05000285/LER-1990-001, :on 900108,fire Barrier for Wall Between Auxiliary Bldg Rooms 26 & 34 Breached But Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Not Established.Caused by Lack of Sufficient Training for Shift Supervisors.Standing Order Revised

:on 900108,fire Barrier for Wall Between Auxiliary Bldg Rooms 26 & 34 Breached But Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Not Established.Caused by Lack of Sufficient Training for Shift Supervisors.Standing Order Revised

ML20006E104
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	02/09/1990
From:	Gates W, Lehman L OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-001, LER-90-1, LIC-90-0106, LIC-90-106, NUDOCS 9002220052
Download: ML20006E104 (4)

LER-1990-001, on 900108,fire Barrier for Wall Between Auxiliary Bldg Rooms 26 & 34 Breached But Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Not Established.Caused by Lack of Sufficient Training for Shift Supervisors.Standing Order Revised

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
2851990001R00 - NRC Website

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Omaha Public Power District P.O. Box 399 Hwy.75 - North of Pt. Calhoun Fort Calhoun. NE 680234399 -

402/636-2000 February 9, 1990 LIC-90-0106 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk R

L Mail Station P1-137

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Washington,_DC 20555 References-Docket No. 50-285 Gentlemen:

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Subject: Licensee Event Report 90-01 for the Fort Calhoun Station L

L' Please find attached Licensee Event Report-90-01 dated February 9, 1990.

This report'is being submitted per requirements of 10 CFR

'50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

L If you should have any questions, please contact me, l

Sincerely, l

A0 0 M W. G, Gates-Division Manager l,

- Nuclear Operations-(

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Attachment c:

R. D. Marti*

NRC Regional Administrator A.~Bournia, RC Project Manager P. H. Harrell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector A

INPO Records Center American Nuclear-Insurers L

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e, n.1 A Fire Barrier Breach Permit for the wall between Auxiliary Building Rooms 26 and 34 was taken to the Shift Supervisor for authorization on January 8, 1990.

The Shift Supervisor authorized the fire barrier breach at 1025 hours0.0119 days <br />0.285 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.900125e-4 months <br />, but Security was not notified to establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

Hence,.

TechnicalSpecification2.19(7)wasviolatedbyfailuretoestablishanhourly fire watch patrol for that area following the breach of the fire barrier. A separate fire watch patrol was established.in the same area on January 9, 1990 l

at 0940. The Fire Protection System Engineer discovered the discrepancy on-January 10, 1990 and initiated the required fire watch patrol.

The primary cause of this event was failure of the Shift Supervisor to assure

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his procedural responsibility for initiating a fire watch patrol was met.

Contributin factors were past practices and inadequate training associated with the Sh ft Supervisor responsibilities of the Fire Protection Program.

Changes to the Fire Protection Program to better define associated responsibilities will be implemented by February 16, 1990. The Shift Supervisors and other licensed operators will be trained concerning each of these changes prior to implementation.

NRC Penn 300 (649)

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On January 8, 1990 Fort Calhoun-Station Unit No. I was operating in Mode 1 at 100 percent power..An addition to the Auxiliary Building was under construction. The construction modification package required that a hole be bored in the fire wall between Rooms 26 and 34 of the existing building to run conduit for the new expansion. Craft personnel initiated a Fire Barrier Breach Permit form to obtain authorization to breach the fire barrier pursuant to Standing Order G-58, Control of. Fire Protection System Impairments.

The form was taken directly to the Shift Supervisor who gave authorization,to breach the fire barrier at 1025 hours0.0119 days <br />0.285 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.900125e-4 months <br /> on January 8, 1990.

l The Shift Supervisor assumed that the Fire Protection System Engineer had been notified and would notify Security of the need for an hourly fire watch i-patrol.

Standing Order G-58 required the Shift Supervisor or his designee to assure adequate compensatory actions were implemented prior to breaching a fire barrier.

There was no requirement for the Fire Protection System Engineer to i

be notified.

In most )revious cases the Fire Protection System Engineer had, i

when notified, taken tte actions needed to implement compensatory actions.

In this case, the craftsman did not contact the system engineer and no hourly fire watch patrol was initiated. The craftsman believed the paperwork to be in order and proceeded with breaching the fire barrier soon after authorization.

Fort Calhoun Technical Specification 2.19(7) requires that within one hour of the discovery of a degraded fire barrier, the fire-detector on at least one side of.the penetration must be verified as-operable and an hourly fire watch patrol must be established. There was no indicated inoperability of fire detectors in the affected area during this time period. Since the hourly fire watch patrol was not established, Technical Specifications were violated after the fire barrier was breached.

On January 9, 1990, at 0940, the requirement for an hourly fire watch patrol was technically met when an hourly fire watch patrol was established for l

another degraded fire barrier in the area. On January 10, 1990 the Fire Protection System Engineer discovered the missed fire watch during a review of the hourly fire watch patrol log and the fire protection impairment log.

The System Engineer notified Security and initiated the appropriate hourly fire watch patrol for the degraded fire barrier in question.

The primary cause of this event was the failure of the Shift Su)ervisor to assure his procedural responsibility for initiating a fire watc1 patrol was met.

There were several factors which contributed to this failure.

Past practice had been for the Fire Protection System Engineer to frequently assume this responsibility to reduce the work load for the Shift Supervisor; however, there was no formalized, consistent method for this delegation of responsibility.

There was also a lack of sufficient training for the Shift Supervisors on details of their responsibilities relative to processing of Fire Barrier Breach Permits following previous changes to this process.

Several Shift Supervisors interviewed were unaware of their responsibility to initiate hourly fire watch patrols.

NRC Fenn 308A (649)

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TEXT ta nuwe anses 4 soeused use seutuvieuv4C #eme m W (17)

As a result of previously identified deficiencies in the Fire Protection i

Program, Standing Order G-58 had been extensively revised and training of personnel prior to implementation of the revised procedure was in progress at the time of this event.

If implemented, the changes in G-58 would have prevented this event.

- There was minimal safety significance associated with this event.

The area on the Room 26 side of the fire barrier is a short hallway with two closed doors (one door not fire rated) containing little or no flammable materials. The breach was a small hole drilled for conduit. Hence, the likelihood of a fire s

igniting in, spreading through, or spreading to this area from the Room 34 side of the barrier was minimal.

Fire detection instrumentation was operable in this area throughout this period. The area was without an hourly fire watch patrol for approximately 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br />.

Corrective actions associated with this event are:

(1)

Standing Order G-58 has been revised to require the Fire Protection System Engineer to coordinate planned system impairments.

The System Engineer will assign appro Technical Specifications. priate compensatory measures as required by The Shift Supervisor will assure compensatory measures are in place prior to approving system i

l impairments. Training on changes to G-58 will be completed for Shift Supervisors and other licensed operators prior to implenientation. The revised G-58 will be implemented by February 16, 1990 (2)

Operations Shift Supervisors have been reminded of their procedural L

resionsibility to verify that a fire watch is established before aut1orizing a fire barrier impairment.

(3)

Verbatim compliance and the total completion of all procedures and forms will continue to be stressed by management and Licensed Operator Requalification Training.

LER 88-030, LER 89-11, and LER 89-18 document previous events pertaining to failure to perform hourly fire watch patrols previously implemented. As noted above, corrective actions resulting from deficiencies associated with these events had not been fully implemented at the time of this latest event.

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