Specific

The value shown- for each monitor in Table R-1 is two times the high (red) alarm setpointfor .

the Digital

~

Radiation Monitoring . ' .

System (ORMS). The ORMS high (red) alarm setpoints for the listed monitors are conservatively setto ensure ODCM radioactivity. release limits are not exceeded (ref. 1).

Instrumentation that may be used to assess this EAL is listed below (ref. 2):

Service Water Effluent Loop A/B RadiatiQn monitor: -2SWP*RE 146A/B recorder: 2SWP*RR 146A/B

-anriun~iator: 851258

_* liq~idEffluent Line *

-- monitor: LWS"'RE206 * '

' __

annunciator: 851258 :

- Coolin~Tower.Blowdown Line

moriitqr: CWS:-RE 157

--__ *ahnfrnciator: 851258

._* *-.-:-, .A radiation- monitor readi~g. isVALID w~ena rel~a~epath is established. If the ~elease path to the

- envi~onment has.been isolated, the :radi.ation monitor mading is' not VALID for ,classification.

Gsneric

Th*e Emergency-Director should not wait until the applitable time has elaps~d, but should declare the *

' event as-so6ri as }fls determinedthaf the con~itiori will likely exceed the applicable time. '

..; ' <-~*.::

_This-12. addre~s~sapotehtial-dedreasein the level ~f safety.of the plantas indicated by a radiologi~al

-* releasethat_exceeps regulatory pommitmenfafor an.*extended period of time, - *- * *- --. * * -

- - *. , -" Nudear powerplants *incorporate features intended fo c9ritr61 the release of radioactive effluent~ to the

- ,__ * --* .*-

envirorin;ient Further, there ar(3 administrative qontr61s established to prevent unintentional releas~s;'or

- . , control c:i"ndmonitorintentionalfoieases~ The occurrence of extended, uncontrolled radioactive reieases t6 the envirol1menfis inditative 6t..adegradatiori

~ . . . ..

in thesefoatures and/or controls. --

. '~ '.

, ..

r'

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4.

Revision 1 Page 47of264

. Attachment 1, Emergency* Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

RU1 .2 (Continued) . .

The 2 x OPCM. limit multiples are specified only to distinguish between non.:.emergency conditions ..

While these multiples obviously correspond to an off-site. dose or dose rate, the emphasis in classifying *

- these eVentS is the degradation in the lew~I of safety of the plant, not the magnitude of the associated

. dose or dose rate. *

Releases should not be prorated or averaged. For example, a release exceeding 4x ODCM for 30 minutes does not meetthe threshold.

This EAUncludes any release for which a radioactivity discharge permit was not prepared, or a release

.* that exceeds the conditions (for example, minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm

. setpoints, and so forth) .on the:applicable permit.

This EAL addresses radioactivity releases, that forwhatever reason, cause effluent radiation monitor

readings to exceed the threshold identified in the EAL established by the radioactivity disGharge permit.

a

.*This .value may be associated with a planned batch relec;ise, or continuous release path.

. NMP2 Basis Reference(s): .

1.. NMP2 Off-SiteDose Calculation Man~al Sections D.3.1.1, D.3.2.1,D.3.3.1, D.3~3.2 2: N2-0P:-79 Radiation Monitoring Sys,tem 3 .. NEl9S-01 ICAU1

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1

. Page 48 of 264 I . ' .

~ttachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continµed)

Category: R . . :. Abnormal Radiation. Levels /Radiological Effluents Subcategory: 1 - Offsite . Rad Conditions .

Initiating Condition: ANY rele~se of gaseous or liquidradloactivity tc:i the environment

> 2 times the ODCM for 60 minutes or longer ..

EAL:

Unusual Event Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous.or liquid releases indicate concentrations or relee1se rates > 2 x ODCM limits for~ 60 min. (Note 2)

Note2: *The E.D should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as itis

determined that the release. duration has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable lime: In the absence of data tqthe contrary, assu111e thatthe release duration has exceeded the applicable time if ari ongoing .release is .

detected and the release start time is unknown.* * *

. : . Mode Applicability: .

A.II Basis: -* ,.__

Plant.:.speCific

. Releases.rn~x~e.ss oft\l\fbtimesthe sitebtrsit~*oose.Qalculati~n Manual (ODCM) (ref.1) *.

instantC1neous limits that conti.nueJ~r 60 rnfnutes or lqnger represent an uncontrolled situation* and:

hence; Cl pot~ri~iai degradation in th~ 1evel ofsafety~The final integre1ted dose (which is .yery low in the 7

Unusual Event .- .

eine~~~ncy .

~lass) .is' not the. primary*concern*

her~; ff is .**the degradation iripl<mt control*.*

\, , .. implied by. thed~ct thafthe release . - was ..

ndtisolated within.

60rni.nutes.

Therefore;-it is_not. intende.c:lJhat the release be ~Veraged_ over60 rriiriut~s_. For(:}xarriple; a release of4 times the ODGM limit for 30

.rninut~s do~s .

~dt, ~~ceed ~his .' .

initla.t:i~g-cdnditi9ri.>Fyrth~r.

the ED should ri~twait until 60 -minutes has .

,elapsed' but sho'uld dedare'. the' event 'as soon as it is determin~d 'that the* release duration has orwill

- . lik~ly exc~ect-~6 minutes.* ,.* . .. . . . . .

. *_.,. ~ ;_ ...

. '.'. ~- . '. *-*-* ..

- . . \

.*...*.. *~- - . *. '* -.

. **. .~ ~ ..

.. ~- ..,

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addend urn 4 Revision 1

- - -Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Page 49 of 264

-_Rli1 .3 ljnuslJal Event (Continued)

GeneriC The Emergency Director should not wait unti_I the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time.

- -This EALaddmsse~ a potential decrease in the level ofsafety of the pla~t as indicated by a radiological release that exceeds- regulatory commitments for an extended period of time. -

Nuclear p9wer plants incorporate features intehded fo control the release of radioactive .effluents to the.

environment:_ Further, there are admin.istrative controis established to prevent unintentional releases, or

. controLarid monitor intentional releases. The occurrence of extended, uncontrolled radioactive releases -

to the erivi~onment is indicative of*~ degradation in th.esefeatures and/or confrols. -

The 2 xODCM limit multiple~arespecifiedonlytodistinguish between non-emergency conditions.-.-

While thesemultiples obviously correspond to an off.,.sitedose or dose rate, the emphasis in classifying these events is the degradation in the level of safety of the plant, not the magnitude of the associated dose or dose rate. -

Release~ should ~ot be prorated~ oraveraged. For exaMple, a release exceeding 4x OD_CM for 30

- - minutes does not meet the-threshold-; :*

This EAL includes any release for Which a radioactivity discharge permit wa-s. not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (forexample, minimuro dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm setpoints; arid so forth) onthe applicable_ p_ermit. -- -

This EAL addresses unconfrolled-- releases'that ~re detected by sample analyses; parti_cularly .on unmdriiforedpath\IVays, e.g., spills of radioactive liquids into stor!Tl drairis,heat exchanger leakage in water sy_stenis, and so forth. * - -

. NMP2 Ba~i~ -Reference(s): * *-**, --.- . __ .* _ _

. NMP2 Off~Site bose Calculation Manual ---- -

2. - NE:1-99,~o1*1c 1\61

- ..* ~ - . -*.

. t ..

. *-~*

.~ ... ;-- .

~-------------~--- ---

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICJ:'TION TECHNICAL BASES EP*AA~1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1

Page so of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Le~el Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: . R - Abnormal Radiation Levels I Radiological Effluents Subcategory: *

2- Onsite Rad Conditions &.. Spent Fuel Events . . .*. .

Initiating Condition:

Damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has resulted or will result *.

in the uncovering of irradiated fuel outside the Reactor Vessel . *

EAL:

RA2.1 Alert Alarm on ANY of the following radiation monitors due to damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water **

level: * * * * *

2RMS~Ri;:111 *

2RMS*RE112

2RMS-RE113

2RMS-RE114

2RMS-RE140

2HVR*RE14A

2HVR*RE14B Mode.Applicability:

All B~sis:***

Plant-Specific .. *.*

- .This* EAL is defined by the sp~Cific areas where irradiated fuel is located such as the reactor cavity, *

. RPv o/sp~nt ~uel Pool. . *. . . . .

The bases for th:e area radiati~n. high alarms.and the ~bove Refuel .Floor HVAC Exhaust* .

. (2HVR;,'RE14A/B)high alarms are a spent fllel handling accident and are, therefore, appropriate for this EAL.

Elevated readings on the ventilation monitors may also be indication of a radioactivity release from the

. fuel, 9onfirmihgthat damage has occurred. However, elevated background at the monitor due to water

level loweringmaymask elevated

~ :

velltllation exhaust

.* . airborne activity and lleedsto . be considered.

. ... : ~: :* -. .*_ ..

~ .. -

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page.51 of.264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

RA2.1 Alert(Continued) ' .

However, while radiation monitors maydetect ' ' . .

a rise in dose

. rate due to a drop* in the water

' *. le~el,.

it. .

might not be a reliable indication of whether or not the fuel is covered~ For example, the monitor could in fact be properly responding to a known event involving transfer or relocation of a source stored in or near the Spent .

Fuel Pool or. responding.to a planned evolution such as removal ofthe RPV .

head.

lnterpretatioh of these EAL thresholds requires some understanding of the actual radiological conditions present in the vicinity of the monitors.

Generic*

. . . . . . ~ .

This EALC1dpresses increases in radiation dose rates within plarit buildings, and may be a precursorto a radioactivity release to: the environment. These events represent a loss of control overradioactive

material.

and. .represent *. .

an . actual. or substantial. potential degradation iri the level of safety of the plant.

. This EAL addresses ra~iation monitor indications of fuel uncovery and/or fuel damage.

. lncreased*ventilation monitor readings may be indication of a radioactivity release from the fuel, *

. * **.. . * . . confirming.that damage has occurred. Increased background at the ventilation monitor due to water

.. . ...* ... level decr~ase may maskincreased Ventilation exhaust airborne activity and needs tobe considered ..

While a radiation lllonitor . could detect an increase in dose rate due to a drop in the water level; itmight

- .not be a reliable indication of whether or not the fuel is covered'. .. . .

**** Es~alation ()fthisemergencycl~ssification RS1 .3, RG1 .1, RG1.2 or.RG1 .3: . .

level, if appropriate, would be based .on RS1.1, RS1 .2, .*..

Ba~iSRefenmce(s):

i_ .

. NiVIP2

1. *.* N2-SOP-39' Refuel. Floo~ Events

. .. ~- . 2 ..*N2'.'.ARP-:-0.1 Annunciator Re~ponse Proc~dµres for annunciator 851254

3. NEI 99-01 IGAA2

. ~* . .. .

c-'. **."*

~:- . , .. *-_ .

..~*.* , .... ,

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4.

Revision 1 Page 52 of 264 Attachment 1, *Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category:* R-Abnormal Radiation Levels I Radiological* Effluents Subcategory: * *. 2 c- Onsite Rad Conditions & Spent Fuel Events Initiating Condition: Damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level ttiat has resulted or will result in the uncovering of irradiated fuel outside the Reactor Vessel.

EAL:.

RA2.2 Alert A w~ter. level dropin a reactor refueling pathway that will result in irradiated 'fuel. becoming uncovered

Mode Applicability:

All

Basis:

Plant-Specific The reactor cavity-_and Spent Fuel Pool comprise the reactorrefli~ling pathway (ref. 1).

. The ~ovenient of i~radiated fuel assemblies requires a minimum water level of 22ft 3 iil. above the RPV flarige I

', and the.top of spent fuel inth.e SFP. During *refueling activities, this maintains sufficient water level in the reactor

. cavity and SFP to retain iodine fission product activity in the water in the ev~nt of a fuel* handling accident (ref. 2, 3).'

.* - ~ *. . . . *. . .

Allowing level to de~rease col)ld res~lt in spent fuel being uncover~d. reducing spent fuel decay heat removal and .

,' c;reating ap extreniely _hazardous radiation environment,,

There is no indication that water level ih the spent fuel pool has dropped to the level of the fuel other than by

vis~al obs~rvation by personnel on the refueling floor. N2-SOP-39, Refuel Floor Events, provides appropriate

. instructions to reporfa visual observatio~ of irradiated .fuel uncovery (ref. 4).

Generic This event represents a loss of control over radioactive material and represents an actual or substantial potential degradation ih the level of safety of the plant.

. Escalation of this-emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on RS1 .1, RS1 .2, RS1 .3, RG1 .1, ._

RG1.2 orRG1.3. * . ,

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1.. USAR Section 9,1.2 *

2. lrhprc:iv~d TeC:h~icaLSpecifications Nirie Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2, 3.7.6 .

3. improved Technical.Specifications Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No; 2, 3.9,E) .

4. N2.:.SOP~39, Refuel Floor Events 5 . NEL99~01 IC M2

UNIT 2.EMERGE:NCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

.*Revision 1 Page -53 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (ConUnued)

.. Category:* R-,-' Abnormal Radiation*Levels I Radiological Effluents.

Subcategory:* 2 -:- Onsite Rad Conditions & Spent Fuel Events

Initiating Condition: UNPLANNED rise in plant ra~iation levels EAL:.

RU2.1 Unusual Event UNPLANNED.water level drop in a reactor refueling pathway as indicated by inability torestore andmaintain SFP level> -low water level alarm (Note 3) * * *

. AND .' ' .. ~

Area radiation monitor reading rise; on ANY of the. following:

. 2RMS-RE111 *

- . 2RMS~RE1 12

. 2RMS~R~1t3

- - * . 2RMS:.RE114 .

..*. 2RMS.:RE140 * .

Note 3,: .. if l9s~ ohvater 1e\le1 in the refueling pathw~y occurs while i~ Mode4; p or D, consider classifie<aUon under .EALs *'

cli:ft CU3.2 or CU3~3 . . . . .* . . . .. . .. . . .. .

Mode Applicability:

AH Bas.is:

.*.*: Plant.:specific .

The reactor ca.vlty-and SpenfF.~etPool(SEJ>,}comprisethe reactor refue_lingpathway (ref: 1).

,* :.(*-:** .- . .' '* ~

1

ttie.SFP i*s.nol"nic:illy filiedto a.lev~l:o(3S2 f(fo* in.'-L.~vel swi1ch.es'~SFC {$5SA ..and~*Baresetat2** ** .

- ~-,. inch~s'belC>~ the normal. W~ter .leyel (or 3S2 ft8 in'.) and atti~ate ~nnun,ciators-87331Tand 875117 in ***

the Control Rbohi. (reL2; 3) *,,.. .. . . *. . . . . - ....

The.phrase."~:(i~ahilityto r$stofe:*~nd'rttaintain level? ...*; *allow~_...the.operator.to:~i~ually obse~e the

~- ' ,*..

10\i\i wa.ter ievel.con_ditiori, ff pos~ible, and to a.tforri-Pt water 1eve1 l'est6ration actions*.as long a~>> water *

- *. levelr~m~in§ aboye,thetop otirr~~iated fuel. Water i~ve*I ~estciration ~-pef~tions*are. perro_rmed, in~

ascordancE3.Wit~)N2:.qP.,38{ref.4}'f* :* *:* .. . . .**.*. , * * ..* . .... -

- ~ .-.

.-.-_~. - -. *.

' -~. - : -~ .- : *.**

. *~.

UNIT 2 EME-RGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA.:.1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 54 of 264

. Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

RU2.1 Unusual Event .

(Continued)

I. - Technical Specifications requires that:.*

SFP water level be maintained 22 ft 3 in. above irradiated fuel seated in the storage racks

.*

d~ring movement of irradi~ted fuel assemblies in the SFP (ref. 5).

_* _RPV water level be maintained 22 ft 3 in. above the top of the RPV flange during movement of

- irradi-ated fuel assemblies in_.the RPV (ref. 6).

The listed Area radiation monitors *are.located in the: proximity of where spent fuel may be located and

. . * ' . I . '

have been .

~~leCted to . .

be indicative of adecrease in' radiation shielding due to decreasing .

refueling pcithway water leveJ (ref. 1). \Nhile a radiation monitor could detect a rise in dose due to a drop in the water level; It might not be a reliable indication; in and ~fitsel(ofwhether or not the fuel is uncovered.

For example,_ t~e-r~ading on a-narea. radiation monitor located on the refuel bridge may rise due to pl~nned ~volutions such as RP\(head lift or a fuel assembly being raised on fuel grapple. Elevated radiation monitor indications willneed to be combined with another indicator(or personnel report) of '

water loss:

This event~$calates to a~ Alert ifir~adiated fuel outsidet~eRPV is uncovered ..

Generic

' This EAL:addres~es increased radiatioirle.vels as a:,result ofwater level decreases above irradiated fuel of events ttiat ha\le 'resulted, or IT.lay resul(in UNPLANNED i'ncreases in -radiation dose rates within.

plant. buildings~ These radiationiricr.ease.s. re pre.sent* a_ loss of ccmtrol over radioa~tive -material and represent a'potentiatdegradatibn in.Me level of_scifetrof the piarit. _* .*_- * -* * --

.-*~ *...

a'

.'. The refueHA~i- pattiwciy is' co*nitiirtc:itior;i pf cavities, tulJes, c~nals and pools. While a radiation monitor could detectariincrease.-iridose rate 'due to a drop in the. water_ level, it-migh(notbe a reliable--

' *-, indication'pf-.whetheror"not_the'fu'eliscove*red;-' * *. * -- * * * -* .* * * * *-

. For r~fuelin~- ~verits where' the wat~r leveLdrops below'the RPV flange classification wo~ld be ~ia EAL CLJ3; 1, ¢u32 or CU3:3. ,This e~~nt escalates to,an Aleff per EAL RA2. l ifirradiated fuel Outside the reacfor vessel is uncovered. For eve_nts. involvipg irradiated.fuel _in the reacte>tvessel, _ escalation wou.ld

.-b~-viathe F'ission ProdudBarri~fJ?blefore\Jentsin operating.-mc:ides 1-4.:*--. -- .*- .. * *

- -- - .' ~

--- ._*. . ' ..~ .

- .. . -*~

.~ ' . '

.. ~: -

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHN!CALBASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1 Page 55 of 264 Attachment 1, Emeraency Action Level Technical Bases* (Continued)

RU2.1 Unusual Event (Continued)

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):.

1. USAR Section 9.1.2

2. N2~ARP-Ot Annunciator Response Proceduresfor annunciator 873317 3.. N2-ARP-01 AnilunciatorR~sponse Procedures for annunciator 875117 .*

4. N2-0P-38 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup. System * . . .

5. Improved Technical Specifications Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, U~it No. 2, 3.7.6 .

6.

Improved Technical Specifications Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2, 3.9.6 *

7. N2~SOP'-39Refuel Floor Events . .

'8 .. NEL99-01 ICAU2

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1*

Page 56 of264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: *. *. R- Radioactivity Release I Area Radiation_

Subcategory: 2 - Onsite Rad Conditions & Spent Fuel Events Initiating Condition: *UNPLANNED rise in plant radiation levels EAL:-

RU2.2 - Unusual Event

.*UNPLANNED area radiation readings rise by a factor of 1,000over NORMAL LEVELS.

Mode Ap_plicability:

. All

.Basis:

Plant~Specific .*.**

Assess~en~ bf this EAL may be made with survey readings using portable instruments as well as

- - - - . ' installed

_*Generic*.-- -

radiati~ri monitors.

. *.-* * *-. _.***-This EALaddresse~ increa~ed radiation level~ as a result of water level decreases above irradiated fuel

_or event~ that have resulted, or may result, in UNPLANNED increases in radiation dose rates within_

plant buildings. These radiation;increases. represent a loss of control over.radioactive material (ind .- **

represenla potential degraC;fatiqniri thelevel ofsafety :of the plant. .- - -

. * ...*. *-*Thi~ EAl.addr~ss~s increases in plantradlatibn levels tbat representa loss of'control of r.adiocictive material res'ultingin a potential degradation iri the levei.of safety of the plant -.*

. This EAL e~dudes radiatidn level increasesthatresult from-plannedactivities s.uch as ~se of - >

.._*-* :radiographic_ soufces *and movement ofradioactive .\Nasfo materic:ils: A specific list ofARMs is not> :

--. * . required as ifwpulq restrict the applicability *of the threshold. The intent is to identify loss of c:bntroLo[ _* .* _ * .

' tadioactive material in any_ monitored area. - ' - ' - - - -- *, -. ', - --

~ *~* .. - . *. -.' .:; . . .' . . . . . . .* .

. . .. -* - NMP2Basis,Referen.ce(s):

1.-. -NEI 99-01JCAU2

. ~- - -.

1*.:.. *."'

' .., . ~

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 57 of 264

. Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: R....:. Abnormal Radiation Levels I Radiological Effluents Subcategory: 3 - CR/CAS Rad Initiating Condition: Rise in radiation levels within the facility that impedes operation of systems required to maintain plant safety functions EAL:

RA3.1 Alert Dose rates > 15 mRerri/hr in EITHER of the following areas requiring continuous occupancy to maintain plant safety functions: '

Control Room OR CAS Mode Applicability:

- AIL Basis:*

Plant.:.Specific

The Control Room and Central Alarm . Station (CAS) must. be continuously

... occupied in all plant

.operating modes at NMP2. CAS is included in this EAL because of its importance to permitting access to areas requir~ to assure saf~ plant operation.

Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) 2RMS-RE129 monitors ra.diatioil levels in the Control Room at 306' elevation. This is one of three Control Building ARMs that actuate Control Room annunciator 851246, CONTROL BLDG AREA RADN MON ACTVATED, giving personnel sufficient warning of changing levels (ref. 1). There is no area radiation monitoring system at NMP2 for the CAS. Abnormal radiation levels may be initially detected by routine radiological surveys.

It is the impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential degradation of the level of safety oftheplant. The cause or magnitude of the increase in radiation levels is not a concern of this EAL. The Emergency Director must consider the *source or cause of the increased radiation levels and

.determine if any~ther EALs may be involved. For example, a dose rate of 15 mRem/hr in the Control

.: Room may be a problem in itself. However, the increase may also be indicative of high dose rates in the primary containment due to a L9CA In the latter case, a Site Area Emergency or a General

. Emergency may be indicated by other EAL categories.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4*

Revision 1

Page 58 of 264

. j.\ttachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)-* .

RA3.1 Alert (Continued)

This EAL could result indeclatatio~ of an Alertat NMP2 du~ to a radioactivity release or radiation shine resulting from a major accident at the NMP1 or JAFNPP. Such a declaration would be appropriate if the increase impairs .

safe plant operation.

This EAL is riorintendedto apply.to anticipated temporary radiation increases due to planned events (for example, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, and so forth).*.

Generic **

This EAL addi-esses increasecj radiation levels that impact continued operation in areas requiring *

continuous 9ccupancyto maintain safe operation pr to pe.tform a safe shutdown; The cause and/~r magnitude ofthe i~crease in radiatibn lev~ls is not coh~em of this EAL. The. a EmergencyDirectqr mustconside.r the source or cause of ~he. increased radiation levels and determine if any other EALm1;1y be invOlved. * * * *

- - - .. . .. -Areas requiring continuous occupancy foci Lide the Control Room and any other control stations that are staffed continuously, such as the-security alarm station CAS.. .

NMP2-BasisrR~fere~ce(s):.

1.- . N2~ARP"'.01: Annun9iatmRespO'nse Proc~dur~s for anlll1neiator 851246

2. NEI 99-011CAA3

. -.:.':~

- . *--~ ..

' . ~"'

U_NIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION*TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA.:.1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 59 of 264

. Attachment 1~ Em~rgency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category H- Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety EAL Group: ANY(EALs in this category:are applicable to any plant condition, hot or .

cold.}

Hazards are non-plant, system-related events that can directly or indirectly affect plant operation, reactor plant safetyorper~cmnelsafety The events ofthis category pertain to the following. subcat~gories:

.

1. NatUral orDestructive Phenomena

Natwal events indude hurricanes; earthquakes or torriados that have potenti~I to cause plant structure. or equipment damage **.* . ,*

ofsuffident rriagnitudetothreaten.personnel . : . or plant safety. Non-*

. **. naturally occurring* events that can cause damageto*planffacilities ahd. include aircraft eras.hes, missile irnpac~s, and s~forth .. ' .

. . .2. FIRE or EXPLOSION'

FIR Es can pose significant haz~rds to personnel ah~ ~eact6r safety: Appropriate tot cl~ssification *

.are FIREswithinthe site PRbTECTED ARE~ o(Which may affectoperabiHty ofequipmerit needed.'

' .. for safe shutdown.

. . . 3. ~ia'za~dous Gas .

Non-naturally occurringeventsthatcan causeid.a111age*fo plant facilities and includ~ toxic;

....

asphykiant,' corr~sive or ffam~able ~as leak~, ....* - . . , '

- . 4: security* :*

. and - .

actual. *. ;

seclidty -

comprol)lise~*threatening; loss o(physic~i control ***,.

of the ..

plant.'.*

, 5. c~ntr61 Roorii Eva~uation ,_*_*:;

'; -. :1::verits.

tbat are indlcati~~ of loss of Control Room hab_itability, -If the _Control Ro9m must'b~

" * * * * ' * * ;" ' * - * *: r ' * ~ ' ~* " * ' * <* * ,. * *' * ; .** * * * * * * * * '." * * * ** * "* ** *

. ***.. *. evac~*afed' additional supportfor monitoring :and' confroll ing plant functiqns' is necessary th rough the '

- .. _: .,.- - . --! - * *, *. '* . .. . ; : .... _- :, , *, .* . . . ' * . . *.. .. '* , .* *- **- ':- ' *.. *, . * . ~

emergehcy response fadlities'.._ .- .......

~

': _v',".*

- - /

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum.4 Revision 1 Page 60 of 264

- - Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases'(Continued).

6. Judgment The EALs defined. in other categories specify the* predetermined symptoms or events that are .

indic~tive of emergency or potential emergency conditions and thus warrant classification~ While these.EALs have,beendeveloped to addressth~full.spectrum of possible emergency conditions

,which maywarrant ~lassific~tio~ and*subsequ~~t implementation of the Emergency Plan,~

.provision for ~lassification bf emergencies bas~d on operator/managem~nt experience and judg~ent is still necessary. The EALs of this category provide the Emergency Direetor the iatitude

, : to classify emer~ency conditions consistent with the established classification criterfa based upon

... EmergehcyDii"ectorjudgment. .*. . . . .* . . . . .

i* .*.**

' *.~- .

~- ~' .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES . . EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 61 of 264.

I*.***:'

AUachment1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases.(Continued)

Category: .*

H- Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcateg()ry: Natural or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition: Natural or destru~tive phenomena affecting VITAL AREAs EAL:

HA1.1 . Alert Seismic ;eyent > 0BE;.(0.075g)

as .indicat~d.byEITHER:

....

Computer Point ERSNC02, OBE Detected.

OR

... ANY amber LED light lit at the Seismic Monitor Panel, Response Spectrum Annunciator * *

AND Earthquake:ccmfirmed by ANY of the following:

Earthquake felt in plant . - . . . . *,._ .. '

. JAFNPP seismic instrumentation

~_ .' .

.* i * ** * ***

ContmlHoorn indication of degraded performance of systems required Jor the

' safe ,shutdown dfthe plant . ' ' ' '

Mode Applicability:

All

- Basis:

Plant~s*pedfic ** * ..

.* ; . ."- ~ This EAL . is based ., . ..

On. the:USAR design bas!~ ope.rating e~rthqu~ke

. . . .. . . .. -~

of 0.07Sg (ref. 1, 2). Seismic ev~~ts ofthis:magnitude,can cause damage to plant ~afety functions,

The mettic)tj

. .. . \:

of~etection relies on. - actuation ofthe

-* - NMP2 seismic monitor OBE .

alarm .

confirmed by one

.*. * < or more indic~fio~s such ;3s shift operators on. di.Jty in the Control Room determining that the ground

'iiloticm *wa$ feit or d~g'r~ded sy~tem perf~f~ance.-

,_ . '" NMP2 ~eisrnicI~strpmentatjon actuates ~t 0.01 g upon s~hsihg any s~ismlc acthtity (ret2):

. NMP1 *'

a~dNMP2sharea comrnori PROTECTED AREAbo'rder, Consid~rationshould be give~ toitw'

- opposit~ unitwh~n classifying u~d$r this EAL

./,. -

.,c * .. <'.:.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision.1 Page 62 of 264

. Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases {Continued)

. HA1.1Alert {Continued)

Generic

'These EALs escalate from HU1 .1 in that the occurrence of the event has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE

. to planfstructure*s or a.reas containing *equipment necessary for a safe shutdown, or has caused damage to the safety systems in those structures evidenced by control rooni indications of degraded

. system response or performance. The occurrence of VISIBLE DAMAGE and/or degraded system response~is intended to discriminate againstlesser events. The initial report should not be interpreted

.. as mandating a lengthy.damage assessment prior to classification. No attempt is inade in this EAL to.*

assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The significance hereis notthat a particular system or structure was damaged, but rather; thaUhe event was of sufficient magnitude to cause this degradation. * * * * *

E&calation of this emergency classification level, if approp~iate, would be based on System Malfunction

- .EALs: .. . . . . . .

Seismic events ofthis magnitude can ~esult i~ a VITAL AR~A being subjected tO forces beyond design 1,

I limits, and thus damage may be assumed to .have occurred to plant safety systems.

NMP2 Sasis Refer:ence{s): .

1. USAR Section 3. 7A.1.1

.2. N2-SOP-90 Natural Events *

"3, *USAR Sectio~ 2:1: 1.1 ***

.A, NEI 99~'011c HA1

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICALBASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 63 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued) .

Category: H - Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 1 - Natural or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting VITAL AREAs EAL:

HA1;2 Alert Tornado striking .

OR Sustained high winds* *> 90 mph resulting in EITHER: .* . . . . . .

VISIBLE0AMAGE to ANY SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURE; SYSTEM or COMPONENT within ANYTable H-1 area-* *

OR Control Rqom *indication of degraded performance of ANY SAFETY"'-RELATED*

STRUCTURE, SYSTEM or COMPONENT withinANY Table H..:1 area

. T~bie H-1 ***

Safe ShOtcJown Areas ** I

- React~r Buildi~g (including Primary Containment)*_

Control Ro-om

.

Diesel Generator Engine and~Board Rooms

- Standby Switchgear and Battery Rooms

.

HPCS SWit9hgea(and _Battery Rooms -

Remote .Shutdow~ Rooms, _.

_*

Confrol_Builqing HYAC. Rqoms-._.*.._

. s~tvice VVater Pump.Room~

Elecptrica(Pr'ot~ction Assembly Rqom

' ' PGCC _Re,l~y ~o9m -

Mode_App_licc:lf?'ility:

All -.**-'

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFiCATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1

. Page 64 of 264 Attachment1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

HA1.2 Al_erf(Continued) ..

Basis:

Plant-Specific .

. All Category 1 structures ~re designed for a wind velocity ~f 90 mph (ref..1). This EAL is based on the

. structural design basis of 90 mph or i~pact by tornado .. Wind loads of this magnitude can cause

. damag.e to safety fu_nctions.

weathe(con~itibns are mo~itored at three locations:.

The 200 foot high Prima~ ORMain Mete~rological Tower locat~d 0.6 miles west-southwest of NMP2

.* .*. The 90 footBackup Tower located ea~t ~f JAFNPP

The 30 foot'lnland~Tower located atthe OswegoCounty.Airport near Fulton Meteorological parc:imeters~ s~ch*as windspeed are sent: to _the Control Rooms and Techriic~ISupport .

Centers (TSC) atNMP1, NMP2,* JAFf\JPP and the Emergency Operations F~cility (EOF). Data from .

sens~rs mounted on .

these

- )

towers.am sent to_* both digital arid analog systemsJor display, processing arid storage: Wind speed and wihd'directiqn, as well as; Wind speed deviation a.nd differential .

temp~r~tures are mqnitored' in NMP2 Control Room ~nd r~corded on strip .ch~rt recorders.: (ref. 2) *

Wi~d spe~d *can bemeasur~g uj:(to tbb mph~ .* * * *

Weather i11formation may be obfainetjJrqm (re( 4): *. .

- . * *-- Nati6rial\NeatherService:f16-565-9001 orabo462:.7751 *.-

'. :. *-.-~--. ' .

- Accu-Weather: 815-'23S-8650or !314~237:.5863 ;* *. - .

The-PROTECTED AREABoundary~is depictedin USA~ F.igure 1.2-1, Plo_f.Plan.. (ref. 3). *

{*.

... . ***. ~ ,*

._ ~ .. , .. - .'

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATl.ON TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 65 of 264 ..

Attachment t, Emergency Action Level Technical .

Bases (Continued) .

HA1 .2 Alert (Continued)

This threshold addresses events that may have resulted in a Safe ShutdownArea being sUbjected to forces beyond design limits and thus damage may be. assumed to have occurred to plant safety systems: Safe Shutdown Areas are areas that house equipm.ent the op~r~tioh bf which may be n~eded .* *

to ensure the reactor safely reaches and is maintained in cold shutdown. Safe Shutdown Areas include structures that contain the.equipment of concern: The Alert classification is appropriate if relevant plant parameters indicate that the performance ofsaf~ty systems in theaffected Safe Shutdown Areas has been degraded. No attempt shouldbe made tofully inventory the actual magnitude of the daniage or *.

quantify*.the ..

degradation of safety .

system .pe~ormance. prior .

to declaration of an Alert under . this threshold.

Table H-1 Safe Shutdown Areas include all structures containin.gCategory I equipment and systems n~eded for.safe shutdown (ref. 5). * .. . . .

NMP.1 andNMP2 share a common PROTECTED AREA-ber-der-; Consideration should be given to the . *.

opposite.unit wh~n classifying under this EAL.*

Generic* .

. . This EAL escalates from H.U 1.2inthat the occurren~e of the event has resulted i'r.1VISIBLE DAMAGE.*

.* to plantsfruetures.or areas containing equipmentneGessary for a safe shutdown, or has caused

.**damage to. the safety systems in those structures evidenced* by control room indications of degraded*.*

-sy~tem.response or performance~ The qccurrence of.VISIBLE DAMAGE arid/or degraded system ...

tesporise is intended to discriminate against lesser events: The initial report should not be interpreted* *

as ml:lndating 1:tlengthy damage.assessment priorto classification. No attempt is made in this.EAL to**

ass~ss the a*cttial*magnitud'? cifthe damage. The significance here is notthat a particular system or

- struch.ire was damaged, buf rather; that the. event was of ~uffiCient magnitude fo cause this ..

degradation. * * * * ** *

f;scalatibn of this emergency classification level, if a*ppropl"iate,-would be .~ased on System Malfunction

~~ . . . .

This EAL is based.on atomadostriking (touching down) or high winds thathave causedVISiBLE DAMAGE to structures containing functions or systems required for sateshutdown of the plant.

NMP2 Basis Reference(s): **

1. USAR Section 3.3.1.1 . * *

. 2. N2~0P'-l02 MeteorologicalMopitoring *

. 3. USARFigure 1:2-1 ...

'* *. ....... .* 4. N2~SOP-64 High Winds -.* ,'

..* * .** 5; USAR 98 and Figure 98-.6-1 *.

. * ... . .**.* ~6. NEl.99:01 IGHA1 ..

~. _;

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES . EP-AA-10.13 Addendum 4. .

Revision 1 Page 66 of 264.

Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical* Bases (Continued)

Category:. H- Hazards and Other.CoriditionsAffecting PlantSafety

Subcategory: *

1 ~ Natural or Destructive Phenomena

. initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting VITAL AREAs EAL:

HA1.3 Alert

.Internal flooding

resulting in EITHER: . -

An electrical shock hazard that precludes access to operate or monitor ANY SAFETY-RELATED STRIJCTURE, SYSTEM or COMPONENT within ANY Table H-1 area

. *o.R

. Control Room indication of degraded. performance of ANY SAFETY-RELATED

.. STRUCTURE, SYSTEM or COMPONENTwithin ANY Table H-1 area .

--1 - Table H.:.1 Safe Shutdown Areas I -.

t~===========.==========_========.======================11

.*. * . Reactor Building (Including Primary Containment)

- - -Control Room

.* Diesel Generator Engine an~B~ard Rooms .

* ~tand~y Switchgear and Battery Booms

- HP-CS-Switchge'ar and Battery-. Rooms

,._' .. - * . Remote Shutdown'Rooms

Control~uilding HVAC Rooms

.... --.,-*- *- _. Service Water Pump_ Rooms

.* _ Electricaiprotection As~embly-ROom

. PG CC.Relay Room ...

.. IV!ode Appli~at>m4:

- All .*-*. __

Basis::

- - Plant-Spetifit- , _.-

of flooding cau~ed compone~t failures/

- - - ~- .* ..

- -- This- threshold . . .

adqresses

. - _ G.irculating; Component Cooling or

~: .

. suppres$iq~ system1 the affect a~tuation, -~nd_outage atti~i-ty mishaps.

by -.infernal events such .as Se~ice \Nater line ruptures, equipmentmisalignment; FIRE

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 67 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

HA1 .3 Alert (Continued),

Table H-1 Safe Shutdown Areas include all structures containing Category I equipment and systems needed for safe shutdown (ref. 1).

Uncontrolled internal flooding that has degraded safety-related equipment or created a safety hazard precluding access necessary for the safe operation or monitoring ofsafety equipment warrants declaration of an Alert.

Generic Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on System Malfunction EALs.

This EAL addresses the effect of internal flooding caused by events such as component failures, equipment misalignment, Or outage activity mishaps. ,It-is based on the degraded performance of systems, or has created industrial safety hazards (for example, electrical shock) that preclude necessary acces-s to operate or monitor safety equipment. The inability to access, operate or monitor safety equipment represents an actual or substantial potential degradation of the level* of safety of the plant.

Flooding as used in this EAL describes a condition where water is entering the room faster than installed equipmentis capable of removal, resulting in a rise of water level within the room.

,Classification of this EAL should not be delayed while corrective actions are being taken to isolate the water source.

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. USAR 98 aild Figure 98.6-1

2. NEI 99-01 IC HA1

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 68 of 264

Attachment 1, Emergency Action. Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category:. . H -- Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 1 ~ Natural or Destructive Phenomena . .

Initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena aff~cting VITAL AREAs EAL:

HA1.4 Alert.

Turbine failure.;generated PROJECTILEs resulting in EITHER:

VISl.BLE DAMAGE to or penetration of ANY SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURE; SYSTEMorCOMPONENTwithiri ANYTableH-1 area .

OR ControlHooni indication of degraded performance of ANY SAFETY-R~LATED

STRUCTURE, SYSTEM Or COMPONENT within ANY Table H-1 area Ta~le H~1 ** .. Safe Shtit~own Areas

.ReactorBuilding (including

*

Control Roor"Tl *

~~irharyContainment) *.

.Diesel Generator Engine ahd Board Rooms.*

- . _St~pdby Switchgear arid. Battery Rooms. * *

HPCS Switchgear and Battery Rooms

. * .*

R~mot~ Shutdo~ri Rooms

..... * * * ' * ~' .. I

. .*. Service yv~ter.Purnp Roofns **: *. *

* *** ElecfricaIProtectlonA~s~mbly Roorri' ~ .. :

- - .

p(3CC.Relqy*Ro()m. . .* . . .

. '~;-

Mode :Applicabi,llty: .*

_All *. .* .

Basis: ..:_.-:..

'1

Plant-Specific '*-' .. -

.. ~ **~*.:

. The! turbln~*g~fi~ratC>~

. ,. .. - Stot~s large_,amounts of f6tationaf kirieti9. energy°rn it~r6tor.

i'n<_the .unlikely. event of a*n~ajor *..

inethanital.failure; this energy rila}ibe transtor~ed into' b~th_rot~tional and transfatic:mal e'nergy bf_rofor . . . *.** .

tra9me~ts: The~e ......

i;a~ments

. *. ~.

m~yirripd6tth'e; ~u~r9 Jncii~~tstatioriary parts . .it_ the en~q:w-a:bso:rbing *~apability .or

, these stationary turbine generator parts is insufficient, external PROJECTILEs will be released: These ejected

, .PROJECTIL'Es ma/impact vario~s pl_an't structUres, i~_cludi~g th()se _ho.using satety relatetj e,quipment. .. * ->*

. . . ~ .;

'1:. .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 69 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

HA1 .4 Alert( Continued) .

Table H-1 Safe Shutdown Are~s include all $tructures containing Category I equipment and systems

. ' * * . . l .

needed for safe shutdown (ref. 1).

Generic*

. This EALescalates from.HU1 .4inthat the occumm~e of the event has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to plant structures or areas containing equipment necessary for a safe shutdown, or has cai:.ised damage to the safety systems in those structures evidenced by control room indications of degraded

-system response or performance .. the occurrence of VISIBLE DAMAGE and/or degraded system

', response Is intended to discriminate against lesser events: The initial report should. not be interpreted as mandating* a lengthy damage .*assessment prior to classification. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess th.e actual rnagnitud.e ofthe damage. The significance here is not that a particular system or structure was damaged, but rather, that the event Was of sufficient magnitude to cause this degradation*. * * * * * * *

Escalation of this ernergency cl~ssificiatiori level,* if appropriate; would be based on System Malfunction EALs. . . . . . . .. . .*

- - This EAL addresses the th-reat.to safety related equipment imposed by PROJECTILEs gen~rated by .

main turbir:le rotating component failures. Therefore, this EAL is.consistent withJhe definition of an Alert*

inJhatthe potential exists for actual or 'substantial potential degradation ofthe level of safety .of the plant. * * * * * * *

NMP2 Ba~is.*Reference(s): .

. 1 .. USAR9B and. Fig~re 9B.6.cf ...

2. NEI 99-0f IC:HA1 : *. : :_' * .

~ .. ' ...

. ..... ~ .

. ~ *. *... :. '

. .: ~ . .

~ " .. . : -:.

. -* { *- . .. . ' ...: ~

..... '.~ *:,.

~:.' ..

.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-.1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 70 of 264

- - - - Attachment 1, ErT1ergency Action.Level Technical Bases (Continued)

.* ~ . . .

Category: ..* H ,.._ Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 1- Natural or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting VITAL AREAs _

. EAL:

HA1.5

.**Alert Lake water level > 254 ft OR Intake water level< 233 ft 1V1ode Applicability:

All Basis:

Plant-Specific *.

This threshold covers high and lowwater level conditions that may have result~d in a plant VITAL

AREA being subjected to levels beyond design limits, and thus damag~ m~y .be assumed to have

occurredtoplantsafety systems.

Tt:ie high.. *lake l~vel is:based upon .the'maxim~m probable flood level (ref: .1);

- The lowloreba*y water level' c~rr~spo~ds to the minimum intake *bay water level which provides

. adequate submergence to the.service water pumps (reL 2, 3).

I.

Generic _

- This EAL addresse~ other site specific phenomena that result in VISIBLE DAMAGE to VITAL AREAs or -

results in indication of damage to SAFETY STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS*, or COMPONENTS containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant that can also be precursors of more*

serious events~ ' ' ' '

NMP2-Basis Reference(s):

.*.. -. 1..

USAFfSectiqn 2A.5.2. -*. *

-2. USAR Section 2A.1.1 . _ .

3. USAR Section 92:5.3.1 *

. 4. N2-osP~LOG~vvoo1,-we~kly Cheqks .

NEL99.'.01 re HA1 - ' '

.. ** ..., . .***,.. -.*.1 .

~ ....

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4. .

Revision 1

. Category: **

.. Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

H-Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Page 71 of 264 Subcategory: 1 ,.._Natural* or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition:

Natural or destructive phenomena affecting VITAL AREAs EAL:**

HA1.6 Alert

.Vehicle crash resulting in EITHER: * . . .

-., - ,.* ..*. VISIBLE.DAMAGE toANY SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURE, SYSTEM or COMPONENT within ANYTable H-1 area*

OR Control Room indication of degraded performance of ANY SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURE, SYSTEM orCOMPONENTwithin ANY Table H-1 area . . . .

Table H-1 Safe Shutdown Areas

Reactor Building (ineludihg Primary. Containment)

- - - >.*..*~*.* .* . .

Control Room I.**

Oiesel Generator Engine and Board Rooms

.* .Standby Switchgear and Battery* Rooms*

. *

HPC$ Switchgear and Battery Rooms *. ,

.I

- . Remote Shutdown Rooms*

.* , Control Building HVACRO()mS , . ,

~ :.. . *.

Service Water. Pump Roqms

Electrical Protection Assembly Room

PGCC Relay Rbom .

. . -- . *. :~ '

. l'Jlod~ Applicabi.iity~

>:*" All*;

, * .** B.asis:

Plant-Spetific

'** .**.*. . This EAL 'is intended to address. **:crashes of-* vehide types la~ge enough to*. cause significant damage.; ..to

- - pl aht structures cpritaining functi()ns ar:i~ sy~tems .required for safe shutdown of the plant. Vehicle types

', 'e. /: : *.

- *** . ' ; ,, .*.. *.- indude autgfnobile's, aircraft, trucks, ~cranes,Jorklifts, *waterborne Crqft; and SO fort~, .

T9blE! H~:1, ~afe s8,utciow~ Are~s include ~Ir Slrlj<:;tures ccfqtaining Gategciry I equipment and systel'l1s

. < rieededfor safe stiutdowri(ref.1}

.. **- *~ . . . .. -

. . . -* ~

.,. .- .. o:.-*

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 72 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

HA1 .6 Alert

. . (Continued)

Generic

.The occurrence of VISIBLE DAMAGE and/or degraded system response is intended to discriminate against lesser events. The initial report should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess.the actual magnitude ofthe damage. The significance here is not that a particular. system or structure was damaged, bu.t rather, that the _event was of sufficient magnitude to cause this degradation.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on System Malfunction EALs. . . . .

.This EAL addresses vehicle cr~shes within thePROTECTED AREA that results in VISIBLE DAMAGE to VITAL AREAs or indication of damage to SAFETY STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, .or COMPONENTS

containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant.

. NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. USAR 9B *and Figure 9a .6-1 2 .. NEI 99-01 iCHA1

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 73 of 264

Category:

Attachment 1, Emergency-Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

H - Hazards and Oth~r Conditions. Affecting Plant Safety -

Subcategory: 1 ....:. Natural or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting the PROTECTED AREA EAL:

. Unusual

. .Event Seismic event identified by ANY two of the following:

Annu~ci~tor 842121 SEISMICACCELERATION EXCEEDED indicates seismic event detected

- * . Confirn1ation bfearthquakereceived on NMP-1 or JAFNPP seismic instrumentation

* - -* Earthquake felt in plant -

Mode Applipabll!ty: - -

All -

Basis:*_

Piant-Specific TheNMP2seismic instrument~tion actuate~ at 0;01 g causing (ref 1-4):

- Powertci remote acce_lerations~nsor units-_-__ -.

:Activation ofMRS1 recio'rder~

---- EVENTalarmHghf on PvVRS1. t~Iight_ ._ -*. - :: . . . . ' . **,*...

- -.- EVENTINDICATOR on PWRS_1 to turnfroili black t6:wtl'ite

,:*. . -, *{*..

- '.- . .. . . .- . - '.: ~-. - :* : .

- :,Anrlunciatqr 8421_21on panel 2~EC-PNL84~Jo be_feceived *

< :. . *_*..~: ..

Anm1ndator a4g121 provicjes the mosFdirect)ndi?ationin the Control Roomttiat a seismic eventh~s occur~ed. The-EVENT ~l~rrn .. : .- . . . . . . ,.. .

ligtlrand EVENT *.\NDICATORare. located ~n 2CES-Pf\JL889 in. the mlay room(ref.--4). .;

Qthermeth6ds *are-ihdit:aHon-received fromJ~MP~-1.

br:JAFNPP**instrumentation.-

Evaluf:itiorf ofthe magnitude oithe eventwill require evaluation dt data reccmied-bythe $eismit - * .

Monitorihg.R$corq(3r~.

*:-*:*: NMP1, and_NMP;tshare acorj,mon-.PROTECTEP AREA_qordef.. bonsideratibh ~houlcfbe giJ~~ to the -.

' oppositeunitwti'en dass,ifyingunder:this-~f\L_ .' .: ~-

.. ~ :

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA~1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 74 of 264

. Attachment.1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases,( Continued)

HU1.1 U"."usu~I Event (Continued)

Generic This EAL is. categorized on the. basis of the occurrence of an event of sufficient magnitude to be of coricem to plant 'operators; Damage may be caused'.to some portions of the site, but should not affect ability of safety functions to operate ..** * * * * * * * *

. As defined in the EPRl-sponso~ed Gui,delines for Nuclear Plant Response t6 an Earthquake, dated Octobe(t989, a telt earthquake" is: An earthqu~ke of sufficient intensity such that: (a) the vibratory

ground motion is felt at the nuciear p!ant site ahdrecognized as an earthquake based on a consensus of control' room opE3rators on duty at the time, and (b) for plants with operable seismic instrumentation, the seismi'c switches of the plant are activated.

NIViP2 Basis Refer~nce(s):

1. USAR Sectioh *3. 7 ~ .. -

2 ..*Technical Requirements Manual Section 3.3.7.2 .*

3. N2-0P-90 Seismic Monifor * .

- - . 4; . N2-SOP-90 Natural Events**

s: USAR Section 2;1.1.1 6~ . NEI 99-01 IC HU1.

': . ~ --

.- , . ~ . - ' :..... .. *~ ~.

. .' - . ,; **-~ .

I I

~ : . ' . >;

' . *. ~. . --. -... - ' . . .:

~ : . : . *- ... :_*____ .:...-*

-.:*,< '* .-5-.

UNIT 2EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICALBASES EP-AA-.1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 75 of 264

. ** *. . Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)*

Category: H - Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety .

Subcategory:* 1 .,... Natural or Destructive Phenomena*

Initiating.Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting the PROTECTED AREA EAL:

HU1.2. Unusual .

Event . . . ' '

T omadb- striking within PROTECTED, AREA boundary OR Sustained high winds > 90 mph.* **

.*.. ; Mode Applicability: .

All

- Basis:

Plant...Specific

All Category 1 safe shutdown struCtures are designedfor a wind velocitY of 90 mph, 30 feet above *

- . ground using a gust factor of 1.1 (ref. 1). . . .* .

Vveather:co~ditions are monito'r~d at three l,ocations:*

The 200 foot high Primary OFHvtain Meteorological Tower located0:6 miles west- .--*

. *.:---: *.*.southwest of NMP2 *. . .

- The.90foot Backup T6werlocatedeast-of JAFNPP

The 30footl~landTower lbcated ~Hile Oswego County ~irport near Fulton

. .. Meteorologlcal parameter~ such. as wind ~peed are sent to the Control Rooms and Technical. Support

.*Centers (TSC) at NMP1, NMP2, JAFNPPand theEmergen.cy . ,. . Operations Facility (EOF). Data .

from sensors mounted .

on these towers are .

sent- to both digital ..

and analog systems for display,- processing and storage. Wind speed and wind direction, as well as wind speed deviatibn and differential temperatures. are monitored .

in. NMP2Control Roomand.recorded .

on

. strip chart recorders. (ref. 2).

.*. Wind spee9 can be measured t.1pfo 100 rnph.

Weather Information may be obta,iried *from (ref. 3): .

