Text

IR 05000443-13-005; 10/01/2013 - 12/31/2013; Seabrook Station, Unit 1, Routine Integrated Inspection Report
	ML14030A509
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	01/30/2014
From:	Glenn Dentel; Reactor Projects Branch 3
To:	Walsh K; NextEra Energy Seabrook
	DENTEL, GT
References
	IR-13-005
	Download: ML14030A509 (34)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

2100 RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 100

KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-2713

January 30, 2014

Mr. Kevin Walsh

Site Vice President

Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC

c/o Mr. Michael Ossing

P.O. Box 300

Seabrook, NH 03874

SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000443/2013005

Dear Mr. Walsh:

On December 31, 2013, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an

inspection at Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1. The enclosed inspection report documents the

inspection results, which were discussed on January 17, 2014, with you and other members of

your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection no findings of significance were identified. However, a

licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed

in Section 40A7 of this report. If you contest this non-cited violation, you should provide a

response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-

0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region I, the Director, Office of Enforcement,

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC

Resident Inspector at Seabrook Station.

As a result of the Safety Culture Common Language Initiative, the terminology and coding of

cross-cutting aspects were revised beginning in calendar year (CY) 2014. New cross-cutting

aspects identified in CY 2014 will be coded under the latest revision to IMC 0310. Cross-cutting

aspects identified in the last six months of 2013 using the previous terminology will be converted

to the latest revision in accordance with the cross-reference in IMC 0310. The revised cross-

cutting aspects will be evaluated for cross-cutting themes and potential substantive cross-

cutting issues in accordance with IMC 0305 starting with the CY 2014 mid-cycle assessment

review.

K. Walsh 2

In accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections,

Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,

its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection

in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)

component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html

(the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Glenn T. Dentel, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-443

License No: NPF-86

Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000443/2013005

w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

ML14030A509

Non-Sensitive Publicly Available

SUNSI Review

Sensitive Non-Publicly Available

OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP

NAME mmt PCataldo/PC GDentel/ GTD

DATE 01/29/14 01/ 30/ 14

1

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket No.: 50-443

License No.: NPF-86

Report No.: 05000443/2013005

Licensee: NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC

Facility: Seabrook Station, Unit No.1

Location: Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874

Dates: October 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013

Inspectors: P. Cataldo, Senior Resident Inspector

C. Newport, Resident Inspector

W. Cook, Senior Reactor Analyst

B. Dionne, Senior Health Physicist

J. Gilliam, Acting Resident Inspector

D. Silk, Senior Operations Engineer

Approved by: Glenn T. Dentel, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................ 3

REPORT DETAILS .................................................................................................................... 4

1. REACTOR SAFETY ........................................................................................................... 4

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection .................................................................................... 4

1R04 Equipment Alignment ............................................................................................... 5

1R05 Fire Protection .......................................................................................................... 6

1R06 Flood Protection Measures ...................................................................................... 6

1R07 Heat Sink Performance ........................................................................................... 6

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program ............................................................ 7

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness ...................................................................................... 9

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control .................................10

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments ....................................10

1R18 Plant Modifications .................................................................................................11

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing ......................................................................................12

1R22 Surveillance Testing ...............................................................................................12

1EP6 Drill Evaluation .......................................................................................................13

2. RADIATION SAFETY.........................................................................................................13

2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment ...............................................13

2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program .....................................................14

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES ..........................................................................................................15

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification ..........................................................................15

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution .....................................................................17

4OA5 Other Activities ........................................................................................................20

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit ...........................................................................................21

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violation ....................................................................................21

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION...............................................................22

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION....................................................................................... A-1

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT .................................................................................................. A-1

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED .................................... A-1

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED....................................................................................... A-1

LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................. A-9

Enclosure

3

SUMMARY

IR 05000443/2013005; 10/01/2013-12/31/2013; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1, Routine

Integrated Inspection Report.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced

inspections performed by regional inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe

operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor

Oversight Process, Revision 4.

No findings were identified.

Other Findings

A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by NextEra was reviewed by the

inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by NextEra have been entered into NextEras

corrective action program (CAP). This violation and corrective action tracking number are listed

in Section 4OA7 of this report.

Enclosure

4

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Seabrook operated at full power for the entire assessment period, with the exception of minor

down powers to perform scheduled turbine valve testing. Documents reviewed for each section

of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 3 samples)

.1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of NextEras readiness for the onset of seasonal cold

temperatures on November 18, 2013. The review focused on the emergency feedwater

pump house, turbine building, and the service water (SW) cooling tower. The inspectors

reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications

(TSs), the seasonal readiness memorandum, and the corrective action program (CAP)

to determine specific temperatures or other seasonal weather that could challenge these

systems, and to ensure NextEra personnel had adequately prepared for these

challenges. The inspectors reviewed station procedures, including NextEras seasonal

weather preparation procedure and applicable operating procedures. The inspectors

performed walkdowns of the selected systems to ensure station personnel identified

issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during cold weather

conditions.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 External Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of December 16, 2013, the inspectors performed an inspection of

selected external flood protection measures for Seabrook Station. The inspectors

reviewed TSs, procedures, design documents, and the UFSAR, which depicted the

design flood levels and protection areas containing safety-related equipment to identify

areas that may be affected by external flooding. The inspectors conducted a general

site walkdown of external areas of the plant, including the diesel generator building,

turbine building, and primary auxiliary building, to ensure that NextEras flood protection

measures were in accordance with design specifications. The inspectors also reviewed

operating procedures for mitigating external flooding during severe weather to determine

if NextEra had established adequate measures to protect against external flooding

events.

