ML11192A075

Email from Vonna Ordaz, Subject: Plan for Addressing Stand Alone SFPs for Charlie Miller'S Task Force

ML11192A075
Person / Time
Site:	La Crosse, Zion, 07200001  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	04/05/2011
From:	Vonna Ordaz NRC/NMSS/SFST
To:	Ray Lorson Division of Nuclear Materials Safety I
References
FOIA/PA-2011-0223
Download: ML11192A075 (2)

Text

Benner, Eric From: Ordaz, Vonna Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2011 5:23 PM To: Lorson, Raymond Cc: Weaver, Doug; Benner, Eric

Subject:

Re: Plan for addressing stand alone SFPs for Charlie Miller's Task Force Great, thanks Ray.

From: Lorson, Raymond To: Ordaz, Vonna Sent: Tue Apr 05 17:16:53 2011

Subject:

RE: Plan for addressing stand alone SFPs for Charlie Miller's Task Force Vonna:

Thanks for passing along! I will touch base with Anhe to make sure that we have a common understanding wrt to what is applicable in TI-183.

Ray From: Ordaz, Vonna Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2011 5:03 PM To: Haney, Catherine; Moore, Scott Cc: Camper, Larry; Lorson, Raymond; Boland, Anne; Lipa, Christine; Weaver, Doug; Benner, Eric; Ruland, William; Mohseni, Aby; Kokajko, Lawrence

Subject:

Plan for addressing stand alone SFPs for Charlie Miller's Task Force Importance: High Cathy and Scott, Larry Camper and I pulled together a conference call yesterday with Region III to finalize a decision on whether a TI should be performed on the stand alone SFPs, comparable to the newly issued TI 2515/183 on reactors in order to support the NRC Task Force on the US actions due to the Japan crisis (Charlie Miller's Team). There are 3 facilities that fall under this category including Zion, LaCrosse, and GE Morris. We understand that Millstone 1 will be addressed by Region I under the reactor TI 2515/183 because of the collocated operating reactors.

A summary of our decision is below. We recognize that there is limited time to implement this and factor the outcome into the Task Force effort. We plan to forward this to Charlie Miller, unless you have any comments or wish to discuss it further. Please advise.

Thanks, Vonna From: Lipa, Christine Sent: Monday, April 04, 2011 4:49 PM To: Camper, Larry; Louden, Patrick; McConnell, Keith; Watson, Bruce; Ordaz, Vonna; Benner, Eric; Boland, Anne Cc: Slawinski, Wayne; Edwards, Rhex; Learn, Matthew; Rodriguez, Lionel

Subject:

FW: Course of action for inspections at stand alone spent fuel pools

I As discussed on today's call between reps from Region Ill, FSME, and NMSS, we have determined a course of action to provide us with additional assurance that the stand alone spent fuel pools have adequate measures in place to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety. We also plan to discuss this plan with Region I to ensure alignment.

Specifically, we discussed that Region III would conduct an inspection at each of our 3 stand alone spent fuel pools (Zion, LaCrosse, and GE Morris) by the date of April 29, 2011. The scope of the inspection would be to ensure site specific coping strategies for the loss of fuel pool cooling and water supply are developed and maintained in a state of readiness. We would use the existing IP 60801 ("Spent Fuel Pool Safety at Shutdown Reactors") and expand the scope to include the applicable elements of TI 2515/183. By using TI 2515/183 as our guide, the focus will be to evaluate and verify the licensee's capability to mitigate conditions that result from station black out (SBO) conditions, seismic, flooding, fires, and beyond design basis events. These include an assessment of licensee procedures, capabilities and actions to ensure:

SBO (1) Materials/equipment (for pool cooling/makeup water DC power) are available and maintained (2) Procedures for SBO response are developed (3) Personnel are trained and procedures are executable Seismic, flooding and fires and Beyond Design Basis Events (1) Strategies (ad-hoc or otherwise) are developed to mitigate the impact of fire, flood and seismic events from adversely affecting the spent fuel (2) Materials/equipment are adequate and staged (i.e., barriers such as curbing/walls/doors, penetration seals, fire protection equipment)

(3) Procedures to implement the mitigating strategies are developed (4) Personnel are trained and procedures are executable Christine A. Lipa Chief, Materials Control, ISFSI, and Decommissioning Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III 630-829-9834 2