ML12025A111
| ML12025A111 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 01/25/2012 |
| From: | Michael Kunowski NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B5 |
| To: | Pacilio M Exelon Nuclear, Exelon Generation Co |
| References | |
| IR-11-005 | |
| Download: ML12025A111 (54) | |
See also: IR 05000373/2011005
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, IL 60532-4352
January 25, 2012
Mr. Michael J. Pacilio
Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLC
President and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO), Exelon Nuclear
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT 05000373/2011005 AND 05000374/2011005
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
On December 31, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the
inspection results which were discussed on January 4, 2012, with the Site Vice President,
Mr. D. Rhoades, and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
Two NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green) were identified during this
inspection.
These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating
these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement
Policy.
If you contest these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this
inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional
Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road,
Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the
LaSalle County Station.
If you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your
disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region III, and the NRC Resident Inspector at
LaSalle County Station.
M. Pacilio -2-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,
its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection
in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component
of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is
accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
(the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michael Kunowski, Chief
Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000373/2011005; 05000374/2011005
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket Nos: 05000373; 05000374
Report No: 05000373/2011005; 05000374/2011005
Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
Location: Marseilles, IL
Dates: October 1, 2011 - December 31, 2011
Inspectors: R. Ruiz, Senior Resident Inspector
F. Ramírez, Resident Inspector
P. Cardona-Morales, RIII Reactor Engineer
J. Jandovitz, RIII Project Engineer
M. Mitchell, Health Physicist
A. Shaikh, RIII Reactor Inspector
R. Winter, RIII Reactor Engineer
R. Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
B. Palagi, RIII Senior Operations Engineer
D. McNeil, RIII Senior Operations Engineer
C. Moore, RIII Operations Engineer
J. Yesinowski, Illinois Dept. of Emergency Management
Approved by: Michael Kunowski, Chief
Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ........................................................................................................... 1
REPORT DETAILS ....................................................................................................................... 3
Summary of Plant Status ........................................................................................................... 3
1. REACTOR SAFETY ....................................................................................................... 3
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01) ............................................................. 3
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)........................................................................ 4
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05) .................................................................................. 5
1R06 Flooding (71111.06) ............................................................................................ 5
1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08P) ........................................................ 6
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11) ..................................... 7
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12) ............................................................. 10
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13) ....... 13
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments (71111.15) .............. 13
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18).......................................................................... 14
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19) .............................................................. 17
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22) ....................................................................... 17
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04) ............... 19
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06) ................................................................................ 19
2. RADIATION SAFETY ................................................................................................... 20
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01) ............. 20
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04) ..................................................... 20
2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (71124.05) ............................................. 22
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES ..................................................................................................... 27
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)....................................................... 27
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152) ........................................... 28
4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153) ................ 30
4OA6 Management Meetings...................................................................................... 32
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................... 1
Key Points of Contact ................................................................................................................ 1
List of Items Opened, Closed and Discussed............................................................................ 2
List of Documents Reviewed ..................................................................................................... 3
List of Acronyms Used ............................................................................................................ 16
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000373/2011005; 05000374/2011005; 10/01/2011 - 12/31/2011; LaSalle County Station,
Units 1 & 2; Maintenance Effectiveness and Plant Modifications.
This report covers a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced
baseline inspections by regional inspectors. Two Green findings were identified by the
inspectors. The findings were considered non-cited violations (NCVs) of NRC regulations.
The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red)
using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP);
cross-cutting aspects were determined using IMC 0310, Components Within the Cross-Cutting
Areas. Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity
level (SL) after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe
operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649,
Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green. A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective
Action, was identified by the inspectors for the failure to promptly identify and correct a
condition adverse to quality. Specifically, on November 8, 2011, the inspectors identified
that the oil reservoir on the Unit 1 high pressure core spray (HPCS) waterleg pump was
empty, with a soiled oil-absorbent pad positioned beneath it. The licensee had
previously identified a leak from the reservoir and placed the pad beneath it, but did not
enter the problem into the corrective action program (CAP) and did not repair the leak.
Upon notification of the condition by the inspectors, the licensee immediately entered
this issue into the CAP, verified operability of the HPCS system, restored the oil level,
established a special log to monitor the leak, and shortly thereafter replaced the waterleg
pump. Additionally, the licensee was conducting an apparent cause evaluation to
determine the causes of the occurrence and to develop additional corrective actions.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the
Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely
affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of
systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because there was no
design deficiency, no actual loss of safety function, no single train loss of safety function
for greater than the technical specification (TS) allowed outage time, and no risk
significance due to external events. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area
of problem identification and resolution, corrective action program, for the failure to
maintain a low threshold for identifying issues within the CAP commensurate with their
safety significance (P.1(a)). (Section 1R12)
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
- SL-IV/Green. A finding of very low safety significance and associated SL-IV NCV of
10 CFR 50.59(c)(2) was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to perform
an adequate 10 CFR 50.59 screening when evaluating if the implementation of Racklife
1 Enclosure
to monitor Unit 2 spent fuel pool (SFP) rack degradation was a departure from a method
of evaluation described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
Specifically, when evaluating in 2005, gif the proposed activity involved the use of an
alternative evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used
in the safety analyses, the licensee dismissed the screening question as not applicable
to the circumstances. As a result, the inspectors could not reasonably determine that
the changes would not have ultimately required prior NRC approval. The licensee
entered this issue into its CAP as AR 1294090. Since the licensee recently completed
the installation of neutron absorbing inserts in the entire Unit 2 SFP, as referenced in
License Amendment No.186, the use of Racklife to monitor its degradation will no longer
be necessary.
The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency is greater than minor
because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of
configuration control (reactivity control) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective
to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from
radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors performed a
Phase 1 SDP review of this finding using the guidance provided in IMC 0609, and the
finding screened as Green because all the questions in the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone
column of IMC 0609s Table 4a were answered no. Because violations of
10 CFR 50.59 can affect the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function, they are
dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process. The inspectors used the NRCs
Enforcement Policy to determine that the violation was a SL-IV violation because the
resulting changes were evaluated by the SDP as having very low safety significance.
The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with the underlying
finding because the finding was not representative of current performance.
(Section 1R18)
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
No violations were identified.
2 Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1
The unit began the inspection period operating at full power. On December 4, 2011, power was
reduced to approximately 80 percent for control rod sequence exchange. The unit was returned
to full power that same day. On December 18, power was reduced to approximately 65 percent
for control rod sequence exchange, scram time testing, and channel distortion testing.
In addition, main steam isolation valve and turbine control valve surveillances were performed.
Unit 1 was restored to full power on December 18 where it remained for the rest of the
inspection period.
Unit 2
The unit began the inspection period operating at full power. On October 2, 2011, power was
reduced to approximately 80 percent due to the failure of the 24A heater emergency drain valve
level controller. Following repairs, the unit was restored to full power on October 3.
On December 11, power was reduced to approximately 55 percent for control rod pattern
adjustments, sequence exchange, scram time testing, and channel distortion testing. Unit 2
was restored to 100 percent power on December 12 where it remained for the rest of the
inspection period.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
.1 Winter Seasonal Readiness Preparations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review of the licensees preparations for winter conditions to
verify that the plants design features and implementation of procedures were sufficient
to protect mitigating systems from the effects of adverse weather. Documentation for
selected risk-significant systems was reviewed to ensure that these systems would
remain functional when challenged by inclement weather. During the inspection, the
inspectors focused on plant specific design features and the licensees procedures used
to mitigate or respond to adverse weather conditions. Additionally, the inspectors
reviewed the UFSAR and performance requirements for systems selected for inspection,
and verified that operator actions were appropriate as specified by plant specific
procedures. Cold weather protection, such as heat tracing and area heaters, was
verified to be in operation where applicable. The inspectors also reviewed CAP items to
verify that the licensee was identifying adverse weather issues at an appropriate
threshold and entering them into their CAP in accordance with station corrective action
procedures. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the
Attachment to this report. The inspectors reviews focused specifically on the following
plant systems due to their risk significance or susceptibility to cold weather issues:
3 Enclosure
- auxiliary building ventilation; and
- lake screen house.
This inspection constituted one winter seasonal readiness preparations sample as
defined in inspection procedure (IP) 71111.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
.1 Quarterly Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant
systems:
- Unit 1 HPCS system;
- Unit 1 low pressure core spray (LPCS) system; and
The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the
Reactor Safety Cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted
to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore,
potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures,
system diagrams, UFSAR, TS requirements, outstanding work orders (WOs), condition
reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in
order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of
performing their intended functions. The inspectors also walked down accessible
portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were
aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the
components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were
no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly
identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events
or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the CAP
with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
These activities constituted three partial system walkdown samples as defined in
IP 71111.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4 Enclosure
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
.1 Routine Resident Inspector Tours (71111.05Q)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability,
accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant
plant areas:
- Units 1 Cable Spreading Room 4D1;
- Units 2 Cable Spreading Room 4D2; and
- observation of control room operators/fire brigade leader response to actual,
unplanned, plant fire alarm.
The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had implemented a fire
protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within
the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, maintained
passive fire protection features in good material condition, and implemented adequate
compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection
equipment, systems, or features in accordance with the licensees fire plan. The
inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as
documented in the plants Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later
additional insights, their potential to impact equipment which could initiate or mitigate a
plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event.
Using the documents listed in the Attachment to this report, the inspectors verified that
fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for
immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient
material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration
seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor
issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees CAP.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
These activities constituted three quarterly fire protection inspection samples as defined
in IP 71111.05-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flooding (71111.06)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected risk important plant design features and licensee
procedures intended to protect the plant and its safety-related equipment from internal
flooding events. The inspectors reviewed flood analyses and design documents,
including the UFSAR, engineering calculations, and abnormal operating procedures to
identify licensee commitments. The specific documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee drawings to
5 Enclosure
identify areas and equipment that may be affected by internal flooding caused by the
failure or misalignment of nearby sources of water, such as the fire suppression or the
circulating water systems. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees CAP documents
with respect to past flood-related items identified in the CAP to verify the adequacy of
the corrective actions. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the following plant area
to assess the adequacy of watertight doors and verify drains and sumps were clear of
debris and were operable, and that the licensee complied with its commitments:
- core standby cooling system (CSCS) below 710 elevation.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one internal flooding sample as defined in IP 71111.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08P)
From February 17 through 25, 2011, the inspectors conducted a review of the
implementation of the licensees inservice inspection (ISI) program for monitoring
degradation of the Unit 2 reactor coolant system, emergency feedwater systems,
risk-significant piping and components, and containment systems.
The inspections described in Sections 1R08.1 and 1R08.2 below constitute one
inspection sample as defined in IP 71111.08.
.1 Piping Systems Inservice Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the following nondestructive examinations required by the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)Section XI Code and/or
10 CFR 50.55a; evaluated compliance with the applicable ASME Code Case and
Section V requirements; and, if any indications were detected, determined if these were
dispositioned in accordance with the ASME Code or an NRC-approved alternative
requirement.
- ultrasonic examination of the six N4 feedwater nozzles;
- magnetic particle examination of residual heat removal (RHR) system lugs,
RH 53-2836X and RH 53-2847X; and
The inspectors reviewed the following examination records with relevant/recordable
conditions/indications identified by the licensee to determine if acceptance of these
indications for continued service was in accordance with the ASME Section XI Code or
an NRC-approved alternative:
- Report No. L1R13-APR-001, HPCS Safe End to Nozzle Weld;
- Report No. L1R13-APR-006, HPCS Safe End Extension to Safe End Weld;
- Report No. L1R13-APR-002, LPCS Safe End to Nozzle Weld;
6 Enclosure
- Report No. L1R13-APR-007, LPCS Safe End Extension to Safe End Weld;
- Report No. L1R13-APR-003, RHR Safe End to Nozzle Weld;
- Report No. L1R13-APR-008, RHR Safe End Extension to Safe End Weld; and
- Report No. L1R13-016, Reactor Pressure Vessel Nozzle to Flange Weld.