.. * . National Weather $ervice: 116~565-9001 or 800-462~7751 *

Accu-we~thet: a1s-23s.:86s6 ~r/: a14-231.:.sao:3 ~ ., ' -

-- ... - -~--

..._ ~ . -

. *_- __ * .. ' :~ -

~ .-

- ' *.:_._:_*: - : :~ '*

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONTECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 76 of 264_ *

- - - - *

A~tachment 1; Em.ergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)*

HU1 .2Unusual Event (Continued)

- ' .. NMP1 and NMP2 share a common PROTECTED AREA bordeL Consideration should be given to the opposite unit when classifying under this EAL.

Generic This EALis categorized on the basis of the occurrence.of an event of sufficient magnitude to be of ..*

concern to plant operators ..

Thi_s EAL.is based on a tornado striking (touching down) or high winds within the PROTECTED AREA of

. _ Escalation this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on VISIBLE DAMAGE, or by otherin plant.conditions, via EAL HA 1.2.

-- NMP2 Basis Reference(s): .

.* 1, USAR -

Section . .,

3~3.1.1. .

2. N2'."0P~to2 Meteorological Monitoring

3. N2.-SOP°"9o Natural Events -* *

. 4 .. NEI 99-:01. IC HU1

... _ ; *--~. ,* '*._.

.. <** '. . . ~,. *~- ** c . * . *.. ,,: _

.... --~ .

-.J:: *.;*-.* *

.. . ~

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 77 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category:* *. H - Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory:* :1 . .,. .:Natural or Destructive Phenomena ..

Initiating Condition: , Natural or destructive phenomena affecting the PROTECTED AREA

.EAL:

HU1.3 Unusual Event Internal flooding thathas the potential to affect ANY SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURE, SYSTEM or COMPONENT required by Technical Specifications forttie current operating mode in ANYTa.ble H,.1 area Table H-1 Safe Shutdown Areas

Reactor Building (including Primary* Containment)

: Control Room

Diesel Generator Engine and Board Rooms

. Standby Switchgear and Battery Rooms

HPCS Switchgear and Battery Rooms

..* Remote Shutdown Rooms Control Building HVAC Rooms

Service Water Pu~p Rooms .**

. Electrical Protection Assembly Room .

PGCC 13.elay Room Mode Applicability:

.All Basis:

Plant-Specific This threshold addresses the affect of flooding caused by internal events such as component failures, Circulating, Componer;it Cooling or Service Water line ruptures, equipment misalignment, FIRE suppression system actuation, and outag~ activi~~ mishaps.

TablE) H-1 Safe ShUtdown Areas include all structures containing Category I equipment and systems needed for .

c * - , : *" -.' ~- ** * *'

safe shutdown (ref. 1).

.*. Flooding a~ usedh.this EAL describes .a cqndition where water is entering the room faster than installed .

. equipment Is capable of removal, resulting iD a rise *of water.level within the room. Classification of this EAL-.

should not be dE)lay{3d while corrective actions are being taken to isolate the water source:

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1*

Page 78 of 264 Attc:tchment 1, E*mergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

HU1 .3 Unusual Event (Continued) __

Generic This EAL is categorized on the basis of the occurrence of an event of sufficient magnitude to be of concern.to plarit operators.

This EAL addresses the effect of internal flooding caused by events such as component failures, equipment misalignment, cir outage activity mishaps.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based VISIBLE DAMAGE via EAL HA 1 ~3. or by other plant conditions. , - - - -

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. USAR 9B arid Figure 9B.6-1

2. NEI 99-01 IC HU1 -

~ *- -.

~- . . .. : ~*: .

' .1. ** *

'.,:H

..... ~ :_ . ' ..

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA.;1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 79 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: .* . H - Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 1 ...:. Natural or Destructive Phenomena Initiating Condition:

Natural or destructive phenomena affecting the PROTECTED AREA EAL:

HU1.4 Unusual Event Turbine f~il~re resulting in ANY 6f the* following:

Ccising penetration

-*.

Damage to turbine seals

_ Damage to generator seals Mode Applicability:*

All

. Basis:*. -

Plant;.Specific The turbille generatorstbre~iarge a~ounts ofrotatkmal kinetic energy in* it~ rotor. In the unlikely ev~nt of a _major-m~chahical failure, this ener,gymay be tran~formed into both**-.'

. rotation~t~nd translational en~rgy qf,rotor fragnients.-These fragments tnay impact the:

surroundrng.stationary parts. If the,e.nergy-absorbing capability of these stationary turbine -

generator parts is 'fr1sufficient; ~.XternaLPROJECTILE~ will be released~ These ejected.

' * * * *

r : '* * - *~* c :. - '. * : *

PROJECTILEs may impa_ct vario'u~ -pian(~fru9tur*e;~;;lr{diuding those* tiousing safety related

.; *.~

. _ equipment;:_ " * - -.*. . :_...*. *.... *,

1n the evenrof PROJECfil..Eejeqtibh, theptobability of a *strike onaplantregionisafunction

of the en~r~y and directi~n_ofan,ej~cted PROJECtlU~ and of the orientation of the turbine _*

with* respectto the picint region .

~** . ;, '

. Failure offorbine c)r gell~rafor $eals,ri1ay be-indicate~ by a loss-ofsEi8.l 6ilpressure or toss of

. *.,. ** : .. *. *I. . :. . * . ' :; . *-: *' .. . . ,*.. :. . ~

c. * .

_cond~nservacui:lm (ref:2, 3):'* * -' * - __ --

' .'.'. **. *~ ..

_ I_ ..

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 80 of 264

- - Attachment. 1, Emergenc}' Action Level Technical Bases (Continued}

H01.4 Unusual Event (Continued}

Generic These EALs are categorized on the, basis of the occurrence of an event of sufficient magnitude to be of concernto plant operators. *

This EAL addresses main*turbine* rotating component failures of sufficient magnitude to cause obser\table damage to the turbine casing or to the seals olthe turbine generator.. Generator seal** .

damage observed after generator purge does not *rneet the intent of this* EAL because it did not impact:

normal operation of the plant. * * *

Of major concern is the potential fo-r leakage of combustible fluids (lubricating oils) and gases .

(hydrogen cooling) to the plant environs. Actual Fl RES and flammable gas build. up are appropriately classified via EAL HU2.1 andEAL HU3.1. . .

This E:AL is consistent with the definition of a UE while maintaining the antiCipafory nature desired and

' recognizing the risk to non-safety related equipment. ' ' '

- . Esc~lation

. NMP2 _Basis of this emergency classification level,. if appropriate, would. be to EAL HA 1.4 based on : .

- damage.done by.PROJECTILES generated by the failu_re or inconjunction:with a.steam generator tube rupture. These latter. events Refe.rence(s}:.

.would

. . be classified by the Category R EALs or Category F EALs.

1. N2-op:.2fMain T_urbine sy~tem

_2:

N2.;SQP-21 Turbine Trip- * . . .* .. . . . ......

3. ,N2-ARP~01 Armunciator Respohse Procedures for annunciator 851102

4. N2-ARP-Of Annunciator Response Procedures for armi.mciator 851140 5** N2,.SOP-09 Loss ofCondeilserVacuum

6. NEI 99~01 ICHU1 '

.:.1.

1 . . . . . -:

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 .

Revision 1

Page 81of264, Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases {Continued)

Categor}':

H- Hazards and Other Cohditicms Affecting Plant Safety*

. Subcategory: 1 - Natural or Destructive Phenomena .*

Initiating Condition: Natural or destructive phenomena affecting the PROTECTED AREA

EAL:*

.HU1.5 Unusual Event L~kewater level> 249~3 .ft OR Intake Weiter level< 237 ft

.* ModeApplic~ll,ility:

All Basis:*.. *.*

.*Piant-Specific****

:. This thresholdaddresses high and low lake water level conditions that could be a precursor of more serious events .

.*The high *lake l~vel is based upon the maximum_ attainable uncontrolled lake water lev.el as specified in the US,L\R.

'Da!Jls on t~e St. :Lawre,nce :River, un_der the authority of the International. St. Lawrence River Board of Cont~ol, are

- *now used to reg~late the lake level. The low limit is set for el 74.37 m (244 ft) on Aprii 1 and is maint~ined at 0r <

aboveth(3t eleyation during th~ e~tire navigation .season (April 1to Nove,mbe~ 30). The upper limit of the lake.

l.¢~el is el.7S.~8 m (249.3 ft)*(re,f. .1 ). . . . . . .

, . The: low level is based on iht~ke' water l~vel and corresponds to the design mini~u~ lake level. The probaple:

rilinimurn l~wwaterJevel of LakeOntariti at the.site h~s been d~termined to be 72.0 rn{236.3 ~) re~ultihg from a .

.. ~etdown capsed byaProbableMaximu.m Wind ~torm concurreritwiththe lowestpfobable lake level. (ref: 2)

Generic i ** * . * *.This EAL is _categ0rized *on the basis of the occurrence of all event of sufficient magnitude to be ofconcern t9 .

I *p1arit operators;. * * * * * ..

Thi.s EAL addresse~

other site specific phenom_ena ihat can _aiso be precursors ofmore serious events.

NMP2 Basis:.Refer~nce(s):

1: USAR Sectio~ 2.4.'1.. 2 .

USA~ Section 2'..4.11.2,,

,~* ~:-

,, ~:;.

' '*' N2-0_SP-LOG-W001,...... Weekly Checks

4. NEI 99~.01 IC HU1

. :- ~ *:: :** ...

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 82 of 264

* ** * ** 1 ** * *

AttachmEmt 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases {Continued)

. Categor}i: .

H - Hazards .

and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory: *. Z- FIRE or EXPLOSION .

Initiating Condition:

FIRE or EXPLOSION affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown

EAL:

l-IA2. 1 . . Alert

. Fl RE or EXPLQSION .

resulting in EITHER: . * * * . . . .

VISIBLE DAMAGE to ANY SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURE, SYSTEM or COMPONENT.

within ANY Table H-1 area OR.

Cont.re.I Room indication of degraded performance of ANY SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURE, SYSTEM or COMPONENT within.ANY Table H-1 area . . . .

- Table*H;.1 Safe Shutdown Areas

*

Reactor Building (including Primary Containment) _*

J

Control.*Room

. Die~el Generator Engine and. Board Rooms

. Standby Switchgear and Battery Rooms

- * .. HPCS .

Switchge~r and B~ttei-y Roo~s *

_* Remote Shutdown Rooms

.*Control Building HVAC Roonis

*. * . 9ervice Water Pump Rooms

.

Electrical Proteetion Assembly Room

.* PGCC Relay Room

.Mode Applicability:

All Basis:* ..

Plant~Specifi6.

~ Tabl~ H-1°S.afe:stiutdown Areas. include all structures containing Categqry I equipmentand systems

.* n~~ded for safe shut~own (ref. 1).. : . . . . .

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 R.evision 1 Page 83 of 264

. ~ttachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued}

HA2.1' Alert (Continued} *

Generic . . , . - . . . .

VISIBLE DAMAGE is used tQ identify the magnitude Of ttie FIRE or.EXPLOSION and to discriminate against minor FIHEs and EXPLOSIONs.

The reference to structures containing. safety systems or c.ompoilents is included to discriminate against FIREs or EXPLOSIONs in areas having a low probability. of affecting safe Operation. The significance here is not that a safety system was degraded but the fact that the FIRE or EXPLOSION was large enoughto cause damage to these systems. . .. .

The ~se of \/ISl13LE DAMAGE should not be interpreted as mandating lengthy dainage assessment a prior to Classification. The c::leclaratiori of an Alert and the activation of the Technical Support Center will provide the Emergency Director with. the resource~needed to. perform detailed damage _assessments.

'The E~erge~cy'Director also need~ to consider any security asp~cts of. the EXPLOSION.

~f ~his:emergency classification level, if appropriate, will be based on EALs in Cat~gory S, Escalation

. Category For Category R *.

.NMP2Basis Reference(s}:

1.. lJSAR9Band~USAR.Figure 9B:6:-l.

2, . NEI gg~Q1:1C HA£ **. . - _, .*

... ; *.. *'*.*._-- *: . *.' . : . *. . ~ .

. *;*. : ... =.*

. . . '. : - *--~* . . *_*.*:_***. -

I - ,_* _'..*,*:* *'

. . -. . **: ~-~'- *.*_* ' . *., ..

I **

I *: ...... ,:. . '. *-:.**

. . -~

.. ' . -,~ .

,** .'{*

' .. '...*** '; . . .* ~ .*.

- -~* ..

.~* *.

~- ~- ..

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA;.1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 84 of 264 Attachment1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category:.* .*. H 7 Haza,rdsancj .*Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety .

Subcategory: . 2 - FIRE or EXPLOSION.

Initiating Condition: *. FIREwithiq. the PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 15 min. of detection or EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA .

'EAL:

HU2A Unusual Event

.*FIRE m:>i extinguished within 15rniri. ofControl Room notification or verification of a Control: Room FIRE alarmih ANY Table H-1 area or Turbine Building (Note 4)

Note 4:

Th~ ED ~hould not wait until the ~pplicable time has elapsed, but should declare.the event as soon as it is det13rinined that the condiUoii' has exceeded, or will likely exceed~ .the applicable time.

Table H-1

S~fe Shµtdown Areas

.Reactor.Build_ing (inciudingPrimary Containment)

Control Room Diesel.Generator Engine-and Bqard Rooms*.

Standby ~witchgear a~*ci Batt~ry Robms . *

*HPCS Switchg~ar and BatterfRooms .*

. Remote. Shutdo~ri . i*

Rooms

. Control

-. . Building HVAC .Room.s ' ' . **. -

*.* Ser-Vice* Water.Pump Rooms *.*.

Electricpi Protectibn As~eml:?ly Room

-** PG.CCRE}lay-Rdo~*:. *. :.--- . .. --

-Mode:Appli¢ability: .:*::_.:_. ;* **. ':

All Ba$-is: , ..'*'."

Plant-SbeCific Taole H~1 .*Safe Shutdown Areas lrid~de all *stwCtures 2ontainin'g Category I.equipment and-systeni$

n~eded for: safe shutd~wrr(re( 1}/f h~ Turbi11e ,~~il~in~ i~ included becguse it:-i!) immediately a9jacent

-tcrone or more Tabie H-'_1 areas and a F'.I RE 'within .the Turbine' Building ITlaypot~ritiQlly _impact safe

._ ~hutd6V\f~ eqSiprti~rit-~h:ould th9. ~l'E ~ot**b~'.cont_rolled; > ; -, **: : , - - _ <. -

-.i *'

UNIT 2EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 85 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases(Continued)

HU2.1 Unusual Event (Continued)

Generic

. This EAL addresses the magnitud~ and extent of FIREs t.hat may be potentially significa~t precursors of .

damage to safe:ltY systems. It addresses .the FIRE; and not the degradation in performance of affected systems that may result. . . .

As used here, detection is visual observation* and 'either report by plant personnel or sensor alarm *.

indication, * ** * * ** *

.The 15 minute tfrne period begins w.ith a credible nbtificatic:>n that aFIRE i~occurring, or indication of.a*.*

' FIRE detection system.alarm/actuation. Verification.of a FIREdetec.tionsystem alarm/actuation .

includes actions that can betaken within the control room or other nearby site specific location to ensure thatit is not spurious. An*alarm is assumed to be an*indication of a.FIRE unless it is disproved

withi.n the 15 minute period by personnel dispatched to the scene. In other words, a personnel report a

from the scene may be used to disprove sensor alarm if.received within 15 minutes the alarm, but . of

. shall not be required to verify the alarm. * ** *

.. * : Th~ intent of this 15 minute duration is to size t.heFIRE and to discriminate ~gainst small FIREs that

.are readily extinguished (for example; smoldering waste paper basket):

. NMP2 Basis RefE!rence(s): .

... 1. : U.SAR. 98 and Figure 98.6~1 2... NEI 99'.:.Qt IC HU2 .

I~.

.* ~ '<**:

1***

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFIGATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4.

Revision 1 Page 86 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: H, __:Hazards and. Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety .*

Subcategory: 2...:. FIRE or EXPLOSION Initiating Condition: . FIRE within the PROTECTED.AREA not extinguished within 15 min. of detection or EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA. .

EAL:

HU2~2 Unusual Event*.

. EXPLOSION of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment within the

PROTECTED AREA Mode_Applicability:

All

- .. Basis:**

Plant-Specific

.... While some E:XPLOSIONs may alsoresultin FIREs thatexceed EAL HU2.1, no FIRE is necessary to.

deciarean emergency in the event of an EXPLOSION. lfa FIRE also occurs asa resultor with: an_' .

.*.*.* EXPLOSION,' decl~re the l)nusual Event based on the EXPLOSION and monitor the progress oftlle

.

FIRE . '

for potential

~scalationdue to FIRE damag~ .

1 . . '

.NMP1 arid NMP2 share acommon PROTECTED AREA border.* NMP1 and NMP2 PROTECTED

, ,AREA boundari~s are illUstrated:in lJSAR Figure ;1.2-1' (ref. 1).

Generic .. *

-_ ;:. ~- *- . This _EAL addr~sses the magnitude and extent of EXPLOSIONs that may be potentially significant precursors o(.

damage to safety systems. It addresses thei'EXPLOSION, and not the degradatiqnJri performance of affected

. *systems th~t may re9ult . . . .. . . . . . .* .

~dqresses e*quipm~~(

.. ":- ,*,

This EAL only those EXPLOSIONs ofsl.lfficientforce to damage permaneritstructures or .*

'* * .. *.

within the PROTECTED AREA. . .. . .* .

_No ~ttempt is made to assess the actualtnagnitude of the da~age. The occurrence of the EXPLOSION .is sufficient for declaration. * * * * * * *

The Enie.rge~cy.direCtor also needs to consider.any security aspects ofthe EXPLosfr:>N, if applicable:

,

c ~*

- Escalatio~qfthis;emergency classification ;level,.if appropriate, would be. based on EAL H!l;2.1.

I -. " . . ' *. . * . .

N:MP~ B~~i~ ~~fer!n~~(s );

0

. * /_::' .*

. ...... f .* USAR, Fi.gureJ:2-1 . *-::* . ..:*,

'. ** . 2 .. NB gg201 -IC HU2 ,.

. . . . ~- \

. */

UNIT.2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES. EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision .1 Page 87 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: * ;H .:... Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory:

3 - Hazardous Gas

Initiating Condition:.* Access to.a VITAL AREA is prohibited due to toxic, corrosive, asphyxiantor flammable gases which jeopardize operation of operable equipment required to maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the .

reactor

. EAL:

. HA3.1 ***~1ert Access toANYTable H-1 area is prohibited*due.to toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases which jeopardize operation of systernsrequired to maintain safe

. operations or safely ~hutdown the reactor (Note 5) * *

. If the equipment in fhe ~tated area was already in6p~rable, or out of service, before the event occurred, then EAL .

Note 5:

. HA3.1 should not be declared as it will liave no adverse impact on the ability of the plant to safely operate or safely shutdown beyond that already allowed by Technical Specifications at the .time of the event.

I Table H-1 . Safe Shutdown Areas

R~cictor _Building (including Primary Contairiment) .*

. Control Room

. * .Diesel Generator Engine. and BoardRooms

- * **.Standby Switchgear and Battery Rooms

* .. HPCS Switchgear. and Battery Rooms

.* Remote ShutdmNn Rooms

Control Building HVAC Rooms

Service Water Pump Rooms

Electrical Protection Assembly Room

PGCC Relay Room Mode AplJIJcal;>ili!y: *

All

~... -.... ,, ..

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1*

Page* 88 of 264

. Att_achment 1, Emergency Action Level Techriical Bases (Continued)

HA3~ 1 Ale.rt (Continued) .

Basis:

Plant-Specific .*

table H~1 Safe Shutdown Areas include all structures containing Category I equipment and systems needed for safe shutdown (ref. 1). *

For areas thatcontain no safety-related structure, system cir componentthatwould potentially be required to be operated or for which the.structure, system or coi:nporient was already out of sen/ice or inoperable before the event; this EAL would not be applicable. . . . . .

For purposes this EAL,* ariy gas {C02 included) is ~onsidered toxic when oxygen concentrations in bf the affected areas have been or could. be expected to be reduced to <19.5% or toxicity of the gas will be injurious to persons inhaling it For discharges of Halon, NM P's systems are designed for discharge concentration from 5% up to 6~5%.Jn accordance with NFPA 12 A, Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Systems; exposures to levels ofup.to 7% produce little ifcmy noti~eable effect (ref. 2).

Generic

.Gases in a.S~fe S.hu!down AREA ~an affe~t the ability to safely operate or safely shutdo_wn the reactor..

The fact that SGBA may be worn does not .eliminat~ the need to d~clare the event.

Declaration.st:lould not be delayed.for confirrnation frolll atmospheric testing iftheatlTlosphere poses an immediate* threat tp.llf9 and health or an Immediate threatofse~ere exposure to .gases: *This.could .* .*. .

be based upC>rt documente(j analYs.is, fndication of p~rsonal ill effectS. from exposi.fre, or operating .

. . experience with the hazards.* . . .* . . . .. . . . . . .,

. If the equipment inthe stated area*was already Inoper~ble,*or oufof service; before the event occurred,

. . ..**. *. tt1en this E;AL should not .be. declared as it will have; no adverse.imp;:ict*on th'eabilityofthe plant to safely oper9te ?r safely shutdowrt beyond th.at alr~ady allow$d by TechriicalSpecifications at the time .**

of the ev~nt. * .: . * * * * * * * ** * * ** ** * * ** *

. An.asphy~ianfl~ ~- ga's capab(e otredudng the* l~ve*I Qf.oxygenih the body to dangero~s Ieveis.* Most .* .

. com111only,-.asphyxian~s work' by merely :qispiacing* air in'an enclosed. environ merit: 1his redupes ttie ... * .

concentration: ofoxyge*ri .belo"" t~~*norrpal* ie\tel of around 1Q%,_which cati l_eacHo _b,reathing difficulties, unconsciousness or even-death. . *. . . ... . . .* . ... ***.. , . . . . . . ...

- .**** An Li~controiled relea~e *of flamm~hl(3 gass~~ within a facility structure hasJhe potentialto affect.'saf~

operc:ition..of the plant by limiting:eith~r opeiator or equipment operations due to ttie potential for ignition and' resulting equipment dcimage/persollnel iQjLiry: .flammable ,gasses; .such cis hydrogeri and . * ..

acetylene; 9r¢ routfnely µsed tOmalhtain* plantsysterns (hygrog~n}qr to* repair equipment/CQJ11pOnents . .

* * . (acetylene-~ ~s~d in we,ding): Thi~:EAL assumes concenJrationl? *of flammable gasses yvhich can i _*----.-

. ignite/support cornbustion ..: :: .....,. . . . " . . : : ,* .

, *.', .. .* ---=~.. *,,,-

.***. . -~-

.*.*_* *' ~--. ~ ~- ::- .. ..'*,*

~-'

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1

Page 89 of 264 Attachment 1, En1ergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

HA3.1 Alert (Continued)

. Escalation of this emergency class'mcatiori level, ifapprop~iate, will be based on EALs in Category S, CategoryF or Category R .

. NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1.. USAR 98 arid Figure 98.6~1 .

. 2. NFPJ:\ 12 A Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Systems

. 3 .. NEI '99-01 IC HA3 .

' .. .i

~

~-. - ~< / *. . , -* '. .

. *.. *=: .:* *: *~ -... : ' - '* -

.... *. **.< *, . .. ~ .. ,*

.; . ~ *.

.: *. ', .. \* ____ ,.,.

. . -. *..~. -

. *. - . ~- -

.....:.~ *.: *..

'.'.~*. ' . * .. :**

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision~

Page 90 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases'(Continued)

Category: H - Hazards and Other Conditions Affectins Plant Safety Subcategory: 3 - Hazardous Gas *

.Initiating C::ondition: Rel~ase of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases deemed .

detrimental to NORMALPLANTOPERATIONS EAL:

HU3.1

. . Unusual Event.

T6xic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flarT1mable gases in ~mounts that have of could adversely affect NORMAL PLANTOPERATIONS. . . . .

Mode Applicability:

All Basis:.

Plant-Specific

. NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS is defined to m*ean activities at the plant site associated with routine

.. *t~sting, maintenance, or equipn1ent*operations, in ~ccordance with normal ~perating *or administrative.*

.

procedu~~s.*Entty into abnormal or e~erge,ncy operatingprocedljres, or devia~io~ from normal security*.

. or radiological c~ntrols:posture,-ls adeparture'from NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS: .

.. Forpurposes ofthis EAL, anygas(C02 \ncluded)is considered toxic when oxygen concentrations in

- the *.affected ar~a~

havebeen:-orcoul~

. . *- ~ .

-be e~pected to be reduced to <1 s.sri10 cfr.. to~idty of the gas ~HI be ir)jur.ious to persons inhaling it. Fm discharges of Halon, NM P's systems are d~signed for discharg~ ..

.* . *concentrationfrbm 5% up to 6.5%. In.accordance with NFPA 12 A, Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing .

. System~ *. exposures to levels of up to 7% produce little if any noticeable .effect (ref..1).

~ .- :* .... ~*: ...

. *. - -~

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 91 *of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

HU3.1 Unusual Event( Continued) **

Generic This EAL is based ~n the release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases of sufficient quantity to affectNORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS. .

. The. fact that ~CBA may be worn does not eliminate the need to d_eclare .the event.

.This.EAL isnot ihtended to require significant assessment or quantification. It assumes ~riuncontrolled

process that has the potential to affect plant operations, This would preclude small or incidental *.

releases, or releases thatdo~not impact structures needed for plant operation .

~f

.* An asphyxiant is. a gas capable reducing the level of .oxygen in the body to dangerous levels. Mo~t .

commonly, as'phyxiants work by merely displacing air in an enclosed environment. This reduces the

.** concentration of oxygen below the normal level of around 19%, which can lead to breathing difficulties,

unconsciqusiless or even death. * * *

- . Escalatio,n ofthis emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on EAL HA3_.1.

NMP2 Basit; Reference(s): . **

.1. NFPA12AHalq.n 1301 FireExtinguishingSystems . *

2. NEI 99.,01' IC HU3

' ~ *.

- ~ . .:

.. .. ~

. * * ,-** :~ * * -: .* c

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 92 of 264

. Attachment _1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Categor}t: . H :. ._ Hazards *ahd Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 3 .. .,.- Hazardous Gas Initiating Condition: Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases deemed detrimental to NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS EAL:

HU3.2 . Unusual Event Recommendation*bylocal, county or state officials to evacuateor shelter site personnel based on an offsite event *

Mode Applicability:

- - All Basis:

- ' .* .. *. *based Plant-Specific .*

A *recommendation. by offsite officials* that* a potential eva~uatioh of site personnel may be required .

on an offsite ~vent ass~llles th~t the plant .lies within an evacuation area established by offsite offidals due to_ a ~elease. oft()~ic,'corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas. In this case, it can be

.assumed that an actual. or potential release of such hazardous gas is anticipated to enter the

..PROTECTED AREA in a~ounts that co~ld affect the health of pl~nt personnel or NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS ..

Generic

.Escalation of this ~mergency- classification level, :if appropriate, would be based on EAL HA3.1.

~. . .. '

NMP2 Basis .Referen~e(s):

1. NEI 99-011C HU3 *

. ~ <*. :.

~ .

. .f ~

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION JECHNICALBASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 93 of 264

. Attachment 1, Emergency Action LevejTechnical Bases (Continued}*

Category:* ,H ~*Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory:*.*

4 - Security Initiating Condition: HOSTILEACTION resulting. in loss ofphysical control qf the facility EAL:

HG4.1 *.General Emergency . ..

A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred such that plant personn~I are unable to operate equipment re_quiredto maintain safety functions * * *

Mode Applicability:

All Basis:*

Plant-Specifi6 .

- Safety 'tlJnctions_

.**. Reactivity control--

i~clude: **

ability to:shut.down\he reattorand keep.

it $hutdown **. .

*

RPVTevel control :-:- abilityto co?! the core

Decay heat removal :-: ability fo maintain *a heat.sink Generic****

.~:; ... .: .. ;.:* ;. :' .*.

This EAL en.compasses condit'iohs Under which a-HbSTllEACTJON IJ.as_ resulted In a loss of physical control ofVIT;l\L AR~As (containi~g vifal'~quipmerit controls of vital equipment) requiredito *rnaintai11 . *

or

.*. - ~ safety functions .arid control qtthat equipmentcannotbetransfE;rred to and operated from another .

location. * * * * .* . . . . . . .

.If control of':the planfetjuipMentJ1~ce~sary.to;r:riai~.t~ih sat~ty functi~nscari be transferred tO:another

.~ .. ,..

location, theri the threshold -is nofmet.* ~-

~.* * * * * < > ., *. * * * * * ** *

** ' * * - * * * ' *_,.. ** * * * *

w *.... ' .. -

.* ~MP2 Basis;Refer~nce(s):

1..* NEI 99-'0+tc HG.1 . . .-: :

- ~ . -.

.. ~ --. ~*,**. *:* ; .- :

~ .

..~.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY ~LASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 94 of 264

. Attachinent1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: H...,. Hetzards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety

. Subcategory: 4"'"" Security Initiating Condition: * *.* HOSTILEACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility EAL:

HG4.2 . . . .* General Emergency .

A HOSTILj= ACTION has caused failure ofSpentFu~I Cooling systems

- - .**AND** .. *.. * .... * ..

IM.MINENTfuel damage is likely.*.

Mode ,(\ppli.cability:

All Basis: . > .

1.

- - Plant-Specific None

Gen~ric * .... :* .*.

This.EAL etddresses failure of spent fuel cooling systems as a result of HOSTILE ACTION if IMMINENT ..*. *

. fuel dani~ge is likely: . * ** * .* * * **

NIViP2 Ba~*is Refer~mce(s): * :* ::*:. **

1. * .NEI 99-01 IC. HG1 ..... .

<-.. ~ .;. . *

' ...*. -~<. . -~ - .. ~ *, .-. . .. . . . ..

~** -. . . . .. *. ' .

. .~* '

. .. * .. ~

.~ . . : ....

-:~ .. ;-. -

'~-(I *

. UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1 Page 95 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases-(Continued)_.

Category: H- Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety

- .. Subcategory: 4-Security

Initiating Condition: . HOSTILE ACTION withiri'the PROTECTED AREA EAL:

HS4.1 . Site Area Emergency _ ._ _

. AHOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROT~CTED AREA as .

reported by the Security Site *supervisor - .

Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Generic I

I_

*_-_**This condition represents an escalated threat to plantsafety above that contained in the Alert inthat

. HOSTILE FORCE has progressedJrom the .Owner Controlled Area to the PROTECTED AREA.

. *This EAL addresses.the coritirigencyfor a very rapidprogression of events, suc;has that experienced .**

.. _.on.September 11; 2001. ltis not premised solely oil.the potential for a radiologicalrelease. Ratherthe *

issue inclu_d~s the need for rc:ipid assistance due to the possibility for significant and iqdeterminat~ . --

a

- damage frbrnaddition~I air, land or water attack elements; .* . .

- . -The f~ct.t~at the siteis under ~eriousattack With nlinimai time available forfurttier-preparation or

-,additional assistance to arrive:requires Offsite Response Organization (ORO) reaqiness and . .

preparation for the implementation

- ' . . .of- protective .

measures.*.

. .*

Th_is EAL ~ddres~es the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION. If_

-- . is n6tinteilded to address incidents that are accidental' events or acts of civil.disobedience, such as small aircraftimpact, hunters, or physical disputes between* employees within the PROTECTED AREA.

Those events are adequately addressed by. other EALs. - - .

_Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on aetual plant status after impact or progression of attack. **

NMP2-easis Reference(s):

1. NMP Sites~~curity Plall

.2 .. NEI 99.:01 IC HS4

. .' *: .. . *-~ .*

~- :*.

UNIT 2 EMERGE.NCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1Q13 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 96 of264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technic.al Bases (Continued)

Category:

H- Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 4,:.... Security Initiating Condition: HOSTILE ACTION within the Owner Controlled Area or airborne attack threat EAL:

HA4;1. Alert AHOSTILE)\CTION is occurring or has occurred within the Owner Controlled Area as reported by the ~Security Site Supervisor *

OR A validated nC>tification from NRG of an AIRLINER attack threat within 30. min. ofthe site

l\Aode Applicability:

- A11*

Basis:

Plant,.Specific .*

None*

....* Ge~~ric .

- - - . Note: Timely.and a.~curate c6IT1rnunicati6_n between the Security Site Supervisor and theControl Ro9m is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.. * * * ** *

"*'. :.This EAL addr~ss~s*th.e* contipgehcy fer a very r~pid progression of events, sUch as that experienced onSepterriber*11, 2001:Tfieyarenot premised solely on the potential for a radiological release. Rather.*

.. the issue includes the. need for rapid assistance due tO thei possibility for* significant and ihdeterminate darnage frc:l'm'additionafair, land or water attack elements.. .. . .

The.fact thafthe site is under.serious attack or is ah ide.ntified attack target .With minimal time available .

. fodurther prep~ration' or ac;jditional. assistance to arrive requires a heightened state of readiness arid'> .

implemenJationofprotectivemeasures that canbe*effective (such as on-site evacuation, dispersalor

,._.* * *. sheltering). ** * * * * * *

..* Fir~t Co~diti~n .*.*.

-*.This condifiC:)n add~esse~ the ptitential for a. very rapid: progression of events due to HOSTILE. . . **** *. . ... a

_;., ACTION~Jtis notinterided to.address incidents-that are accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, *..*

such as smai1 aircraft ilTlpac;t, nunters;_orphysical disputes between. employees within the owner * - : * , .*.

Controlled ....

Areci.

Those .event~

are *-

adequately . .

addressed.

by other EALs.

Note th_(:lt this conditibh is* applicable Jo~ any HOSTILE ACTION occurring, .or that hc:is. occl;lrred, in th~ **

Owner Controlled Area. * ** * * * * * * *... *

r . ..

~ . ,' .. **- *.*.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 97 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

HA4.1 Alert (Continued)

Second Condition This condition addresses the immediacy of an expected threat arrival or impact on the site within a relatively short time.

The intent of this condition is to

. ensure that notifications for the

. AIRLINER

. attack threat are made in a timely manner and that Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) and plant personnel are at a state of

heightened awareness regarding the credible threat. AIRLINER is meant to be a LARGE AIRCRAFT with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant.

. This condition is. met when a plant receives information regarding an AIRLINER attack threat from NRC and the AIRLINER is within 30 minutes of the plant. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Alert.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an AIRLINER (AIRLINER is meant to be a LARGE AIRCRAFT with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant). The status and size~of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRG. *.

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. NMP Site Security Plan

2. NEI 99-01 IC .HA4 .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP.;AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1

. Page 98 of 264

- - .* ~ttach~ent 1, Emergency . -

Action Level Technical Bases (Continued).

Category:* **.* H- Hazards and Oth~r Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcateg~>fy: >. 4 - Security *.

Initiating Condition: . Confirmed SECURITY CONOITION or threat which indiCates a potential

- degradation in the level of safety of the plant

EAL:

HU4.1 * ** unusual Event A SECURITY CONDITION thatdoes not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security .

Site Supervisor.*. * *

OR A c~edible site-specific security threat notificaticm OR A validatednotification from NRG providing information of an aircraft threat

.Mode A~plicabmty: . .

All

'Basis*:**

Plant~Specific< .. . .

If the Security-~ite Supervisor determlri~s that a th'reatnotiftcation i~* cregible,the Security Siter Super\tiso(wiff notify the Operatio~s Shift Managerthat a"Credible Jhrear condition m~ists for NMP2. *.

.; .*

i Generally, NMP2 s~~urlty Proc~dufe~

.address s~andard .praCticesJor determirling credibility . .

.. The . .

three*.

main criteriaJ0r .determining credibility are*: technical feasibility; operatiorialfeasibility,and resolve; For .*

. ).:: , .. :*

.N MP2, a va,nd~te~* notificatioh *d~liv:ered qy tbeF~I'.: the NRG o~ similar a~ency is treaf~dascredible.* .** *.** .

., \ . - .~ _: ~- *,. . .. *: ..

Generic *::, .> ,*.* ..

. . Nqte: °fimelyanq accurate commt,Jb)catioij bktWeen Security the Site Supervisor and t~e Control<R_oom *.

is cruGial fo(t~e iJlipl~~ehtati()il ofeffe~tive S~curity EALs:< * * * *

Secutity event~;~hiCh do n.of r~pre~~'rif~ poteritiai d~gr~da!ioh in the level of scifety ohh~ planr are .

. * < . . . . reported ~ndet) b CFR:t3:?1 'Ckin'sqrn~ cases Linder 10 ¢fR:*5Q.72>Security events assessed as HOSTILEACTIONsi:freclassifiable uhqer EALHA4.1, ~ALHS4.1 and EA~ HG4,1'~

A higtier iriitiai . cla. ~~ification .. ~~uld be.l)\li;fd~ b*ased* upon . thk ~c;itor~ and.timing ofthe**SE3c~ritythi~a(and

.* . . potential cc>>ns,eq*~erces.' The)icensee*.~hall coni:>id~r up_gra~ingjhe emergency.,respcitjs~statu~ and .

. emergen.cy

~ . .

classification leyel in accordance with*' -:**

the,.. NM~ -

Site Security and Pl.an.. ' . . .

c.,. - .. *--- .. **

\*** .... ... ..

0 UNIT 2 EME RGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1

- - Attachment 1, Emergen<:y Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Page 99 of 264

HU4.1 Unusual Event (Continued)

First Condition . .

. ~ . . . . .

Reference is made to security shift supervision because these individuals are the designated personnel on~site qualified ancj trained to confirm that a security event is occurring or has occurred. Training on

secuHty event classification confirmation is closely contfoJled due to the strict secrecy controls placed onthe NMP'Site Security Plan. . . . .

This thresh.old is based ori the.NMPSite Security Pl~n. The NMP Site Security Plan is based on guidance provided by NEI 03-12 .. * * * *

Second *condition.

This thresholc:l is inciluded to ensure that appropriate notifications for the security threat are made in a timely manner. This.includes information of a credible threat. Only the plant to which the specific threat is lllade ri.eed declare the Unusual Event. * * * *

The determi11ation of "credible" isniade through use of .information found in the NMP Site Security Plan .

Third Condition

..** The intent'ofthis EAL-is toensqre thatnotificaticms for the aii"~raft thre~t are lllade in a timel{r'nanner

and that Offsite Response Organizations and plant_persormel are at a state of heightened awareness .

r~garding:the crediblethreat. lfis rjotthe.intent of this EALto replace existing*non-hostile related EALs involying aircr?ft .. _ * * * ** * * * * * *

1 Jh is EALJs met when a plant receives lnformation regarding an ,aircraft threat from N RC. Validation is performed. bY c_aUing the ,N RC or PY other cipproved methods. of authentication .. Only the plant. to. wh,ich th~ speciffcJhreat is made need declare the Unusual Event * * * * **

The NRC.He~c:lquarters.Op~ratiohs6fficer (Hbo)wm-::c611lm.unicate to th~ licensee if the threat.*

involves ~Q~Al_RIJNER (Al.RUN ER ii:> meant tq be a:LAROE.Al.RCRAFTwith tti.e potential for causing *.

significaritdamage to the pJaht):*,lJle status arid size*ot thEfplarie may be provided by NORAD through the.NR¢..** . . ... , ~: -* . .* . . *. . .*.* .. *. ,*.. , .* - .. , . . .. .

. . .: ' .* *,~* .*

Escalation'to Aliart iamergency das~ificationlevelvia :EAL HA4.1 would be ~ppropriate if the thr~at * **** *

i11voives,ari AIRLINER within 30 minutes _oftherplanL.' ' .. . . .* **. . *. . .

NM~2 Ba~is'.Refetence(s);.

_.*. ..: :.. ~.

1: NMP:$i~e*Security,Plan, ._. * : * ** .**

~

. 2. _NEI gg.{)~ IC HU4 ~ *

~.. *'

. . ~*

. UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum.4 Revision 1 Page 100 of 264

. Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued).

Category:* .

H - Hazards and Other Conditions. Affecting Plant Safety

. Subcategory: 5 - *Control Room Evacuation Initiating Condition:. Control Room evacuation has been initiated and plant control cannot be established EAL:

HS5.1 . Site Area Emergency Control. Room evacuation has been initiated .. **

AND*

Control ofthe plant cannot be established within 15 min ..

Mode Applicability:

All

- - . Basis:*

*.Plant~Specific

.

N2~SOP~?a; Control .

Roon~ Evacuation, provides sp~Gific instructions for evacuating the Control *

*. Rboirl/Building *and establ,ishing_ plant .contr61 in alternate locations. _

Generic ...

Thei11tentbf this EAL is tq captqre thb~e:events where control of the plant cannot be reestablished in a timely .

- mariner..ln_t~is case, expeditiouS:transferof control of safety systems has notoccurred (although fission product barrier damage maynot.yet be indicated).* * * * * *

i .*

I

ThE3 intent of~he EAL* is to.establish *control. of important plant equipment and knowledge of important plant*

.- -= ..

parameters in* a timely nianri~r. Primary emphasis should be placed on those components and instruments that

.* supply protection for and information about safety fundions. TypiCally, these safety func.tions are reactivity control

.* {ability to reach and maintain recictor shutdown), reactor water level (ability to cool the core), and' decay heat rernoval (abi,lity to maintain a heat sink). ' ' '

The. determination of whether or not control is established a.t the remote shutdown panel is based cinEniergency Director (ED) judgment. The Emergency Director is expected tcimake a reasonable, informed judgment within the site specific time.for transfer that the licensee

' .. has control of the plant from the remote shutdown ..

panel. '

Escalatiqn _of this' emergency classificatiori level, it' appropriate, would .be. by* EALs *in Category F or Category R. **

S,~5.is

....... .* NMP? Reference(s):

L. *.N2-spP~78Control.~oom Evacua:tion *

2.

USAR Section 98.8.2.2 *** **

. 3.* NE1 99~01 1c8s2" * * '.*._

. -:~ :*. _;_

.. . *~ *.: -

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 .

Revision 1

Page,101 of 264 *

Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technice:tl Bases (Continued)

Category:** H - Hazardsand OtherConditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 5 - Control Room Evacuation Initiating Condition: Control Room evacuation has been initiated

EAL:

. HAs.1 *. Alert

Control Room evacuatio~ has been initiated

- Mode Applicability:

.All*

Basis:

... Plant~Specific * *

. .* N2-SOP-78, Control Roo~ Evacuation,provides speeific instructions for evacuating the Control

.*... *~*** Room/Buikling and establishing . plant control in alternate locations.

. ~ ..

- Generic.***

With the control roorn evacuated, additional ~upport; monitoring and direction through the Technical * .*

Support yen!er and/or other e1nergency r~sponse facilities may be necessary. .. .

Inability tq establish plant control frorn oj.Jtside the control morn will escalate this event to

~mergericy. , *. * ** * * * * .*

aSite..*, Area*

NIVIP2 Basis Reference(s.): . ** ****

1. N2-SOP~78 Control Room*Evacuation *.*. **

' 2.* USAR: Se~tio~ 98.8.2:2 * . . . .

.. .,. :. .3 .. NEI 9g.. IC q1 HAS' ....*. *.. ' ,*

1**

I *. *., . .*. : *

.. . *~

I I

I...

I*'

-* *_ . -~ .*

. *... -~*. .

v"' .~* ...

- - - '*** J .. * ; v -~-

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 102 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: H - Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 6-Judgment Initiating Condition: Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a General Emergency EAL:

HG6.1 General Emerge1 Other condi~ions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that

events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels (1,000 mRem TEDE or 5,000 mRem thyroid COE) offsite for more than the immediate site area Mode Applicability:

All Basis:

Plant-Specific None Generic This EAL. addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exfstwhich are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for General Emergency.

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. NEI 99:-01 IC HG2

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES - EP.;AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision*1 Page 103 of 264

_.* _t\ttachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technic_al Bases (Continued)* -* -

Category: H - Hazards arid Other* Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcateg()ry: 6-Judgment . ' .

Initiating Condition:. Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency EAL_:

HS6.1 . .* -* "

Site Area Emergency .* _ . ..

Other conditibns e~ist which in the judgment of.the E~ergency Director indicate that events are in. progress or hc:1ve occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plahffunctions . needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage ormalidousacts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that-could leadto the likely failure of or;{2)that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection oftbe.pqblic. ANY'releases-are not expeCteq to result in exposure levels which

'exceed EPAProtective Acti9n Guideline exposure l_evels (1,000 mRem TEDE or s;ooo mRem thyroid'CDE).beyond the SITE BOUNQARY ,

- 'Mode Applic:ability: _,

Au*

.Basis:

Plant-Specific.- * *. *_ ..

.*.None '

- -,'.'.~ Ge*n*e*** *r1*c** ** *.':,;

. This EAL adqresses unanticipatec{condition~.not ~ddre~sec~f e)(pilcitly,el~ewhere bµt th~t warrant._.. .._ -.-.

declaratiorl":'6(a11emergen*cy l::>ecause condltiori~:~xist which are believed by the_.Emergency_Dil"eqtor-to*. -

fall under the :er:nergehGy classifi.catio~Jev~L'(lescriptiph for$ifeAr~a ~mergency .. * . . *_. . -*...*. ** - *_ .*... *.

,., '.i".' :*.:- .*.,.';'- . . - .. '. . . . ***. ::

_.* NMP? 8asi~,Ref~rence(s):_, *

..~, ...

. -~. ..,

-* .; *.:. - ~

.. < -*~

.. *-~ ... : ..

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONTECHNICALBASES EP*AA.;.1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 104 of 264 -

Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

_C(ltegor)f: H- He:1zards a~d Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety

- Subcategory: -

6 -'-Judgment Initiating Condition: Other conditions exist that in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an Alert -

EAL:

HA6;1 -- Alert-

-Oth~r conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that eve~ts are in progress or ,have occurred which involye an actual qr potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plantar a security.event that involve~ probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equiprnen_t be¢ause of HOSTILE AC1JON. ANY releases are expected to be limited to small fractions ofthe:EPAProtective Action Guideline exposure levels(1,000 mRem TEPE or 5,000 mRern thyroid COE) __ - - - -

Mode All -

Basis: -

Ap~Ucability:

. . '~: .

Plant-Specific

- - . None

Generic

. *-. \. -.. '::<_._*_.<' . _*, . . . .'...:*:.*.*.:.:

This;EALaddresses*unanticipatec:fconditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere. but thatwarrant . __ _

--deClaration qf an *emergency b~cau~e co11diti9r1s exist_ . \oVhidh:are believed by thefEmergency Diredor to .-*-

. _fc;ill under.the . .. .

Ale.rt- emerger:tcy classification leveL

-. .*. ....~.'.- :_ - -*- *-

-NMP2 B~!;,is:*Refel"e.llce(~l=-- *_-... >:

1. NEI 99;.qnc HA6 '

..._'. *1 .. .-*-.

-*- -*~'

. .: .*.. ~:

.:: ._. .-*~ . :. : '

.t *.*-*,

' ~* -.

.. i '

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 105 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: H - Hazards and .Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 6-Judgment Initiating Condition: Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant d.eclaration of a UE EAL:

HU6.1 Unusual Event Other conditions exist which in the judgmeritof fhe Emergency Director indicate*that events are in progress or .have occurred which indicate a potential degradationof the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No .*

releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs Mode Applicability:

All

- Basis:

Plant-Specific Nohe.**

. Generic This EAL ~ddr~sses *~ nariticipated cbnditions not addressed explidtly elsewhere but that warrant dec::laration of an emergency becaµ~e conditions exist which are believed by the-J:mergericy Director to fall under the UF emergency classification level.' ' ' '

NMP2 Basis.Reference(s):

1. NEI 99-01 IC HUS

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page* 106 of .264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category E.:... INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI)

EAL Group: Not Applicable (the EAL in this category is applicable independent of plant operating mode)

An INDEPENDENT. SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) is a complex that is designed and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage. A significant amount of the radioactive material contained within a

cask/canister must escape its packaging and enter the biosphere for there to be a significant environmental effect resulting from an accident involving the dry storage of spent nuclear fuel. Formal offsite planning is not required because the postulated worst-case accident involving an ISFSI has insignificant cpnsequences to the public health and safety.

A Notification of Unusual Event is declared on the basis of the occurrence of an event of sufficient magnitude that a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is damaged or violated. This includes

classification based on a loade_d fuel storage cask/canister CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY loss leading to the degradation of the fuel during storage or posing an operational safety problem with respect to its remova_I from storage.

A hostile Security event that lea~s to a potential loss in the level of safety of the ISFSI is a classifiable

. event under Security category EAL HA4.1.

Minor surface damage that does-not affect storage cask/canister boundary is .excluded from the scope of.these EALs ..

I I

I : .

-* 0

UNIT 2 EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP.;AA-1013Addendum 4 Revision.1

- . Attachment 1, Emerg~ncy Action Level Technical Bases (Continued}

Page 107 of 264 Category: * * . E -c ISFSI Subcategory: Not Applicable Initiating Condition: Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY EAL:

EUt.1 .

Unusual.

Event. ..* ..

Damageto*a lo~decj cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by measured dose rates > then ANY. . . .~

ofthe following: ..* .

400 mRem/hr *. at 3 feet from the HSM surface .* .

100 mRern/hr outside HSM door on centerline

. *. *

20 mRem/hr end shield wall exterior

Mode Applicability:

I.

- - All Basis:*

Plant-Sp~cific ;>

The NMP site)SFSI utilizes the NU HOMS Horizontal Modular Storage System.

.. This EAL addresses any condition which indicates a loss ~fa cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY and a

thi.Js potential degradation in the le\(el of safety of the ISFSL The cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is tht:i NUHOMS 91BT,.br the NUHOMS 61BTH, Dry.Shielded Canister (DSC). The DSC is the .

pressure-retainir)g componentof the sforagei system (ref.1 ). Each loaded DSC is housed within a ..*

Horizontal StoragerModule (HSM): 'Indication of.a loss of CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is any increase

. in externalHSMradiation levelsinexcess of the niost limiting Technical Specification (ref. 2).

Generic **

Ari UE iii this EAL 'is categori;zed on the basis of the occurrence of an event of sufficient magnitude that a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is damaged or violated. This includes Classification based on a loaded fuel

. sforag*e cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY loss leading to the degradation of the fuel during storage or posing an operational safety problem with respect to its removal froni storage. * *

'NMP2 .Basis Reference(s): . .* . * .

1; CDP. No. N t~07-092/N2-07-070 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station- Conceptual Design, Independent Spe~t

Fuel Storage Installation * * * * * * *

2.

Transnuclear, lnc .. Staridardized*NUHOMS .Horizontal Modular Storage System. Certificate of Compliance No.

1004;.AttachriientATechnical.Speeifications . * .

Section.1.2.1 HSM Dose.Rates with a* Loaded 24P, 52B or 61BTDSC

. Secti9n 1.2.7f,.HSM Or HSM-H,D6f;e Re1tes with a loaded Type! 1 61 BTHDSC Only*

3 ..

NEI 9*9~01 IC E-HLJ1. *.

y : * . ** *

.. : .. ~ ..*

..:*r. *.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1 Page 108 of 264

. j!\ttachment 1,_Ernergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)*

Category C-. Cold Shutdown I Refueling System

~~lfuncti~n . .

