ML16343A814

Issuance of Amendment Regarding One-Time Extension of Intervals for Surveillance Requirements 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3

ML16343A814
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	01/05/2017
From:	Robert Schaaf Plant Licensing Branch II
To:	James Shea Tennessee Valley Authority
Schaaf R
References
CAC MF8441
Download: ML16343A814 (17)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 January 5, 2017 Mr. Joseph W. Shea Vice President, Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street, LP 3R-C Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT REGARDING ONE-TIME EXTENSION OF INTERVALS FOR SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.6.11.2 AND 3.6.11.3 (CAC NO. MF8441)

Dear Mr. Shea:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 3 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2. This amendment consists of changes to the license in response to your application dated September 30, 2016.

The amendment revises the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.0.2 to allow a one-time extension of the intervals for Surveillance Requirements 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact me at (301) 415-6020 or Robert.Schaaf@nrc.gov.

Robert G. Schaaf, Senior Project Plant Licensing Branch 11-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-391

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 3 to NPF-96

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/enclosures: Distribution via Listserv

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-391 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 3 License No. NPF-96

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the licensee) dated September 30, 2016, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

Enclosure 1

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No.

NPF-96 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 3 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and shall be implemented within 7 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O_ 1 ---Y Co~ JoCa~~D.

(}~~

Acting Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: January 5, 2O1 7

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 3 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-96 DOCKET NO. 50-391 Replace page 3 of Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 with the attached page 3. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change.

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a marginal line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE INSERT 3.0-4 3.0-4 3.0-5 3.0-5 3.0-6

C. The license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act, and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect, and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below.

(1) Maximum Power Level TVA is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3411 megawatts thermal.

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 3 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(3) TVA shall implement permanent modifications to prevent overtopping of the embankments of the Fort Loudon Dam due to the Probable Maximum Flood by February 1, 2017.

(4) PAD4TCD may be used to establish core operating limits for Cycles 1 and 2 only. PAD4TCD may not be used to establish core operating limits for subsequent reload cycles.

(5) By December 31, 2017, the licensee shall report to the NRC that the actions to resolve the issues identified in Bulletin 2012-01, "Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System," have been implemented.

(6) The licensee shall maintain in effect the provisions of the physical security plan, security personnel training and qualification plan, and safeguards contingency plan, and all amendments made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50. 90 and 50.54(p ).

(7) TVA shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The TVA approved CSP was discussed in NUREG-0847, Supplement 28.

(8) TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility, as described in NUREG-0847, Supplement 29, subject to the following provision:

Unit 2 Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 Amendment No. 3

SR Applicability 3.0 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.1 SRs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for individual LCOs, unless otherwise stated in the SR.

Failure to meet a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be failure to meet the LCO. Failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency shall be failure to meet the LCO except as provided in SR 3.0.3. Surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment or variables outside specified limits.

SR 3.0.2 The specified Frequency for each SR is met if the Surveillance is performed within 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured from the previous performance or as measured from the time a specified condition of the Frequency is met. In addition, for each of the SRs listed in Table SR 3.0.2-1 the specified Frequency is met if the Surveillance is performed on or before the date listed on Table SR 3.0.2-1. This extension of the test intervals for these SRs is permitted on a one-time basis and expires October 31, 2017.

For Frequencies specified as "once," the above interval extension does not apply.

If a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a "once per ... "

basis, the above Frequency extension applies to each performance after the initial performance.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

SR 3.0.3 If it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the LCO not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the Surveillance. A risk evaluation shall be performed for any Surveillance delayed greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and the risk impact shall be managed.

If the Surveillance is not performed within the delay period, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.

(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.0-4 Amendment No. 3

SR Applicability 3.0 3.0 SR APPLICABILITY (continued)

SR 3.0.3 When the Surveillance is performed within the delay period and the (continued) Surveillance is not met, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.

SR 3.0.4 Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall only be made when the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified Frequency, except as provided by SR 3.0.3. When an LCO is not met due to Surveillances not having been met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.

This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.0-5 Amendment No. 3 I

SR Applicability 3.0 3.0 SR APPLICABILITY (continued)

Table SR 3.0.2-1 Frequency Surveillance Requirement (SR) Description of SR Requirement Extension Limit Verify total weight of stored ice is greater than or equal to 2,750,700 lb by:

a. Weighing a representative sample of<:!: 144 ice baskets and verifying each basket contains greater than or equal to 3.6.11.2 10/31/17 1415 lb of ice; and

b. Calculating total weight of stored ice, at a 95 percent confidence level, using all ice basket weights determined in SR 3.6.11.2.a.

Verify azimuthal distribution of ice at a 95 percent confidence level by subdividing weights, as determined by SR 3.6.11.2.a, into the following groups:

a. Group 1-bays 1 through 8; 3.6.11.3 b. Group 2-bays 9 through 16; and 10/31/17

c. Group 3-bays 17 through 24.

The average ice weight of the sample baskets in each group from radial rows 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, and 9 shall be greater than or equal to 1415 lb.

Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.0-6 Amendment No. 3

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 3 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-96 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATIS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-391

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated September 30, 2016 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML16277A477), Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 2.

The proposed changes would revise Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.2 by adding Table SR 3.0.2-1 to extend, on a one-time basis, the surveillance intervals for SRs 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3. SRs 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3 are normally performed on an 18-month frequency in conjunction with a refueling outage, with an allowable increase per SR 3.0.2 of 25 percent. The proposed change would extend the due date for SRs 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3 from February 1, 2017 (i.e., 18 months from the last surveillance plus the allowable 25 percent extension in SR 3.0.2) to October 31, 2017, and allows these SRs to be performed during the first refueling outage for WBN Unit 2.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The WBN Unit 2 utilizes an ice condenser-type containment as its primary containment.

Containment operability is verified, in part, by the satisfactory performance of the SRs associated with TS 3.6.11, "Ice Bed." As it relates to the requested change, SRs 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3 verify containment operability by verifying the total weight of stored ice is greater than or equal to 2,750,700 pounds (lb) and verifying the azimuthal distribution of ice at a 95-percent confidence level, respectively.

The regulatory requirements upon which the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff based its review of the effects on containment analyses due to the proposed change, are based on the following regulations and applicable General Design Criteria (GDC) contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants":

Enclosure 2

Regulations The regulations at 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical specifications," require, in part, that the TS contain SRs. The regulations at 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3), "Surveillance requirements," state that SRs to be included in the TS are those requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met.

General Design Criteria

• GDC-16, "Containment design," as it relates to the containment and associated systems establishing a leak-tight barrier against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment and assuring that the containment design conditions important to safety are not exceeded for as long as the postulated accident requires.

• GDC-38, "Containment heat removal," as it relates to the containment heat removal system safety function which shall reduce rapidly, consistent with the functioning of other associated systems, the containment pressure and temperature following any loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and to maintain them at acceptably low levels.

• GDC-39, "Inspection of containment heat removal system," as it relates to the containment heat removal system that its design shall permit appropriate periodic inspection of important components to assure the integrity and capability of the system.

• GDC-50, "Containment design basis," as it relates to the containment heat removal system, which shall be designed so that the containment structure and its internal compartments can accommodate without exceeding the design leakage rate and with sufficient margin, the calculated pressure and temperature conditions resulting from any LOCA.

The NRC approved similar one-time SR interval extensions for Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 in 2000 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003696357); Cooper Nuclear Station in 2004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML041960078); Kewaunee Power Station in 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML061640302); and Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1 in 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14356A012).

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Description of Containment The primary containment for WBN Unit 2 is an ice condenser type consisting of a vessel, which is a freestanding steel structure made up of a vertical cylindrical wall, a hemispherical dome, and a bottom liner plate encased in concrete. It is divided into three main compartments:

(1) the lower compartment, (2) the upper compartment, and (3) the ice condenser compartment.

The lower compartment encloses the reactor, steam generators, and associated auxiliary systems equipment. The upper compartment contains the refueling cavity, refueling equipment

and polar crane used during refueling and maintenance operations. The ice condenser compartment is an insulated room in which ice is stored.

3.2 Brief Description and Functions of the Ice Condenser The ice condenser is contained in the annulus formed by the containment vessel wall and the crane wall circumferentially over an approximately 300-degree arc. Ice is maintained in an array of vertical cylindrical columns formed by perforated metal baskets with the space between columns forming the flow channels for steam and air. The ice inventory is contained in 1,944 ice baskets in the ice condenser.

The primary function of the ice condenser is to provide a heat sink in the event of release of energy from a postulated design-basis LOCA or main steam line break (MSLB) accident inside the containment. The ice condenser extracts blowdown energy from the break fluid in the early phase of an accident. The ice baskets are arranged to enhance the ice condenser's function of condensing steam released to the containment during the accident. Another function of the ice bed is to become a large source of borated water after it melts and appears in the containment sump, for the long term emergency core cooling system and containment spray system (CSS) heat removal functions during the recirculation phase of a LOCA or an MSLB. The third function of the ice condenser and the melted ice is to remove fission product iodine released during a LOCA. The iodine removal starts during the ice melt phase of the accident and continues as the sump water, obtained from the melted ice, is sprayed into the containment atmosphere by the CSS. After the ice-melt, the containment pressure control is provided by the air return fan system, CSS, and the residual heat removal system spray train. The ice condenser limits the containment pressure below the design pressure of 15 pounds per square inch gauge for all reactor coolant pipe break sizes up to, and including, the largest double-ended guillotine pipe break of the reactor coolant system.

3.3 Proposed Change and TVA's Rationale for the Change The first performance of SRs 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3, conducted prior to WBN Unit 2 power operation, was initiated on March 17, 2015, and satisfactorily completed on May 28, 2015.

According to the TSs, these SRs are required to be performed on an 18-month interval plus an allowable 25-percent extension to the interval specified in TS 3.0.2: WBN Unit 2 is currently in power operation, and these SRs cannot be performed during power operation. The due date for these SRs, considering 18 months plus 25-percent allowed extension starting from May 2015, is approximately in February 2017. To support continuous plant operation until the first refueling outage, TVA has requested modification to TS 3.0.2 that will insert Table SR 3.0.2-1 to allow for a one-time extension of the interval to the first refueling outage planned in October 2017, with a proposed expiration date of October 31, 2017. In its license amendment request, the licensee provided the following rationale for this request:

On October 22, 2015, WBN Unit 2 received the NRC approved Facility OL

[Operating License] NPF-96. After the WBN Unit 2 OL was received, TVA began the process of starting up the unit that included completion of required TS equipment surveillances prior to entry into the Mode of applicability. In addition to completing the SRs required to enter each specific mode, TVA is performing

power accession testing to confirm that the unit operates as designed. Initial plans for WBN Unit 2 were to obtain an OL and declare WBN Unit 2 ready for commercial operation by the end of 2015. With commercial operation originally projected in 2015, TVA planned the first refueling outage to occur in September 2016. Based on the completion of the 18-month SRs that required the unit to be in CSD [Cold Shutdown], the SRs would still be within required periodicity when the September 2016 shutdown was to occur. However, because of delays in the startup of WBN Unit 2, commercial operation was delayed.

Declaration of commercial operation is now estimated for the fall of 2016 with the first refueling outage currently planned to commence on October 14, 2017.

TVA initially planned to perform SRs 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3 during the first refueling outage for WBN Unit 2 that was scheduled to occur in September 2016.

However, because of delays in the startup of WBN Unit 2, commercial operation was delayed. This delay resulted in a change to the date for the first refueling outage for WBN Unit 2. Therefore, TVA re-assessed the SRs that were scheduled to be performed during the rescheduled outage. The complete list of SRs that will need to be extended is currently being compiled. This SR extension request is being submitted separately due to the near term due date of February 1, 2017 for SRs 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3. Additional amendment requests will be submitted to address additional SRs that require an extension.

To support continuous plant operation until the October 2017 refueling outage, a one-time change is requested to extend the surveillance intervals for the SRs 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3. These SRs are due prior to the beginning of the WBN Unit 2 refueling outage and cannot be conducted during power operations.

TVA proposes to amend the TS to allow the subject surveillance tests to be performed during the planned WBN Unit 2 refueling outage (RFO) (i.e., U2R1).

The applicability of the extension is through the dates specified in TS Table SR 3.0.2-1.

The proposed expiration date specified in TS Table SR 3.0.2-1 for SRs 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3 is October 31, 2017. This allows sufficient time to complete the SRs during the first WBN Unit 2 refueling outage that is scheduled to start on October 14, 2017. Requesting an expiration date of October 31, 2017 allows some flexibility in the shutdown schedule.

Approval of the requested surveillance interval extensions will prevent a plant shutdown solely to perform surveillance tests that would otherwise exceed the surveillance interval of 18 months plus the allowable 25-percent extension to the interval specified in TS SR 3.0.2. In addition, these surveillances would need to be repeated during the next refueling outage to synchronize their performance with the refueling outage schedule. Furthermore, a cold shutdown (i.e., Mode 5) surveillance outage would cause an unnecessary transient on the plant.

TVA will, as applicable, perform SRs 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3 prior to their extended due date, if WBN Unit 2 enters Mode 5 of sufficient duration such that the SRs can be performed.

TS 3.6.11 requires that the ice condenser be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. SRs 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3 require weighing of the ice baskets for which access to the lower containment inside the crane wall is needed. This area of containment is restricted for personnel access during these modes because of radiation level. Therefore, the licensee has submitted a one-time request for extension of the interval for these SRs from 18 months to 32 months, in order that they may be performed during the next refueling outage.

3.4 Staff Evaluation The ice condenser is considered inoperable while the SRs 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3 are being performed. The NRC staff agrees that these SRs can only be performed with WBN Unit 2 in Modes 5, 6, or in the defueled condition. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that TVA's request to extend the performance of SRs 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3, until the refueling outage of October 2017 is justified. The following paragraphs provide the NRC staff's evaluation of: (a) potential degradation of the ice bed due to melting or sublimation during the extension period, and (b) obstruction of flow passages through the ice bed due to deposition of ice or buildup of frost.

Melting or Sublimation of Ice during the Proposed Extension Period The total ice mass in the ice condenser is maintained through two elements: (1) the TS SR to specify the as-found total ice mass after an operating cycle, and (2) the plant-specific ice maintenance procedures to manage the variation in sublimation and weight measuring uncertainty. The combination of these two elements ensures that a sufficient total amount of ice is being provided in the ice condenser for removing heat during a design-basis LOCA, and for meeting the sublimation requirements during an operating cycle. The as-found ice mass at the end of an operating cycle surveillance inspection must be greater than the analytical limit determined by the most limiting analysis for the design-basis LOCA containment peak pressure, which should be bounded by the containment design pressure.

As stated in the WBN Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.2.1.3.3, "Long-Term Containment Pressure Analysis," the design-basis LOCA containment pressure response analysis determined an analytical limit of ice mass of 2,585,000 lb in the ice condenser to limit the maximum containment peak pressure below the containment design pressure. Therefore, the TS limit (as-left ice mass) in the ice condenser must be greater than the sum of as-found ice mass (analytical limit), ice mass lost due to sublimation during the operating cycle, and a conservative allowance for the systematic error in the ice weighing instruments. The licensee stated that historical data for WBN Unit 1 and Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 have shown that for an 18-month cycle, sublimation is approximately 3 percent. Based on a 3-percent sublimation and a 1-percent allowance for instrument uncertainty, the as-left ice weight before an 18-month cycle should be equal to or greater than 2,688,400 lb.

(1.04 x 2,585,000). The licensee has requested an extension to a 32-month cycle (i.e., an increase of 14 months) for the next surveillance for the as-found inspection. As stated, in part, in a letter by Duke Power, "Revision 3 to Ice Condenser Utility Group Topical Report

No. ICUG-001: Application of the Active Ice Mass Management Concept to the Ice Condenser Ice Mass Technical Specification," dated October 23, 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML033110091), the ice mass depletion rates tend to be linear and consistent with sufficient historical data; therefore, the initial mass of ice in the as-left condition for extension to 32 months can be predicted. For a 32-month interval, the depletion would increase from 3 percent to 5.34 percent (3x32/18) and would further increase to 6.34 percent after adding the 1-percent allowance for instrument uncertainty. Therefore, the required initial mass would be 2,748,889 lb or greater, which is bounded by the TS minimum ice mass of 2,750,700 lb. The licensee stated that, for conservatism, the initial WBN Unit 2 ice bed was loaded to a higher mass of 2,961,620 lb instead of the required TS 3.6.11 minimum mass of 2,750,700 lb.

Therefore, a margin of 212,731 lb (2,961,620 minus 2,748,889) of ice would exist with the extension of 14 months (i.e., a total interval of 32 months), from the previous (first) WBN Unit 2 inspection of ice mass. Therefore the NRC staff finds the licensee's request to modify TS 3.0.2, to insert Table SR 3.0.2-1, to allow for a one-time extension of the interval for SRs 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3 from 18 months to 32 months acceptable.

Obstruction of Flow Passages through the Ice Bed due to Deposition of Ice or Buildup of Frost The licensee identified the SRs included in the TS that address obstruction of flow passages and critical surfaces of the ice condenser due to excessive deposition of sublimated ice.

Performance of these SRs according to their required intervals would address the concern.

SR 3.6.11.4 verifies by visual inspection that accumulation of ice on structural members comprising flow channels through the ice bed is less than or equal to 15-percent blockage of the total flow area. Performance of SR 3.6.11.4 verifies that the air/steam flow channels through the ice bed have not accumulated ice blockage that exceeds 15 percent of the total flow area through the ice bed region. This SR is to be performed on an 18-month interval and was last performed satisfactorily on September 12, 2016. Its next performance is scheduled for the first refueling outage in October 2017.

The following SRs are required to be performed with a 3-month interval during the first year following receipt of the license (October 22, 2015), during their Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, and every 18-month interval thereafter:

• SR 3.6.12.3 - Verify, by visual inspection, each inlet door is not impaired by ice, frost, or debris.

• SR 3.6.12.4 - Verify torque required to cause each inlet door to begin to open is s [less than or equal to] 675 in-lb.

• SR 3.6.12.5 - Perform a torque test on a sampling of~ [greater than or equal to] 50% of the inlet doors.

• SR 3.6.12.6 - Verify for each intermediate deck door:

a. No visual evidence of structural deterioration;

b. Free movement of the vent assemblies; and

c. Free movement of the door

The licensee satisfactorily performed SRs 3.6.12.3, 3.6.12.4, and 3.6.12.5 on August 6, 2016, and SR 3.6.12.6 on March 3, 2016. The next performance of these SRs is scheduled for the refueling outage in October 2017.

Based on its review of the above information, the NRC staff finds that all of the SRs that verify the level of obstruction of flow passages through the ice bed due to deposition of sublimated ice or buildup of frost on critical surfaces were performed satisfactorily at their normal TS schedules. Satisfactory performance of these SRs provides the NRC staff reasonable assurance that the ice condenser flow paths remain free from obstruction. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the proposed modification of TS 3.0.2 that will insert Table SR 3.0.2-1 to allow for a one-time extension of the interval of SRs 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3 is acceptable and will not adversely affect the flow of melted ice from the ice condenser to the sump during a design-basis LOCA or an MSLB accident.

3.5 Technical Conclusion Based on its review of the licensee's submission, the NRC staff finds that there will be sufficient ice mass available at the end of the requested extension of the SRs. Further, satisfactory completion of the SRs that verify the level of obstruction of flow passages through the ice bed due to deposition of sublimated ice or buildup of frost on critical surfaces provide reasonable assurance that the ice condenser flow paths remain free from obstruction. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the licensee's request to modify TS 3.0.2 to insert Table SR 3.0.2-1 to allow for a one-time extension of SRs 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3 intervals, from 18 months to 32 months, to be acceptable. The following are the NRC staff conclusions related to compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements:

• 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) requirements are met because the evaluation demonstrated that the SRs will continue to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met during the extended interval.

• GDC-16 requirements are met because the evaluation demonstrated that the performance of the containment in serving as a barrier to fission product release following an accident is not compromised with the extended interval.

• GDC-38 requirements are met because the Ice Condenser System will continue to perform its design function of containment heat removal in response to accident conditions during the extended interval.

• GDC-39 requirements are met because the proposed change will not impact the ability to inspect the containment heat removal system. These inspections will continue to be performed as required by TS in accordance with plant procedures.

• GDC-50 requirements are met because the Ice Condenser System will perform it design functions so that the containment structure and its internal compartments can accommodate without exceeding the design leakage rate and with sufficient margin, the calculated pressure and temperature conditions resulting from any accident.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding published in the Federal Register on October 25, 2016 (81 FR 73442). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b}, no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Ahsan Sallman Date: January 5, 2017

January 5, 2017 Mr. Joseph W. Shea Vice President, Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street, LP 3R-C Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT REGARDING ONE-TIME EXTENSION OF INTERVALS FOR SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.6.11.2 AND 3.6.11.3 (CAC NO. MF8441)

Dear Mr. Shea:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 3 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2. This amendment consists of changes to the license in response to your application dated September 30, 2016.

The amendment revises the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.0.2 to allow a one-time extension of the intervals for Surveillance Requirements 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact me at (301) 415-6020 or Robert. Schaaf@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert G. Schaaf, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-391

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 3 to NPF-96

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/enclosures: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:

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• NRR/DSS/STSB/BC **

NAME MWentzel BClayton EOesterle AKlein DATE 01/04/17 01/03/17 11/03/16 12/09/16 OFFICE OGG "NLO" NRR/DORL/LPL2-2/BC(A) NRR/DORL/LPL2-2/PM NAME BMizuno JJohnston RSchaaf DATE 12/20/16 01/04/17 01/05/17 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY