ML13115A828
| ML13115A828 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 04/22/2013 |
| From: | Lodge T Law Office of Terry Jonathan Lodge |
| To: | Beyond Nuclear, Don't Waste Michigan, NRC/OGC |
| References | |
| Download: ML13115A828 (10) | |
Text
Docket. Hearing From: Terry Lodge [tjlodge50@yahoo.com]
Sent: Monday, April 22, 2013 9:14 AM To: Docket, Hearing; OGCMailCenter Resource Cc: Thomas Keegan; Kevin Kamps
Subject:
Fermi 2, Docket 50-341, REDACTED Notice of intervention on license amendmt + SUNSI Attachments: SUNSllttr Redacted.pdf To the Hearing Docket Administrator:
For public posting, please substitute the attached, redacted version of the letter I submitted to you and the Office of General Counsel on Friday, April 19, 2013. This version reflects removal of the residential street addresses of the two personal intervenors, Colan Keith Gunter and Michael 1. Keegan.
Kindly advise if there will be any problem with this request.
Thank you very much.
Terry Lodge 419-255-7552
--- On Fri, 4/19113, Terry Lodge <tjlodge50@yahoo.com> wrote:
From: Terry Lodge <~lodge50@yahoo.com>
Subject:
Fermi 2, Docket 50-341, Notice of intervention on license amendmt + SUNSI To: Hearing.Docket@nrc.gov, OGCmai1center@nrc.gov Cc: "Terry Lodge" <tjlodge50@yahoo.com>, "Kevin Kamps" <kevin@beyondnuclear.org>, "Thomas Keegan"
<mkeeganj@comcast.net>, "Arnie Gundersen" <sailchamplain@gmail.com>, "Maggie Gundersen"
<fairewinds@mac.com>
Date: Friday, April19, 2013, 11:16 PM To the Secretary of the Commission: Pasted in below, and attached in .pdf format, is our preliminary notification of intention to request a hearing on Fermi 2 proposed power uprate license amendment, with identification of potential intervening parties and request for access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNSI).
Law Office TERRY JONATHAN LODGE 316 N. Michigan Street, Suite 520 Toledo, Ohio 43604-5627 Phone (419) 255-7552 Fax (419) 255-8582 email: tjlodge50@yahoo.com April 19. 2013 Office of the Secretary Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Via email to Hearing.Docket@nrc.gov 1
RE: Detroit Edison Company (Fermi Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), Docket No. 50-341, preliminary notification of intention to request a hearing on Fermi 2 proposed power uprate license amendment, with identification of potential intervening parties and request for access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNSI)
To the Secretary of the Commission:
I represent putative representational Intervenors Don't Waste Michigan through its member, Michael 1. Keegan; and Beyond Nuclear through its member, Colan Keith Gunter. Please let this letter give notice of their intention to intervene and request a hearing with respect to the proposed operating license amendment for Fermi Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, for a thermal power uprate, per thes announcmen in Docket ID NRC-2013-0059. This matter was noticed in the Federal Register Vol. 78, No. 68 on April 9, 2013 at pp. 21164-21171.
Further, Intervenors request access to information associated with the license amendment which has been designated as "Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNS!)" and particularize their request as follows.
I. Representational Standing of Don't Waste Michigan and Beyond Nuclear of members Michael J.
Keegan and Colan Keith Gunter Beyond Nuclear is a six-year-old Maryland-based public education and advocacy group that educates and activates the public on issues pertaining to the hazards of nuclear power, its connection to nuclear weapons, and the need to abandon both. Beyond Nuclear advocates for an energy future for the State of Michigan and the United States that is sustainable, benign and democratic. Beyond Nuclear has approximately 8000 members nationally, several of whom live within 50 miles of the Fermi 2 nuclear power plant site. At the time it submits a formal petition, Beyond Nuclear will submit a declaration from one of its members, Colan Keith Gunter, who lives within 50 miles of proximity to Fermi Unit 2 at his residence address of 13784 Whitby, Livonia, MI.
Beyond Nuclear will petition to intervene to represent and protect the interests of Colan Keith Gunter, which Mr. Gunter will state are concerns for his health and that of his family, and for preservation of his residential real estate, from nuclear calamity.
Don't Waste Michigan is a 24-year-old grassroots organization in Michigan which has from inception opposed various incarnations of nuclear energy, from commercial nuclear power plants to radioactive waste. DWM has about 40 members statewide, and several live within 50 miles of the Fermi 2. At the time it submits a formal petition, DWM will submit a declaration in support of its request to intevene and represent its member, Michael J. Keegan. Keegan lives within 10 miles of Fermi 2 at 811 Harrison Street, Monroe, MI. That declaration will state Mr. Keegan's concerns for his health and for preservation of his residential real estate from nuclear calamity.