Enclosure

5

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed NextEras preparations for the onset of cold weather and high

winds on November 26, 2013. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of adverse

weather preparation procedures before the onset of and during this adverse weather

condition. The inspectors walked down the emergency feedwater pump house and the

SW cooling tower to ensure system availability. The inspectors verified that operator

actions defined in NextEras adverse weather procedure maintained the readiness of

essential systems. The inspectors discussed readiness and staff availability for adverse

weather response with operations and work control personnel.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 4 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:

Equipment alignment of Vital Bus 11A while 11B was cross-tied to battery D and

battery B was out of service on October 2, 2013

B residual heat removal (RHR) return to service (RTS) on November 27, 2013

A emergency diesel generator (EDG) jacket water heat exchanger SW outlet valve

RTS on December 11, 2013

A SW during replacement of the C SW pump motor on December 13, 2013

The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the

reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed

applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, TSs, work orders

(WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant

trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system

performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field

walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and

support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined

the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of

equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed

whether NextEra staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into

the corrective action program for resolution with the appropriate significance

characterization.

Enclosure

6

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q - 2 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material

condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that

NextEra controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with

administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression

equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire

barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that

station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or

inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures.

'A' EDG DG-F-1A-A, DG-F-2A-A, DG-F-3E-A, DG-F-3C-A, DG-F-3A-Z on

November 14, 2013

Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) F-1A-Z 7'/-6'/-26' on November 20, 2013

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 - 1 sample)

Internal Flooding Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, the site flooding analysis, and plant procedures to

assess susceptibilities involving internal flooding. The inspectors also reviewed the CAP

to determine if NextEra identified and corrected flooding problems and whether operator

actions for coping with flooding were adequate. The inspectors focused on the internal

tank farm area of the PAB to verify the adequacy of equipment seals located below the

flood line, floor and water penetration seals, common drain lines and sumps, sump

pumps, level alarms, control circuits, and temporary or removable flood barriers.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the A EDG jacket water heat exchanger to determine its

readiness and availability to perform its safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the

design basis for the component and verified NextEras commitments to NRC Generic

Letter 89-13. The inspectors observed actual performance tests for the heat exchangers

and/or reviewed the results of previous inspections of the A EDG jacket water and

similar heat exchangers. The inspectors discussed the results of the most recent

Enclosure

7

inspection with engineering staff and reviewed pictures of the as-found and as-left

conditions. The inspectors verified that NextEra initiated appropriate corrective actions

for identified deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the number of tubes plugged

within the heat exchanger did not exceed the maximum amount allowed.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11 - 3 samples)

.1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training on October 23, 2013,

which included simulated degraded equipment and subsequent equipment failures that

resulted in escalating degraded plant conditions that ensured implementation of

emergency operating procedures by the operating crew, as well as implementation of

the emergency plan. This emergency plan implementation included classification of

specific events that warranted an Alert Event Declaration. The inspectors evaluated

operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk

significant operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating

procedures. The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications,

implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the

oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified

the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager

and the technical specification action statements entered by the control room supervisor.

Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify

and document crew performance problems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed general control room activities, including alarm response and

control room shift turnovers, conducted on November 9, 2013 and December 23, 2013.

Additionally, the inspectors observed monthly surveillance testing of the B EDG

conducted on November 12, 2013 and December 23, 2013. The inspectors observed

test performance to verify that procedure use, crew communications, and coordination of

activities between work groups similarly met established expectations and standards.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Enclosure

8

.3 Licensed Operator Requalification Biennial Review

a. Inspection Scope

The following inspection activities were performed using NUREG-1021, Operator

Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 9, Supplement 1, and

Inspection Procedure Attachment 71111.11B, Licensed Operator Requalification

Program.

Examination Results

The operating tests for the weeks of October 21, 2013 and October 28, 2013 were

reviewed for quality and performance.

On December 6, 2013 the results of the annual operating tests were reviewed to

determine if pass fail rates were consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1021,

"Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 9,

Supplement 1, and NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, Operator Requalification

Human Performance Significance Determination Process. The review verified that

the failure rate (individual or crew) did not exceed 20%.

1 out of 53 operators failed at least one section of the Annual Examination. The

overall individual failure rate was 1.9%.

0 out of 9 crews failed the simulator test. The crew failure rate was 0.0%.

Written Examination Quality

The inspectors reviewed two written examinations that were administered during the

weeks of October 21 and 28, 2013, for qualitative and quantitative attributes as specified

in Appendix B of Attachment 71111.11B, Licensed Operator Requalification.

Operating Test Quality

Twenty-two job performance measures (JPMs) and six scenarios were reviewed for

qualitative and quantitative attributes as specified in Appendix C of 71111.11B,

Licensed Operator Requalification Program.

Licensee Administration of Operating Tests

The dynamic simulator examinations and JPMs administered during the week of October

28, 2013, were observed. These observations included facility evaluations of Shift Crew

A and Staff Crew 1 during three dynamic simulator examinations and individual

performance of five JPMs.

Examination Security

The inspector assessed whether facility staff properly safeguarded examination material.

JPMs, scenarios, and written examinations were checked for excessive overlap of test

items.

Enclosure

9

Remedial Training and Re-Examinations

The remediation plans for one crew failure and one individual JPM failure from the 2011

requalification examination were reviewed to assess the effectiveness of the remedial

training.

Conformance with Operator License Conditions

Medical records for ten license holders were reviewed to assess conformance with

license conditions.

Proficiency watch standing records were reviewed for the third quarter of 2013.

The reactivation plans for five senior reactor operator license holders and three reactor

operator license holders were reviewed to assess the effectiveness of the reactivation

process.

Simulator Performance

Simulator performance and fidelity was reviewed for conformance to the reference plant

control room. A simulator deficiency report was also reviewed to ensure facility staff

addressed identified modeling problems. Simulator test documentation was also

reviewed.

