05000285/LER-2013-002, Regarding CVCS Class 1 & 2 Charging Supports Are Unanalyzed

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Regarding CVCS Class 1 & 2 Charging Supports Are Unanalyzed
ML13086A037
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 03/26/2013
From: Cortopassi L
Omaha Public Power District
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LIC-13-0035 LER 13-002-00
Download: ML13086A037 (4)


LER-2013-002, Regarding CVCS Class 1 & 2 Charging Supports Are Unanalyzed
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
LER closed by
IR 05000285/2014009 (18 September 2014)
2852013002R00 - NRC Website

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LlC-13-0035 March 26, 2013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 2013-002, Revision 0, for the Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2013-002, Revision 0, dated March 26, 2013.

This report is being submitted pursuant to 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C). There are no new commitments being made in this letter.

If you should have any questions, please contact Terrence W. Simpkin, Manager, Site Regulatory Assurance, at (402) 533-6263.

Sincerely, 4ortOP~SSi '

Site Vice President and CNO LC/epm/rjr Attachment c:

E. E. Collins, Jr., NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV L. E. Wilkins, NRC Project Manager J. M. Sebrosky, NRC Project Manager J. C. Kirkland, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Employment witll Equal Opportunity

NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013

, the NRC may not conduct or sp onsor, and a person is not required to respond to, th e

information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Fort Calhoun Station
2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000285
3. PAGE 1 OF 3
4. TITLE CVCS Class 1 & 2 Charging Supports are Unanalyzed
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 1

25 2013 2013 002 -

0 03 26 2013 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000

9. OPERATING MODE 5
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

CONTINUATION SHEET

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

Failure of the piping could result in release of radioactive material through penetration M-3 due to the lack of double isolation. The charging and HPSI pumps are credited for maintaining containment pressure during a LOCA. Therefore, if the Class 2 charging line were to break during a LOCA, the charging or HPSI pumps may not be able to maintain pressure at M-3 for a minimum of 30 minutes.

However, check valve CH-198 and manual isolation valve CH-194 would be able to isolate the penetration, but are not credited in the analysis.

A causal analysis is in progress. The results of the analysis will be published in a supplement to this LER.

SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE This event does result in a safety system functional failure in accordance with NEI-99-02.

PREVIOUS EVENTS 13 LERs with event dates since January 1, 2010, were identified with the same reporting criteria. The condition identified in this LER is a latent condition that could not have been prevented by the corrective actions taken as a result of the LERs reviewed.

LER 2012-016-0, Unanalyzed Charging System Socket Welds to the Reactor Coolant System, identified a condition where a principal safety barrier was seriously degraded in that:

the 2 inch socket welded fittings on RCS branch line piping cannot be qualified, and the 2 inch charging lines are considered to be in an unanalyzed condition exceeding thermal cycle fatigue.

The extent of condition performed as a result of the condition identified in LER 2012-016-0 resulted in the identification of the condition reported in this LER.