Because locus standi is based on requirements of injury, causation and redressability, the individual Intervenors Keegan and Gunter will request to be allowed to have Don't Waste Michigan and Beyond Nuclear represent them in the proceeding because (1) operation of Fermi 2 at the uprated level ofthermal output would, they believe, present a tangible and particular harm to the health and well-being of persons living within 50 miles of the site, including themselves; (2) the NRC has initiated proceedings for an amendment to the existing operating license for Fermi 2 regarding the proposed uprating, and if granted, it would directly affect Keegan and Gunter on the basis of the 50-mile standing proximity presumption; and (3) the Commission is the sole agency with the power to approve the requested license modification to operate Fermi 2 at greater thermallevcls than presently authorized.
II. The identity of the individual or entity requesting access to SUNSI 2
Don't Waste Michigan and Beyond Nuclear, the Requesters, propose that these individuals have access to the SUNSI data:
Arnold Gundersen, Principal Engineer, Fairewinds Associates, Burlington, VT David Lochbaum, Staff Engineer, Union of Concerned Scientists, Chattanooga, TN Terry Lodge, Intervenors' legal counsel Michael Keegan, Intervenor Kevin Kamps, Radioactive Waste Watchdog, Beyond Nuclear, Takoma Park, MD Paul Gunter, Director of Reactor Safety, Beyond Nuclear, Takoma Park, MD III. Requesters' basis for the need for the information Fermi Unit 2 is the largest-capacity operating General Electric Mark I boiling water reactor (BWR) in North America for which a 12.4% (approx.) extended power uprate (EPU) is planned. Extended power uprates usually require significant modifications to major pieces of non-nuclear equipment such as high-pressure turbines, condensate pumps and motors, main generators, and/or transformers.
While a 12.4% EPU for Fermi 2 falls within the NRC's allowable EPU increase of 20%, in absolute terms the Fermi 2 EPU would be one of the largest power increases ever granted to a Mark 1 reactor, because Fermi 2 has the largest power output of any BWR Mark 1 design.
Chuck Casto, NRC Region III Director, whose jurisdiction includes Fermi 2, who was the top NRC Staff designee to monitor the unfolding Fukushima nuclear disaster from his station in Japan, said of the events in Japan:
"[I]fwe end up with a molten core and then you talk about the time for the concrete to disassociate, you know, that NUREG says it's a couple of inches an hour, you know. And, of course, that Mark 1 containment is the worst one of all the containments we have, and it's literally, you know, this NUREG tells you that in a station blackout you're going to lose containment. There's no doubt about it."
NRC's Operation Center Fukushima Transcript (MLI2052A108), March 162011 (Casto).
Fermi 2's Mark 1 design is similar to that of Fukushima Daiichi, with similar design flaws, including a very small containment volume. Fukushima Daiichi Lessons Learned, including station blackout, have not been incorporated into the Fermi 2 design. Additional power from the Fermi 2 EPU will increase risk of containment failure, as evidenced by the failure of all three Daiichi Mark 1 contaminants. Additional power from the EPU will increase risk of core melt-through because of reactor penetrations placed on the bottom of the reactor in the BWRdesign.
NRC staff has already indicated the necessity of hardened filtered vents for Fermi 2, before this power increase, which have not been installed.
The Union of Concerned Scientists has extensively criticized EPU's in General Electric BWR's, renaming them "Experimental Power Uprates." In "Snap, Crackle, & Pop: The BWR Power Uprate Experiment,"<l> a six page issue brief, UCS chronicles an experiment under way at way at the Quad Cities nuclear plant in Illinois, which are two General Electric Mark I reactors. Using as an example the Quad Cities nuclear plant in Illinois, UCS has documented that after EPU was granted that plant in late 2001, the two Quad Cities reactors experienced numerous unplanned shutdowns to repair equipment that was literally shaking itself apart:
"On March 5, 2002, the Experimental Power Uprate began at Quad Cities when workers reconnected Unit 2 to the electrical grid following a refueling outage. After operating nearly 30 years up to the original licensed 3
power level, the plant literally began shaking itself apart at the higher power level. Workers manually shut down Unit 2 on March 29th after high vibrations caused leaks in the control system for the main turbine."
[d., Issue Brief p. 1. But the problem at Quad Cities was only beginning. <2>
IV. Explanation of why publicly-available versions of requested information are not sufficient to provide the basis and specificity for a proffered contention The increased thermal effects from the EPU will increase the risk of core melt-through because of reactor penetrations placed on the bottom of the reactor in the BWR design. The missing data involves surveillance capsule heating effects, thermal effects on metals in similar BWRs. In order to assess the increased risk of melt-through, it is necessary to understand the heat levels and measured effects on reactor metals. Notably, the BWR at Fermi is considerably larger than either of the aforementioned GE Quad Cities reactors, which in the EPU testing required replacement or modifications to repair leaks in the main turbine control system, a main steam pipe drain line, other main steam lines, and a perforated steam dryer.
Because EPUs typically require significant modifications to major pieces of non-nuclear equipment such as high-pressure turbines, condensate pumps and motors, main generators, and/or transformers, Intervenors and their experts must be accorded access to all information upon which the conclusions summarized in the Federal Register notice are predicated, particularly the conclusion that adequate margins of safety are maintained.
Please do not hesitate to contact us should clarification or additional information be required to complete the NRC Staff's assessment of this request.
Sincerely,
/s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge Counsel for Intervenors cc: Associate General Counsel for Hearings, Enforcement and Administration Office of the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 emailed to OGCmailcenter@nrc.gov xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx FOOTNOTES:
<1> http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear--power/nuclear--power_risklsafety/snap-crackle-pop.htmll
<2> From p. 2 of the UCS Issue Brief: "During the subsequent restart of Unit 2 on April 2, 2002,2 vibrations broke a drain line on one of the four main steam pipes. Workers knew the main steam pipes were vibrating abnormally at the Experimental Power Uprate conditions because insulation and of all things - vibration monitors had shaken loose and fallen from the pipes. Workers fixed the broken line not its cause - and restarted Unit 2 to resume the Experiment. The main steam pipes signaled trouble again on June 7, 2002. With Unit 2 steadily operating at Experimental Power Uprate conditions, the indicated flow in main steam line'A' suddenly increased from 2.95 to 3.05 million pounds per hour while the indicated flows in the remaining three lines decreased. The plant's owner, the reactor's manufacturer, and the site's regulator huddled about the problem. The head-scratching intensified on June 18, 2002, when the measured amount of water droplets being carried away by the steam was about four or five times the values recorded over the past three decades. When the high amount doubled over the next two days, operators suspended the Experimental Power Uprate by reducing Unit 2's output below the original licensed level. But the damage had already been done. Operators shut down Unit 2 on July 11,2002, for repairs. Workers soon spotted a gaping hole in the steam dryer. Metal fragments from the hole were later found in a flow instrument for one of the main steam lines and on the inlet 4
screen for a main turbine stop valve. Thus, at least one fragment from the cracked, broken steam dryer sitting above the reactor core was carried by steam out of the reactor vessel, past both of the main steam isolation valves, out of the primary containment, out of the secondary containment, to the stop valve in the turbine building. According to Exelon, the owner of the Quad Cities reactors: The root cause of the steam dryer failure was determined to be a lack of industry experience and knowledge of flow-induced vibration dryer failures. The dryer failed as a result of fatigue caused by flow-induced vibrations created by higher steam flows due to Extended Power Update conditions. Hence, the Experiment fills in gaps in the nuclear industry's knowledge."
5
Law Office TERRY JONATHAN LODGE 316 N. Michigan Street, Suite 520 Phone (419) 255-7552 Toledo, Ohio 43604-5627 Fax (419) 255-8582 lodgelaw@yahoo.com April 19. 2013 Office of the Secretary Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Via email to Hearing.Docket@nrc.gov RE: Detroit Edison Company (Fermi Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), Docket No. 50-341, preliminary notification of intention to request a hearing on Fermi 2 proposed power uprate license amendment, with identification of potential intervening parties and request for access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNS!)
To the Secretary of the Commission:
I represent putative representational Intervenors Don't Waste Michigan through its member, Michael 1. Keegan; and Beyond Nuclear through its member, Colan Keith Gunter.
Please let this letter give notice of their intention to intervene and request a hearing with respect to the proposed operating license amendment for Fermi Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, for a thermal power uprate, per the announcement in Docket ID NRC-2013-0059. This matter was noticed in the Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 68 on April 9, 2013 at pp. 21164-21171.
Further, Intervenors request access to information associated with the license amendment which has been designated as "Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNS I)" and particularize their request as follows.