Problem Identification and Resolution

A review was conducted of recent operating history documentation found in inspection

reports, NextEras CAP, and the most recent NRC plant issues matrix. The inspectors

also reviewed specific events from the CAP which indicated possible training

deficiencies, to verify that they had been appropriately addressed. The senior resident

inspector was consulted for insights regarding licensed operators performance.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12 - 3 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of

maintenance activities on structure, system, or component (SSC) performance and

reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports, CAP documents,

maintenance WOs, and maintenance rule (MR) basis documents to ensure that

NextEra was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope

of the MR. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly

scoped into the MR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2)

performance criteria established by NextEra staff was reasonable. As applicable, for

SSCs classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective

actions to return these SSCs to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that NextEra

staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and

across MR system boundaries.

Enclosure

10

Chemical and volume control system

Evaluation of stroke time changes on EDG SW heat exchanger outlet isolation valve,

SW-V-16

Evaluation of EDG entry fire door latch failures

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 4 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the

maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that NextEra performed

the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors

selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety

cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that NextEra

personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the

assessments were accurate and complete. When NextEra performed emergent work,

the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant

risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results

of the assessment with the stations probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions

were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the TS

requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to

verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.

Battery cross-tie on October 7, 2013

B RHR pump slave relay testing on November 26, 2013

Chemical volume and control system surveillance testing and SW system

maintenance on December 10, 2013

Safety Bus 5 degraded voltage relay testing and charging system maintenance on

December 13, 2013

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 - 4 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or non-

conforming conditions:

Operability of 1B 125 VDC battery on October 3, 2012

Cooling tower SW pump P-110A oil fill cap found ajar on October 22, 2013

Refueling water storage tank aligned to a not fully qualified seismic pipe on

November 8, 2013

SW-P-41A in-service test flow band incorrect on November 13, 2013

Enclosure

11

The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated

components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the

operability determinations to assess whether technical specification operability was

properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that

no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability

and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TSs and UFSAR to NextEras

evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where

compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors

determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were

properly controlled by NextEra. The inspectors determined, where appropriate,

compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 - 4 samples)

.1 Temporary Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the temporary modifications listed below to determine whether

the modifications affected the safety functions of systems that are important to safety.

The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 50.59 documentation and post-modification testing

results, as applicable, and conducted field walkdowns of the modifications to verify that

the temporary modifications did not degrade the design bases, licensing bases, and

performance capability of the affected systems.

1-RC-TB-451 temporary setpoint change for a pressurizer low temperature alarm

Engineering change (EC) 278785, SW pipe support modification in support of OR16

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Permanent Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the permanent modifications listed below, and verified that the

design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected systems were

not degraded by the modifications. In addition, the inspectors reviewed applicable

modification documents, including associated engineering changes, correspondence

with the vendor, industry operating experience, environmental and seismic qualifications,

as well as the 10 CFR 50.59 documentation and post-modification testing results, as

applicable.

EC 274301, Emergency Power System power supply overvoltage protection

EC 271074, replacement of GE synchronization check relay

Enclosure

12

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 5 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities

listed below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability

and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the

procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the

maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with

the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and

that the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also

witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the test results adequately

demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.

1-RH-FCV-618 positioner replacement on October 16, 2013

Loop B SW basin level indicator calibration on October 31, 2013

1C battery charger maintenance and RTS on November 22, 2013

A EDG SW heat exchanger isolation valve maintenance on November 22, 2013

Primary air handler damper actuator rebuild on November 26, 2013

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 2 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of

selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR,

and NextEra procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance

criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with

design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and

accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test

prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether

the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety

functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:

A SW discharge valve quarterly in-service surveillance test (IST) on October 17,

2013 (IST)

Reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate surveillance test on October 24, 2013 (RCS

leak rate)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Enclosure

13

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 sample)

Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine NextEra emergency drill on October 9,

2013 to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the classification, notification, and

protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed

emergency response operations in the simulator, technical support center, and

emergency operations facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications,

and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with

procedures. The inspectors also attended the station drill critique to compare inspector

observations with those identified by NextEra staff in order to evaluate NextEras critique

and to verify whether NextEra staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering

them into the CAP.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment (71124.06 - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

During the period December 2 to December 5, 2013, the inspectors verified that

gaseous and liquid effluent processing systems are maintained so radioactive

discharges are properly reduced, monitored, and released. The inspectors also verified

the accuracy of the calculations for effluent releases and public doses.

The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20; 10 CFR 50.35(a) TSs;

10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A - Criterion 60 Control of Release of Radioactivity to the

Environment and Criterion 64 Monitoring Radioactive Releases; 10 CFR 50 Appendix I

Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operations to Meet

the Criterion As Low as is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) for Radioactive Material

in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents; 10 CFR 50.75(g) Reporting and

Recordkeeping for Decommissioning Planning; 40 CFR Part 141 Maximum Contaminant

Levels for Radionuclides; 40 CFR Part 190 Environmental Radiation Protection

Standards for Nuclear Power Operations; RG 1.109 Calculation of Annual Doses to

Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents; RG 1.21 Measuring, Evaluating,

Reporting Radioactive Material in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents and Solid Waste; RG

4.1 Radiological Environmental Monitoring for Nuclear Power Plants; RG 4.15 Quality

Assurance for Radiological Monitoring Programs; NUREG 1301 Offsite Dose Calculation

Enclosure

14

Manual (ODCM) Guidance: Standard Radiological Effluent Controls; applicable Industry

standards; and licensee procedures required by TSs/ODCM as criteria for determining

compliance.

The inspectors observed the collection and preparation of one environmental sample

from an on-site groundwater monitoring well. The inspectors selected two SSCs (storm

drains and spent fuel leak detection system) that could interface with ground water. The

inspectors assessed whether NextEra has implemented a sampling and monitoring

program sufficient to provide early detection of leakage from these SSCs to ground

water.