EAL Group:

Cold Conditions (RCS temperature s 200°F); EALs in this category are applicable

. only in one or more cold operating modes. *. . .. * *

. Category C EALsare directly associated with cold shutdown or refueling system safety functions. Given

the variability of plant configurations (for example; systems out-of-servicefor maintenance, containment open, ;educ¢d AC powerredund~ncy;time since shutdown) during these periods, the consequ~nces of any given initiating event can vary g're~tly: For example, a loss. of decay heat removal capability that occurl:) at the end of an exte~ded out~ge has less significa~ce than a similar loss occurring during the

. first\l\leek aftershutdown. Compounding these events is the likelihood that instrumentation necessary for ~ssessment may also be inoper~ble. The cold shutdown and refueling system_ malfunction EALs are

.based ,on performance capability to th~ extent possible with ~onsideratioh given to.RCS integrity,.

containmenf closure, and fuel. clad inte'grityfor the applicable operating modes (4 - Cold Shutdown, s*~.

Refuel, p-Defueled). : . .

The events ofthis catego,ry pertain to the following subcategories:

t. Loss of* AC Power *

. Loss bf emergency plant electrical povjer>can compromise plant safety system operability induding.

decay.heatremovajand$.inerg~nty cor~ cooling 5yste~s whi~~: may be necessary to en,sure

*'* * *.. (" '. . . *_ . r' . '. *. ' *. . *

. fission product' barrier integrity'. This 6ategory includes loss Of()hsite. and offsite pow.er sources for .

th,e 4A6 ,KVem~rgency ~bµ_i;~~, :.* . , .. * * *.*. - ' . . . *.* ** . . .* *. ! ,

. * *. 2 .. Loss of DC Powet .. * .*. '. '*, ,.

-**. L()s~ c)f :~r),er~~ncy~plant electrical p9werc<i1J ~omprhmi$e plant safety syst~m'operability includin*g

. decay :heat f~mo~aLaod em~r~enGy*c~-re 6cio1i~*9 5ysterrls which may he' n~cE:i,s~ary to em;i:ir~ ---.*.* -_...

.* fis~ion ~ro(ju,ctpa~ri~r in~egrity. This categor); i~ciudes-loss of~owerfo th~ 12s vo-c:; buses. _-* ...

3. RPV{evel * .,,** .

.>..~ :~-.:~ --

.*.. RPV. ~atE:lclevel i$ ci m~as;Jre of invehtbr{available 'to, ~nsurE:l a'deqfrate core cooling and, .therefore, ' .

-*** maintai~ fµ~I cl~dintegrity: the'RPV prcivide~ a ~olu;ne:fOrthE:i co~lantthat GO~ersthe re~ctor.core.

_

.:roe RP,V ~n~c~~~~c;iat~d--pre~~ure~p,i~i~g* ( reactor,cbo;~~f~yst~in) toget~~r_prqvitje a'ba:rrier -to~iimit

' the release 'of tadio~ctive m~teriq($hdultj the re~ctor. fuel clad ihtegrity tail;; >*.*'

!:*. . . -* .. . ;:\ ::.:. .. .. . '" -- .. -~ *.*** . '*' ' .

,;* '* ~ .. : .......

.j .-- .

1;. .*:,

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1 Page 109 of 264 Attachment 1,Emergency . - -

Action. Level Technical - .

Bases '

(Co~tinued}

Categorv C """ Cold Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunction (Continued) 4: RCS Temperature Unco.ntrolled or inadvertent temperature or pressure increases are indicative of a potential 1.oss of

. safety functicms.

. 5. *Inadvertent Criticality

. ' ln~dVertent criticalitie,s pos~ bote'ntial personnel safety hazards as well being indicative of losses of

. reacti\/l~~_controL *

6. Communications * * * *** * *

Certain. events that degrade plant operator ab.ility to effectively communicate with essential -

... perso~hel within or external to the plant warram emergency classification ..*.. ;

I I

... -~* . . .- *.-< .. - .

-~'

.. ' -~**. . **':

. . .~

.' .. - ;: . ,- :* ~ .'~***.; .

*__ *.. ~- ...

.:.~ _:. ,*,

. UNIT.2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-.1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 110of264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Le~el Technical Bases (Continued)

Category:. C - Cold Shutdown/ Refueling Sy~tem Malfunction Subcategory: 1- Loss of AC Power , , ,

Initiating Condition: Loss of all offsite and all ons,ite AC power to 4.16 KV emergency buses for ~

15 .min.

EAL:

CA1.1 Alert Loss of all offsite and all onsiteAC power; Table c~1. to 4:16 KVemerge*ncy.buses 2ENS*SWG101 and2ENS*SWG103 for~ 15 min. (Note4) ,,

Note 4: The ED should not wait uritii. the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the e\/ent as soon as it is

determined that the cohd.ition has exceeded, or will likely exceed; the applicable time. '

I.

. Table C-1 AC Power Sources

- 2EGS*EG3 2EGS*EG1

ReserveTransfor~erA

*

Rese~e *Transformer B

.*. AuxBoller Transformer *, .*

_.**- ***.*.** . . -- - *** . .. - . _.. __ "=='=='='=.========================================"

. M~cte'Applicability: .** . .

. : 4 ~-Cold Shu~down, 5 - R~fuel; b -Oefueled .* *

. *~ .. ---._:_

...~ . .**....... ;

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1

Page 111 of 264, Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

CA1 .1 Alert (Continued)

.Basis:

Plant-Specific 2ENS*SWG101,2ENS*SWG102, and 2ENS*SWG103 arethe 4,16 KV emergency buses. Bus

2ENS*SWG101 is dedicated to Division lof the On-site Emergency AC Electrical Distribution Syst~m.

bus 2ENS*SWG102 is dedicated to Division Ill (HPCS), and bus 2ENS*S\(VG103 is dedicat~d to

.* Division 11. Buses 2ENS*SWG101 and *SWG103 feed all Station redundant safety-related loads;

... except the HPCS system loads: The HPCS syste_rn loads are fed by bus 2ENS~SWG102 (re( 1, 2). **.

*.. All three* divisions are normally energized by the On~site Normal AC Electrical Distribution

Syst~'!lviathe off~site power sources through the reserve station service transformers 2RTX-

. XSR1A and 2RTX-XSR1B ..

. o .*.* 2ENS*SWG102 from transformer 2RTX-XSR1A

. o 2ENS*SWG103 from transformer 2RTX-XSR1B.

-* Ea.ch of the three 4-16 K\Cemergency buses has a standby diesel generator {2EGS*EG 1, 2EG~~EG3, 2EG$*EG2)t0 carry itsloads in case ofaLOOR or in case of a sustained *** *

...... degrad.edvoltagec.onditionon the offsitesource (ref. 3, 4).*.**

.*. _*.. : .:* *.

Consider~Jion should be given to operable IOads--necessary to remove* c:lecay heat or provide RPV ..-*. .

.. .r11akeup Capability when evaluati~g lo~s of all AC pow~rlo ~ital buses. Even though an essential bus *.

.: n1~y be en~rgiz~d. it,n~cessary. !dads. (that is, loadsthat if lost wo.uld inhibit decay heat r~rnoval : .

....*. -~:. .ca_pability. qr: RPV mcikeup capability) a~e_ not operabl~. ()nthe. energized QUS the11: the bus should not be

. considered ()perable. . .. . . -.. '

, * :, . ** The ..

fifte~n;minute....

inteni'ar wai s<31ected as a th ieshdld to exclude tiansientpow'er losses.

....' ~* .

. *. ; .. ThisEALis. . .

the cold condition equi~alent of the.hot condition loss of all AC.power EAL ss1:1 .

* .. .* r* . *.*

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP.;AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision.1 Page 112 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

CA1 .1 Alert (Continued)

Generic

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal .* Spent Fuel Heat Removal and the *.Ultimate Heat Sink.

The event can be classified as anAlertwhen in cold shutdown, refuel, or defueled mode becau~e of the significantly reduced decay heat and lower temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore

.** ohe of the ~rnergency buses,* relative to that spedfied for the Site Area Emergency EAL.

Escalating to *site Area Emergency, if appropriate, is by EALs in Category R.

. ~ . . . . . .

Fifteen minutes was. selected a~ a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

NlVlP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. USAR . *.:

Section 8.2

2. USAR Section.8,3

. ** .........

3 ... N2-SQP.:.03 Loss of AC Power

4. N2~SOP-01 .Station Blackout

. 5 .. NEI 99-01 IC CA3

~ . '

y-*'

~ .. - *.. :*.'.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP.;AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1 **

Page 113 of 264

.. Attachment 1;. Eniergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued) . *.

Category:.**. C -Gold. Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunction Subcategory: *1 - Loss -

of:. AC Power .* . *-

Initiating Condition: AC power capability to 4.16 l(V emergency buses reduced to a single power : i

source for*~ 15. min. such that ANY additional *single failure would resultin a I complete loss of all 4.16 KV emergency bus power .

EAL:

CU1.1 Unusual Event*

AC power capability to 4.16 kv emergency bu~es 2ENS*SWG 101 and. 2ENS*SWG103 reduced to a single power sonrce, Table C-1, for~ 15 min. {Note 4) *

'AND ANY additional. si.ngle power source failure will result in*a loss of all power to 4~ 16 KV e~ergency buses 2ENS*$W(3101and 2ENS*SWG103 .

Note 4: The Elhiiouldnotwait until th~ applicable ti medias elapsed, butshould declare th~ event as soon as it is*

determined thatthe.coridition has*exceeded, or will iikely exceed, the applicable time~ . .

T~bie c~1 *AC *p(>wer s6urces *

2EGS*EG1.

., 'j__ *..... --~:*_.

- . 2EGS*EG3 ,* **:. -

~ **

-~* ._:

. * *Reserve TransfOrmer;s

ui .,.... *;*-:...... *

,* * * *5. -... * *AuxBof1er Trat1storrtier* . ;* .> ....:_ :~~

Mod~ Applicability: *

.' *~:* .*.

.. , ... :-:.* *-*~*,** . .> . ..* *,

- ,\ - .*

. *-. '.. ; ~- ! - .~ ..

.i. '.*

.*,1. - . - . .*.

...._.. - ~

~ . .~'

UNff 2 E~ERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL.BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 114 of 264 Attachment.1,Ertiergency Action Level Technical Bases . (Continued}

.cu1.1 Unusual Event(Continued}

Basis:

Plant-Specific

2E: NS*SvvG101;2ENS*SWG1ofand 2ENS*SWG103 are the 4.16 KVemergehcy bu~es. Bus 2ENS*S\IVG101 is dedicated to Division I ofthe Ori:-site Emergency AC Electrical Distribution System,

bus 2ENS*SWG102 is dedicated to Division .Ill (HPCS), ahd bus 2ENS*SWG103 is dedicated to

. Divi~ionlf'Buses2ENS*$VVG101 and 2ENS*SWG103 feed all Station redundant s~fety-related loads,

.. except the.. HPCS . ,,*

system .*

loads.The HPCS system . .

ioads are fed .

by bus ~ENS~SWG102 (ref. 1, 2) .

AU three divi.sionsare norrilaliy energized bytheOn-site.Normal AC Electrical Distribution

.* System via the off~~itepowe.r sources through the reserve station se~ice transformers 2RTX-XSR 1Aand2RTX~XSR1B. .*

I

- **.**Buses .

o *. 2ENS*SWG10ifrbm transformer 2RTX-XSR1A . *.

.o 2ENS*SWG103Jrom transforme,r2RTX-XSR1 B.

2ENS*SWG101 .

~nd.2ENS*SWGfo3each have a backup source, the Auxiliary Boiler I

. T~~ri~former 2ABS*-X1. Also; 2ENS*SWG101 ar\d 2E:NS*SWG1 b3 ~ach have a feeder to a * **

nor;,,_~frAC .. .

(stub) bus, NNS~SWGOt4andNNS-SwGb1s*respectively

. 'B6s:2Ef\JS.*SWG102 has. abackµp. connedibn JO the Reserye St(3tion .~~rvice Transformer

. 2RTX-XSR1 B, if required. * . _

- . * *:: Each,C)t:~hetnree 4.16f<Vemerg~hcy.busestjas:a ~tandtiy diesel:g~~eratpr (2EGS*EG1,

* **

2EGS*EG3, 2EG'S*J:=G2):to c~rry its loads in case.cit.a LOOP 0r inccis.efof a sustained

d~g~~ded volta~~ c0nditi6n,9ri.:th~qffsit~,s~Lirc~(ref 3/4). . .

. i-he-fitte~n-rJ1in.ute interval was §eieet~d as p_ttJrest101d.to exciude tran~ie,nt J?o0er 1osses.1t multiple - **

. sources fail'to energize the unit ~afety-related bu~es~ithin 15 minutes>an Unusual Eventis declared , .

.*. 'under this. EAL. The ~ubs~querit l~ss of the .single rerfoini~g .powersodrce es~alates th~ eV~ilt t_o a,n *

.Alerfu~der.EAl CA1 .1: - * : ., ** __ .

.. .. .~ . .- *.:": *: _ . ..

. . . ~-**:* .

- . .*.. '*, -~ =***

>" *' ~ ..._. ~:: *. . -* ;

i*.... *::..*'

... *~- .

UNIT 2 .EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1 Page 115of264 .

Attachment 1, Emer1;1ency Action Le~el Technical Bases'{ Continued)* . *.

CU1 .1 *Unusual Event (Continued)

. Generic*

The condition indicated by this- EAL is the qegradati"c:m of the off-~ite and cm~site Ac power systems .

such thanmy ~dditidnal single faih.irewould result iri a complete loss of 4.16 KVemergericy bus AC power to one or both units. This condition could occur due to a loss of off~site power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency generator to supply powerto it$ emergency bus.The subsequent loss of this single power source* would escalate the eventto an Alert in accordance with EAL CA 1.1-. .

Fifteen minutes was selected (lS ~ threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of power.

NMP2 Basis Reference(s): -*

1. USARSection 8.2

2. USAR Section 8.3 3 .. N2-SOP-03 Loss of AC Power 4: . N2~s0P-01 Station Blackout *

5. NEI 99:.01 IC cu3

-. . -', . ~ : .... .:~*. . ' .

. .{ ,.

. .*. ~ , ..

. . . .. ~: : ...... .

. :* ~-* * ... '

.. . *~ .. -

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFlCATION TECHNiCAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 116 of 264

Attachment 1; Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category:

C - Cold Shutdown l Refueling System Malfunction

. Subcategory~ 2 - Loss of DC Power lnitiatirig Condition: .Loss ofrequired DC power for~ 15 min.

EAL:

CU2;1 *.: . .

Unusual .

Event. : . *. . . : :* .. .

< 105VDC on required 125VDC emergency buses for~ 15 min. (Note 4)

.* Note4: *. The ED should n~t wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is **

determined thaithe cond.ition has exceeded~ or will likely exceed, the applicable time.

Mod~

Applieal:>ility:

.* 4 - Cold Shutdown, 5 - Refuel

Basis:*.* *' ..

Plant-specific

.* . The emergency 125 VDC power system includes three electrically independent and separate switchgears ..*

- - - - . : (2BYS*SVVGb02A; 2BYS*SWG002B and 2CES*IPNL414): Division 1((2BYS~SWGb02A) and Division II:.

(2BYS*SWG002Bf fe.ed the redundant em~rg~ncy DC loads associated with Divisions 1*and II of the emergency .

, , ,.* onsite AG s;ste~. respectiv~ly.Division Ill (2CES*PNP414 )feeds the emergency DC loads assotiated With,

. Division Ill (HPCS system).

Each emergency 125V0Gdistribution system has ii bat!erY,,anqabattery charger that are normally connected.to .

the- bus suthtbat

. ' ..* ' .. : ~.-*.

these tw9 sources ot power are operating .. .. . in. parallel. the charger is*normally

.. . . . supplying system

~lectrical loads with the. battery ~na float charge .. Should both battery ch,argers for ally particular battery be dut of .* *. * .

. *..SeNice ~tany pointin the,,OC load cycle, the battery is capable of starting a.nd operating its associated loads *for 2

.* ,.hr according to a precalculated load, profile withou(the battery t~rminal voltage falling below rninlmum acceptable **,

1eve1. 1o5voc/(ref.1, 2, 3) ** * * * * * * * *

hi Cold ShutcioV\/n mode:and*Refuel rnode; requ.ir~ments on emergency 125 voe pm'\ler are ref~x~d.The term "required" in .this

~-

EAL signifi~s th~ minimum Tech~ic~I $pecifications, . ..

requirements for shutdown ~onditio'ns (ref.,

. ** 011eDiyi: ~io11 lpr bi~ision ILDC electrica[poV\/ersubsystem; and. * . * .****

,* Di\ll~ion Ill t5C eleetrical p~wer subsystem when* the HPCS syst~m is reqµire~tt6 be opera!:> le, ,.',

This. ..

EAL.*isthe cold~bnditiori equlvalent'of . . .' ~ .* tfi~*hot c;~nditionlossof DC power**

.:-r:*

, EALSS2.1: ***"

'. :~...... *,-..... ,., ;'*

.-:i.'

UNIT 2 EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 117 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

CU2; 1 Unusual Event (Continued)

Generic.

The purpose of this EAL is to recognize a loss of DC power compromising the ability to monitor and

control the removal .of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refueling operations.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. USAR Section 8.3.2.'1.2

2.

Improved Technical Specifications Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2, 3.8.5

3. N2-SOP-04 Loss of DC Power

4. NEI gg:.01 IC CU?

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES

EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1*

*Page 118 of 264

~ttachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: C-,- ColdShutdown /Refueling System Malfunction Subcategory:

3-RPVLevel Initiating Condition:* Loss of _RPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with Containment challenged. * * *

EAL:

CG3.1 .*.* ** * *General Emergency *. * ...

RPVlevel < -:14.in. for~ 30min. (Note4)

AND . ....

ANY C()ntainrhent Challenge Indication, Table.C-3 Note 4: ** The EDshouh;I riot wait until the applicable time has elapsed; bL1tshould declare the event as soon as it is.

determined that the condition has e~ceeded, or will .likely exQeed, the applicable time; . *. .

- - - - *. Table C-~ ContainnielitChaH~nge Indications

- *.. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE*n:ot established.

Explosive: mixture existsi nside Pd111ciiry .Contai riment.

(H2 <:: '6% and"O~ <:: *5%) .* * * *

YNPL4NNEDi"ise in Prii:Ji~ry'Contain.mentp~~ssure *

... ~B af~~ .~adiation > 8~ooE+3. mR/hr .** *

*Mo~& A;pl ;\,~*!Jilify: . ...*. .. . .*** *. \

4 ~Cold Shutd6wn,*s,. RefuE}I**_ .*.*. . **.:> .. ,*.*

Basis:':. ... *,'::*

' ',i' "i :~. ** ,. :

. . When* R.PV level drops the top qfqqtive fuel (~n indicated HPV level'of-"14 In:), core uncovery starts to

~c~ur (ref. t~i).. . . . . .. : . . : * . . < * . *. .. . . *. ..

. .. ~-:; .... :.*

. , . *.... ~ ... - .

..:*_:* =---: ....*

, *, ~ ::. . <; ,*,

... *; ... ~. .. . .

'* \

.\: .

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP~AA.;1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 119 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

CG3.1 Ge.neral Emergency (Continued)

Four conditions a:re associated with a challenge to Prirnary Containment integrity:

. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is the procedurally defined actions taken to secure containment

. (primary or secondary) and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional

. b~rri~rto fission product releas.e under existi~g plant conditions. This definition is less restrictive

. . thari Technical Specification qriteria governing Primary and Secondary Containment operability .

.. . . lfthe TechnicalSp~Cifiba.tio~ qiteria are met, therefore, CONTAINMENT CLOSURE has been

~~tab,lished. (ref. 3, 4, 5). .

f::xplo_sive (deflagration) mixtures in the Primary Containmentare assumed to be elevated

. concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen. BWRinqustryevaluation of hydrogen geher~tion for

',I devel~pmenf of EQPsfSAGsindicates thatarly hydrogen concentration* above minimum

. . . - . \ : . :* .. . : ~ *. - *.

. deteet;:1ble is not to be expected within the short term. Post-LOCA hydrogen generation primarily caus~d l;>y_radiolysis is a slowly evolving, lorig~tef"m c~ridition. H~drogenconcentrations that

- rapidly develop are.. most likely. caused by rnetal-Water reaction. A metal"'.yvater reaction is

.indicative .of~n accident

. ' -: ~ - .. . .-

more. severe th~n actidents considered .

in *...the plant design b~sis and ...

would be indicative, therefore; o.f a potential thr~aUo Primary Containment integrity~ Hydrogen co.~centration of approximately 6% is corisioered the global deflagration concentration limit.

.: . The sp.eCified values for this thr~shold are the ~in'imum global deflagration concentration limits

- - . **. (6% .

. h*ycirogen and 5,o/o oxygen), . .

ahci r~(idilY.. r.$tognizaq1e

. . .- -~-. - - ' *- .. - .. . -

be~ause a% hydroge~ is we11. above - - -

- - .* . ttie. EOP.... *, ' .... flo~chart entry coQditiori. Therpiqimum....global deflagratiOn hydrogen/oxygen

... * *.* *. corlc~~tr~ti~ns.(6%/5%,. t~specti~ely).requfre int~ntio~al Prilllary *Contai~m~ntventing, which .is definedto *baa ioss:.oftll~

~~ihiary Contciin~en'tb~rri~r.'(;ef.

), *7) ..

Th~ l,JSAR requires th~ °H2/Qz- (3nalyzers to be ~bleJo provide *and re~ord combustible gas> .* ...

co~6~ntration in the primary C~ntalhrn~nt;withi~*eo minutes follm1vi11ga tOCA with safety .

": *. . ' .** .*. syst~:rninjectlon. ]"h$fh/9~' analyzers are normally~li1 -~Jandby, c:ttid requki:'. a 30 rijinutewarr.n~ *

. ,. '. up/self-test period .befo;~:\heystari providing data .. (ref. 6).. : .

1":*...

,': - - -~ ..* .. * -~. -*.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATl()N TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA'."1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 120 of 264

Attachment 1, E~ergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

CG3.1 General Emergency (Continued).

If tpe hydrogen or oxygen monitor isunavailable, sampling and analysis may determine g~s concentrations; The. validity of sample results must _be judged based upon plant conditions, .

since drawing and analyzing .

samples.

may take some time. If sampi~ .

results cannot be relied upon and hydrogen concentrations cannot be determined by any other means, the concentrations must be :considered "unknown.'; The monitors. should not be considered

.* "uriavailablell until ~n attempt has been made to place them i~1 servtce. (ref. 2)

Any UNPLANNED rise in Primary C~ntainment pressure ih the Cold Shutdown or Refuel mode indicates CONTAINMENT CLOSURE carindt be assured and tne Primary Containment cannot**

be relied upon as a barder to fission product release.

*. RB (Reactor Building) area .radiation monitors should provide Indication of increased release .

. that may be indicative of a c;hallenge to CONTAINMENT *CLOSURE.: The EOP Maximum Safe.** . *.

Operating level is 8.00E+3 ~R/hr and is indicative ~f problems in the secondary containment**.*.

that are spreading. The: locations into which the primary system discharge is of concern

. correspond to the areas addre_ssed in Det~il S ofN2-EOP-SC (ref. 7): .

.*._If. RPV*level

*: , . .is r~sfored ancl maintained . *,

above. the .

top .*of.active .

fuel before a Contc;iinmenfChallenge condition occlirsand subsequently .

a Containment Challenge . .

condition . isreached, ' .

this-* EAL is riot.. met.

Generic*.

.

This.EAL fepresent~ tpe inability to restore arid maintain RPV water leveltoabove:the topofaCtive f~el *

with.containment challenged: Fuel damage is probable if RPV water leve.1 cannot be restored, as * . * *

. available decay heat will cause boiling,.furtherreduc;ing the RPVwater level. With the Containment

breached.or challen'ged then the potential for unmonitmedJission productrelease.to the environment is high. This represents a direct path for r*adioactive inventory to be released to the environment. This is

consistent with the definition of a GE. The GE is declared on.the occurrence of the loss orlMMINENT loss of function of all three barriers .

. . . A numb.er of variables. can have a significant impact cm heat removal ~apability challenging the fuel clad .

barrier. Examples include: mid-loop, reduced level/flange level, head in piace, cavity flooded, RCS

venting strategy, decay heat removal system design, vortexing pre-:disposition, steam generator U~tube

di-'aining. * * ** * * * * * * *

Analysis indicates that core ;damage may occur within an hour following* ccmtinued core uncovery *

. th.erefor0*:*30 , .. -.: .

minutes was. conservatively chosen: .

.If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE isre::establi~hed p'riorto ex~eeding th~:30mi~uf~_~ore uncovery tillle<

ii mit the.n:.escal'ation fo Gen~rai' Emergency would. not'occl.Jr. . . **.* .*. *. . . . . . .. . .

.-:;:., "*****c ,* :* -. .* *: .* -: . ' -. . .- . . ., .** ,.

. -~: : ... ~- :-* . ':1

. *.. *=, ..***

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum . .

4.

Revision 1 Page 121 of 264.

Attachment1, Emergency

. . Action Level Technical Bases (Continued) .

CG3;1 General Erriergenc~ (Continued)

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. N2-EOP-RPV RPV Control

2. NER-2M-039; NMP2 Emergency Operating Proc.edures (EOP) Basis Document

3. NIP-OUT-01 Shutdown Safety ' .

4. Improved Technical Speeifications Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2, 3.6.1.1 s:

Improved Technical Specifications Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2, 3.6.4.1 * *

6.

N2-EOP~PCH Hydrogeh Control *

7. N2-EOP'-SC Secondary Containment Control

8. NEI 99'-01 IC CG1

.: . ~.

- *** o

~ :

.:~>. .-

_*. *._,.*=*

UNIT 2 EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP.;AA-1013 Addendum 4.

Revision 1 Page 122 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases*(continued)

Category: * .C :. .:. Coid Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunction Subcategory: 3- .RPV Levei

.Initiating Condition: **Loss of RPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with Containment challenged * *

.EAL:

CG3.2 . General Emergency RPV water leveicannotbe ~onitored with core uncovery indicated by ANY of the following for ~ 30 min. (Note 4 ): * * *

ANY UNPLANNED RPV leakage indication, Table C-2

* . Erratic Source Range Monitor indication AND . .

ANY corltainrnt:mtChallehge Indication, Table q'.:3 Note 4: . The .ED shquld not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. .

Table. C-2

. . RPV Leakage Indications

Drywa'll equipment drain sump levelrise

*

Dry\Neli floor drain sump level rise

.* Reactor building eguipmentsump level rise

.* ..

Reactor Building floor drain sump level rise

. * $Lippression Pool ie".'el rise*

- UNPLANNED rise in RPV make""UP rate

Observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage

. Table. C-3 ContainmentChallenge ln~icatiohs

CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established.

Explosive mixture exists inside Primary Containment

(H2 ~ 6% and 02 ~ 5%) * . * * . * .

:* UNPLANNED rise in Primary .Cc:mtainmentpressure

RB area radiation> a.OOE+3. mR/hr

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1 Page 123 of 264

. Attachment 1, E111ergency Action l..evel Technical Bases (Continued)

CG3.2 Gen.era! Emergency (Continued)

Mode Applice1bility: -

4 - Cold Shutdown, 5 - Refuel Basis:_

Plant-.Speclfic *

If RPVwater level monitoring capability is unavailable, all RPV y\tater level indication would be

. unavail?ble ~rid,'the-RPV'inventory loss niust be detected by Table C-2, RPV Leakage Indications.

Leveliricre~s~s must b~ evaluated against other pot~ntial sources of leakage such as cooling water

sources in~id~ the drywell to ens~re they. are indicative of RPV leakage. Drywall equipment and floor drain ~ump levelris.e is the.normal method of monitoririgandcalculating leakage from the RPV~ A.

Reacto~-Buil~fi~g equipment orfloor*drain sump l~vel risem'ay also be indicative of RPV inventory*.

-losses e~ternal to the Primary Containment from systems connected to the RPV~ With RHR System

.operating in the Shutdown Cooling mb{je, an* UNPLANNED rise in suppression -pool

. indicativ~ otRHRvalve misalignment or leakage. If the. make-up rate to

above the pr(3-estaplished rate; *-**

a loss .*ofRPV

, 1.' - .

inverl'tbry may be occurring th~ RPV uhexplainablyrises .

even,if the le~el could b~

source of the

.- . . - ) . : . . . ., - ' ' ... . . . . . -

. leak~ge

.cahp:ofbe.immediately identified. -

Visual observation of. le13kag~

from*. ~ysteim$ ". .

con~ec~eid .. '

to'.

the..

_RCS in areas:6ut.sidethe.PrimaryContc:ifnmentthat.8annot be. isolated .

could be ir:idicative ofa -

loss.of RP_V inyentory, (ref. 1, 2, 3)

Four chanr~I~'. of 1b~ countratemet13rs'.~re availabl~ inthe ControtRoom to*deteCt, erratic source range

, moriitor indicaiioh~(rE)f.. 4): ** . . * ** ' * . -

S~M A& Con ~CEC*PNL6b6

\-

9: 'sgM Ef &D'dn 2CEC*PNL633* .* :

.~ . ,_ '< ..*' .. :-:

Post~TMi. **.sfodies iildicat~d'thafthe i~stalled iiuclear ihstrurri~nt~tbn will operate .~ff~tically

- ., -:- .. ~ ' . . -** -. . -

When .

the .*_** ,

. core .- . -

is uncovered - . *-- :* ... .

and . '.,,

that source'*'range monitors: can

-..~ . :-' . .*.. . .... . :.-

be.used*. as atool for: making

~~-- : : .* . : - . such'

. determinatipn~._.Ficiure C-2 ~hov\i$,the,,r~sponse of the solirce/ang¢monitor duri.hg the first.few hours .

. of'theTMl;2_ ~-~~:ldent. The,in~ttLmenf ;eported~nX~¢r~a~irlgs.ignatabouf3o min~tes iritothe accident

.. *:. *.' " . J . *.*.-*, *. _. .. _ .... **,*: . ' ,",' '*.*; *.c* : * - . > *.*, --.* *. . ' .*' : *** . .

.Afthis .

time, the reactor . coolanf.-... pufop$Wer~

*'* ~. ; -. . . . ..

running.and ' . .. ,

the

- .. core .was .

adequately cooled. .; ..

as indicated . ..

'by the core outlet 'thermoc~upies. Hence, the increasing ~lgnal was the result of an incr~asi~g ~WO-

' . * **. * ,, _ p-h~~~ void-.tr~Ct!on.in ~the_reactbr.c~~e::~*na ve~se1 a9wnG~rner-anci th'e-;educkkshi.e1.ciiii~that~he two~ **

. *. ' : ' ,:.1 .*. ' . . . .*. :.-: . "; :* *..* ':.- ' - ... : * ,.": .." . * '* * . * .:.

pha~e ITlixtur!3. prqvides to the so'urc~ range morlltor:: ' \: '

UNrf 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 124 of 264 Attachment 1.. Em~rgency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

.c9a.2 G~n~ral Emergency (Co_ntinued)

Four conditions are associated with *a _challenge t~ Primary Containment i11tegrity:

CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is the procedurally defined actions taken to secure containment

{primCiry *or ~econdary) and its associated structures, ~ystems, and components as a functional

. ** barrierto fission product release under existihg plant conditions. This definition is lesi;; restrictive . *

- - .. than.Technical Specification criteria governing *Primary and Secondary Contai~ment operability.

If.the Technical Spedfic~tio~ criteria aremet,therefore, CONTAINMENTCLOSURE has been

., ' esta,bl,ished. (ref. 5, 9, f~) ' ' ' '

E:xplosive (deflagration) rnbdures in the Primary Containment are assumed to be elevated

. concentrations of hydrogen* and oxygen. BWRindustry evaluation of hydrogen generation for

--.*'

development of EOPs/SAGs indicates thc;1t arly h~drogenconcentration above minimum

- .

deteetable is not tobe expected within the short t~rlTl. Post-LOCA hydrogen generation primarily

caL.Js~d byradioly~is is~ slowly evolving, long.,term condition. Hydrogen concentrations that rapfrjly develop are.most.likelycaused.bymetal-wat~r;reaction. Am~tal-,yv~terreaction is*

indicative of an accident- Ill ore severe than' accidents. considered' in the

. . .. .. .* ~

plant' desi,gn basis and

. would ,be indicative;* therefore,* of apotential threat to Primary. Containrnent integrity. Hydrogen concentration of apptoxilllately 6% is considered the glob~! deflagration concentration limit.

. , ,The.specified values for *.*

this th'resholdareithe ..

hlfnimum globc:tl. deflagration concentratio.n limits

. * (6%(hSfdrogen arid 5o/o O,Xygeh}, anff rladlly recognizaQle. because 6%hy~frogen is well.above

.t,he E:;QP fl9\fvchart

o*: *.: * > * * *

lf1trY c<mdition.

~ *

The **rninimllm'91oba1 defl8grati6n*

hydrogen/oxygen *

.cohce:r1tratip11s:(6%t5%, respectively) *requi'r~ intentional Primary *Containment*venting,.which .is definedto b~* a iC>~s::of tti~:-i=>Hhi.arycontainhie~tbarrier.;{~ef. 6, .7) *. - , .

' *,' The. USARrequ_i,res' .. .-

th~ H2/0~ c:i,naly,zers to be ~b-le fo pfoyide and.* rec;.cird combustible gas'.:

. ~. .. . . . .

concentration inJheprimary C~iitaihmeof Withln;90 minutes following a* l:::OCA With.safety s:ysWrn.'inje,dio~. Th<;i: b;'2/0;anc::tlyzers* a_renOrmally iil ~staildbyanci*requir~*a 30 riliriutewar~n~'

u~/~e1f.:test' period befor~\lley sfart providing data. (r~f. '6) . . .*. '. .. ,. .. . .

~.: - .. ~ '

.... **.,. *:~.", **- *.*- -*:*

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICALBASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 125 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases '(Continued)

CG3.2 General Emergency {Continued) lfthe hydrogen or oxygen monitor is unavailable, sampling and analysis may determine gas **.

. . concentrations. The validity of sample results must be judged based upon plant conditions,

.since drawing and analyzing samples may takes6rl1e time. If sainple re$ults.cannot be relied upon.* and hydrogen . .. . .

co~centrations cannot be determined . by any other means, the

.* cOriceiltrations must be considered "unknown." The monitors should not be considered* .

"unavailable" until an attempt has been .made to place them in service. (ref; 7)

AnfUNPLANNED rise in Primary Containment pressure in the Cold Shutdqwn or Refuel mode .*

indicates.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE can~ot be assured and the Primary Containment cannot * .

be reiied upon as a barrier to fission product release.

RB. (Reactor Bu'ilding) area radiation monifors should-provid~ indication of increa.sed release .. *.

that .

may be I i~dicative of a challenge to CONTAINMENT CLOSURE. The EOPMaximurn Safe.

Operating level *is 8:00E+3 mR/hr and is indicative of problems in the secondary containment .*

... that are spreading. The locatio.ns into which the primary system discharge is of concern correspond . . .,

to*the areasaddr~ssed* i~Detail S bf N2-EOP~SC (ref: 8). . .

. If R.PV level is restored and maintained abo~e the top of active fuel bef~re a Containment Challenge ..

. c()llditi6n OCCUrS and subseq~ently a Contai~me~fCh.allenge condition is reached.this EAL is not met:..

- * * -: ,. *

c ***** ***** - ** - * ** ** * - * '*

Gen~riC

~

This EALrepres~nts the inability to rester~ and mairitainHPV wat~r lev~I to above the top of active fuel with .*

containment challenged. Fuel darriage'is probable if RPV water level cannot berestored, as available decay heat ..

. \,\lill cause boiling, further reduCing the RPV water level. With the~Containment. breached or challenged then the .

potential for urimonitoredfission productrelease to the environment is high. This represents a direct path for radioactive inventory tci be released to the environrrient. This is consistent with the definition of a GE The GE is .

declared on the bccurrence of the loss or IMMINENT loss of function* of all three barriers~ *

. A number of Variables can have a significant impact on he.at removal. capability challenging the fuel dad barrier. ..

Example~ include: in_itial RPV water level_, _shutdown heat removal system design. * .

.* * .* .* AnalY~is *inc;jicates that core damage may occur withinan hm.irfollowing continued core imcovery therefore, 30

. minutes was ccinseivatively chosen: . . * * ** * * * *

._':. _* . . . *.. " - - . : . -- r.

. If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE Is 'te~e~t.abllshed prior to e~ceeding the .30 minute tore uncovery time limit then

.<<*:. * .**. E;lSC:~lationJo General. E_mergency wo~ld .not occur.

.* .*Sump andta'nk level increases mu~t be evaluated agains(other potential sources of !ea~age such as cooling :

water ~~urces insid~ the contairfrnent toehsl!re: lhey are ln.dicative:_ofRCS leaka!:Je. . ..

___ ** .

, .- . . ~ **'.

-~ '. *. *:.

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 _

Revision1

Page 126 of 264.

Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level TechnicalBases (Continued)

CG3.2 General Em~rg~ncy (Continued)

As water level.in the RPV lowers, the dose rate above the core will increase. The dose rate due.to this core shine should result in site specific monitor indication and possible alarm. *

Post-TMlstudies indicated that the installed nuclear instrumentation will operate erratically when the core is uncovered arid that this should be used as a tool for making such. determinations.

NMP2. Basis. .

Reference(s):

1. USAR Section 5.2.5

2. USAR Section?.6.1.3

3. N2"'.'EOP'-PC Primary Containment Control

4. N2-0P-92 Neutron Monitoring

5: lmpro\fed Technical Specifications Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2; 3.6.4.1 6, N2.,EOP.,pCH Hydrogen Control . . . _ .

7.. NER~2M~039, NMP2 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) Basis Document .

. R N2-EOP"SC SecondaryConfainrnerit Control . * *

. 9. NIP-OUT-01 Shutdown Safety . . .

- , 1a. Improved Technical Speeifications Ni Ile Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2, 3.6.1.1

. 11. NEl99~01 IC GG1 . . .. .

I I": ...* :: .*

. /.:

. ;'* -~*

I '.*:

.... ~

. ; . ;. : . ~

1-.,

~

.,~ ,: ...

. .. * '~**

UNIT 2 EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 127 of 264

-Attachment 1, Emergency Action Levei Technical Bases (Continued)

Figure C-2: 'Response of the TMl-2 Source Range Measurement During the First Six Hours of the Accident

- en e: '.5 Cl>

c 0

(\I

-*e.....

c:

0.

..... Cl>

c: -

0 ....

Q)

~

- <(

Cl>

E i=

g

. ll>

.s* a.

L.;;...,----;.......,...-"'----------'----.,...--------

CO lb_ _-. ._,. M 0 - -e ~

~

(sapebap 601) puo:ias Jad ~iuf1o~

.- ' ... .i.

.. ~- : .-

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 128 of 264

. .. . ' : ' . ' ~ . : . . . ' . . . . . '

Attachment 1; Emergency Action. Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category:.*. . C """"' Cold Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunction .

Subcate~ory:

3 ;_ RPV Level Initiating Condition: Loss of RPV inventory affecting core .decay heat removal capability EAL:

CS3.1 Site Area Emergency With CONTAINME_NT CLOSURE not establi~hed, RPV water level< 11.8 in ..

Mode Applice1biiity:

4- Cold .shutdown, .5,. Refuel Basis:

.* Plant-Sbecific *

When RPVWater level decreases to 11 .8 in.,. water level is six inches below th.e.Jow-low-fow ECCS actuation setpoint (ref .1} .

The inabilityJo restore and maintain leyeLafter teaching this setpoiht infers a failure of the RCS barrier

and ~otenti~t.Lo~s of the Fuel Ci~d barrier. * .

CONTAINMENTCL09URE_is thepr~ce:dura'lly defined actionstak~n to secure containmen~{primary or *.

secondary)anctits associatedstrU,ctures, *~ystems,*and co~p~rients* as a*fµnctional barrier.to fission

. product releas,e under existing plaot c~nditibns~ this d~firiitionis '1~~s restri~ti~e than technical '

.. Specificatiop criteria governthg Prjmar; *~11d.*Seq()ndary:~ontainlllept operability; 1/the Technic;aL

':, Specification:c~iteria are .met;' the.~ef~~e, CQNTAINME,NT CLOSURE ti~s been es,tablish~d.

(ret 2; 3, 4r . *-

. *.'*; . ~ . : .

. 'Ge~eric .

unde~ th~ 6oriciiti6os specified by this EAL+ cohtiol1eci d~crease i~;RPV *1evel*Js i*~diCati~e of c:i loss *of inveiitory control.Jnvenfory loss maybe:due*to an HCS*breach*; pressure boundary leakage, or contifiued boiling :in the.

RPV: Thus, declaration of a Site Ar~a Emergeh~y is warranted. *.* . ' .*:**. .. . . . *. . ...*

~,/

Escalation.to*a' General *Emergency is via EAL CG3, 1, EAL CG3.2; RG1.1; RG1.2 br RG1

3 .

\~""

NMP,2 Basi~ Reference(~): . '. . ..

1..*

N2~()p-33 High PrJ§s~re. Core Spray

. *2. ! NIP-0UT~01'St)utdown Safet}I<> ; . / -. ,, , ' .*

.* 3: *.*..improved Tec~*nital' Specifi~~tibris' Nii:J~Mife Point Nucl~arstatio~. Uri it No. i, 3:sj;1 * *. *.

4. lmprov~ci Technical'Spedfications}Jirie Mile Point Nucle~r*Station, l.Jnif No.

s. NErss-ot1cfos1* * * - *** ' ****.. *>

2, i6.<:L*1 *

- - -~ *,*

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA*1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 129 of 264 Attachment *1, Emergency Action L~vel Technical Bases. (Continued)

C ~Cold Shutdown /Refueling System ~~!function Category:*

Subcateg~ry:

3.:... 'RPV . Level

. Initiating Condition: . Loss of RPVinventory affecting. core decay heat removal capability

.EAL:

CS3.2 ... , .. Site Area Emergency

\/Vith CONTAINMENTCLO$UREestablished, RPV water level< -14 in.

Mode . .

Applicability:. . *. . .

4 - C~ld Shutdown, 5 - Refuel .* *.* *.

Basis:

Plant-Specific When RPV*;-:level*drops the ..

top.of active fuel .

(an indicatecfRPVl~vel . : .

of,14.

in.), core uncovery starts to .

occur (ref. 1.. 2).

CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is *.

the.'procedurally defined actions taken to secur~;contaihment (primary

()r' secqndary) ~nc:I its. associated structures, systems, and compon~nts as a funcUonal barrier to fis.siori *.

. . prod.uct release under existing pla.lltcqnditiohs. This defi'nltion is less restrictive than Technical

. - . ;* .. *. - .* .. . . .- *. : . . *:*.*. *: .* **r .. :. .:* .. ... * ... -. -. . . ,* *; ..: ...

Specification criteria*governirjg*Prirriary and Secondary Ccmtainrnent operability, If the Technical**

Sp~~ificati~n criteria ar~ tnet; th~l"~toref; CONTAINME:NTicLOSUREhas beell ~stablished. (ref. 3, 4; 5)

Generic.. **.*"*>. ::.c:**- *:

Under tfre ,t9hditlons spedfied by .this i:=AL. contim.led:decrease *in RPVlevel. is indicative of a Jo~s of ,

inveritory, control. lhvenfory lossmay be dueJo ar:i *RCS breach, pressure :bou(itjary leakage,.* or

.* contihued .bolling in the* RPV. Thlis, de~laratlein ()fa- Site Area Ernerg~ncy is warranted ...*** * ...

.* Escalatlori)O aGerieratl;merg~nqy is';via. EALCG3.j ', EAlCG3,2' RG1'1, HG.t2 or HG 1.3..

.... .; ;. -*.. ; '.: *. .. . - . ..* *. - .. .~* . . .

~: _.- ...

NMP2 BasisReference(s):**

.. *- . . * ... ....,:.-. . *.-.. : .:.. . . . '~

. 1. : N2~EOP-RPV RPV Confrol':: '. *, ....* ....

- 2. **. NER'..?M~b39;.NMP2 .Emerg~ridypperating.Procedures.(EOP} Basis *ooc.ument. *

3. 'N1P~bur~o1 shutdown*:satety> *. * *...... * * .**** . *... * . * ..* - * ** *.* * . -

* ****. ** *. 4:*. lmproyed:.Technical Specific~tions Nine Mile. Point Nl1dearStation, UnifNo.* 2,* 3.6. t 1 *

* * .. . *. 5. ** . tmw6ve~.TechnicafSpecificati8ns Nine)~ile Pc)intNuCl.ear ~tation, tJnitNo. 2;. 3.6.4. t

6. f\JE1 99.,011c~ cs1 .i . '." * ** , *. * * * * *. * * * *

. ' .-*, . .*.. . .'-- *.:.: . ~

. .~: ' _.,.

-"1";,': .

-~ ... *.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA~1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 130 of 264 .

Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category:* C - Cold Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunction Subcategory: 3-RPV Level Initiating Condition: Loss of RPV inventory .affecting core decay heat removal capability EAL:

CS3 .. 3

Site Area Emergency RPV water level cannot be monitored for2': 30min. (Note 4) with a loss of RPV inventory as indicated by ANY of the following: *

.* ANY UNPLANNED RPV leakage indication, Table C-2

Erratic Source Range Monitor indication Note 4: The ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed;-but-should declare. the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time .

Table C-2 RPV Leakage Indications DryWell equipment drain sump level rise Drywell floor drain sump level rise

Reactor building equipment sump level rise

Reactor_ Building floor drain sump level rise

.. Suppression Pool level rise.

UNPLANNED rise in RPV make-up rate

Observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage Mode Applicability:

4 - Cold Shutdown, 5 - Refuel

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4.

Revision 1 Page_.131 of264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases {Continued)

CS3;3 Site Area Emergency (Continued).

Basis:

Plant-Spedfic it RPV water lev~I monitoring capability is unavailable, all RPV water level indication would be unavailable and, the RPV inventory loss must be detected by Table c.:2, RPV Leakage Indications~ .

Level incre~ses must be evaluated against other potential sources of leakage such as cooling water .

spurces inslcfe the drywell to ensure they are indicative of RPV leakage. Drywell equipment and fl~or drain sump .

level. rise . is the normal .

method of monitoring . .

and calc~lating leakage from the RPV.*A Reactor Building - . equipment or floor drain sump level rise may .

also be .indicative of RPV inventory, *

.* losse~ extemaitothe Primary Containment from systems connected to the RPV. With RHR System .

operating'in the Shutdown Cooling mode; an UNPLANNED rise in suppression.pool level could be.

indi~ative ofRHR valve misalignment or leakage. If the make-up rate to the RPV unexplainably rises

above the pre-established rate; a loss of RPV inventory may be occurring even if the source of the

leakage. ~an not be. immediately identifie.d. Visual observation of leakage from systems* connected to the

RCS in ar.e'as o.utside the Primary .ContainlTlehtthc;it cann9t be i.solated could be indicative of a loss of RPV inventory. (ref. 1, 2, 3)

'Fourchannels(>f log courit.~ate meters are availabie .in the ControlRoorri to detect erratic source tange

rnonitor. indic~tions (ter 4): *. *

*

SRM A*&c on 2CEC*PNL606 .

.

SRM B & p on 2CEc*PNL633 .* : *. * *

* .**.*. <*** Post~TMI studies indic:ated that :the inst~iled nuclear instr~mentation' will 'operate erratically ~h~nthe~:: .

atooIfor making such

'" ... "*:*'* "": \ !* .

.. core is uh covered and thatsource ral')ge monitCm; carf b~ used as

..**. * * * .' d.eterniinatiorn:;. :Figurer c.:..2 shows the response ofthe ~ource range monitor during the fir~t few hours*

. >of the TM1.:?'~Gciderit. The instrument reported; an increasi~g signal about30 minutes into.the accident.* .

. ._Afthis tirri'e,.the.reactorcoolantpumps were',

running. a,nd the corewas

. adequately . .

cooled as._indicated*

by ttie c9re outlet th~rmocouples: Hence, th*e increa~ing signal was the result cit ~n increasing twp.:. . .*.* ..

pha~e void fr~dtion*in.th~ r~actor.cote*~ncl .\/e~se.I downc~lll~r and the *r~duced ~hieloing th~t the~tVvo~ .. *.

phase mi~ture ..

proyjdes to the'..source r~nge. monitor:

. *~

~

UNIT 2 EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP~AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 132 of 264

. Attachment 1, Emergency Action Levei Technical Bases (Continued)

CS3~3 Site Area Emerge,ncy (Continued)

Generic Under the conditions specified by this EAL, continued decrease in RPV level is indicative of a loss of inventory control. Inventory loss may be due to an RCS breach, pressure boundary leakage, or continued boiling in the RPV. Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted.

Escalation tQ a General Emergency is via EAL CG3.1, EALCG3.2, RG1.1, RGt.2 or RG1.3.

*

The 30-minute duration allows: sufficient time for actions to be performed to recover inventory control equipment. * * * * * * * * * **

As water level inthe RPV lower~, the dose r~te above the core will increase. The dose rate due to this

.. co.re shine should result in site specific monitor indication arid possible alarm.

. NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1.

USAR Sedion 5.2.5

2. USAR Secti~n 7.6. L3

3.

N2-'EOP-PC Primary ContainmentControl 4~

N2-bp.;92 Neutron Mbniforing 5 .. NEI 99-01 IC>CS1 * .

" *. . ' ~ ; '*

'. _j_

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP..;AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1

Page 133 of 264

. Attachment 1, Emergency Action Levef Technical Bases (Continued)

Figure C-2: Response of the TMl-2 So~rce *Ran~e Mea$urement I

. During the FirsfSix Hours ,of the.Accidenf I I

~

.N

.*~

.) ...

Q)

- ~.

....CD

.~ .',:~_***. ' *, *. E

.: .* . j::

. *. .'(...... . *.. ~ .* .

. ; ~ .:*

.... '*..~

. ' ': .* :** :*~--~

.- >-*G>"

~5~

....~... :- . :L_,,.-;....;.;....;._..;._..;.._., _. ;,. ; . . - 'l.F'" "-;. . ;.~.;, ,;. .;. ,.,. . ,.,.;,~. ,. . . i,.-~. .:. , ~- *-~ *-*"0-Cl>-"*_.G~* *l~ .. 0

.M. . *1-

. csa~eo~p

.. /* ; ~- '. .

6oo*ptio~es.Jad : - ..

si~no~.*-

~ ;., .

~ .: *. : *.* ..

- - *~ '.* .:(.

1, **

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP;.AA.:.1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1 Page 134 of 264

Attachment 1; Elllergem:y Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: **C- Cold Shutdown I Refueling SystE3m Malfunction Subcategory: . 3-:- RPVLevel ln.itiating Condition: .

Loss of RPV inventory EAL:

CA3.1 Alert

RPVwater level< 11.s.in.

. OR . . . . .: .

RPVwater:l~vel.cannot be monitored for~ 15 min. with ANY UNPLANNED RPV. leakage indication, Table .C-2 (Note4} * ** * *

NoteA: The ED should not wait ~ntiltheappiicable time has elapsed, butsh~uld declare the event as soon as itis

. d~termined.that the condition ha's ex.ceeded, or will likely. exceed .* the applicable time.* .

. ..Table c-2 RPV Leakage Indications

*. DrywelLequipmeritdrain sulllp level rise

. * ..

b;ywell floor drain sump level rise Reacto~ building equipment sump i~ve1 rise

' : ~

.* *. * :.':.~.

R~~bt~r ~uildingfl~or dr~ii1_$ump l~vel rise .

. *,

SuppressionPooU~v~I ds~ . . .

