ML12047A301

E-mail from K. Wood, NRR to S. Bahadur, NRR Et Al. Re North Anna

ML12047A301
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	09/08/2011
From:	Kent Wood Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Bahadur S, Ulses A Division of Policy and Rulemaking, NRC/NRR/DSS/SRXB
References
FOIA/PA-2011-0357
Download: ML12047A301 (2)

Text

Wood, Kent 93 From: Wood, Kent ý0,ý Sent: Thursday, September 0 2011 11:12 AM To: Bahadur, Sher; Ulses, Anthony

Subject:

FW: North Anna Sher/Tony, These are the items that we have identified with respect to the SFP.

Kent From: Jones, Steve Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 2:03 PM To: Wood, Kent; Wilson, George Cc: Clifford, Paul; Ulses, Anthony; Mendiola, Anthony; Dennig, Robert

Subject:

RE: North Anna

Kent, Your list is great! I have just one item of operating experience: absence of leakage out the liner tell-tale drain does not confirm an absence of liner damage because other plants have experienced boric acid blockage of the drain paths. Boroscopic examination may be appropriate to verify the drain is open.

Steve From: Wood, Kent Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 1:02 PM To: Wilson, George; Jones, Steve Cc: Clifford, Paul; Ulses, Anthony; Mendiola, Anthony; Dennig, Robert

Subject:

RE: North Anna

George, With respect to the SFPs:

1. There is some confusion over whether or not North Anna is crediting Boraflex. NAPS UFSAR Rev 46 Section 9.1.2 indicates they are still crediting Boraflex for sub-criticality. There is a LAR from September 27, 2000, (ML003758403) that was removing the credit for the Boraflex. There have been indications at other sites that Boraflex can shift during normal operations, let alone an earthquake. If they are crediting Boraflex they should not move any fuel in the SFP it can be evaluated.

2. The storage racks should be inspected for any damage or deformation that would affect cooling water flow or the criticality analysis.

3. Any leakage from the SFP above what was occurring before the earthquake would be an indication of an issue with the SFP stainless steel liner.

4. Even if the leakage has not increased the storage racks are free standing and likely shifted/bounced during the earthquake. The liner may be damaged, but not to the point where it is leaking. However, it may be weakened should another event occur. The liner should be evaluated.

5. The effect of the SFP racks shifting/bouncing on the SFP concrete should be evaluated. The concrete should be inspected if it can be.

6. On page 9.1-4 of the NAPS UFSAR there is a discussion of a reinforcement of the SFP that was done when they went to high density storage. That might warrant a closer look.

7. The crane(s), rails, and structural support should all be inspected.

8. All fuel handling equipment should be inspected and alignment with reference locations confirmed.

9. All pumps, valves, and connected piping should be inspected/tested just as they should for any other safety related equipment.

Steve, can you think of anything else?

Kent From: Wilson, George I (k *\

Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 10:15 AM To: Clifford, Paul; Wood, Kent; Ulses, Anthony; Mendiola, Anthony; Dennig, Robert

Subject:

North Anna Bob please send me something on cnmt, and paul and Kent something on the feul and spent fuel George Wilson USNRC EICB Branch Chief, Division of Engineering Mail Stop 012H2 301-415-1711 2