ML14237A172

2014-07 Final Written Exam

ML14237A172
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	07/31/2014
From:	Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV
To:
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Download: ML14237A172 (169)

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Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2073 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/3/2014 QID #: 1 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 000007A201 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 1 System

Title:

Reactor Trip - Stabilization System Number 007 K/A EA2.01 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.1 SRO Imp: 4.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ESPTA OBJ 12

Description:

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to a reactor trip: - Decreasing power level, from available indications Question:

During the performance of OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions (SPTAs), Reactor power is verified lowering by monitoring _________________ .

A. startup rate on 2C03 B. CPC Delta - T power on 2C03 C. boron dilution monitors on 2C09 D. COLSS instantaneous power on 2C100 Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: Checking for a negative startup rate with all CEAs inserted is used to verify lowering Reactor power level per OP-2202.001 (SPTA Tech Guide)

B. Incorrect: CPC Delta - T power on 2C03 indicates approximately 2% power post trip due to decay heat C. Incorrect: Boron Dilution monitors on 2C09 have a range low in the source range less than 1E4 cps which equates to less than 1E-5 % power and would not be available during the course of SPTAs.

Plausible because these indicators are directly in front of the ATC and are used during other operations for reactor power monitoring. Their purpose is to verify power is not rising (during shutdown operations or refueling) vs verifying power is going down.

D. Incorrect: COLSS does not perform power calculations when Reactor power is less than 20%

References:

OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev 014, step 3 page 3 of 19 EOP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions Tech Guide, Rev 014, step 3 pages 8 and 9 of 42 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ESPTA, objective 12: Describe the parameters used to assess the status of the safety functions listed in the SPTA.

Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-NI, slide with picture of indicator on 2C09 STM 2-67-1, Excore Nuclear Instrumentation, section 2.3.5 Historical Comments:

Rev 1 Incorporated NRC examiner comments. Editorial changes to question and improve justification for plausibility of boron dilution monitor distracter. CMS 7-3-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 1

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2074 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/3/2014 QID #: 2 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000008K304 10CFR55: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45 Safety Function 3 System

Title:

Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief System Number 008 K/A AK3.04 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.2 SRO Imp: 4.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ELOCA OBJ 12

Description:

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: -

RCP tripping requirements Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 has tripped

• A Pressurizer Code Safety valve has stuck open

• RCS pressure is 1350 psia and lowering

• RCS temperature 556°F and slowly rising

• CRS directs securing all 4 RCPs per OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP What is the reason for securing RCPs?

A. prevent re-pressurization when pressurizer is solid B. margin to saturation (MTS) concerns C. prevent reactor head voiding D. reactor core lift concerns Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: MTS is Less than 30°F (1350 psia saturation temperature = 582.32°F. Given RCS temperature

= 554°F. 582.32 - 556.00 = 26.32°F) which requires all 4 RCPs to be secured per LOCA entry section step 9 contingency column 9.B.1)

A. Incorrect: Solid plant control is directed from the Isolated LOCA section to initiate depressurization via cooldown or placing letdown in service and does not direct any actions for RCPs. Due to the failed relief valve, this event would be mitigated by the Un-Isolated LOCA section of the EOP. RCP criteria through out the EOP is based on MTS or RCP operating limits.

C. Incorrect: Head voiding will likely occur in this event. Securing RCPs will not prevent voids and could cause earlier formation. Plausible as this is a concern during rapid cooldown (depressurization) when all 4 RCPs are secured.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because securing at least 1 RCP when RCS temperature is less than 510°F is directed to prevent possible core lift during plant cooldowns. Incorrect because of the current RCS temperature and priorities of the event.

References:

OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP, Rev 14, section 1, Step 9 page 4 of 74 EOP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident Tech Guide, Rev 14, section 1, Step 9 page 19 of 140 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ELOCA, objective 12: Discuss the reasons for securing all RCPs during a large break LOCA event.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 2

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Historical Comments:

Rev 1 Incorporated NRC review comments. Changed focus of stem on the 'reason' for actions to eliminate distractor overlap and potential for 2 correct answers. CMS 7-3-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 3

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2075 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/16/2014 QID #: 3 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: Modified NRC Bank Q# 0593 Search 000009K203 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.7 Safety Function 3 System

Title:

Small Break LOCA System Number 009 K/A EK2.03 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.0 SRO Imp: 3.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ELOCA OBJ 4

Description:

Knowledge of the interrelations between the small break LOCA and the following: - S/Gs Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 has been tripped from 100% power due to a 95 gpm LOCA inside containment

• OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident, is being implemented

• Containment pressure is 14.9 psia and rising slowly

• RCS pressure is stable at 1350 psia

• SDBCS is in auto and controlling S/G pressures at 1000 psia During implementation of OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident, increased steaming of both S/Gs using SDBCS in manual should be done to ______________________.

A. minimize RCS break flow B. initiate RCS void elimination C. initiate natural circulation flow D. minimize S/G tubesheet differential pressure Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

The initial conditions indicate that HPSI pumps are maintaining RCS pressure stable due to leak rate within capacity of HPSI and CCPs. The containment pressure trend was added for determination of RCP status. Containment pressure approaching CSAS setpoint could require securing all RCPs due to spray actuation, however, given parameter indicates that is not a current threat. The EOP initiates the cooldown with S/Gs in step 19 and the RCS depresserization in step 21. The MTS band given for the cooldown keeps the balance between minimizing pressure, for break flow, and maintaining enough margin to keep RCPs operating properly and single phase coupling between the Rx and SG.

A. Correct: RCS pressure is reduced to minimize break flow which challenges RCS Inventory. RCS cooldown is initiated to maintain MTS during the depressurization which will minimize break flow.

B. Incorrect: Plausible in that a large break LOCA can cause voids in the S/G tubes and/or in the vessel head due to a rapid depressurization. In this event, the indicated pressure would exclude that option for the informed. The action to steam is also plausible because that is what would aid in removal of a void in the S/G tubes.

C. Incorrect: The given condition implies that RCP forced circ cooldown will be performed but plausible because it is common to do natural circ cooldowns for large break LOCAs.

D. Incorrect: S/G tubesheet differential pressure is a concern but primarily during an ESD event due to the effected S/G depressurizing while blowing dry. Since this is a small break LOCA, the differential between SG/RCS is minimal and not a challenge during this event. Steaming to lower SG pressure will actually increase the D/P until RCS depressurization occurs.

References:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 4

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 OP-2202.003 Section 2 Isolated LOCA, step 23 EOP-2203.003, LOCA Section 1 Tech Guide AOP-2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage Tech Guide, step 21 explains the reason for the MTS values.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1 modified NRC BANK QID #0593 for better tie to the EOP part of the K/A. Original question was NRC BANK QID

1. 0593 used on 2006 NRC Exam and was tied to a small RCS leak vs a Small Break LOCA. Cms 7-16-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 5

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2076 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/3/2014 QID #: 4 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000011A106 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6 Safety Function 3 System

Title:

Large Break LOCA System Number 011 K/A EA1.06 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.2 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EDG OBJ 11

Description:

Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: - D/Gs Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• #2 EDG is tied to the grid for its monthly surveillance run Now the following occurs:

• A Large Break LOCA inside Containment After the reactor trip and automatic actuation of SIAS, #1 EDG would be running at __________

and #2 EDG would be running at ___________ .

A. no load; no load B. design ESF load; no load C. no load: design ESF load D. design ESF load; design ESF load Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: a large break LOCA inside Containment will cause a Reactor trip and a SIAS actuation. The SIAS will generate an auto start signal for both EDGs. #1 EDG will start, #2 EDG will continue to run.

The SIAS will cause the #2 EDG output breaker to open. Neither EDG will tie to its respective safety bus due to the availability of the offsite source (the trip will cause a fast transfer of offsite power from the Unit Aux transformer to Startup Transformer #3). Therefore, post trip both EDGs will be running, not tied to the grid and at no load.

B. Incorrect: see discussion above C. Incorrect: see discussion above D. Incorrect: see discussion above

References:

STM 2-31, Emergency Diesel Generators, Rev 34, section 1.1 page 1 and section 3.2.1 page 56 STM 2-70, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, Rev 18 section 2.2.1 page 5 and SIAS table pages 64 and 67 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-EDG objective 11: Given a set of plant conditions explain the operation of the Emergency Diesel Generators for the following scenarios.

Paralleling with off-site power.

A Main Turbine trip while running at full load during a surveillance.

A SIAS while running at full load during a surveillance.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 6

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 A loss of off-site power while the EDG is in standby.

Engine running loaded with degraded cooling.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1 incorporated NRC review comments to improve the statement establishing the time frame of the EDG status. CMS 7 14.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 7

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2077 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 5 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000015A208 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

017 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Malfunction System Number 015 K/A AA2.08 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Imp: 3.5 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ARCP OBJ 4

Description:

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions: -

When to secure RCPs on high bearing temperature Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• Annunciator 2K11 B-3 "UPPER THRUST BRG METAL RCP TEMP HI" for "B" RCP comes into alarm

• "B" RCP Upper Thrust bearing metal temperature is reading 230°F and trending up IAW OP-2203.025, RCP Emergencies AOP, what actions are required for this condition?

A. Trip the plant and secure ALL RCPs B. Trip the plant and secure ONLY "B" RCP C. Monitor Thrust bearing temperature and commence a rapid plant shutdown D. Monitor Thrust bearing temperature and commence a normal plant shutdown Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: with thrust bearing temperature >225°F OP-2203.025, RCP Emergencies contingency step 8.B requires the RCP to be secured to prevent possible pump damage due to the high temperature. The plant would be taken off line first then the RCP would be secured then Standard Post Trip Actions EOP (OP-2202.001) would be entered.

C. Incorrect: monitoring of bearing temperatures and consulting with operations management is directed by OP-2203.025 contingency step 8.C when temperatures are between 212°F and 225°F.

Shutdown would be directed based on rate of temperature change.

D. Incorrect: monitoring of bearing temperatures and consulting with Operations management is directed by OP-2203.025 contingency step 8.C when temperatures are between 212°F and 225°F. A plant Shutdown would be directed based on rate of temperature change.

A. Incorrect: OP-2203.025 directs tripping the unit and securing the affected RCP, not all RCPs, prior to entering Standard Post Trip Actions EOP (OP-2202.001) plausable due to action that is taken if there was a common failure with the RCPs (i.e. loss of cooling water)

References:

OP-2203.012K, Annunciator 2K11Corrective Actions, Window B-3, Rev 044, page 25 OP-2203.025, RCP Emergencies, Rev 015, step 8.B contingency column, page 19 of 30 AOP-2203.025, RCP Emergencies Tech Guide, Rev 015, step 8 contingency column, page 12 of 15 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ARCP, objective 4: Evaluate a given set of plant conditions and appropriate reference material and determine what actions should be taken for any RCP emergency.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 8

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Historical Comments:

Rev 1 incorporated NRC comments. Minor wording changes to distracters. CMS 7-3-14 Rev 2: incorporated NRC comments. Added IAW procedure in question. MWF 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 9

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2078 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 6 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0000222445 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45 Safety Function 2 System

Title:

Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup System Number 022 K/A 2.4.45 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.1 SRO Imp: 4.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ACCP OBJ 2

Description:

Emergency Procedures/Plan - Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm.

Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• Annunciator 2K12 D-3 "PUMP A OIL PRESS LO" for "A" CCP comes into alarm

• WCO reports "A" Coolant Charging Pump (CCP) oil pressure is 8 psig

• WCO has retrieved his procedure and is adjusting "A" CCP oil pressure During the adjustment the following alarms are received:

• Annunciator 2K12 B-3 "HEADER FLOW LO"

• Annunciator 2K12 B-2 "HEADER PRESS LO"

• ATC reports "A" CCP Green and Red light indications are off IAW OP-2203.036, Loss of Charging AOP, what action(s) are required?

A. reset and restart "A" CCP B. place "B" CCP handswitch in START C. place ALL CCP handswitches in STOP D. close CCP suction and discharge valves Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: with the annunciator in for low oil pressure on "A" CCP the ACA directs adjusting pressure to clear the alarm or swap CCPs and declare the affected CCP non-functional but with the charging header pressure and flow low annunciators in the ACAs direct entry into the Loss of Charging AOP.

Since the green light (board indication for CCP running status) is not lit, step 2 contingency action will direct starting a backup CCP and securing the affected CCP (as desired)

A. Incorrect: restarting "A" CCP is not directed in either the AOP or ACA C. Incorrect: Securing ALL CCPs and isolating letdown is directed by the AOP if there are indications of CCP gas binding. (step 3 contingency action) the stem does not give indications of gas binding.

D. Incorrect: Low oil pressure ACA does give direction for isolating the CCP due to low oil pressure.

References:

OP-2203.012L, Annunciator 2K12 Corrective Actions, Rev 045, Window B-3 page 18 of 116, Window B-3 page 36 of 116, Window D-3 page 38 of 116 OP-2203.036, Loss of Charging, Rev 011, step 2, contingency column 2.A. and 2.D page 3 of 24 AOP-2203.036, Loss of Charging Tech Guide, Rev 011, step 2 page 6 of 18 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 10

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ACCP objective 2: Describe the mitigation strategy and instructions for actions directed in the Loss of Charging AOP, OP-2203.036 Historical Comments:

Rev 1: changed distracters based on NRC comments re-arranged answers/distracters based on shortest to longest Rev 2: incorporated NRC comments. Added IAW procedure in question. MWF 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 11

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2079 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 7 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0000252120 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) System Number 025 K/A 2.1.20 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.6 SRO Imp: 4.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ASDC OBJ 3&4

Description:

Conduct of Operations - Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is in Mode 5

• RCS pressure is 150 psia

• RCS temperature is 180°F

• "A" SDC train is in service with "A" LPSI Pump through "A" SDC Heat Exchanger

• "B" SDC train is in standby

• "A" SFP cooling pump is in operation

• SFP purification is aligned to the refueling canal

• Annunciator 2K11 C-10 "PROC LIQUID RADIATION HI/LO" comes into alarm

• CBOT reports Radiation Monitor 2RITS-1453, SW From SDC Heat Exchanger 2E-35A, is in HI alarm

• CRS is implementing OP-2203.029, Loss of Shutdown Cooling, AOP IAW OP-2203.029, Loss of Shutdown Cooling, which of the following actions would be required?

A. Secure "A" LPSI pump, close SDC RCS Isolation MOVs, start RCPs for RCS heat removal via Steam Generators B. Align Service Water and RCS to "B" SDC Heat Exchanger, isolate Service Water and RCS to "A" SDC Heat Exchanger C. Start "B" Containment Spray Pump and align "B" SDC Heat Exchanger, secure "A" LPSI pump, isolate Service Water and RCS to "A" SDC Heat Exchanger D. Verify Refuel Canal flooded and connected to the SFP, secure Service Water and RCS to "B" SDC Heat Exchanger, maximize SFP cooling to remove decay heat Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: the initial conditions give indications of an RCS leak into the "A" SDC heat exchanger. The Loss of SDC AOP will direct leaving the "A" SDC pump in operation, placing the "B" SDC heat exchanger on line, then isolating the "A" SDC heat exchanger (step 8 contingency column 8.E)

A. Incorrect: securing the SDC pump and isolating the SDC system from the RCS is directed if there is a level is lowering to prevent pump cavitation and air binding of the SDC system or if RCS pressure is to high to prevent piping damage. Also incorrect based on directions for starting RCPs for RCS heat removal via Steam Generators is not directed from the Loss of SDC AOP, these actions are directed from the Lower Mode Functional EOP C. Incorrect: the stem gives conditions for a leaking SDC heat exchanger. The AOP will give directions for Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 12

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 placing the unaffected SDC heat exchanger in service. Per the AOP technical guide securing the running pump is not desired to prevent complicating the event. Post event the crew could decide to shift SDC pumps but placing a LPSI pump in service is preferred over a Spray pump. SDC system operations limit and precaution would exclude starting a Spray pump as the SDC pump based on RCS pressure. The L&P states when operating Containment Spray pumps on SDC system, maintain SDC suction pressure less than 50 psig to prevent over pressurization of Containment Sump/RWT suction piping D. Incorrect: the AOP does not direct this action. Plausible due to the hydraulic connection between the SFP and the refueling canal when flooded and SFP cooling is still available.

References:

OP-2203.012, Annunciator 2K11 Corrective Actions, Window C-10, Rev 044 pages 107, 108 and 110 of 125 AOP-2203.029, Loss of Shutdown Cooling Tech Guide, Rev 017, step 8 page 10 of 20 aOP-2203.029, Loss of Shutdown Cooling Tech Guide, Rev 018, entry section page 1 of 21, step 8 contingency 8.E.1) thru 7 pages 5 and 6 of 21 lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ASDC:

Objective 3: Describe the mitigation strategy and instructions for actions directed in OP-2203.029, Loss of Shutdown Cooling AOP Objective 4: Discuss the basis /strategy as stated in OP-2203.029, Loss of Shutdown Cooling AOP Technical Guidelines, for actions directed by the AOP.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1: based on NRC comments, replaced distracter, added wording to notes for clarity and rearranged distracters from shortest to longest Rev 2: based on NRC comments, added RCS temperature and pressure to stem and added to note section for distracter "C" to exclude "C" as a possible correct answer. MWF 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 13

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2080 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/3/2014 QID #: 8 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000026A101 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6 Safety Function 8 System

Title:

Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) System Number 026 K/A AA1.01 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.1 SRO Imp: 3.1 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-CCW OBJ 15

Description:

Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: -

CCW temperature indications Question:

Consider the following:

• Annunciators 2K11 A-1/A-3/A-5/A-7 "CCW DISCH FLOW LO" for RCPs comes into alarm

• OP-2203.025, Reactor Coolant Pump Emergencies, has been entered

• ATC reports CCW to RCP Containment isolation valve, 2CV-5236, is closed The Control Room staff should monitor Loop 2 CCW temperature Dixon indicator mounted in panel ______ and should expect Loop 2 CCW temperature to ______ .

A. 2C14; remain the same B. 2C33; remain the same C. 2C14; trend down D. 2C33; trend down Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: loop 2 CCW temperature Dixon indictor is mounted on control panel 2C14 and Loop 2 CCW temperature would be trending down due to the isolation of the RCPs from the system (The RCPs are a major heat load on the system)

A. Incorrect: Loop 2 CCW temperature Dixon indictor is mounted on control panel 2C14 not 2C33.

Plausible due to these control panels are side by side.

B. Incorrect: Loop 2 CCW temperature Dixon indictor is mounted on control panel 2C14 but Loop 2 CCW temperature would be trending down due to the isolation of the RCPs from the system (The RCPs are a major heat load on the system). Plausible due to mind set of operator during a Loss of CCW event. The major concern is re-establishing cooling water to the RCPs due to over heating concerns.

D. Incorrect: Loop 2 CCW temperature Dixon indictor is mounted on control panel 2C14 not 2C33.

Plausible due to these control panels are side by side.

References:

OP-2203.025, RCP Emergencies, Rev 015, step 2 page 3 of 30 AOP-2203.025, RCP Emergencies Tech Guide, Rev 015, step 2 page 6 of 15 STM 2-43, Component Cooling Water, Rev 14, section 2.1 page 2, section 2.7 page 9 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-CCW objective 15: Given a set of plant conditions and appropriate reference material, determine the actions required to be taken for any alarm on the CCW system.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 14

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Historical Comments:

Rev 1 incorporated NRC comments. Improved plausibility of A/B distracters. CMS 7-3-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 15

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2081 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 5/31/2014 QID #: 9 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000027K102 10CFR55: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3 Safety Function 3 System

Title:

Pressurizer Pressure Control (PZR PCS) Malfun System Number 027 K/A AK1.02 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.8 SRO Imp: 3.1 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ALOTL OBJ 3

Description:

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: - Expansion of liquids as temperature increases Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• #2 MTG Control Valve fails closed Concerning the Pressurizer control system, the ATC should expect the Pressurizer spray valves to be ________ and the Pressurizer backup heater breakers to be ____________ .

A. closed; closed B. closed; open C. open; closed D. open; open Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: this event would cause a partial loss of heat sink for the RCS (lower steam demand) which will increase RCS temperature resulting in an insurge into the pressurizer from the expansion of liquid from the heatup. RCS pressure will rise with the insurge (compression of the steam bubble in the pressurizer) causing the spray valves to open to try and maintain RCS pressure in band. As pressurizer level increases from the insurge, the backup heaters will energize (breakers close) due to the system seeing this as a 'cold' water addition. Therefore the ATC should see the spray valves open with all backup heaters on (breakers closed)

A. Incorrect: see above C. Incorrect: see above D. Incorrect: see above

References:

STM 2-03-01, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control, Rev 16, section 2.2.4 page 8, section 2.2.6 pages 11 and 12 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ALOTL objective 3: DESCRIBE the mitigation strategy and instructions for actions directed in OP 2203.024, Loss of Turbine Load Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 16

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2082 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 10 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC BANK QID #1495 Search 000029K206 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.7 Safety Function 1 System

Title:

Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) System Number 029 K/A EK2.06 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.9 SRO Imp: 3.1 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-DSS OBJ 4

Description:

Knowledge of the interrelations between the ATWS and the following: - Breakers, relays, and disconnects Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• Diverse Scram System (DSS) Pressurizer pressure transmitter (2PT-4600-1) fails high

• Diverse Scram System (DSS) Pressurizer pressure transmitter (2PT-4600-3) fails high The DIRECT and IMMEDIATE effect of these conditions should cause ______________________ .

A. two Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers to open AND NO Reactor trip B. four Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers to open AND a Reactor trip C. ONLY the "A" MG Set output contactor to open AND NO Reactor trip D. "A" AND "B" MG Set output contactors to open AND a Reactor Trip Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: with 2 out of 4 pressures indicating high (>2450 psia) a trip signal to BOTH M/G DSS contactors will be sent causing power to be lost to the CEDMs (Reactor Trip)

A. Incorrect: these pressure transmitters are independent of the pressure transmitters that feed RPS and Reactor trip breakers would not open initially but all 8 circuit breakers eventually would trip open due to LPD and DNBR trips B. Incorrect: these pressure transmitters are independent of the pressure transmitters that feed RPS and Reactor trip breakers would not open initially but all 8 circuit breakers eventually would trip open due to LPD and DNBR trips C. Incorrect: pressure transmitter 2PT-4600-1 and 2PT-4600-3 do feed directly into the "A" M/G set DSS contactor but the 2 out of 4 combination of ATWS pressure transmitters failing high will give a full DSS output to open both "A" and "B" MG set DSS contactors causing a Reactor trip

References:

STM 2-63-1, Diverse Scram System, Rev 2, section 2.1 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-DSS, objective 4: Describe the trip path logic used by DSS.

Historical Comments:

NRC QID #1495 used on 2008 NRC Exam.

Rev 1 Incorporated NRC review comments. Minor clarification of stem and distracters. CMS 7-3-14 Rev 2: Based on NRC comments capitalize the word "and" in distracter "D" mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 17

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2083 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/3/2014 QID #: 11 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000038K309 10CFR55: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45 Safety Function 3 System

Title:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) System Number 038 K/A EK3.09 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.1 SRO Imp: 4.5 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ESGTR OBJ 7

Description:

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the SGTR: - Criteria for securing/throttling ECCS Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 has been tripped due to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture in "A" S/G

• "A" S/G has been isolated

• RCS pressure 1650 psia

• "B" hot leg temperature 572°F and trending up

• "B" cold leg temperature 549°F and trending up

• CET average temperature 580°F and trending up

• PZR level 30% and trending up

• RVLMS LVL 02 indicates WET

• "A" S/G level 56% and trending up

• "B" S/G level 21% and trending down Criteria for securing/throttling HPSI flow has NOT been met based on _______________ .

A. Pressurizer level B. Margin To Saturation (MTS)

C. Steam Generator heat removal D. Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS) level Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: RCS heat removal is not being met based on both RCS hot leg and cold leg temperatures are trending up coupled with "B" S/G level trending down ["B" S/G is being steamed but not enough to maintain RCS temperatures, level is going down due to the steaming]. Criteria for securing/throttling HPSI (ECCS) flow is: RCS MTS 30°F or greater (saturation temperature for 1650 psia is 609.05°F, Th =

572°F, therefore MTS=37°F) PZR level greater than 29% and controlled, RVLMS LVL 03 or higher elevation indicates WET, At least ONE intact SG available for Heat Removal by EITHER of the following: (1) Level 10 to 90% with FW available (this is not met. Student should deduct that FW is not available due to level being below EFAS setpoint [22.2%] and level is trending down) or (2) Level being restored with total FW flow of 485 gpm or greater (SG level is trending down)

A. Incorrect: see discussion above B. Incorrect: see discussion above C. Incorrect: see discussion above

References:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 18

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 OP-2202.005, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Rev 014, step 22, page 17 of 49 EOP-2202.005, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Tech Guide, Rev 014, step 22, page 37 of 82 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ESGTR, objective 7: Given a set of plant conditions during a SGTR, determine if High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) termination/throttling criteria exist.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1 incorporated NRC review comments. Added initial condition data for "A" S/G to stem Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 19

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2084 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 12 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 000040K105 10CFR55: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Steam Line Rupture System Number 040 K/A AK1.05 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.1 SRO Imp: 4.4 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-SDMGN OBJ 3&4

Description:

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Line Rupture: -

Reactivity effects of cooldown Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 was tripped due to a steam leak inside containment

• OP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand, is being implemented

• Cooldown has been commenced During the cooldown there should be a reduction in available Shutdown Margin due to the effects on the reactor from A. Xenon (Xe-135)

B. Samarium (Sm-149)

C. Pressure Coefficient of Reactivity D. Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)

Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: Performing a cooldown will lower the available SDM due to the positive reactivity added by the Moderator Temperature coefficient. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> post trip Xenon would be building up in the core adding negative reactivity (for approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />) raising SDM. Samarium will also continue to decay and add negative reactivity to the core (for approximately 12.5 days) raising SDM. The overall available SDM will be lower due to the cooldown.