UNPLANNED riseinRPV make-up rate ..

* .()bs~~~t1ori qfUNl~bi..AsLEBCS '1eakag~* ..

. . Ni~CI~- App1fcability:

: ..:.- .~-

. 4 ~ Colcf' shutdown; .s ~ 'RefueF\ , *;,_. ..

.. ~ . .'

.~-.: . ..

. -. ~*

. *. -~

. _.*=**

.... - ..:;: . :.. i ~-**

-~, ~* ..

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 135 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Actio.n Level Technical Bases (Continued)_

CA3~ 1 Alert (Continued)

Basis:

Plant-Specific The threshold RPV water levei of 17 .8 in. is the low-low-low ECCS. actuation setpoint (ref. 1).

Figure C-1 illustrates the RPV water level instrument ranges (ref. 2, 3).

In Cold Shutdown mode, the RCS will normally be INTACT and standardRPVwater level monitoring means are available. In the Refuel mode, the RCS is not INTACT and RPV water level may be -

monitored by different means, including the' ability to monitor level visually.

In the second condition of this EAL, all RPV water level indication would be unavailable and,

. the RPV inventory loss must be detected by Table C-2, RPV Leakage Indications. Level increases must be*

evaluated against other potential sources of leakage such as cooling water sources inside the dryweff to ensure they are indicative of RPV leakage. Drywell equipment and floor drain sump level rise is the normal method of monitoring and calculating leakage from the RPV. A Reactor Building equipment or floor drain sump level rise may also be indicative of RPV inventory losses external to the Primary

.Containment from systems conneded to the RPV. With RHR System operating in the Shutdown Cooling mode, an UNPLANNED rise in suppression pool level could be indicative ofRHR valve misalignmenfor leakage. If the make~up rate to the RPV unexplainably rises above the pre-established rate.. a loss of RPV inventory may be.occurring even ifthe source of the leakage cannot be immediately

-. identified. Visual observation of leakage from systems con~ected to the RCS ih areas outside the Primary Containment that cannot be isolated could be indicative of a loss of RPV inventory. (ref. 4, 5, 6)

Depending on the configuration of the reactor cavity and Spent Fuel Pool (gates installed or removed) and the status of refueling operations (all spent fuel seated in storage racks/RPV or a bundle raised on the fuelgrapple), a loss of inventory may reduce water shielding above irradiated components or spent fuel. EALs in Subcategory R.2 should be assessed for emergency classification due to the radiological consequences of such events .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 .

Revision 1.

Page 136 of 264 Atta.chment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

CA3;1. Alert (Continued)

. Generic This EAL s~rves as a precursor to a loss of ability to adequately cool the fuel. The magnitude of this

. loss of water indicates that makeup systems have not been effective and may not be capable of .

preventing further RPV water level decrease and potential core uncovery. This condition will result in a**.

minimum .emergency classification level of an Alert. * .* * **

The inabilityt6 restore and maintain level after reaching this setpoi~t would be indicative of a failure of

. the RCS bafrier. * * * * *

. ' . . . .~ .

- . lfRPVwater level continues to lower then escalation to Site Area Emergency will be via EAL CS3:1; EALCS3.2 or EAL CS3.3; .

NMP2 Basis .*

Reference(s):

- 1. N2.:.Q~-'~3High.Pressure Core Spray

- . 2: N2'-EOP-RPV RPV Control ' .

3. N2-0P-34 Nuc:;lear Boiler; AutomaticDepressurization; and Safety Relief Valves

4. USAR Section 5.2.5 .. .

. 5.

USARSection 7.6.1.3

6; N2~EQP~PC Primary Containment Control f NE1:99.:01 IC CA1 . .

c,*_,

.* *. . *.~

..... : .. ~ . : . *..

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES . EP,;AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 137 of 264

.*Attachment 1, Emergency Action Levei Technical Bases (Continued)

Figure C~1 RPVWater Level Instrumentation Ranges (ref. 2, 3)

'.**~*******~***

. 545..

~*

. . I

.3_

'~*

I 0 1 0* I

,,J-'- *

). I

.*" *:r: .,.,..* w (f) ,q*.::5a. .z j

0 r;,;,i

_j w.

205 Ci::

HfoH LEVELTRIP~ 202;3 .. *. .

~**~ **~ . -*.I

. : . HIGH LEVEL ALARM 187.3' ~ ..

. NGRMAL WATEKiEVEL ~**. "' ' j . . i

. * : *. *. Low LEv~L;ALAR'.10. i7s.3 *

1 1

..* . * *. .* !::ow tEVELTRIP i59'.3 f

. .. ..145. . .**. . . *.

J Dijl)~L~\OW LEVELT~I~j>*1o~:s*

- - - - ltllt~ll llil!lil*~.*** .***********

.I FEEDWATER' 35**

1*

TRIP:~. LS.W.~~VE;L TR~P_ ..* 17;;~* .

'INSTR!JMENTZERQ

... * *. D . ..., .. .......

. ..: ... .::5,,

~ ~ ........ .....................

................. ~

. ~ ..... .

TOP* OF ACTIVE Fl)El,. .-14,p

-165 1

I I

.1 JET PUMP* INSTR.

. . . . .,. . - **-*---*. ACTIVE Rll}.j(J5

..'.'" - .,;, _; _ - - - INACTIVE RANGE

. ~..

'.* .. '": ~ ' ', ,

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BA$ES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1

Page 138 of 264

. ~ttachment 1, Emergency Action Level Te~hnical Bases (C~nUnued) * ..* *.

*Category: c ..,,..cold*Shutdownj Refueli.ng System Malfun~tion

Subcategory: 3 - R.PVWater Level Initiating Condition: . RCS leakage .

EAL:.

CU3.1 Unusual Event

RCS leakagJ re~Lilts in the i11ability t6 maintain orrestore RPV water level> 159.3 in ..

tor ~ 15 min. (Note 4) . . . .

Note 4: . The ED should not wait until the applicable tirrie has elapsed, but sh~uld declare the event as soon as it is

. determined that the conditiori has, exceeded, .or will likely exceed, the applicable time *

Mode Applicability:

4 -C~ld Sh~tdown .* *

Basis:*

Plant-Spedfic. .

.. Figure*c-.1* iHustratesthe.RPVwater*level instrum.erit.ranges(ref *1, 2). * * .*

"'* " * * ********* *,. '. ** * .* * * * , "t * * * *** * ,. * *

"* '*.=:7 *...

. . 159.3 in. i~ the'RPY loyv water level scr*:frn setp9int (ref. t)>

RPV water. level is monitored}rom

. .. . ;16S'rn. fo +54s'in. to- ensur~ acjequate co\leragefor

" . . . . *. . . expected

. . and

.* p~stul~ted:~~n'ditio~s of RP\(wate~ l~veL Rf?V ~C1t~r.l~vel*measu~~r)1entisAerived.by.t~e differential

..... press.ureth:at~~ist~ i>~t\1Vee~ar~feie~c¢ leg arid v~riable l~g; All level)nsfru~~nts are reforenced to'an .

"iii9trumenf.zerq", which is .380:99 inches abpve "vessel :zeiro.:Jhe instrument Zeto is the t()p of the

, reactor've~~¢1 upeer gric:J (top*~lUid~Y RPy:water level monitoring' is ~ubdjvided into five ranges .. ** .*

~ . -~ .~* ..... ' identified a~o:.< *.r .' ** * * *.*. *.. ****

.. Narrow provides'ihdi.cation. and control:sign~ls)or. riafin~I. planfoperatiqn,and -protection system . actuaticn. *.

Wjde pr:ovidesi'ridication:~nd ccihtrol signals to~ t~arisier1tconditions* below th~ rio.rinal operating b~r:id and

.* .... ~~¢rn~lldyequipm~nt:~cttlatib.il-:)*<*- .** _,,. . * '.*.~

.:,*. .:".; *:. :*,; . *:*~ - - ~ ..*

.. .*. , i

-** . .-.. _* ~. ;:- - :

- ... ~

.* -Shutefownprovitjes ind!cation(qr ve~sel flood up'and attivfries.

-. ., * - . ,

Fuel Zone:prnvides

-. . *' ..* *" ,::..'*_*<" ***~

indication'fori~ngterm accidenfcohditicns wh~re reiacto~*:l~~el canncifbe restored ..

.. . . . :.*. :.;_.;* .. * '.... ' . *:~ .. *, : . .~ ... >., ' ,. ~.. *;** *.. .' . . . . .-: ' .

-~* .,.,_.,..

. *,* -~

~

- < * *'~ ****

r: .- .*.

\*.

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION*TECHNICALBASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 139 of 264

Attachmen't 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases. (C~ntinued)

CU3.1 Uriusual Event (Continued)

. The shutdown range level indication is utilized du~ing _cold reactor startup and vessel flood up for

. . refueling. The shutdown range Instrument uses a single level transmitter (21SC*LT105) to provide an

.. input to a level indicator on2C~S*P.NL85t(Computer Point A486). (ref. -3)

This Cold Shutdown EAL represents the hot condition EAL SUB.1, in which RCS leakage is associated

with Technical Specification limits: In Cold Shutdown, the~e limits are not applicable; hence, the use of RPVieveiasJhe parameter of c~ncern in this EAL (ref:). *. .

Generic * ..

This EAL *is .consid~redtob~ apot~~tial degradation ofthe level of safety of the*plant. The inability to*

maintain '

or .

restore level is indicative.of loss .

ofRCSimientory.* . *.

Relief val\t'~_normal operation shouldbe excludedJr~mthis EAL. .However, a relief valve that operates and fails Jo close~ per design should be considered applicable to this EAL if the relief valve cannot be*

isolated.*. * * * * * * ** * * *

Proionged-.ioss of.RGS inv~ntory:may resultirresGalation tb the Alert. emergency Classification level via either EALCA2.1 or EAL CA3:l: .* .** .. . . . . .. . . . I I

I NMP2 Basi~(Reterence(s): I 1.. N2-I;OP:-RPV RPVConfrol --.

2. N2-0P~34-Nuclear Boiler, Automatic bepressuri;fa~tion; and Safety Relief Valves

3. NIP-:Ol)T,.01 Sh.utdoWn Scifety.< '.**.***** ' .. * *. '.

' ' . 4 .. NEI .99~()1 IC CLJ1. ' ' ' . ' ** ;

- -~

. .~. '

.- . ~ *._.

~- ' .. *.-.-

~- .

- . ~* .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 140 of 264 Attachment1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases.(Continued). *.

Figure.C-1 RPV WaterLevel Instrumentation Ranges (ref.1, 2)

w

,(!) '

I .* *z w

~ (!) tiJ

.***** .. *.* . * ** .. * **j***

MAiN,.

STEAM

.*. '§*. * *.*UJ~;

ei:::

z . . . z:

o*

' _j

~.*

w

. . ., .* : ... *<( ,__,. ,:::>'

.? . ~**. *~*-

205

' H'fGf-:1. LEyEl TRiP' 202;'3' ' *.* .

llllllHUHilHU . . 111.

Hl!lllillllll llllllHHll llllHllU 1111111111111 l

No~l~*~Xr~LtL~!~ *isz*.

3

~ *.

tu :

LO~$~JE~~:r~ 1 1 ~ 0 8 ~ .

s r

~**

. ~::i:_ ' :'

.I

' ~~*~****;~

', ... 145 '

.... ob'tJ~LE.tow.LE\lt:L.T~I~\ ' ' '

~."1ui**** 1111i11)~~~~*** . ......... .. .,

.I I

J I . ', FEEDWATER ' ' 35**

. *'l:RIPE; L(JWL.EVEL~TRlP*. 1?:;8>

. lNSTRL!MENTZERO ..*

'>, '* * *","**' *** *** v*

a*.*. .* ':>"-5..

,* ~ ."

11t.!U*H*lllllhUIHtl*IHIHlf:l!l,llllOIHllHtHIHIUllHlltl

_165 I.

'I ..

J NorE::: . JET

.. ALL LEVELS ARE REFERENCED ',' ,* PUMP/INSTR.* "" ', .,. _.'-~- AcmvE RAN(JE, 1;0 J['JSTRUMENT ZERCL.. ,, , . . .

(;3"8p,;6,9" Ai;>,OVE VESS El ZERO)*

~-- . . ----INACTIVE RANGE '

.'..: *,. ': ~ ** ...

.. . . :. ~- ...

:~.I *

' )

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 141 of264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technicc:1I Bases (Continued)

Category: ._.* *_* G- Cold .Shutdown /Refueling* System Malfunction Subcategory:

3 - RPV Water Level Initiating Condition: RCS Leakage EA~:

cua.2 Unusual Event .

. *..* UNPLANNED RPV water level drop below EITHER of the following for~ 15 min. (N~te 4):

364 in, (RPV flange)

. RPV water level band (when the RPV water level band is established below the

HPV flange) * * *

.* Note 4: . **.The ED:sho~ld notwaituntil the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is

det~rrnined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time

- ** Mode *Applic~bility:

- - .Basis:

Plant-Specific _**

- .*, ..*= *:.*

The:RpVfl~nge ievel is ftt364 in. or 330 ft 1o in. el (ret.:1 )..

.. -Figure cj .i.llu_strates the .RPV,water level instrument ranges (ref. 2, .3). -_ * *..

_.* ..*.. RPV water)evel is rfionitored from-165 Jn. to +545 :iri, fo ensure adequate coverag~ for expeeted and

. *.. *_ 'pqstu'lat~d co'nditions bf RPVwater level. RPV wa~er level measurem~ntis d~~ived by the differential pre~surethat ... -: _ __

exists' betw~en'a~eference leg and vari~ble l~g. All .level instruments are ref~~~nced t~ an .*

"instrument zero°, which is 360.69 inches above '\iesselzero" ~ The instrument zero is the top of the

- - .. : *..' rea~torve~sel

u~pergrid (top.gUide).

RPV .~at~rlevel .

monit~ri~g is subdi~ided into five ranges Identified* as: *

- . N~rrovv- **-.*

p~ovides.

indic~tion ~nd. control signal*~ far norm~I-p*lant operation and protection s~stem actuation.

* *. Wjdeprbvides indication.and control.signalsfortransi~nt conditions below the normal operating band and.*

". :emergericy-eqi.iipmenf actUation'. * *

" * . Ups~_t)fovides indi¢ation'for transient conditions ab~ven9rmal operating,bancL.

'", .~*'

- Shutdown ~rovide~* indication for.*v~ssei tiooq up*and.activities. *.

. ** 7* : . - *** * *-

... ,- . . * * * * *, . ** * .~

..

ruel *:zone *prov(~es indicatiop for long term accident conditions where reactor level cannot be restorecf. *...

. ,/ .;*.:*

,* *--~_-. *::,

UNIT 2 Erv1ERGENCYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 142 of 264

. Attachment 1, Emergency Action Levei Technical Bases (Continued)

CU3~2Unuslial.Event (Continued).*.

The shutdown range lev.el indication is utilized during cold reactor startup and vessel flood up for *

.refueling. The shutdown range instrument uses a single level transmitter (21SC*LT105) to provide an input to a level indicator on 2CES*PNLB51 (Computer PointA486). (ref. 4)

. This Cold Shutdown EAL represents the hot condition EAL SU8.1, in which RCS leakage is associated_ .

with Techn.ical Specification limits. In Cold Shutdown, these limits are not applicable; hence, the use of -

RPVwater leyel as the parameter of concern in this EAL (ref. 5).

Generic

__ This EALis a precursor df more serious conditions and considered to be a potential degradation of the -

- . leveH ofsatety of the plant..* . -

Refueling evolutions that decrease RPV water level below the RPV flange are carefully planned and -

procedurally controlled. An UNPLANNED .event that results in water level decreasing below the RPV flange, or below the planned -RPV wate~ level for the given evolution (if the planned RPV water level is.

already bel()W the RPV flange); warrants declaration of a UE due to the reduced RCS inventory that is *.

available to keep the core .covered. . .

Theallowanceof15 min~tesw~.schosen becayse itis reason~ble to assume that level can be resfored within this ~inie frame using one or more of the redundant means of refill that should be available. If

'level cannot-be res~ored in this time frame then it may indicate a more serious condition exists.

Continued loss of RCS Inventory will resultin escalation to the Alert emergency classification level via either EALCA2.:1 or EAL CA3.1. * - -* .

_This EAL' involves a decrease in RCS level below the top of the RPV flange that continues for 15 minutes due to an UNPLANNED event. This EAL is not applicable to decreases in flooded reactor

-cayity level, which is addressed by EAL RU2.1, until such time as the level decreases to the level of the --.

vessel flange. * -* -

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. N2-SOP-31RRefueling Qperations Alternate Shutdown Cooling -

2. -. N2;;EQP"RPV RPV Control .

3. - N2-0P-34 Nuclear Boiler, Automatic Depressurization, and Safety Relief Valves 4 .. NIP-OUT-01 Shutdown Safety _. _ _ . _ . - *

.9._~ lniprpv~d Technical Specifications Nine Mile Point Nuclear-station, Unit No. 2, 3A.7

-* .6, NEI 99'."01 IC GU2 I *.-*. :.,

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BA$ES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1

. Page 143 of 264

_.Attachment 1, Emergency Action 'Level Technical Bases-(Continued)

Figure C-1 RPV Wate~ LeveHm;trumentatiori Ranges (ref. 2, 3) .

..--* iii

(!) .

UJ z *z.*

j* . . ** .*.*.

MAiN.

~..*

... ..:.J' fZ STEAM. UJ 205 2>.

l';l!G~LLEVELIRIP' 202.3 j '

l_lltll~4lf.l~llii11ti*1tHI_ HUlllllllH lf~lilHIUtl !ltiHHll tolllt111114HI H}.Gl-j LEVEL ALARM. 18:?:~3,,:.__I ** *:tu* .

I

.1 '*

NORMAL WATER LEVEL . a.to.

LOW LEVEL ALARM 178 .3

LOW LEVEL TRIP 159.3' :: . 'J.

- . . .. I

~-~****~- ~~~.i ~ HHt~*-~*** ~~

t,.E~L TRIP.. 10s*:s-: ..

I 1!11.'!_ ... . . *** .-***

DG0BLE Lbw .. .

. . l* J ..

.* TRIPE 1.owt~~VELTRW *

11:*.s ~ ~ *

FE:EDWATER 35i

-.:JNstRUMENTZERb_. .o. . *.:.5

.._.11*11**1tn."~-*.*ui1o111tHll.'~Ul!!Hiil"'**********~**,.. ,._, ......

TOP: OF *AtJIVE FU~~- ~ 1~to . __,___. . .

. ;*; ;)° ... :* ,'*. *... **

. 21i5

' ' ,.** :l.

. * :.**-. . )

~--

\: ......::*,: .* *:- **..

. ~ . . ..

.*:.:- .** ~* *:

. ,.\ *** ~

__......,....... ACTIVE.RAN.GE' 7;..~i~--~ JN~cnvE$NdE-.

-: **_: *. ~ .*._,.*".

. :* -..,.: ~ . . . .. : ..

.. * ....; ~-

. ~. . ':< .

~**** '*.

UNIT2 EMERGENCY ~LASSIFICATIONTECHNICALBASES, EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page.144 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases_(Continued}

Category: - C .:c.: Cold Shutdow_n l Refueling System Malfunction Subcategor}t: 3 ...., RP,V Water Level -

Initiating Condition: _HCSLe~kage -

EAL:

cu:t3 - . _Unu~ua_I Ev~nt -

RPVwater level cannot be monitored With a loss of RPV inventory as indicated by ANY UNPLANNED RPV leakage indication, Table C~2 - - - -

-Je1ble C-2RPVL~~kage Indications

D~yWel! equipment drain sump level rise i ** -DrY\/Vell flqor drain' sump level rise -

i

Reactor.. building equjp~entsump level rise -*

I

Reactor Building flo~r .drain *sunip level rise

-Suppression Pool level rise _

- UNPLANNED rise' ip RPV make~up rate

.~ *. .* Observation of LJNISOLABLE. RC-S leakage -_- _ :

. . .. ' . . .: *. . . , ' . - .~~ .

. Mode Applicability:

,:* ,, -s --~ Ref1Jel ;.:.* . *-*.::*:

. . . .:* : . ~- *. . *. -. . . *:. - ~ ;_; .. .

-. ........ .. .~::- . . .

- - ... : -*-:. *~ J *.:* _*.

_:-.* . .\-.: .

~ . .. ...

- ,~

. UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1

-** CU3.3 Unusual Event (Continued) .*

..* Attachment 1, Emer~ency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)* . *.

Page 145 of 264 Basis:*

Plant-Specific In this EAL, all RPV water level indication would be.-unavc:ii!able and, the RPV inventory l~ssmust be .*

C-2, RPV 'Leakag~ L~vel increases must be evaluated against other

. detected by Table . *. .. .

Indications,

. . - \ . -

potentiaLsources . . .

of leakage .

such as. cooling wate~.. sources .

inside the drywell to' ensure .

they are I

I

indicative of RPV leakage. Drywell equipment and floor drain .sump level rise is the normal method of *_

I .

monltOri'ng and calculating* leakage fromthe RPV. A*ReacforBuilding equipment Or floordrain s-ump*.-

inveritoryloss~s ~xternal to th~Primary Containment from.

I

.* level rise' may also be indicative of RPV systems c~nriected to the RPV. With RHR System ~perating in the Shutdown Cooling mode, an UNPLANNED rise in suppression pool level couid be indicative ()f RHR valve misalignment or leakage; .

If the make-up rate to the RPV unexplainably rises above-the-pr-e-established rate, a loss of RPV . .

inventory may be occurring even ifthe source of the leakag~ cannot be imfnediateiy identified. Visual.**

......' .. obs13rvation of leakage from_ systems connected .t~ U1e RCS in areas outside the Primai-Y Containment

that cannot ,

be . isolat~d. couldbe indicative of a Josspf ..

RPV inventory.

(ref. 1, 2, 3)

Depending on the. configurationof thereact~r cavity and Spent Fuel Pool (gates installecLor removed) *.

and the status ofr~fueling operations(all s~ent fuel ~eated in storage racks/RPV or abundle raisedon

..**. .the fuel :grapple); a io~s of inVe~tory rllay reduce Vvater shielding above irradiated components or: spent

-fuel: EALs in ~Spbcategory R.2 sf1~uld~~e a~sessedfor-.emergency clas~ifitation due to the radiological *.

c9nsequerices of~uc~_events. :

Generic .

.. "fhisEAL is a precursor o~mor~ ser.ious conditionsarid cori'sidered tobei potential degradation of the level of .safety-of the plant. * * * * * * *

Ref~eling evolutions that decrease RPVwater level below the-RPV flange are carefully planned and >

procedurally controlled. An UNPLANNED event that results in water level decreasing bel9w the RPV

flange, or below the plann(3d RPV water level tor the given evolution (if the planned RPV water level is.*

already below the RPVflarige),warrarits decl8ration ofa UE due to the reduced.RPV inventory thatis,.

available to.keep the core-cover¢d: ' ' '

. *~ ..

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013-Addendum 4 Revision 1

.. Page 146 of 264.

Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Continued loss. of RCS lnventorywill result in escalation to the Alert emergency classification level via either EAL CA3.1 or EAL CA4.1.tempera,ture indication and RCS level indication may not be.available.

Redundant means of RPV vvater level indication will normally be installed (including the ability to*

monitor level visually) to assure ttiat the ability to monitor level will not be interrupted. However, if all level indication were to be lost during a loss of RPV inventory event, the operators would need to determine that RPV inventory loss was occurring by ob.serving sump and tank level changes. Sump and tank level increases must be evaluated against other potential sources of leakage such as cooling water sources inside the containment to ensure they are indicative of RCS leakage.

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. USAR Section 5.2.5

2. USAR Section 7.6.1.3

3. N2-EOP-:-PC Primary Containment Control

4. NEI 99~01 IC CU2

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 147 of 264 Attachment 1, Emerg~ncy Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

.Category: ** C *...:. Cold Shutdown J *Refueling. System Malfunction ..

. SubcategQry: 4-RCSTemperature .

.Initiating Condition: Inability to maintain plant in cold shutdown .

EAL:

CA4 ..1 Alert An UNPLANNED. evenUesults

. . . - in EITHER:

RCS temperature >200°F for> Table C~4 duration OR RPV pressure increase > 10 psi due to an UNPLANNED loss of decay heat removal capability

.1:.

Table C-4 .RCS. Reheat Duration-Thresholds CONTAINMENT

RCS* Status Duration .

CLOSURE Status

INTACT. .N/A *60 min.*

'. ~ . ..

-* Established 20 min.*

- . *Not INTACT

Not established O min.**

lfanRCS heat removal system is in operation-within this time frame a~d RCS temperature is being redl,lced, the EAL is not applicable.

ModeApplicability:

4 -c 'C~ld ShutdoWn; 5 - Refuel .

' ; . ~

. '~ ~ .......

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICALBA$ES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1 Page 148 of 264

. .. ' *~ . . ... -: . . . . .' .*. . .* '

. Attach~ent 1, Emergency Action LevelTechnical Bases (Continued}*

CA4 ..1 Alert (Co~tinued)

Basis:

Plant~Spedfic Several in'strLJments are capable of providing indication of RCS temperature with respect to the *.

Technical Specification cold shutdowntemperature limit (2.00°F). These include (ref. 2):

Recircoperatihg~.Temperature RecorderB35-R650.at P602:

o

l;.obp A: Channel . ..

1,.. RCS .

LOOP . '

A s*uctlON * *

.* o .* LqopB: Channel 6, RCS LOOP B SUCTION

.*. Shutd()vyn,cooling operating*_: Temperature Recorder E12~R601 at P601 ..

o Loop A; Pt>int 1,.RHR INLET TO HX A *

. Loq~ B:.Pqint2, RHF{ INLET TO HX B . *..

- - - - . *.**. 0

' . If Rx,Recir~ orshutdqwn Cboling~ pumps are not in. ~peration and re.actorcoolaht tem1pe~ature is .*. .

greater tha~ qr equal to 212°F, RCStemp¢rature can be obtained by corl'verting ttie RpV pre~15ljre to temperature ~~ing the. saturated st.eam*t~b.l_e~. . * * * * * *

. If RCS temperature exc~eds 200°F, an op~rating mode change ocdurs. Although the* event may have .

originated in c9ld conditions, the emergency classification s,hall be.based on the;operating mode that'*.

existed at the)il1)e the everit occur+~.d (prior to anyprotective system or operat9r a,Ction initiated in

.* response to the condition)". F6r everitS'thatoccur in:'Cold Shutdowri*or Refuel., escalation is via EALs **

'thafh13veC()ld stiutdown 'or,*R~fljel}or rn,o~e applicability; ev~n itff6t Shutdown* (or a higherniode )is *....

.**,entered during any subsequent heat~up_.. lfrparticular;. the fissimrproduct ba.rrierEALs are applicable

. *; only .to .* events that .initiate .

in Hot-Shutdown

- . . -: : ..,- ~~

orhigher.

. .. _. ~- ;:- -

*'.. . *.~ ! ,.: **

~-:- ':**;'._": ,***

' *-. ~ -':

. . ~- .' .,

UNrf 2 EMER.GENCY ~LASSIFICA~IONTECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 149 of 264 Attachment 1, E~ergency Action LevelTechnical Bases (Continued)

CA4.1 Alerf(Continued)

. The pres~ure rise of greater than 10 psig infers an RCS temperature in excess of th~ Technical

specification cold shutdown li~it (200°F) for which. th_ is EAL ~ould other-Wise permit up to sixty minutes to restore RCS cooling before declaration of an Alert (RCS INTACT). This EAL therefore covers

situations iri which .it is determined that, due to high decay heat loads, the time provided to reestablish tem1perat'ur~ control should be iessthan sixty minutes (as> indicated by significant RCS re-pressuritation ).

Wide range pressure indication(0-~2oopsig) is capable of measuring pressure changes of 10 psig (ref.

6).

.If RCS temperature ~xceeds 200<>F, an operating ~~de change occurs. Although the ev.ent may have

originated in Cold conditions, the emergency classification shall be based Ori the operating mode that

.* ~xisted at-the time the evehtoc~urred (prior to ariy protectiv~ ~ystem or operator action initiated in response;tothe condition). For events thatoccurin C~ld ,Shutdown or Refuel, escalation is via EALs '

thafhave C9ld Shutdown* or RefuelJ?r: mode applicability, e'ven *if Hot Shutdowri (or a. higher mode) is

.. entered du_~in*g any subsequent h~at-up. In particular, the fiss.ion product barrier EALs are applicable o_nly to eyents that initiate in Hotstiutciowti or higher.*.

Escalatioh td a Site Area Emerge~~Y would be Linder EAL.* CS3.1 stiduld bC>Hing r~sult in .significant RPVwater level.loss lead)ng to cor~ Lir")COVery..

.Gerie~ic .. *

,*The RCS R~heat DurationThresho.iq~:table'address~~ ¢o'rnpiete)oss:of fur1cU011s req~ired for core '.

cc)oling f()r greater th?n 60 r:ninute's during refuel and cbldsJiutdown mocies when ~cs integrity is *..

estaplisll¢~/Th~ 60 mi11ute timeJran1e should allow sufflci~tidime to' restore c6oling without there .

being a ~u~stantial deg_ra_datiori i,f:ir?lpnt.safety. ,, ' ' *. ' ' *.* ' ' ' ' . '.*. *, ' '

The RCS 'Reheat Di.I ration Thresholds'.:table also ~d,dressesthe complete loss<offLinctiohsrequired for '

.core_ coolihgJor greater than 20 ,riiiril:it<?~ during* Refuef"~nd cold sh.utdowri lllddes whe'n * * *** ** * ** *

CbNTAI NMENT CLO SU RE is est~blish~_dbut R.C$ integrity Is not established:* The .allowed 20 minute to tirile'franie was* included allowo'perator actiontorest()re the heat rernovalfun'ction, if possible;

Fi_nally,* corl'lpl~te loss of fur1etie?*risreqcii~ed:forcore,cooU1Jg duringRef~erand* cold.shutdown modes.**.

when neit~~r,_cor*ffAINf\/lENTCLbSµHEnor.RCS integdty are established_ i$. addressed. f\Jo. delay~ .*

time*fs'allowed because the evaJ>oratedreactO( coolant thafmay be'released_fnto the Containment

duting th.is heatup conditiOri could also be directly rel1?~sedto'Jhe environment ... *.* . . .. .

' The'not~ (*}iry,diqates th~tJhis .,EAL ls.not~p~licable ifactions are SUCGSSsful in r~storing an' RCS heat

>

remov~I sy~!em to operiltion arid :R*cs ternperc;itufo i~ b~ing red4ced wiJhiri the ~pe~ifiec:J lime:fram.e. * -

,_ *. -* :: .. ~- .

- :~ :.... -'; *. .

.* ** L '

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1

_Page 150 of 264 Attachment 1; Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)_

CA4~ 1 Alert (Continued) -

The 1O psig pressure increase addresses situations where, due fo high decay heat loads, the time -

provided to restore temperature control, should be l~ss than 60 minutes. The RPV-pressure setpoint was chosen_because it is the lowest pressure that the site can read on installed Control Board instrumentation that is equal to or greater than 10 psig. - -

Escalation to Site Area Emergency w~uld be via EAL CS3.1 should boiling result in significantRPV level loss leading to core uncovery.

A loss of Technical Specification components alone is not intended to constitute an Alert The same is true of a momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the_Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limitvithen the heat removal function is available.

The Emergency Director must remain alert to events or conditions thcit lead to the conclusion that exceeding the EAL is IMMINENT. If, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, an IMMINENT

- situation is at hand, the classification should be made as if the.threshold has been exceede_d.

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. Technical Specifications Table 1.1-1 2; N2-0SP-RCS-@001 RCS Pressure/Temperature Verification

3. NIP-OUT-01 Shutdown Safety -

4. -_Improved Technical Specifications Nine' Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2, 3~6.1.1

5. Improved Technical Specifications Nine Mile Point Nuclear Sfation, Un!tNo. 2, 3.6.4.1

6. _N2~Qp.,34 Nuclear Boiler, Automatic Depressurization arid Safety Relief Valves, Attachment 1

- 7. NEI 99-o1* 1c CA4

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNiCAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum4 . .

Revision 1 .'

Page 151 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical.Bases (Continued)

Categor}i: * **** C - Cold Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunction Subcategory:

.. .. . . ~

4 ~*RCS Temperature

. Initiating Condition: UNPLANNED loss of decay heat removal capability EAL:.

I

CU4.1 Unusual *..Event . *. .*

UNPLANNED event results iri RCS temperature> 200°F

. Mode Applicability:

4 - Cold Shutdown, 5 - Refuel

- easis:

Plant-Specific

- - Severalir1struments are capable of providing indic~tion of RCS temperature with respect to the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit (200°F). These include (ref. 2):

Recirc.operating-Temperature ~ecorder B35-R650 at P602: ****

o

Lbop A: Channel 1, RCS LOOP A SUCTION .

. o : Loop B: Channel 6; RCS LOOP B SUCTION .

Shutdown cO'oling ' ope~ating

- "femperature.Rec~rder E12-R601 atP6ci1

. '. 0 'Lbop A:Poinf1' RHRINLETTO HXA ci .* LpOp. B: Point 2, RHR; INLET TO H)<< B*. *

. If Rx Recirc or Shutdoll'ln Cooling; pumps are. not in operation and re.actor cbolant temperature '.is. . .

greater th~h or equal tc:i 212°F,> RC$. temp~rature can be obtained by corwerting the RPV pressure to*' *

. te111perature l.Jsing *the saturated.steam table*s, *.. *> * * * * * * **

.*, . .*. .* If RCS temperatur~.exceeds 200°F, an operating. mode change. occurs, Although the event may have .. .

. originated :in, cold conditions,. ihe emergency Classification shall be. based ori the operating mode thaf*' .

e'Xil:)ted atJhe time the' event occurred *(prior t() any protective system or operator action initiated in > .

. r:esponse fo the *condition). For events that occur in Cold Shutdown or Refuel, e~calation is via EALs .

.thathavE:} Cold.Shutdown or Refuel for mode applicability, even if Hot Shutdown (or a higher.mode)is

. *** . .. entered during any* subsequent heat-up ... In particular, the fission product barrier *EAL.s are. applic~ble only to events that initiate in Hot Shutdown or higher. * * * * * * *. *

f. ., .., ...

.*:.~* ,. -

UNIT 2 EME_RGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Re:vision 1 Page 152 of 264

-. -. _ Attachm~nt 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

CU4.1 Unusual Event (Continued) *

Generic

This EAL is-a precursor of more serious conditions and, as a result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. In cold shutdow11 the ability to remove decay heat relies primarily :on forced cooling flow .. Operation of the systems that provide this forced cooling may be jeopardized due to the unlikely loss of electrical power or RCS inventory. Since the RCS usually

remain$ INTACT in the cold shutdown mode a large inventory of water is available to keep the core covered~ - - - . - -

During refueling the level in the RPV Will normally be maintained above the .RPV flange. Refueling -

-evol_utions that decrease water level below the RPV flange are carefully planned and procedurally * . . _

controlled. Lossof forced decay heat removal at reduced inventory may result in more rapid increases in RCS/RPVtemperatures depending on the til)le since shutdown.

-Normal mean~ of core temperature indication arid RPV water level indication may not be available in the Refuel mode. Redundant means of RPV water level indication are therefore procedurally installed to assure that the ability to nionitorlevelwill not be interrupted. Escalation to Alert would be via EAL CA3.1 based on an inventory loss or EAL CA4.1 based on exceeding itstemperature duration or pressure criteria.

NMP2 Basi~ .

Reference(s):

- 1. Technical Specifications Table 1.1-1 -* * *- . - * * ._ *.

2. 'N2-0SP-RCS"@001-*

RCS Pressure/Temperature Verification

__ 3. NEI 99-01 IC CU4 *

'* I

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 153 Of 264

. ~ttachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: C - Cold Shutdown/ Refueling System Malfunction Subcategory:. 4 - RCS Temperature Initiating Condition:* UNPLANNED loss of decay heat removal capability EAL:

CU4.2 Unusual Event Loss of all RCSJemp.erature andRPV water level indication for~ 15 min. (Note 4)

Note 4: The ED should notwaituntil the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time Mode Applicability:

4 - Cold. Shutdown, 5 - Refuel Basis:

Plant-Specific*.

Shutdovvn co~ling operating-;-- Temperatur13 Recorde~E12~R601 atP601

. ~ 'toop~::Pointt,>RHR*l~LE+toAx.A:-

.6 Loop.B: Poirif2;RHRINLJ3T TO t-lxs . * .*.*

.*. If Rx Reeirc or Shutdown Cooling *pumps .

are not in operation. and reactor cqolant .

temperature is:.

greater than o~ equal to 212~F. gcste~perature. can be obtairied by converting the RPV pressu~e to temperatur~_using fhe..saturate~ stea~ tables>

r.

UNfr2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA.;1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page.154 of 264 Attachment t, Emergency Action. Level Technical Bases (Continued)

CU4.2 *unusual Event (Continue~)*

RPVwat~rJevel Is monitoredfrom.~16.5.in. to +54S.iri.t()ensureadequatecoverageforexpected and.

postulated conditions of RPVwater level. RPV water level measurement is derived by the differential pressure that ex.ists between a reference leg and variable leg. All level instruments are referenced to an "instrument i~ro", Which .is 380.69. inches above "vessel zero". The instrument zero is the top of the reaetor ~es.s,81 upper grid (top ~uide}. ~Pv water level moni~oring is subd.ivided into five ranges ideritified as: '.

* .* N.arro\IV . ;* *.

provides indicationandcontrolsignals for .

normal. plant operati~n *and protection system actuation

.* Wi~e *provides indication'andcontrol signalsfor.fransient con~itions below the normal operating .

baMd.and.ernergency equipment actuation ..

*. Upset provides indicatiordor transient conditioris ~bove normal operating band.

Shutdown .*.*

provides

indi.catlon for vessel flood .

up. and . .

activities . '

F~elZone provides indic~tiopforJong term accideiltconditions where r~actor level cannot be

.restoi"ed. . .

. The shutdown range levei indicaticm is.Utilized d~ring ~91Cf re~ctor startup and vessel flqod up for ..

ref~el.in.g. *The shlltdow~ range in~t~~m~ntuses a single l~v~ttransmitter (21SC~LT105) to provide an .*

. input'to a 1e~e1 inctic~tor on 2c~s~PNLas1'iG9~r>ut~r.P9int_A4eer (r~t. 3) * . . .

-** . . ....... : .. -:*~ - : -- :- . ,

Althougti.the. e~ellt i:J1ay have o-r'igfrmted.in*cold *c6hctitibn~ ..:the emergency cl8sS.ification ~hall be based on th.e o~~~~tihg. mode .that exi~t~d ~'.t.t6e tinie the :~vent~6curreg .*.(prior to any:*p~otective systern or :' *.

. oper~tor acUOn initiated* in respons~:tQ:'fhe Goridition} For events thatoccur iri c'old Shutdown or *. . .

RefQ~l;esc~lation i~,~ia EA.L~thaH1av.e

. -'. .* *.. * -.*., .... Shutdowridr. R~fuel for rnode.applfo~bi.lity, Cold . . . ... .

ev~~ if:Hof_

Shutdown'(ora highe~ mod~) is.enteredduring aljy:sl,ibsequent heat-:UP, *.In.particular, the fission prodOct~a~ri~rEALs

. . .. .' . ., . . ~ -.

a~eJ1pplio.able only to. ev~nts

.thatirlitiate. in Hot St1~tdo\Nn' o*r *. higher.*

. '.":!°

.:,_.__ .* *. .. . *~

_,* ;*': '.o."

.~ .

..=**

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 155 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

CU4.2 Unusual Event (Continued)

Generic This EAL is a precursor of more serious conditions and, a,sa result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety ofthe plant In cold shutdown the ability to rernove,decay heat relies primarily on forced cooling flow. Operation: of the systems that provide this Jorceg cooling may_ be jeopardized due to the unlikely loss of electrical power or RPV inventory. Since the RCS usually

remains INTACT in the cold shutdown mode a large inventory of water is available to keep the-core covered.

During* refueling the_ level in the RPV will normally .be maintained above the RPV flange.* Refueling*

evolutions that decrease water level below the RPVflange are carefully planned and procedurally_ .

controlled. Loss of forced decay heat removal at reduced inventory may result in more rapid increases in RPV temperatures depending on the time since shutdown. *

Normal means of core temperature indication and RPV water level indication may not be available in the Refuel mode. Redundant means of RPV water level indication are therefore procedurally installed to assure that the ability to monitor level will not be interrupted. However, if all level and temperature indication were tb be lost in either the cold shutdown of refueling modes, this EAL would result in .

declaration of a UE if both temperature and level indication cannot be restored within 15 minutes from the loss of both means of indication. Escalation to Alert would be via EAL CA3.1 based on an inventory

_loss or EAL CA4.1 based on exceeding its temperature criteria.

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1, - Technical Specifications Table 1.1:-1 . * .. *-

2. N2-0SP-RCS-@001 RCS Pressure/TemperatureVerification

3. NiP.,.OLJT.:.0;1 Shutdown Satety .

4. NEI 99-01 IC CU4

.. ' ~ ~ . ..:

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 . .

Revision 1 ..

Page 156 of 264, Attach_ment 1, Emergency Action Level Technict,11 Bases (Continued)

Category:*. C :-- Cold Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunction

Subcategory:

Q-'-Inadvertent Criticality Initiating Condition: *1nadvertent criticality EAL.:

. Unusual . Event . . . . .

A~ UNPLANNED.sustained positive period observed on nuclear instrumentation.

. .. Mode Applicability:

. 4 - Cold Shutdown, 5 - Refuel

Basis:

.' .. : Plant-Specific ..*

The term "sustain~d" is *used to allow exclusion of mcpected short-term positive periods from planned .*

- .fuel bundle or.control rod movements during core alteration. These short-:-term positive periods are the.

.res~lt ofthe . ..*

rise in neutron population .

due.to subcritical.*. .

multiplication .. *

Generic

.*This' EAL:aqdresses* criti~ality events t,hatoccur in.Cold Shutdown or Refueling modes such* as fu.el mis-

. loading eventS and inadvertent dilution events. This EAL indicates a poteritialdegradatidn of the lever of .*.*

.**.. , .*~ .. *.

safety of th~ plant, warranting aUE c:lassification ... *.*. * * * * *

Escalatio~ wo~id be .by Emerg'ency Dir~ctor judgme~t

,, .. NIVIP2 Basis Refererice(s): .

1. 'NEI 99-011Ccu8

.. ,..;, : . . . . ... r

' .*" ~*

.. *.* ~ :

,*...* ': :. ~ ._

UNIT 2 ErvlERGENCYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision.1 Page 157 of 264

. Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: c ~ Cold Shutdown./ Refueling System Malfunction ..

Subcategory: .

6 - Communications Jnitiating Condition:

Loss of .

allonsite or offsite communications capabilities EAL:

cua.1 * *

. .* . ~

Unusual .. . .

Event Loss ofal.1 Table C-5 onsite (internal) communication methods affecting the ability to

.perform routine operations : .

OR *.

Loss of all Table C-5 offsite (external) communication methods affecting the ability to perform offsite .

notifications .

Table c;.5 Communications Systems Onsite Offsite

System (internal) (external)

PBK(nor'filal ~Hal telephones) x x Gaifronics *.

x

. *Station radio. (porta~le) *..

x Control Room installed satellite phones (non portable) x

.. ENS** x RECS x Mode Applicability:

. .4 - Cold Shutdown, 5 - Refuel, D -Defueled

- . Basis:

Plant--Spedfic Onsite/off~it!:l cqm~unications systems are listed in Table c-2 (ref. 1, 2, 3). *

.* * * *...

JhisEAL isthec61d condition equival~ntof !he hot condition EAL $U6.1.

.*~..

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BA$ES.

EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1**

Page 158 of 264

.Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued} *

. CU6.1. Unusmll Event (Continued}

Generic The purpose of this EAL .is to, recognize. loss of conimuriications capability that either defeats the plant a

. operations staff ability to perform rou.tine tasks necessary for plantoperations or the ability to .

communicate issues with off~site authorities. The loss of off-site corriniunications ability is expected to

. be significantlymore comprehensive than the condition addressed by 1o CFR 50.72.

Th~ availability of one method of ordinary off-site cmnmunicatiorisis sufficient to inform federal, state, -

. and local auth_orities of plant issues, This EAUs Intended to be used only when extraordinary means

- . (for example, relaying of information from radio transmissions, individuals being sent to off-site

. locations; andsoforth) are being utilized to make communications possible, NMP2 BasisReference{s):

1. USAR Section .9.52

2. Nine Mile< Point Nuclear Station Site Emergency Plan, Section 7.2

3. *N2-0P~76: PlaritCornmunications *. -*

-. *.:--4 .._N*E1**99_;0*1 . Jc cu.6

-~* , .

-~- ...* '* *:-** *.* :,:*. ,,**

.*. - ~ '* .-( *:

. .** - _:_~: . -< *.. -;:

... *'* -- ~ ..

- *:- _, ..... _ .-___ ; *-:* .. _ **...* ~. ;:-

- /.-"** ..

..... '.* .. . ---~- :* -..

-. ~ . -

UNIT 2EMERGENCY CLASSIFICA;ION TECHNICAL BASES . EP-AA~1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 159 of 264

- .Attachment 1, Emergency Action L~velTechnical Bases (Continued)

Category s L.. System Malfunction . .. . . .

*.. EAL Group:

Hbf Ccmditions (RCS b3mper~ture > 200°F); EALs in this category are applicable only ir:i ohe or mor~ hot operating modes.

Numerous system-related equipment failure events that warrant emergency classification have been

.identifiedJnthis category.They may pqse qctual or potei;itial threats to plant safety .

.* ~

The eve~ts.of this category pertain to the following. subcate.gories:

1.Los~of AC Power

- Lossof ~mergency* plant electrical power .can con:ipromise plant safety system operability including dec~yheat removal and emergency core cooling systems which may be nec~ssary to ensure

.. fission: product ba~i"ier integrity. This category in~ludesloss of onsite and offsite power sources for*

the 4.1 SKVemergency buses. * . . . . .

.*. 2.- Loss bf DC Power

- - - - Loss of;E3mergency plant electrical power can compromise plant safety system operabilityincluding

.* ...*decay.i;eat retnoval.and emerge~GY core*cbolihg.systems \11/hichm~y be*n~6essary t.o.ensure *

. fissioh .product barrier integrity.This. category includ.es lo~s of power to the 125VDG buses ..

. 3, Criticality & RPS Failure<

Inadvertent critic;:alities pose p~t~qtial personnel. ~c:ifety hazards as.well being indicative. of losses ,of .* .

- . reacti~ity co~tr6L ..* . . < .* ** * * '.

.. : ,_; ~ *'*- ,., :*.

Events r~lated to.failure of the'ReactbrP~btectiori'.System

. . . . . *: *.:: .. _.; .. .. . .. ,. . . . . **.* . . . ' . . .. - . . *. - *.~ .. - ; ... ! ; *..

(RPS) to i_nifiate and complete reactor

scrams;~ ln.'the-plan_t licensing basis, postulated failures-of the RPS to complete a reactor scram

.*..*. 'con'\pi'i~~~~ .. .

spe~ifi6'setbf*ap~IY?~(j_~~entsr13ferred to a~. AiJtibpatedTranSien(Withqut

'~ ' . . ..

Scram (AT\NS) ~vents~*. For EAL'Cl~$siflc~tio.n

. -* .... ~. . .. , .. .

how~Ver,ATWS . .. -. : .

is.(nte11ded to 111e~n*~~yscram:tail~re_~vent-

'that doe§. not achieVe.reactor:shtt'd'own' If.RPS.actuation . *-* .....

' '. . . .fails to. . as~ure .teadorshutdown,positive

. . . . ~ . . .. .. *, .. .. . .

pontr'Ol.*~freadivity is.'a(risk anq could causea threatto.ft:iel clad,.RCSanc:j_containment il)tegrity.**

- .. ., .* **'
  
  . ..:'.\'

*.. * *. .*4 .. Inability to Reach or *MaintahtShutdowri .conditions:. . . -*.. "*<

.. -SystJrn-.riialfunctions may{eadfofaili.JrE3 ofth'e pl<;intto be*br6ughtto*thefr~quiredplant C?PE:lrating . *

.. ~con~-fiticmr~quired by: tecbnic~ispecificatioh~

.. ... ' ... .. .* . . . ~' . .

ifa IJrniting" . .

conditio~

for operatibn.(LCO)i~

oot met.. .

~ ' -~*: . ' ..

.*_ .*. . -~.: . '

r

UNIT2EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICALBASES EP-AA~1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1

. Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued). *.

.Page 160 of 264 Categorj S;.... System Malfunction (Continued) . *.

5, Instrumentation Certain events that degrade plant operator ability to effectively assess plant conditions within th~ ..

.. plant warrant emergency classification. . ;'

Losses ofanriunciators are in.tnis subcategory.

. 6. . Communications CE3rtain events that degrade plant operator abiiity to effectively com111unicatE3 with essential .

personnel within or external to the plant warr~ntemer~ency classification ..*

. 7. FuelClad Degradation .** *

.During normal ~peratiori,reactor coolantfission product activity is very low. Small coh~entrations of .

.

fiS$iOn products in the coolant are primarily from the fission-of tramp uranium in the fuel *Clad 'or .

. .**.*minor pertoration~ in the c1ad itself. Any significant incre~setrom these base.,line 1eve1s (-5% clad *

*. failures) is indicative bf fuel :failures and is cover~d un.der Category F, Fission Product Barrier

.Degradation. However, *lesseraniounts ofcla(j damage may result in coolant activity exceeding T ~chnicai Specifi~ation limits. These fission. products will be circulated withJhe. reactor coolant and

earl.be _detected by coolant sam~Hng and/or the Letdown radiation monitor. *. . .

.* --~ B. RCS Leakage *.

. The . RPV pro\/ides a volum~*fqr _th~ coolant that cover$ the reactor core: The. RPV and associated

. pressure piping (reactor coblarit'systei"n) together provide a barrier-to limit ttie telease of radioactiv~ * ...

. ~~terial shoukl the reacfor fuel clad integrity fail. . . .

Excessive RCS leaka~e greater than Technical Specification li~its are utilized t() .indicate potential*

.* <.*pipe cracks that may propagate to an_exterltthreatening fuel clad, RCSarid containmentintegrity. *

.. . *. :* *.~ '._*-~ .

. --~. ~. ,

- ,.... ~

.. :; *. *- **. - ...*... * ;,-* . '~

c--------,

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision1

.. . .. Page 161 of 264.

. Attachment1,Emergency.

Action Level Technical .

Bases (Continued)

Categor}':~ * *.

S -System Malfunction *.

SulJcategory:

1 - Loss of Power Initiating Coh~ition:

Prolonged loss of all offsite .and all onsite AC power to 4.16 KV emergency* .

buses * *

EAL:

. .- ~- -

SG1.1. .*..*General Emergency . . . . .

i. Loss of alroffsite and all onsite AC power, Table S-1, to 4,16 KVemergency buses 2ENS*SWG101 and 2ENS *SWG103 .

AND EITHER:

- - - Resto'r~tio~ of 4.16 KV emergency bus 2ENS*SWG101 or2ENS *SWG103 within4*.

hour~.is n'c>t likely

.oR . . .

