05000285/LER-2013-011, The Fort Calhoun Station, Inadequate Design for High Energy Line Break in Rooms 13 and 19 of the Auxiliary Building

The Fort Calhoun Station, Inadequate Design for High Energy Line Break in Rooms 13 and 19 of the Auxiliary Building

ML13225A367
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	08/12/2013
From:	Cortopassi L Omaha Public Power District
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
LIC-13-0114 LER 13-011-00
Download: ML13225A367 (5)

LER-2013-011, The Fort Calhoun Station, Inadequate Design for High Energy Line Break in Rooms 13 and 19 of the Auxiliary Building

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
2852013011R00 - NRC Website

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fjjjjjfj Omaba PIIIJHc Power Dlsltlt:t 444 South J(Jh Street Mall Omaha, NE 68102-2247 LIC-13-0114 August12,2013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Reference:

Docket No. 50-285

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 2013.011, Revision 0, for the Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2013-011, Revision 0. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(ii)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v),

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A). There are no new commitments being made in this letter.

If you should have any questions, please contact Terrence W. Simpkin, Manager, Site Regulatory Assurance, at (402) 533-6263.

Sincerely, Louis P. Cortopassi Site Vice President and CNO LPC/epm Attachment c:

S. A. Reynolds, Acting NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV J. M. Sebrosky, NRC Senior Project Manager J. C. Kirkland, NRC Senior Resident Inspector L. E. Wilkins, NRC Project Manager Employment with Equal Opportunity

NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Fort Calhoun Station

2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000285

3. PAGE 1 OF 4

4. TITLE Inadequate Design for High Energy Line Break in Rooms 13 and 19 of the Auxiliary Building

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 06 13 2013 2013 011 -

0 08 12 2013 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000

9. OPERATING MODE 5

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

CONTINUATION SHEET

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The required analyses will be performed, required modifications completed, and supporting documentation (including program documents) will be updated as required.

EEQ procedures will be revised such that all EEQ engineering activities are performed under the Station's configuration change control process.

Additional corrective actions will be implemented using the station's corrective action program.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

FCS has analyzed for breaks between the containment penetration and the isolation valves for the main steam and main feedwater systems and there is no adverse consequence to plant safety or accident mitigation for a postulated main steam line break (MSLB) or feedwater line break (FWLB).

However, due to an error in one analysis, there is a possibility of the loss of both safety-related AFW pumps in Room 19. FCS previously installed a third non-safety related diesel driven AFW pump which may be available to support the safety-related function. In Room 13 however, the exemption of breaks in the other smaller high energy piping systems (e.g. Letdown, Charging, and Steam Generator Blowdown) are not supported by existing analyses and could produce environmental effects that are more severe than currently analyzed in areas not bounded by the MSLB or FWLB analysis.

SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE This issue does constitute a safety system functional failure in accordance with NEI 99-02, Revision

6.

PREVIOUS EVENTS LERs 2012-009 and 2012-015 document similar equipment qualification events. The condition discussed in this LER was identified during the extent of condition from these previous events. As a result, any corrective action from the previous events would not have prevented this condition.