The inspectors reviewed the following pressure boundary welds completed for
risk-significant Unit 2 systems to determine if the licensee applied the pre-service
non-destructive examinations and acceptance criteria required by the construction Code,
ASME Section XI Code, and NRC-approved Code Cases. Additionally, the inspectors
reviewed the welding procedure specification and supporting weld procedure
qualification records to determine if the weld procedures were qualified in accordance
with the requirements of the ASME Section IX Code.
- Weld fabrication during replacement of valve 2E12-FO64B of the RHR system;
and
- Weld fabrication during the installation of 16 strain gauges on the Main Steam
lines.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of ISI-related problems entered into the licensees
CAP and conducted interviews with licensee staff to determine if:
- the licensee had established an appropriate threshold for identifying ISI-related
problems;
- the licensee had performed a root cause (if applicable) and taken appropriate
corrective actions; and
- the licensee had evaluated operating experience and industry generic issues
related to ISI and pressure boundary integrity.
The inspectors performed these reviews to evaluate compliance with 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requirements. Documents reviewed are
listed in the Attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (71111.11Q)
a. Inspection Scope
On October 31, 2011, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plants
simulator during licensed operator requalification examinations to verify that operator
7 Enclosure
performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and documenting crew
performance problems, and training was being conducted in accordance with licensee
procedures. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:
- licensed operator performance;
- crews clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;
- correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;
- control board manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan
actions and notifications.
The crews performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action
expectations and successful critical task completion requirements. Documents reviewed
are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator requalification program
sample as defined in IP 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Biennial Written and Annual Operating Test Results (71111.11B)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the overall pass/fail results of the Biennial Written Examination,
and the Annual Operating Test, administered by the licensee from October 10, 2011,
through November 18, 2011, required by 10 CFR 55.59(a). The results were compared
to the thresholds established in IMC 0609, Appendix I, Licensed Operator
Requalification Significance Determination Process," to assess the overall adequacy of
the licensees licensed operator requalification training (LORT) program to meet the
requirements of 10 CFR 55.59.
This inspection constituted one biennial licensed operator requalification inspection
sample as defined in IP 71111.11A.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Biennial Review (71111.11B)
a. Inspection Scope
The following inspection activities were conducted during the weeks of October 17
and 24, 2011, to assess: 1) the effectiveness and adequacy of the facility licensees
implementation and maintenance of its systems approach to training (SAT) based LORT
program, put into effect to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59; 2) conformance
8 Enclosure
with the requirements of 10 CFR 55.46 for use of a plant referenced simulator to
conduct operator licensing examinations and for satisfying experience requirements;
and 3) conformance with the operator license conditions specified in 10 CFR 55.53.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
- Facility Operating History and Licensee Training Feedback System
(10 CFR 55.59(c); SAT Element 5 as Defined in 10 CFR 55.4): The inspectors
evaluated the licensees ability to assess the effectiveness of its LORT program
and its ability to implement appropriate corrective actions to maintain its LORT
Program up-to-date. The inspectors reviewed documents related to the plants
operating history and associated responses (e.g., plant issue matrix and
performance review reports; recent examination and inspection reports; licensee
event reports (LERs)). The inspectors reviewed the use of feedback from
operators, instructors, and supervisors as well as the use of feedback from plant
events and industry experience information. The inspectors reviewed the
licensees quality assurance oversight activities, including licensee training
department self-assessment reports.
- Licensee Requalification Examinations (10 CFR 55.59(c); SAT Element 4 as
Defined in 10 CFR 55.4): The inspectors reviewed the licensees program for
development and administration of the LORT biennial written examination and
annual operating tests to assess the licensees ability to develop and administer
examinations that are acceptable for meeting the requirements of
- The inspectors reviewed the methodology used to construct the examination,
including content, level of difficulty, and general quality of the
examination/test materials. The inspectors also assessed the level of
examination material duplication from week-to-week for both the operating
tests conducted during the current year, as well as the written examinations
administered in 2011. The inspectors reviewed a sample of the written
examinations and associated answer keys to check for consistency and
accuracy.
- The inspectors observed the administration of the annual operating test to
assess the licensees effectiveness in conducting the examinations, including
the conduct of pre-examination briefings, evaluations of individual operator
and crew performance, and post-examination analysis. The inspectors
evaluated the performance of two crews in parallel with the facility evaluators
during two dynamic simulator scenarios, and evaluated various licensed crew
members concurrently with facility evaluators during the administration of
several Job Performance Measures.
- The inspectors assessed the adequacy and effectiveness of the remedial
training conducted since the last requalification examinations and the training
planned for the current examination cycle to ensure that they addressed
weaknesses in licensed operator or crew performance identified during
training and plant operations. The inspectors reviewed remedial training
procedures and individual remedial training plans.
9 Enclosure
- Conformance with Examination Security Requirements (10 CFR 55.49):
The inspectors conducted an assessment of the licensees processes related to
examination physical security and integrity (e.g., predictability and bias) to verify
compliance with 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests.
The inspectors reviewed the facility licensees examination security procedure,
and observed the implementation of physical security controls (e.g., access
restrictions and simulator input/output controls) and integrity measures
(e.g., security agreements, sampling criteria, bank use, and test item repetition)
throughout the inspection period.
- Conformance with Simulator Requirements (10 CFR 55.46): The inspectors
assessed the adequacy of the licensees simulation facility (simulator) for use in
operator licensing examinations and for satisfying experience requirements.
The inspectors reviewed a sample of simulator performance test records
(e.g., transient tests, malfunction tests, scenario based tests, post-event tests,
steady state tests, and core performance tests), simulator discrepancies, and the
process for ensuring continued assurance of simulator fidelity in accordance with
10 CFR 55.46. The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the discrepancy
corrective action process to ensure that simulator fidelity was being maintained.
Open simulator discrepancies were reviewed for importance relative to the
impact on 10 CFR 55.45 and 55.59 operator actions as well as on nuclear and
thermal hydraulic operating characteristics.
- Conformance with Operator License Conditions (10 CFR 55.53): The inspectors
reviewed the facility licensee's program for maintaining active operator licenses
and to assess compliance with 10 CFR 55.53(e) and (f). The inspectors
reviewed the procedural guidance and the process for tracking on-shift hours for
licensed operators, and which control room positions were granted
watch-standing credit for maintaining active operator licenses. Additionally,
medical records for 12 licensed operators were reviewed for compliance with
This inspection constituted one biennial licensed operator requalification inspection
sample as defined in IP 71111.11B.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)
.1 Routine Quarterly Evaluations (71111.12Q)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following
risk-significant systems:
- RHR system; and
- Unit 1 HPCS system.
10 Enclosure
The inspectors reviewed events, such as where ineffective equipment maintenance had
resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems, and
independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition
problems in terms of the following:
- implementing appropriate work practices;
- identifying and addressing common cause failures;
- scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;
- characterizing system reliability issues for performance;
- charging unavailability for performance;
- trending key parameters for condition monitoring;
- ensuring 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification or re-classification; and
- verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and
components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2), or appropriate and adequate
goals and corrective actions for systems classified as (a)(1).
The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability,
and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance
effectiveness issues were entered into the CAP with the appropriate significance
characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted two quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined
in IP 71111.12-05.
b. Findings
Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct an Oil Leak on the HPCS Waterleg Pump
Introduction: A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified by the
inspectors for the failure to promptly identify and correct an oil leak from the HPCS
waterleg pump, a condition adverse to quality.
Description: During a system walkdown on November 8, 2011, the inspectors identified
that the oil reservoir (bubbler) on the Unit 1 HPCS waterleg pump was empty.
The inspectors noted a soiled oil-absorbent pad positioned beneath the bubbler.
The inspectors also noted that the pump had just been replaced in October and that the
leak had not been entered into the CAP, contrary to station procedure LS-AA-120,
Issue Identification and Screening Process. Had the oil leak been entered into the
CAP, corrective actions could have been taken before the inspectors identified that the
oil bubbler was completely empty. The inspectors immediately notified the Operations
Shift Manager of the degraded condition and observed the licensees immediate
followup actions.
Upon responding to the waterleg pump location, an operator removed the bubbler and
verified that oil was still present within the connecting line, thereby confirming that the
pumps bearings were never without oil. Further, the licensee performed a vibrational
analysis of the pumps operation. With no other apparent degraded conditions present
on the waterleg pump, or on the HPCS system in general, the system was confirmed by
the licensee to have maintained operability despite the empty bubbler. The operator
then refilled and reinstalled the bubbler and proceeded to replace the oil absorbent pad
11 Enclosure
with a fresh pad. Then, as a result of the inspectors observations, the licensee entered
the issue into the CAP for the first time.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that failing to enter a known condition adverse to
quality into the CAP was contrary to a station procedure and was a performance
deficiency.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the
Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the
cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems
that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, i.e., core
damage. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in
accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and
Characterization of Findings, Table 4a, for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, dated
January 10, 2008. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance
because there was no design deficiency, no actual loss of safety function, no single train
loss of safety function for greater than the TS allowed outage time, and no risk
significance due to external events.
This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and
resolution, corrective action program, for the failure to maintain a low threshold for
identifying issues within the CAP commensurate with their safety significance (P.1(a)).
Enforcement: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action,
requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to
quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and
equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, between October 2011 (when the HPCS waterleg pump was
replaced and returned-to-service) and November 8, 2011, the licensee failed to promptly
identify and correct a condition adverse to quality regarding an oil leak on the HPCS
waterleg pump. Specifically, the licensee failed to enter the oil leak into the CAP at the
time that it became necessary to place an oil-absorbent pad on the pump. Because the
condition was not identified within the CAP, the leak was not promptly corrected and
continued until the NRC inspectors identified that the oil bubbler was empty. Upon the
inspectors identification of the empty oil bubbler, the systems condition was such that
operability was in question. As part of the corrective actions taken by the licensee,
operability of the HPCS system was verified, oil level was restored, and a special log to
monitor the leak was established until the waterleg pump was ultimately replaced in
December 2011. The licensee is in the process of performing an apparent cause
evaluation to determine future corrective actions to address the cause(s) of the violation.
Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it was entered into the
CAP, as ARs 01287679 and 01301053, this violation is being treated as an NCV,
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy
(NCV 05000373/2011005-01, Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct an Oil Leak on the
HPCS Waterleg Pump).
12 Enclosure
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
.1 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and management of plant risk for the
maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related
equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed
prior to removing equipment for work:
- Unit 1 Yellow risk during Division III work window;
- Unit 1 Yellow risk during Division I CSCS work window; and
- Unit common B control room ventilation/auxiliary electrical equipment room
ventilation emergent repairs and emergent reactor water cleanup leak repair.
These activities were selected based on their potential risk significance relative to the
Reactor Safety Cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that
risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and were accurate
and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the
plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the scope
of maintenance work and verified plant conditions were consistent with the risk
assessment. The inspectors also reviewed TS requirements and walked down portions
of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were
valid and applicable requirements were met.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
These maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control activities constituted
three samples as defined in IP 71111.13-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments (71111.15)
.1 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following issues:
- 1B DG lube oil leak (AR 1273465); and
- Operability Evaluation 04-006 (AR 0236085).