. RPVWater.level carmotbe re*storedand maintained above-14 in. or RPV water

level ¢an riot be determined

Table S-1 ACPower Sources *

- 2EGS*EG1. ,._ -. -

Cl> ... * ** 2EGS*. EG3.

_*:~"* ..... ** * . 2.EGS*EG2

. 0 .

(with2E.NS.*SWG102

. crosstied to 2ENS*SWG101 or :.;:

.2ENS~SWG103)

.:*.* - :*

Reserve

.. Transformers

. ., -. -: ~-. ..._*.-... -. ~ *: _* . *. *

Aux BoilerTransformer *

. Mode

- ~

Appl_iq~l:>ility:

f *"'. Pow~r. ~perati()_n,_2-~ Startup; 3 *~Hot Shutdown .

.:*_:* <::..~* :._*_. .

. *. .'.~ *..~* . .: ..

. * ... /* ~ *.. -:* ..

- .:* :**... __ ,:=:

UNIT 2 EME_RGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES . EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 162 of 264

.* Attachment1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

SG1 .1 Ge~eral Emergency (Contin!Jed) .

\

Basis: .

Plant-SpeCific 2ENS*SWG101, *SWG102, and *SWG103 are the 4.16 KV emergency buses. Bus 2ENS*SWG101 is

.dedicated. to Division I ~f ttie On.,.site Emergency AC Ele¢trical Distribution. System, _bus 2ENS*SWG 102

-is. dedicated . '

to.Division

.Ill (HPCS), .

and.bus 2ENS*SWG103is dedicated to Division. '

II. Buses 2ENS*SWG101 and.*SVVG103feed ali Station redundantsaf9ty-related loads, except the HPCS

.. *system loads, The . ,

HPCS system loads .

are. fed. by bus 2ENS*SWG102 ,**

(ref. 1, 2).

All three divisions are normally energized by the On-site Normal AC Electri.cal Distribution ..

System via the off-site power sources through the reserve station service transformers 2RTX-XSR1A and 2RTX-XSR1B.

o. *2ENS*SWG102 frolll transformer 2RTX-XSR1A.

o 2ENS*SWG103 from transformer 2RTX-XSR1B.

Buses ~ENS*SWG101 and *SWG103 each have a* backup source, the Auxiliary Boiler T~ansfo~m~r2ABS-X1. Also; 2ENS*SWGtd1 and *SWGto3*each have afeeder to a normal AC

.. _ (stub)bus, NNS-SWGb14a~d NNs:.swG015 respectively. . .

. Bus 2ENS*SWG102 _has a batkup connectipn to the Reserve Station Service Transformer .*

. 2RTX-XSR1B; i_f required.-_. . .

'. *-* ~ach ~fthE3three4.16 KV emergency buses.has a standby diesel generator (2EGS*EG1,

. *

2EG~*EG3, 2EGS*EG2} to carry its loads in. case of a LOOP or in case of a sustained

.. degradedvoltagecondition on.the offsite source (ref. 3, 4). 2EGS*EG2 (Division 111) is capable of powering..

either .

the Division: .

I or Division II 4.'16 . ..

KV emergency bus through manual breaker*

alignment~~The availability of 2EGS*EG2 as an onsite AC power source in Table S-1 only applies if2EGS*EG2 is aligned to energize2ENS*SWG101or2ENS*SWG103 .

. Consideration sh61Jld pe 'given tooperable loads necessary to remove decay heat or provide RPV mcikeup capabiHtywhen evaluating loss'ot all AC power"fo vital buses. Even though an essential bus .

' ' ~ .may be energiz:ed; if hecessary loads (thatis; lo.ads that _if lost would inhibit decay heat removal

c~pability Or RPVhiakeUp ca~ability):arenot operal;>le o~Jhe energizedbus. . .

then

. the bus should not be

. *~ .*.

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BA$ES EP-AA-1013 Addendum .4

Revision 1

Page 163 of 264

~ttach~ent 1, Em.erg~ricy A~tion Level. Te~hnical Bases {Continued)

SG1.tGeneral Emergency {ConHnuecl)

If the line volt~ge is less than 11 OkV, or the Post LOCA contingency alarm is locked in, then offsite P()W~r is unable to perform its Emergency Function of maintaining ECCS loads during an event. and th~ affected line should be corisidered ' - .

l9st for the, purposed of EAL classification.

Fou~ hours i~ the station blackoutcoping period (ref. 4, 5).:

AnRPVwat~r:level instrument readi~g of-14 in. indicates RPV water level is atthe top of active fuel.

When RPVwater lev.el is at ~r ab()ye the top of acti~~*fuel, the core Is co*mpletely submerged. Core submergen~e is the mo~t d~sirable means.of core cooling. When RPV water level is below the top of active fuel, the uncovered portion of th~ core must be cooled by less reliable means (that is, steam.

cooling qr spray cooling). If cor~ *uncovery is threatened, theEOPs specify alternat~. more extre111~ *

.RPV water.level control measurE!s in order to restore and<maintain adequate core cooling (fof. 6). Si~te.

core uncov~rybegin~ if.RPVwater l~vel d~ops to ~14 in., t~e level is indicative of a ~hallenge*to core

_- .

.. Coolin~ andth~ Fuel Clad barri~r. . . .

. Consistent with the EOP definition Cif"cannot be;restored_a~d n1aintaihecf" thed~termination thatRPV' ...

w~ter IeveI canho~ be resto~.ed ar:id-rnaihtain.ed. abo~e the top of active fuel may be made at;. before,. or * *.

.aft~r RPVvv~l.er.

level

~ctually d13creases tothis p~int (r~f'.. 6;)

. *

Wheh RPV.*water l~vel c~nn°'t be detertrlinecj,EOP~,-require RPVflqoding strategi~s: Rpvwc;itef. level

- .. inditatio~ provid~s the .prim~ry IT1$<:i1Js bf -~n~wing ff ~d~quate cor~_booling is being mai~~ain,ed .* Wherl

. alFr:neans e>f detenhirilng RPV water '1ever ~re ~navailable, t6e:tuel clad parrier is threatened and .

feliance .onaltern~te iilean,s 6f ass~ring _a.d~qucite. core cooling must be attempted. Th~ instructio~s In *. . .

.E0p.:(;4 .sp~cit/th~~~hie~ns~ wh*i~-h. i~cl.ude:e~~~~ericy*d~pre~surization_ of the;kpv and .iriJk'c~tion. into*.

the RPV at~ a.*~ate deeded to' fl odd ~oiti-~ ~*iev~ticfo of the mah~ stearii Hries .;r hold ~pV: pressure ab()ve the. Miniml.lm.~team Coding ~re~s~r~ (in f.TWS ~vents). (r~f.])lfRP~ ~~~erle~~lcannot be .* *. .

.*

deterlJlined.Withr~spect to toe t9p-of activE{fuel, a.potential loss* ofthe Fuel Clac;J 'ba~rier exists.*

. ~**~-*. :. >.> ..'-' . ,. ~,.:. ".:* ... ' . ;-~*-:. .,. ' . - . .

Note {hat ~EQP7c5 may*require intentional uncov~'ty of thefobre and conttol ot'RPV.water levetbetWeeri *. . *.

0

* ~14 in .* and -3.e.ih .* th~* M'initnu~-$i~a~-~ooJing RPV:Wate,r L~v~I (MsbRWL) (reLB). u_riderth~se . . -

, . .

coi\ditionS, a high~power ATW$ evi.nl,eXistS and rBquir.is fo lea St a Site Aiea Erilergehcy ciiissiiicatic>n

in .accordah~e\~1jth.th~ AtWS/C.ritic~lit~ EAL~.

0

. .' . . ;. *. ~ . . :. :~*:. .. . :: :***.

~ *.. - ~

'\* * .

,_* *~*. . .

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP.;AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision* 1

- - . Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Con.tinued)

Page 164 of 264 SG1 .1 Gf:)n~~al. Emergency (Contirmed) .

Generic*

Loss of all AC power to emergency busses compromises all plant.safety systems requiring electric pow(3t including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal. and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss

'qt all AC power to emergency buses will lead to loss of fuel clad, RCS, and containment, thus warranting d~claration of a Gen~ral Emergency ..

This EALi~ specified to assure thatln the unlikely eventof~ prnlonged loss of all AC power to 4.16 KV emergency buses, tirriely recognition. of the seriousness of the event occurs and that declaration of a General.Emergency occurs as early as is appropriate, based ori a reasonable assessment of the event trajectory: > ** * ** *

The likelih.ood of restoring afleast one emergency bus should be based on a r~alistic appraisal. of the situation sirice a delay ih an upgrade decision based ori only a chance of mitigating the even*t could result in a.loss of valuable "time ih preparing and impl¢menting public protective actions.

' ..., In addiUoh, .under these conditions,ffssionproduct barrieimonitori~g capability may be degraded.

NMP2 Ba~i~ Reference(s): *

1.

USAR Section 8:.2 2.. USAR Se6tion 8;3

*.** .. 3~. N2-SOP,.03 Loss of AC Power* *

4. N2-SOP:~o1 st~tion Bla~koJF ********. *.

5. *** USAR Section 8.3.1.5~2 .*.* . ..

6. NER,.?M::039, NMP2 Emergency OperatingProc~dures (EOP) Basis Document

7. N2,.Edp-c4* RPV Flooding . .* .*... . , . *.

8. N2-EoP:::¢5 Failu~e to scrarn : <* * .: > * ** .

i:_

9. NEI 99-0:11C sG.1 . < >> . .* >

. f1 .*

-* 0 .-. '

. _** ..:*-.*' .. .. I

. **.. ~: ...

.1*

' :: ~

. .~ ":* -* ' ..

. .. ~

. ~ : ... ... ; *:

. . *. c. *.: .*** -

. ~: .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICALBASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 .*

Revision 1 Page 165 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Actiori Levei Technical Bases-"cContiilueci)

Category: $ - System Malfunction . *

. Subcategory:

1 ~ Loss of AC Power Initiating Condition: Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to 4.16 KVemergency buses for~- *.

15 niin. * * *

.EAL:*

ss1 ~1 . . Site Area Emergency . . . . .

Lqss of'aU offsite and all onsite AC po~er, Table S-1, to 4;16 KV e111ergency buse~

2ENS*~WG101 and2ENS*SWG103 for~ 15 min. (Note 4). . . . .

Note 4: The ED should not wait ~ntil the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare. the event as soon as it is

determined that the condition has exceeded,* or will likely exceed, the applicable time.

Table S~1 AC Power Sources

- 2EGS*EG1.

Cl) .

. 2EGS*EG3

. .*~

tn .

0 c ** .2EGS*EGZ (with2ENS~SWG102

. :: : *crosstied to 2ENS*SWG101 or

- . ~ ... . *'* . 2ENS*SWG10;3) .

.. ~

*.*

Reserve Transformer A*.

.* Reserve Transformer B

' ~ *.. **. '

Aux Boiler Transformer ** *

. .. . .... * :. . ... "===*='==================~=;=========;======='J M~de AppUc~bility:

1--~ Power Op~ration, 2 ~ Startup, 3_ - Hot Shutdow"l .

' ~ ,... . ~. :.

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1.

Page 166 *of 264.

Attachment1,Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued}

551.1 SiteArea Emergency (Continued}

Basis:

Plant-Specific

2ENS*SWG1 Ot, *SWG10.2. and *SWG103 are the 4.16 KV emergency buses. Bus 2EN$*SWG101 is dedicated

.*

to Division Lof the On'-site Emergency AC Electrical Distribution System, bus 2ENS*SWG 102 is dedicated to *..

Division ill (HPCS);

and bus- 2ENS*SWG103 .

is dedicated to Division -

II. Buses 2ENS*SWG101 and *SWGto3 Jeed all Sfatio~redundantsafety~related loads, except the HPCS system loads. The HPCS system loads are fed

.by b~s 2ENS,*SWG102 (ref. 1, 2).

.All. _th re~ . ..

divisions are normally .

energized by the On-site .

Normal AC Electrical -

Distribution System via the

. *off~sit~ power sour~es through the reserve station service transformers. 2RTX-XSR1 A arid 2RTX-XSR1 R 0 ~ENS*SWG102from transformer 2RTX-XSR1A

', .Q- 2ENS*SWG103 from hansfo~mer 2RT.X-XSR1B.

.. Bu'ses 2ENS*SWG101 and *SWG103 each have a backup source, the Auxiliary Boiler Transformer

2ABS~X1. Also, 2ENS*SWG101 hav~ a feeder toa normal AC(stub}bus, NNS-

- - - - $WGQ14 ancj NNS-SWG01s>respeetively.

arid ;.SWG103 each

- Bus 2ENS*SWG102 has a backup connection to tlJe:Reserve.statidn Seriiice Transformer 2RT)(-XSR1 B, ifrequired,.

(:ach qf the three 4:16 KV~r11ergency buses_:has a standby diesei generato((2EGS*EG1, 2E(3S*EG3, .

'.:. **.'*.*. 2E,GS~EG2)to-carry its loads in case of a LOOP or in.case ofa sustained deg*raded voltage, cc:inqition on bffsit~ .source. (ref.* 3; 4). 2EGS*EG4 (Division Ill) is cap~ble. of po\..vering either the Division-I ,or *.

. ~-.

the . . * .. ' . *- . . .* .' *. - . ' . . '

... *.. =_- :*:*

~ -

are.*-

not operable on }he e*nergized bus. then'* the bus.should ri,ot be considered operable.

.:*. -.**~.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 167 of 264

Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

SSt.1 *site Area Emergency (Continued)

If the line voltage is less than 110kV, or the Posf LOCA contingency alarm is locked in, then offsite.

power is unable to perform its Emergency Function of maintaining ECCS loads during an event and the affected line should.be considered losi for the purposed of EAL classification.

The fifteen-minute interval was selected as a *threshold to exclude transient power losses.

Generic Loss of all AC power to emerg~ncy busses compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss.

of all AC powerto 4.16 KV emergency buses will lead to loss of Fuel Clad, RCS, and Containment, thus this event can escalate to a General Emergency .

. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold fo exclude transient or momentary losses of off-site power.

Escalation tq General Emergency is via EALs in Category For EAL SG1 .1.

NMP2 Basis. Reference(s):

1.

USAR Sectiori. 8.2

2. : USAR Section 8.3 3 .. N2--SOP~o3 Loss of AC Power . * *

4. .N2-SOP;:o1 statior:i Blackout *

. 5. NEI 99'-01'1C SS1

. '.:-.; ,'::-~.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA~1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1 *

Page 168 of 264

~ttachment 1, Emergency Action Le~ef Technical Bases (Continued}.

Cate~ory: .* S-::-SystemMalfunction Subcategory:*.* 1 - Loss of AC Power Initiating Co.ndition: AC power capability to 4.16 KV e~ergency buses reduced to a single power source for ~15 min. such that ANY additional single failure would result in a complete loss of all 4.16 KV emergency bus power .*

EAL:*.

SA1.1 AC power ~apability to 4.16 KV emergency buses 2ENS*SWG101 and 2ENS*SWG103 reduCed to C1 slngle*power source, table S-1, for;,:: 15 min. (Note 4)

AND ANY additional single power'sourte failure will result in a loss of all power to 4.16 KV*

. .. *emergency.bus~s 2ENS*SWG101and2ENS*SWG103 *

~: :*..

Note 4: ..

The ED.should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is

determined. that .

the condition .. -.

has e.xceeded, . . . ..., -

or will iikely .

exceed, the i!IPPlicabletime:

. .Tabl~ S"-1 AC Power.Sources*

... : .. ~: ...

.* * .. 2EGff~E(31.... .

<:Cl)

--. * '* 2EGS*EG3 . * .* .

'* *u; ' ' ' . *"*. ' '-'.** ,*' .

C q **** 2.EGS*E:G2(with'2gNS*SvVG1C>2 .*. *. *.. *.***.

. < __ * '*.> . .** *. crOsstiedtp 2ENS*$WG1e.1* or**

- - . 2ENS*SWG103) .*. .******, ; :**.* . .

.. ' . *

R¢serve fransforrper'I-\.~* < ....

~****

~

~ ;*. ./ - * . ReserveTfansf9triier s* e:

o* ***.

Au~ BoilerTran*sf~rmei: :i *.'.

'ivlode AppOcabOity:

'\ ~--

~**~. *: :* . .

. -*.: ~ .'

UNlt 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONTECHNICALSASES. EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1 Page 169 of 264

- - - - ' *. . .*~** *. ' . . ' ' . ' . ' ' . ' ' ' .

Attachment 1, Em~rgency Action Level Technical Bases. (Continued)

. .SAt.1 *.

Alerf(Contin~ed)

Basis:

Plant - -

.,Specific

. ,2~NS*SX'fG101'; *SWG1Q2, and~SWG103 ate the. 4.16 KVemergency buses. Bus 2ENS*SWG101 is dedicated to Division I.of the On-site E:mergency AC Electrical Distribution System, bus 2ENS*SWG102 is dedicated* to Division Ill (HPCS), and bus 2ENS*SWG102 is dedicated to Division II. Buses

'*2ENS~SVVG101 and ,;.SVVG1 o3 feed all Station redundantsafety-related loads, except the HPCS

. system load~,":TheHPCS systemloads.arefedby bus 2ENS~SWG102 (ref 1; 2).

AUthree divisions are.normally energized.bythe.On-sit~Normal AC Electrical Distribution

~ystem viathe off~.site.po~ersources through the reserve station service transformers 2RTX-

. XSR1Aand 2RTX-:XSR1B~ . . ..

o . 2ENS*SWG102fro~ transformer2RTX~XSR1A

.o .*

2ENS*SWG103froril.transform~r2RTX-XSR1 B .

.*.**:

sJses . : \ *.*. 2ENS*SWG101*.~nd'.fswG103 each- hav~ a. backup . *,.

source,.the Auxiliary Boiler .

. Transformer2ABS:.Xt: Als~,2ENS*SV\IG101 and *SWG103 each have afeeder Jo a normal AC.

(st~bYbus, NNS-$WGQt4 apd t'J'Ns.,swGotsrespectively. . .. . .

.. Bus_2ENS*SWG102 .**: . : . **--, -< .

ha~ a' *.backup . " -

connection to the . Reserve .

Station S~ryice Transformer

'.2RTXi.:XS,R1B, ifrequired; ,* . ' ** ..*. *.. '*

~. -*..- . *. ..... **: . .*. -: :-.

*.* Eac~:9'f:tpethree 4.16 Ky emergency bl.lses l;ias;a ,standby diesel generator (2EGS~EG1,

- '* :'~ \~**.:.

* : 2EGS*EG3; 2EGS*EG2)jq/carl'y:its l()ads in case 6f a LOOP or in cc:is.e ofa sustained degraded volt13~e 6o*nditiq~ pnth~ offsite,*s.ourc~*(r~f. 3,4) .. 2EGS*EG2.* (0i~isi6n lll)*i~ capable**.

~: -.

.**.~fpqwering eithert.he Di\lis.i6~J orDivisionti*4:t6 KVemergency busthro~gh niandal breaker****

... ** ali~n*l'llents:Jt. ls unli~ely'lh~t t~ese *~dions cotHd be performed within th~:fifteen-111inute interval

.ofthi~EALThe ~vailaqility of 2i=GS*:t=q2. as an oMsit~AC pqw$rsourbe.i11,Tab1e*s~lonly applies if2EGS*_EG2..is ~llgn~d to ene'rgize*2ENS*SWG101 or 2ENS*§WG103, * .

- . ~ - . . - :~

- **:* -.- : . . . ~.; . . . '. . -

~ ., ..

.*: '": . *: *-~'

-:~- ' _., . <-*:.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 170 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Le~el Technical Bases (Ccmtinued) .*.

SA1.1 Alert (Continued)*

. If the linevoltage is less than 110kV,. or the Post : . ..* LOCA .

contingency alarm .

is . locked in, then.offsite .

power is unable to perform its Emergency Function of maintaining ECCS loads during an event and the affected iine should be considered lost tor.the purposed ofEALdassification.

The fifteen-minute interval was selected as a threshold to exclude transi~~t power losses. If th~....* *.

capabilityforrnultiple sources t~ eriergize .the unit vital *buses within 15 minute~ is not restored, an _Alert

. ' *. is declared Ond~r this EAL. The subsequent loss of thesingle r~maining power source escalates the ' .* * ...

event to a Site Area Emergency under EAL SS 1.1.

Generic.

The condition indicated by this EAL is the degradation of the off-site and on-site AC power systems

- such that any additional single failure would result'in complete loss of 4.16 KV ,emergency bus AC

._. power tq one or both .units. This condition could occur due to a loss of off-site power with a concurrent

*

failure of all but_ one* emergency generator to supply power to its emergency buses. Ah other related

a cohdiUon could be the loss of ali off-si_te po"Yer and foss of on-site emergency generators with only one*.

.*tra_in of4';16_KV emergency buses b_eir')Q ba_ckfed from thE:lUnifmain' generator, or the loss of on-site .

. .--*_emergency generatorswith only one train of 4.16 KV emergency buses being backfed from off-site power. The *subsequent loss of this single 'p0Wer5ource would escalate the event to Site Area a In

. .En?ergency accordance with. EAL ss1 .1. .*. * *_*. -

_*. *

_-* . . *_ . * - _

Fifteen minutes was selected as. a thn:~sholdto exdude ti'anslentor momentary losses of poweL *

NMP2 Basis Reforerice(~): . . . . .

_1;. LJSARSedion 8.2-*

2.. WSAR *section 8.3

_. .

. . ._-. ~; *..... '.

3. N2;,SOP-'03 Los's of AC Power 4;

N2~SOP'-01 Station Blackout

-5, NEI 99-01 IC SA5

. *:~.-

~* :*_. :-....

. -.~- .. . :-. .

-. '~*

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 . .

Revision 1 Page* 171 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical .Bases* (Continued) - -

Category: *. *. S - System Malfunction Subcategory: 1 .,:.. Loss of AC Power Initiating Condition: Loss of all offsite f.\C power to 4.16KV vital buses for~ 15 min.

EAL:*

SU1.1*

Unusual .

Event . *. - .

Loss' of.alloffsiteAG power, Table S-1, to 4.16 KV emergency buses 2ENS*SWG1 Ot and 2ENS*SWG103 ** . .

Table S-1 AC Power Sources

*2EGS*EG1 *

Cl)

u; c:

- - o ...

.* 2EGS~EG3

. 2EGS*EG2 (with 2ENS*SWG102 crosstied to 2ENS*SWG101 or*

2ENS*SWG103)

. Cl) . .* * * . R~serve Transformer A *

~ *

Reserve Transformer B o, ,.

" * *Aux Boiler Tra:nsformer

'MO~e Applicability:

1 ~ Povvef. Operation, 2 ~ Startup, *3 .'.' H~t Shutdown * .

,Basis: *

. : * . Pla~t-Specific . * * , .. ** ...'.

.. *.. .* **. 2ENS~Svv~*101.~swb102, ~nd 2ENS*SWG1,03 are the 4:16 KVe~ergency buses. Bus

- * . 2ENS*SWG10'1 is dedicated to Division I of the On"'site Emergency AC Electrical Distribution System,

bu~ 2ENS*SWGf02isdedicatedjo Oivision lfl(HPGS), and bus 2ENS*SWG103 is de~icatecffo .* .

J)ivision'IL:l;3u~~~ 2E~S*SWG101 and *Syv9103feed:ail Station redundant safety'.'related loads,* ..

. . exc~pdhe HP.CS:~y~t~m load~. Th~**HPC$ system.loads are fed* by bus 2ENS*SWG102* (ret* 1; 2):\*

. * .* < . - . - ., . - * . - ,. . . ~ - -* - * *~ .* * ' - .-* . * * . . - - * * * *

I***:

. *< ~ .. ', ;_, ..

-~i.'

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES. EP~AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision1 Page 172 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued}

SU1.1 Lfnusual Event (Continued} . . .

All three divisio~s are normally energized by the On-site Normal AC Electrical Distribution System via the off.,site power sources through the reserve station service transformers 2RTX-XSR 1Aand2RTX-XSR1Et'

o. 2ENS*SWG102 from transformer2RTX-XSR1A o 2ENS*SWG103 from transformer 2RTX-XSR1 B.

Buses 2ENS*SWG101and *SWG103 each have a backup source, the Auxiliary Boiler Transforrner 2ABS~X1. Also, 2ENS*SWG101 and *SWG103 each have a feeder to a normal AC (stub) bus; NNS-SWG014 andNNS-SWG015 respectively.

Bus 2ENS*SWG102 has a backup connection to the Reserve Station Service Transformer .

2RTX-XSR1B .. if required.

Each ofthe. three 4.16 .

KVemerg~ncy .

buses has a standby .diesel generate~

2EGS*EG3, 2EGS~EG2) to carry its lpads in case of a LOOP or in case of a sustained degraded voltage condition on the.offsite (2EGS*EG1, .

sour~e (ref. 3, 4). 2EGS*EG2 (Division 111) is capable

.* of powering either the Division I. or Division 11*4.16 *KV emergency* bus through *manual breaker*

. alignmen.ts. It i~ unlikelythatthese actions could be performed within the fifteen-minute interval ofthis EAL The-availability of ?EGS*EG2as an onsite AC power source in Table S-1 only

.. applies if 2~GS*EG2.is aligned to energize 2ENS*SWG101 or 2ENS~SWG103 .

If th~ line yoltage is less than 11 OkV,. or th~ Post LOCA contingency alarm is locked in, theh offsite .*

p()wer is ~hable fo perfo~m its Emergency Function of maintaining EGGS loads during an event and the .

affected line should be considered lost for the purposed of EAL classification.

The NMP2 electrical .

distribution . -

configuration precludes restoration of offsite. power sourceswithin 15 *

minutes i.n all instances; on~e lost Therefore.no time component is allocat~dforthis EAL threshold ..

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BA$ES EP..;AA-1013 Addendum 4

.*Revision 1 Page 173 of 264

.* Attachm~nt 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued) ..

SU1.1* Unusual Event (Continued)

Generic .

. Prolonged loss of off'-site AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the* plant more vulnerable to a complete loss of AC power to emergency busses ... , * * .* ,!,-

NMP2 ~asis ~eference(s);.

1.

l.JsAR Section 8.2

2 .. USARSectidn 8.3 .

3. N2-SOP-03 Loss of AC Power

4. N2-SOP-01 Station Blackout *

5. NEI 99-01° IC SU1

~* :.* .-

. :...~. -.. ,.- .

. *. **~ *'.

, ... ~ '.*:: *.* .. *_* ......

. . *:*, *~

" ~ ~* .. : . , - -- .

~' *: ... , .. ..-.... ,.. :

~* ..., ..**.

.c

~.*. . . -*:.

UNiT 2 EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Afjdendum 4 .

Revision 1

- ***. Attachment 1, Emergenc:y Action Level Technical Bases (C~ntinued)

Page 174 of 264 Category:. . . S ~ ~yste~ Maifunctiori *..

stibcate~ory: * * *2 - Lbss of DC Power Initiating Condition:

Loss of all emergency DC power for:::: 15 min.

EAL:-

SS2.1

Site Area Emergency*

.::: 105 VDc'on both 2BYS~SWGQ6"2A and2BYS*SWG002Bfor ~ 15 min .. (Note 4)

Note4: *.The ED should not wait until .ihe applicable time has 'elapsed, but should declare ttie event as soon as it is

... determined that the condition has exceeded; or will likely exceed, the applicable time.*. .

Mode Applicability:

~

1 Power Operation; 2 .: Startup, 3 - Hot Shutd_own *** * .

Basis:

Plant~Spetific

- - - - The emergency* 125 VDG power system includes thre~ electriCally indepenqenf and separate switchge~r~ . '..

(2BYS~SWG002A 2BYS~SWGo02B arid 2CES*IPNL414}.Divisi6h 1* ((2BYS*SWG002A) and Divisionli (2.BYS*SWG002B) f~ed the redund~nt emergen~y DC loads -associ~ted with Divisions I**

and H of th~* emerg~ncy onsit~ AC ~ystem, respec:;tiv~I~. bivisioJ"l .111 (2CES*PNP414) feeds ttie .

.* emerge~cyDy loads a_~sociatedwith Division m(HPCS ~ystem), 2CES*IPNL414 is not included In this (3ALbeccilJse it olllysuppliespqwef to HPCS loads:**

Eath * *

emerg~ncy 125 *VDG distributibr! s~~terti has*a b~tf~ryari~ a b~ttery ch~rger that are normally**

. . * *~- - * * . . . ** * - ' -- * : ** ** ** * - * ,** c . * * * * * : ' .* - : -'. - .. * * -

cb11nected)pthe bus' such that tflese two sources of power are operating* in parallel: The charger is

nor~~11y::~,&~p1yi-ng syst~niA~1~~trica1-1o~d~ with *-th~-b~tte~-~m~ tioat ch~rge-.*_st1ou1d bott1 battery r ,* * ,* ; *' '* ** * :,.* **-: *: ,. .* ** *,* *, *,',, \,. < * * * *, ,. * ** *. ** - *,**. * *

.

chargers fqr .any particular battery bfj-oufof ser:Vice'atanypoint in the DC loacl cycle, the battery is capable of ~farting

~ , -~ ' . -. ;

and pperatihg -

its::~$-sociated:ldadsf~;*2 hr according to'- - -

~pre~alculated l~~d pfofile* . -,

without ~he~battery term_i1JaLvolf~ge falling be10V\I minhlium ac~epfoble leve1;10_5'VDC. (ref._ 1, 2, 3)

- .*This.* EAL-iifthe hotponditidn ~qtliy~l.e~fofthe cottj*_ coriditioh lb~s 'Of DC p9wer . > --- .

EAL:Cwzh; .* * . -. . - . . - . . ..* - ; :: . ., .

-- . . -.... *,.: ~ '. *:_ -. . - -* - - : ...

. *.' .. '.**.*. '1.,

. ~**

UNIT 2 EMERGENCYCLASSJFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-.1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 175 of 264

. Attachment 1, Emergency Action Le~el Technical Base!:f{Continued)

SS2~t Site Area*Emergency (Continued).

Generic Loss of all DC power compromises ability to monitor and control plant safety funetioris. Prolonged loss :

of all DC power will cause. core uncovering and loss bf cOhtaihment integrity whE:m tt:iere is significant decay heat and sensible heat in the r~ador system. * * **

Fiffeeh minutes was selected as a.threshold to exclude transient or momentary ~ower losses. -

Escalati~n to ~ -Genercil Eniergericy wouid dccur byEALs in Category Ra_nd Categqry F: * *

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. USAR Section 8.3.2.1.2 .*

2 .. Improved Technical Sp~cificati6ns Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station; Unit No. 2; 3.8.4 3 ... N2-SOP-04Loss of DC.Power 4~ NEI 99-01 IC SS3

. (."**:*** :_, ..

.**** . *. c,*;

. *:* ;:.: .-~**. :~ . . -> ,* ....

... \

UNIT 2 EMERG.ENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES. EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1

. . .* .. Page 176 of 264.

Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category:*.*** s. - System Malfunction

. Subcategory: 3 - Criticality & RPS Failure Initiating Condition: *Automatic scram and all manual actions fail to shut down the reactor and indication of an extreme challengetothe ability to cool the core exists EAL:

SG3.1 * . General Emergency Anautornaticscram f~ils to shut down the reactoras indicated by reactor power >.4%**

AND:***

All m.anual ~ctions fail to shut down ther~actoras indicated by reactor power> 4%

AND EITHER of the following exist or have occurred: .

RPVw~ter level cannotbe restored and maintained above -39 in. or RPV water level .

cannot .. -.

be determined

. *.OR Sl.Jppre~sion pool temperature and RPV pressure cannotbe maintained below the. *.

_He?tCapacity Temperature Limi~ (N2-EOP-PG Figure M) ** * *

_.,Mo~e Applh::abilify:

.*.** 1 - Powe~. Ope-~ation, 2 ~ startup Basis: :i . *

. Plant-specific *

~* .. Thi~- Ef,\L ~ddres~es ttiefollowirig:*

.

Any automatic ** ~. * * * -

re~ctor scram signalfollowed by a".nianual scramthat faffs to shut dbWn th~*; ">

'. ' * * ' * * * ' *

5 * *

.. .. . reJctdr.fo an extent th"e rnactor*is prdduclrig energy in exce~s of the he~t load for which the .

safety sy~iemsweredesigned (El\L SS3.1 ), and'

0

..; *._ .. ~* .

. .*. . . .*

lndi~ations that either core cooling is extre~elychalleng~d or heal removal is extremely * ..

. . *.** _chaH~n9ed. * . . .. . . .. .

..-". . .*. :: -.. ~ ..

. ' . -; . .: ; *'* . ~- .. ~=.:.: .'. : .. :**,..

.: ....._:: -~

~**. *. < . . * ...: .. :::*:

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP,;AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 177 of 264

. Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

SG3 ..fGener~i Emergency_(Continued)** *.

. Reactor shutdown achieved by use ofthe alternate control rod insertion methods of EOP~C5 is also *

. credited as asuccessful manual scram pro~ided reactor power can be reduced below the APRM downscale trip setpoint before indication~ of an extreme challenge to. either core cooling or heat removal exist (ref 1, 2).

The APRM downscale trip setpoint (4%) is a minimum. reading on the power range Scale that indicates .

.* *._ power prodLIC?t.km (ref. 1, .2). It also approximates the decay heat which the shutdown systems were ..

designedto re~ove.and is indicative of a condition requiring immedi~te response to prevent subsequent . '

core damage. . .

At or below the APRM do~nscale trip setpoint, pl~nt response will be similar

~ -

to that observed during a.n.ormalshutdown. Nuclear instrumentation (AP RM/I RM) indications or other reactor parameters (for*example, number of open SRVs,.riumber of open main turbine bypass valves, main steam flow,. RPV pressure and suppression pool temperature trend, and so forth) can be used to

.

determiri~-if reactor power is greater thCJn 4% power(ref. 2). .

The coll1bination of failure of both front line and backup protection systems to function in response to a plant transient; a19ng with, the continued production of heat, poses a direct threatto the Fuel Clad and .

RCS barriers.-****

.* ~ydefinition, ati operating niode*change occurs when the Mode Switch is moved from the startup/hot

standby O'rrun position to th~ shutdown position. The plant operating modethatexisted at the time the

.** event occurs (that)s, Power Oper~tion or Startup), however;. requires emergency Classification of at

least an Alert. The o~e:rating mode change* ass~ciat~d with movement of the Mode Switch; by itself,

does not j~stify foilure tcfdeclare an emergency for ATWS events.

. . . -~ . - _, :*

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BA$ES EP".'AA-1013 Addendum4

Revision 1**

Page 178 of 264

. * . Attachment 1, Eme~gency Action Level. Technical Bases (Continued)

SG3~ 1 General Emergency (Continued) lndicationthatcore.coolingis extr~mely challe~gedis manif~st~d by:

. RPV level cannot -

be re~tored.and mail1tained abov~ -39 in. (ref. *1*, 2). The Minimum Steam .

Cooling. RPV Water L.evel (MSCRWL)*is the lowest RPV water level at which.the. covered*.

. portion of the reactor c~re will generate suffiCientste,am to preclude any clad temperature in the

. uncovered portion of the core from exceeding 1soci°F. Consistent with the EOP definition of .

"canndt be restbred and lllaint~ined," the d~termina~ion thatRPV level cannot be. restored and maintained aboVe the MSC~VVL may be mad~ at; *b~fore, or after RPV level actually decreas~s * . I to t~is point. . .. . . . . . . ..

. . Whe,nRPV \,vater level.canriotb~ determined, EOPs'require RPV flooding strategies. RPV *

. \l'/a.ter;Jf:}Vel indication provides the primary ITleans.of knowing ifadeguate ~ore cooling is.being.*

- maintained~ V\/tien.all m.eans of determining RPV water level are unavail~ble; the fuel clad.

.*

barrier. i~ threatened and :reliance cm alteri'iate means of assuringaqequate core .cooling must

.. *. .

be atte~pted,The instructionsJn N2-EQP-C4 spe6ify these mean~, which include emerg~ncy

de~l'e~~ufization ofthe RPV ~rid injection in.to t.he RPV ~ta rate n~ededto flood to the elevatio~

.~ :

of: . th~mairiste~m line~.or hold.RPV

. ~ . . ,

press~reabo~e the Minimum .

SteamCoolingPressure (in < **

.* ATWS events) (ref. 3) .

.* Th~ HQTL is the highest w~tvyellJernperature from which emergehcy RPV c:tepressurizationwill .. '

.~ .

ot s~pp~es~ion ch.amber*tevip~rature.abovethe c;f~sig~*val~e (270°F); or

suppr~s~i911 cliamber pfessureabgve Prin1ary d)ntaihment Pres~ureUmitbefore the.*>...

rat~ cif"~h¢r~y Jra~~t~rfrd:m-t'n,e,RF>Yto ttte ~~nt~inlllentJs:great~Fit1anthec;~~abity.df~. *.

.* * * ..* . the containment vent,.. * **; > ::. *

- .... ~* The. HGTLi~ a,Junctiori ofRRVpres~ure and;suppre'ssion pool water leveL:~lt is utiliz.ed td . '

~,

' ... The**HCIL-- is gi\ten in N2~EQ,p.5po Fig~re M: This threshold --i~ nfofwnen: RPV

. . ... .... ." *'* . - BLOW DOWN is *-**

.. '**:* ... ... .requir~d:ln .*."'" *,'

N2-cE6P.,PQ,

-** -- - St~p-~PT:6;(ref*/-l

).Thi§

~dpditiqn

~ddresses.Jos~

of fun~tions requi_red *

. *--~ > Jar hofshGtdown with the, reaC,tor.ai pres~l:ire and te.mperature, .*.. *-*~* .

-**-.-. \:

. . UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONTECHNICALBASES . . . .. . .

EP-AA.;,1013 Addenduill 4 .

Revision 1 Page .179 of 264 Attachment1 7 Emergency Action Level Technical Bases(Continued)

.SG~.1 Gene~! Em~rgency

Generic *.

(ConHnued) *****

Under thes~ c:;onditions, the rea~tor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for

. which the<safoty. systems are designed and efforts to bring the reactor subcriticalare unsuccessful.

. The reaqtorshould be considered shutdown when it producing .less heat than the maximum decay heat

.load for.whic:;q the safety systems ar~ designed {4% *powe~) .. In the event either of these challenges ex.ists at <ftime that the reactor has.hot been brought below the power associated with the safety system de~ign a core melt sequence.exists. In this situation, core degradation can occu.r rapidly. For*

this reason, Jhe General Emergency d~claration is inlended to be anticipatory of the fission product barrier fable'declarafion to permit maximum off-site inter\ienticmtime. . ,*

NMP2 Basis Refer:ence(s): **

1.

N2:.E6P~C5 Failureto *Scrmn 2.* NE_R-?M-039, NMP2 Em~rgency Operating Procedures (EOP) Basis Document

3. N2-EOP:-C4 RPV Flooding . .* i .**

- - - - 4. N2~EOP.-PC PrimaryContaiqmentControl

5 NEI 99-:01 IC SG2

. . -.; : ~ : *.

. UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES . EP-AA~1013 Addendum 4*

Revision 1

.Page 180 of 264

. Attach merit 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued).

Category:.* s, System Malfundion ,

Subcategor}i:

3 - Criticality & RPS Failure

*

Initiating Condition: *.

Automatic scram .fails to shut down the* reactor and manual actionstaken

from the reactor control console are not successful ih shutting down the reador * ** * * * *

EAL:

SS3.1.* ..... * . site Area Emergency An automatic scram failed to shut down the reactoras indicated by reactor power> 4% . *

. 'AND . . . . . .

.Manual ~ctions taken at the reactor c~ntrol co.nsole. (mode switch in ~hutdo~n *. manual scralll push ..* ..

buttons and ARI) failed to shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power>4%

Me>de Applicability:

1 ~Power Operation,2- Startup *.

. ' . * . ** *Basis: . .

Plant.:.specific

. .This EAkaddresses ~ny automatic re.actor scram signal followed by a manual scram t~at failed to shut ...

. downfhe reactor to ari .extent th~ reactor is.producirig energy in excess ,of the heat load for whichthe .* .*

* * * - . * * . . _. 7 . . . * * - *

safety systems were designed.'

. ~** .

_ .. * *: . * . *Fort~e .t>u.rp()s,!38 of ep1ergenqyela~sifjcation* atfhe *Site.Area Emergency.Jevel,.successful manual** .

. sqram a~tiOns:~re tho~e which can he quickly performed from the reactor contro1 *cans61e'(that is, Mod~ . *.

. *. :Switch,*manual*scram*pushbuttonsarid ARI act'uation). Reactor ~hutdown*achiev-ed by.use.of the ... * *

. *. alt~fnate co~trol rod insertion methods of EQP~C5 doesnofconstitute a s.uccessfUI manual scram (ref. *.

1, 2) .

. TheAP~M'downscale trip.setpoint (4o/otis a minimum reading on th~ powerrarige scale that indicates.

power prdduction (ref. 1)~ It also approximates the decay heat which the shutdown systems were designed to remove and is indiqative 'of a conditiohr~quir:ingJmmedic;ite responseto prevent .

.*.. subseq~ent core.damage. At or b~lo~ the APRM. downscale trip setp9int, plaritresponse will be similar .

- - to tbat*observed,during a*normal shutdown.Nucleiar instri.Jment.ation (APRM/IRM)*indications or other ...

*** ...... * * , *. *r~acfor p*aranieters (for ex~lllple, :number of ~pen SRVs,number of ope~ m~in tµrbine bypass.valv~s. ** *.

. * *. **... mafn§te~JT1.t1ow., RPV pr~ss~r~*an9 Wetwell temper~turefrerip, and so f~rth) ca~:be u~edto _determine

, ifi:egct6r'powefis greater

than

". ~.

4%power.

.. ~--:

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNiCAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1.

Page 181*of264.

Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued) 553.1 _5ite Area Emergency (Continu*ed)

By defiriition,an operating mode change occurs when theMode Switch i~ moved from thestartup/h()t standby or ~un position to the shutdown position. The plant operating mode that existed at the time the

_eventoccurs (that is, Power Operation or Startup), however, requires emergency classification of at*

leasf.anAlert The.. .

operating mode . ~

change associated with movement of the Mode. Switch, by itself,

. dOes not justify failure todeclare anemergencyfor ATWS events .

<Escalation ohhis event to a General Emergency would be under EAL SG3.1 or Emergency Director

1

. juqgment ** ,

.*Generic Under these' Conditions, the reactor is producing .inore heat than the maximum decay heat load for ..

._,~*.: ...

- whic.h the safety systems are .designed and. efforts to bring the reactor sub critical are unsuccessful. A

. SiteArea Emergency is warranted because conditions exist that lead to.IMMINENT*loss'or potential*.

loss of both f~el clad an_d RCS. * * *

The reactor should be considered shutdown when it producing less heat than the maximum de6ay he;:it *

, . : . _load forwhJch. the s('.lfety systemsare designeg (4%power), * * * * * ** ..... * *

tvlariual :scram actions' taken at the reactor control consoJe are an.y set of actions by the reactor *. * .*...* ..

. . opei"ator(s) atwhich*causes or should cause control rods to be rapidly inserted i,nto the core and shuts

.**down the:reador. * * * * *. * * * **

. * * *. Manualscram, actio~s ar~ not*t~~sidered s~ccessful if action awayJrom the reactorcontrol ~onsole is ._._* .

to.

. Jeqljired scramtne reaCtor. This EAL is, stilfappJicable even if actiobs.takel1 away from the reactor *... *

. control console are successfulil1 shutting the reactpr down becaus!3 the design limits of the fuel may .

. .. have t>e.en .exceeded or.becausE:} of the gros$ failure of the Reactor Protection System to Shutdown 'the' .

plant. .. . ** * **. ** * * * * * ** * * . '_ .*_*...

.* E~calation ofthi~ event to Gen~ral Ernergen~y would be.duea tb a prolong~dcondition l~adi6g t() ~r);: .*...

extr~me challengeJo either ¢ore-.cooli11g or heatremovaL . . .' ' .. *. *.* ..

. ~MP2*B~sl.~ Reference(s)': .

1. . N2~E6P.~C5Failure to Scram **

2/ NER~2M-.Q39, NMP2~ En1erg~hcyOperatirig Prn~edures (EOP} Basis Document 3: . N.EI 99.:.01 ICSS2 . . .. . .. :* . . .. . .. .

.',. ~; . " ;. .~

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP~AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 182 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Levei Technical Bases (Continued)

.. ca~egory: * ..s '-: - System Malfunction Subcategory: *. 3 ~.criticality &*RPS Failure.

. Initiating CC>ndition: Automatic scrarnfailed to Shut down the reactor and the manual actions taken from the.reactor control cons~le are succ.essful in shutting down the reactor EAL:

SA3;1 . Alert* .

An automatic scram failed to shut down the reactor AND Manual acti.onstakenat the reactor co~trol console (mode switch in shutdown, m~nual scram pus~

buttons or ft.RI) successfully shut down the reactor as indicated by reaetor powers 4%

Mode Applicability:

1 "' Power .Qperation, 2 - Startup* *

- - - - ' Basis:

*Pl.ant-s!'.)erimC: *.

. Thefirstconc:litiori ofthis EAL identifies the need to cease critical reactor operations by actuation of the automatic

.ReaetbrProte~tion S~stelTI (RPS) st'~a~ tGnction. Areactor scram is .automatically initiated by the Reactor

'Protection Syste~*(RPS)'.when cert~in: contim.lbusly mohit~red parameters exc~ed predetermined setpoints. A .

reactprscram*may:be theresultofmahu~I orautcimatfc. a6tioh.in respons~

to various plant conditions (ref. 1):

Following a su9c~ssful .reactor scram,* rapid insertion of the cbntrol rbds occurs .. Nuclear power promptly drops to afractiori.ofthe ori~inal power level anc:I the~ decays to alevel several decades less with a negative period. The reactor power drop eontinues u.ntil reactor power reaches the point at which the influence of source neutrons on reactor power starts to be observable. Apredictable post-s~ram response from an automatic reactor scram signal should therefore con~ist of a prompt drop in reactor power as sensed by the nuclear instrumentation and a, *. ' '

lowering of power into the source range. A successful scram has therefore occurred when there is sufficient rod insertion ffom the trip . "

of- RPS to bring the reactor power .to

~r below the APRM downscale trip setpoint of 4%. For the purposes ofthiif EAL, a successful. automatic initiation of ARI that reduces reactor power to or below 4% is a not asui::c~s~fdl.automatic scram.

lfa~tolllatic

- . actuation of ARI has occurred and caused

. . . . ' ._ . reactor

. shutdown, th~

', ' automatic RPS ~scr~m :must have failE;)d, ARI is a backup nleans of inserting ,control rods ih the unlikely event that

*. * **.*an ~~tornatikRPS scram signal exists but the reacfor continues to gener~te significant power; (ref. 2, 3)

UNIT 2 EMERGE:NCY CLASSIFICATIONTECHNICAL BA$.ES. EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 *

.. * . Page 183 of 264

.. . , . . - . ' .. - : .~ - - .. . -. .. ' : .:. . . ' - *. .. .. . ...

Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Tech'!ical Bases (Continued) .

SA3.1 Alert . *-.. * *-.' - _- -

(Continued). :_

For the purposes of emergency classification at the Alert le~el, successful manual scram actions are tho~ewhich c~n be quickly performed from the rea'Ctor ccmtrnl console (that is, mode s~itch, manual scram pushbuttons, - ' .

and manual .

ARI actuation). Reactor ,* -**

shutdown achieved ' '

by. use of the alternate controlrod insertion .

methods ofEOP...,C5 does notconstitute a successful . '

manual scram .

(ref. 2):

Following any a~tomatic RPS scrarn si.gnal EOPs prescrib~ .insertion of redundant manual scram signals fo bac~* up the autorriaticHPS scram funttion and ensure reactor shutdown is achieved.

Even if theJirst subse~ue,nt manual scram signal inserts all control rods to the full~in position immediately after ..

. . the initial failure of the automatic, scram ,_the lowest .ieyel of classification that must be declared is an Alert~*-*

If the. operatordetermines the reactor must be scrammedb~fore one of the ..RPS setpoints. is reach'ed, ..*

'procedures*r~~Girethatthe M~de Svvitchfirstbe placed ih th~ shutdownpositiori. Although .*

m~nipulfition ottheMode Switc:;h is manual action'.the RP.S logic trains are actuated as W.ith an

. automatic RPS,.initiated. scra'r11.Jfr~act~6r powerrenfains above the AP RM .downsccile trip setpoirif after a

.the .rvtode s\IVitth . .

is.placed inshutdo\f\/n,. ' .* ' -*

RPS ha~ '.

f~'iledandpas .* . ' -

a minimu~. an *-*

Alert -*

emerg~ncy .

declarat.iori

.' . ~ . ..

is*retjulred.

Ifsubsequent . . . .. . --

actuation ...

ofthe.

rea~torscram pushbuttons .. . and manual initiation .* *. *

do ho(reduce reactdrpovveFto .orb~lo~ the AP RM dow~scale trip setpoin( a Site Area of ARI

Em~rgency deClaratioriJs requiredpnder EALSS3.1 '. * *-* . . .* *

. ...lnthe . . -

evehtth~t the,opefatofid~n~ifi~s

.* .- ... ' . :' *~ . :. :*:.*.* .* .

a;reaCtorsd-am is IMMINENT *' **. *. _-.*.::;:

a'nci-._

(

friitiat~{a successfui. manllal

. reactorscrambefbre_

the .. autorrtaUp

'~* :.= *:. . ;.

scram

~etp~int i~' r~~chcid, 11c> decl~ration ;Is r~*quired. The ..

. *... *:* .. *-. - . '. . - .. ~ - - ;'.: .. : : . :- .

successful'manual scram of the reacto(before ifreaches its<'~ht6matic. scram setpoint br reactor scram .. * ..

-.~ignal~. c*a~f)~ci, .* by~ihstrurn~ntatioricharn.~tf~ilur~s'.da, n~t:le~dto a.*pptenlial fi~~.igri'*.prn~uct.*~~rrier, las~: *_ .

If man.Lia( ~eaptorscralll. acUons*fall t9.r~duc~ reacf<?r powe*r:tcj orbelow 4%ith~ ~vent. escal~testo the., ***

SiteAfoaEriierg.~ncy'u~d~;EA~S$~.*1. *. , ' ** ., . . . . * . ** ' * * * *

.* By.proCedyr~>operatcir action's inbludetti~lnitiatib~ bfanir:rlm~diate manu~I scr~rn follow.ing. re~eipt of*.

~n. a~tomatlc~t;.~~*sigr,t~1*... 1f ttJ~~~e . ~r~\10. di ear i~dicatiori~. trat ~.he'.aljtorpatic**scr~-~ifail8:d *(such..~{~*.

~

time 981ay:fo1rdi(Ving.fodi6atioh~.th~t.a:scran1setpoint wase*ceeded), ~may !;le .difficult 'to deterrnirieif * *.

the '

rea~t6~ whs _. . 'sbl1fdo\Nn

~ .. - - .*becaqs~:ol~.L1tom~tic$cr~ri16r*rn'~nua.f*actions~

. -* .. -.- ... * ... - .. ._ *. *- ... .. .. If a s:~bseqiJerit teviewof

the' scram actuation indicaticihs re~~gls: that.the automatic scram. did noi cau,sethe ~eactbr to be ~hut

do\/Yp, cori~iq~r~tion.s~ouid b~. giv~p:t~ e_~al!J.~atihg th~Jd~l~*fG?:~*pote.rJtiaLdamag~ al)d the reporting, ...