The inspectors reviewed any significant changes made by NextEra to the ODCM as the

result of changes to the land census, long-term meteorological conditions (three year

average), or modifications to the sampler stations since the last inspection. The

inspectors reviewed technical justifications for any changed sampling locations to verify

that NextEra performed the required reviews.

The inspectors reviewed the results of the NextEra Analytical Laboratory vendors inter-

laboratory and intra-laboratory comparison program to verify the adequacy of

environmental sample analyses performed by the vendor laboratory. The inspectors

assessed whether the results included the media/radionuclide mix were appropriate for

the facility.

Problem Identification and Resolution

Inspectors assessed whether problems associated with the effluent monitoring and

control program are being identified by NextEra at an appropriate threshold and are

properly addressed for resolution in the CAP. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the

appropriateness of the corrective actions for a selected sample of problems

documented. One corrective action involving the Groundwater Protection Program

(GWPP) was not completed in a timely manner and is described in Section 4OA5 of

this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (71124.07 - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

During the period December 2 to December 5, 2013, the inspectors verified that the

radiological environmental monitoring program (REMP) quantifies the impact of

radioactive effluent releases to the environment and sufficiently validates the integrity

of the radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent release program.

The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20; 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A

Criterion 60 - Control of Release of Radioactivity to the Environment; 10 CFR 50

Appendix I Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for

Operations to Meet the Criterion ALARA for Radioactive Material in Light-Water-Cooled

Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents; 40 CFR Part 190 Environmental Radiation Protection

Enclosure

15

Standards for Nuclear Power Operations; 40 CFR Part 141 Maximum Contaminant

Levels for Radionuclides; the guidance in RGs 1.23 Meteorological Measurements

Program for Nuclear Power Plants, RG 4.1 Radiological Environmental Monitoring

Programs for Nuclear Power Plants; RG 4.15 Quality Assurance for Radiological

Monitoring Programs; NUREG 1301 ODCM Guidance: Standard Radiological Effluent

Controls; applicable industry standards; and licensee procedures as criteria for

determining compliance.

The inspectors determined if NextEra has made significant changes to their effluent

release points.

Records of any abnormal gaseous or liquid tank discharges were reviewed to ensure the

abnormal discharges were monitored by the discharge point effluent monitor. When

discharges were made with inoperable effluent radiation monitors, or if unmonitored

leakage occurred, the inspectors ensured that an evaluation was performed, as required.

For unmonitored spills, leaks, or unexpected liquid or gaseous discharges, the

inspectors ensured that an evaluation was performed to determine the type and amount

of radioactive material that was discharged. The inspectors verified that surveys were

performed to include consideration of hard-to-detect radionuclides. The inspectors

determined whether or not NextEra had completed offsite notifications (State, local, and

if appropriate, the NRC), as provided in the Groundwater Protection Initiatives

implementing procedures.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Safety System Functional Failures (1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled NextEras submittals for the Safety System Functional Failures

performance indicator (PI) for the period of October 1, 2012 to September 30, 2013. To

determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, inspectors used

definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment

Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, and NUREG-1022, Event Reporting

Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. The inspectors reviewed NextEras MR

records, maintenance WOs, CRs, event reports and NRC integrated inspection reports

to validate the accuracy of the submittals.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Enclosure

16

.2 Mitigating Systems Performance Index (2 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed NextEras submittal of the Mitigating Systems Performance

Index for the following systems for the period of October 1, 2012 to September 30, 2013:

Residual heat removal system (MS09)

MSPI cooling water system (MS10)

To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, the inspectors

used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory

Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7. The inspectors also

reviewed NextEras condition reports, mitigating systems performance index derivation

reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the accuracy of

the submittals.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

During the period of December 2 to December 5, 2013, the inspectors sampled

NextEras submittals for the occupational exposure control effectiveness PI for the

period of the fourth quarter 2012 through the third quarter 2013. The inspectors used PI

definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02,

Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the

accuracy of the PI data reported.

To assess the adequacy of the licensees PI data collection and analyses, the inspectors

discussed with radiation protection staff, the scope and breadth of its data review and

the results of those reviews. The inspectors independently reviewed condition reports,

electronic personal dosimetry dose alarms, dose reports, and dose assignments for any

intakes that occurred during the time period reviewed to determine if there were

potentially unrecognized PI occurrences.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Radiological Effluent Occurrences (1 sample)

Inspection Scope

During the period of December 2 to December 5, 2013, the inspectors sampled

NextEras submittals for the radiological effluent TS/ODCM radiological effluent

occurrences PI for the period from the fourth quarter 2012 through the third quarter

2013. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy

Enclosure

17

Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,

Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported.

The inspectors reviewed NextEras corrective action report database and selected

individual reports generated since this indicator was last reviewed, to identify any

potential occurrences such as unmonitored, uncontrolled, or improperly calculated

effluent releases that may have impacted offsite dose. The inspectors also reviewed

NextEras methods for quantifying gaseous and liquid effluents and determining effluent

dose.

Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 - 3 samples)

.1 Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the

inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant

status reviews to verify that NextEra entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate

threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and

addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive

equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors

performed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended

condition report screening meetings.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Sample: Review of Corrective Actions for Alkali-Silica Reaction Affected

Structures

a. Inspection Scope

Between November 12 to November 14, 2013, NRC inspectors from Region I and

a reactor engineer from the Division of License Renewal, NRR, witnessed testing

conducted at the Ferguson Structural Engineering Laboratory (FSEL) at the University of

Texas - Austin in support of the Seabrook Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Project Corrective

Action Plan. Specifically, the inspectors witnessed strength testing of anchor bolts in a

large-scale ASR-affected concrete specimen performed in accordance with MPR Anchor

Testing Procedure 09, Conduct Unconfined Tension Test on Expansion Anchors.

The inspectors also observed installation of a number of anchor bolts conducted in

accordance with MPR Anchor Testing Procedure 03, Install Hilti Kwik Bolt Expansion

Anchors, and Procedure 12, Install Drillco Maxi-Bolt Undercut Anchors. Following the

completion of anchor bolt testing, the inspectors witnessed the cutting of large-scale

anchor test specimen AN-02 into four sections to investigate the depth/progression of

observed bifurcation cracking induced by ASR expansion.

Enclosure

18

During the week of November 18, 2013, inspectors were on-site to review the results of

the June 2013 Combined Crack Indexing (CCI) measurements. Inspectors reviewed

and discussed with the responsible Seabrook engineers the collected data and

engineering evaluations associated with the June 2012 six-month interval monitoring

results. Data sheets and associated records are attachments to internal Seabrook

document Foreign Print (FP) 100831, Revision 0, ASR Expansion Measurements.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

The inspectors observed proper procedural adherence and appropriate quality

assurance oversight of testing conducted at the FSEL facility. Testing was performed

by graduate students and supervised by a UT-Austin research assistant. Quality control

engineering oversight was performed by an MPR project engineer responsible for

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, implementation and periodic audits and assessments of testing

activities. The inspectors witnessed formal communications and independent

reader/verifier and performer coordination by testing personnel. All test results were

electronically recorded and overseen by FSEL and MPR supervisory personnel.

The preliminary results of this first stage of ASR-affected specimen anchor testing (ASR-

affected specimens fabricated on May 24, 2012 and displaying CCIs values of between

1.0 and 1.31 mm/m) identified no significant degradation from the control anchor test

results taken in November 2012, on specimen AN-07. Segmentation of anchor test

specimen AN-02, which was performed to investigate the depth of the bifurcation

cracking, identified that the surface cracks terminated approximately 8-9 inches into the

specimen. In discussions with NextEra staff, inspectors determined that the bifurcation

cracking was not unanticipated, based upon the specimen design (absence of through-

wall steel bar reinforcements/stirrups). However, inspectors determined that the growth

and depth of these types of surface cracks will continue to be monitored by NextEra for

both impact on test specimen performance and possible implications for Seabrook

Station ASR-affected structures.

The June 2013 CCI data analysis and conclusions are summarized in FP 100831 and

below:

416 of 445 measurement lines (93%) show crack length changes of 0.002 inch or

less compared to baseline measurements.

17 (3%) show length changes of 0.003 inch (5 vertical and 4 horizontal on exterior

surfaces, 8 vertical on interior wall locations.

9 (1.6%) measurements show length changes of 0.004 inch or greater (3 vertical and

1 horizontal exterior and 4 vertical on interior walls.

The average maximum expansion of 0.02% or less (from the baseline measurement,

using the combined crack index) represents 1/10th of 0.20% strain value associated

with published expansion strain limits for a typical concrete structures.

3 measurement lines show length changes of contraction between 0.007 and 0.008

inch compared to the baseline. The negative change measurements appear to be

the result of gage pin displacement.

Enclosure

19

Based upon the above data analysis, NextEra staff concluded: 1) no significant changes

have occurred in the 26 monitored locations after 18 months of data collection; 2) the

type of structure on site does not significantly impact the observed variations in

measured expansion; 3) thermal effects on seasonal measurements are noticeable; and

4) continued monitoring is warranted to assess trends.

Inspector review of the data identified no additional issues or concerns. As noted in

FP100831, based upon examination of eight new locations under the Phase 3 ASR

walkdowns, four new locations were added to the six-month CCI monitoring program

due to CCI values exceeding the 1.0 mm/m threshold. In accordance with the Structures

Monitoring Program, EDS 36180, Revision 4, these four locations will require a structural

evaluation to assess available margin.

.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues, as required by Inspection

Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, to identify trends that might

indicate the existence of more significant safety issues. In this review, the inspectors

included repetitive or closely-related issues that may have been documented by NextEra

outside of the CAP, such as trend reports, PIs, major equipment problem lists, system

health reports, MR assessments, and maintenance or CAP backlogs. The inspectors

also reviewed NextEras CAP database for the third and fourth quarters of 2013 to

assess CRs written in various subject areas (equipment problems, human performance

issues, etc.), as well as individual issues identified during the NRCs daily condition

report review (Section 4OA2.1). The inspectors reviewed NextEras quarterly trend

report for the third quarter of 2013, and selected departmental reports conducted under

procedure PI-AA-207-1000, Station Self-Evaluation and Trending Analysis, Revision 0,

to verify that NextEra personnel were appropriately evaluating and trending adverse

conditions in accordance with this and other applicable procedures.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

The inspectors evaluated a sample of departments that provide input into the quarterly

trend reports, which included maintenance and engineering departments. This review

included a sample of issues and events that occurred over the course of the past two

quarters to objectively determine whether issues were appropriately determined to be

newly identified as open or continued to be tracked as open adverse trends, potential

adverse trends, or management awareness areas. The inspectors verified that these

issues were addressed within the scope of the CAP, or through department review and

documentation in the quarterly trend report for overall assessment. For example, the

inspectors noted that consistent with the occurrence of a significant service water leak

in the third quarter associated with Strainer No. 11, NextEra had appropriately identified

this issue under the degraded component section of the trend report based on

exceeding a statistical control threshold. However, the inspectors noted that other

NextEra processes had captured the underlying issues related to service water system

challenges including associated corrective actions, and was therefore consistent with the

trend report not warranting additional evaluation.

Enclosure

20

Additionally, based on previous issues that had been identified and tracked in the

corrective action database, the inspectors noted an apparent trend in procedure use and

adherence. More importantly, NextEra had appropriately captured the increase in

human performance issues associated with procedure use and adherence as a potential

adverse trend in their trending analysis report for increased attention.

.4 Annual Sample: Follow-up of Corrective Actions for the Loss of Bus 5 during OR15

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of NextEras root cause analysis and

corrective actions associated with condition report AR 1808492, loss of Bus 5 during

clearance, which occurred during refueling outage OR15, in October 2012.

The inspectors assessed NextEras problem identification threshold, cause analyses,

extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness

of corrective actions to determine whether NextEra personnel were appropriately

identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and

whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors

compared the actions taken to the requirements of PI-AA-205, Condition Evaluation and

Corrective Action and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

The inspectors reviewed selected CAP records and did not identify any additional

issues. The inspectors determined NextEras overall response to the issue was

commensurate with the safety significance, was generally timely, and included

appropriate compensatory actions. The inspectors determined that the actions taken

were reasonable to resolve both the initial clearance deficiencies and subsequent loss of

emergency response communication data due to other unrelated failures that occurred

due to the loss of safety Bus 5.

Additionally, the inspectors noted that NextEras quarterly trend reports have captured

adverse trending related to clearance requests. This identification, as evidenced by

exceeding a statistical threshold of condition reports associated with clearance requests

throughout 2013, resulted in additional assessment within the CAP and the station

trending program. The inspectors verified the additional corrective action reviews were

appropriate for the circumstances to address the specific adverse conditions associated

with the tagging and clearance deficiencies identified by NextEra personnel. The

inspectors verified that the issues that caused the identification of the adverse trend

associated with clearance requests, were not related to the original cause of the loss of

safety Bus 5, and did not invalidate the corrective actions implemented to prevent

recurrence.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) Report Review

a. Inspection Scope

Enclosure

21

The inspectors reviewed the final report of the International Atomic Energy Agencys

OSART follow-up visit to Seabrook Station that occurred on June 3 to June 7, 2013.

The June 2013 visit was the follow-up assessment from the original review of Seabrook

that was conducted in June 2011. The inspectors reviewed this report to ensure that

any issues identified were consistent with NRC perspectives of NextEra performance

and to determine if the OSART team identified any significant safety issues that required

further NRC follow-up under the Reactor Oversight Process.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed reported groundwater monitoring results and changes to

NextEras written program for identifying and controlling contaminated spills/leaks to

groundwater to determine if NextEra has implemented the GPI as intended.

b. Findings and Observations

No Findings were identified.

One observation was identified concerning compliance with the voluntary Nuclear

Energy Institute GPI.

NEI 07-07 Industry Initiative Groundwater Protection Program dated August 2007

contains an acceptance criteria 1.1.e which states UFSAR to be updated with

information from Hydrological Investigation Report. NextEras Fleet procedure

EV-AA-100-1001 step 4.2 2.B c requires that Each site shall ensure that the Updated

Safety Analysis Report is in agreement with the characteristics of the site hydrology and

geology. (NEI 07-07 1.1 e). NextEra updated the Seabrook Station Groundwater

Completion Report on August 22, 2012. A subsequent review was performed of the

Hydrological Investigation Report and it was determined by the licensee that an update

to UFSAR was needed. No update to the UFSAR has been performed (AR 01924442).

This issue is considered minor as it does not affect safety-related SSCs nor impact any

radiological monitoring requirements.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On January 17, 2014, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Kevin

Walsh, Site Vice President, and other members of the Seabrook Station staff. The

inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or

documented in this report.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violation

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by NextEra

and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement

Policy for being dispositioned as a NCV.

Enclosure

22

10 CFR Part 50.65, paragraph a(4), Requirement for Monitoring the Effectiveness of

Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, states, in part, that the licensee shall assess

and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance

activities. NextEra procedure WM 10.1. On-Line Maintenance, Section 3.3.1,

requires that an evaluation of the risk impact of planned maintenance tasks be

performed. Contrary to the above, on September 24, 2012, NextEra failed to

adequately assess and manage the impact to plant risk during a planned

maintenance activity. Specifically, NextEra identified during internal reviews that

they had failed to recognize an elevated online maintenance risk level (Yellow)

during the performance of the 1-EDE-B-1-B Battery Service Test due to incorrect

coding in NextEras PRAX risk model program. The inspectors determined

NextEras failure to assess and manage risk during the period when the Battery

Service Test was reasonably within NextEras ability to foresee and correct, and was

identified as a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than

minor, and considered a finding, because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems

cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone

objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond

to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Because this finding

represents a violation of 10 CFR Part 50.65 Requirements for Monitoring the

Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Section a(4), the inspectors

used IMC 0609, Appendix K, Flowchart 1 Assessment of Risk Deficit, to analyze

the finding. The regional Senior Reactor Analyst determined

the incremental core damage probability (ICDP) for the surveillance period (~5-10

minutes) to be several orders of magnitude below the 1E-6 threshold due to the short

duration of the systems unavailability. As this finding is not related to Risk

Management Actions only, and the ICDP Risk Deficit is not >1E-6, the inspectors

determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green). The issue was

entered into NextEras CAP as AR 1906782.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Enclosure

A-1

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

K. Walsh, Site Vice President

T. Vehec, Plant General Manager

V. Brown, Senior Licensing Engineer

M. Chevalier, Radiation Protection Supervisor

J. Connolly, Site Engineering Director

K. Douglas, Maintenance Director

P. Dullea, Principal Chemist Specialist

D. Flahardy, Radiation Protection Manager

A. Giotas, Chemistry Specialist

M. Lake, Chemistry Technician

M. Leone, Operations Training Supervisor - Continuing

M. Ossing, Licensing Manager

V. Pascucci, Nuclear Oversight Manager

D. Robinson, Chemistry Manager

D. Strands, Chemistry Supervisor

M. Strum, Principal Radiological Engineer, AREVA

S. Wellhoffer, Nurse Manager RN

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures

ON1490.06 Winter Readiness Surveillance, Revision 12

ON1090.13, Response to Natural Phenomena Affecting Plant Operations, Revision 1

OP-AA-102-1002, Seasonal Readiness, Revision 1

OS1200.03, Severe Weather Conditions, Revision 20

OS1090.09, Station Cold Weather Operations, Revision 2

Condition Reports

01879206 01904449 1918322 1888495 1634911

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40197808

Miscellaneous

Evaluation of Beyond-Design-Basis External Flooding at Protective Features Identified as

Having Small Available Physical Margin, Revision 1

Seasonal Readiness Memo to Mano Nazar dated 9/24/13

Attachment

A-2

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

Procedures

OS1048.13, Vital Bus 11A Operation, Revision 8

OX1413.03, B Train RHR, Revision 10

OX1416.04A, Service Water Quarterly Pump and Discharge Valve Test and Comprehensive

Pump Test, Revision 18

Condition Reports

01793891 01923437

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40227849 40284358

Drawings

1-NHY-310042

PID-1-SW-B20795, Service Water System Nuclear Detail, Revision 40

PID-1-SW-D20795, Service Water System Nuclear Detail, Revision 42

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Miscellaneous

Seabrook Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Strategies, Volume I, PAB F-1A-Z 7/-6/-26

Unit No. 1 Diesel Generator Building Pre-Fire Strategies DG-F-1A-A, DG-F-2A-A, DG-F-3E-A,

DG-F-3C-A, and DG-F-3A-Z, Revision 2

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures

Miscellaneous

BTP MEB 3.1 Determination of Rupture Locations and Dynamic Effects Associated With the

Postulated Rupture of Piping

Calculation 9763-F-FS-01, Flooding Study for Primary Auxiliary Building - Moderate Energy

Lines

Seabrook Station Moderate Energy Line Break Study

Drawings

1-WLD-D20216 1-WLD-D20226 1-WLD-D20229 9763-F-805669

9763-F-805793

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance

Procedures

ES1850.017, SW Heat Exchanger Program, Revision 1

PEG-268, Heat Exchanger and NRC GL 89-13 Program, Revision 0

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40103638 40235240

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program

Procedures

NT 5702, Administration of Requal Program Annual Exams, Revision 23

OX1426.05, DG 1B Monthly Operability Surveillance, Revision 28

TR-AA-104, NEXTERA Energy Fleet Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program, Revision 4

TR-AA-230-1007, Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation, Revision 1

Training Group LORT Training Program Description, December 2012

Attachment

A-3

Condition Reports

1699285 1702114 1714783 1752327 1830734 1833538

1841980 1879841 1889829 1915426

Miscellaneous

E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 50

Requalification Training Program Annual Examination Sample Plan 2012-2013

Simulator Examination, Demonstrative Examination on October 23, 2013, Revision 14

Simulator Action Request:

TWR01818481

Simulator-Related Test Documents:

C Feed Reg Valve Failed Closed Plant Trip, 11/28/12

Closure of All MSIVs, 8/22/13

Main Turbine Trip below P-9, 8/22/13

Manual Rx Trip, 8/22/13

Simultaneous Trip of All RCPs, 8/22/13

Steady State Operability Testing, 11/19/12

Trip of a single RCP, 8/22/13

Trip of All FW Pumps, 8/22/13

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

Procedures

MS0519.129, Bettis Air Actuator Maintenance for 1-SW-V-16 and 1-SW-V-18, Revision 0

PEG-40, Scoping Changes and Program Interfaces, Revision 5

PEG-45, Maintenance Rule Program Monitoring Activities, Revision 17

Condition Reports

1921691 1927198 1927831 1904565 1926696 1902366

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40200892 94082141

Miscellaneous

Chemical and Volume Control System Health Report

ER-AA-100-2002 Form F01, Revision 1, Maintenance Rule Functional Failure

Form 36180, Structural Monitoring Program Form 2, Revision 1

NEI-99-02, Revision 7

System Health Report (10/1-2013 - 12/31/2013) for the Fire Protection System

System Health Report (10/1-2013 - 12/31/2013) for Service Water System

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Procedures

PRA-301, MR (a)(4) Process for On-Line Maintenance Group Instruction, Revision 0

WM-AA-100-1000, Work Activity Risk Management, Revision 0

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40227849 40227820 40281251

Attachment

A-4

Miscellaneous

Engineering Evaluation EE-13-007, Maintenance Rule (a)(4) Fire Implementation, Revision 0

Maintenance Rule a(4) Assessment Report for Work Week 1347

Maintenance Rule a(4) Assessment Report for Work Week 1349

Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Procedures

EN-AA-203-1001, Operability Determinations / Functionality Assessments, Revisions 12 & 13

OS1006.05, RWST and SFP Silica/Activity Clean Up Operations, Revision 6

OX1416.04 Service Water Quarterly Pump and Discharge Valve Test and Comprehensive Test,

Revision 18

Condition Reports

1755671 1909051 1918208 1918332 1919255 1920352

1920353 1920354 1914280

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40222427

Miscellaneous

SW-P-41A IST Pump Data Log

Section 1R18: Plant Modifications

Procedures

EN-AA-100, Design Change Program, Revision 1

EN-AA-100-1003, Control of Design Interfaces, Revision 1

EN-AA-205-1100, Design Change Packages, Revision 9

ES0815.004, Welding of Carbon Steel Materials (P-1 to P-1), Revision 1

LS0563.141, SWG-5 25R Synchronization Check Relay Inspection, Testing and PM, Revision 0

LS0568.21, Wiring Verification and Functional Checks, Revision 4

OS1000.01, Heatup from Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown, Revision 39

OX1426.03, Emergency Power Sequencer 18 Month Operability Test, Revision 7

OX1446.02, Bus E5 and E6 18 Month Offsite Power Supply Transfer Operability Test,

Revision 7

Condition Reports

01669517 1692863

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40233633 40233635 40040243 40090976

Miscellaneous

Calculation C-S-1-45886, Service Water Return Piping from CC-E-17-A&B Qualification,

Revision 2

Calculation 9763-3-ED-00-23-F, Medium Voltage Protection Relay Coordination, Revision 0

EC 274301, EPS Power Supply Overvoltage Protection

EC 279413, Modifications in Support of OR16 32 SW Tee Replacement, Revision 1

EC 278785, SW Pipe Support Modifications in Support of OR16, Revision 2

Engineering Change (EC) 272542, 1-RC-TB-451 Temporary Setpoint Change

Attachment

A-5

FP 36550, Environmental and Seismic Qualification Dedication Test Procedure and Test Report

for GE Relay P/N 12SLJ21A1A, Revision 0

UFSAR 8.3.1.1.e.b

Westinghouse Comparator Calculations

Drawings

310108

801815S, Sheet 1 of 2, Support No. 1815-SG-51, Revision 1

1-NHY-310102, Sheet A52, Control Wiring Diagram 4160V Bus 1-E5 RAT Incoming Line,

Revision 3

1-NHY-310102, Sheet A53a, 4160V Bus 1-E5 PTs Three Line Diagram, Revision 14

1-NHY-310231, Sheet 11c, Miscellaneous Relays 4.16kV Switchgear Bus 1-EDE-SWG-5,

Revision 7

SK-274863-2001

Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures

IS1672.211, 1-SW-L-6139 Service Water Cooling Tower Basin Water Level Loop B Calibration,

Revision 9

OX1413.01, A Train RHR Quarterly Flow and Valve Stroke Test and 18 Month Valve Stroke

Observation, Revision 18

OX1456.81, Operability Testing of IST Valves, Revision 18

Condition Reports

1915871 1897370 1916203 1916204 1908426 1926696

1927845 1921678 1921938

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40177013 40177017 40270845 40037987 40267058 40273297

40221056 40200892 40284268 40238117

Drawings

1-NHY-310107, Sheet D88a, 125 VDC Bus 11C 1-SWG-11C Three Line Diagram, Revision 11

1-NHY-310107, Sheet D88b, 1-SWG-11C Battery Charger Supply 1-BC-1C Schematic

Diagram, Revision 2

1-NHY-503956, SW to DG WTR Jacket Hx Logic Diagram, Revision 6

Foreign Print (FP) 92380, Fisher Butterfly Valve

G25163, 16 Type 7620 Valve Bettis T-316-SR2 Rotary Actuator, Revision H

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

Procedures

OX1416.06 Service Water Discharge Valves Quarterly Test and 18 Month Position Verification,

Revision 9

Condition Reports

01913220 01916357 1914416

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

40222447

Attachment

A-6

Miscellaneous

Containment Sump A and B level trends

Unidentified Leak Rate trends

Section 2RS6: Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment

Procedures

CD0904.11, Split and Cross Check Analysis, Revision 5

CDI-015, Sampling of Groundwater Monitoring Wells, Revision 3

CP 8.1, Verification of Analytical Systems Performance, Revision 23

CS0908.01, Off-site Dose Assessment, Revision 15

CS0910.11, Wide Range Gas Monitor Sampling, Revision 1

CS0917.02, Gaseous Effluent Releases, Revision 13

CS0917.03, Unmonitored Plant Releases, Revision 10

CS0917.04, Monitoring Plant Systems for Radioactivity, Revision 1

CX0917.01, Liquid Effluent Releases, Revision 20

Condition Reports

01634121 01876200 01876873 01876972 01876868 01898430

01891531 01924442 01924764

Miscellaneous

GEW Permit 13-150 Containment Purge, 4/4/13

GEW Permit 13-165 Continuous Plant Vent Releases, 4/9/13

HPOG 38 Dry Fuel Storage - Monitoring Plan for Kr-85 Release, August 14, 2013

HPSTID Number 13-005, Calculated Radiological Conditions Caused by the Release of Kr-85

during Dry Fuel Storage Campaign, August 14, 2013

LEW Permit 13-198 ASDA, 4/25/13

LEW Permit 13-149 Waste Test Tank B, 4/2/13

LEW Permit 13-194 Steam Generator Blowdown Flash Tank 4/10/13

LEW Permit 13-181 Turbine Building Sump, 4/3/13

SB Inter Laboratory Radiochemistry QC Report 2012

Seabrook 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

Teledyne Brown Engineering Laboratory, CARR No. 120306-667, March 6, 2013

Teledyne Brown Engineering Laboratory, CARR No. 120831-715, August 31, 2012

Teledyne Brown Engineering Laboratory, CARR No. 120726-698, July 26, 2012

Teledyne Brown Engineering Laboratory, CARR No. 121127-742, November 27, 2012

Teledyne Brown Engineering Laboratory, CARR No.121109-744, November 9, 2012

Section 2RS7: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program

Procedures

CD05-01-01, YSI 556 MPS Operations Manual, Revision 3

CDI-015, Sampling Groundwater Monitoring Wells, Revision 3

EV-AA-100-1000, Groundwater Protection Program Communications/Notification Plan,

Revision 4

EV-AA-100-1001, Fleet Groundwater Protection Program Implementing Guideline, Revision 2

LI-AA-102-1001, Regulatory Reporting, Revision 0

NARC 3-1.1, Periodic and Special Regulatory Reports, Revision 148

ON1244.01, Spill Response, Revision 24

OP 4.1, Effluent Surveillance Program, Revision 24

Attachment

A-7

Condition Reports

01891529 01891530 01891531 01891515

Miscellaneous

Seabrook 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification

Procedures

CS0917.02, Gaseous Effluent Releases, Revision 14

CX0917.01, Liquid Effluent Releases, Revision 20

HD0958.33, Performance of Radiation Protection Supervisory Plant Walkdowns, Revision 6

JD0999.910, Reporting Key Performance Indicators per NEI 99-02, Revision 6

NAP-206, NRC Performance Indicators, Revision 6

Audits, Self-Assessments, and Surveillances

Quick Hit Assessment Report 1914767, HP Performance Indicator Verification, November 1,

2013

Condition Reports

01856230

Miscellaneous