The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance
of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical
adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the
subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in
risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the
appropriate sections of the TSs and UFSAR to the licensees evaluations to determine
13 Enclosure
whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures
were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures
in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors
determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the
evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of CAP documents to
verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with
operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This operability inspection constituted two samples as defined in IP 71111.15-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)
.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI)05000374/2010005-06, Implementation of the Racklife
Computer Model to Monitor Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks Degradation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors review of this issue focused on the application of NRC regulations
associated with changes, tests, and experiments to the licensed facility as a result of the
implementation of the Racklife computer model to monitor Unit 2 SFP storage rack
degradation. In addition to interviewing licensee staff, the inspectors reviewed various
documents such as 50.59 screening forms, change request forms, ARs, and UFSAR
change request forms. Additionally, the inspectors consulted Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI) 96-07, Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation, Revision 1, which contains
NRC-endorsed guidance on the process by which licensees may make changes to their
facilities. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This review of a plant modification issue constituted one sample as defined in
IP 71111.18-02.
b. Findings
Failure to Perform an Adequate 10 CFR 50.59 Screening for the Use of Racklife Spent
Fuel Pool Monitoring Computer Model
Introduction: The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and
associated SL-IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, for the
failure in 2005 to perform an adequate 10 CFR 50.59 screening when implementing the
Racklife computer model to monitor Unit 2 SFP storage rack degradation.
Description: On June 26, 1996, the NRC published Generic Letter 96-04,
Boraflex Degradation in Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks. The licensee was required to
respond to this letter since the SPF for Unit 2 used Boraflex as a neutron absorber.
The response was to include an assessment of the capability of Boraflex to maintain
five percent sub-criticality margin and a description of the proposed actions if this margin
could not be maintained by Boraflex. The licensee responded on November 6, 1996,
with an assessment. The assessment was based on coupon testing, rack exposure
management, and the margin to criticality existing at the time. In the response,
14 Enclosure
Racklife was mentioned as an Electrical Power Research Institute-sponsored
calculational model that was under development and the licensee stated that the
Racklife models predictions would be used in the future to support the Unit 2 SFP rack
management strategy and to identify the need for additional activities to offset any
degradation.
In 2005, through a 10 CFR 50.59 screening, the licensee revised UFSAR
Section 9.1.2.2, Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool, to describe a comprehensive Boraflex
monitoring program that included Boraflex coupon surveillance (onsite and offsite).
In addition, the change to the UFSAR added periodic neutron blackness testing
(Badger testing) and the use of the Racklife computer code to model Boraflex
degradation. Subsequently, in 2006, an additional 10 CFR 50.59 screening was
performed to again revise Section 9 of the UFSAR to specify that the licensee would
conduct Badger testing every three years for as long as Boraflex was credited to help
control the Unit 2 SFP reactivity.
In accordance with licensee TS 4.3.1, a Keff (K effective, a criticality multiplication factor)
of less than 0.95 must be maintained to ensure operability of the SFP. The Racklife
computer model was not part of the criticality analysis that was used to meet the TS
limit. However, Racklife provided data that allowed the licensee to manage the storage
capacity of the Unit 2 SFP and was used to determine if spent fuel could be stored in
any particular cell. Using industry guidance provided in NEI 96-07, Revision 1,
Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation, the inspectors determined that
implementing the use of Racklife was a departure from a method of evaluation described
in the UFSAR. By implementing Racklife to help manage the Unit 2 SFP storage
capacity, the licensee changed to a method of evaluation different from the
one described in the UFSAR. This new method has not been approved by the NRC.
The licensees 50.59 screening document, LS-AA-104-1003, 50.59 Screening Form,
Revision 1, dismissed the applicable screening question (Does the proposed activity
involve an adverse change to an element of a UFSAR described evaluation
methodology, or use of an alternative evaluation methodology, that is used in
establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?) as a No. Had the
licensee appropriately answered Yes to this screening question, a full 10 CFR 50.59
Evaluation would have been required to determine if the proposed change required
NRC approval via a license amendment.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to perform an adequate
screening for using Racklife was contrary to 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2) and was a performance
deficiency. Using the guidance in IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports,
Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated December 24, 2009, the inspectors determined
that, in addition to evaluating it with the ROP Significant Determination Process, the
performance deficiency should also be evaluated using the traditional enforcement
process since it had the potential to impact the agencys ability to perform its regulatory
function.
The performance deficiency is greater than minor because it was associated with the
Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of configuration control (reactivity control) and
adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that
physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by
accidents or events. However, the finding did not result in the compromise of the
TS-required limit of Keff less than 0.95 in the Unit 2 SFP. Using Table 4a of IMC 0609.04
15 Enclosure
and answering the questions on the column for the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone as No,"
the finding screened as Green.
Since violations of 10 CFR 50.59 are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement
process, the inspectors used the NRCs Enforcement Policy to determine the severity of
the violation. Using the violation examples of the Enforcement Policy in Section 6.1,
Reactor Operations, the inspectors determined that the violation is a SL-IV violation
because the resulting changes were evaluated by the SDP as having very low safety
significance.
The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with the underlying
finding because the finding was not representative of current performance.
Enforcement: Title 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, Section (d)(1)
requires the licensee to maintain records of changes in the facility, of changes in
procedures, and of tests and experiments made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59(c).
Title 10 CFR 50.59 (c)(2) states, in part, that a licensee may make changes in the facility
as described in the UFSAR without obtaining a license amendment if the change, test, or
experiment does not result in a departure from a method of evaluation described in the
UFSAR used in establishing the design basis or in the safety analysis.
Contrary to the above, in November 2005, when the licensee performed a 10 CFR 50.59
screening to evaluate the implementation of Racklife computer model to monitor
degradation of the Unit 2 SFP storage racks, it did not consider this as a change to a
method of evaluation described in the UFSAR.
The violation is associated with a reactor oversight process (ROP) finding that has been
evaluated by the SDP and communicated with an SDP color reflective of the safety
impact of the deficient licensee performance. The SDP, however, does not specifically
consider the regulatory process impact. Thus, although related to a common regulatory
concern, it is necessary to address the violation and finding using different processes to
correctly reflect both the regulatory importance of the violation and the safety
significance of the associated ROP finding.
Because this violation was of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful,
and it was entered into the licensees CAP, as AR 1294090, the issue is being treated as
a SL-IV NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy
(NCV 05000374/2011005-02, Failure to Perform an Adequate 10 CFR 50.59 Screening
for the Use of Racklife Spent Fuel Pool Monitoring Computer Model).
The underlying finding aspect of a violation is evaluated separately from the traditional
enforcement violation and, therefore, the underlying finding is being assigned a separate
tracking number (FIN 05000374/2011005-03, Failure to Perform an Adequate
10 CFR 50.59 Screening for the Use of Racklife Spent Fuel Pool Monitoring Computer
Model).
Since the licensee recently completed the installation of the neutron absorbing inserts
(NETCO Snap-In Inserts) in the entire Unit 2 SFP as referenced in License
Amendment No.186, dated January 28, 2011, the use of Racklife to monitor its
degradation is no longer needed by the licensee.
This URI is considered closed.
16 Enclosure
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
.1 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance testing (PMT) activities to verify
that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and
functional capability:
- Unit 1 primary containment ventilation system;
- Unit 2 RHR minimum flow bypass valve; and
- Unit 2 RHR A suppression chamber spray valve.
These activities were selected based upon the SSCs ability to impact risk.
The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable): the effect of
testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the
maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational
readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as written in
accordance with properly reviewed and approved procedures; equipment was returned
to its operational status following testing (temporary modifications or jumpers required
for test performance were properly removed after test completion); and test
documentation was properly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the activities against
TSs, the UFSAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various
NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the
equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors
reviewed CAP documents associated with PMTs to determine whether the licensee was
identifying problems and entering them in the CAP and that the problems were being
corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Documents reviewed are listed
in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted three PMT samples as defined in IP 71111.19-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
.1 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether
risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety
function and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural
and TS requirements:
- LOS-RP-Q3 Main Steam Isolation Valve Scram Functional Test (Routine); and
- LOS-RD-M3 Control Rod Monthly Surveillance (Routine).
17 Enclosure
The inspectors observed in-plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated
records to determine the following:
- did preconditioning occur;
- were the effects of the testing adequately addressed by control room personnel
or engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;
- were acceptance criteria clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and
consistent with the system design basis;
- plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented;
- as-left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency was
in accordance with TSs, the UFSAR, procedures, and applicable commitments;
- measuring and test equipment calibration was current;
- test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy; applicable
prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;
- test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability;
tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other
applicable procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored
where used;
- test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid;
- test equipment was removed after testing;
- where applicable for inservice testing activities, testing was performed in
accordance with the applicable version of ASME Section XI Code, and reference
values were consistent with the system design basis;
- where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed
with an adequate operability evaluation or the system or component was
declared inoperable;
- where applicable for safety-related instrument control surveillance tests,
reference setting data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure;
- where applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical
contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished;
- prior procedure changes had not provided an opportunity to identify problems
encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test;
- equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the
performance of its safety functions; and
- all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and
dispositioned in the CAP.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted two routine surveillance testing samples as defined in
IP 71111.22-02 and -05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
18 Enclosure
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)
.1 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, emergency action level and
Emergency Plan Revision 32 was implemented based on the licensees determination,
in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), that the changes resulted in no decrease in
effectiveness of the Plan, and that the revised Plan, as changed, continues to meet
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
The inspectors conducted a sampling review of the Emergency Plan changes and a
review of the Emergency Action Level changes to evaluate for potential decreases in
effectiveness of the Plan. However, these reviews do not constitute formal NRC
approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future
NRC inspection in their entirety.
This emergency action level and emergency plan changes inspection constituted one
sample as defined in IP 71114.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
.1 Training Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on
October 31, 2011, which required emergency plan implementation by a licensee
operations crew. This evolution was planned to be evaluated and included in
performance indicator (PI) data regarding drill and exercise performance.
The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by
the crew. The inspectors also attended the post-evolution critique for the scenario.
The focus of the inspectors activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in
the crews performance and ensure that the licensee evaluators noted the same issues
and entered them into the CAP. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the
scenario package and other documents listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection of the licensees training evolution with emergency preparedness drill
aspects constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
19 Enclosure
2. RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstones: Occupational Radiation Safety and Public Radiation Safety
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)
The inspection activities supplement those documented in Inspection Report
05000373/2011002; 05000374/2011002, and constitute one complete sample as defined
in IP 71124.01-05.
.1 Radiation Worker Performance (02.07)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found
the cause of the event to be human performance errors. The inspectors evaluated
whether there was an observable pattern traceable to a similar cause. The inspectors
assessed whether this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by the
licensee to resolve the reported problems. The inspectors discussed with the radiation
protection manager any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (02.08)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found
the cause of the event to be radiation protection technician error. The inspectors
evaluated whether there was an observable pattern traceable to a similar cause.
The inspectors assessed whether this perspective matched the corrective action
approach taken by the licensee to resolve the reported problems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04)
The inspection activities supplement those documented in Inspection Report
05000373/2010003; 05000374/2010003, and constitute one complete sample as defined
in IP 71124.04-05.
20 Enclosure
.1 Special Dosimetric Situations (02.04)
Declared Pregnant Workers
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed whether the licensee informed workers, as appropriate, of the
risks of radiation exposure to the embryo/fetus, the regulatory aspects of declaring a
pregnancy, and the specific process to be used for (voluntarily) declaring a pregnancy.