. . < *.. . ..

requirements bf $b. 72 sh9uld be c::of1$idpr~d for the transi~ht even( *.

. .,, ~ '.;

UNI; 2 EME.RGENCY. CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES . EP-AA.:.1013 Addendum 4

- *... Revision 1 Page.184 of 264 *

. Attachment1,.Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

SA~.1 Alert (Continued) *

B~ definition.an operating mode change occurs when the Mode Switch is moved from the startup/hot standby or run position to the shutdown position. The plant operating mode that existed at the time the eventoc~urs(that Is, Power Operation or Startup), however, requires emergency classification of at

1easfan*AlertThe'operating mode*charigeassociated,with movement of the Mode Switch, by itself,

. does_ notju~tify failure to declarff an ~rnergency for ATWS ,events.

. ~ . .

Generic : * ..

The re*actor~hould be considered shutdown when itproducing less heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systerris are designed (4% power)~

.Manual scram actions taken ~t thff r.eactor controi console are any set of actions by the reactor operator(s)which causes or should cause control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core and shuts down the reactor: ** *

This conditip~ indicates failure ofthe a.utomatic protection system to ~cram the reactor. This condition is rr:iore thari a potential degr~dationofa safety system.in that a front line automatic protection system did

- .

not function.in resporiseto *a sc.ram signal: Thus the plant safety has been compromised because of the failure bfRPSto automaticallyshutciowrithe plant.An Al.ert is.indicated.because conditions may exist

thaflead ~6 .potentiai loss of fuel_dad be1rrier*or *RCS barrier and because ofthe failure ofthe Reactor* *

. Protection System to automatically.shutdown the planf _* * * - *

If manual .~ctions taken atthere~ctor cont~OI consol~ fail ta' shut down the re~ctol-, the event \f\/~uld *..

escalate to .a Site Area:*Erriergency. , . . .. -

.* NMP2.ea~is Retel"~nce(s'): _* * .*. __

.1. -. lmproyed-Jechni~al Specifi6atiohsNi~e Mlle.poiri(Nucle~rstation, Unif.No:2, Table 3.3.1.1"'1 2.. > N2~E()g4.¢s Failure to Scram>**. * - -

-- 3. ,' _NE~~~M~039, NMP.2 Friie~gerlqy.Qper~tingProcedutes ci=<)e) Bas_iS' Docqmerit

'.4~ *, NEr-99~ot IC SA2 ,, .,. *.- -*. -. ' ' ' ' ' ,,

.... ; ~ *:

/-. *-' _:.: ....:;

- - -*. . ';. ~-. :* *-.* -~***

. ~*:. ' .:. .

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-.1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 185 of 264 .

Attachment 1, .

Emergency Action,*

Level Technical .

Bases (Continued} .

Category: S - System Malfunction Subcategory: 3 - Criticality & RPS Failure Initiating Condition: Inadvertent criticality EAL:

sua*.1* Unusual Event A.n UNPLANNED Sljstained positive period observed* on*nuclear instrumentation

. Mode Applicability:

. 3 - Hot Shutdown Basis:*

Plant-Specific The term sustained" is used to allow exclusion of expected short-term positive periods from planned fuel

.bundle or control rod movements :* .

during. . core**.

alteration.. These short-term positive periods are the result of the rise in neutron POPLjlation due to subcritical multiplication. *

Generic

.** Th i's EAL addresses inadvertentcriticality events. While the primary concern of this EAL'is criticality This EAL addresses in;;idvertentcriticality events~ This EALindicates a* potential degradation of the level .of safety of the plant, warranting a UE classification; This EAL excludes .inadvertent criticalities .

that occl.lr during 'planned* reactivity changes associ(ited with reactor startups (for example, criticality earlier than *estimated). **

Escalation would qe by EALs in Category F ! as appropriate to the operating mode at the time of the event *

NMP2 Basis Reference(s}: .

1.. NEI 99-01 IC sua

... ~-

.*UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum . *'

4 ._

Revision 1---

Page 186 of 264. *

. .. ."" : .~ ._ - Attachment 1, Emergency Action ~evel Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: S.c System Malfunction Sul;)category: 4 - Inability to Reach or Maintain Shutdown Conditions_ .

Initiating Condition: Inability to reach required s~utdown within Technical Specification limits EAL.:*

SU4.1 * - Unusual Event . . -

- Plant is not brought to required operating mode within Technical Specifications LCO required action completion time .

- Mode AppH~ability: .- .

_ 1 - Power Op~ratio~, 2., Startup, 3 - Hot Shutdown Basis:

-Plant-Specific

.-.. *. * . *... _Limiting C,onditions for Operation (LCOs) specify minimum requirements for ensuring safe operation of

*. **-**. . the Gnit The action~ associated wit,h an LQO state coriditipns that typically describe the ways ir;ivvhicti *,_.: .. *

>. th(3 requirements_ oHhe LCO can fail to be -met Spe~ified with each_ stated condition are required action

cpmpletion tirnes.(tef. t) - . . .. - - . -- - . *- - - .

Generic

pmiting *conditions ()fOperation (LCOs) require the plant to be brought tO a required Operating mode when the-Technical Specification required configuration tan riot be restored. Depending on .the

-* .-_ .-* _ cirQumstimces, this niaYormay notbe an emergency* or precurshr to more s~vere condition. In any _

a

. cas~ *. the initiation*of plant shutdown required by'the site Technical Specifications requires C3 fqur h.ollr .

-.. repbrt .under td. QFR 50, 72 (b) 'Non-"einergency events. The plant is within it~ safety envelope when. -*.-.-- .

-_ -- being shut_d()wn'\~ithinthe allowable requirec:t actioilcompletion time .in the "[echnical SpecificatiC)hS.: -_ _

- .--*' .* An imiJ)ediate UE,:is reqLiir~dwhenthe plant is notbroLighttOthe required operating mo.de within thef'~ -

- ;** .. allowable requii-¢d'.action completion time in the Technical .Specifications. Decl.aration of a UE is based

- - <Jn.the time at \l\fhich the !-CO~specified' required actionj::oinpletion time period elapses under the site

' Te~hnical$p~Cificc:itiohs and i~not*related_to how IC>ng*aconditidn may have existed. . .

. --... _NMP2 13asj~ Ref~rence(s): >. ._

f. lrnprov$d Tech,ni.tal SpecificationsNine*Mil~ Poin(Nuclear Station;*Unit No.*2, 1.3

.2;.- NEI 99~01 IC $02 - -. . ' -* . ..0 *'- -- . ._*-. -.*. * .. - *-- .

../ _.:

UNIT2. EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013Addeiidum 4 Revision 1 Page 187 of 264

-.* *Attachment 1, *Emergency Action- Level Technical Bases (Continued)

. ~ ' .

Category:*>- s ~ System Malfunction

_Subcategory:* 5 """".Instrumentation Initiating C~ndition:

Inability to mor1itor a significant transient in progress

.EAL:

SS5.1 Site Area Emergency Lo,ssof> approximately]5% of annunciation or indication on all of the following Control Room panels for?: .

15 min. (Note4):* * *. * *

2CEC*PNL601

2cEC*PNL~o2

2CEC*PNL603

2CEC*PNL851

. 2CEC*PNL852 AND ' ... . .... .. . . ,*_ *.

A i:>ignificaQt transient is in progress, Table S-2 _.

AND CorTipensatory iridic~tionsare unavaiiable (1=>>1ant Process. Computer, SPDS) *.

Note 4: The Ebstiould notwaitrnitil the applicable time ti~s elapsed, but should de~lare the event as soon as it is

. detern\ined thattiie qonditi6n has exceeded, or will iikely exceed, the applicable time .* . ..

. . Table

. . .....Signifi~ant S;.2 ' . .

Transients.

.. _AutomaUc turbine nmback >25% thermal reactor power

. * *,Electric load rejection> 25% full electrical load

- .. *. *

Reactor scram

ECCS injection

ThermaFpower oscillations > 10%

. ' . ."'============.=='====.==c=====;==========e'=======;==="

Mode ApJ>ii!?~bility:

1- Power Qp~ration, 2 - Startup, 3 ~ Hot Sh.utdown

.Basis:

. *Plant-Spedtrc .

Pl~ntProc~s$:C6rriputer?nd.SPD$ are considered compensatory indication.

S_ignifitariftransients are listed in Table s~2 ..

~ ..

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION.TECHNICALBA$ES EP"'.AA-1013 Addendum .4

Revision 1*

Page 188 of 264 *

- - - *Attachment 1, Eme~gency Actionl.evel Technical Bases (co.ntinued) .

sss.1 Site Area. Emergency (Continued)*

Generic This EAL is int~nded to recognize the threat to plant safety ~ssodated with the complete loss of capability of the control room staff to monitor plant response to a significant transient.

"Planned" and "(JN PLANNED" actions are not differentiated since the loss of instrumentation of this magnitudeis*of such significance during a transient that th~ cause of the loss is not an ameliorating factor. * * * * ** * * * **

Qt.iantificationjs arbitrary, however, it is estimated tha.t if approximat~ly 75% of the safety system . .

annunciators Or ii'idicators are lost; ther.e is an increased risk that a degraded plant condition could go

undetiade_d~ It fa not. intended that plant personrlel perform a* detajled count of the instrumentation lost

. but use. the valuE3 as ajudghierit threshold for determining the severity of the plant conditions .. It is also not intended.that theShift Manc:iger be tasked . with making a judgment decision as fo whether additional personnel are required tO provide increased rnoniforing of system operation. . .

. *..It is further recbgriized.that mostplant designs *provide redundant safety system indication .powered .* .*

.from separate<uninterruptible poWer -sljpplies. While failure of a large portion of annunciators is more .

. likely than a fail~re* .of: a large portion of.lndications,Jhe concern is included in this :EAL due tq difficulty

. assodated V\(itfi assessment of 'plarit csmditions. The: loss of specific! or several, safety system . . . .

. in(jicators shOuld rema.iri a functlcm of tfia.t specifiGsystem or compon~nt operability status. Jhiswill be. * .

apdressedby thespecificTechniQal Specific::ation-; The initia,tion of _a Tec::hhical. Specification imposed

. plant shutdown rel,ated to th~ instrument loss will be reported. via 10 CFR'50}2. Ifthe shutdown is not

in complians~yvith the Technical Specificatiori f,lCti?n,the NOU~ is based ort EAL'SU4: 1 . .

. A Site Area. Ernergency is considered to exist If th~: corifrbl *fbom staff cannqt rr1on'itor safety functibns .

. rieeded;for pr(?tedi()tl onh~ pul:)li("Yhile a $ignificanttransient' is in progr~ss. * ' . :. . . :

; * *. *.* Anmmciatorsforthis EAL an~{ liniitedto.irclude thq~~ id~ntified intbe Abnbtmat Operating Procedures, ,

in

' / iri the*Emergency Operating*Procedures/ and -'o,ther*EALs (.g., area, .J:>rocess; and/or* effluentfad .* .

'monitors,* etr,idso forth) * * * * * * * *

. ,.* Indications pe~tj~dJo moriito:rsafet~JLI'hcti6ns_nec~~sar§tor prb'tection ~ftbe pubJic includk. contr9I ,* .* . .

roomirydications~ 9omputer'geh~r~ted'i,1dicati9hs i;lnd'dediC,,ated anril!nciation capability:: . ;> : **.***

* . *:* .*c/ * . . *' *., *. ;* .-:.< " '. "":*\., ' :;~:,.* *.: '.:~** - .-* ..< **.,. *- . !."'

* "Compensat0wfndi9ationsin thfs qontexfinc::lugefc::omputer ba~ed, informatioh*su9h as Planf P-rocess .*

Computer'and*SROS. * ' * * *.* * * * * * * * .* * ** .* * * ** *

Fifteef1 mih~te~,wa~. selected a~*.a thre~hold to .~xch.i-de tr:ahsi~nt or. momE3ntary powe:r losses.

NMP2 -Ba~is.-~efer~nc~(sl: .. * *' ~: *:=' ..

- * * * * * ~* .~~~~E,~~~~~£l~comP~~r' * . *

i~** /*.3:** N2-oP~91f3:*Safety* PararY,l~terJ)lspJ~y

, 4. *soP-78A EOPKey Para1T1etef:Alt~rn~te.instrurnent~ltioii .: *.

System ($PQS) ; .*-

. .* ' : : . *,* * ' 5**~ 't\JEI ~9~b1 JC SS6

.<~: _. *..

UNrt2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONTECHNICAL BASES EP-AA,;1013 Addend urn 4

Revision 1 Page 189 of 264

Attachment 1; Emergency Action Level Technical Bases*(continued)

Category:.

S ~ $ystem Malfunction Subtat~gory:

_* 5 '-.Instrumentation

_Initiating *c()ndition: UNPLANNED loss of safety system annunciation or indication in the Control Room

- . with either (1) a significant transient in progress, or (2) compensatory indicators are unavailable EAL: ..**

SAS.1 * *Alert --

. UNPLANNED loss of> approximately 75% of annuritiation or indication on all of the following Control Room panels for~J 5 min. (Note 4): * ** *

..**. * *2cEdPNL60f .

...*. 2C.EC*PNLS02 .

2CEC*PNLf;03

2CEC*PNL851 .

. 2CEC~PNL852 .

. AND EITHER:

_. A sig~ificanttransient is in prog.re~s. Table S~2

- .. OR . .

... *. Corripensatciry - . . .

Jndicationsar~

unavai19ble.(Pl~nt Pracess Computer, SPDS)* ... ...

Note 4: The.ED should not wait uqtil the applicable time has elapsed, but should declareithe event as soon as it is

. det~rmineid that the cqndition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time,

- -jableS-2 Sig~ifi~an(T:ransients

-*..

_ Auto.niatictur~in¢.runback >. 2.5% thermal reactorp*ower

=: ~. ,* * -.

El~ctri¢ io~9.

rejectioll >.>25% 'full_ electricarloacf .*-

---, * . Reactors'C:;ram

* ** ~c,c"s ifiJeetioh .* _ ._ _ :: . ~. . .. '.

. * ** Therm_a(~{)ViJer oscillMio~s>*io*iyo

. ~. '.

1

.. . . ~. *..- : : -

Mode Applicability: *** .. ,* .. - .*.

_1 *---P~wer c)~~;ati9h;* ;; ~ ~ta*rtGp; 3~**~~f:Sh'llt~owr} *: .* .*....* .

Basis~* ** . . * - ,-

...*.**, . *c*:_ ...

Plarit-"Specific *. . **,,.*

-. Plart Proces..s. qomputer !3nd spps;ar~.con~i~e;e~ .compe~satoty i~dication~ __

.. . ..... .-.: .. ~. **~' '"'-. -

..*-~ignific~nt tra~sient~

.~. *-*. :

~l"e._list~q)n Table.s-2: _ >

..

UNIT.2 EMEoRGENCY ClASSIFICATIQN TECHNICAL BAS ES EP~AA~.1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 190 of 264 *.

. Attachment 1~ Emergency Action Level T~chnical Bases (Continued) *.

SA5.1 Alert (Continued)

Generic*

. This EAL is intended to recognize the difficulty a~sotiated with monitoring changing plant tonditions .

with0ut the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment during a significant ' .

transient* *. * ** * . .. .. *. .

. "Planned" 10-~s of ann~nciators m indicators includes ~che.duled maintenance and testing activities.

dbantification is arbitrary, however, it is es~imated that if.approximately 75% of the safety system ....

annunciators or indicators are lost, there is an increased risk th.afa degraded plant condition could go .. *

' undetected. It is notintendedthatplant personnel perform a detailed'count of the instrumentation lost.

. but use fhe value as a judgment threshold for determining the severity ofthe plant conditions. It is also *..*.

not intendedthatthe Shift fv:lanagerbe tasked with niaking a judgment decision as to whether additional.

. personnel are required to provide increased monitori.ng of system operation.

lti~ further recognized that most plant designs provide r~dundant safety system indicationpowered

. froni separate uninterruptible power supplies:*whilefarlurebfa largepO:rtion of annunciators is more

. likely than a failure of a. large portion of indications; the concern is included ih this EAL due to difficulty of

.* associated with. assessmerit ofplarit conditions~ The. loss specific, *or several, safety system , .

indicators should remain a function oUhat specific system or component operability status ..This will be

. . .. addressed by the specific Technical Specification~The initiation of a Tecflf1ical _Specification imposed ..

. ** .. * .> plantshLitdown related to the instrument loss*will oe:report~d via 10 CFR 50.72. If the shutdown is not

in q6mpliar:iGe with the TechnicalSpecificaUonaction,the UE.is based on_ EAL ~U4:1. * * *.*

. .*An*nuntiators orindic~tors for *thi~ EAL. include those. id~~tified in the Abnormal Operating Procedures,* .

',, in tfle'Emergency Op~rating Procedures, and. iri other EALs (for example; a_rea, process; and/oreffluent *.. '

rad monifors 1-arid s.oforth). ** ** * * * * * * * * *

.. "Compensatory.Jndicatioris" in this context includes computer based informat-ion such as Plant Proce~s

. *.. Compute( and 'SPDS. * * * * * * * *

. . Fifteen mi_nuteswas selected as a thresholdto e~clude transient orniomentary power losses ..

This Alert will be escalated to a Site Area Emergency if the operating crew can riot monitor the transient

in progress due to a concurrent loss* of compensatory indications with .a significant transientin progress

during the loss of annunciation orindication. * *

NMP2-8asis Reference(s):

1. lJSARFigure_.1.2-15 > ' *_ '

-* 2 ..* N2~0P-91A Process Comp'l1ter * . . .* *.

.* 3. N2-'0P-91B Safety Parah1eter DispJay System (SPDS)

<* **. , :***:**-4*.* §OP~78AEoP-Key.ParameterA1ternate**1nstrurrientatidn NEl-99~01 1c{sA4 . * * * * * *

5

.. ~* .. : .

':: . . -: -~: :

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1.

Page 191of264.

Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Categor}t: S - System Malfunction Subcategory: 5 . . .:. Instrumentation Initiating Condition: UNPLANNED loss of safety system annunciation or indication in the Control Room for ~ 15 min.

EAL:

SUS.1 Unusual Event UNPLANNED loss of> approximately 75% of annunciation or indication on all of the following Control Room panels for~ 15 min. (Note 4):

2CEC*PNL601

2CEC*PNL602

.2CEC*PNL603

2CEC*PNL851

. 2CEC*PNL852 Note 4.: The ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined thatthe condition has exceeded, or will likely f!XCeed, the applicable time Mode Applicability:

1 ~Power.Operation, 2 -*Startup, 3 - Hot Shutdqwn Basis:

Plant-Specific None Generic This EAL is intended to recognize the.difficulty aS$0Ciat~d with ~onitoring changing plant conditions without the. use of:a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment .

.* Recognitionoftheavailability.ofc9mputer based ind.icatim1 equipment is considered.

"Planned" loss.of annlJ~ci-ators.or indicators includes scheduled maintenance arid testing activities.*.*

- aua*ntificati~ri is arbitrary, however; it is ~stimateci that if approximately 75% of the safety system* .. *. ..*

. ::.. ..:.>.. * ** *

annunciQtors o~ indicators .a're fost, there is an increased risk'that a degraded plant condition. could go undetected; It is' notinterided that plant persoririE31 perform a detailed co.unt of the instrwrrientation lost a

.but use the Value, as judgment threshold for determir)ing 'the severity of the plant conditions~ .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 192 of 264

Attachment 1, Emergency Action Levei Technical Bases (Continued)

SU5;1 Ul'lusual Event (Continued)

_It is further recognized that plant design provides redundant safety system indication powered from

.separate uninterruptible power supplies. While failure of a large portion of annunciators is more likely than a failure ofa large pqrtion of indications, the concern is included* in this EAL due to difficulty associated with assessment of plant conditions. The loss of specific, or several, safety system _

indicators should remain a function of that specific system or component operability status. This will be

addressed by the specific Technical Specification. Ttie initiation of a Te9hniyal Specification imposed

__ plant shutdown rela~ed to the instrument loss will beJeported-via 10 CFR50.72. If the shutdown-is not in

- - _ compliance with the Technical Specification action, the UE is based on EAL SU4.1.

Arinunciators-ori~dicators for this EAL fnclude those identified in the Abnormal Operating Proced~res, in the Emergency Operating Procedures, and in other EALs (for example, area, process, and/or effluent radmoriitors, and so forth). * * * ** - -

. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

-This UE vifill:be escalated to an Alert based on a concurrent loss of compensatory indications or if a _

. significant transient is in progress during t~e loss ofarinundation or indication .

. NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. USAR. Figure 1;?-"15 _. _ _ _

2. N2-0P-91AP~ocessComputer

_ ._ _

3. N2.,QP~9tB Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). _

4. ** S0P-7BA EOPkey Parameter Alternate lnstrur:nentation *

5. NEI 99~611dsu3 ' - - .. .. .. ...

'i

~

'~ .- ' . -

1:- *. ***

.. ~.-

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES . EP-AA-1013 Addendum.4

- Revision 1 - _

- Page 193 of 264 Attachment 1,Em-ergencyAction Level.Technical Bases (Continued)

- _Category: - S ::.: System Malfunction

- ~

Subcategory: *.

6- Communications

Initiating Condition:* Loss of .all onsite or offsite communications capabilities .

EAL:

SU6.1

Unusual Event Loss of~ll table 8~3-onsite (inter~al) communication ~-ethods affectlngthe aqility to

. ' perform ro0tlne operations . . . ' . '

. OR Loss of all "fable S-3 offsite (external) communication methods affecting the ability to perfornioffsite notifications __ * *

--* Table s.:.:~ . Communications Systems -

.***System Onsite

Offsite

_(internal) - * (external) _

ps><"foorrnal _di~I telephone.sf .-

.. . . . ' *. :' ' . . - *i*

X..

.... :- ... : --*-* . ~- .

. Gaitronics x

)( '

... :.~-_.:~ :. ' *. _', .

Cqntrol RO()rr i.nstall~c;f ~~te.llite _:phdn~s (non por.tablef ENS:. *- ... :***,::

.*RECS;*

.~ ..

_. ~ . - -*.

-- *.* .. -_ - -_ ~-'" PowerOperation*,_2 :.*$tart~p, ~~-Hotsti:utdd\IV~

-Basis: - - . *-** -* -*

Plant-Specific

.:*.\~': ;: . ., ,,. ..

. *~ *. . .. - .-'**-:*::;

~:

- _'_. ~- **.. _-* ...

._ . bn$ite/otf~i!e.s~rimt_fnicati8nf$y~temsare 1i$tedinTab1~.~~~::(re(.1, 2:, 3): *. -* - . ,. ~ : .. '

.' ,, -~*-. -. -~-- - *.~ * ' ': _:: '.= .. - * ' * "!:'.

.~ ,. **-* . ..'-" ~*: . ... - .::_* _,.. .~ ,.. _. .

'. **~ . -~

-_ .- ~. .;_ ' ..

~ _- *--.

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 194 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

SU6.1 Unusual Event (Continued)

Generic The purpose of this EAL is to recognize a loss of communications capability that either defeats the plant operations staff ability to perform.routine tasks necessary for plant operations or the ability to communicate issues with off-site authorities.

The loss of off-site communications ability is expected to be significantly more comprehensive than the condition addressed by 10 CFR 50.72.

TheaVailability of one method of ordinary off..,site communications is sufficient to inform federal, state, an.d localauthorities of plant problems, This EAL is ir:itended to be used only when extraordinary means (for example, 'relaying of information from non-routine radio transmissions, individuals being sent to off-site locations,. and so forth) are being used to make communications possible~

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. *USAR. Section 9.5.2

2. Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Site Emergency Plan, Section 7.2

3. N2-0P-76 Pla~t Communication~

4. NEI 99-01 IC SU6 J"'

, ~ _:.'

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 195 of 264 Attachment 1, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: S - System Malfunction Subcategory: 7 - Fuel Clad Degradation Initiating Condition: Fuel clad degradation EAL:

SU7.1 Unusual Evertt Reactor coolant activity> 4 µCi/gm*l~131 Equivalent

- Mode Applicability:

1 - Power Operation, 2 - Startup; 3 - Hot Shutdown Basis:

Plant-Specific This EAL addres$es reactor coolant samples exceeding Technical Specification 3.4.8 (ref. 1). A reactor coolant sample analysis with speeific activity in excess ofthe Technical Specification lirllit of 4 µCi/gm 1-131 Equivalent is indicativeofadegradatlon of the fueLclad, and is a precursor of more serious problems. This. activity level f~r which operation is allowed to continue for up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to ~ccommodate short durationfodine spikes following changes in thermal power.

Generic This. EAL is* included becaus.e it:i!:; *a* precursor of more serious conditions and, as result,. is considered to be. a potential degradation of the level of safe~y of the plant

Escalation of this EAL to the Al~rt level is via the EAL~ in C~tegory F.

This threshold addresses coolant samples exceeding coolant technical specificationsfor transient iodine spiking limits.

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1, .lmpr.oveci Technical Specifications. Nine Mile Point Nudear Station, Unit No. 2, 3.4.8

2. Improved Technical Specification*s Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2, 3.4.8.A.1

3. NEI 9~-01 IC SU4 .

UNIT 2EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addenduli14 Revisiori 1 ***-**

Page :196 of 264, ,*

Attachment 1; Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued) category:-* S - System Malfunction

. *, Subcategory: *. 77" Fuel Clad Degradation Initiating Con,dition: . Fuel clad degradation EAL:

. ~U7.2 .- Unusual Ev~nt

offgas*radiation DRMS high*(red) alarmfor ~ 15.min.

Mode AppllC:abUity: . . . .

. 1 - Power Operc:ition, 2 - Startup, 3- Hot Shutdown Basis:* ..

-Plant-Specific *_

. - ~levated ~ffgas'. radiationacti~ity represents a potentialdegradation in the level of safety ofthe plant

anda potentic:il precursor of more serious problems. The Technical Specification allowable limit is an*

- - offgas level notto.exceed 350,000 µCi/sec (ref..1). The DRMS ala.rm setpoint has been con~ervatively*

- - selecteq'beqauseit is operationally significantand.isreadily recognizable by Control Room operati~g** .

-**, .*._' st~ff, 15 'rrirnutes is allotted for operator acti~n to reduc~the offgas radiation levels and e~clude' . .

meth~d61ogy ouUihed

.. - - 'TRANSIEN"f..conditiOl'lS(reL2, 3t 4). The high offgasradiation alarm is set using

.. ~ *.. '

il'l theOD(}M{ref; 5). *. ..

. . ~* . . *, . . '***Generic * -

.*.This EAL is. includ~d because if is ~ precursor of mor~* serio_us: conditions and, as result, is considered.,

tp pea potential degradatipnofthe level ofscifety.of tile pla~t * * - * * .*

. : -- ** * * :. ; Es~~lation:of~his~AL t~theAlerfl~velisyi~ the EAls ih.*G~tegory F'.'

* .-* *

__ * ~'*:.* , ... This ttireshqld il'lt~grity. . ._ * * *

~ddresses* radiati~rt *monit()r reaciings **

thatprovide indication ofa'degradati()n *of fueLtl~d

.* NMP2 Basis.Reference(!;):

1 Improved teChnical.S~~cifications NineMile.Poirit NJ61ear Stc;1tion, U'nit No:2, 3:7.4 * -

'2~, N2.:ARP~fr1An11Jr1ci~-tor'Respons~ prbcedures*tora-nnun~iator 851253 *

L'. N2"'~RP~O 1 Ann1.inciatorHespohse 'ProcE:ldur~~ fotanouncili!tor 8Sl~26

_*. 4.,

N2"S6P117Fue]Faill]re o{High Activity in ~~ Coolant8~'0ffgas - *.

. ~.'

5, Offsite pose C?lc~lation Manual '.3.3:2 * * -. -

::: 6: NEI 99::011c,.su4-_ - *-

... - . . ,~*. ..

"*t~* .. .~ . .. _,..~

-*~.

.;~ .. ,*. _:*.

~.,. .

-;~,

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 197 of 264 Attachm~nt1, Emergency Action Levei Technical Bases (Continued}

Catego..Y: s ~ System Malfunction

.Subcategory: a -:- RCS Leakage Initiating Condition:

RCS leakage

'.EAL:

Slj8,1 Unm;ual Event .

Unidentified . . . or reactor . coolant. pressure boundary leakage > ~. 0. gpm

- oR--

Identified reactorc,oolant leakage >*25 gpm

- . Mode Applicability-:

1 - Power Operation,, 2 - Sta1tup; 3 *~ Hof Shutdown Basis:.

- *. * *. Plant:.Specific

',*,< 'Elevat~d RCS leakage maybe detec:;ted by the following annurciators (ref.. 1-A):

.. 87311_5 DRWL FL~DRN: LEf-15 RATE HIGH (setpoint 4 gpm) *

* *._ 873\11 DRWL FlR ORN TANK 1 LEVELHl'-HI ..

873105 bRWLEQPT DRNTANK 1 LEVEL Hl:.HI . *

873110DRWL EQPT DRN_DAILY LKRATE HIGH* .

-.** The Plant Process Computer monitors Ul)identifled and identified leakage over six 1]1inute intervals (Computer Point DERXA01 )'a!) ~ell as a twenty-f~urJmur ~ver~ge (Co~puter .Point 2DER-FI 101 ). Leak rates can also be *...

verified by alternate measurements according to N2-0SP-LOG-S001, Atta~hments 6 and 7 (ref. 5, 6).

Generic This E,A.Lis included as a UE because it may be a precursorof more serious Conditions and, as result, is considered to be*a potential degrad~tion of the level of safety of the plant. The 10 gpm value for the

unidentified .or pressure boundary leakage was selected as ,it is observable with normal control room indications. Lesser-Values mustgenerally be determined through time-consuming surveillance tests (for

e)(ample, mass*b~lances). , - . . . -

'.Relief valve*rformal-operation should be excluded from this EAL. However,**a relief valve that op.erates.-***

** and failsJb close-petdesign should: be considered applicable to this EAL if the relief valve cannot be

. , isolated. . * *** * * * * * * . .

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES. EP*AA~1013 Addendum.4

.**Revision 1 Page 198 of 264

.Attachment t, Emergency Action.Level Technical.Bases (Continued)

SUB.f Unusual~ Event (Continued) .*.

The EAL fbrjdentified. leakage is set af a higher value due tbthe lesser significance of identified ...

leakage in comparison to unidentified or pressureboundary.. leakage. In eithercase, escalation of this *

EAL to the Nert level is yia EALs in Category F. * *

NMP2 Basis Reference(s):

1. N2:.ARP-qt Anmineiator Response Proced.ures for annunciator 873115 *

2. N2-ARP,.Q1 Annunciator ResponseProcedures for ann'i.Jnciator 873111

3. N2-ARP:;01 AnrnJndatorResponseProcedures for annunciator 873105

4. N2-:ARP-"01 Annunciator Response Pr~cedures for anhuriciator 87311 o*

5 .. N2-0SP-LdG-Sob1' shift Checks -Mode 1 . *. . '

6 .. N2,.QP-~7:Drywell Equipmeritand Floor Dr~ins System

7. NEI 99-01 JC SUS . . .

-, -- -~ **; . -:*

. -: ...-~ : ., .

-'~ .~' ;'*;**

UN1f2 EM~RGENCY CLASSl~ICATION TECHNICAL BASES *. EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 199 of 264

.. *, /

- - - Attachment 1,*E~ergency Action. Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Categocy:*F-- FissiC>n ProductBarrier Degradation, .*. . .* .* *.. * * * * **

. . . *.EAL Group:**.. Hot Conditions (R,CS temperature> 2b0°F);.EALs in this: category are.applicable

- - only in one or more hot operating modes:.* * * * .. * ** * * .

- EALs in th.iscatego~y representthreat~'to.the defensein depth design c9ncept that*precludes the

relea.se of:highlyradioactive fission products to the environment.This concept relies on multiple .

phy~icatbari"iers any on~ of whiqh, if maintained iNTACT, precludes th~ release of $ignificant amounts ot radi~m::tive fission. products t9 the environment. The prih1ary fission product. barriers . -

are.:

- .A. FuerCiad (FC): fircoriium tubes which hou$e the ceramic uranium oxide pellets along with the end. plugs which are welded into each .el1d of the fuel rods comprise the FC. barrier. * .

. B. Reactor CoolantSystern(RCS):Thereactor~essel:shell, vessel head,.CRD housings, vessel

. nozzles and penetrations; and all primary systems* directly. corin13cted *to the RPV up to the outermost PrimaryContainmentisolation valve comprise the RCS barrier.

.*. C: Containment(PC): The drywall, the suppression chamber/pool, their. respective interconnecting

- paths;*. and other connections*up to and ineiudirig tt,ie outermost containment isolation valves

. col11P.rise the Primary Coritaihrnenfbarrier: * ** : * * ..**.* . *.* . ** * .*. ..

The. EALs ii{ this* category require fission eval~aUon oftheloss and potential loss thresnolds listed in. the*

protjtic~ barri$rmatrix ofT~bl~ f-1**.(Attachme~t 2). "Los's,; and "Potentl~fLoss" *signify the

. relative dalllage and threatof dam,age tp the barrier. ,;L-~ss~' n1eansthe barrier *no longer assures containme~fof_radioactive materials. "Potential Loss~' r'rle~hs i11t~grity of th.e bartier is .threa.tened and

. ** cou1J .be lost if cq~ditions continu~ t_o ~egrade.The number of barrie~s that are lost or pot~ntially lost

~11dthe followi.qg criteri~ cletetrniii.e,the ~ppropriate en1~rgency c;1~ssification Jevel:

dnusu~iEvent:

- . Anylo§s'pr*.anypotentia/ 1os~hi'Qonfa1/'1fn~'!t :

J .*

., **** ... : :; ; * **- ~* t -**** -

- 'Alert:.,:*** * "' --. - -~- -

~ -* ,*

ArwJo§S,oi-anfpote',jti~J. los~ofeitherFµe(Gla.(1 otRCS .**..*

- . : * <.' * : .* * * ~ * *_ .. -... :'.

Site.*Area Emergencv.~ .. -- . . ,: ~ - . ;

-_*-:* .::_-~~<:*--:* . > .

Loss,orf:iote.ntiall(Jss.otany'6i/obarrier5c. ;* -

.. Ge/1efalEm*era~'~c-V:--; . _:*-* *- *'.-. *_-~ *. - *.*- ,., :_, .. . :- ,.

. *Loss of:;J'J1y . - -. ; .

two barrie.rd anJ//oss* o[. potent](3{loss ofthethird b~rrier .. :<

'\ . ... - . . *:.-. *.. * .

._

-~ ..

, UNIT2EMERGENCY .CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA~1013 Addendum A*

Revision 1 Page 200 of 264 Attachment 1,. ~mergency Action Level TechniCal, Bases (Continued) ...

C~tegory,F.-Fission ProductBarrier Degradati~n (Continued)

.The logic used for Category F. EAl.s reflects the follovving considerations:.

. . The - *-*

Fuel Clad Barrier a~d-the RCS Barriera~e weighted more heavily than the Containment Barrier. UE EALs associated with. RCS and Fuel Clad Barriers are addressed under Category R

*,

Atthe Site Area Emergen~y le~el, the~emust be some ability to _dynamic~lly assess h6w far .

. . *.. present conditions are from t~e threshold for a. General Emergency. For example, if Fuel Glad* .

arid RCS Barrier "Loss"Jhresholds existed, that, in addition tooff~sitedose assessments, would req~ire continual assessments of radioactive inventory and. containm.ent integrity. Alternatively;.

if both Fuel Clad and* RCS Barrier "Potential Loss" thresholds existed; the ED would. have more *.

assurance that there. was n()

im~ediate need to escalate to a *General Emergency.

' * *

r * * *

*. Tile abilityto escalate*to higher emergency ~lassification levels as an.event deterioratesmust *..

be. maintained. For exc:uliplei RCS leakage

.risk to public. health .and safety.

~teadily increasing wouldrepresent an increasing ** ***

T~e ContC1inmeritBafrier shoutd notbe d~clared lost' or potentiallyJostb~sed on exceeding.** .*

. Tech.nic~ISpecification action.$tatement criteria, unless there. is an eve11t in progress'requi.dng .* *.

.*mitigation by the Containment bc:trrier. *

. *. ~- : .

- -- -~

UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA.;1013 Addendum 4 .

Revision 1 .. *..

Page 201 of 264.

At~achment1,-EmergenC:y Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Category: _*_.*. -~-

FissionProduct Barrier .Degradation .

Sul:>categocy:.

N/A Initiating Condition: Loss of ANY two barriers and loss or potential loss of the third barrier EAL.:

FG1;1 General Emergency Loss ofANY t~ci fis~ioh product barriers

- . :.. ::: .. . AND Loss.or potential loss. of third fission product barrier (Table F-1)

.. . - . .. ~ . .: . -

.*Mode Applicability: .

1 - Power Op~ration, 2'- Startup, 3 ~Hot Shutdown .

Basis:

. * * ._* *Plant-SpeeifiC: *

.*.. FuelClad; RCS and. Containhientcomprise the fission product barriers~ Table F-1 (

Attachment:

2) li$ts * .

.**-.*_the fis~i()~ p;oduttbarri~r thresh~lds, bases andreference.s;.**

Atthe General Emergenty classific~tidn level eath barrier is weighted equcilly,:A Gener~I Etnergericy*ji

.* therefqre:appr_opriat~ for any combination Of the follOVlfiQQ conditiorts: *.

-:.- * **.* Loss ofFl.lel Glad; RCS:am:iContairimerit barriers . .

*.* Loss*bf:Fu.el Clad ~nd RCS 1:>arrierswithpotentia1*rq$s of.Containrne.11ibarrier

*

Loss ofRCS antj c6ritainrDent barriers \Nith potentiallossofFuelCl~d b~rrier .

. .* * .

Los~* ofFuelClad ~hd Contaihm~nt_; . .. -

barri-~rs with- pot~htial loss .of RCS ba~rier *

. .. ,_~. .

.-.*. * *Generic .** *.

None.* * . >

NMP2 B~si~--~eference(s}:. *.

. 1 . NEI 9~-:01JCFG1 . .

. **. *-~

. *' ~

UNIT 2 EME_RGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum4

-Attachment 1,_ Emergency Action Level Technical Bases (Continued)

Revision 1 Page 202 of 264

_Category:-----*

_-_ Fission*Prodµctl3arrier Degradation

'subcategory;* N/A 1.nitiating Condition:. -- -**Loss or potential loss of ANY two-* barriers

.EAL:

- FS1 .1 Site Area Emergency _ __-.

Loss or potential lossof ANY two fission product barri_ers (Table F~ 1)---

-_ - Mode Applical:>ility:

-t- Powerdperation, 2 .:.*startup, 3 - Hot Shutdown Basis:

_-_ Plant-SpeCitiC Fuel Clad, RCS and Containment comprise the fission product barriers. Ta_ble F-1 (Attachment 2) lists the fissi~n product barrierthresholds, bases and refer~nces.

At the Site Area Emergency classification level, each barrier Is weighted equally. A Site Area

, ___ -EmergenCyis tt)er~fore a*ppropriate fbr any combination of the following conditions:

' -

One ba'tri~r l0.ss_a11d a second barrier .

loss(that -

is,- loss .:.1oss)

--- Orie barrier loss anda~etond barri~rpotential loss (that is; loss ,.-potential loss)*- _

--*

One.bar~ie~

loss) -- -

pot~ntial- loss- aiid - -

a secondb~rH~r potential loss (that is, potential loss - potential Atth~ site Area Em~rgency classificati~n- level, the ability to_ d'ynamically assess the proximity of

- pr~sentconditib~s-withrespect.tothe thr¢stioldfora-General Emergency is important. For example, -

-_ - - -the existence of Fuel Glad and RCS Barrier loss thresholds in- addition to offsite dose assessments would-require continual assessments ofradioactive inventory _and Containment integrity in anticipation

of reaching a G~neralEmergency classification. Alternatively, if both--Fuel Clad and RCS potential loss thresholds existed, the Emergency . '

Director would have greaterassurance that escalation to a General

- Emergen~y i$ lesslMMINENT.

.. :, . Generic -

... * * "NMP2 fia~;S R~teten~~l: *..

'> - -----*-* _1.> NE199:.011cFs1 _ _ - - -:

.. : . ~ .... , ": ..

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BA$ES EP".'AA-1013 Addendum 4

Revision 1 *

Page 203 of 264

.. ,6,ttachment 1, Emergency Action L<ivetT~chniCal Bases (Continued)*

Category: *

Fission Product BarrierDegradation Subcateg(:)ry: .* N/A Initiating Condition: .

ANY loss or ANY potential Joss of EITHER Fuel Clad OR RCS EAL:

FA1 ~1 * *Alert AN~. loss. or ANY potenti~l loss of EITHER . -* . '.

Fuel .Cladbarrier OR RCS barrier(Table F-1) . .

. *. Mode . . .*.**

Applicability:... :- ..

1 "' Power Opefration, 2 ~*Startup,.. 3 - Hot Shutdown .***

Basis:.***

.* Plant-Specifi*c Fuel Clad, RCS and Containment comprise the fission prqductbarriers. Table F:1 (Attachment 2) lists .

. * *. _Jhe fission pr~-~~ct bar,rierthr,esholds; bases c:ind referenc~~- .

. At the Al,etid~s.sification level, F~el Glad and RCS barrier~ are weighted.more heavily than:the .*

*.- c;ont~inmenfparrier.

Unlike the Cqniairimentbarri~r,

*: . ,' ~ *. -

loss or potential loss of either .. . . ..

the Fuel.Clad or ..

RCS barrier_f1.lay.resuitjil th~.relot~tiqn* ()('(~dioac.ti\le materials or degradation ofcore cooling .

capabilityi

-~

Nofe'thatthe.. fos~'

or:pot~ntiallo~s

. .. *. -< -~- '.** ' .

of C611tainllle~t barri~r: in combination with loss of . ,..

potentlal

1o~s*bfeitherFuel CJad or _*RCS:b~rrier

.-.-.' .: .*. .. --. . ... ,, res~ltsindeclaratior1 ofa. .Site Area ' . *'.

Emergenc/under E:AL f=St.. _, . '

Generic .** .: .. *

- .Nemer:, .** .

NMP2 8~sisRefer~~*ce(sj: . ., .. .'

f\JE:r99-o1*1cF~1.

.; 1.* * , -

* . :.;j*

~ : 1

... *::~

UNii 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFl~ATIONTECHNICALBASES EP-AA,;,1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 204 of 264

.* *. . . Attactun*~nt 1, Erriergency Action Level Technical Base$. (C~ntinued)

Category:

.. Fissi~n ProductB~rrler Degradation<

Sub~ategory: *

N/A*

Initiating Condition:*

ANY.loss or ANY potential ioss of Containment EAL:

FU1.1 *

Unusual Event ANY loss ~rANYpotential lqss of Containm'erii barrier (Table F-1 r

-Mode Appli_~ability: *

. J :.po\fVer ~~~ration, 2 -Startup,*3.: H~t Shutciowh

Basis:

Plant-Specific.* .

FueLClad,*

RCS - ;:'

and Contain~entcon1pri~e the fission pr~ouct barriers. Tabl~ F~t (Attachment2) lists

. .~ .. . . .. . -~ . .. .: . . .

- - - - theJissioriproduct barrier thresholds, bases arid references ..

Fuel Clad and RCS. barriers are ~~-ighted more heavily thahthe Containrrie~t ~afrier. Unlike the Fuel .*

Clad and RC? barriers, th~* los_~<ot-eith~rof which r,esults, in ari Ale~* (EAL FA1 .1); 1.oss of the

.. Contalnmeint barrier in and of itselfdoes not resultin the relocation Of radioactlye l:nateri(31s. or the poteritial'fordegradation of' core c6~1ing . ' '

cap~bility.

HoW~vkr,- loss orpoterttia1:1ciss of the Containment .

bar~ier in combination y\fitH th~ ioss. ~r potential loss, of either the Fuel ,Clad or*RCS barrier results. ,in

. dedlfm1ti611:of.<f°SiteAreaEmerg~n6y.u°rj~~r EALFS.1.1~ ..

Generic '**': - :.*

NOrie.**. . '.</~ -- .' ..

**** NMP2 Ba$i~ Refereoce(s)':

1. NEt99.:ot*ICFU1 *. , *.

, -..:* ~' *,: ; . "

. ~:- -

-**.-* -**;.c****

.. UNIT2 EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIQN TEC.HNICAL BASES EP-AA~1013 Addendum .4 Revision 1 **

Page 205 of 264 .

. Attachment 2, Fission Product Barrier Loss/P()tential Loss Matrix And Basis .

Introduction Table.F-1 lists the threshold conditions that defiriethe Loss and.Potential Loss ofthe three fission.*

. product barriers (Fuel Clad; Reactor Coolant System, and Containment).The table is structured ~o th~t

.each of the three barriers occl!pies adjacent columns: Each fission producfbarrier column is further.

divided into two columns; one for Loss thresholds and one for PotentialL~ss thresholds.

- The first colun1nbf the fable* (to the leftof the Fuel. Clad Loss column) list~ the categories (type~) of fission pr~duct b~rri~r thresholds. The fission product baffier categories are:

. A. RPV Level S: . Primary Containment Pressur~ I TemperattJre *.** *

C. *isolation**

n. Rad*

. **. E. .Judgment

*Eath cat~gory occupies a row* in* Table F-1 th.us forming a ma.trix defined bythe categories. The

'in~ersection of each row with~ach LoSs/Potehtial. Lciss column forms acell in which one or more fissi~ri

.. *.* . * .*.***pro~uct .. -

b~r~ierth~esh~lds

~pp~ar~ If NEI. ' .. .

gg~o1 does.. not define a thresholdJor.a ba~rierLoss/Poter1tial

. Lo~s, the word "f'!one" is entered inthe celL

~ .-.: :*_', ',* . .. .. '

.

Thresholds are assighed s.equemtial r1umbers within each L~ss and**PbtehtialLoss 9olumn beginning

. with number o~e. In thi~ man~:er, a thresh~ld. earl be identified. by its ~at~gory titie *andnumb~r; For .***.

. * ~~ampl~;the.firstFueLc1ad barrierL~ss in Cat~gbryA ~ould be assigned "FGL~ss A.1/'the third*...

< ..* Confainmerit barrierPotential Lpss would be ~ssigneq "PC P.,LossB.3, and soforth ..

.* ii a cei1 in Table F.,1* contains more than one nl,Jmbered threshold, .each otthe numbered thresholds, if

.*exceeded, signifies a Loss o~ Potential L~ss of the barrier. It is not necessary to exceed all of.the

. thresholdsin a bategory before d~claring a barrier Loss/P,otential Loss. *. . .

Subdivision of Table f., 1 by category*.facilitates a*sso~i9tion *of plant conditions to the applicable fission.

. productbarriefr. Loss and Pot~~ti~I Loss thresholps. This structure promotes a systematic approach to .

*: .ass~.ssing tile dassific~tiorfst~tus *of the fission pr()dqctbarriers.

.*. ,/_ ..

- *: c. *-~. . ***_*

__ . '.~ ' :-

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4.

Revision 1 \*.

Page 206 *of 264,

.Attachment 2.:-Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential loss Matrix And Basis (Continued) *.

lntroducti<)n (Continued) -

Wheri equipped with knowledge of plant conditions related to the fission woductbarriers, the EAL-user firstscans d~wn the category column of Table F-1, locates the likely c~tegory and then reads across

. the fission product barrier Loss. and Potential Loss thresholds in that category to determine ifa .. .

threshold. has been. exceeded. If a threshold. has. not been exceeded, the EAL-user proceeds fo th~ *

' next likely*tategory andconti'hues review of the thresholds iri th_e neV\I category ..

. If the EAL-~s~r determines that any threshold has been exceeded, by definition, the barrier is lost or

pqtentiallY lost.,,. even if niultiple thresholds in the same barrier column are exceeded; only that one .* ..

barrier is fost or potentially lost. The EAL-user niust examine each of the three fissionproduct barriers*.

to d~ter~ine if ~ther barrier thresholds in the category are lost or potentially lost. Fm example, if

.*. **Primary6ont~inme~t radiation issufficiehtlyhigh, a Lossof the.Fuel Clad and RCS barriers anda .*

_** ....*:* '. Potential Loss ()f the C~ntainment barrier can occur. Barrier Losses and Potential Losses are then .**

?PPlied fothe_algdrithms giveni~ EALs FG1 .1, FS1.1, FA1 .1 a11d FU1 .1 to determine the appropriate*.

emerge~GY.glassification.

-. * *.*.* *

In the remainder of this Attachment, the. Fuel Clad barrier threshold bases app~ar first, followed by .the ..

. RbS barrier;and finally the Gonfoinment b~rrier threshold bases. In each barrie~. the bases ~re given* '

accotdingt~ :c:at~gory Loss followed by ca'tegoryPotentlar Loss beginning with, Categ~ry/\. ..

. "~ : . --..

then B,. .\J=* .* .* * . ,

' ~. ~*

*-.=" ..-.: -

- .. 'r

' .. , c*~,

~--------------- -

.,, -------------------------------------------------P_a-=g_e_2_0_1_o_f_26""!'4_

- - EP-AA.1013.Ad. .duin 4

, RevisioriJ .

Attachment 2,-. Fission ProdiJcfBarrierl,ossfPotential Loss . .

Matrix And Basis(Continued}.

.i.*,--*

Table F~1 Fi!;sion Product Barrier Matrix* ':

'r*:'*

FUel*Clad Barrie!"' ' ~eactor CoolantSystein Barrier Containment Barrier*

Categbry, Loss** Potential Loss

Loss*** Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss 1.. RPV water.level cannot be .

resiored and.maintained**

R~~ water l~vel ca~not be

'A* 1: *

Prima~ Containm~nt above ~14 in.' foilowing *

restored and .maintained' None None

.1. Primary Containment Flooding is

Flooding is required depressurization of.the RPVor above ~14 in. or RPVwater required*

RPV Level. RPVwater level cannot be . . level cannot be determ,ine'd determined*,

2.

Prima,Y Containment pressure >

1. Primary Contai~me~t press~re 45 psig and'rising* *

B rise followed by a rapid 3: Explosive mixture exists inside UNPlAN!lj.ED drop in Primary . Primary Containment Primary Containment pressure *

containm *.None: .None

2. ' Primary .Containment pressure (<: 6% *H; and 1.6Bp$ig due to RC.s Jeak~ge .2.. Primary Cont~inment pressure *4. *:* Suppression pool temperature and.

response not consistent with RPV pressure cannot be Ptessi.ire t, LOCA conditions . . maintained below the 'Heal'
.Temp.:*
Capacity Temperature Limit (N2-EOP-PC Figure M)
3. Failure of all Primary .
Containment isolation valves in
""NY .one line to close following
' . auto or manual initiation
3. ~elease pathw~y e~i~t~ o~side AND Prjmary Containment resulting* Direct downstream pathway UNISOLABLE primary system.
from isolation failure*in ANY of outside Primary Containment and*
.leakage outside Prima,Y the following (excluding 'normal. to .the environment exists ..
Containment as indieated by*
process system flowpaths from 4. lnteritiona.1 Primary Containment*.
c None None an*UNISOlABLE system): '.
-_* Main st~arTI line exeeeding.EITHER: .
RB area tempe'ratu~e above an
.*venting per EOPs
.None Isolation isolation setpoint 5. UNISOlABLE primary system
RCIC. steam line leakage outside Primary
OR Containment as indicated by*
o 'RWCU REi area radiation above an exceeding EITHER:*
Feedwater . alarm setpoin!' '
RB area maximum safe
.4. RPV blowdolivn is required .temperature value .
(N2-EOp-SC Detail S)
OR
RB area radiation
> a.miE+3 mR/hr
2.
Drywell area radiation
,;,.3100 R/hr(3.. 1 E6 mRem/hr)
D None
5. Drywell area radiation*
None None
5. Drywell area radiation
,41 R/hr(4.1 E4mRem/hr) ;, 6.0 E4 R/hr (6.0 E7 mRem/hr)
Rad. 3. Reactor coolant activity
> 300 µCi/gm 1-131 Equivalent
4. ANY condition in the opinion of 2. ANY condition. in the opi~ion of .6. ANY condition in the opinion of 2. ANY condition in the .opinion of the 6. ANY condition in ttie opinion of 6. ANY condition in the opinion of the E the Eme'rgency Director that the Emergency Diri;>ctor that the Emergency Director that Ernergency Director that indicates the Emergency Director that Emergency Director that indicates indicates Joss of the Fuel Clad indicates potential loss of the indicates loss of the Reactor potential loss of the Reactor indicates loss of the Containment potential loss of the Containment Judgment barrier
Fuel Clad barrier Coola.nt System b.arrier . Coolant System barrier* barrier barrier
UNIT 2 EMERGl;NCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES. EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 208 of264 Attachment 2, Fission Produ~t Barrier Loss/Potential. Loss Matrix: Arid Basis (Continued)
Barrier: . FL!el Clad
. Category: A. RPV\l\/ater Level .
Degradation Threat: Loss Threshoid:
1. Primary Containment Flooding is reqUired Basis:
.Plant-Specific *
.. Requiremerltsfor Primary Contai~mentFl6oding ~re;~stablished in EOP-RPVStep L-16; EOP-CS Steps:
L-8,- L-10 and.L-18; and EOP-C4-0verride 1. These .EOPs provide instruetions to ensure adequate core cooling by m;:tihtainingRPV water level above prescribed limits or operating sufficient RPV injection sour~es: when level barinot be det~rr:nihed~ SAP entry is required when (ref. 1): .
****** * -RPVwaterlevel ca*nn()t_be restored and maintained above -39 in. with insufficient Core Spray_
. ' Coqling'. Jhe Miriimum $t~am CSoolin!;r RPV NV~terLevel (MSCRWL) is the lowest RPV water * *
. .. .
1~Je1.~twhich . ... .
th~ covered portio"n_
ofthe rea~torcorewillgenerat~sufficieritsteam
. " . .* . ~ . . ) ' . .. . . .
to preclude
. an~icl~~ temperatur~ irfth~ uricovete<;J portion of the core from exceedihQ '1 soo~F. 'core Spray '
Cooling'Is insuffidient if R-PV wat'erl~vel caririotbe..restored ;and marntainec:I at or ab6~e -62 in .
. , with *. ;:itJ~ast 63~0-_g*p~~or~*sway loop flow. 6onsistent ~ithJheEOP definition of"can~otbe .
. res~med and m~intalne(j/ th~ determinatiqdthat the para!ll~ter canpotbe restored arid
~ ...* .
rri~intafh~d.ab6yethe-1i1Tlit_m_ay'bernaci~'at, b~fore; oraft~rth~*'paramet~r*actuallydecreas~s-to-
.. this- point' ..* --. -*. *
--*-.. e.,, .

:: .*>.: .**:* . ...
.* - w~ter)e:vel il18icatl6n pwvj_de~ the primary flieans pf krmwi11g if adequate. core cooHrig is. being
...*- mai~t~ip~ct;Whe'ri <:ill. rneari~qfclet~rnjihirig RPVwater*lev~Care ull~vallab.1~, relian:qe on ---* .*.-. . .
. ** alt~~*n~i,~*~*e~ns-of~-~sJfi~g:~a~quate ~or~:doollng must be 'attem~ted~ The. instru¢tiohs in EbP- .-
.*. - . 64:~~etlfy the~e ~eahs-, Whith-illdu~_e emerg~11_cy d~pr~ssuriiatic>:n ofthe :RPV an~ injection .
. into-the.RPV.at a r~tefneededtc:iJlood fo theelevaiionbt.the main *~team lines or*holci RPV-*
- :-
_:*:*' ** ~<- -; * : * :- "** :
-* .( * ::".* .
-* -
pre.ssu,rEfab9ve the Mlriim~JTI $fea.rrr qo<;>lin~ Pr~s~9re :(in ATWS evehts):*. *.*
~ \
_

. *. -* ., , - .*~~:.. . .:: :~ ~: :. ": ' :.:* ..:- .
. *: :. :*. ~ \ ..
UNIT2 EME.RGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 209 of 264 c . . *.
Attachment 2; Fission Produ~t Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued)
Prima..Y Containment Flooding is required (Continued)
This thre~hold is also a Potential. Loss, of the Containment barrier (PG P-Loss A.1 ). Since SAP entry occurs after core uncovery has occurred, a Loss of the RCS barrier exists (RCS Loss A.1 ). Primary Containment Flooding (SAP entry), therefore, represents a Loss of two barriers and a Potential Loss of a third; which requires a General Emergency classification.
Generic This site sp~cific value corresponds to the level lJsed in EOPs .to indicate challenge of core cooling .
. This is the minimum value to assure core coolingwithouHurther degradation of the clad.
NMP2 Basis Reference(s):
1. NER-2rvl~039, NMP2 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) Basis Document
2. . N2-EOP~C4 RPV Flooding *
3. NEI 99-01 FC Loss 2
, , ~ ... :
.: ~ :_
. .. '~.~
........,;;.;...;.;..;....~--'-----""_;_~~_;_~_;_~__:.~~----'-~~
UNIT2 EME.RGENCY CLASSIFICATl.ON TECHNICAL BASES. *. EP-AA-1013 Addend.um 4 Revision *1 **
Page 210.of 264.
Attachment 2, Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continu~d) ..
Barrier: Fuel Clad . . .
Category: B .. Primary ContainmentPressure/.Telllperature.
Degradation Threat: . Loss .
Threshold:
. *.. ~ ' .
--~ :; ..* . ,. *.:.*
. >-.. _ . .*"v
.. '".~ ***.
.. ;_'" ~ :) . ".. :* .* .
.**:~ :*.. . ':, **: ... , .
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP,;AA-1013Addendum 4.
Revision 1 Page 211 of264 Attachment 2, *Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued) ..
Barrier:
Fuel Clad Category:. *
C. Isolation Degradation Threat: Loss Threshold:
I None
-~- '.** ... *
- ...". , .~ . -
. - --~:
- '*~'
UNIT 2 EMERGENCYCLASSlflCATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 212 of 264 Attachment2, Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued)
Barrier:* Fuel Clad Category:*. D.Rad
_Degradation Threat: - Loss
- -- Threshold:
-2, DryWell _area rcidiat_ion ~ 31 DOR/hr (3~ 1 E6 mRem/hr)
_Basis:.
Plal"lt,:Specific
- .
It is important to recognize thattheradiation monitor rriay be se~sitive to shine from the RPVor RCS -
piping (caused by lowerthannormal RPV water levetfor example). The Drywell High Range Radiation _
-Monitorsar~ t~eJ~llowing(ref. 1): - . . , .- . .- - -
- 2CEC*PNL880D: DRMS 2RMS*RE1 BID
1
RMS*RUZ1A
-- - -~RMS*RUZ1B -_ - - --
-.... 2GEC*PNL$80B: ORMS 2RMS~RE1A/C -
.~ .. -
-*- RMS*RUZ1 C RMS*Rl,JZ1,D -
Fig_ureP-1 ill~sfrates the location of the following four detectors inside the drywell (ref. 1): _
- * -- 2RMS:*RE1A P.C: 268170EAZ
2RMS*RE1C P.C. -- -_ 267 024EAZ
- :2RMS:'.'RE1 B P;C. -268 245EAZ -
. *- . _.* ***_.*--2RrviS*RE1D P.C. 26~ 353EAZ
-*- ---* _- **-*--> - ~Th~ threst1~1dyal~ewas calcuf-ated assuming_the instantaneous release-and dispersal of the reactor
. * *: > coolant nobie g-a~-~ndi_odine inventory a~sociated with a concentrc:ttion bf 300 µCi/gm f,:131 Equivalent .
- (or appro~imately 5% clad failure) into the drywell ~tmospher~ (ref. 2).
-. * ~ 7* . . * "'* " . .* * * * *
-* ,._ . -~

.
.*. . ~ .
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES. EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 213 of264 Attachmen.t2; Fis~ion Product B~rrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis.(Coritinued)
Drywell area radiation;;:: .3100 R/hr (3.1 E6 mRem/hr) (Continued)
Generic
. The 3100 .R/hr (3.1 E6. mRe111/hr) readihg is a value which indicates the release of reactor coolant, with elevated. activity indicative offuel damage, into the dryWelL * *
Reactor coolant 9oncentrations of this magnitude are several times larger than the maximum .
concentrations (induding iodine spiking) allowed within technical specifications and are therefore .
indicative of-fuel damage.* * * * *
This value is higher tharl thatspecified for RCS barrier Loss thresholdo:s. Thus, this threshold . ..
indicates a loss of both Fuel Clad barrier and RCS barrier that appropriately escalates the emergency ciassificcition:levelto a Site AreaEmetgency. * * * * ** .* * *
. There .is no PotentialLoss threshold associated with this item.
.* * .- *. ' . *- '. : * * ' . ... : ",I
.. NMP2 B~!;is R~fer:ence(s): *.. . * ...*
1. N2-RSP~RMS,.R1Q6.Channel Calibration Test ofthe Drywell High Rarige Area Radiation
. 2. CalculationPR~C-24:-0 .*.*
3: NEI 99-0J.FCLoss4.
Monito~s
.. ~ .*'
I .*. . ., .~*.
I. *.;*.... :*
. ~- - . -
. i
.. ~- - ,**.
). ; ...
-~ ; . ... ..
'. : . _,. _ . _* -~ . . '" .
.:*: .. ~- . :'* .
l_.: .
"*\*'
. -~- .: . .
~ .,* . . ..
'~ *. o > *
.; ~:.
':.:~
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFl,CATIONTECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1
.Page 214 of 264
. Attachnjent2, Fission Produ~t Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued)
. Figure F.:1: Drywall Hi,gh R.ange Radiation Moniblr Detecfor Locations (ref. 1)
Drywell 261 I.
I
-I
, Ei:nsrge.~ct * *.
.:; . escape'
.. *..- - *e:Stdh * *.-.. ,
._* ... -~
': -~ *.
"i**:*"
UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP*AA-1013 Addendum*4*
Revision 1.
Page 215 of 264 Attac~mer:it2,.Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss MatrixAndBasis (Continu~d)
Barrier: Fuel Cl.ad Category: D.Rad Degradation Threat: Loss Threshold:
3.. Reactor coolant activity> 300 iJCi/gm 1-131 Equivalenf Basis: .......
Plant:.spedfic None Generic 300.µCi/gm*l~131
._.- .Thesite specificvalue corresponds to Equivalent. Assessment.by the _EAL Task.
.Fore~ inclicates that300 µCi/gm 1-131 Equivalent coolantaetivity is Well above that expected for iodine*
spikes and corresponds to lessthan 5%fuel clad damage, Thisarnount ofradioactivity indicates
significant clad damage* and thus ttie fuel CladBarrier.is considered lost. .. _._.*
* ' * '
c _.. * * *
. **.,*-*********There is noPot¢ntial Lossthresflold~ssociated with this item.*
. . . . Nrv1P2 aa~is Reference(s):. * ..*_*.
-_ ,* * . 1. .General Electric N ED0-22215, Pro-cedures for the Determination of the Extent ofCore Damage Under AcCidenLCoriditions *
2.. NE1 99-ot F.cLo$.s 1 *
.:-; . . .-. ,~ .*.. '
~- . -.
~
.*UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFiCATIONTECHNiCAL BASES EP.;AA-1013 Addendum-4 Revision 1 Page 216 of 264 Attachment 2,.Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Los$ Matrix And Basis (Co_nti~ued) _*.
Barrier:
Fuel Clad Category:
E. Judgment Degradation Threat: Loss Threshold:
4. ANY condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates loss of the Fuel Clad.*.*
barrier ** *
. Basis:
Plant-Specific The Emergertcy Director judgment threshold addresses any other factors relevant to determining if the
Fuel.Clad ba_rrier.is lost.Such adetermination shouldinclude IMMINENT barrier degradation, barrier
. * .* monitoring c~pability and do~inant accident sequ~nces ..
IMMINENTbarrier.degradation*existS if the degradati9nwill likelyoccur vvithin two ho-ur~ based .. *, __ *..
on ~ ~rojectfbn qf currentscifety systenj performance. The term 111.MMINENT" refers to .. - *** *..
/ re9()gi1i~ionof the inability to rea.ch safety acceptcince criteria before completion of all checl<s; *
-. * .*. Barl"iermcinitorinq .
capability . . -
is-dec'reased ..
ifthere-is a loss or l~ckc>f reiiable .
indicators. This .*.*
~sses~ment
. ..... _.. . &hould. inc1Gde**instrumeritation bperabmty concerns; .
readings from .Portable.
.*
insfrum~11tCltion and corisideratiqn *of btrsite monitoring results.
-* Dominant accident sequences lead to degradation of all fissio*n product .barriers and likely entry to th~-EOPs'. The i=mergency Directqr §hould be m_indful of the Loss of AC power (St~~ion - .
,' .. *** ......* Blackoutfand~ .. *.
ATWS *l;ALs)o assure timely'emergency classification declaratio_ris:
. *~:
. -Ge~eric ** ..... .
This threshold ~ddres§es.any qther factors thafc:ire to. be used by the EmergencyDirectO.r in ... ' .* **.* .. * .*
-.. ' .. ~
.qetermini119 wheJh.~rth.e° Fuel Clad barri~r is Jost In cidditiqn, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be* inc_c)rporc:i.ted~in this thresholq a~ a fact& in Emergency Director ju.dgment that the bar~fermay **.
be considered losC' . . *. *. ~ . . . . . . .
>\',** .... ~_MP~ Basi!;J~ef~.r~nc~{s):
.;*_ .*** *.; - . .. **' *~* *.
\~:: ... _.:_.: ... ..,*: ..
f. .* NEI 99~'01 Fe Loss s ,. -;;.
~ ::*
. **~.:- .. **
. _.* ~ .
).** .
UNIT 2EMERGENGYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL.BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revisi<m 1 Page 217 of 264 Atta:chmenf2, Fiss_ion Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued)
' *Barrie*r:
. Fuel Clad Category:* *A. RPV Level -
. -.DegradationThreat: - Potential Loss Threshold:.
1. RPV.water level ca~not be rest~red and maintained above -14 *in. following depressurization of
- the RP\( Or cannot be determined . - - -
Basis:
Plant-Specific An RPVwater level instrument reading of-1_4 in. indicates RPV water_ .level is at the fop of active. fuel. When RPV waterlevelis afar above the top of active fuel, the core is completely submerged. Core submergence is the most *.
desirable means of the RPV (automatically, of core cooling. Wilen RPV w~ter level is beiow.the top of active fuel following depressurization manu~lly or by failure of the RCS barrier), the uncovered portion of the core must be
. cooled I:>~ le~s reliable means (that is, sp~ay- cooling). l_f core uncovery is threatened, the EOPs specify alternate, -
mar~ extreme, RPV water level co~trol measures in order to restore and maintain ~dequate core cooling (ref. 1).
.Consistent'witficthe EOP definition' of "cannot be restored and* maintained," the determination that RPV water level cannot be restor~d arid ~aintained above the top of a~tive fuel may be made at, before,. or after RPV water level.
cictually decreases:ta:this point. (r~( 1) . . - .
Whe~ RPV water iev~I ~annot be determined, EOPs requir~ RPV flooding strategies. RPV water level indication *
_ provide~ the primary m~a*ns of knowing if adequate core ~ooling is being maintained. When all means of
.... deter111~nin~ R~V water level are unavailable, the fuel clad barrier is threatened and .reliance on alternate means
. . ' . . ,* , . )
of assuring*adequate core cooling. must be attempted. The instructions in EOP-C4 specify these means, which .
include emergency depre~surizatioh of the RPV and injection into the RPV at a rate needed to flood to the
~levation of the mairJ steam lines or .hold RPV pressure above the Minimum Steam Cooling Pressure (in ATWS .
events). (~et 2) lfHPV water level cannot be determined with respect to the top of ~ctive fuel, a potential loss of
.* ** ' the f~el clad '6.arrier' E3xists*.
Note that E~P~CS rnay ~equire intentional_ uncovery of ~he core anq control of RPV water level between -14 in ..*.
. *.*. *** ** _ -and -39 -
in,; the Mlrii~uin Stearn Cooling. RPV Water Level (MSCRWL) (ref. 3).Under thes_e. conditions, a high-
. 8~wer ATWS ev~11fexist~ ~nd reql!ires at'leasfa Site Ar.ea Emergency classification in accordance with the
, AT\NS/Criticality S,ALs; *. ,_
, . ' -~: .
~ ":
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 218 of 264 Attachment-2, Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued)
RPV water level cannot b~ restored and maintained.above -14 in. following depressurization of the RPV or cannot be determined (Continued) .
Generic The site specific RPV water level threshold is the same as the RCS barrier Loss threshold A 1 and to corresponds the RPV water level at.the top of the active fuel. Thus, this threshold indicates a Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad barrier and a Loss of RCS barrier that appropriately escalates the emergency classification level to a Site Area Emergency. This threshold is considered to be exceeded when, as specified iri the site specific E:OPs, that RPV wate{cannot be restored and maintained above the specified level following depressurization of the RPV (either manually, automatically or by failure of the RCS barrier).
NMP2 Basis.Reference(s):
1, NER7 2M~039, NMP2 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) Basis Document
2. N2-EOP7C4RPV Flooding.
3. N2-EOP-C5 Failure.to Scram
4. NEI 99-01 FC Potential Loss 2
' ~-' -.. ,-
I._.
. . ~.. .
r
UNfr 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL.BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 219 of 264 Attach111ent2 1 Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued).*
Barrier:***** Fuel Clad
.Category: ** .*. B. Primary Containment Pressure /Temperature Degradation. Threat:
Poteri~ial Loss Th res.hold:
I None ' . :' ~ :
I
i* _. -*
:_ ...-~ ..
.* .* : . :~:*'
,_. ',_-.: ~: -. : ' .,~-:*~- *-:-
r* .* ';
,c .. *
..*~ ' ...,
~'
~' ::
UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES
EP~AA-1013 Addendum 4
Revision 1
Page 220 of 264 .
Attachment 2, Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis. (C()ntinued)
Barrier: Fuel: Clad Category: C. Isolation
Degradation Threat: . Potential Loss Threshold:* *
. . I None
- . *:; - .- . - . ' * *..--~. . .*.. -
... **- - ~- -
. .**..:: ~ *. *.:
. : .. :~... ....... *
-.. -~** -*
UNIT 2 EM{::RGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP.:AA-1013 Addendum 4
.
Revision 1 Page 221 of264
. . ~. . *
,. :~:* .. -.. *
. ~ .. _'-
. . . ; .

. ; ~ .. "
.. ~-*
.. *~ .,* . '*, '
UNIT2 Erv1E_RGENCYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES
EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 222 of 264.

Atta(:hment 2, Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued)
Barrier:
. * .* fuel Clad

Category: E. Judgment
.Degradation Threat: - Potential Loss Threshold:
2 ... ANYconditi~n in the opinior:i of the Emergerity Director that indicates *potential loss of the Fuel_
Clad b~rrier ** * * * * -
Basis:
PlanhSpeeific *. *
- ~ *. . .* . - . - . . - . . . . .
_ The Emergency Director judgmentthreshold addres~es any other factors relevant to determining ifthe Fuel Clad barrier is potentially lost. Such a determination should include IMMINENT barrier
. degrad~tion, barrier monitoring capability
* .__ IMMINENTbarrier degradation exists if the degradation and dominant .
accident sequences .
will likely oc.curwithin two hours based
. , on a projection of current safety system performance. The term "IMMINENT" refers to

*. *recqghltiC>~ *of the iriabillty fo reach safety acceptari.ce criteria before completion of all checks.

. Bafr.ier iiioriltoriri.g capability is decreased if ttiere is a loss or lack of reliable indicators. This assessm~nt~hould inclucfo instrumentation operability co11cerns, readings from portable Ihstrume~tation and consideration of offsite monitoring results.
-Domiriant~ccidentsequences lead to degradation of all fission product barriers and likely entr-Y *
---. to th~ EOP?. Th~ Emergency Director .sh~uld be mindful of the Loss of AC power (Station
siacko~t) and ATWS EALs to assure timely emergency classification declarati~ns.
-Generic * -
This thresh,'~ltj ~cjdresses any other factors-that are fo .he used by the Emergency Director in determirilrig whether the _Fuel Glad barrier is potentially lostln addition, the inability to monitor the .
__.... _ barrier should also be incorporated iri this threshold as a factor in Emergency Dire~tor judgment that
the barrier. may .pe considerecj. potentially lost
_.--__ NMP2 Ba~is Refer~n~e(s): _*_*
, 1; NEI_, 99-01 FC Potential Loss 6
.,._, ~ .*:., . . :.'
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BA$ES. EP-AA-1013 Addendum ' .
4 .
Revision1
Page 223 of 264 Attachmen.t2, Fis~ion Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued}
Barrier:
Reactor' Coolant System
Category: A. RPV level Degradation Threat:* Loss Threshold:
1.
RPVv\tatel"le.vel cannotber~stored and maintained above ~14 in. or~ann<>t be determined
.Basis:***.
Plant-Specific . *.
An RPVwat~r level instrumentreading of-14 in. indicates R'Pv water lev~I is at the top of active fuel '.
(ref. 1). The'tbp *ophe active fuel is sigrifica~tly lower than the normal operating RPV water level*.
control 'bcind. Tor.each this level, RPVinventory lm;~rwould have previously required isolation of the
.* .. RCS arid ContainmenJ(PC) ,barriers, .. and initiation maintaine~*:~bove the top of activ~ fuel, ECCS and other sources <?f RPV injection have been *..
ineffective
. -- l
~r frlcapable of reversi~g *the decreasing *1evel trend. The cause of the loss of RPV inventory of all ECCS. If RPV water level cannot be
is therefore. .- -
aJ~umed. tqbe
.a_ Loss
'bf c~ciiaht AccideM (LOCA). By definition, a LOtA eve~t is a Los~ .
of the.RCS barrier. * *-._*;
.'
Consistent\1vith th~ EOP definition c::i.','canllot be restored arid maintained," the determination thatHPV * . -
. wat~r'Jev~I ¢a~n6t b~ resfor~d a~d~~i*~tained abb\i~;the t~pof a~ti\le f~~Lrnay'be mad~_at, before, .o~ .
- .. after RP.VWate~-:levei abtually decrea,sesto*this poir1C(ref: tr * .
. 'WhenRPV:*ley,e,l<ca,nn9,tbe:_d~ferniln~~. E.dP~ req8ir~ RP\1-flo~qing strat~Qies .. Th~ RPV floqdihg: ;*...
-, ** ' *."... ** . *:... :*. . *.* . , -* . "*** * *"-.* ,' -; ,\ *,*: , . *.* .**. *c :. * . : . . . **-. . -"- *:*,. .... :*. * .
iristrudion~J h EOP-C4 fir~t.$pe'Cify er:nergency qepressurlZ~tion pf the :.RPV'( re( :2);* which: is defined. fo' ' '* .
.: be. a Lc)~s.ot t~e *~qs *b~rrier (R~~ ho~s C.4f *. : . - - *. . . . - - > -
-.-:-*- ;~ ,.; -... *.. ::
. ' . Note .that E9P~G5 ln~Y require i~teniipnal ~hc.overy pfth~ core: arid control of RP~( water level between *.
....... ~14 .in. ~np/~a~\riL ~e _fy1ioi~:U,~:~~te(3rh'.bqcilin~ R_~VWat~rJ~~E11 (¥§SHWL} (r~f 3f Uriderthese._*.*
,* 'coilditiohs, a,hlgh-p9)/Ve(ATW$ event exists and re.quires least a'Site Area*E111ergency classification' -..* at
'inaccor~~:ric~ ~ithJhe ATWS/CritfoaUt~*.eA_Ls. . .. - . . .. - . . . . - *. ** .
.: - -* - - . -- ., . : . ;: .. **'._=,_* ~,.:/ '. '" _.. - .-* ..
. *. **i *.*: ..
.. - -~ '** .**
.. . . ~ .,- .
~-
UN rt 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP.;AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 224 of 264
. *; ~
.,AttachlTlent 2; FissionProduct Barrier Loss/P-otential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued)
RPV water level cannot be resfored and maintained above .-14 in. or cannotbe determined (Continued) . * * *. * * * * * *
Generic . - . . ' -
,The Loss threshold*RPV >>later le~el- of 161 in*~ correspond~ to the level that is used in EOPs to indicate challenge. bf core cooling~ -
-_ **.This thr~shold _is the. same as Fu"~I Clad Barrier *Potential loss threshold A.1 and c~rresponds to a challenge.focore cooling. Thus, this threshold indicates Loss of RCS barrier and Potential.Loss of a
-*Fuel Clad barrier that appropriately escalates the emergency classification level to a Site Area
.* .*Emergency.. * * *. * * * * *. *
Unlike the Fuel Clad barrier RPV waler level Potential Loss threshold. (top of the active fuel), the**
- additional requirement thatth~RPVbe depressui"ized i~ riot associated with the RCS barrier Potential Loss. The significantloss of invelltOry that mustoccurto.deterfnine that RPV water level cannot be
restored andniaintainedabbve the* threshold is, by itself, a very strong indication that the RCS barrier is
. llo-longerccapcible of retaining sufficient inventory to keep. the core submerged, and thus represents a
- Loss of the R*cs Barrier. . -* .
There is no Potential Loss thresbold associateq With thii item.
NIVIP2 ~asis R.eference(s): .*
1,:* NER-2M~039;-NMP2.Emergency.Op~rating Procedure~ (EOP)*B~sis*Do:cuqient* _* -
2. N2-£QP-C4 RPV Flooding . ; * * * *
. 3.
N2'-EOP~cs Failure to Scram *.- -
4. NEI 9~~01RCS Loss 2 . _-.. * -* ...**
. :* **~--- :
. . ~. *.. ' .
.:I
~
. . . *7
' .... - - - ~*
- - ~
UNIT2EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICALBASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4*
Revision 1**..
Page 225 .of 264 . .
. Attachment . .
2, Fission Product . .
Barrier . -.
Loss/Potential Loss .
Matrix And Basis (Continued)*
- , -*~
Barrier: . Reactor Coolant System . *. **
Category: B. Primary ContainmenfPressure/ Temperat~re Degradation Threat: .
Loss .
Threshold:*
2 .. Prin1aryContainment pressur~ >1.68 psig due tp~RCS leakag*e Basis: :
Plant-Specific
..*The drywell high pressure scrarn.setpoint is an entry condition to the EOP flowcharts: EO~-RPV, *RPV
Control,and EOP:-PC, Primary Containment Control (reL 1, 2):~Norma1Prirnary Containment (PC) .
. . . pressure control .functions such as operation of *drywell coOling. arid venting through GTS are specified
.in EOP-PC - - .* ..
suppression. chamber sprays.*..
inadvance
of less qesirable:,
but more. effective- ..
functions such as operation of .
drywall .
o~
. .*
1n the_ NMP2 .. *.* *-
design .
basi~;
Prim~ry Containlllent wessure~
above the- drywell. highpressure scram *

setpoiht are*assumed - - ,:
fo be - ...
the . resui(of ahigh~energy '
release .
into the. containllleiitfor which normal*.
> pr~ssure control' systems. are ina~equate or incap"at:)le ofre~ersing the increasing pressure trend...
... -.. ** ,\ ' .
. Pres&ures::ofJhis -magnitude, ti;ci\lve~er,. can be caUsed by. ho~"'.LOCA -~vents ~uch as a los~ of drywell cooling -~r inability !o ~pntror~rii'nary Containmentv~nt/purge (ref 3, 4). .
. *. ~heJhreshold phrase ~dueto.RCS leakage;'. f~cuse~ the.barrier failureontheRCS instead ofthe.
u ** ,
.. nOn-L.QCA malfunctions that may adversely: affect Primary Containment pressure. Primary. Containment .
. press~re greater than 1.68 psig with corollary indications (for example, . elevateC:r
. . . . ; . dryw~lltemperature, . .
indications of loss of RCS inventory) should, therefore, be qonsidered a Loss ofthe RCS barrier; Loss*.
of drywell cool in~* that results iri *pressure* greater th ah 1.68 psig should hot be considerecl a~ R_CS
barrier loss.
-Generic
.. The Primary Containmenlp;e~sur~ of. i.68 p~ig Ts fa:1sed on the drywall ~igh p~e~sur~ set poi~t which .*. *
... ~ ..*. . .. *.
a
. *.
indicates LOCA by.automatically initiating the ECCSor equivalent makeup system ... * <
. .*.,. .. . . . . ., : .* . . "'"*';* . '. . . . . . .- :" - *;: . - . ~'.
. ****rhefe;is
,. .. . . . .. no Potential Loss threshold associated withthis"iferR
~ .* -*:- ., .. *. . . , . . . *:. ..... .
UNIT2 EMERGl::NCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4.
Revision 1 Pag*e 226 of264 ..
Attachment2, Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued) ..
Primary:Cont~inment pressure>
1;68 psig due to RC~ leak~ge (Continued)**
. NMP2 Ba!i;is Reference(s):
1. N2~EOP RPVRPV Control 2~ . N2:.EQP-PC Primary Containment Control .
3. NER*2M:*039, NMP2 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) Basis Document
4. USAR Section 6.2
5. NEI 99~01 RCS Loss 1
-~ :.'.
" ... .~
... ~- : .
. ** .-~
. ~.
. .- .... * ~ -.
.-~>. .. -:*:-*
UNIT 2 EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES l;P-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1
.,:* Page 227 of 264 Attachnienf2, Fiss.ion Procfuct.Barrfor Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued)
Barrier: .Re~ctor Coolant System Category: * .. C. Isolation .*
.Degradation Threat: - Loss Threshold:
Basis:
.* ,.
Plant-soecific The, .condltions of this threshold include required containment isolation failures allowing a flow path to
. the.environment.A release pathway outside Primary Containment exists when flow is not prevented by
. . .
downstrearri isol~ticms. Emergency declaratibn unde.tthi~ thre~hold would not be required in the ca~e **
..* * *.. of a failure *ofbotll i~_61ation valvesJ() close but no do~nstreamflowpath exists. Similarly, if the emergency
. . . re~pon~e. requires .the normal process flow of a system outside Primary Containment (for
: e~aniple, EOP requirement to bypass MS IV low RPVwater level interlocks and maintain the main condenser as ah~at sink using mai~ turbi~e bypass v~lves ), the threshold is. not met. The combination .*
of these threshold bonditiohs represeritthe loss of both theHCS and Containment (see PC Loss G.3)
.. barriers and justifies declaration of a Site Area Emergency (that is, Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers). -(ref;* t-4}
. Even th9LighRVVCU and Feedwater systems do not cc:mtain steam; they are included in the list
b.ecause a~ uNi~OLABLE .*breakcould result in the high-pressure disctiarne of fluid that is flashed fo *
~st~alll. '
fr9m. ..
relatively large volume
. --- systems directly connected to the RCS ..*.
.*:., *., *.*. ***.. :/ '
.~..
.*~:.
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BA$ES . EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 228 of264
Attachmeri~ 2, Fission Product Barrier Loss/Poten~ial Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued).
Reactor Coo.lant System (Continued).
Generic
An UNISOLABLEMSL break is a breach of the RCS barrier. Thus, this threshold is included for consistency with the Alert emergency classifiGation level: . . .
Other large_ high"'energ'y line: breaks such as. Feedwatei",. RWCU; or RCIC that are UNISOLABLE also represent a significant foss of the RCS barrier and should be considered as MSL breaks for purposes of classification. **. * * ** *
.
NMP2 Basis ~efere~ce(s): *
1. USAR Section 5.4.5
2. USAR Sedlon 5.4.6
3. USAR Section 5.4;8
4. USAR'se~ti.cmSA.9 ..
5. NEL99-01. RCS Loss 3A I .
I 1-
~ ... '. . - ...
. ~ .:* ~,.
.. :/ *.') ;. .
-* . 1***. ~-~ .
-:~
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICALBASES EP.;AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1
Page 229 of 264 Fissi~nPro~uct Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued)
0
** Attachm,ent 2; Barrier:**.
Reacto_r Cool1;1~t System Category:* C, Isolation .
Degradation Tf'lrea:t: *Loss**.
Threshold: ' ' '
.*1*4.******RRV;bl9%ao¥in. isrequired********* . ~-.' .
I Basis:
.* Plant~Specific *
RPVblowdown (Emergency RPV-bepressuri:Z:ation)Jssp~cified in the EOP flb\fl/charts when symbols containi~gJhe phrase "BLOVv'ooWN" 'arer~ached. The 'requirements for er:nergency RPV
.
depressutiza.tion appear inthefoll(>Wing E()Ps (ref 1~7):,
. EOP~RPV RPV Control* .. *.. .
E6P~PCP~imaryG~ntar~~entC6ntrol *
.* ~
.* .: *.
Eop;sc Sec:;ondary Goritalhfl1ehfconfrol
sop~RRRadioactivity RE;ilease Control-
*.* * .*..* RPV.. .
blo\Jl/90\'Vn (Emer,gency*
R~\1-;Depres~uri;z:atiqn)' isalso,performed.
-= ... **:* *.*;*,-...... ** _, ... *... , . .*. ' ...
µpon entrx to EOF>~C4
.(ref B).
-~* :*:
' '* Generic
.. ~ : .
* * .* '* PIC!ntsymptdms r~quirir1g.Emerg~ncy RPV D~pre.ssurizatlbn (RPV blowdowii) per the EOPflowcharts
are i'nd}catiV:e of a loss oft~e RC$_p~rl"i~r. '.If E;rrl'erg~ncy f3PV-d~.P.ressudz~tion is .requfred, the plant.:
operators are direCtedJo open ~a(efy;r~!l~f valves (SRVs):ancf keep ~hem opEm; Everi though the RCS
)s.~eil)g v~~fod info the suppre~siO:n pool.a IQSS.of th~ ~c:;$*$,~9UldhE;i corisJd~re,d to exist due to the.
dirnihished ~ffecti\l~ness of the RG$'pressur~ barrier to a rel~~s_e C>Uission prpdµ_ctS beyohd it~* . *
. bolmdar;y. * * * * , , .... * * * * **
.~'-_
.:~. '....
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES
EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 *.
Page 230 of 264
Attachment 2, FissiOn Product . Barrier Loss/PotentialLoss Matrix And Basis (Continu~d)
RPV blowdown is required (Continued)
NMP2 Basis Reference(s):
1.. N2.;EQP~RPV RPV Contro1 *.
2.
N2-Eop::pc pril11ary Containment Control
.3.
N2~EQP.:sC Secondary Containm.emt Contro_I ._ . :
4 .. N2-EOR-RR Radioactivity Release Control
5. N2~EOP.;PCH Hydrogen Control. * .
6;: N2:-EOP-C3 Steam Cooling
7.
N2-:EOP.;c5 FailuretoScram R N2-EOP-C4 RPV Flooding
. . 9. NEI 99~01RCS Loss 3
.... I
.'\
~ . *: *'
- '*. . ;-... :- ~*-
.* '~ .. .. . . . .
.* UNIT2 EMERGI;NCY CLASSIFICATIONTECHNICAL BASES* EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 *
Revision t Page 231 of 264
. AttachmE!nt 2, Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued}***** *..
Barrier: Reactor Coolant System Category: * .. D.Rad:
Degrada:ti~nThreat:
Loss*
Threshold:*.*
5. Drywall areC) radiation 2.41 R/hr (4.1 E4 mRem/hr)
~ .' .
Basis: *
. Plant~Specific .*
. *.
It is important to recognize that the radiation monitor may be sensitive* to shine from the R~V or RCS piping (caused by !ower than nornial RPV water:level for example). The DrY\llJell High *Range Radiation
.. Monitors ai"E) the following '(ref. 1):
. 2Ct::c*PNLaaoo: DRMs 2RMS*RE1 s10
. RMS*RUZ1A
_, RMS*RUZ1B
. *_ ~ .:*2CEC*PNL880B: D.RMS 2RMS~RE1AtC .' . .- .
'.:: : Rfvl~*RUZ1 c
.*.- Figu,re .
f~1 iit~~tf~te~ . ---** *.
the !~cation of the followlhgfourdeteGtbrs inside the* dry~ell(ref.
t):
c. . * ~- . .'":
. ~ -_ ;... :*- :*- ;."* .

2RMS~RE1A P:c.**-* '268170EAZ
-* <~RMS*RE1CP.G ...- 2s7:024EAZ
-* -- ~*- 2RMS~RE1's* P:b .* <. 268245EAZ .* .. -.._:_
-_~RMS*RE1D P:C.
268 353EAZ
.*:,.: * *... Th~thresh91d_~~lue yvascal<:ula~ed assuming thejn~tantaneous r~lease.a~d disp~rsal ofthereact6r .-
- - *. to~lanf:riobl~* fuas:an,tf iodine inventory aS,~oci~t~ci:witti normal_ ope~ating conce-ntrntions (that is, within. ._
':_ -*** '*. - T~-chrtic~I Sp~cifi~atio'ns) :inio th~ drywell ~frrio~phel"~ {ref. 2);_ The rea_dihg i~ les~-than that specifiS.d 'tof *. *.
th~ fuer'Cl~d l.os~*becahse nO*damaget~ the t~elctad.is _assumed in this Rcsioss. Only le~kage >
,,.; ... *.. c' frcm1 theH2s is a~§u'ITie~"iri th;kEAL. .* . .. . . ... . . -* . . . . ._ .
. ~. ..
.. : ../ .... *
.. ~. . : '
.o* *.
UNIT2 EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 232 of 264 .
Attachment2, Fission Producf Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued) .
ofY\Veuarea radiation*~ 41 R/hr(4.1 E4*mRem/hr) (Continued)
Generic . .
.. The 41 R/hr reading is*avalue which i~dicates the release of ~eactor coolant to the.Primary Containment.. *
This r~adingwill be less than that specified for Fuel Cl~d barrier Loss threshold D.2. Thus, this

threshold v\tquld b~ indicative of a RCS leak onJy; If the radiation monitor reading increa'sed to.that .
value sp~cified by Fuel Clad Barrier threshold, fuel damagewould also be indicated.
Th~re is no Potential Loss threshold assoc'iated with thi~ item:
. NMP2 Basis Reference(s):
1. N2-RSP-:RMS-R106 Channel Calibration.Test of the Drywell High Range Area Radiation Monitors 2, Calculation PR'"C-24~0 . . *
3. NEI 99-01 RCS Lo.ss 4 I .* ,
.; :- -~-' .
.-.~... . ",< * .-_'***.*
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES. EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1
. :!:' Page 233 264of Attachment 2; Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued)
Fi~ure F-1: Dryw.ell High Range Radiation Monitor Detector Locations (ref. 1)
.Or"YweH 261 .
~** .....*.
- *~*.
UNIT2 EM:ERGENCY CLASSIFICA~ION*TECHNICALBASES *. EP~AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 234 of 264 Attachrrnmt2, FissionProduct .. .-
Barrier Loss/Potential . ~
Loss Matrix And . Basis (Continued}
Barrier:
React()r Coolant System Category:* *E. Judgment *
Degradation Threat: *Loss'*
Thre~hold:. *
6. ANY:~qndition : . :.~
in the opinion ofthe . .. ' -
Emergency Director that indicates loss of the RCS barrier
Basis:
Plantispecitic The Em~r~~ncy Di~~ctor judglTle~t thrnshold addre~ses any other factors relevant to determining if the .*
RCS barrier is lost.. Such a determi.nation should inch,.1de IMMINENT barrier degradation, barrie.r lllonitoring tapability anddomi~arit ac~ident sequehc~s~ ..* :
-* *IMMi_NENTbarrier-degradatfon exists if the.degradationwill likely occur within two tiours based .
on a projection of currentsafet}I system~ performance. The term"IMMJNENT" refers to the
. recbghition of.the inabiljty t9 r'~ach. safety acceptance criteria before colllpletion of all checks ..
. Barrier monitoring capability is decreased if there i~ a'lo~s or lack of_relial)le indiccitors. This**
_, . assess~ent shquld ihclUde instrurnerit~tiori operability concerns, readings from portable ..*
... iristrUfi1~ntation ~nd c;nsiaefr~tidn of Offsite.rri~~jtoring.resUlts: ,._ :*.*

Dominant accident sequ~hc~s:*1_e~d t6*:d~gr~datibl1 of a.Ii ftssionproduttb~a~riers and likely entry ..*
.c
toJ6((~bP~;.-Th~:~iTierge~~foi~ector ~h~u.1d :bemindful of ttie ~oss ~f ~C power (statf~n ..
' * *.... *. ' ~lack(>ut).ahd AfWS !=A.~s.foa$sure. timely emetgency*classification deplarations.*. -.
. Generic* :'. **._*.:*
~: .
.*. Thi~'thresho.ldadp~ess¢s ahy otber factbrs that:~re to-:be used~by the Emergency Director in . . .. .*' -*. .
rn determin.ingjvhetherthe ggs o~rrier Js.lost i:iciqitio11, tHe<<irlability fornofiitorthe, barriershpuldalso* .
. . be incorporated int~is.threshOld ~~,a:f~Cto( rt:rE'rnemel1cy: Dil"e,ctor judgment thal'the barrier*m~y be.
_* ***
.cohsider~(jJosL . * * *- * *** * - :~ -*. . *-
~ - ; .. '*'>
.. _* :: **- .... '**'. *_ NMP2 B_~si~ Ref~renC:e(~}:** .
1..* f\JEV99zo):R9s',loss 6 . -. *.. -- - . ;~ *.
~. . -
- ... --.*.* *-~ .. *. -
'... . *.~.
-*.1 : .* *-* :~.'*
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES * .EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 *.*
Page 235 of 264
.*. Attachment 2, Fission.Product Banier Loss/Potential Loss MaUix And.
B3si~ (Continued)* .*.. *.
Barrier: . Reactor Coolant System * *
category: A. RPV Level
Degradation Threat: .* . Potential Loss Threshold:
tNQ~e .*..* ..
1
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP.;AA-1013 Addendum4.
Revision 1.
Page 236 of264 Attachm~nt 2, Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Los~ MatriiAnd.Basis (Continued).*
Barrier: *
Reactor Coola.nt System Ca~egory:** B. Primary Containment Pressure /Temperature Degrada.tion Threat: *Potential Loss Threshold:
1None******** I
:~
-~ -~; .. *.
. *,*=*
.: I *._:. '. * ~
. ~-- ..
UNIT 2 EMERGENCYCLASSIFJCATION TECHNICALBASES
EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 237 of 264 .
Attachment 2, Fission Product. Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis {Continued)
Barrier: *. Reactor CoOlant System .
. Category: c~ lso'lation ..*
Degradation. Threat: . Potential Loss Threshol.d:
1.
UNJSOLA~LE primary system lec3kage oufaide Primary Containment as indicated by exceeding EITHER: * * * * * *
RB areatemperatljre above an :isolation setpoint OR
. RB area radiation above an a.l~rm*setpoint
Basis:
Plant-Specific
presen~e of el~vated general area temperatures or radiation levels in the Reactor Building (RB)
. The may ~e irldicatiye ~f UNISOLA,B~E primary system l~akage outside the. Primary Containment. Whe~
.*****parameters re~chthe threshold I~vel, equipment failure or misoperati<:m may be occurring. Elevated paraA1etersmay ~lso adversely affectthe 'ability to gain accessto or operate equipment wit.hin the
. affected area. (ref; 1, 2)- .
In' general; multiple,
... . indications sh.ould be . used to determine if a primary system. is discharging outside
. *...*.* Prfmary QontainITlerit.For exampl~, a: high area radiation condition .does not necessarily indicate that a
.. " ** *. prim~ry ~ystem i~*discharging iritothe se~ondary cont~inment si.nce this may be caused by radiation *
shine from nearby steam lines or the movement ofradioactive materials~ Conversely, a high area radiation condition in conjunction with other indications (for example, room flooding, high area temperatures, reports of steamin the secondary containment, an unexpeCted rise in feedwater flowrate,
.*. **or unexpected main turbine controLvalv~ closure) may indicate thata*primary system is discharging .
into the secondary*co~tairiment.
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BA$ES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4
. Revision 1 Page 238 of 264 Attachment2; Fission Product Barrier Loss/P.otential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued)
Reactor CoolantSystem {Continued)
Generic EOP-SC temperature isolation.setpoints or area radiation alarm setpoints in thE3 areas of the main steamJine tunnel, main turbine generator; RCIG, and so forth,, indicate a direct path from the RCS to areas outside Primary Containment. * *
The indicators reaching the threshold barriers and confirmed to be caused by RCS leakage warrantan Alert classification. An UNISOLABLE leak which is' indicated'. by a high alarm setpoint escalates to a
siteAreaEmergencywhen combinedwith Containment Barrier Loss threshold C.5 (after a containment i'solation) arid a General Emergency when ,the FueLCiad Ba'rrier criteria is also exceeded.
NMP2 B~sisReference(s):
1. N2-:EOP..:sc Secondary Containment Control
.... 2. NER-2M-039, NMP2 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) Basis Document
' 3. NEI 99.:()1 RCS Potential Loss 3B ' ',*, '
0 .;': ~- * ** *
' .*: :.~ ..
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNIGAL BASES EP~AA-1013 Addendum 4*
Revision 1
Page 239 of 264
..* Attachment 2, Flssiqn ProductBarrier LosslPotential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued).
l *
Barrier:*.*'. Reactor: coolant _System c~tegory: D.Rad Degradaiio11 Threat: Potential Loss Thresho.ld: ** *
I None .. ' ~
I
' ' ~- : '
~ *...
. *,: ~-.::.
. UNIT2EMERGENCYCLASSIFICA~ION TECHNICAL BASES . EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 * .
Page 240 of 264
Attachment 2, Fission Product Barrier .Loss/Potential Loss Matrix Ai1dBasis (Continu~d) * * *'-**
Barrier: . Reactor Coolant.System.**
. Categor}t:
E. Judgment Degradation Threat: :
Potential Loss
Thte.shold: *
2. ANY cbndition in the opinion of the Emergency Direct<;>r that indicates potential loss orthe RCS * * .
. .* barriet * . . *. ..* . . . .
'Basis:.***
Plailt.;specific *.