A. Incorrect: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> post trip Xenon would be building up in the core adding (raising) SDM, not lowering it C. Incorrect: due to lowering pressure adds negitive reactivity. Credible because pressure will be lowered as part of the cooldown.

B. Incorrect: Performing a cooldown will lower SDM (add positive reactivity) due to the Moderator Temperature coefficient but Xenon would be building up in the core adding negative reactivity (for approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />) raising SDM. Samarium will also continue to decay and add negative reactivity to the core (for approximately 12.5 days) raising SDM.

References:

EOP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand Tech Guide, Rev 014, step 47 page 64 of 80 General Physics Corp., PWR Reactor Theory, Chapter 6 and chapter 8 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-SDMGN:

Objective 3: Identify parameters and design conditions which affect SDM.

Objective 4: Describe how changes in parameters and design conditions will affect SDM Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 20

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Historical Comments:

Rev 1: changed distracter "C" based on NRC comments Rev 2: Based on NRC comments changed wording in question from 'would' to 'should' and from 'loss of' to 'reduction in'] mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 21

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2085 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 5/22/2014 QID #: 13 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000054A102 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW) System Number 054 K/A AA1.02 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.4 SRO Imp: 4.4 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ELOSF OBJ 3&4

Description:

Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): - Manual startup of electric and steam-driven AFW pumps Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• "A" EFW pump (2P-7A) is Out Of Service for maintenance

• Loss of Offsite Power occurs

• Annunciator 2K08 B-2 "GENERATOR L.O. RELAY TRIP" comes into alarm when #1 EDG starts

• "A" Steam Generator level is 5% NR and trending down

• "B" Steam Generator level is 8% NR and trending down

• CRS is implementing OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater, EOP IAW OP-2202.006, a manual start of _______ pump is required and feeding "A" and "B" Steam Generators should be accomplished by _________________________.

A. 2P-7B EFW; throttling open EFW injection MOVs to limit EFW flow B. 2P-75 AFW; throttling open EFW injection MOVs to limit EFW flow C. 2P-7B EFW; fully opening EFW injection MOVs to maximize EFW flow D. 2P-75 AFW; fully opening EFW injection MOVs to maximize EFW flow Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: a loss of feedwater event is in progress due to the loss of offsite power causing a loss of vacuum and Main Feed Pumps to trip, "A" EFW OOS and the power supply to "B" EFW pump locking out ("#1 EDG Generator lockout). OP-2202.006 will direct starting the AACDG and aligning it to an available bus (2A3 is preferred based on the hierarchy in the EOP). With S/G levels below the feed ring

(<49%) the supply MOVs (2CV-1025-1 and 2CV-1075-1) will be throttled to <150 gpm to minimize the impact to the S/G feed ring.

B. Incorrect: starting AFW Pump 2P-75 is plausible due to the ability to align the AACDG to 2A1 (non-vital bus) and OP-2202.006 has direction to restore feedwater using 2P-75, but, based on feed restoration hierarchy in the EOP, 2P-7B ("B"EFW pump) is the first pump choice for restoring feedwater.

C. Incorrect: starting 2P-7B ("B" EFW pump) is the correct but with S/G levels below the feed ring (<49%)

the supply MOVs(2CV-1025-1 and 2CV-1075-1) will be throttled to <150 gpm to minimize the impact to the S/G feed ring not fully opened to maximize EFW flow D. Incorrect: starting AFW Pump 2P-75 is plausible due to the ability to align the AACDG to 2A1 (non-vital bus) and OP-2202.006 has direction to restore feedwater using 2P-75, but, based on feed restoration hierarchy in the EOP, 2P-7B ("B"EFW pump) is the first pump choice for restoring feedwater. With Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 22

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 S/G levels below the feed ring (<49%) the supply MOVs(2CV-1025-1 and 2CV-1075-1) will be throttled to

<150 gpm to minimize the impact to the SG feed ring not fully opened to maximize EFW flow

References:

OP-2203.012H, Annunciator 2K08 Corrective action, Window B-2, Rev 037 page 13 of 50 OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater, Rev 011, step 7 page 3 of 27 and step 12 page 5 of 27 OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater Tech Guide, Rev 011, step 7 page 14 of 55 and step 12 page 19 of 55 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev 022, Attachment 11 page 30 of 204 and Attachment 52 pages 159 and 160 of 204 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ELOSF:

Objective 3: Analyze a set of plant conditions, during a loss of feedwater event, and determine the actions necessary to restore feedwater flow to the Steam Generators.

Objective 4: Describe the limits associated with restoring feedwater to the Steam Generators.

Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 23

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2086 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 14 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: New Search 000055K302 10CFR55: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45 Safety Function 6 System

Title:

Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Black System Number 055 K/A EK3.02 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.3 SRO Imp: 4.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ESBO OBJ

Description:

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Station Blackout: - Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite power Question:

Given the following:

• Unit 2 has been in Station Blackout conditions for 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />

• All attempts to restore AC power to the safety buses have failed

• Vital DC batteries are discharging at their rated capacity

• OP-2202.008, Station Blackout EOP, is being implemented At this point in the event, EFW pump 2P-7A should be manually controlled ___________________

so S/G levels can be controlled while ______________________ .

A. locally at the steam admission valve 2CV-0340-2; maintaining stable conditions until AC can be restored B. locally at the pump using the trip throttle valve; maintaining stable conditions until AC can be restored C. locally at the steam admission valve 2CV-0340-2; cooling to cold shutdown when the vital battery is exhausted D. locally at the pump using the trip throttle valve; cooling to cold shutdown when the vital battery is exhausted Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

If the blackout is expected to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> then battery load reduction actions are implemented. Speed control of 2P-7A from the control room is established for maintaining SG levels. If the blackout is extended and expected to last more than 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, further significant DC load reductions are taken so that battery life can be extended for monitoring plant conditions as long as possible. Shifting control of 2P-7A to local at the pump using the trip throttle valve (TTV) is part of the EFW system actions. At 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> as given, the applicant should know that the long term battery load reduction actions are in effect and that it is beyond the time frame for maintaining steady state conditions.

A. and B. plausible if the focus of the EOP is only to recover AC power. Incorrect because cooldown to cold shutdown is required. Total condensate inventory available would limit maintaining stable plant conditions.

C. Incorrect: the EOP does not direct local operation of 2CV-0340-2 , plausible due to being the steam admission valve to "A" EFW pump

References:

2202.008 Station Blackout Tech Guide for step 17 2202.008 Station Blackout EOP step 17 2202.010 Standard Attachment 25 Load Shedding of Battery Loads Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 24

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 2106.006 Exhibit 3 Local operation of 2P-7A Historical Comments:

Rev 0: Rearranged and truncated distracters from original NRC Bank QID #1501. Cms 6-17-14 Rev 1: Rejected original K/A. Replaced with new question. Cms 7-17-14 Rev 2: Based on NRC comments changed wording in distracters "A", "B", "C" for better alignment/plausibility added to notes for changes to distracters. mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 25

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2087 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 6/2/2014 QID #: 15 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000056A275 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 6 System

Title:

Loss of Offsite Power System Number 056 K/A AA2.75 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.0 SRO Imp: 3.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ELOCA OBJ 6&7

Description:

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: - CVCS makeup Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is performing a downpower due to a 20 gpm RCS leak

• Unit 2 now trips due to a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)

• #1 EDG was secured during SPTAs due to a rupture in its Service Water supply The MAXIMUM net makeup rate available to the RCS is _______ .

A. 20 gpm B. 24 gpm C. 64 gpm D. 68 gpm Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: with a 20 gpm RCS the operators will be able to maintain post trip RCS pressure and temperature using Pzr proportional heaters and auxiliary spray. The LOCA EOP will be entered from exhibit 8 due to an RCS leak in progress and a LOOP. LOCA will direct actuating SIAS and CCAS but the HPSI pumps will not inject into the RCS due to RCS >HPSI shutoff head. Therefore RCS makeup will be accomplished by CVCS (Coolant Charging Pumps) there will be only 2 CCPs available for makeup to the RCS due to the #1 EDG being secured. With the actuation of SIAS, RCP controlled Bleedoff (CBO) will be directed from the VCT to the RDT and CCP suction will be aligned to the BAMTs. RCS leakage will equal the 20 gpm leak plus an extra 4 gpm loss from CBO. 2 CCPs will be available with a capacity of 44 gpm each. 88 gpm - 24 gpm = 64 gpm maximum makeup rate for the given condition.

A. Incorrect: based on using only 1 CCP and subtracting CBO flow (44 - 24 = 20 gpm)

B. Incorrect: based on using only 1 CCP but not subtracting CBO flow (44 - 20 = 24 gpm)

D. Incorrect: based on using 2 CCPs but not subtracting CBO flow (88 - 20 = 68 gpm)

References:

OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev , exhibit 8 page 193 of 204 OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident, Rev 014, step 5 page 3 of 74, step 6 page 3 of 74, step 15 page 8 of 74, step 21 page 11 of 74, step 23 page 13 of 74, and step 24 page 13 of 74 EOP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident Tech Guide, Rev 014, step 23 page 39 of 140 STM 2-70, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, Rev 18 section 2.2.1 page 5 and SIAS table pages 62 and 63 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ELOCA:

Objective 6: Given a set of plant conditions during a LOCA, demonstrate understanding of the LOCA EOP and ability to use the LOCA EOP to control the plant Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 26

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Objective 7: Given a LOCA event and a set of plant conditions, determine if the LOCA has been isolated and if it has occurred inside or outside of the containment.

Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-CVCS objective 4: Describe the following components of the CVCS. Include component functions, normal operations, interlocks, power supplies, locations and flow paths as applicable: Reactor Coolant pump Control Bleed-off Isolation Valves (2CV-4847-2 and 2CV-4846-1),

Charging Pumps (2P-36A, 2P-36B and 2P36-C), Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Valve (2CV-4824-2)

Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 27

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2088 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 16 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000057A101 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6 Safety Function 6 System

Title:

Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus System Number 057 K/A AA1.01 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.7 SRO Imp: 3.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-A480V OBJ 2

Description:

Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: -

Manual inverter swapping Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is at 100% power

• Inverter 2Y-13 is aligned to 120 V Vital bus 2RS-3

• Swing Inverter 2Y-1113 is shut down

• 120 V Vital bus 2RS-1 has been re-energized following emergency maintenance

• Startup of Vital Inverter 2Y-11 is in progress with the following indications:

- Output voltage 129 V

- Output frequency 61 hz

- Alternate Source Supplying Load light is ON

- Inverter Output breaker is CLOSED

- INSYNC light is ON IAW OP-2107.003, Att F, what action is required to restore 2RS-1 with an Operable Inverter?

A. lower 2Y11 Alternate AC 480V supply voltage B. lower 2Y11 inverter output frequency C. depress 2Y11 Inverter to Load pushbutton D. secure 2Y11 and use 2Y1113 to supply 2RS-1 Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

These indications are typical for the point in the startup procedure (2107.003 Att F) just before transferring the load (2RS-1) to the inverter. Voltage is high in band as typical for an unloaded inverter. The INSYNC light ON indicates that the inverter is in sync with the Alternate source voltage and frequency so the inverter should pick up load normally. A licensed operator should also know that 2RS-1 bus operability is based on voltage specs (between 117 and 130 VAC) and Inverter operability is based on being on the Normal (DC uniteruptable) source. The discriminatory value is in selecting between high voltage/freq and recognizing from indications the source status.

C. Correct because the inverter is still on Alt Source. Plausible as incorrect because operability of the RS bus is challenged with the high volts.

A. Plausible because this is an action given in the startup procedure if your Alt AC voltage is high, however, this is not part of the operability spec for the Inverter as long as it will sync with the Alt AC source.

B. Plausible because the frequency is on the high limit and free running frequency can be adjusted for an inverter, but not by Operations.

D. This is a plausible action for an abnormal running inverter. 2Y1113 is available and is a swing inverter that can be aligned to either 2RS-1 or 2RS-3. Indications given are high but still in band.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 28

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14

References:

2107.003 Att F section 7.0 Historical Comments:

Rev 1: replaced K/A and Question Rev 2: Based on NRC comments added IAW to question and added 2Y11 to distracter "A". mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 29

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2089 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 6/4/2014 QID #: 17 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0000582123 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45 Safety Function 6 System

Title:

Loss of DC Power System Number 058 K/A 2.1.23 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.3 SRO Imp: 4.4 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-A125 OBJ 3

Description:

Conduct of Operations - Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is at 100% power

• 'A' Main Chiller is in service

• Annunciator 2K01 A-10 "CONT CENTER 2D01 UNDERVOLT" comes into alarm

• OP-2203.037, Loss of 125V DC, AOP is being implemented

• Reactor does NOT trip

• CBOT reports that containment temperature and pressure are slowly rising Which of the following actions would be directed from the AOP to mitigate these conditions?

A. Start 'B' Main Chiller B. Restart tripped containment cooling fans C. Align SW to the running containment cooling fans D. Locally open chill water to containment isolation valves Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: The cause for the rising containment parameters is due to the air solenoids on the chill water to containment isolation valves deenergize on loss of Red DC allowing the valves to fail closed.

A. Incorrect: 'A' main chiller would still be running. There is no need to start 'B'.

B. Incorrect: none of the containment fans would 'trip' for this condition.

D. Incorrect: these valves fail closed, the AOP does not direct local manual operation.

References:

OP-2203.037, Loss of 125V DC, Rev 009, section 2 (Red Train) step 9.0 AOP-2203.037, Loss of 125V DC Tech Guide, Rev 009, section 2 (Red Train) step 9.0 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-A125 objective 3: Describe the mitigation strategy and instructions for actions directed in OP 2203.037, Loss Of 125V DC AOP Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 30

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2090 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/17/2014 QID #: 18 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000077K207 10CFR55: 41.4 / 41.5 / 41.7 / 41. Safety Function 6 System

Title:

Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbanc System Number 077 K/A AK2.07 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.6 SRO Imp: 3.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-MGEN OBJ 2

Description:

Knowledge of the interrelations between Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances and the following: - Turbine / Generator control Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• Grid voltage steps up from 520 KV to 525 KV

• Annunciator 2K02 C-3 "NEGATIVE SEQUENCE HI" has come into alarm and cleared

• Annunciator 2K02 D-3 "EXCITER FIELD OVERCURRENT" has come into alarm and cleared

• Annunciator 2K02 B-2 "VOLTAGE REGULATOR TRIP" comes into alarm

• CBOT reports Main Generator voltage regulator is in MANUAL and MTG MVARs has risen from 100 MVARs OUT to 300 MVARs OUT In this condition, Main Generator _______________ voltage is used to regulate the Main Generator output and the change in Main Generator MVARs was due to ___________________ .

A. field; change in Grid voltage B. terminal; change in Grid voltage C. field; imbalance between the manual and automatic voltage regulators D. terminal; imbalance between the manual and automatic voltage regulators Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: MTG output is normally controlled by terminal voltage to allow automatic compensation for changes in Grid voltage (VARs). Due to the alarms the operator should know there is a difference between the outputs of the auto and manual voltage regulators because they do not auto track.

Therefore when the voltage regulator shifts to manual the operator should expect a change in MVARS A. Incorrect: with the voltage regulator in manual generator field voltage will be in control of generator output but the change in Grid voltage would cause MVARs to lower not raise B. Incorrect: with the voltage regulator in manual generator field voltage not terminal voltage will be in control of generator output and the change in Grid voltage would cause MVARs to lower not raise D. Incorrect: with the voltage regulator in manual generator field voltage not terminal voltage will be in control of generator output

References:

OP-2203.012B, Annunciator 2K02 Corrective Action, Rev 039, Window B-2 page 12 of 100, Window C-3 page 25 of 100, Window D-3 page 26 of 100 STM 2-30, Main Genrator Construction and Control, Rev 9, section 2.7 page 28 and section 4.2.2 page 36 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 31

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-MGEN objective 2: Describe the Main Generator interlocks and controls.

Exciter Field Breaker, Voltage Regulator Auto/Manual Select, Generator Terminal Voltage Adjust, Generator Field Voltage Adjust, Voltage Regulator automatic throw over, De-excitation System Historical Comments:

Rev 1 - moved the grid voltage initial data to before alarms based on Ops validation comments. Cms 7-17-14.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 32

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2091 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 19 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000001A203 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 1 System

Title:

Continuous Rod Withdrawal System Number 001 K/A AA2.03 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 4.5 SRO Imp: 4.8 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ACEA OBJ 2

Description:

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal: - Proper actions to be taken if automatic safety functions have not taken place Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is raising reactor power

• Current reactor power is 82%

• Group 6 is being withdrawn from 120 inches

• Outward motion on CEA #49 continues when the Shim switch is released

• CEA #49 withdrawal does not stop when Mode Select Switch is taken to OFF

• Annunciator 2K04 J-5 "CEAC #1 CEA DEVIATION" comes into alarm

• Annunciator 2K04 J-6 "CEAC #2 CEA DEVIATION" comes into alarm

• OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunctions, is being implemented IAW OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunction AOP, what action should be taken?

A. Trip the reactor, enter SPTAs B. Place Group 6 on the HOLD bus and verify CEA motion stops C. Commence a rapid power reduction to less than 60% reactor power D. Select Manual Individual for CEA #49 with shim switch to INSERT and verify CEA motion stops Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: OP-2203.003 step 2 contingency column directs tripping the reactor if unable to stop CEA motion. This is the first action in the AOP. With CEAs below 140 inches, both CEAC deviation alarms

(>5 inches) would also indicate that penalty factors for outward deviation (>9.7 inches) to CPCs are imminent.

B. Incorrect: Plausible troubleshooting action in the AOP for other conditions, but would take too long to wait on I&C support.

C. Incorrect: condition in stem requires a reactor trip per the AOP but plausible due to a power reduction is required for other CEA malfunctions [dropped rod]

D. Incorrect: AOP does not direct this action to stop CEA motion. Plausible as it may be a reactionary thought.

References:

OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunction, Rev 021, step 2 contingency 2.A.and B. page 2 of 29 AOP-2203.003, CEA Malfunction Tech Guide, Rev 021, step 2 page 7 of 35 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 33

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ACEA objective 2: Describe the mitigation strategy and instructions for actions directed in OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunctions AOP Historical Comments:

Rev 1 incorporates NRC review comments. Eliminated redundant items in initial conditions. Clarified a single CEA #49 is withdrawing for stronger tie to K/A. Added CEAC #2 alarm to validate condition requiring action. Modified distracter A based on NRC comment as a possible correct action. Add more to Notes to describe plausible/incorrect distracters. Cms 7 14.

Rev 2: Based on NRC comments changed distracters "B" and "C" added to notes and rearranged distracters from shortest to longest. mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 34

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2092 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/17/2014 QID #: 20 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000005K103 10CFR55: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3 Safety Function 1 System

Title:

Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod System Number 005 K/A AK1.03 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Imp: 3.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ACEA OBJ

Description:

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod: - Xenon transient Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 was performing a CEA exercise when CEA #51 in shutdown bank "A" slipped into the core to 10" withdrawn

• OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunctions AOP, is being implemented

• Reactor power is being maintained at 60%

• CEA #51 will not respond to any movement commands

• I&C troubleshooting has been unsuccessful

• 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> has elapsed The operational implications of this configuration from the Xenon transient should cause power to shift

____________ in the core due to the downpower and shift _______________ in the core due to CEA #51 current position.

A. axially; axially B. axially; radially C. radially; axially D. radially; radially Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: the Xenon transient from the down power will cause a shift in core power axially due to the poison buildup felt uniformially across the core however, the stuck CEA will have a localize affect on the core around its position causing a Aztilt or radial power shift. A single CEA will have some axial effect if the CEA position remains in the upper part of the core, however, during normal operation for adjusting CEAs to control ASI, CEAs inserted below 80" are ineffective pushing the ASI toward the bottom. The informed applicant should recognize that at 10" there will be no axial effect of the dropped CEA. The radial impact will be significant for all but CEA #1 (center).

A. Incorrect: see above C. Incorrect: see above D. Incorrect: see above

References:

OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunction, Rev 021, step 24 and 25 page 11 of 29 OP-2102.004, Power Operation, Rev 57, section 11 note top of page 37 of 98 AOP-2203.003, CEA Malfunction Tech Guide, Rev 021, step 24 and 25 page 20 of 35 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 35

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ACEA objective 4: Describe the basis / strategy as stated in AOP-2203.003, CEA Malfunctions AOP Technical Guidelines, for actions directed by the AOP.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1: changed stem CEA position from 40" to 10" and added Power Operations to references Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 36

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2093 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/17/2014 QID #: 21 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 000024K302 10CFR55: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45 Safety Function 1 System

Title:

Emergency Boration System Number 024 K/A AK3.02 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 4.2 SRO Imp: 4.4 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EBOR OBJ 5

Description:

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Emergency Boration: - Actions contained in EOP for emergency boration Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power

• Following the trip, Emergency Boration of the RCS is required

• Volume Control Tank (VCT) Outlet Valve (2CV-4873-1), will not close At this point, at least one Boric Acid Makeup (BAM) Pump is required to be aligned via the Emergency Borate valve (2CV-4916-2) because _____________________ .

A. the BAM Pumps discharge directly into the VCT B. Gravity Feed line pressure from BAM tanks is too low C. Gravity Feed valves are interlocked with VCT Outlet Valve D. the BAM Pumps discharges are interlocked with the Emergency Borate valve Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: With the VCT outlet valve failing to close the procedure (OP-2203.032 or OP-2202.010- Exhibit

1) will direct establishing emergency boration using a BAM pump (pressurized source) to overcome the static head from the VCT. BAM Tank static pressure via Gravity Feed paths is lower than normal VCT pressure.

A. Incorrect: BAM pump discharge does not go to the VCT when the Emergency Borate valve is open.

Emergency Borate valve aligns directly to CCP suction.

C. Incorrect: Gravity Feed valves and VCT outlet are not interlocked. Plausible because there is an interlock between the VCT outlet and the RWT boration source valve that initiate a swap over on low VCT level.

D. Incorrect: BAM pump discharge and Emergency Borate Vlave are not interlocked together. Plausible because both receive an automatic open signal on a SIAS signal.

References:

OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments - Exhibit 1, Rev 022, page 179 of 204 OP-2202.032, Emergency Boration, Rev 011, step 4 contingency action, page 3 of 14 OP-2203.032, Emergency Boration Tech Guide, Rev 011, step 4, page 5 of 14 and step 5, step 6 of 14 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-EBOR objective 5: Describe the pumps as outlined in OP-2203.032, Emergency Boration AOP, that would be used during emergency boration and the plant conditions that are required for their use.

Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 37

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Rev 1: based on NRC comments, reworded distracter, added to notes and rearranged from shortest to longest Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 38

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2094 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 5/31/2014 QID #: 22 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 000051K301 10CFR55: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum System Number 051 K/A AK3.01 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 2.8 SRO Imp: 3.1 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-AVAC OBJ 2

Description:

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum: - Loss of steam dump capability upon loss of condenser vacuum Question:

During a Loss of Vacuum event, the Steam Dump Bypass Control System (SDBCS) will shift steaming from the condenser to atmosphere.

The reason for this redirection (shift) of steam is to ____________________________ .

A. prevent damaging the LP turbine casings from over-pressurization B. prevent "Stall-Flutter" on the last stages of the low pressure turbine C. prevent possible tripping the Feedwater pumps on high condenser back pressure D. provide more available steaming capacity to allow further load reduction of the Main Turbine Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: with a lowering condenser pressure (loss of vacuum) the SDBCS will automatically secure steam to the condenser to prevent damaging the LP turbine casings from over pressurization. If steam is still admitted to the condenser the LP turbine casings are equipped with rupture discs to relieve the excess pressure to the turbine building. As condenser degrades, admitting steam via the bypass valves would admit higher energy, higher enthalpy steam and cause condenser pressure to degrade faster.

B. Incorrect: manually reducing main turbine load is directed in the AOP due to the concern with "Stall-Flutter" on the last stages of the low pressure turbine but this is a manual action of the control room operators and a function of reducing main turbine load not an automatic function of the SDBCS C. Incorrect: Feedwater pumps will trip on high condenser backpressure but the main turbine will trip first which would trip the reactor and shut the steam admission valves immediately reducing steam load.

D. Incorrect: SDBCS securing steaming to the condenser would reduce the available steaming capacity not increase it. Without dumping the "raw" steam into the condenser turbine load could be reduced further but the overall effect would be a higher load on the condenser due to the turbine having to makeup for the loss in steam dump capacity. (there is 27% Steam dump capacity to the condenser and only 23% capacity to atmosphere as normally align)

References:

OP-2203.019, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, Rev 011, not before step 5 page 4 of 18, step 6 page 5 of 18 AOP-2203.019, Loss of Condenser Vacuum Tech Guide, Rev 011, AOP introduction page 3 of 22, step 6 page 9 of 22, Attachment "A" page 22 of 22 OP-2203.012B, Annunciator 2K02 Corrective Actions, Window 2K02 B-14, Rev 039, page 95 of 100 STM 2-23, Steam Dump & Bypass Control System, Rev 16, section 1.2 pages 1 and 2, section 2.7 page 23 Lesson Plans:

A2LP-RO-SDBCS:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 39

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Objective 11: Describe the Condenser Interlock feature of the SDBCS including what causes it, its effect on the SDBCS, and methods to clear the interlock A2LP-RO-AVAC:

Objective 2: Describe the mitigation strategy and instructions for actions directed in OP-2203.019, Loss of Vacuum AOP Objective 4: Describe the basis / strategy as stated in AOP-2203.019, Loss of Vacuum Technical Guidelines, for actions directed by the AOP Historical Comments:

Rev 0 - no issues with selections during validation or Ops Reviews. Cms 7-19-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 40

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2095 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/17/2014 QID #: 23 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000037A105 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6 Safety Function 3 System

Title:

Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Leak System Number 037 K/A AA1.05 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Imp: 3.5 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-RMON OBJ 11

Description:

Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: - Radiation monitor for auxiliary building exhaust processes Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is holding Reactor power at 19% following a forced outage

• A 5 gpm RCS leak into "B" Steam Generator has occurred Which one of the following radiation monitors should be expected to come into alarm FIRST?

A. 2RITS-0645, Main Condenser Off Gas B. 2RITS-0201, "B" Steam Generator N-16 monitor C. 2RITS-0715, Steam Generator Blowdown to the flume D. 2RITS-8542, Aux Building Radwaste Area Ventilation System Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: 2RITS-0645 (Main Condenser Off Gas) will come into alarm first as fission product gases come out of solution and buildup in the condenser (verified on Simulator) followed by Main Steam Rad monitor and Aux Building exhaust fans B. Incorrect: "B" S/G N-16 monitor calculates when Reactor power is 20% and above therefore this monitor is not available for the given power level C. Incorrect: S/G blowdown is a method to monitor RCS leakage into a S/G but 2RITS-0715, Steam Generator Blowdown to the flume Rad monitor is normally not aligned therefore this monitor is not available D. Incorrect: 2RITS-8542, Aux Building Radwaste Area Ventilation (2VEF-8A/B) would come into alarm as the discharge from the condenser vacuum pumps is directed to the suction of these fans but the fission product gases will concentrate in the main condenser and be monitor by main condenser Off Gas rad monitor first before being monitored by the 2VEF-8 rad monitor also, there is more dilution flow for the 2VEF-8s than the discharge of the vacuum pumps.

References:

STM 2-22, Condenser Vacuum System, Rev 15, section 1.2 and 1.3 page 2, section 2.4 page 6 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-RMON objective 11: Using Abnormal Operating Procedures, discuss the operation of the Radiation Monitoring System.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1: added to notes for correct answer for proof of alarm sequence from simulator verification Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 41

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2096 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 5/12/2014 QID #: 24 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NRC Bank QID #0004 Search 000076K201 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.7 Safety Function 9 System

Title:

High Reactor Coolant Activity System Number 076 K/A AK2.01 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 2.6 SRO Imp: 3.0 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ARCSA OBJ 1

Description:

Knowledge of the interrelations between the High Reactor Coolant Activity and the following: - Process radiation monitors Question:

Which one of the following Annunciators requires entry into OP 2203.020, High Reactor Coolant Activity?

A. 2K10 A-6 "CNTMT RADIATION HI" B. 2K11 A-10 "SEC SYS RADIATION HI" C. 2K12 A-1 "LETDOWN RADIATION HI/LO" D. 2K11 C-10 "PROC LIQUID RADIATION HI/LO" Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: Letdown Rad monitor is used to directly measure RCS activity (both gross and iodine specific).

A. Incorrect: Containment Radiation alarm could increase with an increase in RCS activity but is not used as a primary indication of high RCS activity and is not listed as an entry condition for the RCS High Activity AOP.

B. Incorrect: plasuable due to this alarm is used to monitor radiation trends and is a rpimary indictor of a RCS to secondary leak.

D. Incorrect: Process liquid radiation monitor is used to detect leakage in the intermediate boundaries between the RCS and the public (i.e. CCW system) It is not used for a primary indication of RCS high activity.

References:

OP-2203.020, High Activity in RCS, Rev 012, Entry Conditions, page 1 of 7 AOP-2203.020, High Activity in RCS Tech Guide, Rev 012, Entry Conditions, page 1 of 7 OP-2203.012L, Annunciator Corrective Actions.2K12 A-1, Rev 045, page 5 of 16 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ARCSA objective 1: Describe the Entry Conditions for OP 2203.020, High Activity in the RCS Historical Comments:

NRC Bank QID #0004 used on 1998 NRC Exam. Reordered distracters. cms Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 42

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2097 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 25 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC BANK QID #0229 Search 00CA11A202 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

RCS Overcooling System Number A11 K/A EA2.2 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.0 SRO Imp: 3.4 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EESD OBJ 4

Description:

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (RCS Overcooling): - Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments Question:

Consider the following:

• RCS Pressure is 1100 psia and slowly lowering

• CET Temperature is 465°F and slowly lowering

• Pressurizer Level is 0%

• "A" Steam Generator pressure is 375 psia and lowering

• "B" Steam Generator pressure is 725 psia and lowering slowly

• "A" Steam Generator level is 70 inches Wide Range and lowering

• "B" Steam Generator level is 240 inches Wide Range and stable

• Containment Temperature is 200°F and rising slowly

• Containment Pressure is 27.5 psia and lowering slowly IAW OP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand, which of the following describes the correct actions for this event?

A. When CET temperature starts to rise, fully open SDBCS valve 2CV-0303 B. When RCS pressure starts to rise, stabilize pressure by using Aux Spray C. Manually initiate EFAS to "A" S/G and commence feeding in manual to restore level D. Open Aux Spray valve to lower RCS pressure and maximize HPSI flow to restore Pzr level Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: the EOP will direct stabilizing RCS Pressure by using Standard Attachment 48 which will direct using either Main or Aux Spray A. Incorrect: without RCPs running (secured due to containment spray has actuated) RCS CETs will be used to monitor S/G blowdown conditions, but SDBCS valve 2CV-0303 is unavailable during these conditions due to the actuation of MSIS which shuts the MSIVs, isolating 2CV-0303 from the S/Gs.

C. Incorrect: EFAS should be isolated to the "A" S/G since it is the effected S/G. Feeding it would only further the RCS cooldown.

D. Incorrect: Opening the Aux Spray valve and lowering RCS pressure to allow maximize HPSI flow would only further cooldown the already overcooled S/ G and RCS. There has not been a mass lost from the RCS during this event and extra makeup is not required/desired.

References:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 43

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 OP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand, Rev 014, step 21 page 8 of 41 EOP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand Tech Guide, Rev 014, step 21 page 42 of 80 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev 022, Attachment 48, step 1.C or D., 142 and 143 of 204 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-EESD, objective 4: Given a set of plant conditions during an ESD, determine the actions necessary to maintain post-cooldown RCS temperature and pressure.

Historical Comments:

NRC BANK QID #0229 used on 2000 NRC Exam Rev 1: changed stem to match parent question and added procedureal reference based on NRC comments Rev 2: changed distracter "C" and note to "A" SG based on NRC review. mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 44

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2098 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 26 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 00CA162406 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 Safety Function 2 System

Title:

Excess RCS Leakage System Number A16 K/A 2.4.6 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.7 SRO Imp: 4.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ALEAK OBJ 4

Description:

Emergency Procedures/Plan - Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

Question:

During execution of OP-2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage AOP, directions are given to isolate Letdown if Pressurizer level can not be maintained within 5% of setpoint.

IAW OP-2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage AOP Technical Guide, ___________ is listed as the LEAST preferred Letdown isolation valve because it ______________ .

A. 2CV-4823-2; is not designed to close against RCS pressure B. 2CV-4823-2; has the longest stroke time C. 2CV-4820-2; is not designed to close against RCS pressure D. 2CV-4820-2; has the longest stroke time Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: per the Tech Guide, 2CV-4823-2 is the least preferred due to not being designed to close against system pressure.

B. and D Incorrect: Stroke time for any of the valves is not a factor but is plausible because sounds like a prudent measure for isolating L/D C. Incorrect: 2CV-4820-2 is actually the most preferred in this scenario because it isolates the most L/D piping for leak isolation/determination. Plausible because the RO will have to know system flowpath and valves.

References:

OP-2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage, Rev 017, step 4 page 3 of 31 AOP-2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage Tech Guide, Rev 017, step 4 page 8 of 27 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ALEAK objective 4: Describe the mitigation strategy for the following conditions: RCS Leak inside Containment, Letdown Leak inside Containment, RCS Leak into CCW System Historical Comments:

Rev 1 included NRC review comments. Change format to 2X2 to improve plausibility of distracters. Cms 7-3-14 Rev 2: based on NRC comments added IAW OP-2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage AOP Technical Guide to question. mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 45

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2099 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 27 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC BANK QID #0188 Search 00CE09A103 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6 Safety Function System

Title:

Functional Recovery System Number E09 K/A EA1.3 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.6 SRO Imp: 3.8 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EFRP OBJ 3

Description:

Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the (Functional Recover): - Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power

• 110 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture is in progress in "B" S/G

• 60 gpm Loss of Coolant Accident is in progress inside containment

• RCS cooldown is in progress

• RCS depressurization is in progress

• RCS pressure is 1200 psia

• RCS Thot is 530°F

• RVLMS level 4 indicates WET

• Containment pressure 15.3 psia and rising slowly IAW OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery EOP, which of the following actions should be performed FIRST for the above conditions?

A. Secure all RCPs B. Stop RCS cooldown C. Align auxiliary spray per Standard Attachment 48 D. Stop depressurization until RVLMS level 1 indicates WET Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: The Functional Recovery EOP will direct performing Standard Attachment 9 if there is indications of a void in the RCS. Step 2 of Att. 9 directs stopping the RCS depressurization until RVLMS level is recovered B. Incorrect: stopping the RCS cooldown is not directed by the Functional EOP until reaching 275°F; plausible because the RCS is less than 535F, the rapid cooldown for SG isolation can be slowed, but the cooldown needs to continue to minimize break flow for both leaks and get to SDC conditions.

A. Incorrect: the Functional EOP will direct securing ALL RCPs when RCS MTS is <30°F not just one in each loop. Plausible because the given MTS is close to the limit. Incorrect because securing all RCPs will cause make it more difficult to eliminate the head void. The forced flow will cool the head internals metal mass that is contributing to the void formation.

C. Incorrect: aligning aux spray will further depressuirze the RCS and cause the head void to become larger. Plausible as this step is part of securing all RCPs and will be used eventually but is not the FIRST action as stated in the stem.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 46

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14

References:

OP-2202.010, Standard Attachment, Rev 022, Attachment 9 page 25 of 204 OP-2202.009, Rev 017, step 13 (EOP Functional Recovery Procedure)

Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-EFRP objective 3: Describe the use and sections of the FRP, Entry Section, Success Path Tracking Page, Safety Function Decision Tree, Success Path, Continuing Actions, Long Term Actions, Floating Steps, Safety Function Status Checks Historical Comments:

NRC BANK QID #0188 used on 1998 NRC Exam Rev 1: added to stem for clarity, changed parameter values back to parent question values based on NRC comments Rev 2: Based on NRC comments added IAW procedure to question, replaced distracter "C". Added containment pressure trend to justify no need to secure RCPs if still running. Changed distracter to secure all RCPs vs 1 in each loop as that was too plausible. Rearranged choices to read shortest to longest mwf 7/23/14 NRC examiner recommended modifying distracters B and C to be more plausible if used again.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 47

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2100 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 6/5/2014 QID #: 28 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 003000K503 10CFR55: 41.5 / 45.7 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS) System Number 003 K/A K5.03 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.1 SRO Imp: 3.5 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-OPROC OBJ 7

Description:

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RCPS: - Effects of RCP shutdown on T-ave., including the reason for the unreliability of T-ave. in the shutdown loop Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is in Mode 4

• RCS pressure is 298 psia

• Cooldown is in progress

• "A" and "B" RCPs (2P-32A and 2P-32B) are running

• "A" SDC is in service with "A" LPSI pump (2P-60A) through "A" SDC Heat Exchanger (2E-35A)

RCS cooldown rate should be monitored using RCS _______ due to ___________________ .

A. Tc; thermal stresses on reactor vessel belt line B. Tave; thermal stresses on reactor vessel belt line C. Tc; inadequate temperature mixing through "B" Steam Generator D. Tave; inadequate temperature mixing through "B" Steam Generator Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: with RCPs running, RCS cold leg temperature is used to monitor T.S. cooldown rates to prevent possible vessel damage from the thermal stresses B. Incorrect: RCS Tave is not used with the unit off line due to the temperature inconsistencies and being less conservative when monitoring vessel cooling.

C. Incorrect: Tc is used but inadequate mixing through "B" S/G is not a concern with 2 RCPs runnig but plausible since the 2 RCPs that are running are in "A" loop.

D. Incorrect: RCS Tave is not used with the unit off line due to the temperature inconsistencies and being less conservative when monitoring vessel cooling. Inadequate mixing through "B" S/G is plausible since the 2 RCPs that are running are in "A" loop.

References:

OP-2102.010, Plant Cooldown, Rev 050, section 5.0 page 6 of 54 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachment, Rev attachment 1 page 6 and 6 of 204 attachment 8 page 23 of 204 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO -OPROC objective 7: Describe the required reactor operator responsibilities and actions for a given procedure Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 48

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2101 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/3/2014 QID #: 29 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 004000K601 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.7 Safety Function 1 System

Title:

Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) System Number 004 K/A K6.01 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.1 SRO Imp: 3.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-PRZ OBJ 11

Description:

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following CVCS components: - Spray/heater combination in PZR to assure uniform boron concentration Question:

Both Pressurizer Spray Valve bypass valves are left closed when clearing a tagout.

What effect should this have on the system?

A. thermal shock from any PZR insurge B. vapor binding of the PZR spray nozzle C. thermal binding of the PZR spray valves D. reactivity changes from any PZR outsurge Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: without spray valve bypass flow there will be a difference in the boron concentration between the PZR and the RCS. The spray valve bypasses provide a constant flow of water through the pressurizer which maintains the boron concentrations approximately equal) The RCS boron concentration will lower during power operations due to dilutions required to maintain Reactor power.

With a difference in boron concentrations, an out surge from the PZR would borate the RCS causing a change in reactivity.

A. Incorrect: Heater controls compensate for the thermal transient caused by an insurge. Bypass flow has no effect toward this transient.

B. Incorrect: The spray nozzle would have thermal stresses when the spray valves open but the spray nozzle would still function as designed.

C. Incorrect: If the spray valve is operated there would be some thermal stresses across the spray head (inside the PZR) which is a concern (spray valve cycles are logged when using Aux spray due to this concern) but, the spray valves themselves are not part of this concern.

References:

OP-2203.005, Pressurizer Operations, Rev 034 ,setion 5.0 steps 5.13 and 5.14 page 6 of 38 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-PZR objective 11: Explain the following:

Limits and Precautions associated with Pressurizer Operations (2103.005)

Equalize RCS boron and Pressurizer boron.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1 incorporated NRC review comments. Reworded stem for clarity. Reworded distracters to be more discriminating.

Reordered distracters for visual balance. CMS 7-3-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 49

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2102 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/15/2014 QID #: 30 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 005000K111 10CFR55: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 4 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) System Number 005 K/A K1.11 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.5 SRO Imp: 3.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-SDC OBJ 1

Description:

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RHRS and the following systems: - RWST Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is in Mode 3 with cooldown in progress

• Preparations to place Shutdown Cooling (SDC) in service are in progress IAW 2104.004 SDC Operations The reason for closing LPSI Pump Recirc valves prior to aligning the SDC suction from the RCS to the LPSI system is to prevent _____________________________ .

A. draining RCS to the RWT B. exceeding LPSI system flow limits C. draining RCS to a BMS Holdup Tank D. exceeding LPSI system pressure limits Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: LPSI pump suction is initially lined up to the RCS when pressure is approx 350 psia which will align a direct path from the RCS to the RW through the LPSI recirc header.

C. Plausible because this flow path is used in Mode 6 to drain the RCS/Refuel canal. Incorrect because Mode 3 requires the recirc header remain aligned to the RWT for the Spray pumps.

B. Incorrect: SDC flow limits are based on NPSH requirements not flowpath alignments. Plausible because of the concerns with losing SDC due to votexing D. Incorrect: pressure limit concerns are addressed in the initial conditions for aligning SDC and are associated with the entire system not just the recirc header

References:

OP-2104.004, Shutdown Cooling System, Rev 055, section 7.0 page 12of 128 STM 2-05, Emergency Core Cooling System, Rev 28, section 4.0 page 33 and simplified drawing page 80 Lesson plan A2LP-RO-SDC objective 1: Describe the following evolutions as controlled by appropriate procedures including flowpaths and purposes of flowpaths, initial conditions, procedural steps and limits & precautions as appropriate: Preparation for SDC Historical Comments:

Rev 1: changed distracters and added to notes based on NRC comments Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 50

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2103 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 6/5/2014 QID #: 31 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 006000A213 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 2 System

Title:

Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) System Number 006 K/A A2.13 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.9 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-AINAD OBJ 2

Description:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Inadvertent SIS actuation Question:

During an Inadvertent ______, at 100% power, it is procedurally directed to stop travel and reposition an ESF actuated component prior to that component reaching its fully actuated position to prevent A. CSAS; RCP damage B. CIAS: loss of RCS makeup C. RAS: flooding the Containment Building D. SIAS; a Main Turbine Generator Runback Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: Inadvertent SIAS AOP will direct stopping the SW to ACW valve travel prior to them reaching their fully actuated position (closed) to prevent a possible MTG runback due to the loss of cooling water to the stator water cooling system A. Incorrect: there is no inadvertent CSAS AOP due to this actuation would cause a reactor trip. SPTAs would be entered and Spray pumps would be secure to prevent possible RCP damage B. Incorrect: an inadvertent CIAS would not cause a loss of RCS makeup. The concern with this actuation is the loss of cooling water to the RCPs C. Incorrect: an inadvertent RAS would cause flooding of the containment building by transferring water from the RWT to the containment sump while the RAS signal is transferring suction valves. The AOP directs closing the inside containment sump valve to minimize/mitigate this event. It does not direct stopping valve travel.

References:

OP-2203.018, Inadvertent SIAS, Rev 010, step 4 page 3 of 54 and step 5 page 4 of 54 AOP-2203.018, Inadvertent SIAS Tech Guide, Rev 009, step 3 and 4 page 6 of 60 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-AINAD objective 2: Describe the mitigation strategy and instructions for actions directed in: OP-2203.018, INADVERTENT SIAS Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 51

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2104 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/3/2014 QID #: 32 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC BANK QID #0476 Search 007000K502 10CFR55: 41.5 / 45.7 Safety Function 5 System

Title:

Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System ( System Number 007 K/A K5.02 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.1 SRO Imp: 3.4 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-PZR OBJ 11

Description:

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the PRTS: - Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 has completed a refueling outage

• Pressurizer (PZR) has been filled to 85% in preparation of forming a steam bubble

• All Pressurizer heaters have been energized

• Pressurizer temperature is rising

• Pressurizer is being vented to the Quench Tank (QT) to remove non-condensable gases

• Quench Tank is being vented and purged when it reaches 30 psig Which of the following parameter changes would indicate that all of the non-condensable gases have been removed from the Pressurizer?

A. PZR pressure lowering with PZR water temperature at saturation B. PZR pressure rising with PZR water temperature below saturation C. QT pressure rising continuously with QT level stable D. QT pressure rising with QT level rising Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: With only a slight rise in QT pressure and level during venting of the PZR is the proper indication of a steam bubble. PZR high point vents enter the QT through the PZR Safety Valve line and are discharged below the water line so when all non-condensable gases are vented from PZR, then QT pressure will rise only slightly. This is due to only steam being vented into QT that is condensed causing level and pressure to rise only slightly.

A. Incorrect: PZR pressure would remain constant at saturation temperature or rise as saturation temperature went up B. Incorrect: the only way PZR pressure could rise below saturation temperature is with non-condensable gases present in the PZR C. Incorrect: this is the expected response with non-condensable gases being vented to the Quench Tank

References:

OP-2103.002, Filling and Venting of the RCS, Rev 057, section 9 note before step 9.20 page 29 of 78 NOP 2103.007, Quench Tank and Reactor Drain Tank Ops, Rev 024, section 3.0 page 2 of 31 STM 2-03, RCS, Section 2.4 and figure on page 58.

A2LP-RO-RCS objective 26: Describe the Control Room Instrumentation associated with the Quench Tank and what they Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 52

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 would be used for Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-PZR, objective 11: Explain the following: Establish a steam bubble in the Pressurizer Historical Comments:

NRC BANK QID #0476 used on 2005 NRC Exam Rev 1 for NRC review comments. Fixed formatting for printed view. Fixed inconsistent use of abbreviations for "pressurizer" and "quench tank" in disctracters. Removed "slightly" from 'D'. Cms 7-3-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 53

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2105 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/3/2014 QID #: 33 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 008000K202 10CFR55: 41.7 Safety Function 8 System

Title:

Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) System Number 008 K/A K2.02 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.0 SRO Imp: 3.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-CCW OBJ 2

Description:

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: - CCW pump, including emergency backup Question:

Loop 2 Component Cooling Water (CCW) is normally supplied by 2P-33C, "C" Component Cooling Water (CCW) pump, which is powered from ________ and its backup pump, 2P-33B, "B" CCW pump, is powered from ________ .

A. 2B-1; 2B-2 B. 2B-2; 2B-1 C. 2B-2; 2B-7 D. 2B-7; 2B-2 Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: "C" CCW pump is powered by 480v bus 2B-7; "B" CCW pump is powered 480v bus 2B-2 A. Incorrect: 2B-1 powers 2P-33A and 2B-2 powers 2P-33B B Incorrect: 2B-2 powers 2P-33B and 2B-1 powers 2P-33A C. Incorrect: 2B2 powers 2P-33B and 2B-7 powers 2P-33C

References:

STM 2- 43, Component Cooling Water System, Rev 14, section 2.1 page 2 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-CCW objective 2: Describe the CCW pumps to include their power supplies and operation.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1. No NRC comments on question. Fixed typo in Notes for which selection is correct. Cms 7-3-14.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 54

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2106 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 6/2/2014 QID #: 34 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 010000A201 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 3 System

Title:

Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) System Number 010 K/A A2.01 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Imp: 3.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-PZR OBJ 3

Description:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR PCS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Heater failures Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• The in service Pressurizer backup heater bank breaker trips

• RCS pressure initially trends down to 2175 psia The impact of this breaker trip will have a _______________ reactivity effect and OP-2103.005, Pressurizer Operations, should be used to ________________________ .

A. positive; place another Pressurizer backup heater bank in service B. negative; place another Pressurizer backup heater bank in service C. positive; take manual control of Pressurizer proportional heaters and adjust to full fire D. negative; take manual control of Pressurizer proportional heaters and adjust to full fire Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: changes in RCS pressure will cause a change in reactivity and Reactor power therefore with RCS pressure lowering, the ATC should expect Reactor power to also lower not raise due to the addition of negative reactivity A. Incorrect: negative reactivity will be added due to the lowering of RCS pressure not positive. Placing e another set of backup heater bank in service is prudent and allowed by the normal operating procedure C. Incorrect: negative reactivity will be added due to the lowering of RCS pressure not positive. The proportional heaters will automatically adjust for the lost of heat input due to the tripped breaker on the backup heaters, there is not reason to take manual control and adjust to full fire D. Incorrect: negative reactivity will be added due to the lower RCS pressure but the proportional heaters will automatically adjust for the lost of heat input due to the tripped breaker on the backup heaters, there is not reason to take manual control and adjust to full fire

References:

OP-2103.005, Pressurizer Operations, Rev 034, section 15.0 page 24 of 38 A2LP-RO-PZR objective 3: Explain the following for the Pressurizer Heaters: The capacity of each heater bank, The low level interlock associated with Pressurizer Heaters, The high level interlock associated with Pressurizer Heaters, The controls associated with the B/U Heater Banks, The controls associated with the Proportional Heater Banks, The controls associated with the breakers for B/U and Proportional heater banks Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 55

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 56

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2107 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 35 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0120002132 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12 Safety Function 7 System

Title:

Reactor Protection System System Number 012 K/A 2.1.32 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 4.0 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-CPC OBJ 37

Description:

Conduct of Operations - Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.

Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is performing the initial startup following a refueling outage

• ATC notes considerable variations in DNBR when performing CPC channel checks

• Reactor power readings on all 4 CPCs are as follows:

PID 171 (Phi Cal Calibrated Neutron Flux Power) = 18%

PID 10 (raw upper neutron flux detector) = 17%

PID 11 (raw middle neutron flux detector) = 16%

PID 12 (raw lower neutron flux detector) = 16%

The auxiliary trip for QASI is __________ and the DNBR variances are because _________________ .

A. enabled; core effects on DNBR are intensified early in core life B. not enabled; core effects on DNBR are intensified early in core life C. not enabled; CPC constants from startup testing have not been entered D. enabled; CPC constants from startup testing have not been entered Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: QASI trip looks at the average of the raw powers (PID 10, 11, 12) to enable the QASI trip. QASI is a quality check for the Axial Shape Index (ASI) calculated by CPC. Raw power average must be >=17% to enable the aux trip function. and DNBR variances are expected during a startup following a refueling outage due to physics testing has yet to be performed and new constants have not been entered into the CPC calculators.

PID 171 included and reading 18% for plausibility for the 'enabled' choice.

Core effects on DNBR are actually intensified at the end of core life not at the beginning. The variances listed in the caution statement are referring to channel to channel differences changes due to core effects on a single channel.

References:

OP-2105.001, CPC/CEAC Operations, Rev 043, section 5.0 step 5.5 page 8 of 97 OP-2102.004, Power Operation, Rev 057, section 6.0 step 6.1 page 8 of 98 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-CPC objective 37: Given the limits and precautions associated with OP 2105.001, CPC/CEAC Operation, describe the purpose of each Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 57

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Historical Comments:

Rev 1 - Modified stem question and initial condition data and replaced choices in the 2X2 per NRC review comments. Cms 7-9-14 Rev 2: based on NRC comments changed "due to" to "because" in question. mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 58

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2108 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 36 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: New Search 013000K303 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.6 Safety Function 2 System

Title:

Engineered Safety Features Actuation System ( System Number 013 K/A K3.03 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.3 SRO Imp: 4.7 L. Plan: A2P-RO-SPRAY OBJ 2

Description:

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ESFAS will have on the following: - Containment Question:

Consider the following:

• Containment Spray Pump 2P-35A is tagged out for motor replacement

• A large break LOCA has occurred

• Bypass Damper for 2VSF-1C, Containment Cooling Fan fails to drop on CCAS actuation

• Containment Spray Pump 2P-35B is providing 1950 gpm flow to Containment

• ECCS suction is aligned to the RWT

• OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP, is being implemented Adequate Containment temperature and pressure control ______ available based on Green Train Containment Spray flow AND ______________ Train Containment Cooling units.

A. is; Green B. is; Red C. is not; Green D. is not: Red Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

The Containment Spray system (CSS) in conjunction with the Containment cooling system (CCS) provides sufficient redundancy so that any of the following combinations of equipment will provide adequate heat removal to attenuate the post accident pressure and temperature conditions imposed upon the Containment following a LOCA or Main Steam Line Break (MSLB):

• all four Containment cooling units; or

• both loops of the CSS; or

• two of the four Containment cooling units and one CSS loop This makes answers C and D wrong. Answer A is wrong because with 2VSF-1C [a Green train containment cooling fan]

OOS the green train coolers by their selves would not meet the requirements for containment cooling.

The 1950 gpm adds plausibility for determining spray pump contribution to design base containment heat removal. With ECCS aligned to the RWT, the designed flow is >1875 gpm to satisfy the spec. If the suctions were aligned to the sump, indicating RAS actuation, then the flow would need to be >2000 gpm.

References:

STM 2-08, Containment Spray System, Rev , section 1.3 page STM 2-09, Containment Cooling and Purge Systems, Rev , section 2.7 page Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 59

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 STM 2-42, Service Water & Aux Cooling Water Systems, Rev , section 3.5.4 page OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident, Rev , Safety Function Status Check step 8 page of EOP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident Tech Guide, Rev ,

Lesson Plan A2P-RO-SPRAY objective 2: Given a set of plant conditions determine if the Containment Heat Removal System is satisfying its design bases.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1: based on NRC comments, replaced K/A K3.01 with K3.03 and replaced question. MWF 7-18-14 Rev 2: Based on NRC comments changed wording in stem for plausibility mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 60

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2109 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 37 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 022000A405 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8 Safety Function 5 System

Title:

Containment Cooling System (CCS) System Number 022 K/A A4.05 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 3.8 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-CVENT OBJ 4

Description:

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: - Containment readings of temperature, pressure, and humidity system Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• Containment Cooling Fans 2VSF-1A, 2VSF-1B AND 2VSF-1D are in service

• Annunciator 2K05 J-7 "CTMT BLDG CLG FANS C/D TROUBLE" comes into alarm

• All indicating lights on 2VSF-1D are extinguished

• IAO reports thermal overloads on 2VSF-1D supply breaker, 2B63 J2, are tripped and will not reset

• Annunciator 2K10 A-7 "Containment TEMP/HUMIDITY HI" comes into alarm 2K10 ACA will direct monitoring containment temperature, pressure, and humidity on Trend Recorder, 2TR-5660, located on panel _________ and this condition should be corrected by manually _____________________ .

A. 2C17; starting Containment Cooling Fan 2VSF-1C B. 2C33; starting Containment Cooling Fan 2VSF-1C C. 2C17; aligning Service Water to 2VSF-1A Cooling Unit D. 2C33; aligning Service Water to 2VSF-1A Cooling Unit Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

Containment parameters trend recorders are located on 2C33 (Black) which is located adjacent to 2C14. The auto start feature for the containment cooling fans is actuated by a CCAS signal (>18.3 psia containment pressure) There is not an actuation signal present therefore the "C" containment cooling fan would required to be manually started. The ACA directs to align ventilation per the normal operating procedure which gives directions on a normal 3 fan alignment.

2C-17 is plausible because that is the panel where the associated annunciator and handswitch controls for 2VSF-1C are located.

Aligning SW to the cooling unit is plausible in that this is an action is done as an emergency backup to a loss of Chilled Water to Containment.

References:

OP-2203.012J, Annunciator 2K10 Corrective Action, Rev 039, Window A-7 74 of 84 OP-2203.012E, Annunciator 2K05 Corrective Action, Rev 039, Window 64 of 86 OP-2104.033, Containment Atmosphere Control, Rev 072, section 3.0 page 2 of 80, section 5.0 page 6 of 80, section 8.0 page 13 of 80 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 61

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-CVENT objective 4: Describe the automatic actuation associated with the Containment Cooling Units.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1 changed response in C and D from 'verify' to a choice that requires an action to be done per NRC review comments.

Cms 7-9-14 Rev 2: Based on NRC comments, changed distracters "C" and "D" to make more plausible and added to notes. Also added the word 'manually' to question and removed from all 4 distracters. mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 62

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2110 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 5/13/2014 QID #: 38 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NRC BANK QID #1528 Search 026000A106 10CFR55: 41.5 / 45.5 Safety Function 5 System

Title:

Containment Spray System (CSS) System Number 026 K/A A1.06 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.7 SRO Imp: 3.0 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-SPRAY OBJ 3

Description:

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CSS controls including: - Containment spray pump cooling Question:

During a Large Break LOCA, the ___________________________ system supplies cooling water to the Containment Spray Pump seal coolers and ______________required to be available to the seal coolers after a Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS)

A. Service Water; is B. Service Water; is not C. Component Cooling Water; is D. Component Cooling Water; is not Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: Spray pump seal cooler receives safety related Service Water for cooling. The isolation valve for each seal cooler is normally open and receives no automatic closure signal during the RAS.

B. Incorrect: Service Water will still be aligned after RAS C. Incorrect: CCW does not cool the Spray pump seals D. Incorrect: CCW does not cool the Spray pump seals

References:

STM 2-08, Containment Spray System, Rev 22, section 3.4 pages 14-18 STM 2-42, Service Water, Section, Rev 36, section 3.5.19 page 41 Lesson Plan Spray, Objective 3: Summarize the purpose of the interrelationship between the following and the Containment Spray System: Service Water; Electrical Distribution System, to include power supplies for specific components; Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Historical Comments:

NRC BANK QID #1528 used on the 2008 NRC Exam Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 63

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2111 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/9/2014 QID #: 39 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 039000K108 10CFR55: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 4 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS) System Number 039 K/A K1.08 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.7 SRO Imp: 2.9 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-MFPTC OBJ 10, 21

Description:

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MRSS and the following systems: - MFW Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is at 20% power

• MFP 2P-1B is running and maintaining S/G water levels

• Main Turbine is running at 1800 rpm

• Main Generator output breakers are open 2P-1B turbine steam is being supplied from _______________ and turbine speed is being controlled by the ______ steam control valve.

A. 'A' MSR; low pressure (LP)

B. 'A' MSR; high pressure (HP)

C. main steam; low pressure (LP)

D. main steam; high pressure (HP)

Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

Steam directly from the main steam header upstream of the MTG stop valves supplies the MFP turbines at low powers. The MFPT control valve assembly has a single poppet on the HP steam supply side and 5 poppets on the LP steam supply side.

Plausibility for the LP choice is that in this configuration, the LP control poppets are actually full open while the HP poppet is throttling to control speed.

Plausibility for the MSR steam is that from the given conditions the MTG main stop valves and at least one control valve would be open allowing steam flow through the HP turbine, however, at this power level (MTG unloaded) there is not adequate flow through the MSR to provide steam to the MFPs.

The initial power level given helps add plausibility to the MSR choice. The applicant will have to recognize the difference between turbine power and reactor power. MSR steam flow is directly tied to turbine power.

References:

STM 2-19-1, MFP Turbine, Rev 21 page 29 Historical Comments:

Rev 1 rejected K/A and replaced with new question per NRC review comments.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 64

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2112 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 40 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 059000A212 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Main Feedwater (MFW) System System Number 059 K/A A2.12 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.1 SRO Imp: 3.4 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-FWCD OBJ 8

Description:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Failure of feedwater regulating valves Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• Annunciator 2K03 K-4 "FWCS 2 TROUBLE" comes into alarm

• "B" Steam Generator level is 58% and lowering

• 2HIC-0740, "B" Main Feed Reg Valve (MFRV), controller output indicates 100%

• 2CV-0740, "B" MFRV Green and Red lights are lit

• 2HIC-0744, "B" Main Feed Reg Bypass Valve (MFRBV), controller output indicates 100%

• 2CV-0744, "B" MFRBV Red light only is lit With the above conditions, ________________ MFP speed should rise and to mitigate the event the CRS should direct A. ONLY "B"; tripping the reactor and performing SPTAs B. BOTH "A" and "B"; tripping the reactor and performing SPTAs C. ONLY "B"; placing the HIC in manual for "B" MFRV and controlling level D. BOTH "A" and "B"; placing the HIC in manual for "B" MFRV and controlling level Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: The S/G level deviation on 'B' S/G will cause the level control system to increase speed on both MFPs The initial conditions indicate a failure of the MFRV (valve intermediate with 100% demand, MFRBV full open and S/G level going down). The ACA will direct taking manual control of MFRV and MFRBV and restoring S/G level. The student should recognize these actions would be unsuccessful due to the HIC output already at 100%. The ACA directs a reactor trip if unable to establish control of S/G level.

A. Incorrect: both MFP speeds will increase due to the lowering level on "B" S/G not just "B" MFP C. Incorrect: both MFP speeds will increase due to the lowering level on "B" S/G not just "B" MFP. Also incorrect due to the given conditions, manual control of the "B" S/G is not possible from the HIC in the control room.

D. Incorrect: both MFP speeds will increase due to the lowering level on "B" S/G but for the given conditions, manual control of the "B" S/G is not possible from the HIC in the control room.

References:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 65

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 OP-2203.012C, Annunciator 2K03 Corrective Action, Rev 031, Window K-4 pages 51 and 52 of 176 STM 2-69, Feedwater Control System, Rev 13, section 2.5.3 page 23 OP-2106.007, Main Feedwater Pump and FWCS Operations, Rev 12, section 3.0 pages 4 and 5 of 113 A2LP-RO-FWCD objective 8: Describe the construction, purpose and operation of the following components: Main Feedwater Pumps, Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRV), Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves (MFRBV)

Historical Comments:

Rev 1: based on NRC comments, changed initial conditions in stem to indicate failure of "B" MFRV. Changed answer and notes Rev 2: Based on NRC comments, changed indication for MFRV lights to both lights on and changed notes to reflect an intermediate valve position. Changed SG level to 58% and initial power level to 100% to magnifiy the loss of control of SG level due to FW flow needs at this power. This makes C &D incorrect but still plausible. mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 66

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2113 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/10/2014 QID #: 41 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 061000K402 10CFR55: 41.7 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) Syste System Number 061 K/A K4.02 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.5 SRO Imp: 4.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EFW OBJ 5

Description:

Knowledge of AFW System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: - AFW automatic start upon loss of MFW pump, S/G level, blackout, or safety injection Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 has tripped from 80% power due to an MSIS actuation

• Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) occurs concurrent with the trip

• 1 MINUTE after the MSIS and LOOP the conditions are:

"A" S/G pressure 740 psia and stable "B" S/G pressure 680 psia and lowering "A" S/G level 21% and stable "B" S/G level 18% and lowering EFW pump 2P-7A in standby EFW pump 2P-7B in standby The EFW pumps are still in standby due to _________________________.

A. "A" and "B" S/G pressures are too low B "A" and "B" S/G pressure differential is too high C. "B" S/G level is above EFAS actuation setpoint D. EFW pump start time delay after EFAS actuation is not complete Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: The selection logic on the bistable input to the EFAS actuation path will not actuate if SG pressure drops below MSIS value (751 psia) before level lowers to EFAS setpoint (22.2%). EFAS will not actuate until the bistable determines which S/G is the affected S/G by waiting until there is >90 psi differential between S/Gs. The given event indicates that both S/Gs met the MSIS pressure causing actuation. After MSIS actuates, the affected S/G will continue to blowdown (assuming the break is upstream of the MSIVs) while the unaffected S/G will stabilize. In the given scenario, EFAS-1 will actuate and feed "A" S/G only when "B" S/G blows down and meets the 90 psi D/P. The LOOP was added to add plausibility to time delay starts. 2P-7A (steam driven) does not have a time delay start. 2P-7A (electric) has an 85 sec time delay. The LOOP would add appox 8-10 seconds for 2DG1 start and auto tie on to bus 2A3.

B. Plausible in that it checks understanding of the logic circuit and discriminates an operator that may remember D/P is a factor but not understand how.

C. Plausible in that it checks understanding of the logic circuit and discriminates an operator that may know level is a factor but remember actuation values or be confused on the input logic tree.

D. Plausible in that 2P-7B does have a time delay that would still be preventing the pump to start in the timeframe given, however, the discriminating fact is that EFAS would not be actuated yet and if it was, 2P-7A would not be delayed in starting.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 67

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14

References:

STM 2-19-2, Emergency Feedwater and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems, Rev36, section 1.0 page 4, section 2.0 pages 14,15 and 22, simplified drawing page 39 STM 2-70 Rev 18 page 80, EFAS bistable actuation logic Historical Comments:

Rev 1 - revised to simplify the way the question was being asked and list of initial conditions for clarity per NRC review comments. Changed Dif to 3. cms 7-10-14.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 68

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2114 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/19/2014 QID #: 42 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 062000K201 10CFR55: 41.7 Safety Function 6 System

Title:

A.C. Electrical Distribution System System Number 062 K/A K2.01 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Imp: 3.4 L. Plan: OBJ

Description:

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: - Major system loads Question:

The power supply to 2P-3A, "A" Circulating Water Pump, is _______________bus.

A. 2A-1 B. 2A-2 C. 2H-1 D. 2H-2 Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: 2P-32A "A" Circ Water Pump powered from 2H-1. The other choices are plausible because there are major electrical system loads that are powered from 2A-1/2A-2 (condensate pumps, heater drain pumps, main chillers) and 2H-2 (reactor coolant pumps, circulating water pumps).

A. Incorrect: 2A1 is a RED 4160 kv bus, "A" Circulator is a RED 6900kv load C. Incorrect: 2A2 is a GREEN 4160 kv bus, "A" Circulator is a RED 6900kv load D. Incorrect: 2H2 is a GREEN 6900kv bus, "A" Circulator is a RED 6900kv load

References:

STM 2-32-1, High Voltage Electrical Distribution, Rev. 26, System Drawing, page 86 STM 2-40-1, Circulating Water Sysem, Rev 30, section 3.0 page 53 Historical Comments:

Rev 1 - rearranged distracters for balance of C correct answers. Cms 7-19-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 69

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2115 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 5/23/2014 QID #: 43 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 063000A301 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 Safety Function 6 System

Title:

D.C. Electrical Distribution System System Number 063 K/A A3.01 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.7 SRO Imp: 3.1 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ED125 OBJ 6&7

Description:

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the D.C. Electrical System, including: - Meters, annunciators, dials, recorders, and indicating lights Question:

Consider the following:

• Battery Charger, 2D31A, has failed

• Battery Charger, 2D31B, was been placed in service 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> later When 2D31B is first aligned to DC bus 2D01, its output meter will rise to approximately ______ amps and output voltage would rise to approximately _______ volts .

A. 400; 128 B. 400; 140 C. 130; 128 D. 130; 140 Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: without a battery charger attached to the bus, 2D01 would have been discharging for the hour it took to restore the backup charger (2D31B). 2D-31B, when connected to 2D01, will go to maximum output (400 amps and 128 volts) to restore 2D01 to full charge B. Incorrect: without a battery charger attached to the bus, 2D01 would have been discharging for the hour it took to restore the backup charger (2D31B). 2D-31B, when connected to 2D01, will go to maximum output (400 amps and 128 volts) to restore 2D01 to full charge. When the charger is placed on equalize charge for testing its output voltage is 140 volt. Equalize is a special charge that is conducted periodically or for maintenance purposes at a higher voltage (140 VDC). This charge is necessary following an Emergency Duty Cycle such as would occur during an 18 month discharge test or an actual plant emergency.

C. Incorrect: plausible due to this is the approximately normal output of the chargers when align to its bus D. Incorrect: as discussed above

References:

STM 2-32-5, 125 Vdc Electrical Distribution, Rev 20, section 1.0 page 2, section 2.1 and 2.2 page 3 and section 2.3 page 9 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ED125:

Objective 6: Describe the operation of the following Battery Chargers:

The Battery Chargers associated with 2D01 and 2D02 The Battery Chargers associated with 2D03 Battery Eliminators Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 70

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Objective 7: Describe the operation and ratings of the following:

Batteries 2D11 and 2D12 Battery Disconnect and Fuses for 2D01 and 2D02 Battery 2D13 Battery Disconnect and Fuses for 2D03 Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 71

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2116 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 5/13/2014 QID #: 44 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC BANK QID #1659 Search 064000K608 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.7 Safety Function 6 System

Title:

Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System System Number 064 K/A K6.08 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Imp: 3.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EDG OBJ 12

Description:

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ED/G System: - Fuel oil storage tanks Question:

Given the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• #1 Emergency Diesel Generator (2DG1) surveillance is in progress

• 2DG1 is currently tied to the grid and is consuming 2.2 gallons of fuel oil each minute

• Fuel oil transfer pump 2P-16A is running and filling 2DG1 Day Tank 2T-30A

• At 500 gallons in 2T-30A, 2P-16A breaker trips open on thermal overload and fuel oil flow stops

• NO operator action is taken Based on these conditions, what is the MAXIMUM amount of time 2DG1 can continue to operate at the current load until the T.S. MINIMUM Day Tank Volume is reached?

A. 54 minutes B. 90 minutes C. 146 minutes D. 182 minutes Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: Minimum T.S. Day Tank Volume is 300 gallons. Given starting volume of 500 - 300 gallons divided by 2.2 gpm (rate of consumption) = 90.9 minutes A. Incorrect: number based on 2T-16 low level alarm (391.3 gallons) 500 - 391.3 = 108.7gallons divided by 2.2 gpm = 54.3 minutes C. Incorrect: number is a combination of A and B (54 + 91 = 146 minutes)

D. Incorrect: number is twice B

References:

T.S 3.8.1.1, Electrical Power Sources Modes 1-4, part b STM 2.31, Emergency Diesel Generators, Rev. 34, sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 pages 16-18 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-EDG, Objective 12: Explain the Technical Specifications associated with the Emergency Diesel Generators.

Historical Comments:

NRC BANK QID #1659 used on 2009 NRC Exam. Changed distracters from hours to minutes. mwf Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 72

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2117 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/10/2014 QID #: 45 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NRC BANK QID #1660 Search 073000A401 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8 Safety Function 7 System

Title:

Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System System Number 073 K/A A4.01 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.9 SRO Imp: 3.9 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-RWST OBJ 9

Description:

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: - Effluent release Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• CBOT is performing OP-2104.014 Supplement 1, Unit 2 Liquid Radwaste Release Permit to release Boric Acid Condensate Tank 2T-69B

• Radiation Monitor (2RITS-2330) has been determined to be inoperable Which of the following actions is REQUIRED to be performed to complete 2T-69B release?

A. Perform an independent verification of discharge valve lineup B. Perform an independent verification of proper Unit 1 Circ Water flow C. Process the contents of the tank through the vendor processing skid twice D. Recirculate the contents of the tank for twice the required time before sampling Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: Per the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Rev. 24, Limitation L2.1.1 Action A, with an inoperable rad monitor, effluent releases may be resumed provided; A.2.2.1 analyze two independent samples of the associated tank contents; A.2.2.2 computer input data verified by two qualified individiuals; and A.2.2.3 correct discharge valve lineup independently verified by two qualified individuals.

B. Incorrect: only one person has to verify proper circulation water flow C. Incorrect: not a requirement for an inoperable rad monitor D. Incorrect: not a requirement for an inoperable rad monitor

References:

OP-2104.014, (LRW & BMS Operations) Rev 055, Supplement 3, section 1.0 page 175 of 181 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), Rev. 24, Limitation L2.1.1 Action 1 pages 45 and 46 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-RWST objective 9: Describe the Technical Specifications and Offsite Does Calculation Manual Requirements associated with the following Radwaste Systems:

Liquid Rad Waste System Boron Management System Gaseous Rad Waste System Historical Comments:

NRC BANK QID #1660 used on 1998 and 2009 NRC Exam Rev 1 revised to add procedure title and tank noun name per NRC review comments. Cms 7-10-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 73

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 74

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2118 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/10/2014 QID #: 46 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC BANK QID #1161 Search 076000K307 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.6 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Service Water System (SWS) System Number 076 K/A K3.07 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.7 SRO Imp: 3.9 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ESPTA OBJ

Description:

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the SWS will have on the following: - ESF loads Question:

Consider the following:

Following a Reactor Trip, a check of the Vital Auxiliaries Safety Function status indicates that:

• #1 Emergency Diesel Generator (2DG1) is Running

• 2DG1 Frequency is 60 Hz

• 2DG1 Voltage is 4165 V

• 4160V Vital AC Bus 2A3 is Deenergized

• Annunciator 2K08-B3 "2A3 LO RELAY TRIP" has actuated 2DG1 should be secured to prevent ____________________________________________ .

A. overheating the diesel engine B. uneven lower crankshaft bearing wear C. buildup of unburned fuel in the exhaust manifold D. running the diesel engine without Jacket Cooling Water flow Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: with a lockout on the vital AC bus (2A3) the service water pump would be deenergized and overheating of the engine is a concern.

B. Incorrect: uneven lower crankshaft bearing wear due to the engine being run unloaded could be a concern but does not required an engine shutdown C. Incorrect: buildup of unburned fuel in the engine exhaust manifold during engine low load operations is a concern but does not required an engine shutdown D. Incorrect: Jacket Cooling Water has a engine driven pump which will maintain Jacket Cooling Water flow to the EDG therefore no requirement to secure EDG

References:

OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev 014, step 5.G contingency action page 5 of 19 EOP-2202.001,Standard Post Trip Actions Tech Guide, Rev 012, step 2 .H page 11 of 42 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO ESPTA, Introduction to EOPs and Standard Post Trip Action, Objective 11: Describe the major actions taken during the performance of SPTA and the basis for each.

Historical Comments:

NRC BANK QID #1161 not previously used on an NRC Exam Rev 1 truncated distracters to remove "due to" statement and added "diesel" based on NRC review comments. Rearranged Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 75

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 distracters for balance after editing. Cms 7-10-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 76

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2119 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/10/2014 QID #: 47 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NRC EXAM QID #1763 Search 078000K105 10CFR55: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 4 Safety Function 8 System

Title:

Instrument Air System (IAS) System Number 078 K/A K1.05 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Imp: 3.5 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ALIA OBJ 3

Description:

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the IAS and the following systems: - MSIV air Question:

Which one of the following components is designed to fail closed when Instrument Air supply is lost and associated accumulator is depressurized?

A. Main Steam Isolation Valves B. Main Feedwater Regulating Valves C. Cooling Tower Basin Level Control Valve D. Shutdown Cooling System Flow Control Valve Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: Motive force to open the MSIVs is IA and the valves fail closed when IA is lost B. Incorrect: Main Feedwater Regulating Valves fail AS IS on a loss of IA C. Incorrect: Cooling Tower Basin Level Control Valve fails AS IS on a loss of IA D. Incorrect: Shutdown Cooling System Flow Control Valve fails open on a loss of IA

References:

AOP 2203.021, Loss of Instrument Air, Rev 15, Attachment A Pages 16,18,19 and 27 of 111 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ALIA, onjective 3: Describe the mitigation strategy and instructions for actions directed in OP 2203.021, Loss of Instrument Air Historical Comments:

NRC EXAM QID #1763 used on the 2011 NRC Exam Rev 1 incorporated NRC review comments. Added accumulator status to stem for clarification Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 77

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2120 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 5/14/2014 QID #: 48 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NRC BANK QID #0688 Search 103000A301 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 Safety Function 5 System

Title:

Containment System System Number 103 K/A A3.01 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.9 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ELOCA OBJ 19

Description:

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Containment System, including: - Containment isolation Question:

A valid CIAS is actuated and the following is observed:

• Penetration Room Exhaust Fan 2VEF-38A running

• Penetration Room Exhaust Fan 2VEF-38B running

• All eight Penetration Room Ventilation Dampers indicate CLOSED on 2C-16 and 2C-17 Which of the following will ensure proper operation of the Penetration Room Ventilation System?

A. Place one Penetration Exhaust Fan in Pull-to-Lock B. Place one Filter Cooling valve handswitch in CLOSED C. Verify >2000 SCFM on panel 2C-33 for BOTH exhaust fan filter units D. Verify Filter Cooling valves on BOTH exhaust fan filter units are OPEN Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: Both fans running simultaneously will cause inaccuracies with the monitoring system therefore placing one Penetration Exhaust Fan in Pull-to-Lock is directed/required action B. Incorrect: manipulation of filter valves are not directed at the onset of CIAS for system operation C. Incorrect: only one fan should be running, not BOTH D. Incorrect: there is no direction to open either filter cooling valve during a Valid CIAS condition

References:

OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev 022 Attachment 5, pages 15, 16, and 17 of 204 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ELOCA, objective 19: Discuss the Standard Attachments that are used during the implementation of the LOCA EOP Historical Comments:

NRC BANK QID #0688 used on 2006 NRC Exam Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 78

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2121 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/10/2014 QID #: 49 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 003000A103 10CFR55: 41.5 / 45.5 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS) System Number 003 K/A A1.03 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.6 SRO Imp: 2.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-RCP OBJ 2

Description:

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCPS controls including: - RCP motor stator winding temperatures Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is making preparations to perform a plant heatup following a refueling outage

• The order to start the first RCP has been given Which of the following would require the RCP to be secured if observed 15 seconds after start?

A. RCP amperage on 2C03 indicates off scale high B. Annunciator 2K11 G-6 "RCP VIBRATION HI" is in alarm C. Annunciator 2K10 K-3 "VLPMS RCS VIBRATION" is in alarm D. RCP differential pressure on 2C03 indicates 15 psia and stable Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: when starting a RCP, the meter reading on 2C03 will peg high due to starting current then return to a normal value (approximately 400 amps or 60% of the scale) within 10 seconds after start.

There is a note in the procedure (section 7.0) remind the operator that pump amps should return to a normal value in <10 second post start. With RCP amperage on 2C03 indicating >80% of scale and stable the RCP should be secured due to the possibility of winding damage from the excessive current draw.

B. Incorrect: Annunciator for high vibrations during a RCP start is addressed in the ACA which requires monitoring of the pump post start. The ACA does not required tripping the RCP.

C. Incorrect: this ACA directs monitoring and involvement of system engineering prior to taking actions. It does not direct securing the RCP.

D. Incorrect: This is a normal differential pressure for one pump operations.

References:

OP-2103.006, Reactor Coolant Pump Operations, Rev 029, section 3.0 page 3 of 27 and section 7.0 page 9 of 27 OP-2203.012J, Annunciator 2K10 Corrective Actions, Window K-3, Rev 039, page 43 of 84 OP-2203.012K, Annunciator 2K11 Corrective Actions, Window G-6, Rev 044, pages 56 and 57 of 125 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-RCP objective 2: Describe the indications available in the control room associated with the RCP's and discuss what they are used for.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1 changed time frame to 15 sec to be closer to the expected starting amp duration per NRC review comments. Cms 7 14.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 79

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 80

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2122 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/10/2014 QID #: 50 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 004000A315 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 Safety Function 1 System

Title:

Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) System Number 004 K/A A3.15 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.5 SRO Imp: 3.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-CVCS OBJ 10

Description:

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CVCS, including: - PZR pressure and temperature Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 80% power

• An event occurred causing a 10% step load increase of MTG output

• NO operator actions are taken The ATC should expect the CVCS system to automatically respond by throttling _______ the Letdown Back Pressure control valves and _______ Coolant Charging Pump(s).

A. open; starting B. open; securing C. closed; starting D. closed; securing Answer:

C Correct Notes:

C. Correct: a 10% load change on the MTG will cause a rapid drop in PZR level and pressure. CVCS will respond by reducing Letdown flow to minimum (~28 gpm) and starting all CCPs to recover Pzr level.

With Letdown flow going to minimum, the back pressure control valves will also go to minimum to maintain letdown header pressure above saturation.

A. Incorrect: Letdown back pressure control valves will throttle close, not open, to maintain letdown header pressure above saturation. CCPs will automaticlly start due to the low Pzr level B. Incorrect: Letdown back pressure control valves will throttle close, not open, to maintain letdown header pressure above saturation.CCPs will automaticlly start due to the low Pzr level C. Incorrect: Letdown back pressure control valves will throttle close to maintain letdown header pressure above saturation but CCPs will automaticlly start due to Pzr low level

References:

OP-2104.002, Chemical and Volume Control, Rev 076, section 3.0 pages 4 and 5 of 262 STM 2-04, Chemical and Volume Control System, Rev 29, section 2.1.10 page 11, section 2.2.3 pages 22 and 24076 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-CVCS objective 10: Describe the operation of CVCS as stated in OP-2104.002 Historical Comments:

Rev 1 incorporated NRC review comments. Simplified stem statement. Cms 7-10-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 81

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2123 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/11/2014 QID #: 51 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 012000A202 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 7 System

Title:

Reactor Protection System System Number 012 K/A A2.02 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.6 SRO Imp: 3.9 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-RPS OBJ 5&14

Description:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Loss of instrument power Question:

[REFERENCE PROVIDED]

With respect to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Unit 2 operating at 100% power, a loss of Vital Instrument bus 2RS-1 would cause Solid State Relay(s) for trip path(s) _____________

to de-energize and the reactor _______________ trip.

A. 1 ONLY; would B. 1 ONLY; would NOT C. 1 and 2 ONLY; would D. 1 and 2 ONLY; would NOT Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: 2RS-1 powers the RED train (channel 1) components. Each Matrix has 2 individual 12v power supply, powered by a different vital bus. A failure of one matrix power supply will de-energize 2 of the 4 matrix relays (referred to as a half leg trip). This will cause 2 Trip paths to deenergize (1 and 2) but because of the TCB breaker arrangement, the CEDM bus will remain energized. With the reference provided the applicant should be able to determine the affected trip paths but will have to remember the trip path to TCB arrangement.

Plausibility for the distracters is in that an applicant may remember that a single failure should not cause a trip but not understand the RPS logic or TCB bus arrangement so they could easily assume that the loss of 2RS-1 would only impact the channel 1 RPS leg. Similarly, if it is recognized that 2 Trip Paths will de-energize, then the discriminating factor is understanding the TCB breaker arrangement.

References:

References Provided - STM 2-63 page 67 Matrix Drawing and page 57 2C23 Power Supplies STM 2-63, Reactor Protective System, Rev 11, section 2.0 pages 3 and 5 and section 4.1.1 pages 20 and 21 STM 2-02, Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System, Rev 21, simplified drawing page 83 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-RPS:

Objective 5: Describe the power supplies to the Reactor Protection System.

Objective 14: Given a set of plant conditions related to the Reactor Protection System, predict the system response to these conditions and determine the final state of system components.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1 incorporated NRC review comments. Improved the 2X2 format. Edited stem for better readability. Added reference provided to keep above minutia level. Cms 7-11-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 82

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 83

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2124 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/11/2014 QID #: 52 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 061000K104 10CFR55: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 4 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) Syste System Number 061 K/A K1.04 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.9 SRO Imp: 4.1 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EFW OBJ 15

Description:

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the AFW System and the following systems: - RCS Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• "A" EFW pump (2P-7A) has been started inadvertently The "A" EFW pump should be secured as soon as possible _________________________ .

A. because the pump is operating without a suction path B. because the pump is operating without a recirc flow path C. due to effects on reactor power from the injection of cold water D. due to effects on reactor power from the elevated steam demand Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: 2P-7A is the Steam Driven EFW pump and Reactor Power will rise approximately 0 .05 to 0.020% when the pump is started due to the extra steam demand C. Incorrect: EFW to S/G MOVs are controlled as a function of S/G level and would not cycle open and feed the S/Gs due to the inadvertent EFW pump start. There would not any effect on reactor power.

A. Incorrect: the pump is not operating without a suction path, the suction valves are aligned and administratively controlled in the open position during normal operations.

B. Incorrect: the pump is not operating without a recirc flow path, the recirc valves are aligned and administratively controlled in the open position during normal operations.

References:

OP-2106.006, Emergency Feedwater System Operations, Rev 085, section 3.0 page 4 of 241, Limit and Precaution 5.27 page 12 of 241, Supplement 10 pages 199 and 201 of 241 STM 2-19-2, EFW &AFW Systems, Rev 36, section 1.4 page 4 and simplified drawing page 38 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-EFW objective 15: Given plant conditions and reference material, determine the correct response to an EFW abnormal condition.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1 - incorporated NRC review comments. Minor editorial to stem and distracters to improve readability. Cms 7-11-14.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 84

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2125 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/11/2014 QID #: 53 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 0640002434 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 6 System

Title:

Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System System Number 064 K/A 2.4.34 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.2 SRO Imp: 4.1 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-AAS OBJ 2

Description:

Emergency Procedures/Plan - Knowledge of RO tasks performed outside the main control room during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

Question:

Consider the following:

• A fire has rendered Unit 2 Control Room uninhabitable

• OP-2203.014, Alternate Shutdown, AOP is being implemented

• Initial Control Room actions have been completed and Control Room has been evacuated IAW OP-2203.014, Alternate Shutdown AOP, RO2 would be tasked to _____________________ .

A. perform a No DC Start of #2 EDG B. locally align Service Water to #2 EDG C. locally start 2P-4C, "C" Service Water pump D. open DC control power and verify supply breakers open for RCPs Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: OP-2203.014 AOP is designed to recover the GREEN vital Switchgear during an Alternate Shutdown condition. The SM and STA will monitor the plant from the TSC, the CRS controls electrical equipment (372' Aux Bldg behind door 340) RO2 is assigned to the Aux Bldg, his first action is to manually align SW to #2 EDG (section 7 step 3)

A. Incorrect: No DC Start of #2 EDG is performed by the CRS not RO2 C. Incorrect: local start of 2P-4C ("C" Service Water pump) is directed by CRS and performed by ASDO D. Incorrect: local RCP breaker ops are performed by the EO

References:

OP-2203.014, Alternate Shutdown, Rev 029, section 7 step 3 page 31 of 78, page 15 of 78 CRS action, and page 40 of 78 ASDO action.

AOP-2203.014, Alternate Shutdown Tech Guide, Rev 028, discussion pages 3, 5 and 6 of 26, Time Line pages 10 , 11, and 12 of 26, section 7 page 20 of 26 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-AAS, objective 2 : Describe the mitigation strategy and instructions for actions directed in the Alternate Shutdown AOP, OP-2203.014 Historical Comments:

Rev 1 incorporated NRC comments. Truncated distracters to state only the action and not the reason why. Replaced AACG start action with RCP breaker local ops by the EO to improve plausibility. Add to references the ASDO/CRS steps for starting 2P-4C. Cms 7-11-14.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 85

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2126 Rev: 3 Rev Date: 7/24/2014 QID #: 54 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 078000A301 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 Safety Function 8 System

Title:

Instrument Air System (IAS) System Number 078 K/A A3.01 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.1 SRO Imp: 3.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-LIA OBJ 3

Description:

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the IAS, including: - Air pressure Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• Annunciator 2K12 A-8 "INST AIR HI/LO" comes into alarm

• Unit 2 ATC reports Instrument Air (IA) header pressure reads 78 psig

• Unit 1 CRS reports Unit 1 IA header pressure is 58 psig

• OP-2203.021, Loss of Instrument Air AOP is being implemented 5 minutes later the following is reported:

• Unit 1 reports their IA header pressure is 48 psia

• Unit 2 ATC reports IA header pressure is 58 psig Based on actions taken IAW OP-2203.021, Loss of Instrument Air AOP, in response to the current air header pressures for both units the ATC should expect _______ IA Compressor(s) running loaded and IA header pressure trending __________ on Unit 2.

A. one; up B. one; down C. two; up D. two; down Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: with a Loss of IA event the AOP will direct cross connecting Unit 1 and 2 to help support and maintain IA header pressure on the Unit. When the location of the leak has been determined (which Unit is having the problem) and IA header pressure reaches a pre-determined pressure (<60# on Unit 2) then direction is given to un-cross connect the Units to prevent the possibility of both Units tripping due to the loss of control of IA driven components. With Unit 2 air pressure less than the setpoint for the standby IA compressor to start and fully load the operator should expect both compressors to be running fully loaded and with IA split between the Units he should also expect to see IA header pressure trending up.

A. Incorrect: see discussion above B. Incorrect: see discussion above D. Incorrect: see discussion above Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 86

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14

References:

OP-2203.012L, Annunciator 2K12 Corrective Action, Window A-8 Rev 045, page 85 of 116 OP:-2104.024, Instrument Air System, Rev 046, section 3.0 page 2 of 97 and section 6.0 page 5 of 97 OP-2203.021, Loss of Instrument Air, Rev 015, steps 3 and 4 page 2 of 111 AOP-2203.021, Loss of Instrument Air Tech Guide, Rev 014, step 3 page 6 of 28, step 4 page 7 of 28 STM 2-48, Instrument Air System, Rev 15, section 2.7 pages 8 and 9 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-LIA objective 3: Describe the mitigation strategy and instructions for actions directed in OP 2203.021, Loss of Instrument Air Historical Comments:

Rev 1 incorporated NRC review comments. Edited stem to clarify Unit 1 and Unit 2 actions or responses. Added initial Unit 1 IA pressure for trend. Changed final U2 IA pressure value. Cms 7-11-14.

Rev 2: Based on NRC comments changed pressures in stem for plausibility and added wording to question for clarity. mwf 7/23/14 Rev 3 add more verbiage to stem question to ensure reader is clear that the actions to split the air systems between units has been completed based on NRC recommendation. Cms 7-24-14.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 87

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2127 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/11/2014 QID #: 55 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 006000K416 10CFR55: 41.7 Safety Function 2 System

Title:

Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) System Number 006 K/A K4.16 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Imp: 3.5 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-SDC OBJ 1

Description:

Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: - Interlocks between RHR valves and RCS Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is in Mode 4

• Cooldown is in progress

• Preparations for going on Shutdown Cooling are in progress As RCS pressure is lowered below 350 psia, SDC suction valve (2CV-5084-1) will ______________ as sensed by

______________ pressure instrument.

A. automatically open; SDC suction B. automatically open; PZR low range C. meet open permissive interlock; SDC suction D. meet open permissive interlock; PZR low range Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

C. Incorrect: with SDC suction header pressure <350 psia (=/- 8 psia) will meet the open permissive interlock but the permissive interlock is sensed from the PZR Lo Range pressure transmitter.

A. Incorrect: the SDC isolation valves from the RCS do not receive any automatic actuations, the permissive and alarm function is sensed from the PZR Lo Range pressure transmitter B. Incorrect: the SDC isolation valves from the RCS do not receive any automatic actuations, the permissive .

D. Correct: with SDC suction header pressure <350 psia (=/- 8 psia) will meet the open permissive interlock because the permissive and alarm functions come from the PZR low range pressure transmitter.

References:

OP-2104.004, Shutdown Cooling System, Rev 056, section 6.0 page 8 of 134 STM 2-14, Shutdown Cooling System, Rev 11, section 2.1.1 page 9, section 2.1.4 page 10, and section2.2.1.1 page 11 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-SDC objective : Describe the following evolutions as controlled by appropriate procedures including flowpaths and purposes of flowpaths, initial conditions, procedural steps and limits & precautions as appropriate: Preparation for SDC, Commencement of SDC Historical Comments:

Rev 1 corrected minor errors in the justification statements in the Notes section. CMS 7-11-14.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 88

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2128 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 5/15/2014 QID #: 56 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 001000K201 10CFR55: 41.7 Safety Function 1 System

Title:

Control Rod Drive System System Number 001 K/A K2.01 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.5 SRO Imp: 3.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-CEDM OBJ 8

Description:

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: - One-line diagram of power supply to M/G sets Question:

Bus power that directly supplies the CEDMCS M/G sets is from 480v load centers ______________ .

A. 2B1 and 2B2 B. 2B3 and 2B4 C. 2B5 and 2B6 D. 2B7 and 2B8 Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: #1 M/G set is powered from non-vital 480v bus 2B7 and #2 M/G set is powered from non-vital 480 v bus 2B8 A. Incorrect: these two buses are non-vital 480v but the MG sets are not powered by them B. Incorrect: these two buses are non-vital 480v but the MG sets are not powered by them C. Incorrect: these two buses are vital 480v buses and the M/G sets are not powered by them

References:

STM 2-02,Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System, Rev 21 pages 34 and 83 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-CEDM, objective 8: From memory draw a one-line diagram of the CEDMCS electrical distribution from the MG Sets to the cabinets 2C-70 and 2C71. (Obj.8)

Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 89

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2129 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 5/21/2014 QID #: 57 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC BANK QID #1611 Search 002000K405 10CFR55: 41.7 Safety Function 2 System

Title:

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) System Number 002 K/A K4.05 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-CCW OBJ 13&17

Description:

Knowledge of RCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: - Detection of RCS leakage Question:

With Unit 2 operating at 100% power, which one of the following radiation monitors would indicate a small inter-system LOCA starting to develop from the RCS?

A. Loop 2 Component Cooling Water Radiation Monitor B. In service Containment Atmospheric Monitors (CAMS)

C. Loop 1 Service Water return from the SDC Heat Exchanger Radiation Monitor D. Loop 2 Service Water return from the Containment Cooling Coils Radiation Monitor Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: Any leak from a RCP cooling HX or Letdown HX would be detected at full power as soon as the leak started to develop.

B. Incorrect: CAM units monitor Containment for small RCS leaks that develop directly from RCS piping to Containment Atmosphere C. Incorrect: There is no Service Water flow through the SDC HX at 100% power.

D. Incorrect: There is no direct connection between the Containment Coolers and the RCS therefore this monitor would not see an RCS inter-system leak, only one that has pressurized the containment atmosphere.

References:

STM 2-43, Component Cooling Water System, Rev 14, section 2.5 page 8 and section 4.0 page 19 STM 2-62, Radiation Monitoring System, Rev 21, sections 2.2.2 page 17 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-CCW Objective 13: Define Interfacing System LOCA (ISLOCA) and describe the method used to protect against an ISLOCA used at ANO Unit 2.

Objective 17: Describe the design features of the CCW System which reduce the possibility of radioactive release to the environment.

Historical Comments:

NRC BANK QID #1611 used on 2009 NRC Exam Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 90

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2130 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 58 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 011000K512 10CFR55: 41.5 / 45.7 Safety Function 2 System

Title:

Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS) System Number 011 K/A K5.12 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 2.7 SRO Imp: 3.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-PZR OBJ 7

Description:

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the PZR LCS: - Criteria and purpose of PZR level program Question:

The Pressurizer (PZR) programmed level setpoint is based on __________________

and the volume is controlled to _____________________.

A. reactor power; limit amount of water rejected to Waste Management System B. reactor power; prevent lifting PZR Code Safeties on a full load rejection C. average RCS temperature; limit amount of water rejected to Waste Management System D. average RCS temperature; prevent lifting PZR Code Safeties on a full load rejection Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

A and B incorrect due to basis for level control is on RCS Tave. Plausible because the program level graph includes power levels (due to Tave is programmed based on power).

D is incorrect. Plausible because level and pressure will increase with a load rejection, however, the design criteria for PZR volume is to limit transient pressure increases to be below RPS trip setpoint (2362 psia) which is also below the Code Safety lift setpoint of 2500 psia.

References:

STM 2-03-01, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control, Rev 16, section 3.1 page 15 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-PZR objective 7: Explain the function of the Pressurizer Level Control System.

SAR section 5.5.10.1 Historical Comments:

Rev 1 incorporated NRC review comments. Replace part B of distractors to increase difficulty, plausibility, and discriminatory value. Cms 7-11-14.

Based on NRC comments added wording to distracters "B" and "D" for clarification mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 91

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2131 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/11/2014 QID #: 59 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 015000A304 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 Safety Function 7 System

Title:

Nuclear Instrumentation System System Number 015 K/A A3.04 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Imp: 3.5 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-NI OBJ 8

Description:

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the NIS, including: - Maximum disagreement allowed between channels Question:

The MAXIMUM disagreement allowed between Nuclear Instrumentation channels and COLSS indications per OP-2102.004 Power Operations with reactor power between 15% and 80% is _________.

A. -2% and +2%

B. -2% and +10%

C. -10% and +0.5%

D. -0.5% and +10%

Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: based on T.S., Power operations procedure and Logs A. Incorrect: band is for operations >80 % power B. Incorrect: mixture of bands C. Incorrect: band is reverse of the required band

References:

OP-2102.004, Power Operation< Rev 057, section 8.0 pages 18 and 19 of 98, section 9.0 page 30 of 98 Technical Specifications amendment No. 186, Table 4.3-1 note (2) page 3-8 Ops-B6, Unit 2 ATC Power Distribution Logs, CPC Neutron power, page 1 of 8 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-NI objective 8: Using the Unit 2 Tech Specs explain the Limiting Condition for operations and Surveillance requirements associated with the Excore NI system.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1 - Minor editorial of stem per NRC review comments. Cms 7-11-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 92

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2132 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 5/31/2014 QID #: 60 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 016000K306 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.6 Safety Function 7 System

Title:

Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System (NNIS) System Number 016 K/A K3.06 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.5 SRO Imp: 3.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EFW OBJ 15

Description:

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the NNIS will have on the following: - AFW System Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• Annunciator 2K05 E-9 "2P-7A SUCT PRESS HI/LO" comes into alarm

• WCO reports that 2P-7A Suction Pressure instrument, 2PIS-0795-2, has failed low Given this failure, 2P-7A ACTUAL suction pressure should be approximately ________ psig and the suction valves would be aligned to ___________________.

A. 30; Service Water B. 30; Q CST (T-41B)

C. 85; Service Water D. 85; Q CST (T-41B)

Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

The EFW pump suction is normally aligned to the Q CST which has a nominal 30 psig static head at the suction of the pumps. Failure of this instrument low concurrent with a valid EFAS signal will cause the suction valves to automatically swap over to the SW suction which normally is approximately 85 psig.

A. & C Incorrect: would not be aligned to SW since conditions do not imply a valid EFAS is present D. Incorrect: pressure is too high for alignment to the Q CST

References:

OP-2203.012E, Annunciator 2K05 Corrective Action, Window E-9, Rev 039, page 81 of 86 STM 2-19-2, EFW & AFW Systems, Rev 36, Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-EFW objective 15: Given plant conditions and reference material, determine the correct response to an EFW abnormal condition.

Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 93

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2133 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 61 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0330002431 10CFR55: 41.10 / 45.3 Safety Function 8 System

Title:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFPCS) System Number 033 K/A 2.4.31 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 4.2 SRO Imp: 4.1 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ASFP OBJ 3

Description:

Emergency Procedures/Plan - Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures.

Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• Annunciator 2K11 J-5 "LEVEL LO" for the SFP is in alarm

• WCO reports SFP level is 401' 4" and slowly lowering

• Tilt pit and Cask loading pit gates are installed with seals inflated

• Control Room receives a report of a water leak on the North end of hallway 335' Aux Building

• OP-2203.002, Spent Fuel Pool Emergencies AOP, has been entered Using OP-2203.002, Spent Fuel Pool Emergencies AOP, the CRS should direct Spent Fuel Pool makeup by adding A. boric acid ONLY B. demineralized water ONLY C. demineralized water and boric acid D. borated water by deflating the Tilt Pit gate Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: with a loss of inventory a blended solution boric acid and deminerialized water is the first choice for makeup to the SFP to prevent diluting or concentrating the SFP boron concentration.

A. Incorrect: adding just boric acid will concentrate the boric acid in the SFP.

B. Incorrect: DI water using CVCS to the SFP is directed if low level is based on evaporation, there is a loss of inventory and addition of straight DI water is not warranted.

D. Incorrect: this action is not directed by the AOP or ACA. Plausible due to water will sluice between the SFP and the Tilt pit with the gate deflated.

References:

OP-2203.012K, Annunciator 2K11 Corrective Actions, Window 2K11 J5, Rev 044, page 48 of 125 OP-2203.002, Spent Fuel Pool Emergencies, Rev 009, step 5 contingency column 5.B.1 page 7 of 38 AOP-2203.002, Spent Fuel Pool Emergencies Tech Guide, Rev 009, step 5 page 8 of 15 OP-2104.006, Fuel Pool System, Rev 051, section 3.0 page 5 of 191, section 10.0 page 19 of 191 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ASFP, objective 3: Describe the mitigation strategy and instructions for actions directed in OP-2203.002, Spent Fuel Pool Emergencies AOP Historical Comments:

Rev 1: changed distracters and added/changed notes for clarification based on NRC comments Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 94

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Rev 2: Based on NRC comments, changed 'demineralizer' to 'demineralized' in distracters "B" and "C" mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 95

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2134 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/11/2014 QID #: 62 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: New Search 035000K112 10CFR55: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 4 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Steam Generator System (S/GS) System Number 035 K/A K1.12 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.7 SRO Imp: 3.9 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-RPS OBJ 3&8

Description:

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the S/GS and the following systems: - RPS Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 85% power with online repair of Main Feed Pump 2P-1B in progress

• An electrical fault causes Main Feed Pump 2P-1A to trip The reactor will recieve an automatic trip signal due to ___________________________ .

A. low feedwater flow B. low Steam Generator level C. loss of both Main Feed Pumps D. feedwater flow to steam flow mismatch Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: RPS trip setpoint is 22.2% SG level Remaining distracters plausible in that each of these are true results of this event, however, none of these actually cause a trip automatically by the condition. The conditions will result in lowering SG level which at this power level will quickly cause the RPS trip.

References:

STM 2-63 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-RPS:

Objective 3: List the reactor trips and their trip setpoints.

Objective 3: Describe the operation of the Reactor Protection System.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1 - Reworded stem to be specific to "reactor trip" and replaced distracters per NRC review comments. Original question was bank question NRC EXAM BAK QID #0555 used on the 2006 NRC Exam. Changed to NEW question due to the significant change makes question no longer like the original. Cms 7-11-14.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 96

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2135 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 63 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC BANK QID #157 Search 041000A102 10CFR55: 41.5 / 45.5 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Steam Dump System (SDS) and Turbine Bypass System Number 041 K/A A1.02 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.1 SRO Imp: 3.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-SDBCS OBJ 3&4

Description:

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the SDS controls including: - Steam pressure Question:

The unit is at 50% power during a ramp to 100% power, when a turbine trip occurs.

Which of the following statements describes the IMMEDIATE response of the atmospheric dump valves (ADVs) and Bypass Control valves?

A. ADVs modulate to control RCS temperature and bypass valves receive a "quick-open" signal.

B. ADVs receive a "quick-open" signal and bypass valves modulate to control main steam pressure.

C. Bypass valves and ONLY one ADV receive "quick open" signal then modulate to control main steam pressure.

D. Reactor trip blocks ALL "quick open" signals then ADVs and bypass valves receive modulate signal from the master controller to control RCS temperature.

Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: a turbine trip will cause a reactor trip based on high RCS pressure [secured steam flow through turbine and still making heat in the reactor] The reactor trip will generate a "quick open" signal for both downstream ADV and All Condenser Bypass valves then modulate (ADVs will go closed and the Bypass valves will throttle) to control Main Steam pressure within the post trip band (approximately 1038 psia)

A. Incorrect: see above D. Incorrect: see above C. Incorrect: both downstream ADVs (not just one) and all of the condenser bypass valves will receive a "quick open" signal due to the reactor trip then modulate (ADVs will go closed and the Bypass valves will throttle) to control Main Steam pressure

References:

OP-2105.008, Steam Dump and Bypass Contol System Operations, Rev 028, section 3.0 pages 2, 3, and 4 of 41 STM 2-23, Steam Dump & Bypass Control System, Rev 16, section1.3.2 page 7, section 2.3.6 pages 18 and 20, simplified drawing page 37 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-SDBCS :

Objective 3: Describe how a Modulation Demand signal is generated within the SDBCS.

Objective 4: Describe the SDBCS valve sequencing programs used by the SDBCS.

Historical Comments:

NRC BANK QID #157 used on 1998 NRC Exam Rev 1: changed format to original Bank question based on NRC comments Rev 2: Based on NRC comments, changed stem to a turbine trip causing a reactor trip and corrected answers and notes mwf Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 97

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 98

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2136 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/11/2014 QID #: 64 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 045000A406 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System System Number 045 K/A A4.06 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 2.8 SRO Imp: 2.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-TURBC OBJ 21

Description:

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: - Turbine stop valves Question:

When performing OP-2106.009, Turbine Generator Operations, section 14.0 Turbine Roll, when 100 RPM is selected on the Speed Set controller, the proper Main Turbine Stop Valves opening sequence is:

A. #1 Stop Valve bypass valve opens to equalize pressure then #1 Stop Valve opens followed by the opening of #2, #3 and #4 Stop Valves in sequence B. #2 Stop Valve bypass valve opens to equalize pressure then #2 Stop Valve opens followed by the opening of #1, #3 and #4 Stop Valves in sequence C. #1 Stop Valve bypass valve opens to equalize pressure then #1 Stop Valve opens followed by #2, #3 and #4 Stop Valves simultaneously D. #2 Stop Valve bypass valve opens to equalize pressure then #2 Stop Valve opens followed by #1, #3 and #4 Stop Valves simultaneously Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: #2 Stop valve is the "Master" and #1, #3 and #4 are the slaves. When #2 fully opens the other Main Turbine Stop Valves receive an open signal and simultaneously open A. Incorrect: #1 Stop Valve does not have a bypass valve opens (only #2 Stop Valve has the internal bypass to equalize pressure) and the "Slave" valves (#1, #3 and #4 Stop Valves) would open simultaneously not in sequence B. Incorrect: #2 Stop Valve bypass valve will open and equalize pressure across the Stop valve then #2 Stop Valve will fully open then send a open signal to the "Slave" valves (#1, #3 and #4 Stop Valves) but the "Slave" valves would open simultaneously not in sequence C. Incorrect: #1 Stop Valve does not have a bypass valve opens (only #2 Stop Valve has the internal bypass to equalize pressure). The "Slave" valves (#1, #3 and #4 Stop Valves) would open simultaneously not in sequence

References:

OP-2106.009, Turbine Generator Operations, Rev 074, section 14.0 step 14.10 page 48 of 143 STM 2-24, Main Turbine, Rev 7 section 2.1 pages 6 and 7 STM 2-24-1, Main Turbine Control System, Rev 20 section 2.3.2 page 18 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-TURBC objective 21: Describe the opening and closing sequence between the Master and Slave Intercept valves on the ANO-2 Low Pressure Turbines and the Stop Valves on the High Pressure Turbine.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1 corrected typos in Notes section. Cms 7-11-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 99

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2137 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 65 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 086000K604 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.7 Safety Function 8 System

Title:

Fire Protection System (FPS) System Number 086 K/A K6.04 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 2.6 SRO Imp: 2.9 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-FPROT OBJ 4

Description:

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the Fire Protection System: -

Fire, smoke, and heat detectors Question:

Consider the following:

• One of the Two smoke detectors in the Fuel Oil Vault for #1 EDG (2T57A) has failed in a non-actuated state

• A fire now occurs in 2T57A Fuel Oil Vault The ATC should expect 2T57A Fuel Oil Vault Fire Sprinkler system UAV to ___________________

and the 2T57A Fuel Oil Vault to be sprayed down ______________________________ .

A. automatically actuate; immediately after actuation B. require local manual actuation; immediately after actuation C. automatically actuate; after fusible heads melt D. require local manual actuation; after fusible heads melt Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: Fuel Oil Vault are protected/monitored by 2 smoke detectors. they are arranged for 2 out of 2 in alarm to actuate the deluge system. With one detector out of service, the Control Room would receive an alarm but the fire system would required local manual actuation (pull station inside the door). Once actuated Firewater flow into the vault would commence (deluge system).

A. Incorrect: it requires both smoke detectors in alarm (2 out of 2) to automatically actuate the Firewater system for the Fuel Oil Vault therefore the firewater system would not automatically actuate and spray down the room C. Incorrect: it requires both smoke detectors in alarm (2 out of 2) to automatically actuate the Firewater system for the Fuel Oil Vault. The Fuel Oil Vaults are protected with a deluge Firewater system (open heads) not by a pre-action with fusible heads.

D. Incorrect: manual actuation is required to actuate the Firewater system for the Fuel Oil Vaults but the Fuel Oil Vaults are protected with a deluge Firewater system (open heads) not by a pre-action with fusible heads.

References:

STM 2-60, Fire Protection System, Rev 13, Table 4 page 27 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-FPROT, objective 4: Given a set of plant conditions, evaluate what components or instrumentation could be affected by a fire in a specific area.

Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 100

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Rev 1: changed stem and distracters and added to the notes based on NRC comments Rev 2: Based on NRC comments ,changed structure of stem and wording of question for clarity mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 101

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2138 Rev: 3 Rev Date: 7/24/2014 QID #: 66 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 1940012126 10CFR55: 41.10 / 45.12 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.1.26 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Imp: 3.6 L. Plan: FLP-OPS-ESOMS OBJ 3

Description:

Conduct of Operations - Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen).

Question:

IAW EN-OP-102, Protective and Caution Tagging, which of the following are the DEFINED MINIMUM parameter values to designate a high energy system:

Contains either fluids or gases that operate with a temperature greater than ____°F or a pressure of greater than ________

psig.

A. 150; 300 B. 150; 500 C. 200; 300 D. 200; 500 Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: Does meet the definition of a high energy system per EN-OP-102 A. Incorrect: Does meet the definition of a high energy system per EN-OP-102 B. Incorrect: Does meet the definition of a high energy system per EN-OP-102 C. Incorrect: Does meet the definition of a high energy system per EN-OP-102

References:

EN-OP-102, Protective and Caution Tagging, Rev 16, definition [14], page 7 of 91 and attachment 9.2 secton 5.0 page 67 of 91 Lesson Plan FLP-OPS-ESOMS, objective 3: Explain the information outlined in the following: Attachment 9.1 (Tag Standards), Attachment 9.2 (General Tagout Standards), Attachment 9.3 (Electrical Tagout Standards), Attachment 9.4 (Outage Tagging Guidelines )

Historical Comments:

Rev 1: Based on NRC comments, replaced question due to simplicity Rev 2: Based on NRC comments added wording [minimum] to question for plausibility mwf 7/23/14 Rev 3: added "MINIMUM" to stem per NRC recommendation. Cms 7-24-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 102

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2139 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/19/2014 QID #: 67 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: New Search 1940012103 10CFR55: 41.10 / 45.13 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.1.3 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.7 SRO Imp: 3.9 L. Plan: ASLP-RO-COPD OBJ 3

Description:

Conduct of Operations - Knowledge of shift or short-term relief turnover practices.

Question:

A reactor operator reports for duty on Monday for the first night of night-shift to relieve the ATC. The eSOMS Narrative Log is NOT available to verify watch qualification requirements.

Which of the following items for the individual noted during reviews using alternative verifications should prevent relieving the ATC watch?

A. General Radworker Requal training item is showing overdue in Plateau B. License Operator Requal training cycle completed the previous Friday is showing incomplete in Plateau C. Supervisor Review of Crew Training Requirements Form OPS-144 indicates Fire Brigade qualification will expire at midnight D. Watchstation Proficiency Report posted in the control room indicates 1 ATC watch and 4 CBOT watches completed for the previous month Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

COPD001 Operations Expectations and Standards list the alternate methods for verifying watchstation qualification requirements when the normal method, eSOMS Narrative Log program, is not available.

A. Correct: Plausible as incorrect because an operator may believe that an ATC doesn't need to enter controlled access, however, COPD001 requires that all watchstanders maintain DLR qualification.

B. Incorrect: Plausible because maintaining LOR training current is required to continue licensed operator duties, however, EN-TQ-114, LOR Training Program allows 90 days from the end of a cycle to complete all of the required training.

C. Incorrect: Reactor operators maintain FB quals to allow them to cover NLO position vacancies, however, this is not a required qualification for ATC watch.

D. Incorrect: Plausible in that the individual may be think that proficiency requires 5 for each watchstation.

References:

COPD-001, Operations Expectation and Standards, Rev 065 step 5.16.1.B page 55 of 112 Historical Comments:

Rev 1 replaced question per NRC review comments. 7-19-14 cms.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 103

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2140 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/15/2014 QID #: 68 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 1940012104 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.2 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.1.4 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Imp: 3.8 L. Plan: ASLP-RO-COPD OBJ 16

Description:

Conduct of Operations - Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, "no-solo" operation, maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc.

Question:

The MINIMUM hours of under instruction (UI) watches required to REGAIN RO watchstanding proficiency is _________ hours and the MAXIMUM amount of time allowed to stand the required UI watches is within a calendar __________ .

A. 40; month B. 60; month C. 40; quarter D. 60; quarter Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: standing 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> within the calendar quarter is required prior to the RO being reinstated to a proficient status A. Incorrect: requirement is to complete the 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of UI watches within the calendar quarter not within the month B. Incorrect: requirement is to complete the 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> not 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> (five 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shifts) of UI watches within the calendar quarter not within the month D. Incorrect: requirement is to complete the 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> not 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> (five 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shifts) of UI watches within the calendar quarter

References:

T.S. 6.6.1, Unit Staff Qualifications COPD019, Operations Watchstation Proficiency, Rev 008, section 1.0 page 1 0f 4, section 3.0 pages 2 and 3 of 4 Lesson Plan ASLP-RO-COPD objective 16: For COPD-019, Watchstation Proficiency: Describe the requirements for maintaining and regaining watchstation proficiency.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1: based on NRC comments added clarification to the stem for required hours and maximum time allowed to stand the required UI watches to regain watchstanding proficiency Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 104

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2141 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/11/2014 QID #: 69 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 1940012213 10CFR55: 41.10 / 45.13 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.2.13 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.1 SRO Imp: 4.3 L. Plan: FLP-OPS-ESOMS OBJ 3

Description:

Equipment Control - Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

Question:

IAW EN-OP-102, Protective and Caution Tagging, the proper sequence for isolating and placing a tagout of a centrifugal pump is to place the handswitch in PTL, _____________ then _______________.

A. rack down breaker; close discharge valve before the suction valve B. rack down breaker; close suction valve before the discharge valve C. close discharge valve before the suction valve; rack down breaker D. close suction valve before the discharge valve; rack down breaker Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: IAW EN-OP-102, attachment 9.2 section 8.0, step 8.2 Removing power first is desired for equipment and personal protection prior to manipulating valves. Closing the discharge valve before the suction valve will minimize the potential of possibly creating an overpressure condition on the suction piping by allowing system pressure from another running pump (pressure source) in the system. There is normally a design pressure change from the suction side of a pump and the discharge side of the pump.

B. Incorrect: discharge valve is closed before the suction C. Incorrect: Pump is not isolated prior to isolating the power supply due to the potential of the pump starting after it is isolated, damaging the pump D. Incorrect: without a directed order the suction valve could be closed before the discharge establishing a potential for pump/personal damage

References:

EN-OP-102, Protective and Caution Tagging, Rev 016, Attachment 9.2, General tag out Standards, section 8.0 page 70 of 91 Lesson Plan ASLP-RO-ESOMS, objective 3: Explain the information outlined in the following: Attachment 9.1 (Tag Standards) .2 (General Tagout Standards) .3 (Electrical Tagout Standards) .4 (Outage Tagging Guidelines )

Historical Comments:

Rev 1 fixed typo in distracter D. Cms 7-11-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 105

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2142 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 70 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 1940012237 10CFR55: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.2.37 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.6 SRO Imp: 4.6 L. Plan: ASLP-RO-MNTC OBJ 55

Description:

Equipment Control - Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.

Question:

OP-1015.048, Shutdown Operations Protection Plan, allows a component or system to be considered "AVAILABLE" if a ______________________________ .

A. backup component supply breaker that is outside of the control room can quickly be closed B. backup component supply breaker is tagged to the Shift Manager and can quickly be closed C. system that has been tagged out of service for maintenance but can quickly be filled and vented D. portable temporary power source is stored in the warehouse and can quickly be connected for use Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: per OP-1015.048, Shutdown Operations Protection Plan, Definition 5.1 states that reasonable manual actions from either the Control Room or in-plant is allowed to consider equipment or system available as long as the actions do not have impending times approaching the time to boil prediction B. Incorrect: breakers racked out can not be credited C. Incorrect: system that has been tagged out of service for maintenance but is still filled and vented cannot be credited D. Incorrect: a credited temporary power source is required to be installed and tested not stored on site and designated

References:

OP-1015.048, Shutdown Operations Protection Plan, Rev 16, Definition 5.1 Lesson Plan ASLP-RO-MNTC objective 55: Using EN-OP-119, Protected Equipment Postings, describe the responsibilities of Operations Personnel regarding Protected Equipment concerns, controls and philosophy.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1: changed distracters and added to notes, also arranged from shortest to longest Rev 2: Based on NRC comments added a 'quickly' term to "A", "B", and "D" distracter for plausibility also rearranged distracters from shortest to longest which changed correct answer from "C" to "A" mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 106

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2143 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/11/2014 QID #: 71 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 1940012305 10CFR55: 41.11 / 41.12 / 43.4 / 4 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.3.5 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.9 SRO Imp: 2.9 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-RMON OBJ 9

Description:

Radiological Controls - Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personal monitoring equipment, etc.

Question:

By placing an Area Radiation Monitor instrument selector switch in ______________________ , the Control Room Operator can confirm the functionality of the instrument from the detector to the meter.

A. LEVEL CAL and check the high alarm setpoint B. HV (High Voltage) and observe correct detector voltage C. CHECK SOURCE and observe an increasing meter reading D. PULSE CAL and observe the low alarm light extinguish Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: placing an Area rad monitor in CHECK SOURCE will expose the internal source and increase the meter reading A. Incorrect: LEVEL CAL is similar to HV but when used the meter will deflect to a known value an does not verify the detector string B. Incorrect: HV (High Voltage) is a false signal that only effects the meter will not verify the entire detector circuit D. Incorrect: this action would clear the low alarm and extinguish the light on the panel if it was in, however, it only checks the counting circuit and not a string check from detector to meter deflection.

References:

STM 2-62, Radiation Monitoring System, Rev 21, section 2.1.2 page 8 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-RMON objective 9: Describe the operation of a liquid process monitor.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1 replaced distracter D with more plausible incorrect answer per NRC review comment. Cms 7-11-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 107

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2144 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/11/2014 QID #: 72 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 1940012314 10CFR55: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.3.14 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Imp: 3.8 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-CVCS OBJ 4&9

Description:

Radiological Controls - Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.

Question:

OP-2104.002, Chemical and Volume Control, requires Operations to inform Radiation Protection (RP) due to the start of the additional CCP due to possible rise of radiation levels in the Aux Bldg.

The rise in radiation levels due to the start of an additional CCP is primarily due to __________________ .

A. Co-60 B. Kr-85 C. N-16 D. I-135 Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: CVCS has a decay chamber to allow N-16 short half life gammas time to decay before exiting the containment building. With letdown elevated, letdown spends less time in the decay chamber allowing more N-16 to reach the Aux building, which will raise general area dose rates.

Informing RP allows them to survey and post areas as necessary to prevent un-necessary exposure (ALARA).

A. Co-60 is prevalent in RCS, however raising the L/D flow rate will not have any impact on area dose because of its long halflife.

B. Kr-85 is a gas released from damaged fuel assemblies. Even if the applicant assumes there may be fuel damage, Kr-85 is a beta emitter which would not penetrate CVCS piping.

D. I-135 may be prevalent in the RCS, however, like the Co-60 the half life is long enough that increased flow does not have an impact on dose rates.

References:

STM 2-04, Chemical and Volume Control, Rev 29, section 2.1 page 4 OP-2104.002, Chemical and Volume Control, Rev 076, section 8.2.3 page 21 of 262 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-CVCS Objective 4: Describe the following components of the CVCS. Include component functions, normal operations, interlocks, power supplies, locations and flow paths as applicable. N16 Decay Chamber Objective 9: Given the Limits and Precautions of procedure OP-2104.002, Chemical and Volume Control, explain each.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1 - revised distracters so applicant has to pick the prevailing radiation source vs type of radiation (alpha, beta, etc) to improve plausibility and discriminatory value. Cms 7-11-14.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 108

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2145 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 73 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 1940012312 10CFR55: 41.12 / 45.9 / 45.10 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.3.12 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Imp: 3.7 L. Plan: ASLP-RO-PRCON OBJ 7

Description:

Radiological Controls - Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

Question:

The reason why only 1 Control Room Fan Filter Unit (VSF-9 or 2VSF-9) should be running during a Design Base Accident is due to concerns with possible ________________________________ .

A. exothermic reaction within the charcoal bed from radioactive Iodine B. damage to the filtration unit charcoal filter bed from excessive air flow C. over exposure of Control Room watchstanders from radioactive Iodine D. damage to the Control Room envelope from excessive internal pressure Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

Unit 2 DBA is a large break LOCA inside containment.

C. Correct: per limit and precautions securing one supply fan is preferred based on dose limits and is in line with SAR and engineering recommendations A. Incorrect: Iodine absorption in the charcoal bed is also an exothermic or heat producing reaction but the decay heat provided by these isotopes contributes very little to the heat load of the charcoal and a spontaneous fire is not a concern B. Incorrect: not a concern due to each fan unit is a stand alone unit. Plausible due to normal supply and exhaust fans share filtration units D. Incorrect: the supply fans do create a positive pressure in the control room but they will not exceed any pressure rating with both fans running. Plausible due to normally only one fan at a time is aligned for operation.

References:

OP-2104.007, Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning and Ventilation, Rev 066, section 5.0 L&P 5.4 page 9 of 183 Lesson Plan ASLP-RO- CRVNT objective 9: Explain the control room ventilation systems limits and precautions as stated in applicable procedures Historical Comments:

Rev 1: replaced question based on NRC comments Rev 2: Based on NRC comments changed wording in stem/question and distracters for clarity and plausibility mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 109

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2146 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/18/2014 QID #: 74 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: New Search 1940012406 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.4.6 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.7 SRO Imp: 4.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EFRP OBJ 2

Description:

Emergency Procedures/Plan - Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

Question:

While evaluating Safety Functions during performance of OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery EOP, entry section, Vital AC Auxiliaries are checked _________ Vital DC Auxiliaries and Containment Isolation is checked _________

Containment Temperature and Pressure Control.

A. before; before B. before; after C. after; before D. after; after Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

The safety functions in order of priority IAW OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery entry section, step 11 are: 1. Reactivity Control 2. Vital AC Auxiliaries 3. Vital DC Auxiliaries 4. RCS Inventory Control 5. RCS Pressure Control 6. Core Heat Removal 7. RCS Heat Removal 8. CNTMT Isolation and 9. CNTMT Temp. & Pressure Control

References:

OP-1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP User Guide, Rev. 011, section 4.3 page 8 of 73 and Attachment A, Safety Function Hierarchy page 50 of 73 OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery, Rev 017, entry section, step 11, page Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-EFRP, objective 2: Describe the Safety Functions checked by FRP Historical Comments:

NRC BANK QID #1683 used on 2009 NRC Exam Rev 1: replaced with New question based on NRC comments Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 110

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2147 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 5/20/2014 QID #: 75 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 1940012432 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.4.32 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.6 SRO Imp: 4.0 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-PANN OBJ 8

Description:

Emergency Procedures/Plan - Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators.

Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• Shift Turnover Checklist Annunciator test is being performed

• There is no Alarm response to the Test

• CRS has entered OP-2203.042, Loss of Control Room Annunciators AOP With the loss of alarm panel 2K10, the AOP directs the operators to __________________ .

A. set PMS Programmable alarms to continuously monitor COLSS Power Margin Alarm, CPC Az Tilt Alarm, and Tech Spec Az Tilt B. set SPDS Programmable alarms to continuously monitor COLSS Power Margin Alarm, CPC Az Tilt Alarm, and Tech Spec Az Tilt C. declare COLSS Inoperable and perform Loss of COLSS AOP in conjunction with Loss of Control Room Annunciators AOP D. continuously monitor COLSS Power Margin Alarm, CPC Az Tilt Alarm, Tech Spec Az Tilt by local observation of the PMS computer Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: with the loss of all annunciators the operators should know to continuously monitor COLSS Power Margin Alarm, CPC As Tilt Alarm, Tech Spec Az Tilt for T.S complaisance by local observation of PMS computer A. Incorrect: the PMS Programmable alarms could be set but without annunciators they would be useless for monitoring COLSS Power Margin Alarm, CPC Az Tilt Alarm, Tech Spec Az Tilt since these alarms are already driven by PMS B. Incorrect: SPDS does have programmable alarms but COLSS Power Margin Alarm, CPC Az Tilt Alarm, Tech Spec Az Tilt are PMS generated and are not monitored by SPDS C. Incorrect: Declaring COLSS Inoperable an performing Loss of COLSS AOP in conjunction with Loss of Control Room Annunciators AOP is an action in the AOP but only if the PMS computer has failed

References:

OP-2203.042, Loss of Control Room Annunciators, Rev 007, step 9 page 3 of 22 AOP-2203.042, Loss of Control Room Annunciators Tech Guide, Rev 007, step 9 page 9 of 12 STM 2-66, Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS), Rev 14, section 1.0 page 1 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-PANN, objective 8 : Discuss Annunciator Abnormal Operations to include: Actions allowed for a loss of Annunciator Power Supplies Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 111

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Purpose of 2203.042, Loss of Control Room Annunciators Actions taken to mitigate a loss of Control Room Annunciators Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 112

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2148 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 76 Author: Simpson Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000009A202 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 3 System

Title:

Small Break LOCA System Number 009 K/A EA2.02 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.5 SRO Imp: 3.8 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ALEAK OBJ 4

Description:

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: - Possible leak paths Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• "C" CCP (2P-36C) is Out of Service for maintenance

• CRS has entered OP-2203.016, Excess RCS leakage AOP due to pressurizer level trend

• Letdown is secured

• RCS Leakage is calculated to be 68 gpm

• CCW Surge tank levels are trending up

• Annunciator 2K11 G-2 "RCP BLEEDOFF TEMP HI" comes into alarm

• CRS orders tripping the unit

• SPTAs are complete The CRS should implement ________________ because the RCS leakage is _____________________ .

A. OP-2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage; within CCP capacity B. OP-2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage Attachment "A"; outside the containment building C. OP-2202.003 Loss of Coolant Accident, section 2, isolated LOCA; within CCP capacity D. OP-2202.003 Loss of Coolant Accident, section 3, unisolated; outside the containment building Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: the student should recognize the leak is from the RCPs into the CCW system. Excess RCS leakage AOP would be entered and actions taken to isolate the leak per attachment "A". When RCS leakage exceeds 44 gpm the AOP will direct tripping the reactor, actuating SIAS and entering SPTAs but, Att. "A" will direct securing RCPs and isolating CCW to the containment building. These actions are taken upon the reactor trip and prior to entering SPTAs. The CRS should enter the LOCA EOP after completing SPTAs based on RCS leakage >44 gpm and SIAS actuated. Since the RCS leakage is within CCP capacity, section 2, isolated LOCA should be implemented.

A. Incorrect: if the RCS leakage was <44 gpm the CRS would not direct actuation of SIAS and at the completion of SPTAs OP-2202.010 Exhibit 8 would direct returning to Excess RCS Leakage AOP.

Plausible due to RCS leakage is <CCP capacity B. Incorrect: if the RCS leakage was <44 gpm the CRS would not direct actuation of SIAS and at the completion of SPTAs OP-2202.010 Exhibit 8 would direct returning to Excess RCS Leakage AOP.

Plausible due the actions for isolating the RCS leakage by isolating CCW to containment building are Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 113

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 contained in Attachment "A" D. Incorrect: the decision to use either section 2 or 3 of LOCA EOP is based on weather RCS leakage is within available CCP capacity or not, it is not based on leak location. plausible due to leakage greater than 1 CCP

References:

OP-2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage, Rev 017, entry page 1 of 31, step 12.F page 8 of 31, Att. A page 26 and 27 of 31 OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident, Rev 014, section 1, step 23 page 13 of 74 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ELOCA objective 7: Given a LOCA event and a set of plant conditions, determine if the LOCA has been isolated and if it has occurred inside or outside of the containment.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1: reworded stem, question and answers based on NRC comment Rev 2: Based on NRC comments changed wording in distracters mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 114

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2149 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/14/2014 QID #: 77 Author: Simpson Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000062A202 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Loss of Nuclear Service Water System Number 062 K/A AA2.02 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.9 SRO Imp: 3.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-LOSW OBJ 7&8

Description:

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: - The cause of possible SWS loss Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• "A" and "C" Service Water pumps (2P-4A and 2P-4C) are in service

• "B" Service Water pump (2P-4B) is aligned to Loop 2

• Service Water pre screen cleaning is in progress

• Annunciator 2K09 B-6 "C SW BAY WATER LEVEL LO" comes into alarm

• Annunciator 2K05 A-6 "SW HEADER LOOP 2 PRESS LO" comes into alarm

• Annunciator 2K06 E-5 "2K06 2P4C STRAINER Delta P" comes into alarm The CRS should enter ___________________ to mitigate this event that is due to _____________ .

A. OP-2203.008, Natural Emergencies; Intake bar grate blockage B. OP-2203.022, Loss of Service Water; Intake bar grate blockage C. OP-2203.008, Natural Emergencies; SW pump discharge strainer fouling D. OP-2203.022, Loss of Service Water; SW pump discharge strainer fouling Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: Loss of SW entry conditions are met due to the lowering SW header pressure. The initial conditions indicate excessive trash in the SW suction source. The excessive trash in the forebays would clog the SW pump discharge strainer causing the lowering SW header pressure.

A. Incorrect: Loss of SW AOP is required for the given conditions, the Natural Emergencies AOP would be refered to and performed in conjunction with the Loss of SW AOP. It is not designed to handle the given event by itself.

B. Incorrect: Loss of SW AOP is correct but the bar grates are upstream of the pre screens therefore would not be effected by the washing of the screens. Lowering SW header pressure coupled with the prescreen wash is an indication of SW pump discharge strainer fowling.

C. Incorrect: Loss of SW AOP is required for the given conditions, the Natural Emergencies AOP would be refered to and performed in conjunction with the Loss of SW AOP. It is not designed to handle the given event by itself.

References:

OP-2203.008, Natural Emergencies, Rev 030, entry section page 1 of 39 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-LOSW:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 115

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Objective 7: Given a scenario for a low level alarm in a Service Water Bay, describe the actions required to recover the Service Water System Objective 8: Given a scenario for a low Service Water Header pressure, describe the actions required to recover the Service Water System Historical Comments:

Rev 1: reworded question and changes distracters and notes based on NRC comments Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 116

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2150 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 78 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000038A209 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 3 System

Title:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) System Number 038 K/A EA2.09 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.2 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ESGTR OBJ 2&11

Description:

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to a SGTR: - Existence of natural circulation, using plant parameters Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 has tripped due to a loss of both 6900v buses

• At completion of SPTAs, the following is observed:

• "A" Steam Generator level is 40% and rising

• "B" Steam Generator level is 27% and lowering

• RVLMS level 1 indicates WET

• RCS pressure is 1400 psia

• Average CET temperatures is 568°F

• RCS Cold Leg temperature, Tc, is 535°F and lowering

• RCS Hot Leg temperature, Th, is 568°F and stable

• Containment pressure is 14.7 psia and stable

• LRW/BMS trends are stable

• CCW surge tank levels are stable The CRS should implement ___________ and conditions for natural circulation _______ satisfied.

A. OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident; are not B. OP-2202.004, Steam Generator Tube Rupture; are not C. OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident; are D. OP-2202.004, Steam Generator Tube Rupture; are Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

A loss of 6900 volt buses will result in a reactor trip due to deenergizing RCPs. With RCS pressure below SIAS setpoint concurrent with A SG level rising, LRW/BMS trends and CCW surge tank levels stable, a 700 gpm SGTR is indicated in "A" SG. Natural circulation conditions (per SGTR EOP) are not satisfied with the given conditions due to inadequate MTS based on CET temp vs. RCS pressure. Although Tc is lowering and all other conditions are met, the low MTS does not ensure adequate pressure to maintain fluid coupling between SG and core.

A. and C. Incorrect. Plausible because inventory loss is indicated. Although the low pressure and small head void indicate inventory loss from the RCS, containment pressure, LRW/BMS trends and CCW surge tank levels are stable, the RCS inventory loss is into the SG with the rising level.

D. Incorrect. It has to be recognized that MTS (using CET and RCS press) is less than 30°F not meeting natural circ conditions for the SGTR optimal recovery procedure.

References:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 117

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 OP-2202.004, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Rev 014, CAUTION before step 1 page 2 of 49, step 43.A page 27 of 49 EOP-2202.004, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Tech Guide, Rev 014, step 43 page 61 of 82 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev 022, exhibit 8, page 193 of 204 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ESGTR Objective 2: Given a set of plant conditions, determine if the required entry conditions exist to enter the SGTR emergency operating procedure (EOP).

Objective 11: Given a set of plant conditions during a SGTR, determine if natural circulation conditions exist.

Historical Comments:

Incorporated NRC preview comments in Rev 0.

REV 1: changed parameter values in stem based on simulator results of event.

Rev 2: Based on NRC comments added indications [LRW/BMS trends and CCW surge tank levels] to distinguish between a LOCA outside containment and a SGTR. Added/changed notes for changes in stem mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 118

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2151 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 79 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0000402107 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Steam Line Rupture System Number 040 K/A 2.1.7 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.4 SRO Imp: 4.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EESD OBJ 1

Description:

Conduct of Operations - Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power

• Containment pressure is 24.4 psia and trending up

• Containment temperature is 205°F and trending up

• Containment High Range Radiation monitors are in alarm reading 1500 R/hr

• Pressurizer level is 35% and trending down

• RCS pressure is 1600 psia and trending down

• Average CET temperature 520°F and trending down The CRS should enter _______________________ based on ______________________ indications.

A. OP-2202.003, Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA): containment pressure B. OP-2202.003, Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA); MTS trend C. OP-2202.006, Excess Steam Demand (ESD); containment pressure D. OP-2202.006, Excess Steam Demand (ESD); MTS trend Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: parameters are trending up inside containment [indicative of both LOCA and ESD] but with the Hi range radiation monitors [which are unreliable when exposed to high heat] coupled with MTS trending up should direct the CRS into ESD versus LOCA post SPTAs A. Incorrect: the containment conditions could occur post LOCA coupled with high rad monitors in alarm is a possible indication of a LOCA, but MTS would either be steady or trending down, not up B. Incorrect: the containment conditions could occur post LOCA coupled with high rad monitors in alarm is a possible indication of a LOCA, but MTS would either be steady or trending down, not up C. Incorrect: the containment conditions could occur post ESD but the EOP does not use containment parameters alone to determine applicability.

References:

OP-2203.012J, Annunciator 2K10 Corrective Actions, Window A-6 , Rev 039, note on page 62 of 84 STM 2-62, Radiation monitoring system, Rev 21, section 2.1.2 page 11 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-EESD, objective 1: Given a set of plant conditions, determine if the entry conditions exist to enter the Excess Steam Demand EOP.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 119

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Historical Comments:

Rev 1: removed low range rad monitors from the stem and changed the second half of distracters "B" and "D" from low range rad monitors to MTS trend. Added notes for each answers/distracters plausibility based on NRC comments Rev 2: Based on NRC comments changed second half of distracters "A" and "C" for plausibility and corrected notes to reflect changes mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 120

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2152 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 80 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0000542406 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW) System Number 054 K/A 2.4.6 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.7 SRO Imp: 4.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ELOSF OBJ 5

Description:

Emergency Procedures/Plan - Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• AFW Pump (2P75) is OOS for pump bearing replacement

• Control Room receives a report of a steam leak in the Turbine Building

• Reactor is tripped and the MSIVs are manually closed

• "A" and "B" Steam Generator pressures are being controlled by the MSSVs

• "A" EFW Pump (2P-7A) trips on overspeed

• "B" EFW Pump (2P-7B) fails to start

• SPTAs are complete The CRS should enter __________________ and direct ______________________________ .

A. OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater, EOP; securing all running RCPs to minimize the amount of heat input into the RCS B. OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery, EOP; securing all running RCPs to minimize the amount of heat input into the RCS C. OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater, EOP; securing ONLY 2 RCPs to maintain forced circulation for precise plant control D. OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery, EOP; securing ONLY 2 RCPs to maintain forced circulation for precise plant control Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: the steam leak was secured when the MSIVs were closed, after SPTAs exhibit 8 would direct entry into Loss Feedwater EOP. Securing all RCPs is a major mitigation strategy to minimize RCS heat load and thus preventing a more rapid loss of S/G inventory due to RCP heat input.

B. Incorrect: entry into Functional Recovery EOP is not required due to the steam leak was isolated before SPTAs were commenced regaining Feedwater using the optimal procedure would be more timely C. Incorrect: entry into Loss of Feedwater EOP is correct action but a major mitigation strategy for this EOP is minimize RCS heat input. Plausible due to a "trip 2, leave 2" strategy for RCPs D. Incorrect: entry into Functional Recovery EOP is not required due to the steam leak was isolated before SPTAs were commenced regaining Feedwater using the optimal procedure would be more timely also a major mitigation strategy for this EOP is minimize RCS heat input. Plausible due to a "trip 2, leave 2" strategy for RCPs Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 121

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14

References:

OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater, Rev 011, step 5.A and step 6.A page 2 of 27, list of the major recovery strategies page 19 of 27 EOP-2202.006, Loss of FeedwaterTech Guide, Rev 011, step 6 page 13 of 55 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ELOSF objective 5: Analyze a set of plant conditions, during a loss of feedwater event, and determine if adequate RCS heat removal exists and the actions required to restore RCS heat removal if it is inadequate.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1: added manually closing the MSIVs to stem. Removed [maximize steam generator blowdown to increase the heat removal rate from the RCS] from distracters "C" and "D" based on NRC comments Rev 2: Based on NRC comments changed second half of distracters "C" and "D" for plausibility and corrected notes to reflect changes mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 122

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2153 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 81 Author: Simpson Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0000552132 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12 Safety Function 6 System

Title:

Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Black System Number 055 K/A 2.1.32 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 4.0 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ESBO OBJ 2

Description:

Conduct of Operations - Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.

Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power due to a loss of power

• OP-2202.008, Station Blackout, is being implemented

• No AC sources have been recovered

• 50 minutes have elapsed IAW OP-2202.008, RCS Inventory Control will be challenged due to _______________ flow and will require TSC support to ________________________ .

A. controlled bleedoff; connect a temporary makeup source B. controlled bleedoff; enter containment to isolate leakage C. minimum letdown; connect a temporary makeup source D. minimum letdown; enter containment to isolate leakage Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: with a total loss of AC power (station blackout) controlled bleedoff can not be isolated (bottled up) from inside the control room. The containment isolations valves will close redirecting CBO to the QT through a relief valve. The relief valve would normally be isolated by a MOV (no power) therefore, to stop the 4 gpm RCS leak for CBO a containment entry is required and this would be controlled by the TSC A. Incorrect: CBO is the concern but connecting a temporary makeup source is SAMG action and not directed by SBO EOP C. Incorrect: Letdown flow would be isolated due to the loss of Instrument Air also connecting a temporary makeup source is SAMG action and not directed by SBO EOP. Minimum letdown flow plausible in that this is the typical demand from the the PZR level control system that keeps flow minimal without the thermal transient of isolation. "Minimum Letdown" is a term commonly used for this condition.

D. Incorrect: Letdown flow would be isolated due to the loss of Instrument Air

References:

OP-2202.008, Station Blackout, Rev 012, section 1 step 24 page 23 of 79 EOP-2202.008, Station Blackout Tech Guide, Rev 012, section 1 step 24 page 30 of 103 Lesson plan A2LP-RO-ESBO objective 2: Given a set of plant conditions, describe the strategy for the Station Blackout optimal recovery EOP.

Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 123

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Rev 1: added RCS unidentified leakrate to stem and procedure reference in the question based on NRC comments Rev 2: Based on NRC comments changed first half of distracters "C" and "D" for plausibility and corrected notes to reflect changes mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 124

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2154 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 82 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0000032123 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45 Safety Function 1 System

Title:

Dropped Control Rod System Number 003 K/A 2.1.23 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 4.3 SRO Imp: 4.4 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ACEA OBJ 3&4

Description:

Conduct of Operations - Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• Annunciators 2K04 J-5 and J-6 "CEAC 1/2 CEA DEVIATION" come into alarm

• CEA #11 indicates 143" withdrawn

• CEA #22 Rod Bottom light is on

• All other CEAs remain at 150" withdrawn

• COLSS LPD and DNBR POLs indicate zero IAW the ACAs, the CRS should enter __________________ and direct ______________________ .

A. OP-2203.043, Loss of COLSS; reactor trip B. OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunction; reactor trip C. OP-2203.043, Loss of COLSS; commencing power reduction D. OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunction; commencing power reduction Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: with CEA #22 dropping fully into the core (rod bottom light is on) the pulse counters will automatically reset. This will Set the POLs to zero but COLSS is still operable and working, therefore entry into CEA Malfunction AOP is correct and commencing a power reduction is directed with 2 CEAs misaligned by >7" A. Incorrect: Portions of COLSS are still operable in this condition however, the rod bottom contact will cause the COLSS calculation of DNBR and LPD Power Operating Limits (POLs) to go to zero. Also, the Loss of COLSS AOP does not direct a reactor trip B. Incorrect: CEA malfunction is the correct AOP but conditions are not met to perform a reactor trip (requires 2 CEAs misaligned by >19')

C. Incorrect: COLSS is not completely operable as discussed for A. The CEA Malfunction AOP also mitigates the COLSS issues;

References:

OP-2203.012D, Annunciator 2K04 Corrective Action, Rev 036 Window J-5 page 54 of 94 and Window J-6 page 66 of 94 OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunction, Rev 021, step 7.A page 4 of 29 AOP-2203.003, CEA Malfunction Tech Guide, Rev 021, step 7 page 9 of 35 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ACEA:

Objective 2: Describe the mitigation strategy and instructions for actions directed in OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunctions AOP Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 125

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Objective 4: Describe the basis / strategy as stated in AOP-2203.003, CEA Malfunctions AOP Technical Guidelines, for actions directed by the AOP.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1: changed "would" to "should" and added reference to ACAs in the question based on NRC comments Rev 2: Based on NRC comments made minor change to wording in distracters "C" and "D" mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 126

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2155 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/24/2014 QID #: 83 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000037A216 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 3 System

Title:

Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Leak System Number 037 K/A AA2.16 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 4.1 SRO Imp: 4.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-APSEC OBJ 3

Description:

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: - Pressure at which to maintain RCS during S/G cooldown Question:

[REFERENCE PROVIDED]

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 has been shutdown due to a 25 gpm leak into "B" Steam Generator

• Loss of Offsite Power occurs when the reactor is tripped

• Cooldown is in progress

• RCS T-hot is 529 °F

• RCS T-cold is 521 °F

• "A" Steam Generator pressure is 820 psia

• "B" Steam Generator pressure is 820 psia

• SPTAs have been completed The CRS should enter _________________ to control the cooldown and direct maintaining RCS pressure between

______________ psia after isolating the "B" Steam Generator.

A. OP-2202.004, Steam Generator Tube Rupture; 1150 to 1250 B. OP-2202.004, Steam Generator Tube Rupture; 1050 to 1150 C. OP-2203.038, Primary to Secondary Leakage; 1150 to 1250 D. OP-2203.038, Primary to Secondary Leakage; 1050 to 1150 Answer:

A. Correct Notes:

A. Correct: Steam Generator Tube Rupture would be chosen if the RCS leakrate was >44 gpm or if there was a loss of Offsite power along with the S/G tube leak, neither condition is given in the stem therefore entering Primary to Secondary Leakage AOP is correct B. Incorrect: Steam Generator Tube Rupture would be chosen if the RCS leakrate was >44 gpm or if there was a loss of Offsite power along with the S/G tube leak, neither condition is given in the stem therefore entering Primary to Secondary Leakage AOP is correct also this pressure band would violate RCP NPSH requirements C. Incorrect: RCS Inventory and Pressure control would be satisfied during performance of SPTAs (S/G tube leakage <44 gpm) Exhibit 8 of Standard Attachments will direct entry into Primary to Secondary Leakage AOP. With forced circulation and using Att. 1, the CRS should direct a RCS pressure band that will maintain both NPSH requirements for the RCPs and minimize RCP break flow. To accomplish this, the AOP will direct maintaining RCS pressure within 100 psia of the RCP NPSH requirements therefore a 1150 to 1250 psia pressure band should be chosen Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 127

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 D. Incorrect: Primary to Secondary Leakage AOP is correct based on discussion above but this pressure band would violate RCP NPSH requirements

References:

OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Attachment 1 page 5 of 204 [PROVIDED TO STUDENT]

OP-2202.038, Primary to Secondary Leakage, Rev 014, step 30 pages 19 and 20 of 32 AOP-2202.038, Primary to Secondary Leakage Tech Guide, Rev 014, step 30 pages 30 of 33 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-APSEC objective 3: DISCUSS the basis / strategy as stated in OP 2203.038 Technical Guidelines, for actions directed by the AOP.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1: added verbiage to notes for the "A" answer based on NRC comments Rev 2: changed to include LOOP so the EOP choice would be correct per NRC review comments. Cms 7-24-14.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 128

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2156 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 84 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0000512446 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Loss of Condenser Vacuum System Number 051 K/A 2.4.46 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 4.2 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-AVAC OBJ 2&4

Description:

Emergency Procedures/Plan - Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.

Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• Annunciator 2K012 A-9 "CIRC WTR SYS POTENTIAL FAILURE" comes into alarm

• ATC reports "B" Circ Water Pump, 2P-3B, is tripped and its discharge valve, 2CV-1215, breaker tripped when it began to close

• Annunciator 2K03 A-3 "2E11A PRESSURE HI" comes into alarm

• Annunciator 2K03 A-4 "2E11B PRESSURE HI" comes into alarm

• Annunciator 2K03 E-4 "VACUUM PUMP 2C5B AUTO START" comes into alarm

• Condenser Vacuum is reading 6.6" HGAbs and degrading

• OP-2203.019, Loss of Vacuum, has been entered IAW OP-2203.019, Loss of Vacuum AOP, the CRS should direct __________________________ .

A. the NLOs to manually close "B" Circ Water pump discharge valve 2CV-1215 B. verify BOTH vacuum pumps are running and align for manual Hogging operation C. commencing rapid power reduction to 20% and tripping the Main Turbine Generator D. tripping the Reactor, verify Main Turbine tripped, and go to Standard Post Trip Actions Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: the alarms confirm the "B" Circ pump discharge valve did not close and a reactor trip is directed by the AOP in this condition A. Incorrect: having the NLOs manually close "B" Circ Water pump discharge valve is not an option due to the time required to close the discharge valve B. Incorrect: this actions is directed by the AOP (step 17) is the loss of vacuum is caused by air in leakage, not from a loss of condenser cooling water C. Incorrect: reducing Turbine load would be a correct action for lowering vacuum from a loss of cooling if the circ pump discharge valve went closed but not to 20% . For the given conditions, the operator would not have enough time to complete this action prior to a turbine/reactor trip.

References:

OP-2203.012L, Annunciator 2K012 Corrective Actions, Rev 045, Window A-9 page 97 of 116 OP-2203.012C, Annunciator 2K03 Corrective Actions, Rev 031, Window A-3 page 28 of 176, Window A-4 page 41 of 176, Window E-4 page 46 of 176 OP-2203.019, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, Rev 011, step 4 contingent action4.A.2) page 3 of 18 AOP-2203.019, Loss of Condenser Vacuum Tech Guide, Rev 011, step 4 page 7 of 22 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 129

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-AVAC:

Objective 2: Describe the mitigation strategy and instructions for actions directed in OP-2203.019, Loss of Vacuum AOP Objective 4: Describe the basis / strategy as stated in AOP-2203.019, Loss of Vacuum Technical Guidelines, for actions directed by the AOP.

Historical Comments:

Rev. 1: changed distracter "D" based on NRC comments and changed the order of answers based on length Rev 2: Based on NRC comments changed distracter "C" and notes for plausibility mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 130

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2157 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 6/17/2014 QID #: 85 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 000067A203 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 9 System

Title:

Plant Fire on Site System Number 067 K/A AA2.03 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Imp: 3.5 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-FPROT OBJ 3

Description:

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: - Fire alarm Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is at 100% power

• Annunicator 2K11 A-9 "FIRE ALARM" comes into alarm

• CBOT reports 2C-343 module 1-1-4 (T) "Cable Spreading Room" is in alarm

• IAO confirms an actual fire in a cable tray affecting several cables in the Cable Spreading Room The CRS should enter ______________________.

A. OP-2203.030, Remote Shutdown B. OP-2203.014, Alternate Shutdown C. OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions D. OP-2203.049, Fire in Areas Affecting Safe Shutdown Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

The Fire Panel ACA directs to implement Fire and Explosion AOP and Alternate Shutdown AOP if conditions warrant control room evacuation. Confirmed fire in the cable spreading room is an entry condition for Alternate Shutdown if it is meets the definition of severe fire. A fire in a cable tray as listed in the conditions meets the definition of severe.

A. Plausible due to common confusion between Alternate and Remote Shutdown C. Plausible due knowing that a fire in this room requires a reactor trip but not understanding that SPTAs are not used for Alt S/D.

D. Plausible due to a fire in this room is affecting safe shutdown but has its own procedure

References:

OP-2203.009 Fire Protection System ACA Rev 26, page 25 OP-2203.014 Alternate Shutdown Rev 29 Entry Conditions Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 131

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2158 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 6/9/2014 QID #: 86 Author: Simpson Lic Level: S Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 003000A202 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS) System Number 003 K/A A2.02 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.7 SRO Imp: 3.9 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ARCP OBJ 8

Description:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RCPS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Conditions which exist for an abnormal shutdown of an RCP in comparison to a normal shutdown of an RCP Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is in Mode 3

• Plant Cooldown is in progress

• Preparations are being made to secure RCPs

• Local operator is stationed at "A" RCP When ATC secures "A" RCP the following alarms come in simultaneously

• Annunciator 2K10 C-2 "REVERSE ROTATION" for 2P-32A

• Annunciator 2K10 C-4 "REVERSE ROTATION" for 2P-32B

• Local operator reports "A" RCP shaft has stopped The CRS should use _________________ to address RCP conditions and then continue the RCS cooldown using A. OP-2203.025, RCP Emergencies; OP-2102.010, Plant Cooldown B. OP-2203.025, RCP Emergencies; OP-2203.013, Natural Circulation C. OP-2203.012K, Annunciator 2K10 Corrective Action; OP-2102.010, Plant Cooldown D. OP-2203.012K, Annunciator 2K10 Corrective Action; OP-2203.013, Natural Circulation Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: the ACA for reverse rotation would be used to evaluate the RCP status. With both alarms coming in simultaneously, and a local report that the shaft has stopped rotating, is indications of an common failure (ACA points at a blown fuse) therefore securing all RCPs due to reverse rotation is not required and forced circulation is maintain A. Incorrect: reverse rotation alarm is not an entry condition for RCP Emergencies AOP plausible due to the alarms are associated with the RCPs. Plant Cooldown would be used to continue the plant cooldown due to there is not a loss of forced circulation B. Incorrect: reverse rotation alarm is not an entry condition for RCP Emergencies AOP plausible due to the alarms are associated with the RCPs. Plant Cooldown would be used to continue the plant cooldown due to there is not a loss of forced circulation Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 132

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 D. Incorrect: the ACA for reverse rotation would be used to evaluate the RCP status. With both alarms coming in simultaneously, and a local report that the shaft has stopped rotating, is indications of an common failure (ACA points at a blown fuse) therefore securing all RCPs due to reverse rotation is not required and forced circulation is maintain

References:

OP-2202.012, Annunciator 2K11 Corrective Action, Rev 044, Window C-2 page 17 of 125, and Window C-4 page 35 of 125 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-RCP objective 8: Evaluate a given set of plant conditions and appropriate reference material, determine what actions should be taken for any RCP emergency Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 133

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2159 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 87 Author: Simpson Lic Level: S Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0050002225 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.2 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) System Number 005 K/A 2.2.25 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-SRO-TS OBJ 5

Description:

Equipment Control - Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

Question:

Regarding T.S. 3.9.8.1 Bases, the requirement for maintaining greater than 23 feet of water level above the top of irradiated assemblies is to ______________________________ .

A. maintain RCS temperature below 140°F while moving fuel B. minimize radiation exposure to refueling equipment operators C. provide adequate time to recover cooling loop flow if the operating loop fails D. ensure core cooling for moving fuel if the reactor has been subcritical less than 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: per T.S. bases, maintaining the fuel region covered by at least 23 feet of water will maintain cooling capacity without SDC flow A. Incorrect: RCS temperature of 140°F is the temperature requirement for Mode 6 (REFUELING MODE).

Plausible because the purpose of having a SDC loop in operation is to maintain this required temperature as discussed in T.S. 3.9.8.1 bases.

B. Incorrect: Plausible because more water depth does help with dose but not correct as the bases for any of the refueling T.S.

D. Incorrect: Fuel offload is not allowed until the Rx has been subcritical greater than 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />. This is referencing the Decay Time of T.S. 3.9.3 which is based on decay of short lived isotopes as related to fuel handling accident analysis and not decay heat load.

References:

T.S. 3.9.8.1 bases Lesson Plan A2LP-SRO-TS objective 5: Describe the bases for technical specifications and technical requirements.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1: changed question to ask bases for 23 ft level based on NRC comments Rev 2: Based on NRC comments change the wording in the question for clarity mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 134

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2160 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/7/2014 QID #: 88 Author: Simpson Lic Level: S Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 008000A209 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 8 System

Title:

Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) System Number 008 K/A A2.09 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.3 SRO Imp: 2.8 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-CVCS OBJ 8

Description:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Results of excessive exit temperature from the letdown cooler, including the temperature effects on ion-exchanger resins Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is 100% power

• Annunciator 2K12 C-1 "LETDOWN HX 2E29 OUTLET TEMP HI" comes into alarm

• ATC reports that letdown temperature is 160°F and rising

• L/D HX Temperature controller, 2TIC-4815 will not respond in AUTO or MANUAL The CRS should direct the ATC to _____________________ using ____________________

to mitigate the event.

A. isolate letdown: OP-2203.028, PZR Systems Malfunction B. isolate letdown; OP-2203.012L, 2K12 Annunciator Corrective Action C. maximize charging flow; OP-2203.028, PZR Systems Malfunction D. maximize charging flow; OP-2203.012L, 2K12 Annunciator Corrective Action Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

The letdown piping temperature limit is 150°F. Directions in the ACA for the given alarm direct to isolate letdown if temperature exceeds this value. The normal operating procedure 2104.002 for CVCS is referenced, but would not be used in hand, due to the expediency needed to isolate letdown in this event. The CRS should direct the ATC to isolate letdown per the actions in the ACA and then will direct follow up using sections in 2104.002 for temporary isolation of letdown for configuration control. The PZR Systems Malfunction AOP is plausible for the action choices due to impact that letdown changes will have on PZR level control.

A. Incorrect: correct action with wrong procedure referenced.

C and D. Incorrect: maximizing charging flow would raise, not lower, system temperature due to the response of letdown. As Charging flow is raised, PRZ level will raise, causing letdown to raise to maintain PZR level.

References:

2203.012L C-1, Rev 45, page 8 of 116 Historical Comments:

Rev 1: changed distracters "C" and "D" (removed match letdown and] and replaced with [maximum] and changed notes to reflect change based on NRC comments Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 135

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2161 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/10/2014 QID #: 89 Author: Simpson Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 026000A207 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 5 System

Title:

Containment Spray System (CSS) System Number 026 K/A A2.07 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.6 SRO Imp: 3.9 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-SPRAY OBJ 8

Description:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Loss of containment spray Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 experienced a large break LOCA 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ago

• ESF pump suctions are aligned to the Containment sump

• HPSI pumps 2P-89A and B are running

• Spray Pumps 2P-35A and B are running

• RAS now actuates 30 minutes later the ATC reports:

• "B" Spray header flow, discharge pressure, and amps are fluctuating and containment sump blockage is indicated per Standard Attachment 43

• Containment pressure stable at 24 psia The CRS should direct securing _____________ using _____________________ .

A. "B" Spray pump (2P-35B) ONLY; OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident section 3 "Unisolated LOCA" B. "B" Spray pump (2P-35B) AND "B" HPSI pump (2P-89B);

OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident section 3 "Unisolated LOCA" C. "B" Spray pump (2P-35B) ONLY; OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Att. 45 "CSAS Reset" D. "B" Spray pump (2P-35B) AND "B" HPSI pump (2P-89B);

OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Att. 45 "CSAS Reset" Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: The LOCA EOP has the operators monitor for Containment Sump Blockage (Standard Attachment 43) when the RAS pretrip alarm is received (LOCA EOP, section 3, step 21). "B" Spray pump is cavitating by the combination of header flow, pressure, and amps fluctuating. Attachment 43 will direct the CBOT/ATC to inform the CRS (step 7) if there is any indication of Sump Blockage. The CRS will use the LOCA EOP (section 3 step 23 and 24) to direct both "B" train ESF pumps to be secured to prevent pump damage.

A. Incorrect: only securing "B" spray pump is plausible due to it is currently the only effected pump but Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 136

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 the LOCA EOP directs securing BOTH ECCS pumps supplied by that side of the containment sump.

C. Incorrect: LOCA EOP directs securing BOTH ECCS pumps supplied by the effected side of the containment sump not just one. Attachment 45 is plausible in that the actions for securing spray pumps is listed, however, containment pressure has to be below 22.5 psia to allow reset.

D. Incorrect: The LOCA EOP will direct securing BOTH the "B" Spray pump and HPSI pump when containment sump blockage is indicated not Att. 45. Attachment 45 is plausible in that the actions for securing spray pumps is listed, however, containment pressure has to be below 22.5 psia to allow reset.

References:

OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident, Rev 014, section 3, step 21 page 38 of 74, step 23 and 24 page 43 of 74 EOP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident Tech Guide, Rev 014, section 3, step 23 pages 115 and 116 of 140, step 24 page 117 of 140 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev 022, Att. 43 page 131 of 204 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-SPRAY objective 8: Given a Containment Spray Actuation, evaluate the Containment Spray system response to determine if the system has responded as designed and what actions, if any are required to make any necessary corrections Historical Comments:

Rev 1: added "B" Spray pump discharge pressure, and amps are fluctuating and containment sump blockage is indicated per Standard Attachment 43 to the stem and expanded the explanations for the distracters.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 137

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2162 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 6/11/2014 QID #: 90 Author: Simpson Lic Level: S Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0610002423 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 Safety Function 4 System

Title:

Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) Syste System Number 061 K/A 2.4.23 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Imp: 4.4 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ

Description:

Emergency Procedures/Plan - Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency procedure implementation during emergency operations.

Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is at 100% power when a steam leak inside containment is detected

• OP-2203.050, Overcooling Event in Mode 1 & 2 AOP, is implemented

• The reactor is manually tripped and MSIS manually actuated

• SPTAs have been entered but not yet implemented

• "A" S/G pressure is 790 psia and lowering, level is 15% and lowering

• "B" S/G pressure is 850 psia and rising, level is 25% and stable

• ATC reports that EFAS has actuated and is feeding "A" SG The CRS ______________________ direct the CBOT to secure feeding "A" S/G based on _________________________.

A. should; safety function hierarchy in SPTAs B. should not; safety function hierarchy in SPTAs C. should; implementing the Overcooling AOP in conjunction with SPTAs D. should not; implementing the Overcooling AOP in conjunction with SPTAs Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

The Overcooling in Mode 1 & 2 AOP is written to overlap SPTAs until EFW is isolated to the affected SG and manually actuate MSIS at which point the AOP is exited. This precludes the need to pull up any steps from the latter safety function steps in SPTA or subsequent optimal/functional recovery EOPs.

A. Incorrect: safety function hierarchy would require performing steps in sequence. Although the ESD step is a floating step, there is no indication of a need to pull forward to maintain any safety function.

B. Incorrect: plausible due to sequence of SPTAs if the exit step from the AOP is not understood D. Incorrect: plausible due to SPTA typically takes priority to assess plant conditions and is not done in conjunction with other procedures. This is a special case transition from AOP to EOP.

References:

OP-2203.050, Overcooling Event in Mode 1 &2, Rev 1, Step 3 OP-1015.021, EOP/AOP User's Guide, Rev 011, step 6.4 pages 28 and 29 of 73 Historical Comments:

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 138

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2163 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/14/2014 QID #: 91 Author: Simpson Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: New Search 015000A201 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 7 System

Title:

Nuclear Instrumentation System System Number 015 K/A A2.01 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.5 SRO Imp: 3.9 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-NIMAL OBJ

Description:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the NIS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Power supply loss or erratic operation Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is at 100% power

• Annunciator 2K04 D-8 "CHANNEL 3 NI INOPERATIVE" comes into alarm

• Annunciator 2K04 A-6 "CH C RPS/ESF PRE TRIP/TRIP" comes into alarm

• CBOT reports "C" Excore high voltage (HV) supply indicates 0 volts on 2C23-3 Due to the loss of "C" Excore HV power supply, the _____________ trip(s) would be in for "C" channel and the CRS should use the Unit 2 ____________________ to determine affected RPS functional unit(s).

A. Log power; Technical Specifications B. LPD and DNBR; Technical Specifications C. Log power; Technical Requirements Manual D. LPD and DNBR; Technical Requirements Manual Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: All of the causes for the NI INOPERATIVE alarms, which includes the loss of HV power, also cause a Power Trip Test Interlock (PTTI) for the respective NI channel. A PTTI also causes a CPC aux trip (due to an input being out of range) which is indicated by a DNBR/LPD trip on the CPC. The ACA will refer the CRS to the NI Malfunction AOP to implement any actions due to the tripped channel. The AOP refers to the applicable TS and has action steps to bypass/trip inop functional units. The TS lists the affected functional units which in this case would be points 1,2,3, and 4 on channel 3 PPS.

A. Incorrect: T.S. is the correct location for determining RPS functional units affected A loss of power will cause the excore signal to fail low but will not cause it to trip.

C. Incorrect: TRM would be used for determining ESF functional units affected not RPS. Also a loss of power will cause the excore signal to fail low but will not cause it to trip.

D. Incorrect: LPD and DNBR would trip due to this failure but TS should be referenced not TRM. The TRM would be used for determining ESF functional units affected not RPS.

References:

OP-2203.012D, Annunciator 2K04 Corrective Action, Rev036, Window A-6 pages 56 and 57 of 94 and Window D-8 page 80 of 94 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 139

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 OP-2203.026, Nuclaer Instrument Malfunction, Rev 007, step 2 contingency action 2.A page 2 of 7 Unit 2 TS 3.3.1.1 Historical Comments:

Rev 1: Changed distracters "C" and "D" and restated notes to support the change based on NRC comments Rev 2: Based on NRC comments added the word 'the' to the question for clarity mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 140

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2164 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 92 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0330002225 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.2 Safety Function 8 System

Title:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFPCS) System Number 033 K/A 2.2.25 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-FH OBJ 5

Description:

Equipment Control - Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

Question:

[REFERENCE PROVIDED]

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is in mode 6

• Core off load is in progress

• "A" LPSI pump through "A" SDC heat exchanger is in operation

• "B" LPSI is in standby for SDC

• "A" and "B" SFP cooling pumps (2P-40A and B) are in service The following occurs:

• "A" SFP cooling pump (2P-40A) has tripped

• Reactor Engineering reported current heat load in SFP is 30 MBTU/hr

• Service Water flow to the SFP Heat Exchanger is 3800 gpm

• Service Water temperature is 80°F The CRS should enter ____________________ to direct securing Fuel movement and adequate cooling _______ available for the current SFP heat load.

A. OP-2202.011, Lower Mode Functional Recovery EOP; is B. OP-2203.002, Spent Fuel Pool Emergencies; is C. OP-2202.011, Lower Mode Functional Recovery EOP; is not D. OP-2203.002, Spent Fuel Pool Emergencies; is not Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: entry conditions have been met for SFP Emergencies and the AOP will direct securing Fuel movement and verifying adequate heat removal capacity in the SFP for current conditions. Per figure 3.9.3-2 (used with SW flow between 1600 and 4000 gpm) there is not sufficient cooling currently available A and C. Incorrect: Lower mode functional is plausible for the given mode and off load in progress. It has mitigating actions for fuel pool issues, however they are related to inventory concerns and not heat removal.

B. Incorrect: Entry conditions for SFP Emergencies has been met but per figure 3.9.3-2 (used with SW flow between 1600 and 4000 gpm) there is not sufficient cooling currently available Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 141

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14

References:

TRM 3.9.3 decay time, Rev 49, [PROVIDED TO STUDENT]

OP-2203.002, Spent Fuel Pool Emergencies, Rev 009, entry section page 1 of 38, step 8 page 13 of 38 A2LP-RO-FH objective 5: Given a set of plant conditions associated wit fuel handling, evaluate Technical Specification and Technical Requirements entry conditions and describe any LCO actions that may be required Historical Comments:

Rev 1: added SDC lineup to stem based on NRC comments Rev 2: Based on NRC comments changed second first of distracters "A" and "C" for plausibility and corrected notes to reflect changes mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 142

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2165 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 93 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 0340002142 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.7 / 45.13 Safety Function 8 System

Title:

Fuel Handling Equipment System (FHES) System Number 034 K/A 2.1.42 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 2.5 SRO Imp: 3.4 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-FH OBJ 4&5

Description:

Conduct of Operations - Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement procedures.

Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is in Mode 6

• Core reload is in progress

• Annunciator 2K10 K-4 "STARTUP CHANNEL 1 TROUBLE" comes into alarm

• Startup Channel #1 has been declared Inoperable Which of the following describes the required action per Technical Specifications?

A. Fuel reload may continue provided Startup Channel #2 is operable B. Suspend core alterations until boron sample verifying SDM has been taken C. Suspend core alterations until the inoperable channel is returned to operable status D. Fuel reload may continue provided action is taken within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to restore the inoperable channel to operable status Answer:

C. Correct Notes:

C. Correct: T.S. 3.9.2 requires 2 Startup channels to be operable based on the ability to detect criticality when reloading the core therefore fuel reload may not continue with only 1 startup channel operable A. Incorrect: T.S. 3.9.2 requires 2 Startup channels to be operable based on the ability to detect criticality when reloading the core therefore fuel reload may not continue with only 1 startup channel operable B. Incorrect: Suspend core alterations is required and boron sample verifying SDM will be taken but reload will not continue until both startup channels are returned to operable status D. Incorrect: T.S required both SU channels to be operable to move radiated fuel and does not provide a provision to continue with one inoperable

References:

Tech Spec 3.9.2 OP-2502.001, Refueling Shuffle, Rev 050, steps 6.20 page 9 of 84 and 8.2.15 page 29 of 84 OP-2203.012J, Annunciator 2K10 Corrective Action, Rev 039, Window K-4 page 54 of 84 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-FH:

Objective 4: Given a fuel handling evolution or condition, determine the correct response per OP 2502.001, Refueling Shuffle procedure.

Objective 5: Given a set of plant conditions associated with fuel handling, evaluate the Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements entry conditions and describe an LCO actions that may be required.

Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 143

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Historical Comments:

Rev 1: spelled out Tech Specs in questions. Changed distracter "D" based on NRC comments Rev 2: Based on NRC comments added 's' to specification in question mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 144

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2166 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 7/23/2014 QID #: 94 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 1940012137 10CFR55: 41.1 / 43.6 / 45.6 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.1.37 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.3 SRO Imp: 4.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-COLSS OBJ 17

Description:

Conduct of Operations - Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management.

Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 has been returned to full power following the restoration from a loss of COLSS

• OP-2105.013, COLSS Operations, Attachment F, COLSS Return to Service Checks has been completed

• Annunciator 2K10-A2 "COLSS POWER MARGIN EXCEEDED" comes into alarm

• Smoothed Plant Power (PMS Point CV5993) indicates 100%

• Smoothed KW/FT Power Operating Limit (POL) (PMS Point CV5997) indicates 99.7%

Which of the following actions is REQUIRED be taken for this alarm and indications per Technical Specifications?

A. Reduce plant power below 100% within 5 minutes using OP-2203.012J, Annunciator 2K10 Corrective Action B. Declare COLSS inoperable and perform the actions required by OP-2203.043, Loss of COLSS AOP C. Trip the Reactor due to exceeding KW/FT POL and enter OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions EOP D. Commence reducing power within 15 minutes to a power below KW/FT POL using OP-2102.004, Power Operations Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: This question is based on an actual event where COLSS was lost and recovered. After declaring COLSS operable Axial Shape Index (ASI) was diverging quickly to the top of the core causing 2K10 A-2 alarm came in, the crew mistakenly declared COLSS inoperable again (even though they had just verified COLSS operable a couple of hours earlier) instead of taking the correct action of starting a power reduction within the 15 minute time limit of T.S. 3.2.1 Action a.

A. Incorrect: if alarm was in due to instantaneous plant power greater than 100% the ACA would direct lowering plant power to less than 100% within 10 minutes not 5 minutes.

B. Incorrect: COLSS is still operable and calculating a POL C. Incorrect: a reactor trip is not required

References:

T.S 3.2.1 Linear Heat Rate, action a.1 OP-2203.012J, Annunciator 2K10 Corrective Action, Rev 039 Window A-2, Step 2.4.1 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 145

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 OP-2105.013, COLSS Operations, Rev 033, Attachment F page 22 of 38 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-COLSS objective 17: EVALUATE a set of plant conditions that is causing an alarm on the following and determine the cause of the alarm and any action required to be taken.

1. 2K01 H9 - PMS Cabinet temperature alarm.

2. 2K01 H9- Power Operating Limit Margin alarm.

3. 2K10 A2 - COLSS Power Margin Alarm

4. 2K10 B2 - Tech Spec Aztilt Exceeded

5. 2K10 C2 - CPC Aztilt Exceeded Historical Comments:

Rev 1: added [per Technical Specifications] to question based on NRC comments Rev 2: Based on NRC comments changed "A" and "C" distracters and notes mwf 7/23/14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 146

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2167 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 6/9/2014 QID #: 95 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC BANK QID #1790 Search 1940012242 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 / 43 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.2.42 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.9 SRO Imp: 4.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ELOSF OBJ 12

Description:

Equipment Control - Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications.

Question:

Consider the following

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• #1 Emergency Diesel Generator (2DG1) is out of service for maintenance

• An Inadvertent Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS) has occurred

• 2A1 lockout alarm actuates on the plant trip

• "A" Emergency Feedwater Pump (2P-7A) overspeeds and trips when starting

• SPTAs are complete The CRS should enter_____________________, and Technical Specification ____________________ should be implemented.

A. OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater; 3.7.1.2 Emergency Feedwater System B. OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater; 3.0.3, LCO 3/4 Applicability C. OP-2202.010, Functional Recovery; 3.7.1.2 Emergency Feedwater System D. OP-2202.010, Functional Recovery; 3.0.3, LCO 3/4 Applicability Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: entry conditions are met for Loss of Main Feedwater: 1) the CSAS tripped the MFW pumps and closed the MFW Block and Main Steam Isolation valves. 2) The B EFW pump and AFW pump 2P75 are not available due to the loss of their power supply bus 2A1 and the 2DG1 and 3) the A EFW pump is not available due to an overspeed condition. The functional recovery procedure should not be diagnosed because there is only one event occurring for the given conditions above and the loss of power can be restored using the Loss of Feedwater EOP. T.S 3.0.3 should be implemented because there are no EFW pumps available to feed the Steam Generators. The EFW T.S 3.7.1.2 applied until 2P7A oversped and tripped. Both Containment Spray pumps will be placed in Pull to Lock in SPTAs which again would be T.S. 3.0.3 instead of T.S. 3.6.1.2. The MSIV T.S. does not apply because the MSIV are closed in their ESF position.

A. Incorrect: See above C. Incorrect: see above D. Incorrect: see above

References:

OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater, Rev 9, Entry Conditions, page 1 T.S. 3.7.1.2, EFW System Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 147

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 T.S. 3.0.3 T.S. 3.6.2.1, Containment Spray System T.S. 3.7.1.5, MSIVs Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ELOSF objective 12: Describe the Technical Specifications that are applicable to a Loss of Feedwater event.

Historical Comments:

NRC BANK QID #1790 used on 2011 NRC Exam Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 148

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2168 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 6/17/2014 QID #: 96 Author: Simpson Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 1940012220 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.2.20 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.6 SRO Imp: 3.8 L. Plan: ASCBT-EP-A0011 OBJ 3

Description:

Equipment Control - Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities.

Question:

Consider the following:

• An event has occurred on Unit 2 that led to the declaration of an SAE Emergency Classification

• ERO has been activated and is fully staffed

• Emergency Direction and Control has been shifted to the EOF With the ERO fully manned and declared operational, direct assignment of craft teams for in-field repair efforts will be implemented and tracked by the _______________________.

A. Shift Manager B. OSC Manager C. Emergency Director D. Emergency Plant Manager Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: OSC is the implementation branch of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). The OSC Manager directly assigns teams and tracks their status for the various repair or rescue activities based on the priority assigned by the EPM and ED.

A. Incorrect: Shift Manager holds this responsibility until the ERO is declared operational and then it is turned over to the OSC Manager.

C. Incorrect: Emergency Director is overall responsible for plant recovery, Emergency Plan implementation. Troubleshooting and repair plans are developed and implemented by the OSC and TSC D. Incorrect: Emergency Plant Manager (EPM) has the responsibility to develop repair plans.

The OSC Manager will report status of completed or in progress plans to the EPM.

References:

OP-1903.033, Protective Action Guidelines for Rescue/Repair and Damage Control Teams, Rev 023, steps 4.1, 5.2, 5.4 and 5.8, pages 3 and 4 of 15 Lesson Plan ASCBT-EP-A0011, objective 3: Identify the ERO positions, their respective emergency response facilities and their reporting chain.

Historical Comments:

Incorporated NRC pre-submittal comments in Rev 0. cms 6-17-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 149

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2169 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 6/9/2014 QID #: 97 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC BANK QID #0511 Search 1940012311 10CFR55: 41.11 / 43.4 / 45.10 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.3.11 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 4.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ARCSA OBJ 5

Description:

Radiological Controls - Ability to control radiation releases.

Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power

• OP-2203.020, High Activity in the RCS, is being implemented and actions have been taken due to the following Chemistry sample reports for RCS activity:

01/19/2014 at 0200, 1.4 microcuries/gram DOSE EQUVALENT I-131 01/20/2014 at 0330, 1.35 microcuries/gram DOSE EQUVALENT I-131 01/21/2014 at 0300, 1.2 microcuries/gram DOSE EQUVALENT I-131 Per Tech Spec 3.4.8 for RCS Specific Activity, which of the following action(s) is required to control the potential release of radiation?

A. Perform RCS sample for Iodine activity every two to six hours to determine the number of leaking fuel assemblies B. Place the unit in at least HOT STANDBY with Tave <500°F within six hours to limit offsite dose in case of a SGTR C. Restore RCS activity to within limits in the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or place the unit in HOT STANDBY to limit offsite dose in case of a SGTR D. Trip the Reactor, reduce RCS Thot to less than 535°F and isolate Steam Generators within one hour to limit offsite dose in case of a SGTR Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: this action is required per T.S. action c.

A. Incorrect: this action is taken if Power has been changed over 15% in one hour C. Incorrect: activity has been above 1 microcuries/gram DOSE EQUVALENT I-131 for > 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and the T.S. action call for a shutdown to HOT STANDBY D. Incorrect: T.S would required taking the Unit off line but it directs lowering Tave to <500°F. SGTR EOP directs lowering Th to <535°F to allow isolation of the ruptured S/G. There is no indication of a Tube Rupture therefore this is not required and if a SGTR was present only one S/G would be isolated, not both

References:

Technical Specification 3.4.8, LCO a. and Action a.

OP-2203.020, High Activity in RCS, Rev 012, step 5 page 4 of 7 AOP-2203.020, High Activity in RCS Tech Guide, Rev 012, step 5 page 8 of 11 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ARCSA Objective 5: Discuss the Unit 2 Technical Specifications that are associated with High Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 150

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Activity in the RCS Historical Comments:

NRC BANK QID #0511 used on 2005 NRC Exam. Reworded stem for clarity. CMS Rev 1: removed the word [one] for question based on NRC comments Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 151

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2170 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/7/2014 QID #: 98 Author: Simpson Lic Level: S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: New Search 1940012306 10CFR55: 41.13 / 43.4 / 45.10 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.3.6 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.0 SRO Imp: 3.8 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-RMON OBJ 18

Description:

Radiological Controls - Ability to approve release permits.

Question:

The CRS is reviewing a Gas Decay Tank release permit for approval to start the release.

Which of the following conditions could exist and still allow approving the starting of a release of a Gas Decay Tank?

A. Pre-Release Report was NOT signed by the chemist B. Gas Decay Tank vent line rad monitor is INOPERABLE C. Rad Waste Exhaust monitor SPING 6 is INOPERABLE D. Rad Waste Exhaust fan interlock does NOT close the gas discharge valve Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: there are multiple contingency steps in the release permit for performing a release with the tank discharge rad monitor inoperable.

A. Incorrect: Specifically identified and verified in two different steps in Verification section 3.0.

C. Incorrect: The vent rad monitor may be inoperable and ODCM entered for the release, but SPING 6 (Super Particulate Iodine Noble Gas monitor for RadWaste vent stack) is specifically checked as operable. There are no conditional steps in the release allowing it to be inop.

D. Incorrect: Similar to the SPING 6 verification, the interlock is required to be operable. This step also ensures there is a dilution flow established with the release by verifying an exhaust fan is running.

References:

OP 2104.022, Gaseous Radwaste System, Rev 43, supplement 1, section 3.0 page 55 to 60 Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-GRW objective 18: Discuss Technical Specifications/ODCM associated with Radiation Monitoring System to include reason for spec and actions required if inoperable.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1: change waste gas tank to gas decay tank in stem and distracter "B" and reworded the stem/question based on NRC comments Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 152

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2171 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/7/2014 QID #: 99 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 1940012420 10CFR55: 41.10 / 45.13 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.4.20 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 4.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ESPTA OBJ 3

Description:

Emergency Procedures/Plan - Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

Question:

Concerning the operational implications of Notes and Cautions as used in Abnormal Operating Procedures, the CRS should generically expect ALL procedural NOTES to convey information to ____________________ .

A. identify steps that could adversely affect plant operations B. alert the user to conditions that could damage equipment C. alert the user to conditions that could possibly injure personnel D. identify steps that could be performed in parallel or out of sequence Answer:

D. Correct Notes:

D. Correct: per OP-1015.021, EOP/AOP User Guide and the NMM Procedure Writer's Manual A. Incorrect: see above B. Incorrect: see above C. Incorrect: see above

References:

OP-1015.021 ANO-2 EOP/AOP User Guide Rev 12, step 6.14 EN-AD-101-01, NMM Procedure Write Manual, Rev 12, attachment 9.1 step 8 page 7 of 31 Lesson Plan A2LP-RP-ESPTA, objective 3: Describe the content of 1015.021,the ANO-2 EOP/AOP Users Guide, to include Definitions of Terms, Post Trip Emergency Operations and Usage Philosophies.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1: reworded stem/question based on NRC comments. Add more info to Notes and References Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 153

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 Bank: 2172 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 7/14/2014 QID #: 100 Author: Simpson Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 1940012416 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 Safety Function System

Title:

Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.4.16 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.5 SRO Imp: 4.4 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ESPTA OBJ 3

Description:

Emergency Procedures/Plan - Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures or guidelines such as, operating procedures, abnormal operating procedures, and severe accident management guidelines.

Question:

Consider the following:

• Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power

• RCS pressure is 1380 psia and lowering

• Neither 4160V vital bus is energized

• Offsite power is available and powering non-vital buses

• OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery Procedure, is being implemented

• RCS pressure control success path PC-1, Subcooled Pressure Control, has been attempted without success

• RCS pressure control success path PC-3, Saturated Pressure Control, has been attempted without success Concerning the RCS Pressure Control Safety Function, the CRS should __________________________ .

A. re-diagnose event using OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Exhibit 8 B. implement Continuing Actions of OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery Procedure C. implement Long Term Actions of OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery Procedure D. coordinate with ERO to implement Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG)

Answer:

B. Correct Notes:

B. Correct: when a safety function is not met and all success paths have been explored, OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery Procedure will direct performing Continuing Actions to keep trying to recover the safety function A. Incorrect: re-diagnose event using OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Exhibit 8 is directed by FRP if a specific event is identified during performance of the entry section C. Incorrect: implementing Long Term Actions of FRP is directed after a safety function success path has been completed and the safety function is satisfied D. Incorrect: coordinating with ERO and implementing SAMG is not warranted unless fuel damage is suspected or confirmed

References:

OP-1015.021, Unit 2 EOP/AOP Users Guide, Rev Lesson Plan A2LP-RO-ESPTA objective 3: Describe the content of OP-1015.021, the ANO-2 EOP/AOP Users Guide, to Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 154

Data for 2014-2 NRC RO/SRO Exam 01-Aug-14 include Definitions of Terms, Post Trip Emergency Operations and Usage Philosophies.

Historical Comments:

Rev 1: changed question to a scenario base as requested by NRC Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 155