The inspectors selected individuals who had declared pregnancy during the current
assessment period and evaluated whether the licensees radiological monitoring
program (internal and external) for declared pregnant workers was technically adequate
to assess the dose to the embryo/fetus. The inspectors reviewed exposure results and
monitoring controls employed by the licensee and with respect to the requirements of the
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Shallow Dose Equivalent
%_ Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed shallow dose equivalent dose assessments for adequacy.
The inspectors evaluated the licensees method (e.g., VARSKIN or similar code) for
calculating shallow dose equivalent from distributed skin contamination or discrete
radioactive particles.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Neutron Dose Assessment
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensees neutron dosimetry program, including dosimeter
types and/or survey instrumentation.
The inspectors reviewed neutron exposure situations (e.g., independent spent fuel
storage installation operations or at-power containment entries) and assessed whether:
(a) dosimetry and/or instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra;
(b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose and/or dose rate measurement; and
(c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated. The inspectors also assessed whether
interference by gamma radiation had been accounted for in the calibration and whether
time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events, as
applicable.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
21 Enclosure
Assigning Dose of Record
a. Inspection Scope
For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section, the inspectors assessed
how the licensee assigned dose of record for total effective dose equivalent, shallow
dose equivalent, and lens dose equivalent. The inspector assessed external and
internal monitoring results, supplementary information on individual exposures
(e.g., radiation incident investigation reports and skin contamination reports), and
radiation surveys and/or air monitoring results when dosimetry was based on these
techniques.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (71124.05)
This inspection constituted one complete sample as defined in IP 71124.05-05.
.1 Inspection Planning (02.01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the plant UFSAR to identify radiation instruments associated
with monitoring area radiological conditions, including airborne radioactivity, process
streams, effluents, materials/articles, and workers. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed
the instrumentation system and the associated TS requirements for post-accident
monitoring instrumentation, including instruments used for remote emergency
assessment.
The inspectors reviewed a listing of in-service survey instrumentation, including air
samplers and small article monitors, along with instruments used to detect and analyze
workers external contamination. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed personnel
contamination monitors and portal monitors, including whole-body counters, used to
detect workers internal contamination. The inspectors reviewed this inspection list and
assessed whether an adequate number and type of instruments were available to
support operations.
The inspectors reviewed licensee and third-party evaluation reports of the radiation
monitoring program since the last inspection. These reports were reviewed for insights
into the licensees program and to aid in selecting areas for review (smart sampling).
The inspectors reviewed procedures that govern instrument source checks and
calibrations, focusing on instruments used for monitoring transient high radiological
conditions, including instruments used for underwater surveys. The inspectors reviewed
the calibration and source check procedures for adequacy and as an aid to smart
sampling.
The inspectors reviewed the area radiation monitor alarm setpoint values and setpoint
bases as provided in the TSs and the UFSAR.
22 Enclosure
The inspectors reviewed effluent monitor alarm setpoint basis and the calculational
methods provided in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM).
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Walkdowns and Observations (02.02)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors walked down effluent radiation monitoring systems, including at least one
liquid and one airborne system. Focus was placed on flow measurement devices and all
accessible point-of-discharge liquid and gaseous effluent monitors of the selected
systems. The inspectors assessed whether the effluent/process monitor configurations
aligned with ODCM descriptions and observed monitors for degradation and
out-of-service tags.
The inspectors selected portable survey instruments that were in use or available for
issuance and assessed calibration and source check stickers for currency as well as
instrument material condition and operability.
The inspectors observed licensee staff performance as the staff demonstrated source
checks for various types of portable survey instruments. The inspectors assessed
whether high-range instruments were source checked on all appropriate scales.
The inspectors walked down area radiation monitors and continuous air monitors to
determine whether they were appropriately positioned relative to the radiation sources or
areas they were intended to monitor. Selectively, the inspectors compared monitor
response (via local or remote control room indications) with actual area conditions for
consistency.
The inspectors selected personnel contamination monitors, portal monitors, and small
article monitors and evaluated whether the periodic source checks were performed in
accordance with the manufacturers recommendations and licensee procedures.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Calibration and Testing Program (02.03)
Process and Effluent Monitors
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected effluent monitor instruments (such as gaseous and liquid) and
evaluated whether channel calibration and functional tests were performed consistent
with radiological effluent TS/ODCM. The inspectors assessed whether (a) the licensee
calibrated its monitors with National Institute of Standards and Technology traceable
sources; (b) the primary calibrations adequately represented the plant nuclide mix;
(c) when secondary calibration sources were used, the sources were verified by the
23 Enclosure
primary calibration; and (d) the licensees channel calibrations encompassed the
instruments alarm setpoints.
The inspectors assessed whether the effluent monitor alarm setpoints were established
as provided in the ODCM and station procedures.
Changes to effluent monitor setpoints were enabled; the inspectors evaluated the bases
for the changes to ensure that an adequate justification existed.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Laboratory Instrumentation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed laboratory analytical instruments used for radiological analyses
to determine whether daily performance checks and calibration data indicated that the
frequency of the calibrations was adequate and there were no indications of degraded
instrument performance.
The inspectors assessed whether appropriate corrective actions were implemented in
response to indications of degraded instrument performance.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Whole Body Counter
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the methods and sources used to perform whole body count
functional checks before daily use of the instrument and assessed whether check
sources were appropriate and aligned with the plants isotopic mix.
The inspectors reviewed whole body count calibration records since the last inspection
and evaluated whether calibration sources were representative of the plant source term
and that appropriate calibration phantoms were used. The inspectors looked for
anomalous results or other indications of instrument performance problems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected drywell high-range monitors and reviewed the calibration
documentation since the last inspection.
24 Enclosure
The inspectors assessed whether an electronic calibration was completed for all range
decades above 10 rem/hour and whether at least one decade at or below 10 rem/hour
was calibrated using an appropriate radiation source.
The inspectors assessed whether calibration acceptance criteria were reasonable and
accounted for the large measuring range and the intended purpose of the instruments.
The inspectors selected two effluent/process monitors that were relied on by the
licensee in its emergency operating procedures as a basis for triggering emergency
action levels and subsequent emergency classifications, or to make protective action
recommendations during an accident. The inspectors evaluated the calibration and
availability of these instruments.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees capability to collect high-range, post-accident
iodine effluent samples.
As available, the inspectors observed electronic and radiation calibration of these
instruments to assess conformity with the licensees calibration and test protocols.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Portal Monitors, Personnel Contamination Monitors, and Small Article Monitors
a. Inspection Scope
For each type of these instruments used onsite, the inspectors assessed whether the
alarm setpoint values were reasonable under the circumstances to ensure that licensed
material was not released from the site.
The inspectors reviewed the calibration documentation for each instrument selected and
the calibration methods with the licensee to determine consistency with the
manufacturers recommendations.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Portable Survey Instruments, Area Radiation Monitors, Electronic Dosimetry, and
Air Samplers/Continuous Air Monitors
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed calibration documentation for at least one of each type of
instrument. The inspectors reviewed detector measurement geometry and calibration
methods and had the licensee demonstrate use of its instrument calibrator for portable
survey instruments and area radiation monitors. For the portable survey instruments
and area radiation monitors, the inspectors compared instrument readings to an
NRC survey instrument if problems were suspected.
As available, the inspectors selected portable survey instruments that did not meet
acceptance criteria during calibration or source checks to assess whether the licensee
25 Enclosure
had taken appropriate corrective action for instruments found significantly out of
calibration (greater than 50 percent). The inspectors evaluated whether the licensee
had evaluated the possible consequences of instrument used since the last successful
calibration or source check.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Instrument Calibrator
a. Inspection Scope
As applicable, the inspectors reviewed the current output values for the licensees
portable survey and area radiation monitor instrument calibrator unit(s). The inspectors
assessed whether the licensee periodically measured calibrator output over the range of
the instruments used through measurements by ion chamber/electrometer.
The inspectors assessed whether the measuring devices had been calibrated by a
facility using National Institute of Standards and Technology traceable sources and
whether corrective factors for these measuring devices were properly applied by the
licensee in its output verification.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Calibration and Check Sources
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees 10 CFR Part 61, Licensing Requirements for
Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste, source term to assess whether calibration sources
used were representative of the types and energies of radiation encountered in the plant.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Problem Identification and Resolution (02.04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated whether problems associated with radiation monitoring
instrumentation were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and
were properly addressed for resolution in the licensees CAP. The inspectors assessed
the appropriateness of the corrective actions for a selected sample of problems
documented by the licensee that involve radiation monitoring instrumentation.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
26 Enclosure
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
.1 Safety System Functional Failures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Safety System Functional Failures
PI for Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the fourth quarter 2010 through the third quarter 2011.
To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period, PI definitions and
guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline, Revision 6, dated October 2009, and NUREG-1022,
Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73," definitions and guidance, were
used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, operability
assessments, maintenance rule records, maintenance WOs, issue reports, event
reports, and NRC Integrated Inspection Reports for the period to validate the accuracy of
the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to
determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted
for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted two safety system functional failures samples as defined in
IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Heat Removal System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Mitigating Systems Performance
Index (MSPI) - Heat Removal System PI Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the fourth quarter 2010
through the third quarter 2011. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during
this period, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02 were used. The
inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, issue reports, event reports,
MSPI derivation reports, and NRC Integrated Inspection Reports for the period to
validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the MSPI component
risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent since the previous
inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any
problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator
and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this
report.
This inspection constituted two MSPI heat removal system samples as defined in
IP 71151-05.
27 Enclosure
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Cooling Water Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the MSPI - Cooling Water Systems
PI Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the fourth quarter 2010 through the third quarter 2011.
To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period, PI definitions and
guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02 were used. The inspectors reviewed the
licensees operator narrative logs, issue reports, MSPI derivation reports, event reports,
and NRC Integrated Inspection Reports for the period to validate the accuracy of the
submittals. The inspectors reviewed the MSPI component risk coefficient to determine if
it had changed by more than 25 percent since the previous inspection, and if so, that the
change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed
the licensees issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified
with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted two MSPI cooling water system samples as defined in
IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency
Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and
.1 Routine Review of Items Entered into the CAP
a. Inspection Scope
As part of the various baseline IPs discussed in previous sections of this report, the
inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant
status reviews to verify that the issues were being entered into the licensees CAP at an
appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective
actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. Attributes reviewed
included: identification of the problem was complete and accurate; timeliness was
commensurate with the safety significance; evaluation and disposition of performance
issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes,
extent-of-condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews were proper and
adequate; and that the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective
actions were commensurate with safety and sufficient to prevent recurrence of the issue.
Minor issues entered into the licensees CAP as a result of the inspectors observations
are included in the Attachment to this report.
28 Enclosure
These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute
any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure they were considered an
integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in
Section 1 of this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews
a. Inspection Scope
In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific
human performance issues for followup, the inspectors performed a daily screening of
items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished through
inspection of the stations daily condition report packages.
These daily reviews were performed by procedure as part of the inspectors daily plant
status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection
samples.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the licensees CAP and associated documents to
identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue.
The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered
the results of daily inspector CAP item screening discussed in Section 4OA2.2 above,
licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The inspectors
review nominally considered the six-month period of July 2011 through December 2011,
although some examples may have expanded beyond those dates where the scope of
the trend warranted.