The EmergencyDirector judgment threshold addresses any other factors relevant to determining if the i.
RCS barrier is potentially lost. Such a det~rminati()n should include IMMINENT barrier degradation,
." barrier monitori~g capability 'and dornin~nt accidentsequenc~s.
.
IMMINENT barrier d~aradation exists ifth~degracfation will likely occutwithintwohours based
cmaprojectioffofcurrentsafety syst~m perfonnance. The term "IMMINE~T" refers to the
...*...* **.inabmty to reac~final safety a~ceptanc;e criteria before completing all chycks: .**
<: ~<* t3~rl"ier monitoring. capabilit}' is *decreased if:there is a loss or lac~ ofr~l.iabl~ indica.tors.*This
.. *. *.. ** * .. a:s~essrnent sryould in~itid~ in~trume~taticm operability conc~rns, readings fr~m portable .* *.
.* .* ..* instru~entatioiiand conside~ation of offsitemonitoring *results ..
.* *. *. Ddmin~nt aceidenlsequenCes le~d to degra~ation of all fission .product barriers.and likely entry
. t~ the'EoPs. The Emergency Di;ector should be miildful ofthe Lo~s ~fACpower (Station Blacko[Jt) and ATWSEALs f() assure timely emergency classific!=ltion .d~clarations Generic *.
.... Thisthreshold addresses any* otherfaCtors that are'tobe used by the Emergency Director in . . .
. de~errnining whether the RCSbarrieris potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitorthe barrier .*
*.*.. $h6uld .a1s*o .be incorporate(finth.isthreshold as a factor in Emergen(;y [)irectorjudgmenfthat the .* .
. **:i. ".* **. **
**
t>arrier fliay be considered.pot~ntially lost * . *.. ** **** * *
Nfv1P2. ~~~is Reference(s):
.1 .. NE1.9s;.61 RCS.Potential Loss.6. -
~. ,~ .. -
<I
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNiCAL BASES EP..;AA-1013 Addendum 4.
'*...*.. Revision 1
.* Page .241 of264
. Attachment 2, **Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Los$ Matrix And Basis (Continued)
Barrier: Containment
. Category: . A. RPV Level Degradati6n Threat: *Loss Threshold:
I None
.. ~* .. I
- *"/;. -.
UNIT 2 EMERGENGYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES *EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 242 of 264 Atta'chment2, Fission Product Barrierloss/Potentiai Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued)
Barrier:* Containment Category: . . .
B. Primary Containment Pre5$ure/Temperafure
. : Degradation Threat:* Loss
.. Threshold:
. 1.. primary COntainmentpre~sljre risefollowedby Cl rapidUNPLANNEb drop in Primary
~ontainmentpressure *.... * * *
Basis:
.* Plant-Speeific
. *.** Generic *
' Rapid UNP(ANN~D IO$S. pressure. (that is, not attributable to drywell spray or condensation effects) .
of
' ' ' following a.n initial pressure increasefrom a. high energy line break indicates a loss of containment .
. integrity:Prfrna[yContainment pressure $hould increase as a result of mass arid *energy release into coiltain111entfrori1a LOCA.. Thus',.Primary<;ontainment pressure not increasing under these conditions
.. ,indicates aJo~s. of con.fainmentintegi"ity: * * .* * *. *.
Ttiis indic~tor~telies on qperatbr.tecoghltion of e1ri.unexpecteq response for the condition and therefore
. does ~not .have~ a: sp~.Cific value associate_d wi.th it:The unexpected response is fmportant because it is the iridicafor for a coritairimenfbype1ss condition._ . * . .
. Nl\liP2 Bash~ Reference(s):*
.~ " . -
s9-01 C~T.Loss1A
-1.*- NEI
.~.;~*-*
\'.* .... ,,;-..;.
.. *.. '.* .;.~ .~ ***, . .
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONTECHNiCAL BA$ES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision'1 Page 243 *of264.
Attach~ruu'.1.t2, Fission ProductBe1rrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued)
Barrier: .
Containment Category:
B. Primary Containment P~essure/ Te.mperatu~e Degra<:tation *Threat: . .Loss Thresli~ld: .
-2.
Primary - . -* "'
bontain~ent pressure response not col'lsistent ~itli.LOCAconditions .*.*.
. Basis:
Plant-Specific * **
USARSectibJn6.2.1 provides~ surnmary of Primary Containment.pressure response for s~veral. *
postd1~ted ~dcid~~ntconditio~s r~~~lting _in the release of RCS inventory to the containment. These *
- . .~ -- - : *.. : .
..*.< .. :..
accidents iricli.Jde:
o~arecirculation li~e'
..::,,*',c
: RuptG;e .
,<<_ -~ -.
* ~upture of.fl m~in steamlln~ . .*, .. _*,_ -
. '.
lnterrhe~iate size liquid line;f~ptufe:i *. .
.... .**. : sriian ~i~~ steam line tuptl.ire ..*.*.* *.*
-~-
.. -. *. ' ' . *'* ... ' . : ,. \ . .. - .- . ' ~: ...
.... The.contail1mentresp6h~e tb the niain ste<UTl lihe; iritermkdiate liquid li~e a~d"sm~ll size ~team line *.
.br~aksw~re))~un(j~dt>y th~redf,cui~ti()n.-linebr~~~~(r~ftl . . . . . *. , **' . . *
.* .*:*:* .:* :~ **:;,. . ,* ___ , ~- *. ;"-...
USAR Figll;es.6:2-:2 and . . .
_6.2~9J11u$tfate't~e, 9pnt~i~rtientpr~ssi.ite respiJ.q.se due.to a.recircµl~tiorl
'". ~- . ... ..
li~e*' :._ .*
. break(reL 2; 3). The m'aximuni.c~iculated :dryweli;pressure:.Js :3'9:75 pslg a~d i$*Weu be.low th~ c:t~si'gri a11owa~1e Pr~;~~ure ot45~srg:(ret.4,'s) .. -;* th'., * > . .- _ . >'
v Due to, Co11s~ry~tistns,i~'tdCA~n~lyses, a91u~I pre$sure re~ponse is e~pe9ted_ to.~e Jess th~I) the ' .
.*. analyzed 'i~~p.q~_se'.;For examp!~;>blowdc).w~. massf16wr~t~,;11aVbe ;cmly 6o;so% .dft~~ analyzed rate:
initial co~t~i~~~rit~r7.s$ur~ '!l~,~'be,ies~'th:(in Q.?s:*p~iQ;,a~d~s~fqrlhi .*. ,_ . _ _ .***.
LOGA cbh(fitldns a~s n,i~nifest~d,*.dn 'Cohtrql~Room in~t~LimeJ1t~Uob' by dry~ejl. pressure rising \A/ith: *...
. ;--*-**** _*._ suppre~sio11 ~hc:irh~er'.pr~ssqreJ61lbwi119 in:~-mannyr.similar to.that showf1 if1,-Y:9AR ~igur~s62~2 a,nc:t
.. :, 6.2:.3: Abro~~~-:S~V tail pip~ could in,f~r thisthr~~_hbl_g i(~~PW~~s.ion charri~erpres~ur~ Is high~r t~an* *-
- _.* _ ...* drY\l\Jellpress9m;;howev~~* irthe SR\f i~*:-cibsed, tY)e qonditfbh would i:JP longer e>C'is(* . *:;: :
-~
-'~ .~ :" ~---~
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONTECHNICALBASES EP.;.AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 244 of 264 AttachrT,ent 2, Fission Product .
Barrier Loss/Potential .
Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued)
Prim~rfContainment pressure respons~ not consistent with LOCA conditions (Continued)
Generic**
Rapid UNPL,L\NNED loss of pressure (that is, not attributable to drywell spray or condensation effects) following'aninitial pressu~e increase from a high energy lihe break indicates a loss of containment integrity: Primary Containment pressure sh*ould increase as result of mass and energy release into a contaiQment from *a LOCA. Tbus, Primary Qoht~inmerit pressure not increasing under these conditions .
indicates ~ loss of containment integrity. *
This imjicato(relies on .operator recognition of an unexpected response for the conditio.n and therefore
.* does not have a speCific value associated with.it. The* unexpected response is important because it is the indicatO(for a containment bypass 'condition. . '
NMP2 *-
Basis . ..
Reference(s):
1.
USAR . Section 6.2.1 .
2.
USARflgure 6.2-2 3: USAR Figure 6.2-3
4. USARTable 6.2-18
5. USAR'Section fr2.1.1.2 .
6. NEI 99:.()1 GMT Loss 1B
-~*.
'*'/ .
~. **. -
' ~ .
~ .*
.. ' ..... -~ *" *, ;
.* UNIT 2EMERGENCY CLASSIFICA~ION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 245 of 264 .
I (Continu~~),
I
Attachment 2, Fission Product Barrier Loss/Pote,ntial Loss Matrix And Basis * **. '
Barrier: Containment Category: C. lso.lation
Degradation Threat: * .. Loss
Threshold:*
. 3. Failure of all Primary C6ntain.ment isolatiQn valves in ANY ohe line to clos~ f~llowin*g auto or . *.*
. *manu~I initiation * * *. ** * * *** * * * *
AND Direct downstream pathway. outside Primary Ccmtainmentand to th~ environrrient exists* ..~
Basis:
Plallt~Specific This.thr~shold addresses failure of qpen isolationtjevices which should:close . upoh receipt ofa manu~I * .*.
~adiological r~lease pathway
or aµtomatic Primary Containment isolation* signal .resultingjn a significant
directlyto the*environment:Theconcern is theUNISbLABLE open pathwayto;the environment. A
failure of the ability to :isolate.any ~ne line iri'c:Jicates *~ breach of Primary b~ntai~ment integrity.
.... T~6h~ical ~pecific~tions Table 3~6.1:3~1 provides alist of ~pplicable.isolation valves{r~f. 1) ...* .
. * " As*§ltated t:ibove, the ~djective**;'Direct, modifi~s* "pat~way'; to cliscriniipate against release paths ..
., 'throllgh~nterf~pingliquid.syst~rTIS. LEiakage. into. acl~sedsy~te~-is 'to be consid~red.only.if the closed* .** ** ..
sy$,te'm is breatheda~d therehy creates asignificant pathway to the environment. Examples include ,*
UN.ISOLABL~
Main st~am. line *o~ RCIC steam llne breaks,'. UN ISO LAB LE RV\!CU system. breaks, and ..
)

Linisioable Primary ContaillmentatmospherE:l vent paths. If the main condenseris available with ah .*
. lJNISOL.t\BL~. main ~team line, there l11ay be relea~es through th.e steam jet air.ejectorsand gland seal e~hausfors:These pathways are monitofed; however, and do not meet the intent of a nonisolable .
release .
path to the environmerit..Th~se minor.releases .
are assessed Using the Category REALs:
.. The e~istence ofan in_:.line charcoal filter (GTS) doesnolmake a rel~ase path indirect si~ce the filter is
. *. not effective *9t removing fi~siqn 11oble gases. Typical filters have an efficiency of 95~_99% removal of.** ...
iodine. Given ttie 111agriitudef ofthe. core ihventqry ofiodine; significahtrel$ases.c::ould stillo9cur. In
'*.**. adcjitlQn,:sinc::~.the, fission ~roductre.i~~se w~ulcj be*d.riven by b~iling in t~~ rea~t9~ vessel, the high i ..
I *.I I .
I'*
I -* .*. :- :-,; . . ...
-~
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4
Revision 1
Page 246 of 264 .* .
. AttCichmellt 2, *Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued).
Containinent*(Coritinued) ..
The th.reshold is met if the breach is not isolable from the Control Room or an attempt for isolation fr~m .
the Control' Robni has been made and was unsuccessful. An attempt for isolation from the Control * **
Room shouldbe made prior to the emergency classification. If operator actions from the Control Room are successful, -
thisthreshold
. . . is not appli~able. Credit is not given for operator actions
~ .
taken. in-plant .
(outside the Control Room) to isolate the breach:
.*. . N2'-EOP~PC, Primary Containment C.ontrol may specify Primary Containment venting and intentional *
*. bypassing of the containment isolation valve logic even if offsite radioactivity release rate limits are ** .
. exceeded. (~ef.2).Under these conditions wit~ a VALIDcontainrl1ent isolation signal, the Containmeni .
.*barrier shou1a.be considered lost.
Generic
. ***** * **.. . : !~:i~~~~=~tolds address incomplete cqntainmerit isolation that allows direct release to the T~e *agai~sf throu~h
.. :..**.:
use.pftfle modifier 'id ired" in defining the release pathdiscrfrninates release paths
* .. interfacing*liq*uidsystems. The existence ofan in-line charcoal filter does nof make a release.path.: .
.***.*indired since the filter is not ~ffedive at rem6ving fission product noble gases. Typical filters have an* *..
effidency:0(95~99%' removal qf iddlne. Giventhe magnitLde of the core irwentory of iodine;'sigriificailt releases could .stillgccur. In addition, since the fission product releasewould. be driven by boiling. inthe
. reactor v.essel,Jhe high humlditY in the re leas~ st(eam c(3n be expected
jn a shorf periocL * .* * * * * * * .* * * *
to ren~er the filters ineffective
.**.NMP2 B(lsis Reference(s): .
1.
ltn~ro~ecftechriical Specificatio~s Nine MilefPoint Nudear $tation, Unit No.'.2, Table 3.6.1.3:-t.
2.
N2.;EQp,,pcPrillla~y colltainlllent C_9ntro1**. *. * .* * * *.* *
>. * ~. 'NEI 99~0,fCMTLoss 3A .* *..*.. .. . . ....
.:~ ... *
.* . ~--.
.. . ~ .
,/ ** .. * :... _ ..

~
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 247 of 264 Attachmenf2, Fission Product Barrier Loss/Pote~tial Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued) .
Barrier:* '*
Containment
. Category:*.* c. Isolation *... *
Degradatipn Threat:
Loss Threshold;:
- .- . ~ .
4. Intentional Primary Containmentventing per EOPs
. Basis:**
Plant-Spedfic N2--EOP~PC,Primary Containment Coritrol, andN2-EQP.:.PCH, Hydrog~n Confroi, may specify Primary*
Containment venting and intentional bypassing of the containment isolation valve logic, even if offsite .
I - .*radioactivity relea~e rate limits are exceeded (ref. 1, 2rThe threshol_d is met when ttie operator begins venting th.e Primary Containment in accordance witb£,OP~6. Support Procedures (Attachment 21. or
. .. 25), riot\,vhen actio~S are takento bypa~s interlocks prior to opening the vent valves (ref. 3). Purge and
**vent actio11s spetified in N2-:EdP-PC Step PCP-1 to control Primary Containment pressure below the
. .* drywell high press~re s~ram Setpointor EOP-PCH Step 31 or 34 to lower hydrogen concentration does
.. *.**.. *.** *
not ITleet this threshold becaus~.~uch ~ction is only permitted if offsite radioactivity release rates will
..... remain bel?wtheODCM limits(ref. t, 2). . . . . . *.
Generic
These threshcilds .acldress incomplete co~tainmerit isolation that allows .direct release to the environniellt. . . *. . . . . . . .. . ..
. .* Site specific EOP~ may direct containmentisolation valve logic(s) to be in'tentionally bypassed, . ..
. regardless of radioactivity release rates: Under these conditions with a VALID containment isolation .
signal, the contain merit should also be considered lost _if Gontainment venting is actually performed. * *
' * * * ' * : ' '
I
lntentio~alventing of Primary Cbntainm~nt for Primary Containment pressure or combustible gas control per EOPs to the secondary containment and/or the environment is considered a loss of containmen( Corit~inment venting for pressure when not in an accident situation should not be c.onsidered*> * ** * * *
NMP2 Basis ~eference(s): *
. .. *1*.. N2-EOP-PC>Primary Containment Control
.. *****
2 ..
N2-EOP--PC~~FHydroge~ Contr~I
< * ;: : *. 3,- EOP'.'6 NMP2>E6F>.sl.ipport Procedure . *
4. NEI 99-01 *CMT
.:- ~ ....
-~,
Loss 38... .
.- : -.. ~ *-.
~.-.
UNIT 2EMERG~NCY CLASSIFICATiONTECHNICAL*BASES- EP-AA~1013 Addendum 4 Revisior11 Page 248 of 264
- Attachment -
2; Fission Product -
Barrier.-
Loss/Potentiaf -
Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued) _
Barrier: Containment.**
Category:.-****
C. Isolation Degradation Threat: Loss Threshold:
5. UNISOL.J:\B,LE primary system leakage outside Primary Containment as indicated by exceeding EITHER: . . . ..
RB ai:~a rnaximum sa.f~temperaturevalue (N2-E6P~SC Detail S) o~- *- . .
RB ai'earadiati~n>8.00E+3.n:'R/hr
. Basis:
': . . . .: . .. -.~- :, -. *. .'
.* * * ** Plant~Specific
.. :
The . -
presenb~'-of elevated gene~al 'area temperatures orradjation le\tels i~ the Reactor Building (RB) _
,*may.be indicative . .,... -
of UNISOLABL:E primary*.,*system leakage . ,_...
outside the .
Primary Containment.
TheEOP-
.maxim
c, *-
urn ' ' .,
safe ,,/'"'*
values
define
"** \
this , *: ,\
cobtai~ment barrier thr~shold becaus~ they. are indicative of *. ' ..
<< *' *' ::: .. *' * .~C * :: * ' ' ' * '* ,, ' ,: ,.- .~* '* * ' * * * *': '* * *, * : *
.. probl~ms in the secondary 8ontaipr1nent that. are spreading a~d pose a threat to achieving a safe. piant .
shutdowll: This.thr~shold addr~ss~~ pr()blem~tic (fis6harges outside. PrimaryCdntainment thafm~y not *...
. *. *** originate from 'ahigh-:ebergyJine break: TheHoc::ations info which the.primarysystern discharge is of *
. < c~ncerri b~rre~~ond;fo .* .. *.:
the ~reas aci~i~e~~ed :inN2~EbP:.SC Details (ref.1 )~ ~ee Figure*f"2. *...
. :* .* . . , .
Aufv1aiimurr(Safe Value;, is the highes(~al.ue atwqich equ.ipmeht*necessary f()rth~ safe shutdoy\ih of the plant will op~~ate and p~rsonn.el'c~np§frbrm atiy,actlonsnedessary forthe s~fo.sh.utdoW,ri of the.~-***
plant., *. *-_ . . .. ** '* ..:* <~* * ..* ** .. *. ** *. * ' _-. , . . . ***.*. . .
~ ,;:>" . ,_; * ... * .*.: . "**, *. -**
****.' *._ '.' *'. .1 - -;.*.** --.**' '.- -.. ;.
. > The tfiaxim~.rJl safe; value'for, temp~ratu[~
i$ ~epei)dent on wheth~r acces~:is needed to areas within*.
the re'actor;bJllc1ing to' perforrri aqtiory~ reqµfred by ofb~~ EOP steps

Oniy are.as ip which th~ -actions
.:~ustb~ takek(~~d-th~te_ i$-~q:bthe-~ ~lt~r~ati\/e):ql,i~lify ~s)'~~~as" .~hen. detem1in*i~g* the number df .*
. a~ecte~ ~f~~s';{ref; 2f * * * '* ._.,
.....,*-... . .. *-' **~. .*
,: ;* -:*_ . .. <:*. **:. ~- ....
J ~:-**
. :* ~ : .. .
'The maxim_un*1s~fe(value fat.radiation .. . : .
i~B,00E+3'mR/hr.
_- ~*,-.*,. .. '.
.[:** ...
..1:.
UNli"2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 249 of 264 Attachrt)ent 2; Fission Product Barrier-Loss/Potential Los$ Matrix And Basis {Continued) -
-contairiri1erit {Continued)
In general,rnultiple indications should be used to deter111ine if a primary system is discharging outside Primary Containment. Fo:r example, a high area radiation condition does not necessarily indicate that a-pri~ary system is discharging int~the secondary cor1t~inment since this may be caused by radiation
.* shin~frorii nearby steam' liries or the- movement of radioactive materiais. Corwersely, a high area
radiation.
conditioniri conjuncti~ri
~ .* . .. .
wilt-~ oth~r indications (for. ~xample, roo111 flooding, high area -
~ . ' -
tenipefatu~es, reports of steam iii t~e-~econdary containment, an unexpected ri~e in feedwater flowrate,
- orunexpeCted -. ' **:' .
main tu'rbirie .
contrdl .
valve '* **..
Closure) **, .
may indicate . that a primary *.
system is discharging .
--into the. secbndary c6ntainment. *_.....
Generic _.**
This environment:
thresh~ld _addresses inconiplete c~ntainmentis61atiofrthatallow~ . . -
direct release to the In addition, The presence ofarearadiation or temperature_ Maximum Safe Valuesindicating . . _
UNISOLAB.~E primary system leakage outside.the primaryC6ntainmeritare aq~:fressed after a*
containment ' . :
isolation~ ...
The .
indiCatofs should .
be confirmed " .
tb'be -.
caused :_.*_ .
by RCS leakage. -_ . -
. There -is rio P~teritial Loss thr~shoid associated with this item. * *> <-
. NMP2 Re_fei"e_nce{s): -*
1. N2::E()P-8C secondary cont,ainrnent.control . *.. _ _ * .. _'._'. . _
.*..... :_ . . 3.
2: NER~~uv1~b39, NMP2-Em~rgebcy Qp~rating Procedures (EQ_P) Basis Document "NEI 99~()1 GMT Loss 3C ..* -.. -.*.- .. * - ...... : : . . . . .* *. ' -
--*.* ~ -
. - -. '.. .. :_~:\
.. '* . :~ . . _:_--;,* *.* . ' .. :*
... ::-,". :*.. > .* . . -** .*. . ;:*.._. : ~* ... ,
.*\ '
- . '~ *. .*. ..
.. ~ '*:: ..
. -~' '-->.
,_;.-- ;*; .. **.. ~-
- "~ -::'-*.
.~- *. ..* -,
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 250 of 264
Attachment 2, Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (C()ntinued)
Figure F-2: N2..EQP.;SC Detail s Nla,Cimul'li Sctfe Valu*s
.Parameter Location Maximum Safe Value Area Temperature All areas *2f2°F (EOP-6 Att 28)
Areas when* access 135°F is required for support.of EOP actions .
Area Radiation
. Area.Water Level All areas Ail.are~s 8.00E+3 mR/hr*
Flooding -alarm
UNIT2EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONTECHNICAL BASES EP.:AA-1013 Addendum 4.
Revision 1 Page 2S1 ot264 Attachm~nt2,.FissicmPrc>ductBarrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued): .
Barrier: Containment Ca~egory:. D.Rad*
Degradation Threat: Loss Threshold:
I
.: ~.=
. =.. *.;**='.:-.
. *.. r, ; ,'
.. ~ . ,-.::
' ~ '
r *,"'.-,
.UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES
EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 252 of 264
Attachm.e~t2, Fission Pro~ucf Barrier Loss/PotentialLoss Matrix And Basis (Continued)
Barrier:**** * . Containment**
Category: *. * *.* ,E. Judgment
.Degradati6n Threat: Loss**
.Threshold:.*
6.
ANYconditior'l
~~fil .
in. the .
opinion *.
oi'the Emergency Director that' indicates loss of the Containment.
Basis:
.. Plant-Specific *.
The Emergemcy Di~ectorjudgment threshold addresses any other factors relevant to determining if.the Con.tainmerit barrie~ is lost Such a determination should include.IMMINENT barrier degradation, barrier monitoring capability and dominantaccident sequences ..*. '
** IMMINENT barrier degrad~tion*e~ists ifthe degradation-will likely occur within two hours based
~n a* proj~ctioil ofcu*rr~nt safety system performance. The term "IMMINENT" refers to
. re~~gnition ~f the inabiHty to reach '.Safety acceptance criteria before completion of all checks .
.* Barrier mollitbrillg c~pability is d~creased if th~re is*a loss or.lack of reliable indicators. This as~~ss$~ntsh-buld include.inst~u~entati~n* operability concerns.
readings from portable ..
. fn~tru111~ritatioh and ~bnsideratim; cif offsite monitoring results.
..- . . . ' *~ .: ..
Dorrii~anfacdd~~fsegi.Jences*1e~d*to degradation.ofall fission product barriers and likely entry
. ~ .
to the EOPs. The Emergency Director should be mindful of the Loss of AC power (Station
. BlackOLJt) aqd A TWS EALs to as~ure timely emergency classification declarations.
Generic**
Thisthresh.old addresses' any other factms that are to be ~~ed by the Emergency Director in determining whet~er the:Contaihmentbarrieris lost. In addition, the inability to nionitor the barrier should also be incorporated ir1this
threshold as.a factorcin EmergericyDirector.judgment that the barrier*may be considered lost. .
. . '.;. ~-. ; .. . ' .
.The Gontai~menf.b~trier should not be declared lost based on exceeding Technical Specification action
.*.statement criteria, UflleissJhere is an event in progress requiring mitigation by the Containment barrier. When no,
-. ' . /. event,is inprbgress:(Los~ or Potenttal Loss of either FuelClad and/or RCS) the Containment barrier status is
. ' *. * .*. * . .. addressed by Technical Specifications. ' .* . .
.*, **>***/~******. * .* N~_P2. Basis ~efe~~nc~(sJ:*****
~... .:
1:'Ni=l99-ofcrvii:Los5s
-. <*.::~ .;...;,
\ . - *... ;* ... . *~ '
UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BA$.ES. EP-AA-101 JAddendum 4 .
Revision* 1 Page 253 of264 *
*Atta_chment 2, Fission Prod~ct Barrier Loss/Potentie1l .Lbss Matrix And :Basis (Continueq) *.
. Barrier: contain.ment . *. *.*
Category:* A. RPVLevel
.Degradation Threat:
Potential *Lass Threshold:
1. Primary Containmemt Floqding is required ..
Basis:
-
Plant-Specific R~quirementstorPrimary Cont~ihmehtFlooding are established. in EOP-RPV StepL-: 16;. EOP-C5 *.
Steps.
L'."8, L~1.0 . '
and L~18; andEOP~C4Override1.These EOPs ..*
provide .instructions fo ensure *
. adequate cqr~cooling by mainta,iriing RPvVlfater leve.1 abov~ prescribed limits or operating suffiCierit RPVinj~dionsourceswheb.le~elqmflpt bedeter111im~d:*sAP entry is req~ired when (ref. 1):
*. RPV)tvater level cannot be 'resfored:andmaintalned ~bove ,.39 in.vyith insufficienfCoreSpray .
Co~H~g: The Minirn~mstea~ Cobling R~V ~~t~rL.~vel (MSCRVVL) is the lo~est RPV ~ater .
, .* .* . *1eve1 at '1\fhich the *~qvered: pOrtion. of.the. fe~ctpr co;e.will generat~ sufficientsteam t() predude. ..
. -.. any dad t~mpeiirature in the'l.1n99vered po.rtion qfth~:cCJreJron:l ex9eedi~g '1o009F. Core Spray .*
coblingjs in,sufficieht lfRP\{;~aterl~vel c~lln6i be restored.ahq mafntairi~d,at or above' -62 in:* . *
. wit~~fleast 6~_50gprn.cbr~$Pi.aylbop flo~::':consistent.WiththeEOHd,efini.tlon of*"cann~tbe .** -*
1
l~~t;:~~~::;Z~~l1
. '** / this point:' >- *.* * '-'*, *::,
~

ld:ti~~=~:~;*;::i:~:::~:z,~~~J!t::~ea:es10 /.* -° * ...: .
~~~:~ ;:;!:te~~~~;:i;~~~,~~~~:i~~~tkt!:1~o;:o~~~~~~~t~~~
1 0
- ... ;" *.*.*~-.. -
~~,!~(level fndiCation. provides the p,Fi~afy:rneahs qf.'knQ,Wi~g if adeqliate cote.
COOiing is* being * **
.'*. m~ihtafrl~cL \/Vhen ~1f m~an~--()fciet~m1ining: HPV Watef.lever 'are unavaflabie' *reliance. oh
.... * *"*~11t~rn~te m~c\ns9f:~ss~6ng.aqequ~te do~~co.oling~~~t:be*a~t~~pte~L . TheJnstructions.in EOP~-. *
c4:.speCify;We::;e means; _whrch inplpde em~1"9~6¢Y*depr~s~~riiatioh~ bf thkRP\t cin,_cfinjectiqn .. ..
' ... intcfthe' RPVat a.rate rieeded't6flci6d fo the elevation of thefoain st~.m :line~ orhold RPV.
c, ~,' -:-:, * - * ' * :* ,.*
. pressµi-e<above:thefylinimuni.:*~teafficoo)i.ngj?ressur~.(irl*_Atws event§); '
~ . : .. - '
,. . . *:~
,_f,*
uNfr2 EMER~ENCY CLAss1FiCAT10N TECHNICALBASES . EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4
. Revision 1 Page 254 of 264 Attachlllent2 1 Fission Prod:u~tBarrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix An.d Basis (Continued) -
c" *'
Prim~r}# corjtainment Flooding_ is requir~d (Continuet;I)
This thre~hold is also a Los~ of the Fuel: Clad barrier (FC Loss A 1). Sincepdmary Containment Flooding occ,;urs after core unc~weryhas occurred. a Loss of the RCS barri~rexists (RCS Loss A.1 ).
primary Col"ltc1inmel1t Flo~ding (SAP entry), therefore, represents a Loss of two barriers and a Potential Lo.ss qt C1 thirti;which requires* a *General Emergency classification.
Generic**
.* . . There is n6 Loss threshold associ~ted'with this item;
The potenti~Lioss requirem.ehtfor drywall flooding indicates adequate core cooling cannot be *
. established and maintained anq that core melt is possible. Entry into Primary Containment Flooding _*
procedure_.s(SAPs):isa*logical*escalation in response
. to the inability to maintain . adequate .
core.cooling.
.* Theconditlo~in thispotentfal lossthresholdTePreserits a potential core .melt sequence which; if not corrected;* cquid lead to vesselJailure and increased potential for containment failure. In conjunction
. withReadorVessel water*leveLLoss"thresholds in the Fuel Clad arid RCS*bari"ier columns, this . .
threshold willresult'in the dedaration of a GeneraLErtiergency '."- loss of two .barriers and the potential .
loss ofa third. . ..** . . ' .. ' ......_-. ..* *.* ' . . ' ,..*... ** *. *. *. ; < ' *_' ' . . .. .*. ' *-*-. . . "* . ' .. '
"1!IVIP2 Ba$i~,Reterence(s): *.. _ ,.
* ** 1.. NER-2rvfa)39, NMP2 *EmergenCy.Op~rating ProcedUres (EOP) Basis.Document 2.. £\J2~E:bt=>:c4 RP\tFlooding* *_, _* * * * * *. * * * * * * *. *
3.
Ni::1*99~<}fcrvrr Potential L6ss 2 -*
'_.. f .
/*.- *.
-~* .' ...
~ . . " .:.
'*._*=--**
. UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATl()N TECHNiCALBASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1
Page 255 of 264 .
. *Attachment 2, Fission Produc:t Barrier L.oss/Potential Loss Matri,x And Basis (C()ntinued) .
Barrier: Containment
. . . l . ' .
. Category: R Primary. ContainmentPressure1 Temperature Degradation Th.reat: . Potential Loss**
Threshold:
2, . Primary Containment pressure >45 psig aridrisirig Basis: .**
. Plant~Spedfic
If. this threshold is exceeded, a challe~ge to the ' .
.Primary Contaim:nenf structure has .occurred .'
because
assumptionsus~d in the accident analysis, are no longerVALID-andari unanalyzed conditio_n exists
.* * ... (ref .1). This constitutes a. Pot~ntial Loss of the Contciinmerit barrier even ifa*.containment breach .*has.*.*...
nofoccurred ~
Generic***
**
Thf Prir:nary,Containm~nt pressure of45i:>sig is.based c:>n the*PrimaryContainmentdesign pr~ssLire. **
* * , , '
I
.. NMF>2 Basis.~efere~ce(s): '.. ...

1. USAEfSectipn6.~h.12 > .* .*.
2.. NEI 99~0 (cMf P~tential Loss* 1A.
"~ ..
. *. ; '.".. "~ . :*.--* *. ***:' : .. .
. ~ . *. ., ...
-* ~, . - .. : . "
. *..*UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASS IFl CATION TECHNICAL BASES EP.;AA-1013 Addendum 4.
Revisio~*t Page256 of264 *.
.* ....* ,Atlachm~iit~. Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matril< And Basis ((:ontiiluOd) ...
Barrier:.
Containment*
** Category: .* B. Primary Containment Pressu~l;l /Temperature
. ** Degradation Threat: Potential Loss
. Threshold:
3; Explosivemi~ture exists inside Primary Containment (<:: 6% H2 and <:: 5% 02)
Basis:-*
.* Plant~s 0 ecific Explosive'(defl~gratio'n).mixtures*inthe Primary Containm~nt are assumed to b~ elevated concenttatibns of hydrogen and oxygen. BWR.industry evaluation of hydrogen generation for development pf EOPs/SAPs i_ndicates that any hydrogen concentration above minimum, detectable is **
. . * ** , ... notto be expected within the snort term. Post-LdCA hydrogen generation primarily caused by *
.*.*. radiolysis i~a slowl~ eVolVing,Iong-,term condition. Hydrogen ccmcentrations that rapidly develop are:" *.
_ *** *.* most likelycaused by metal-water reaction. A metal~watetreaction is indicative of an accident more *
.* .* * :* >> ** ** <se~~re th#n ~ccidents cbnsidere9. irdhe plant desigr)basis and wo.uld *be i.ndic<:itive, therefor,e. of a*
.** * 'potentiafthre~t to,P(imaryContainme11t integrity. Hydrogen concentration otapproximately 6% is
..... ***.* considered t!Je.glob~I cietla~ration concentratiori ljlllit(reL1 ). <
.. i 1* . . - - . - ' .. .. . - .
.*.*..*. ** ..*
Eic~~t for*bii~iJ)eridds quring'plantstartup ~nd shutdow~, pxygen coricentrati~~ inthePrimary ..
.**.
Cd~taiorn~ntis maintained afinsi~nifib~nt l~velshy.nitrogen ine~i~n-.The ~p~~ified vaiuesJot this*
** * * * ,._ ** : ..... :* -* ' * < /,.; * ** * * ** ' *' * ** * * * ** * *, ~ * ' * - * ** ** **
Potential Loss threshold are the minimurrf global deflagration concentration 'limits (6% hydrogen arid
. : 5°(0 . ~xyge!l;+ef; 1).and re.adily,recogniza~le betause 6°1<> .hydrogen _is weU above the. N2:-E.OP-PCH' .
entry:coridititSr(
(r~f; 2):The minimum global*. deflagratio'n *-. *.*
.hydrogen/oxygen concentrations (6%/5%,.
respectively) require intentionai . Priniary Containmentv~nting, which isdefinedtbbe a*Loss of
GoritC)inril~nt(PC{nss C,4). .*. .* .. , .
. :*. The lJSARfoq~ir~slne H2/02~ah~iyzers fo be ab.le* to p~ovide and record 'combustible g~s conceritr~ti~n .
. . *f~:th~ . Prim~ty.Co~tain~~nt.W.ittliri*. 90 rrtinute.sto11()win.9 a LQGA with_sa,f~ty*system injection.The';Hiio2
analyzefrs.~t~ riprillallyin:'.staridby and.retjuirea 36 lllinutew~rrn-,up/self:-testperiod before.they,stci~. . .
. -proyidindci~~a.(ret. 0 1}**. *.**** . .. - . ;, *. .... . . . . . .** ..
~-
UNIT2 EMERGENCY CLAS,SIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 257 of 264.
Atta~h~e~t 2, Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Mafrix And Basis (Continued) .
. Expll>sl:e mii<tu: e,.i~~ Inside Prlm;ry Containment*(~ e% il ~nd *~* 5% 2 0 2) (Continued)
If the hydrogen or oxygen mo,nitOrJs LinaVailable, sampling anc:I analysis may determine gas
.. co11cenfratiolls. The-~alidity ofsample results must be judged based upon plant conditions, ~ince
, drawing and analyzing samples niayfake some time. l(sample results cannot be relied upon and hydrogen concentrations cannot.. be determined '* . . '
by .
any .
other .means, the. con~~ntrations must be.
. co,nsidered "unknown.!'. The IT!onitcirs shoL1ld notbe considered "unavailable" until an attempt has been made to place' th~ITI In s~rvice. (ref. 1)
Generic
. BWRs spgcific~lly definethe .limits assodatedwith explosi~e mixtures .in terms of deflagration concentrationsofhydrogen and.oxygen.' , , , ,
NMP2 Basi~l R~ference(s): .
. . .*:*.':* . 1. .NER:"2M-:-Q39, NMP2 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) BasisDocument
2. *... N4-EOP-PCH Hydrogen. Control ** . . .
* : 3.
NEI gg~o1 GMT PotenticiLLoss 1R
' i .
. *,~ ._
. - ..~
I .
I
.*-.. . ~. . '
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONTECHNICAL BA$ES EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision*1
.,*, . . . Page 258 of 264 Atta.chmel'lt .. ,
2, Fission .
Product Barrier Loss/Potenti~I -*
Loss Matrix And. Basis (Continued)
Barrier: * .Containment Category: .* .*
R. Primary ContainrnentPressur~/*Temperature Degradation Threat:.. . Potential Loss_
Threshold:.**
4. Suppressipnpool temperatu,re and RPV pre~sure. cannot b~. maintain13d below the Heat
.. Capacity'Temperatur~ Lin1it (N2-EOP::-PC Figure.M) * *
Basis:*
H.
F>1arit~specitld
The Heat Capa'9ityTelTlperature Umit(HCTL)is given in_EOP Figure M. This threshold is met when
N2:-EOP,.PCStepSPT-6 is*reached.{r~f.1). . . . . . .
.-.,~ .
* * *.**Generic *
.***The. I-I eat CapacityTerT1peratureLimit (HCT:L.) is th13 faigh_est~uppression'. pool temperature from which .* .
E1T1er~e.rlcy RF>.V bepressurization~WiH m>t rciise:' * * * * * * * ** -* * * *
~ . ; .~ .'<.* - . '
. Suppr'(3ssion chi:frnbe(tempetat~re ~pove th~ desigh value (210°F),
. *. - - **~ ' . . ,*.. - .- . -, *i .. . . . . . . . .- . . . : . ' . .* . ; . . .. ,
-~
.. - * *~* *.. -. Sup,pression chamber pres~ure-ab9vef Prir:rtary*Cpntainment.Ptessure:Liniit, befqrethe;faie :of- .
.. ~-*.
. energy trar:isfe(fromthe: RPVto:the.coritaininent is greater than the capac:;ity ofthe contalnmerlt **
venfr*' ..:*: , .- -*-<_, ' , * * "*:*_,*;.:_,o::***<-.,-,..... *.... -**, .:_**.* .. :-' .--: ** . -
"' . .. ._. . ' :<\*.>:* :. . *..,. ;~
tf"le* HCTki'~ .af~Mcti_qri bf-RPV pressure: anet sµppfo?sion* pdol water*level.*l.t*is utilized to preclL(de* *
failure, bf.the,-.~ontainment 9ndequipr:1:1enfihthe*_corttainm~nfri(3p~ssa-ry for.the ~afEfshutdown9fthe* **
plant ~lld)het~fore,Jfle inability'to IT)alhtafnplarit parameters below the liniitcpn$titutes potential Joss '.-
of:Collt~irimenf , - . ****. . . .* . .* . .- . . . - . .
a .. . -.
. . . ~:'" ... , :.".. *\,_ :**
NMP2 B~*s.is f{efer~nce(s):- , . ., ---~ * *.*. - *-
... ~ '*
1 N2-'Eqp:PCPrimar,y,cbntah1ment Control . :
2.: NEi'99~of CMT'PO'f~ntiaiLos$/I c( ' ' '
.... -. : **~* .... .: ... *
.**/: ':**
.;.***- - *~ ... *.*
. :* ~..
UNIT 2 E~ERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES. EP;.AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1
Page 259 of 264
*.__ .*_ . Attachrnent 2;*Fission*Ptodu~t Barrier Lo!:;s/Potenti~l .Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued)
. . Barrier:.**' . * * **
Contain merit*
category: . : D. Rad*
Degrad~tion Threat:
. Potential Loss
.Threshold:
5. DryyJeu.*area radiation? 6.0E4 R/tir (6.0 E7mRem/hr)
~asis: ..*_. . ***
. p1'ant~s~e~ific
. It.is importa'nt to recognii:E:l that.the radiation monitor m~y be. s~nsitive to shine from the RP~ or RCS ..
. piping (ca~~ed by lower than "norhia1 RPV water IE!vel for example). The Dryweli High Range. Radiation M~nitorsare thefollowing:(ref. 1): * .
~C~C*P:NL880D: DR~S :~RMS*RE1 am<
- :** 1 RMS*RUZ1A RMS~ROZ1B-
.
2cEc~PNLaaos: DRMS2RMS*RE1A/C .. *. "*: *. *_*
RMS~Ruz1c* . .
.* * ... HMS*RUZ10: ,,' *,
. *, *.* c*.
-* .. _ !.**. '* o*: .* \.
Figure F-1 miJ~trafos the 1ocati6~ of' th~ followingfoufdetecfors inside *the~ar:yWe11 (ref.1):
-~
>2.RM8*RE1CP:.C.
. *. *. .' -~~ **~. . . .
-~- .: 2RMS~RE1hP':c, . 268 353EAZ ,
~-*~
.: ..* .: . *.,. * *:*; -_. *** . ..- .**:*: ,_* ...* : -* *:. . * .*: _.=* : ~ -.:
The thres.hold value was calculated. ass.u_ming,the.instantaneous release an.d dispersal of the,i"eactor
'coolantlloble gas and'iodin~ i~hyefitory.as~o,ciated_with ~O_o/~:fuel dad qamage.'into the drYWell _.* . . ,* .
. ~t~~sp6e~E:l~(~~f. 2, -3 ).. The. ref~ten:Gecfcakulatiqn *;:i~.lds.~c(Value Of 5.e E,4. ~h;:* ;+~is. has be~n m_unded .*
. to_.6.o_E4. f3th-( bec~~~~)t_'is,ob~e,rv~ble-~n:~~i~tin~flnstrurt1eri_tatlon .. *. * * .. * </ :_
.- :'- :- ~ ...
'~.:.
UNIT2 EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP.;AA.;1013 Addendum4 Revision 1*
Attachment 2, Fission Produ~t Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Page 260 of 264 .**
Basi~ (Continue~)
-Dryw~ll area radiation~ 6.0 E4.R/hr (6.0 EimReril/hr) (Continued).* *.
_*Generic The 6.0 E4 R/hrreading is a value that indi_cates significant fuel damage welUn excess of ihatn~quired *.
for loss of RCS and Fuel Clad. -* * * *. , ** -* * * ** * *
. Regardl~~s of. whether contaimn~nfisch~Henged, this.amount of activity in cont~inment,.ifreleased,.*
_ .could have such severe corisequenc~s that itis prodent to treat this as a p9tential loss of containment, .*
. Sl1Ch that a General Emergency declaration is warranted'.. - . .. . .. . -
.. There i~-~oL~ss threshold.associatedwiththis item .*
NMP2 Basis Reference(s):* < .
_1.. -N2-RSP~RMS~R 106 Channej Calibration Test of the. Dry\l\le11 High Ra~ge Are~ Radiation Monitor~ .
2. _Calculation PR-C-24-0 * . . ** -
3. GCN No ..<009718 Calculation of Drywell Radiaticm-General*Emergency EAL -*
... .. 4. *. NEI 99;,01 GMT Potential Loss4 * .
. --~ -.* . : -
~ .
.- . ~:-
. *-_-, ... ;\ __ .*.:
. : _ ..* -~* *.*..
.. *. . ~
. .*~: . .* .::. ,. '. -
UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP-AA-1013 Addenduni 4 .
Revision.1 Page 261 of264 Attachment 2, 'Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix And Basis (Continued) .
Figure F~1: Drywell High Range RadiatiQn Monitor Detector Locations (ref. 1)
Orywell 261
DrY\fle 11 26i .,-.
l
-/
. . - -~
--* .~* ..
I
- I UNIT 2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES - EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 262 of 264
~arrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix AndBasis (Continued)
Attachmenf ;, ,Fission Product >
Barrier: - Containment<
.Category: * * * . E. Judgment Degradatitm Threat: -- Potential Loss_
-Thn~shold:
6. ANvd:mditionin the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates potential loss of the Containmentbarrier * * ** * - - -
Basis: -
- Plant.::specifi~ **
-The Emergency Director judgment threshold addresses any other factors relevantto determining if the
.* -- Containment barrf~r is potentially lost. Such a deterniinationshould i_ildudelMMINENT barrier
- degradation, barrier nionitoringcapability and dominant *accident sequences.
-* * *IMMINENT barrier degradation exists if the degradation will likely occur within two hours based
-- on'a proj~ction of current safety *system performance. The term UIMM IN ENT" refers to recognition oUhe inability to reach safety acceptance criteria before completion of all checks.
B~~riermo~itori~~;~apapility is decreased ifthere~is a loss or lack of reliable indicators. This asses~nie~t *,: . . .
shbuld include jnsfru111entatiqn operability concerns: readings from portable
. instrumentation ahd cbnsjderation of-offslte monitoring results.
. 'oorriiriant accident sequences lead to degradation of ail fission product barriers and likely enttY to'the-EOP~. The Emergency Director should ~~~mindful of the Loss of AC power (Station
.
Blackbut) and ATWS l;ALs to asst.ire time_ly emergency classification declarations.
Generic This threshold add~esses any othe~. factors that are tb be used by the Emergency Director in determining whet~er the Containm13ntbarrier is potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be * -
incorporated iri this threshold as a factor in Emergency Director judgment that the barrier may be considered potentially lo.st - - -
-The Contai~ment_bl:lrrier should riot be declared potentiall~/'lost based on exceeding Tec~nical Specification~*
. action stat~ment criteria, unless ther,e is an event in progress requiring mitigation by the Containment barrier.
is
-_._ \/Vhen* no event irrprogress (Loss or Potential Loss of either Fuel Clad and/orHCS) the Containmentbarrier -
-status is addressed byTechnicai Specifications. . . -
' * . NMP2 Bas.is._Refe~~m:~(sf: __
' * * . 1: NEI ~9~016MtP.otential Loss: 6 -
, ... *.***~ . :: .. *.
.* ...~ ' **._,
UNIT 2-EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TECHNICAL BASES EP~AA~1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 -
Page 263 of 264
. . ~ . . . .
Attachment 3, Abbreviations I Acronyms -
AC .. :**:*****':***:*: ...... :............... :***********:*. ;..........................-.:: ........... ,.................. Alte~nating current_-
APRM .: .. :.' ....... :.... '.********:****... :~ ..... :....... :.: ... ,.......... ::: .. :...... , ......... ,._.... AveragePower Range Meter* --
ATWS .... :.... O:J..........* , ...;; .... : ..*.. _,., ........ ~.: ............... ~.-.. , .......... ,.Anticipat~d TransientWithout:Scram BLDG .. :... :.......-.: ..... :...................... :..... :........ :...... :......-......... :: *... :.............. _ ........................ Building BWR ..... ,.... ;.. ,.:, ..................... _ ... ,.: ............... ,.............. :.:: ...*.. :....... *... :..... .-.; .. Boiling Water Re~dor. -
CDE ..... ;.: ..... ,; .*.... ,..... ~.: ... :..... ..-: ....... ,.. :..............-, .... :.. ,................ :.. :.. Committed Dose Equivalent CFR- .. ::: .... ,.; ... :.:_ .......... ,............ .- . .- .. :.-.* :...................... :..........-.............. Code bf Federal Regulations DC ......... : .. :... -.::.: ...... : ..-.... :..... ,: ......... :..-..... :..*...... ;.................. :........ ~ ............... :., ........ Di:rectCurrent EAL., .... ~:: ... ;..,.................. '. ...d.: .. ;...... ;.~.-..........*.-......* H..... ;.:n .............*......* Emergency Action-Level_
I I
I -
EC.:.::.:.,.: .. :: ... )...*. ~ ....... :~:***'******: ... :.. u * * '. * * ; *** -* * * * * * * * * * * * *:_.: * * * * * * * * * * * : : * * * * * * * -.-* * * * * * * * , : *
Emergency Condenser EGGS, ........ :..-,: .............. , ...........-...... -_.. ,.. ,., ..................... ,... ,., ...... Emergency Core Cooling Systein
~.*::::::*:::: :;x:::: ::::: ::::;:: : ::::: : ::::::::::: :::* :::: ::::::::::: ::::*:: : : ::: *;::::: :*:::::::::: ::::::: :.~.~~'.~~-n~E;e:::;
E~F ::_......... :....:;:.. '.'. .... :;.:.; ..... ;............. :.':.: ...... ~:*****':: .. :, ..... ~~ ..... / ..... ,.EmergencyOperations Facility--
- __ - EOPM.:: .. :.. ;::*******:*:-**:***:***:._. .... : .. :.: .. ,......... :.*.........*.. :....... :::: ..... Em~rgency Operating Procedure EPA .. ,:.,.:*'*:'.~ ...*.. :.:*****'*':*_**'.**: .*.::::******~****:****<.-.: .. :.: ..-::: *.... ::.:".-, .._. EnJirOnm_ehtal Protection Agency_- _-*
-_ EPMP .. ;.. ,.":.-.:-....*. ,... .-:.:*.::., .. :.*. ::.-... ,:~.:~ ... : .... :.... , ..... i.-: *. ,.. Emerge~cy Plan Mai11tenance Procedure
EpRI :.. :.: ... :_,.,:: .......... :.: ..... :.-,_..: .. ;.. ::~,:: .. :.. :'.,/.;: .. *.: ... :...-~ ......... -...-.:.Electric Power Research Institute.
1-EP~P_.**':': .. ~.-'.*:*:_'. ....... '..: .. -.:.::: .. ,:.***:-::.-...-..-: ... :: ..*.*....... :.* ;. Errlefgency Plan lrhplerheriti11g Proc~d_ure *- -- -
. .. *. :::::::*::::;:::?;: ;::::') :\ :::.: ,.:..:.*. i: '.:. ........... :' ..*.....*.. :*.*.. :.. ,,....*... F0deiaJBUre.~u of invEistig~tion **
~ :L:;: ~: .fr: 2: .,:*: : : : : : : : .-:-'.: .:/:*: : : ;.: :;: :*;:>*.~ ~ tj: ~:i~J:~~~;:~:~E; f
.** .* .;~~~~:: ::::::g':,.... ::::::::~:;:,~:: :;;:::'" : :*,N*~g~~~-~~N+*~-~~J~-~~-~~-~~i;d~i;:;~11~:~;~~* *..* =:*.;
JAFNPP.'... :.,\(.,'.. :... ~: ..*:: *.. ':~ ...... :.: - - .'.: .. :* ...-...... ~.*..*:.. ,.,.: *. j~~esA. 'FitzP~trickNJdearP6we~Plant---_
=
lCO :... :.. ;. - ..*.. :.-: ........ ,. :....... ::.:*.. :_:.: .. ,; ... :._..*. :.... :_.* :: ... ,:;:*:****,*.:* Lirniting.~onditip~of Qp-eratio_n
,. ~.' :, *, .:. -- .* .: .
.*. ~
\ ..-.... :..... '.Loss ofCoql~u1t Accident* ---
.* - m'R :... :.~.:,:;;:~~:-.:,<. .. ;.:*::. * :*,;*.'..~~'..'.'::.-._.., ....... ::., _::-., .. :..\.*.'.: ..... :.'. .. :::::_ ..... ,.p1illiR_dentgen -* .. *_.*
_ . __ ---fV]s_cHwL.>.'-:':<:,:.,.,,*:._... ~*.. ,:: ..*,.,:,~'..-i; ....* ;-;:*.. _"'.'*:.:.~ .... .-,>*.. *Mln-irnJ1ril s_t~am c961ing RPV ~ater'Level*_
-.- *< -- MSIV.......
_\ - __ - :, MSL. -... ~ ..... }.:,~: ..... ~ .... };~ ...'.;.*: ... ~:::'..
- : . _.'*.-_**.- _**.*_*.-.*-:*_ *.*.*_ ,. *_-_* ...-.M
-_ .a - .in* _.- s_.- _- *.~-:.~ - _._ a*_ :._.mM,als1;n~1S~tt_eioanm:VLa1*_1vnee
-~ \ .. . *_:,,*. -
' . -:~ -.
~, *. *.: . .* .
.- *~:
uN1T. 2 EMERGENCY cLAss1i=icAr10N . . *. . . TECHNICAL
. . BASES
EP~AA-1013 Addendum 4 Revision 1 Page 264 of 264
.*. Att~chmeiit 3; Abbreviations I Acronyms (_Continued) ,
. *NEL~ *... ~; *.. :........ :.. .-......... ;....... :; .. :.,.:: ..................... :......... / .. : ........ -. ....... ,.. Nuclear Energy Institute N~SP .:................ :........... :: ...... ;.;: ........ :.:..................... :...... ;National Environmental Studies Project
NRC ... :.... ;., .. '.: .... :: ............... ,..... :........... ~.:., .... , ...... : ............ ;........ Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NORAb.:: .......... :.... ,.. ,.: ...* ,... :: ........*.*.: ....... ;............,North American AerospaceOefense Command Nl.JMARC ) ..... ~.:: ...... :: ....... : .... ~ .. *,-.... ,.... ~~ ... :.: ....... :.. NuGlear Management and Resources Council
osE .. '. .. .":.:~-*......... :.:.. :: ............ :...... ;,;~:: ...... '. ............... :....................... Operating Basis Earthquake
QCA .... ,:::::::~: ....... ;: ... ::: .... : .... :.. ,... :: ..... ;*. ,.:,:, ... ; .......... ,: ..... ;........................ Owne~ Controlled Area
.* OQCM.; .... >.:'.n ... ,.: *..* :.......... ;: ......**:..... ~.::.:.,, ... , .*..*:.: .... :.,.*;,.'...... :.*. Off-site Dose Calculation Manual
. QGE~M .-:,'.'*****'::._:: ... , .. :::.o...'......... :_: ..... .,.............. ;......... '. ....... :............. Offgas Effluent Stack Monitor.
ORO ........ :: ..... ,:., ............. / ...*::.: .. :.... ,: ...'.., ............... :.. ,./.. :........:: .. Off-site Response.Organization
.
PAG: ... ~ ... :/n ....... :.. :: ..... :.. :... :.... :... :.. :... :... :.. :.... :........ ;.... :.. :............ :... Prot~ctive Action Guideline *
~rd: *: ~*:>'.: : : : : : : : : : : : : :;:*:*: : : : : : ;: : : '.:;: : : '.:.: (: : ~: :::*~~~~d;:*~:~:::e~~:~a6~:9"~
=~:: : ::: . :;\:::::::: : ::: :: ::: : : : :;:.: : ;': : : : : : : *: : :*: :.:: :: ;: : :: :: ::': :;:: ::: :. ::,.:-;~~~~o~;:~~~~.
* *RCS:.: ... ~*:'..:: ...... :, ....._... ;;'._, .... :...*,:~****':., .... :;: ..... ,~ ...**,.: ..... :::,,,::***: ........ :.. '. .. :. R.eac:;for Coolant System
.. Rem: .. :._.'..).;:::: .. ,.:,::*************:*.. :: .. :.. * ... ~r .... ':::*****;'*"*~ .. ::., .... :.... :.:.... :, .. Roentg~n *Equivalent Man
.. *. : .e.'.*.*..'_. '.:.::.::*.;"... _*..:::.
i:::::*.::<:*:_'\::_:*::L::. :_:' ,,,.:{ .... ,: *.. ..... .'* ,,. (: ...,: .,........ '* ..Reactor Protection System .
,: .. ~.~ ... , .... ;.'. ......... ;..... :..'. ..... :.:*.:, ... Reacforpressure Vessel *
. RW ...... :..... \:~ .... :..... :: ... :..... '.... :.:::'. ....... ,:;., ":"\~,.,,,_: ::. ..~ ...Haw Water.
..._- ~- *_ .
~ *; *.
-~ .*
__,.. '*. !

ML17158B259

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