ML17059A701
| ML17059A701 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1995 |
| From: | Terry C NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17059A702 | List: |
| References | |
| NMP1L-0910, NMP1L-910, TAC-M90102, NUDOCS 9503100126 | |
| Download: ML17059A701 (32) | |
Text
jF'RIORITY (ACCELERATED RIDS PROCESSIi REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9503100126 DOC.DATE: 95/02/28 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-220 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Niagara Powe 05000220 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION TERRY,C.D.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Responds to request for addi info re core shroud repair.
Suppl 1 to GE-NE-B13-01739-04, "Suppl 1 to Nine Mile Unit 1 Shroud" encl.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
AOOID COPIES RECEIVED:LTR L ENCL L SIZE:
TITLE: OR Submittal: General Distribution NOTES:
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6 1
1 1
1 1
0 1
1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-1 PD FILE CENTER Og RR/DSSA/SPLB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE iVASTE!CONTACTTIIE DOCU~IENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM PI-37 (EXT. 504-2083 ) TO ELINIIVATEYOUR NAME I'ROTI DISTRIBUTIONLISTS I:OR DOCUMENTS YOU DON"I'EED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 17 ENCL 16
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M V MIIASAIRA lMU MOoNIAWK NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWER CORPORATION/NINE MILEPOINT NUCLEARSTATION, P.O. BOX 63. LYCOMING,N.Y.13093 nEL (315) 349-7263 FAX(315) 34~753 CARL D. TERRY Vice President Nuciear Engineering February 28, 1995 NMP1L 0910 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 RE:
Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Docket No. 50-220 DPR-
Subject:
Response to Request forAdditionalInformation Regarding the Nine MilePoint Unit I Core Shroud Repair (TAC No. M90I02)
Gentlemen:
By letter dated February 23, 1995, the Commission made a request for additional information concerning the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Core Shroud Repair.
Our letter dated February 24, 1995, provided responses to the requested information except for requests 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7.
Attachment 1 to this letter provides responses to these remaining items.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation has completed an inspection of the core shroud H8 weld.
The inspection utilized ultrasonic examination supplemented by enhanced visual examination in areas where access was not possible for the ultrasonic inspection tool. A total of approximately 260 degrees of the weld circumference was inspected by the combination ofultrasonic and visual examination.
Two areas containing indications are being evaluated.
At this time, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation believes none of the indications is ofstructural significance and that Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation's acceptance screening criteria is met with significant margin. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, therefore, has decided that repair of the H8 weld by installation of brackets is not necessary.
Future reinspection of the areas containing indications will be addressed at a later time consistent with the ongoing BWRVIP work on reinspection scope and frequency.
Very truly yours, CDT/JMT/kab Enclosure C. D. Terry Vice President - Nuclear Engineering "COQ22 9503100l26 950228 I
PDR 4DOCK, 05000220 P
Page 2 xc:
Regional Administrator, Region I Mr. L. B. Marsh, Director, Project Directorate I-l, NRR Mr. D. S. Brinkman, Senior Project Manager, NRR Mr. B. S. Norris, Senior Resident Inspector Records Management
I
ATTACHIVIENY1 R
est 2 The summary of the hardware stresses provided with the repair hardware analysis, General Electric (GE) Report No. GE-NE-BI3-01739-04, indicates that the stresses in the toggle and lower support are at or near the allowable values for the steamline break and design-basis earthquake (DBE) events.
Provide the details of these calculations to demonstrate that the bending stresses in the toggle due topostulated failures ofwelds H~and H8 have been considered in the evaluations.
~Res ense 2 The details of the lower support (Drawing 112D6585) stress calculations are attached (Attachment 2).
The analysis of the lower support includes both tensile and bending stresses and is found acceptable.
The depth of the toggle (Drawing 112D6581) is 3.83 inches, which is large compared to the 7,13 inch span across the hole in the cone, and the traditional beam bending equations are not applicable.
"Formulas for Stress and Strain," by R. J. Roark and W.
C. Young, Fifth Edition, assume a span to depth ratio of 8 or more for the beam equations to be applicable.
The span to depth ratio of the toggle = 7.13/3.83 = 1.86 The loads on the toggle were evaluated for shear or tearout stresses which are found to be acceptable.
Ifone considers the loading on the toggles to be in bending, the following calculations show the calculated bending stresses are acceptable.
Bending stress = Mc/I M = moment c = distance from centroid to surface I = section modulus Assume the toggle is a simply supported beam that pivots about the edge of the hole through the cone and with the load applied at the center of the span.
The maximum moment occurs at the center of the span.
Mmax = Pl/4 P = applied load 1 = span length
The section modulus at the center of the toggle is at the same location as the pin. The section modulus at this location is that of the toggle less that of the pin.
I = 2 x [(b x h'/12) - (b x D'/12)]
b = width of the toggle h = depth of toggle D = pin diameter The bending stresses calculated are tabulated below, EVENT Normal Upset Emergency Faulted CALC STRESS PSI 30,500 62,100 83,000 119,384 ALLOWABLE TR S
PSI 71,250 71,250*
106,875 142,500 The actual Code allowable where the pressure differences for Level B Service (Upset) exceed those for Level A Service (Normal) is 110% of the Level A allowables (Ref.
NG-3223).
Upset Allowable = 110% x 71,250 psi = 78,375 psi.
J ormation Re uest 3 The assessment to determine the impact ofthe tie rod assembly on the stresses at the H8 weld, provided in Report No. GE-NE-B13-01739-04, Appendix A, is based on an uncracked shroud condition.
What would be the impact ofthe tie rod assembly on the H, weld stresses ifit were postulated to be cracked through wall in the vicinity of the attachment points of the tie rod assembly?
~Res ense 3 Crack propagation analysis is based on stresses calculated for material in the noncracked condition. Once the uncracked stress is known, the crack propagation is calculated using the appropriate stress intensity factor.
The crack growth is entirely determined by the stress in the uncracked condition.
The condition stated where the H8 weld is assumed cracked throughwall in the vicinity of the tie rod location was not specifically analyzed.
The crack propagation stress intensity factor was defined for the H8 weld uncracked condition.
This analysis is documented in Appendix A of GENE-B13-01739-04 and demonstrated that the tie rods have no significant effect on the stresses in the H8 weld.
Since the H8 weld inspection
has demonstrated that the H8 weld has no significant cracking, a detailed analysis of the impact of tie rods on'postulated partial throughwall cracking at the tie rod attachment points is not considered required.
In ormation Re uest 4 The postulated 360 through wallfailures ofH,, H6, Hand H, was judged to be the most representative forincluding gaps in theftnite element model as stated in Section 3.5. 14 ofReport No. GE-NE-B13-Ol 739-04.
Provide the rationale for not including postulated failures ofwelds H, and Hin the analytical model.
Also, provide the magnitudes ofthe calculated gaps at the postulated failed weld locations H,, H,, H~, H, Hand H,for both normal operating and accident conditions.
~Res onse 4 Our intent was to assume a worst case scenario for cracking in all the circumferential welds from Hl through H7. Since cracking at welds H2 and H3 could affect the shroud stiffness, and therefore the preload, additional stress analysis was performed as a
supplement to the referenced stress analysis (GE-NE-B13-01739-04) (Attachment 3). The results confirm that there is no gap for normal conditions for welds Hl through H7. For upset conditions, conservative assumptions predict a maximum separation of.030 inches.
Realistic assumptions regarding the H2 and H3 filletweld integrity demonstrate that no separation would occur for bounding 100% rated core flow upset condition pressures.
For accident conditions, gaps are predicted and were addressed in the safety evaluation previously submitted.
The existence of gaps during conditions other than normal operation does not violate the generic VIP shroud repair guidelines.
The potential crack separation for upset event conditions is temporary and will close following the event.
The tie rod assembly stresses remain within elastic limits, The weld separation will close following the upset event since the thermal preload is recovered and the rod willremain tight. The mechanical pre-load is not affected.
No inspection of the tie rod or weld is required following an upset event above the normal tie rod and refuel outage shroud ISI plan which is under development.
The supplemental stress report has been prepared to specifically address the issue ofweld crack separation during normal/upset operation and accident conditions.
The conditions considered include throughwall 360'racking simultaneously at H2 and H3.
The analysis does not postulate cracking at H8, but covers cracking at all other welds (Hl-H7). The results of the H8 weld inspections validate the assumption that the H8 weld is not 360'hroughwall cracked.
An ANSYS finite element model was prepared that includes details at the top guide support ring and at the conical support.
The stabilizer stiffness and the stiffness of the lower support are also included in the preload calculations and the supplemental stress evaluation.
Since welds H2 and H3 affect the shroud stiffness, they are specifically addressed in the supplemental analysis.
Welds H2 and H3 are fullpenetration welds with a 0.63 filleton the ring side.
Fillet welds with 0.6 inch legs are modeled for conservatism.
Four cases were analyzed which bound the stiffness at the top guide ring are listed below.
The Ks term is the shroud stiffness including the top ring and conical support.
Case 1. Welds H2 and H3 have a 360'hroughwall crack on the ring side of the filletweld (Ks = 6.76 x 10'b/in).
Case 2.
Welds H2 and H3 have a 360'hroughwall crack on the shroud shell side of the filletweld (Ks = 6.33 x 10'b/in).
Case 3.
Welds H2 and H3 have a 360'hroughwall cracks and there is no fillet weld (Ks = 2.70 x 10'b/in).
Case 4.
Welds H2 and H3 are not cracked (Ks = 68.7 x 10'b/in).
Metallurgical evidence from reactor weld failures analysis suggest Case 1 is the most likely to occur for cracks extending greater than 180 Cases 1 through Case 3 bound the ring stiffness for the postulated crack scenarios.
The compressive load at welds H6B and H7 are calculated for each case and are shown in the table below.
The combined stiffness of the four stabilizers, including the lower supports, is 1.978 x 10'b/in.
COMPRESSIVE LOAD AT WELDS H7B AND H7 CASE NUMBER THERMAL PRELOAD, LB 237,188 233,596 176,954 298,010 NET WEIGHT, LB 174,910 174,910 174,910 174,910 TOTAL LOAD, LB 412,098 408,506 351,864 472,920 During normal operation at 105% core flow, the core support pressure drop, BPcs, is 15.9 psi and the shroud head pressure drop ash, is 5.9 psi. The calculated liftload is 339,836 lb.
The results show there is no crack separation for all the cases considered.
The compressive thermal preload plus weight of the internals exceeds the 339,836 lb. load tending to separate the welds for all load cases.
During a main steam line break accident condition, the loads on the stabilizers can exceed the thermal preload and there may be separation at postulated crack locations.
The most severe conditions are 360'hroughwall cracks at welds H6B, H7 or H8.
Failure at one or more of these welds transfers the core bP loads to the stabilizers which, when combined with a seismic event results in the 311, 710 lb. stabilizer load.
The
maximum separation during this event is 0.63 inches.
This displacement is temporary and the stabilizer springback and weight of the internals willclose the gap once the event is over.
In ormation Re uest 5 Identtfy the most adverse combination ofpostulated weld failures and loading conditions in evaluating the shroud conical support deformations and provide documentation to demonstrate that the limiting deformations have been factored in the calculation ofthe tie rod preloads and the gap calculations requested in question ¹4 above.
~Rs ~5 A 360'hroughwall crack at welds H2 and H3 is the most adverse condition for shroud stiffness and results in the lowest thermal preloads.
The analysis does not postulate cracking at H8, but covers cracking at all other welds.
The results of the H8 weld inspections validate the assumption that the H8 weld is not 360'hroughwall cracked.
The cone stiffness is included in the analytical model used to calculate shroud stiffness in the supplemental stress report.
As shown in Number 4, there is no crack separation during normal operating conditions.
The minimum compressive load at the welds occurs ifH6A or H7 is failed and the core d,P load is restrained by the stabilizer assemblies.
From the viewpoint of applied loads, an infinitely stiff shroud results in the highest thermal loads.
The thermal loads calculated in the original stress report are based on the assumption of an infinitelystiffshroud. The shroud and stabilizer thermal stresses, based on the high thermal loads, are shown in the original stress report to meet the required stress limits.
In ormation Re nest 7 During a combined steamline break and DBE event, the tie rod load has been determined to be in excess of300,000 lbs.
Withpostulated failures ofwelds H, and Ha, the H8 lower weld bracket would impose a bending moment on the H, upper weld bracket in the vicinityofthe adjustable foot.
Provide calculations to demonstrate the structural integrity of the bracket under these loading conditions.
~Res ense 7 e
The tie rods are restrained by the cone which carries the load to the reactor pressure vessel wall.
The H8 weld brackets rest on the cone at different locations from the stabilizer assemblies and are not loaded by the tie rods.
In the faulted event referenced where the tie rod loads exceed 300,000 lb., weld separation is predicted below the core support.
Since the upper bracket is attached to the shroud below the core support, the brackets, become unloaded and the upper bracket is unrestrained in the vertical direction (free to lift). Any postulated cone defiections would not produce significant load on the brackets.
The H8 weld brackets are designed to carry the downward load produced by a recirculation line pipe break.
Each bracket is designed for a 418,833 lb. vertical load and a 42,715 lb. horizontal load during this event.
The bearing, shear and bending stresses produced by these loads have been calculated and found acceptable.
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