The review also included issues documented outside the normal CAP in major
equipment problem lists, repetitive and/or rework maintenance lists, departmental
problem/challenges lists, system health reports, quality assurance audit/surveillance
reports, self-assessment reports, and Maintenance Rule assessments. The inspectors
compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees CAP
trending reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in
the licensees trending reports were reviewed for adequacy.
This review constituted one semi-annual trend inspection sample as defined in
IP 71152-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
29 Enclosure
.4 Selected Issue Followup Inspection: Dedicated Operator Use of Emergency Restoration
Procedure Steps
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected the use of emergency restoration steps by a dedicated operator
during surveillance tests as an issue-followup inspection. Specifically, the inspectors
reviewed the use of restoration actions to maintain the availability of safety-related
systems during tests or evolutions that would result in the system being inoperable and
unavailable. The inspectors review focused on verifying that the restoration steps were
contained in a written procedure, were uncomplicated, did not require diagnosis or
repair, and could be completed within the allowed Probabilistic Risk Assessment outage
times. In addition to reviewing Nuclear Management and Resources Council document
93-01, Section 11, Assessment of Risk Resulting from Performance of Maintenance
Activities, issued February 22, 2000, for guidance, the inspectors interviewed
operations personnel and observed restoration action demonstrations in the plant.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This review constituted one in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as
defined in IP 71152-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)
.1 Retraction of Event Notification47509
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the plants emergency notification system report, EN 47509,
that was transmitted to the NRC on December 7, 2011, when the reactor building
ventilation differential pressure exceeded the TS allowable limit. This non-emergency
notification was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Event or condition that
could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. After conducting an in-depth
evaluation of the occurrence, the licensee later determined that the reactor building,
which also serves as the secondary containment structure for both units, maintained its
ability to perform its safety function and retracted the EN on December 22. The
inspectors reviewed the basis of the retraction to ensure that it was technically accurate
and met 50.72 reporting requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment. to this report.
This event followup review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
30 Enclosure
.2 (Closed) LER 05000373-2011-004-00 and 01: Loss of Secondary Cooling Function Due
to Spurious Closure of the Shutdown Cooling Suction Isolation Valve
This event occurred on February 2, 2011, while Unit 1 was in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown),
cooling down to Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) in order to perform forced outage work
following an unplanned reactor scram. While in Mode 3, the 1B RHR pump was started
in preparation for starting the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) system. When the pump was
started, a momentary high pump suction flow signal was received, causing the common
pump suction isolation valve 1E12-F009 to close and the 1B RHR pump to trip.
Both SDC trains were declared inoperable, and TS 3.4.9, "RHR Shutdown Cooling
System Hot Shutdown," Required Action A.1 was entered, which specified that action
be initiated immediately to restore the RHR SDC system to operable status. The control
room operators determined that the isolation was spurious, reset the containment
isolation logic, reopened the valve, and exited the associated TS timeclock.
This occurrence was reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) as an event or condition
that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or
systems that are needed to remove decay heat. This event constituted a safety system
functional failure.
Inspectors previously reviewed the technical and programmatic adequacy of the
licensees actions in response to the events described in the subject LER.
Inspection report 05000373/374/2011003, second quarter 2011 integrated report, and
05000373/374/2011008, biennial problem identification and resolution inspection report,
contain documentation of the NRC-identified violations associated with this event.
For this current inspection, the inspectors identified no additional findings during their
review. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This LER is
closed.
This event followup review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.
.3 (Closed) LER 05000374/2011-001-00: Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Trip Oil
Pressure Switch Inoperable Due to Incomplete Surveillance Testing
This event occurred on May 27, 2011, while Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power.
The 2A turbine control valve fast-closure trip oil pressure switch (2C71-N005A) was
declared inoperable following the discovery that the required PMT had not been
performed after replacement of the switch during the previous refueling outage.
Response time testing as required by TS Surveillance Requirement 3.3.1.1.17 had been
inadvertently omitted.
TS 3.3.1.1 Required Action A.1 was entered to place the channel in trip within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />,
and TS 3.3.4.1 Required Action A.1 was entered to restore the channel to operable
status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The required TS surveillance was completed, 2C71-N005A was
declared operable, and exited the associated TS timeclock.
This occurrence was reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as an operation or
condition prohibited by the plant's TSs.
31 Enclosure
Inspectors previously reviewed the technical and programmatic adequacy of the
licensees actions in response to the issue described in the subject LER.
Inspection report 05000373/374/2011003, second quarter 2011 integrated report,
contains documentation of the licensee-identified violation associated with this issue.
For this current inspection, the inspectors identified no additional findings during their
review. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This LER is
closed.
This event followup review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting Summary
On January 4, 2012, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Site Vice
President, D. Rhoades, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee
acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential
report input discussed was considered proprietary.
.2 Interim Exit Meetings
Interim exits were conducted for:
- the results of the ISI inspection with Mr. Rhoades on February 25, 2011;
- the results of inspections in the occupational and public radiation safety
programs with Mr. K. Hedgspeth on November 4, 2011;
- the results of the LORT program inspection were discussed with Mr. Rhodes on
November 18, 2011, and the results of the 2011 test review were discussed with
Mr. R. Frederes on November 22; and
- the annual review of emergency action level and emergency plan changes with
the licensee's Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, Mr. J. Hughes, via
telephone on December 8, 2011.
The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was
considered proprietary. Proprietary material received during the inspection was returned
to the licensee.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
32 Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
D. Rhoades, Site Vice President
P. Karaba, Plant Manager
K. Hedgspeth, Radiation Protection Manager
K. Ihnen, Nuclear Oversight Manager
T. Simpkin, Regulatory Affairs Manager
H. Vinyard, Site Engineering Director
M. Sharma, Engineering Program Manager
S. Shields, Regulatory Affairs
J. Shields, ISI Program Manager
J. Smith, Operations Training Manager
G. Beale, Operations Training
R. Frederes, Operations Training
J. Paczolt, Operations Training
J. Hughes, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Michael Kunowski, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5
Hironori Peterson, Chief, Operations Branch
Billy Dickson, Chief, Plant Support Team
AnnMarie Stone, Chief, Engineering Branch 2
1 Attachment
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000373/2011005-01 NCV Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct an Oil Leak on the
HPCS Waterleg Pump (Section 1R12)05000374/2011005-02 NCV Failure to Perform an Adequate 10 CFR 50.59 Screening
for the Use of Racklife Spent Fuel Pool Monitoring
Computer Model (Section 1R18)05000374/2011005-03 FIN Failure to Perform an Adequate 10 CFR 50.59 Screening
for the Use of Racklife Spent Fuel Pool Monitoring
Computer Model (Section 1R18)
Closed
05000373/2011005-01 NCV Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct an Oil Leak on the
HPCS Waterleg Pump (Section 1R12)05000374/2011005-02 NCV Failure to Perform an Adequate 10 CFR 50.59 Screening
for the Use of Racklife Spent Fuel Pool Monitoring
Computer Model (Section 1R18)05000374/2011005-03 FIN Failure to Perform an Adequate 10 CFR 50.59 Screening
for the Use of Racklife Spent Fuel Pool Monitoring
Computer Model (Section 1R18)
05000373/2011004-00/01 LER Loss of Secondary Cooling Function Due to Spurious
Closure of the Shutdown Cooling Suction Isolation Valve
(Section 4OA3.2)05000374/2011001-00 LER Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Trip Oil Pressure
Switch Inoperable Due to Incomplete Surveillance Testing
(Section 4OA3.3)05000374/2010005-06 URI Implementation of the Racklife Computer Model to Monitor
Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks Degradation
(Section 1R18)
2 Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list
does not imply that the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that
selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection
effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or
any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Action Requests:
- 1102692; Heat Trace for the B RSH Traveling Screen Covered with Mud
- 1102695; Heat Trace for LSH Traveling Screen Not Working
- 1106281; EED - Switchyard Winterization
- 1127082; Winter Operation Preparations
- 1135627; Line Needs Insulation Repaired. Winter Readiness Item
- 1135635; Line Needs Insulation Repaired. This is a Winter Readiness
- 1146202; LaSalle Winter Readiness Items Not Completed by 12/1/10
- 1233857; Deicing Salt Impact on Equipment
- 1245643; Winter Readiness - Walkdown of Chemical Feed Building
- 1279484; Heat Trace Alarm for Pipe 0WW61A
- 1295452; Heater Fan Not Operating
- 1297603; Found Heater Not Turned On
- 1299986; Jacket HTR Not Working (Winter Readiness)
Working Documents:
- AR 1233857; Apparent Cause Evaluation: Deicing Salt Impact on Equipment At LaSalle Plant
Periphery in Protected Area; 6/14/2011
- WO 1392995-01; LOS-ZZ-A2 Winterize Station; 10/01/2011
Miscellaneous:
- ATI 1252755-02; Management Directed Assessment Winter Readiness; 11/17/2011
- LaSalle Certification Letter for Winter Readiness; 11/14/2011
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Procedures:
- LOP-DC-01; Battery Charger Startup and Shutdown; Rev. 38
- LOP-DG-01E; Unit 1A Diesel Generator Electrical Checklist; Rev. 7
- LOP-DG-01M; Unit 1A Diesel Generator Mechanical Checklist; Rev. 7
Miscellaneous:
- AR Search for Misposition; 1/1/2011 - 12/29/2011
- AR Search for Configuration Control; 1/1/2011 - 12/29/2011
- LOP-HP-01M; Unit 1 High Pressure Core Spray Mechanical Checklist; 2/10/2010
- LOP-LP-01E; Unit 1 Low Pressure Core Spray Electrical Checklist; 11/22/2011
- LOP-LP-01M; Unit 1 Low Pressure Core Spray Mechanical Checklist; 11/22/2011
1R05 Fire Protection
Action Requests:
- 1306224; SSB Fire Panel Alarm
3 Attachment
1R06 Flooding
Miscellaneous:
- NUREG-0800; 3.6.2 Determination of Rupture Locations and Dynamic Effects Associated with
the Postulated Rupture of Piping; Rev. 2
1R08 ISI Activities
Procedures:
- ER-AA-330-009; ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement Plan for WO No. 01240468;
10/21/2010
- GE-MT-100; Procedure for Magnetic Particle Examination; Rev. 8.
- GEH-UT-718; Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel Nozzle Inside Radius Sections from
the Outside Surface with MICROTOMO in Accordance with Appendix VIII; Rev. 3.
- GEH-PDI-UT2; PDI Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Pipe
Welds; Rev. 5.
- GEH-UT-247; Procedure for Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination of Dissimilar Metal Welds;
Rev. 1.
- GEH-UT-716; Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds from the Outside Surface with
MICROTOMO in Accordance with Appendix VIII; Rev. 3.
- MA-LA-796-001; EMI/RFI Evaluation & Mitigation Techniques for Welding Activities; Rev. 1
- MA-MW-796-101; ASME Weld Data Record for WO 01231145-01; Rev. 4.
- WPS 1-1-GTSM-PWHT; ASME Welding Procedure Specification Record; Rev. 2.