I. Representational Standing of Don't Waste Michigan and Beyond Nuclear of members Michael J. Keegan and Colan Keith Gunter Beyond Nuclear is a six-year-old Maryland-based public education and advocacy group that educates and activates the public on issues pertaining to the hazards of nuclear power, its connection to nuclear weapons, and the need to abandon both. Beyond Nuclear advocates for an energy future for the State of Michigan and the United States that is sustainable, benign and democratic. Beyond Nuclear has approximately 8000 members nationally, several of whom live within 50 miles of the Fermi 2 nuclear power plant site. At the time it submits a formal petition, Beyond Nuclear will submit a declaration from one of its members, Colan Keith Gunter, who lives within 50 miles of proximity to Fermi Unit 2 at his residence address of ,
Livonia. MI. Beyond Nuclear will petition to intervene to represent and protect the interests of Colan Keith Gunter, which Mr. Gunter will state are concerns for his health and that of his Page 1 of 5
family, and for preservation of his residential real estate, from nuclear calamity.
Don't Waste Michigan is a 24-year-old grassroots organization in Michigan which has from inception opposed various incarnations of nuclear energy, from commercial nuclear power
. plants to radioactive waste. DWM has about 40 members statewide, and several live within 50 miles of the Fermi 2. At the time it submits a formal petition, DWM will submit a declaration in support of its request to intervene and represent its member, Michael J. Keegan. Keegan lives within 10 miles of Fermi 2 at Monroe, MI. That declaration will state Mr.
Keegan's concerns for his health and for preservation of his residential real estate, from nuclear calamity.
Because locus standi is based on requirements of injury, causation and redressability, the individual Intervenors Keegan and Gunter will request to be allowed to have Don't Waste Michigan and Beyond Nuclear represent them in the proceeding because (1) operation of Fermi 2 at the uprated level of thermal output would, they believe, present a tangible and particular harm to the health and well-being of persons living within 50 miles of the site, including themselves; (2) the NRC has initiated proceedings for an amendment to the existing operating license for Fermi 2 regarding the proposed up rating, and if granted, it would directly affect Keegan and Gunter on the basis of the 50-mile standing proximity presumption; and (3) the Commission is the sole agency with the power to approve the requested license modification to operate Fermi 2 at greater thermal levels than presently authorized.
II. The identity of the individual or entity requesting access to SUNSI Don't Waste Michigan and Beyond Nuclear, the Requesters, propose that these individuals have access to the SUNSI data:
Arnold Gundersen, Principal Engineer, Fairewinds Associates, Burlington, VT David Lochbaum, Staff Engineer, Union of Concerned Scientists, Chattanooga, TN Terry Lodge, Intervenors' legal counsel Michael Keegan, Intervenor Kevin Kamps, Radioactive Waste Watchdog, Beyond Nuclear, Takoma Park, MD III. Requesters' basis for the need for the information Fermi Unit 2 is the largest-capacity operating General Electric Mark I boiling water reactor (BWR) in North America for which a 12.4% (approx.) extended power uprate (EPU) is planned. Extended power uprates usually require significant modifications to major pieces of non-nuclear equipment such as high-pressure turbines, condensate pumps and motors, main generators, andlor transformers.
While a 12.4% EPU for Fermi 2 falls within the NRC's allowable EPU increase of 20%,
in absolute terms the Fermi 2 EPU would be one of the largest power increases ever granted to a Mark 1 reactor, because Fermi 2 has the largest power output of any BWR Mark I design.
Page 2 of 5
Chuck Casto, NRC Region III Director, whose jurisdiction includes Fenni 2, who was the top NRC Staff designee to monitor the unfolding Fukushima nuclear disaster from his station in Japan, said of the events in Japan:
[l]fwe end up with a molten core and then you talk about the time for the concrete to disassociate, you know, that NUREG says it's a couple of inches an hour, you know.
And, of course, that Mark 1 containment is the worst one of all the containments we have, and it's literally, you know, this NUREG tells you that in a station blackout you're going to lose containment. There's no doubt about it.
NRC's Operation Center Fukushima Transcript (ML12052A108), March 16,2011 (Casto).
Fenni 2's Mark 1 design is similar to that of Fukushima Daiichi, with similar design flaws, including a very small containment volume. Fukushima Daiichi Lessons Leamed, including station blackout, have not been incorporated into the Fenni 2 design. Additional power from the Fenni 2 EPU will increase risk of containment failure, as evidenced by the failure of all three Daiichi Mark 1 contaminants. Additional power from the EPU will increase risk of core melt-through because of reactor penetrations placed on the bottom ofthe reactor in the BWR design.
NRC staffhas already indicated the necessity of hardened filtered vents for Fenni 2, before this power increase, which have not been installed.
The Union of Concerned Scientists has extensively criticized EPU's in General Electric BWR's, renaming them "Experimental Power Uprates." In "Snap, Crackle, & Pop: The BWR Power Uprate Experiment,"1 a six-page issue brief, UCS chronicles an experiment under way at the Quad Cities nuclear plant in lllinois, which are two General Electric Mark I reactors. UCS has documented that after EPU was granted that plant in late 2001, the two Quad Cities reactors experienced numerous unplanned shutdowns to repair equipment that was literally shaking itself apart:
On March 5, 2002, the Experimental Power Uprate began at Quad Cities when workers reconnected Unit 2 to the electrical grid following a refueling outage. After operating nearly 30 years up to the original licensed power level, the plant literally began shaking itself apart at the higher power level. Workers manually shut down Unit 2 on March 29th after high vibrations caused leaks in the control system for the main turbine.
Id., Issue Briefp. 1. But the problem at Quad Cities was only beginning.2 I http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-,,ower/nuclear-"owerJisk/safety/snap-crackle-pop.html 2From p. 2 of the ues Issue Brief: "During the subsequent restart of Unit 2 on April 2, 2002, vibrations broke a drain line on one of the four main steam pipes. Workers knew the main steam pipes Page 3 of 5
IV. Explanation of why publicly-available versions of requested information are not sufficient to provide the basis and specificity for a proffered contention The increased thermal effects from the EPU at Fermi 2 will increase the risk of core melt through because of reactor penetrations placed on the bottom of the reactor in the BWR design.
The missing data involves surveillance capsule heating effects, thermal effects on metals in similar B WRs. In order to assess the increased risk of melt-through, it is necessary to understand the heat levels and measured effects on reactor metals. Notably, the Fermi BWR has a considerably larger output and uses more fuel than either of the aforementioned GE Quad Cities reactors. At Quad Cities, EPU testing necessitated replacement of equipment, or modifications to repair, leaks in the main turbine control system, a main steam pipe drain line, other main steam lines, and a perforated steam dryer.
Because EPUs typically require significant modifications to major pieces of non-nuclear equipment such as high-pressure turbines, condensate pumps and motors, main generators, and/or transformers, Intervenors and their experts must be accorded access to all information upon which the conclusions summarized in the Federal Register notice are predicated, particularly the conclusion that adequate margins of safety are maintained.
Please do not hesitate to contact us should clarification or additional information be were vibrating abnonnally at the Experimental Power Uprate conditions because insulation and - of all things - vibration monitors had shaken loose and fallen from the pipes. Workers fixed the broken line not its cause - and restarted Unit 2 to resume the Experiment.
The main steam pipes signaled trouble again on June 7, 2002. With Unit 2 steadily operating at Experimental Power Uprate conditions, the indicated flow in main steam line'A' suddenly increased from 2.95 to 3.05 million pounds per hour while the indicated flows in the remaining three lines decreased. The plant's owner, the reactor's manufacturer, and the site's regulator huddled about the problem.
The head-scratching intensified on June 18,2002, when the measured amount of water droplets being carried away by the steam was about four or five times the values recorded over the past three decades. When the high amount doubled over the next two days, operators suspended the Experimental Power Uprate by reducing Unit 2' s output below the original licensed level. But the damage had already been done. Operators shut down Unit 2 on July 11, 2002, for repairs.
Workers soon spotted a gaping hole in the steam dryer. Metal fragments from the hole were later found in a flow instrument for one of the main steam lines and on the inlet screen for a main turbine stop valve. Thus, at least one fragment from the cracked, broken steam dryer sitting above the reactor core was carried by steam out of the reactor vessel, past both of the main steam isolation valves, out of the primary containment, out of the secondary containment, to the stop valve in the turbine building.
According to Exelon, the owner of the Quad Cities reactors:
The root cause of the steam dryer failure was determined to be a lack of industry experience and knowledge of flow-induced vibration dryer failures. The dryer failed as a result of fatigue caused by flow-induced vibrations created by higher steam flows due to Extended Power Update conditions.
Hence, the Experiment fills in gaps in the nuclear industry's knowledge."
Page 4 of 5
required to complete the NRC Staffs assessment ofthis request.
Sincerely,
/s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge Counsel for mtervenors cc: Associate General Counsel for Hearings, Enforcement and Administration Office of the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 emailed to OGCmailcenter@nrc.gov Page 5 of 5