ML14294A571

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Memo - Transmittal of the Final Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Accident Sequence Analysis
ML14294A571
Person / Time
Site: Pilgrim
Issue date: 11/04/2014
From: Correia R
NRC/RES/DRA
To: Marilyn Evans
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Chris Hunter
Shared Package
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Download: ML14294A571 (3)


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November 4, 2014 MEMORADUM TO: Michele G. Evans, Director Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Richard P. Correia, Director /RA/

Division of Risk Analysis Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

SUBJECT:

TRANSMITTAL OF FINAL PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION ACCIDENT SEQUENCE PRECURSOR ANALYSIS This memorandum transmits the final results of an accident sequence precursor (ASP) analysis of an operational event that occurred at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station on October 14, 2013.

The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) did not request a formal analysis review from the licensee in accordance with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-24, Revised Review and Transmittal Process for Accident Sequence Precursor Analyses, because the analysis had a preliminary conditional core damage probability (CCDP) of less than 1x10-4. The final results determined that the operational event had a best estimate CCDP of 3x10-5; and therefore, is not considered a significant precursor. A copy of the preliminary analysis was provided to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I staff as a courtesy; no feedback was provided.

The ASP Program continues to systematically review licensee event reports (LERs) and all other event reporting information [e.g., inspection reports (IRs)] for potential precursors, and to analyze those events which have the potential to be precursors. The complete summary of all FY 2014 precursors will be provided in the annual Commission paper on the status of the ASP Program and Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) Models due to be issued in October 2015.

Transmittal to Licensee Requested. We are requesting NRR to send the enclosed final ASP analysis to the licensee for their information. The ASP analysis will be made publically available after the analysis has been transmitted to the licensee. Please inform us when the ASP analysis has been sent to the licensee.

CONTACT: Christopher Hunter, RES/DRA/PRB 301-251-7575

M. Evans Final ASP Analysis Summary. A brief summary of the final ASP analysis, including the results, is provided below.

Loss of Offsite Power during Line Maintenance (October 2013) at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. This event is documented in LER 293/13-009 and in IR 05000293/2013005.

Executive Summary. On October 14, 2013 at 2121 hours0.0245 days <br />0.589 hours <br />0.00351 weeks <br />8.070405e-4 months <br />, with the reactor critical at 100%

power and offsite power 345kV line 342 out of service for a scheduled upgrade, a loss of offsite power (LOOP) occurred due to the loss of the second 345kV line 355. This resulted in a generator full load reject and a reactor scram. The cause of line 355 loss was due to a failure of an offsite substation tower support. All control rods fully inserted, main steam isolation valves closed on the loss of power to the reactor protection system, and the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) automatically started supplying power to both 4160V safety buses.

A plant cool down commenced with reactor water level being maintained by the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems. The offsite tower was repaired and line 355 was energized at 2023 hours0.0234 days <br />0.562 hours <br />0.00334 weeks <br />7.697515e-4 months <br /> on October 15th, approximately 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> after the LOOP initiated.

According to the risk analysis modeling assumptions used in this ASP analysis, the most likely core damage sequence is a non-recoverable loss of offsite power and subsequent station blackout (SBO) due to postulated failures of all EDGs (including the SBO diesel generator) and the failure to restore power to a safety bus prior to battery depletion. This accident sequence accounts for approximately 44% of the CCDP for the event. In general, these results are consistent with at-power LOOP events previously analyzed by the ASP Program at other BWRs.

Summary of Analysis Results. This operational event resulted in a best estimate CCDP of 3x10-5. The detailed ASP analysis can be found in the enclosure.

Sensitive Information. The detailed ASP analysis has been reviewed in accordance with current guidance for sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information, and it has been determined that it may be released to the public.

Enclosure:

As stated

ML14294A557 OFFICE RES/DRA/PRB RES/DRA/PRB RES/DRA/PRB RES/DRA NAME C. Hunter J. Nakoski SUNSI R. Correia DATE 10/22/14 10/24/14 10/22/14 11/04/14