- Wyle Welding Procedure T57688P0110; Welding Procedure for Installation of Strain Gauges
on Main Steam Lines in Exelons LaSalle Unit 2 Nuclear Station; 5/10/2010
Action Requests:
- 01027531; NOS Identified Piping Assembly Failed Hydrostatic Test; 2/8/2010
- 01030879; Relevant ISI Indications on RPV Head Washers from L1R12; 2/10/2010
- 01032636; Required NDE Exam for Welds Not Identified on Weld Record; 2/18/2010
- 01036797; RM CRD 26-15 Flange Leakage During Vessel Leakage Test; 3/1/2010
- 01086083; Defective Weld Allows Water Leakage into Surrounding Containment; 3/5/2010
- 01090982; CDBI-FASA-Revise UFSTable 6.2-21; 7/15/2010
- 01108638; NOS Identified ANI Work Order Signatures Missing; 9/1/2010
- 01131066; Incorrect Weld Size Specified In Work Package; 10/26/2010
- 01155333; ISI Program Documents not Updated Per Procedure; 12/8/2010
- 01177873; Relevant NDE Indication on 2B21-CIVS Steam Strainer Seal Welds; 2/20/2011
- 01177883; Relevant NDE Indication on 2B21-MSV4 Steam Strainer Seal Welds; 2/20/2011
Working Documents:
- Procedure Qualification Record 1-50C; GTAW PQR; 1/3/1984.
- Procedure Qualification Record A-001; GTAW/SMAW PQR; 10/19/1998
- WO 01231145; Replace Valve 2E12-Fo64B; 2/18/2011
- WO 01240468; Install U2 Strain Gauge for Main Steam Dryer Analysis; 2/23/2011
Miscellaneous
- Report L1R13-016; Ultrasonic Examination Report for RPV Nozzle to Flange Weld; 2/16/2010
- Report L1R13-APR-001; Ultrasonic Examination Report for HPCS Safe End to Nozzle Weld;
2/15/2010
- Report L1R13-APR-002; Ultrasonic Examination Report for LPCS Safe End to Nozzle Weld;
2/16/2010
4 Attachment
- Report L1R13-APR-003; Ultrasonic Examination Report for RHR Safe End to Nozzle Weld;
2/17/2010
- Report L1R13-APR-006; Ultrasonic Examination Report for HPCS Safe End Extension to Safe
End Weld; 2/15/2010
- Report L1R13-APR-007; Ultrasonic Examination Report for LPCS Safe End Extension to Safe
End Weld; 2/14/2010
- Report L1R13-APR-008; Ultrasonic Examination Report for RHR Safe End Extension to Safe
End Weld; 2/18/2010
- Report L2R13-007; UT Examination Report for N4 Feed Water Nozzle Inner Radius and Bore;
2/18/2011
- Report L2R13-043; Ultrasonic Examination Report for Component IRH-2005-33 Weld,
2/18/2011
- Report L2R13-048; UT Examination Report for N4 Feed Water Nozzle to Shell Welds;
2/18/2011
- Report L2R13-059; Magnetic Particle Examination Report for Lugs RH53-2836X; 2/22/2011
- Report L2R13-060; Magnetic Particle Examination Report for Lugs RH53-2847X; 2/22/2011
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Procedures:
- JPM; P-CY-05; Rev. 10
- JPM; P-EP-118; Rev. 1
- JPM; P-NB-04; Rev. 16
- JPM; P-PC-02; Rev. 15
- JPM; S-AP-05; Rev. 3
- JPM; S-RX-01; Rev. 2
- LOS-FP-SR1; Diesel Fire Pump Flow Test; Rev. 6
- OP-AA-105-101; Administrative Process for NRC License and Medical Requirements; Rev. 12
- OP-AA-105-102; NRC Active License Maintenance; Rev. 9
- S-11-6-4; ATWS Drill Dynamic Simulator Scenario Guide; Rev. 0
- TQ-AA-306; Simulator Management; Rev. 2
Action Requests:
- 1233962; LOS-FP-SR1 Will Need Rescheduled; 6/28/2011
- 1226136; Editorial Change Needed to LOR-1PM10J-B504; 6/8/2011
- 1237057; TRNG ATV; Critical Steps in JPMs; 7/6/2011
- 1237163; TRNG ATV; Number of Instructors Developing Sim Scenarios
- 1291650; TRNG - NRC Identified; Tolerance for Simulator Testing; 11/17/2011
- 1080288-10; Upgrade of Simulator Test Procedures; 11/18/2011
- 1080288-11; Evaluate Format, Control of Sim Test Procedures; 11/18/2011
- 1080288-12; Incorporate Pen-and-Ink Changes to 2011 Sim Tests; 11/18/2011
- 01090340; Crew Failure during Simulator OBE
- 01077971; Participation by OPS Senior Manager in LORT OBE
- 01063385; OPS Training Group End of Week Critique
- 01002930; 2 DEP Failures during LORT Annual Exams
Working Documents:
- NARS 1; Nuclear Accident Report (Drill); 12/31/2011
5 Attachment
Miscellaneous:
- ANSI/ANS - 3.5 - 1985; Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for use in Operator Training
- ATI 1097100-02; Comprehensive Self-Assessment on LaSalle Operator Training Programs
Identified that Objective 2 of ACAD 02-001, The Objectives and Criteria for Accreditation in the
Nuclear Power Industry, Was Not Fully Met; 09/23/10
- ESG109; Simulator Scenario; Rev. 0
- ESG110; Simulator Scenario; Rev. 0
- Evaluation Summary; LORT Cycles 10-1, 10-2, 11-1, 11-2
- LaSalle 1T11 Site Tri-Annual Performance Report; 05/25/11
- LaSalle 3T10 Site Tri-Annual Performance Report; 01/19/11
- LaSalle Simulator Test; Real Time 1; 2010 and 2011
- LaSalle Simulator Test; Stability 1; 2010 and 2011
- LaSalle Simulator Test; Steady 1; 2010 and 2011
- LaSalle Simulator Test; Transient 1; 2010 and 2011
- LaSalle Simulator Test; Transient 10; 2010 and 2011
- LaSalle Simulator Test; Transient 1A; 2010 and 2011
- LaSalle Simulator Test; Transient 2; 2010 and 2011
- LaSalle Simulator Test; Transient 3; 2010
- LaSalle Simulator Test; Transient 4; 2010 and 2011
- LaSalle Simulator Test; Transient 5; 2010 and 2011
- LaSalle Simulator Test; Transient 6; 2010 and 2011
- LaSalle Simulator Test; Transient 7; 2010 and 2011
- LaSalle Simulator Test; Transient 8; 2010 and 2011
- LaSalle Simulator Test; Transient 9; 2010 and 2011
- LORT CRC Meeting Minutes; 03/23/2010, 5/21/2010, 2/09/2011
- LORT Long Range Training Plan 2010-2011
- Remedial Training Notification and Action on Failure; LORT Forms for 2010 and 2011
- Sat Test Procedures; LaSalle Simulator IO Replacement; Rev. 0
- Week 6 Bi-Annual Written Test for 2011; RO Week 2 Validation Exam
- Week 6 Bi-Annual Written Test for 2011; SRO Week 2 Validation Exam
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
Procedures:
- ER-AA-310; Implementation of the Maintenance Rule; Rev. 8
Action Requests:
- 1022884; 1E12-F064C Slow to Auto Close
- 1060627; MSOPS 2I Spurious Ops that Creates RHR Pump Flow Diversion
- 1067656; Lost Control Power Indication for 1E12-F009 Inbd SDC Isol V
- 1122040; Lost Power to RHR SDC Indb Isolation Valve
- 1125043; Degrading Trend on 1E12-F031B / 1B RHR System Leak Tightness
- 1150074; Blown Control Power Fuse for 1E12-F048A A RHR HX Byp
- 1170495; 1E12-F009 Closure During LOP-RH-07
- 1210566; Unit 1 HPCS Water leg Pump Degradation
- 1220548; NRC 1st Qtr Int Insp Rpt - URI on Unit 1 SDC Reportability
- 1244457; NRC: Loss of Safety Function (1E12-F009 Closure)
- 1248293; NRC: PI & R Inspection - Potential Violation
- 1257672; NRC PI&R Insp Report - Green Finding w/ One NCV
- 1265626; NRC Identified Operator Challenge Inappropriately Closed
6 Attachment
- 1271730; Bearing Housing Plug Orientation
- 1287679; NRC Identified: U1 HPCS Water Leg Pump Oil Bubbler Empty CCP
Working Documents:
- AR 1293017; Adverse Condition Monitoring and Contingency Plan, U1 HPCS Water Leg
Pump; 11/23/2011
- RH-01; Maintenance Rule Scoping/Performance Criteria for Residual Heat Removal;
Suppression Pool Cooling Mode
- RH-05; Maintenance Rule Scoping/Performance Criteria for Residual Heat Removal;
Shutdown Heat Removal
- RH-08; Maintenance Rule Scoping/Performance Criteria for Residual Heat Removal:
Suppression Chamber Spray
- RH-09; Maintenance Rule Scoping/Performance Criteria for Residual Heat Removal: Drywell
Spray
- RH-10; Maintenance Rule Scoping/Performance Criteria for Residual Heat Removal: Keep
Spent Fuel below Design Temperature
- RH-11; Maintenance Rule Scoping/Performance Criteria for Residual Heat Removal: Alternate
Vessel Injection Using Head Spray
- RH-12; Maintenance Rule Scoping/Performance Criteria for Residual Heat Removal: Alternate
Vessel Injection Using Shutdown Cooling Return
- RH-13; Maintenance Rule Scoping/Performance Criteria for Residual Heat Removal: Low
Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Mode
Miscellaneous:
- Operator Log Entries LIS-HP; 11/08/2011
- Training Document 64-01; Shutdown Cooling/Head Spray Overview; 8/2004
- Training Document 64-02; Alternate Shutdown Cooling Overview; 10/1999
- Training Document 64-03; Suppression Pool Cooling/ Full Flow Test Overview; 10/1999
- Training Document 64-04; LPCI Overview; 10/1999
- Training Document 64-05; Suppression Chamber / Drywell Spray Overview; 8/2004
- Training Document 64-06; Plant Support Functions Overview; 8/2004
- Training Document 64-07; Shutdown Cooling Flow Paths; 8/2004
- Training Document 64-08; Alternate Shutdown Cooling 1st Example 8/2004
- Training Document 64-09; Alternate Shutdown Cooling 2nd Example; 9/2004
- Training Document 64-10; Suppression Pool Cooling/Full Flow Test; 8/2004
- Training Document 64-11; LPCI Flow Paths; 8/2004
- Training Document 64-12; Containment Spray; 8/2004
- Training Document 64-13; RHR System Loop B; 3/2001
- Training Document 64-14; RHR System Components; 8/2004
- Training Document 64-15; RHR System Loop A; 10/1999
- Training Document 64-16; RHR System Loop C; 5/2008
- Training Document 64-17; RHR Pump Start / Override Control; 10/1999
- Training Document 64-22; Typical LPCI Initiation Logic; 8/2004
- Training Document 64-23: Suppression Pool Cleanup System; 10/1999
- Training Document, Residual Heat Removal System
- Training Documents 64- 18-21; Valve Interlocks; various dates
- Training Figure RH-1, RHR System; 5/13/2009
- Training Figure RH-2, RHR Models of Operation; 5/13/2009
7 Attachment
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Action Requests:
- 1270329; U-1 HPCS Water Leg Pump 1E22-C003 Low Dsch Pressure
- 1271730; Bearing Housing Plug Orientation
- 1280848; B VE Refrigeration Unit Low on Freon, had to be Swapped Off
- 1282225; Leak Found on B VE Suction Pipe
- 1282324; Contingency Work Order Requested for B VE Compressor
- 1282554; A VE Oil Temperature Trending Lower Than Normal
- 1282959; Foreign Material Identified in 0VE04CB Compressor
- 1282995; Intentionally Abbreviated Maintenance
- 1283057; Alarm B RT Hxer Room Diff Temp
- 1283095; Carrier Reciprocating Compressor Roll Pins
- 1283188; A VE Compressor Oil Temperature Found Out of Spec Low
- 1283741; U1 RWCU Outage Summary for 10-26-11
- 1271285; Equipment Issue Report on 24A Normal Drain Controller Failed to Manual
- 1271383; Equipment Issue Report on Unit 2 RR Loop Divergence Alarms During Ramp
Miscellaneous:
- B VE Emergent Repairs Report; 10/25/2011 - 10/27/2011
- Protected Equipment Log; 10/17/2011
- U1 Div 3 Maintenance Window Scheduled 10/2/11 - 10/5/11
- WO 1451437-01; Human Performance Issue Verbal Report of Unexpected Oil Spill at MPT;
9/24/2011
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments
Action Requests:
- 1273465; Oil Leak on 1DG084
Operability Evaluations:
- 04-006; CSCS Pump Room Ventilation (AR 236085236085; Rev. 3
Miscellaneous:
- ECR 97901; Evaluation of ECR Concerning CSCS Pump Rooms Temperature (EC 349032);
Rev. 0
- LaSalle Operator Log; 10/18/2011 - 10/19/2011
- NDIT LAS-ENDIT-0693; Sargent & Lundy ComEd Nuclear Design Information Trasmittal re:
RHR SW Pump Room Temperature; 5/26/1998
1R18 Plant Modifications
Procedures:
- LS-MW-107-1001; Change Review for UFSAR Section 9.1.2.1.3; 11/01/2005
- LS-MW-107-1001; Change Review for UFSAR Section 9.1.2.2.3; 11/21/2006
Miscellaneous:
- Fuel Storage Reactivity Summary Sheet; LaSalle Unit 1 Cycles 13 and 14; 11/18/2009
- OE 07-006; Boraflex Panels Utilized in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Racks; Rev. 4
- LS-AA-106; Plant Operations Review Committee; Rev. 6
- LS-AA-106-1001; Typical Plant Operations Review Committee Meeting Minutes Template;
Rev. 1
8 Attachment
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
Procedures:
- LEP-VP-101; VP Centrifugal Chiller Shutdown Inspection; Rev. 19
- LES-GM-109; Inspection of 480V Klockner-Moeller Motor Control Center; Rev. 37
- LOP-VP-01; Filling and Venting the Primary Containment Chilled Water System; Rev. 20
- LOP-VP-02; Startup, Operation and Shutdown of Primary Containment Chilled Water and
Ventilation System; Rev. 41
Figures and Drawings:
- 1E-2-4220AJ; Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH (E12); Rev. Y
- 1E-2-4220BK; Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH (E12) Part 34; Rev. L
- 1E-2-4378AA; Internal Wiring Diagram 480V MCCs Details; Rev. R
- 1E-2-4389AC; Int/Ext Wiring Diagram Reactor Bldg 480V MCC 235Y-2 Pt. 3; Rev. N
Working Documents:
- 1384025-02; OP PMT: 1VP01CB B VP Chiller Satisfactory Operation; 10/14/2011
- WO 1241731-01; Perform Cubicle and Breaker Inspection for 2AP76E-C3; Rev. 0
- WO 1241731-02; Perform LES-GM-109 for 2AP76E-C3; 10/17/2011
1R22 Surveillance Testing
Procedures:
- LOS-RP-Q3; Main Steam Isolation Valve Scram Functional Test; Rev. 18
Action Requests:
- 1285340; 1B RHR Pump Discharge Pressure Low Alarm Received in MCR
Working Documents:
- WO 1493158-01; LOS-RD-M3 U1 Cont Rod Att 1A; 12/20/2011
Miscellaneous:
- LOS-RP-Q3; Tech Spec Surveillance, Unit 2 MSIVs Att. 2A; 11/27/2011
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Procedures:
- EP-AA-1005; Exelon Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for LaSalle County Station;
Revs. 31 and 32
- EP-AA-120-1001; 50.54(q) Program Evaluation and Effectiveness Reviews; Rev. 32
- EP-AA-120-F-01; EP Document Approval Forms; Rev. 32
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
- S-11-6-4; ATWS Drill Dynamic Simulator Scenario Guide; Rev. 0
- NARS 1; Nuclear Accident Report (Drill); 12/31/2011
9 Attachment
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)
Procedures:
- RP-AA-460; Controls for High and Locked High Radiation Areas; Rev. 20
- RP-AA-460-002; Additional High Radiation Exposure Control; Rev. 0
- RP-AB-460; Transverse In-Core Probe Area Access Controls; Rev. 1
Action Requests:
- 1189188; Accumulated Dose Alarm Received During LIS-MS-202
- 1022658; Personnel Contamination Event Worker Alarms Radiologically Controlled Area Exit
Monitor
- 1026722; Individual Alarmed Gatehouse Monitor
- 1036201; L1R13 Cavity Manway Cover Removals
- 1178451; Nuclear Oversight Identified: Protective Clothing Removal Issues
- 1284659; RP-AA-460, Procedure Change Needed
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04)
Procedures:
- RP-AA-210; Dosimetry Issue; Usage and Control; Rev. 21
- RP-AA-210-1001; Dosimetry Logs and Forms; Rev. 6
- RP-AA-250; External Dose Assessments from Contaminations; Rev. 5
- RP-AA-270; Prenatal Radiation Exposure; Rev. 6
2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (71124.05)
Procedures:
- CY-LA-110-010; Sampling of Reactor Coolant and Residual Heat Removal System at the High
Radiation Sampling System; Rev. 3
- CY-LA-130-300; Gamma Spectroscopy; Rev. 5
- L-002356; WRGM Calibration Constants; Setpoints; and Adjustment Factors; Rev. 0
- LCP-810-30; Gamma Spectrometer Systems; Rev. 5
- LIS-CM-206A; Unit 2 Post Accident Monitoring (Division 1) Containment Gross Gamma
Radiation Monitor Calibration; Rev. 1
- LIS-OG-104A; Unit 1 Post Treatment Radiation Monitor Channel a Calibration; Rev. 7
- LIS-OG-205; Unit 2 Flux Tilt Linear Radiation Monitor Calibration; Rev. 11
- LIS-OG-105B Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal B Service Water Effluent Radiation Monitor
Calibration; Rev. 3
- LIS-PR-004; Station Vent Main Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor Calibration; Rev. 22
- LIS-RH-205A; Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water Effluent Radiation Monitor
Calibration; Rev. 5
- LRP-5820-34; Off-Gas Post Treatment Monitor Alarm and Trip Setpoints; Rev. 10
- LOR-1H13-P601-B212; 1B Residual Heat Removal Service Water Radiation High; Rev. 2
- LOR-1H13-P601-B501; Liquid Radiation Monitor Downscale; Rev. 1
- LRP-5820-34; Off-Gas Post Treatment Monitor Alarm and Trip Setpoints; Rev. 10
- RP-AA-225; Quality Control Operation for the Canberra FastScan Whole Body Counter;
Rev. 0
- RP-AA-229; FastScan Abacos Plus Wholebody Counter Calibration; Rev. 0
- RP-AA-230; Operation of the Canberra FastScan Whole Body Counter; Rev. 0
- RP-AA-700-1209; Calibration of Shepherd Box Irradiators; Rev. 0
- RP-AA-700-1210; Operation and Calibration of Thermo-electron IPM Whole Body Frisking
Monitor; Rev. 0
10 Attachment
- RP-AA-700-1401; Operation and Calibration of Eberline Model PM-7 Personnel Contamination
Monitor; Rev. 1
- RP-AA-700-1501; Operation and Calibration of the Model SAM 9/11 Small Articles Monitor;
Rev. 1
Action Requests:
- 988898; J.L. Shepherd Calibrator 89-400 Requiring Interlock Repairs
- 1011000; Enhancement to Whole Body Counter Calibration
- 1027143; Electronic Dosimeter Display Is Different Than Expected
- 1027564; 1A Residual Heat Removal Service Water Process Radiation Monitor Nuisance
Alarms Due to Background
- 1032065; 1A Residual Heat Removal Service Water Process Radiation Monitor Has Hi and
Hi-Hi Alarm With No Pump Running
- 1039561; B Residual Heat Removal Service Water Process Radiation Monitor Alarming on
High Radiation With No Flow
- 1068856; Unit 1 Reactor 786 Sample Station Area Monitor In Alarm
- 1069348; Request Area Radiation Monitor Setpoint Be Lowered
- 1075307; Unit 1 Service Water Process Radiation Monitor Discovered to Have No Flow
- 1086361; Nuclear Oversight Identified Air Monitor Without Deficiency Tag
- 1106611; Request Alarm Setpoint Change to 0PLB2J Continuous Air Monitor
- 1177352; Electronic Dosimeter Alarm from Defective Electronic Dosimeter
- 1178079; Electronic Dosimeter Malfunction
- 1180756; Request Component Lead Package for Unit 1A Residual Heat Removal Service
Water Process Radiation Monitor
- 1184566; 2A Residual Heat Removal Service Water Process Radiation Monitor High Radiation
Light
- 1202065; Shepherd 89-400 Calibrator Needs Repair by Off-Site Vendor
- 1238505; Issues Identified with High Radiation Sampling System Area Radiation Monitor
Calibration
- 1251671; D Pre-filter Leaking
- 1251712; ALARA; Broken Monitor and Lack of Monitors
- 1251622; Air Leak on Standby Gas Treatment Wide Range Gas Monitor
- 1263533; Electronic Dosimeter Went to Sleep and Did Not Record Dose for Worker
- 1269531; 2D18-K609B Unit 2B Radiation Monitor Failed Upscale
Working Documents:
- WO 1094386; LIS-PR-005; Standby Gas Treatment Monitor Wide Range Gas Monitor
Calibration; 6/27/2009
- WO 1101742; LIS-PR-004; Station Vent Main Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor Calibration;
11/6/2009
- WO 1112370; LIS -RH-105A; Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water Effluent Radiation
Monitor Calibration
- WO 1169081; Post Accident Division II Containment Gross Gamma Radiation Monitor;
8/8/2010
- WO1210436; Post Accident Division 1 Containment Gross Gamma Radiation Monitor
Calibration; 8/10/2010
- WO 1216647; Post Accident Division 1 Containment Gross Gamma Radiation Monitor
Calibration; 1/21/2011
11 Attachment
- WO 1242997; Unit 2 Post Accident Division 2 Containment Gross Gamma Radiation Monitor
Calibration; 5/26/2011
- WO 14116820; LIS -RH-205A: Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water Effluent
Radiation Monitor Calibration; 3/10/2011
Miscellaneous:
- Calibration of Shepherd Box Irradiator 89-400 Serial Number 2025; 9/15/2011
- Calibration of Thermo-electron IPM Whole Body Frisking Monitor 210; 5/18/2011
- Calibration of Thermo-electron IPM Whole Body Frisking Monitor 220; 5/20/2011
- Calibration of Thermo-electron IPM Whole Body Frisking Monitor 342D; 5/20/2011
- Calibration of Eberline Model PM-7 Personnel Contamination Monitor 113; 8/2/2011
- Calibration of Eberline Model PM-7 Personnel Contamination Monitor 114; 8/3/2011
- Calibration of Eberline Model PM-7 Personnel Contamination Monitor 115; 6/23/2011
- Calibration of the Model SAM 9/11 Small Articles Monitor; 9/20/2011
- Emails from D. Cooke; M. Wolfe re: NRC Request for Info for Off-gas Post Treatment Setpoint
Determination; 11/3/2011
- LaSalle County Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report; Chapter 12; Rev. 14
- Radcal Corporation Report of Calibration Electrometer/Ion Chamber; 5/16/2011
- 10006752-02; Self Assessment: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation; 7/14/2011
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
Procedures:
- LA-AA-2200; Mitigating System Performance Index Data Acquisition & Reporting; Rev. 4
- LIP-RI-503; Unit 1 RCIC Pump Suction Low Pressure Turbine Trip Calibration; Rev. 11
- LIP-RI-504; Unit 1 RCIC Turbine Exhaust High Pressure Turbine Trip and Alarm Calibration;
Rev. 9
- LIP-RI-603; Unit 2 RCIC Pump Suction Low Pressure Turbine Trip Calibration; Rev. 9
- LIP-RI-604; Unit 2 RCIC Turbine Exhaust High Pressure Turbine Trip and Alarm Calibration;
Rev. 11
- LIS- RX-201; Unit 2 Remote Shutdown System Vessel Pressure Calibration; Rev. 8
- LIS_RI_101; Unit 1 RCIC Steam Line High Flow Isolation Calibration; Rev. 19
- LIS-NB-202; Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Water Level Post Accident Monitoring and Remote
Shutdown Indication Calibration; Rev. 25
- LIS-RI-102; Unit 1 RCIC Pump Discharge Flow Indication Calibration; Rev. 8
- LIS-RI-112; Unit 1 Reactor Vessel High Water Level 8 RCIC Turbine Trip and Main Turbine /
Feedwater Pump Trip Calibration; Rev. 19
- LIS-RI-116; Unit 1 Cycled Condensate storage Tank Low Level RCIC Suction Calibration;
Rev. 2
- LIS-RI-201; Unit 2 RCIC Steam Line High Flow Isolation Calibration; Rev. 20
- LIS-RI-202; Unit 2 RCIC Pump Discharge Flow Indication Calibration; Rev. 9
- LIS-RI-212; Unit 2 Reactor Vessel High Water Level 8 RCIC Turbine Trip and Main Turbine
Feedwater Pump Trip Calibration; Rev. 22
- LIS-RI-216; Unit 2 Cycled Condensate Storage Tank Low Level RCIC Suction Calibration;
Rev. 3
- LIS-RI-312; Unit 1 Reactor Vessel High Water Level 8 RCIC Turbine Trip and Main Turbine
Trip Feedwater Pump Trip Functional Test; Rev. 16
- LIS-RI-316; Unit 1 Cycled Condensate Storage Tank Low Level RCIC Suction Functional Test;
Rev. 2
- LIS-RI-412; Unit 2 Reactor Vessel High Water Level 8 RCIC Turbine Trip and Main Turbine
Trip Feedwater Pump Trip Functional Test; Rev. 18
12 Attachment
- LIS-RI-416; Unit 2 Cycled Condensate Storage Tank Low Level RCIC Suction Functional Test;
Rev. 4
- LOS-RI-Q1; RCIC Valve Inservice Test; Rev. 48
- LOS-RI-Q1; RCIC Valve Inservice Test; Rev. 48
- LOS-RI-Q3; Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Pump Operability and Valve
Inservice Tests in Conditions 1, 2, and 3; Rev. 46
- LOS-RI-Q5; Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Pump operability, Valve Inservice
Tests in Modes 1, 2, 3 and Cold Quick Start; Rev. 33
Figures and Drawings:
- M-101; P & ID Reactor Core Isolation Coolant (RCIC); Rev. BH
- RI-1; RCIC System Training Drawing (M-101); Rev. 5
Working Documents:
- LaSalle MSPI Cooling Water Systems (CSCS) 4th Quarter 2010 - 3rd Quarter 2011
- LaSalle MSPI Heat Removal System (RCIC) 4th Quarter 2010 - 3rd Quarter 2011
- Operator Log Entries Report; (LOA entries); 10/13/2010 - 9/7/2011
- ROP LaSalle Mitigating System Performance Index Basis Document; Rev. 10, Rev. 11
Licensee Event Reports:
- 2010-003-00; Standby liquid Control Test Tank Seismic Analysis; 12/17/2010
- 2010-003-01; Standby Liquid Control Test Tank Seismic Analysis; 9/16/2011
- 2010-01-00; High Pressure Core Spray System Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Room
Ventilation Control Relay; 11/24/2010
- 2011-001-00; Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Trip Oil Pressure Switch Inoperable Due to
Incomplete Surveillance Testing; 7/26/2011
- 2011-002-0; Unit Shutdown Required by Plant Technical Specifications Due to Pressure
Boundary Leakage; 4/1/2011
- 2011-003-00; Secondary Containment Inoperable; 4/29/2011
- 2011-004-00; Loss of Secondary Cooling Function Due to Spurious Closure of the Shutdown
Cooling Suction Isolation Valve; 9/16/2011
- 2011-01-00; Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Main Power Transformer C Phase Electrical
Fault; 3/25/2011
Miscellaneous:
- Clearance Order Review 90989; 2E51-F360, Governor Limit Switch Adjustment; 3/7/2011
- Listing and PI View Report of LaSalle Units 1 and 2 Safety System Functional Failures; 4th Qtr
2010 - 3rd Qtr 2011
- Clearance Order Review 91138; 1E51-F080, Replace 74 Relay; 4/27/2011
- SSFF PI; Safety System Function Failures, Units 1 & 2, 3rd Quarter Performance Indicators;
12/5/2011
- LSCS-UFSAR 15.3-15; Core and System Performance; Rev. 18
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
Procedures:
- LIP-RI-603; Unit 2 RCIC Pump Suction Low Pressure Turbine Trip Calibration; Rev. 9
- LIS-RI-202; Unit 2 RCIC Pump Discharge Flow Indication Calibration; Rev. 9
- LIS-RI-212; Unit 2 Reactor Vessel High Water Level 8 RCIC Turbine Trip and Main Turbine
Feedwater Pump Trip Calibration; Rev. 22
- LIS-RI-216; Unit 2 Cycled Condensate Storage Tank Low Level RCIC Suction Calibration;
Rev. 3
13 Attachment
- LIS-RI-316; Unit 1 Cycled Condensate Storage Tank Low Level RCIC Suction Functional Test;
Rev. 2
- LIS-RI-416; Unit 2 Cycled Condensate Storage Tank Low Level RCIC Suction Functional Test;
Rev. 4
- LOP-DG-02; Diesel Generator Startup and Operation; Rev. 49
- LOP-TX-01;TSC Uninterruptible Power Supply Startup Operations and Shutdown; Rev. 13
- LOS-HP-Q1; HPCS System Inservice Test; Rev. 63
- LOS-RH-Q1; RHR (LPCI) and RHR Service Water Pump and Valve Inservice Test for Modes
1,2,3,4 and 5; Rev. 77
- LOS-RI-Q3; Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Pump Operability and Valve
Inservice Tests in Conditions 1, 2, and 3; Rev. 46
- LOS-RI-Q5; Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Pump Operability, Valve Inservice
Tests in Modes 1, 2, 3 and Cold Quick Start; Rev. 33
- LS-AA-125-1005; Coding and Analysis Manual; Rev. 8
- OP-LA-101-111-1002; LaSalle Operations Philosophy Handbook; Rev. 37
Action Requests:
- 1241181; Wrong Significance Level Assigned to Issue Report
- 1257808; Ops to Perform CCA for Unplanned LCOS
- 1280756; Door 234 Plate Loose
- 1283662; Employee Medical Issue Requiring Off Site Medical Attention
- 1283670; Security - Ambulance on Site for Medical Emergency
- 1294581; PCR for LIP-RI-503 Include Equipment Availability Attachment
- 1294588; Update LOS-RX-SR1 to Include Restoration Attachment
- 1301579; Very Difficult and Unsafe Getting to C RHR Hi Pt VNT Valves
- 1305335; Need Procedure Change to LIS-NB-418 for Availability
- 1291726-01; RX VSL Hi LVL 8 RCIC Turb Trip & Main Turb/FW PMP Trip
Action Requests Resulting from NRC/IEMA Inspection:
- 1273680; NRC: Procedures May Contain Insufficient Detail
- 1274769; NRC: WC-AA-101-1004 Attachment 4 Incorrect Reference
- 1276863; NRC Identified-Walkdown Observation
- 1283935; NRC Identified - IR on Door 234 Did Not Review HELB Impact
- 1287679; NRC Identified: Unit 1 HPCS Water Leg Pump Oil Bubbler Empty
- 1294090; NRC: Potential Violation for Use of Racklife Figures and Drawings
- 1306237; NRC Identified - Question about NRC Control Room Phones
- 1310365; NRC:4th Qtr 2011 Finding/Violation
- 1310426; NRC: 4th Qtr 2011 Finding/Violation
Figures and Drawings:
- 1E-1-4000FF; TSC Uninterruptible Power Supply Panel 1IP03E System IP; Rev. M
- Fig. 12-1; TSC D/G and UPS; 2/2011
- RI-1; Training Document for RCIC System; Rev. 5
Miscellaneous:
- INPO POC by Event Code Chart; 12/16/2011
- Operator Log Entries; 1/26/2010 - 6/3/2010, 10/11/2011 - 10/12/2011
- Operator Log Entries, Search for LIS-RI; 1/24/2011 - 11/28/2011
14 Attachment
4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Action Requests:
- 1299082; Error in Submitted Licensee Event Report
Figures and Drawings:
- M-89; P&ID Standby Gas Treatment; Rev. AG
- M-153; P&ID Process Radiation Monitoring System; Rev. O
Licensee Event Reports:
- 2011-004-00 and 01; Loss of Secondary Cooling Function Due to Spurious Closure of the
Shutdown Cooling Suction Isolation Valve; 9/16/2011
- 2011-001-00; Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Trip Oil Pressure Switch Inoperable Due to
Incomplete Surveillance Testing; 7/26/2011
Licensee Event Notifications:
- EN 47509; Secondary Containment Was Rendered Inoperable (duration less than
14 minutes); 12/7/2011
- EN 47509; Retraction of EN 47509 - Secondary Containment Was Rendered Inoperable;
12/22/2011
15 Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
AR Action Request
ADAMS Agencywide Document Access Management System
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CAP Corrective Action Program
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CSCS Core Standby Cooling System
DG Diesel Generator
EN Event Notification
FIN Finding
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
IP Inspection Procedure
IR Inspection Report
ISI Inservice Inspection
Keff K Effective
LER Licensee Event Report
LORT Licensed Operator Requalification Training
LPCS Low Pressure Core Spray
MSPI Mitigating Systems Performance Index
NCV Non-Cited Violation
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
PARS Publicly Available Records System
PI Performance Indicator
PMT Post-Maintenance Testing
ROP Reactor Oversight Process
SAT Systems Approach to Training
SDP Significance Determination Process
SFP Spent Fuel Pool
SL Severity Level
SSC Structure, System, and Component
TS Technical Specification
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
URI Unresolved Item
WO Work Order 16 Attachment
M. Pacilio -2-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,
its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection
in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component
of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is
accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
(the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michael Kunowski, Chief
Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000373/2011005; 05000374/2011005
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
DISTRIBUTION:
See next page
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRPIII\1-Secy\1-Work In Progress\LAS 2011 005.docx
Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Sensitive Non-Sensitive
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy
OFFICE RIII RIII RIII RIII
NAME MKunowski:cs
DATE 01/25/12
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Letter to M. Pacilio from M. Kunowski dated January 25, 2012
SUBJECT: LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT 05000373/2011005 AND 05000374/2011005
DISTRIBUTION:
Breeda Reilly
RidsNrrDorlLpl3-2 Resource
RidsNrrPMLaSalle
RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource
Cynthia Pederson
Jennifer Uhle
DRPIII
DRSIII
Patricia Buckley
ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov