Text

Draft - Section C Operating Exam (Folder 2)
	ML070820573
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	10/24/2006
From:	Shortell T; Constellation Energy Group
To:	Caruso J; Operations Branch I
	Sykes, Marvin D.
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Appendix D, Rev. 9 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: NMPI Scenario No.: NRC 1 Op-Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators Event No.

Malf. No.

I Event Type*

Event Description 1 FWO2C C(TS Feedwater Booster Pump 13 auto trips. The pump is a HPCl SRO) component and must be declared inoperable. SRO enters TS 3.1.8 and the pump must be restored within 15 days.

rN

~

2 Transfer pressure control from MPR to EPR per N1-OP-31, F.3.0.

3 RP20B I(TS Drywell High Pressure Transmitter 201.2-476A fails downscale.

SRO) Transmitter supplies input to RPS, Core Spray and Containment Spray Systems. SRO Tech Spec Entry into LCO 3.6.2 is required.

4 RROSC C(ALL) Recirc Pump 13 Motor Generator Slot temperatures rise. Removal of the pump from service is required, which also requires a power R (RO) reduction. Actions are taken for the Recirc Pump Trip per SOP-I .3 5 Steam Seal Regulator Failure. Power reduction reveals a pre-existing failure in the Steam Seal Regulator and results in degraded steam seal header pressure and increased condenser air in-leakage. Regulator Bypass must be manually opened to restore seal pressure.

6 Recirc Master Controller fails low resulting in Restricted Zone entry.

Entry into SOP-I .5. Flow drops to 21 Mlbm/hr and power is 45-50%

I R (SRO RO) on APRMs. Cram Rods must be inserted to exit the restricted zone. Power must be reduced to about 30% power to exit region.

7 Override M(ALL) Loss of Condenser Vacuum due to Steam Seal Regulator Bypass Valve Failure. Enter SOP-25.1. A turbine trip is required when condenser backpressure exceeds 5 inches with generator load

< I 90 MWe. Reactor scrams either manually or automatically.

~~ ~~ ~ ~______ ~

1 d Steam Leak in Drywell 20% ramp time 1O:OO minutes. After the scram and initial actions are complete, the steam leak develops.

Drywell pressure exceeds 3.5 psig and EOP entry is required.

Drywell parameters will reach values that require use of Containment Spray.

1 9 RP26B C(ALL) Drywell High Pressure Transmitter 201.2-476C fails downscale.

With the "A"transmitter previously failed the high drywell pressure RPS scram signal, Core Spray and Containment Spray automatic initiation signals are prevented. Crew must take manual actions to initiate these functions.

10 RPV level instrument reference legs flash. Crew is required to perform RPV Flooding. Event is classified as SAE 2.1.2 RR87

( N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 10/21/2006 6:39:44 AM 1 of8 NRC Exam Draft Exam Submittal

Facilitv: Nine Mile Point I Scenario No.: NRC-01 Op-Test No.: NRC TARG ET Q UA NTITAT1V E ATT RIBUTES ACTUAL (PER SCENARIO; SEE SECTION D.5.d) ATTR IBUTES Total Malfunction Count:

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 6 Major not included in this count.

Events 4,5,6,8,9,10 Didnt count Event 1 and 3,

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 because these only require SRO Events 9 and 10 tech spec use.

3. Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Event 6 SOP-I .5 and Event 7 SOP-25.1 Abnormal Events Count:

4. Major transients (1 -2) 1 Does not include the SRO TS related events. These are Event 7 Loss of Vacuum considered separately.

5. EOPs enteredirequiring substantive 2 actions (1-2)

SRO TS Events Event 6 EOP-2 RPV; EOP-4 Pri Containment Event 1 and 3 are SRO Tech Spec evaluation events.

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive 1 actions (0-2)

Event 9 EOP-7 RPV Flooding CT-1 .O Flood to Main Steam Lines CT-2.0 Containment Spray 10/21/2006 6:39:44 AM 2of8 NRC Exam Draft Exam Submittal

NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 1 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 34 RPV FLOODING PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 7/14/06 VALIDATED M. Meier, L. Blum, J. Tsardakas DATE 9/18/06 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING OPERATIONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CON FIGURAT1ON CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Length: 90 minutes Initial Power Level: 90%, above the 100% Rod Line The scenario begins at 90% reactor power, with the Mechanical Pressure Regulator (MPR) in service. The crew will shift pressure control to the Electronic Pressure regulator (EPR) per normal operating procedures. Shortly after assuming the shift, Feedwater Booster Pump 13 automatically trips and the standby booster pump automatically starts. The pump is a HPCl component and must be declared inoperable. SRO enters TS 3.1.8 and the pump must be restored within 15 days. While shifting regulators, one of the four drywell pressure transmitters fails downscale, preventing that channel from actuating protective functions. The transmitter inputs to RPS, Core Spray, Containment Spray and Automatic Depressurization Systems (ADS). Tech Spec 3.6.2 entry is required.

Recirc Pump 13 Motor Generator experiences an overheating condition and generator slot temperature rises. The crew will reduce power and remove Recirc Pump 13 from service. As turbine load is reduced, a pre-existing failure in the Turbine Steam Seal regulating system is revealed. The turbine seals are normally self-sealing at high power levels. The component failure is only evident as load is reduced from the Recirc Pump trip. Seal header pressure drops below normal values. The crew restores seal header pressure by manually opening the steam seal bypass valve.

A failure of the Recirc Master Flow Controller results in an unplanned power change, as Recirc Flow is reduced to minimum. Plant parameters are such that the Restricted Zone of the Power/Flow Map is entered. The crew implements N1-SOP-1.5 and must exit the Restricted Zone by inserting cram rods. The transient is complicated by a failure of the Turbine Steam Seal Regulator Bypass valve which causes a degraded condenser vacuum, due to loss of steam seals. Vacuum lowers and now results in a required turbine trip due to low load ( 4 9 0 MWe) and high backpressure (>5inches). The crew trips the turbine, but the reactor remains at power, since power is now within turbine bypass valve capability. The crew is expected to NRC Scenario 1 July 2006

manually initiate a scram, due to the degrading conditions. If the crew does not initiate a manual scram, a spurious automatic scram will occur.

Several minutes after the reactor is scrammed, a steam leak inside the drywell develops along with a failure of an additional drywell pressure transmitter. The transmitter failure results in loss of function for actions occurring on high drywell pressure. These functions include loss of automatic scram, automatic start of Core Spray and Containment Spray systems and ADS.

Following the scram, all RPV water level indicators will become erratic as reference legs flash, due to the elevated drywell temperature. The crew will be required to flood the RPV to the Main Steam Lines per N1-EOP-7, RPV Flooding. The crew will also control Primary Containment parameters by implementing N1-EOP-4, Primary Containment.

Major Procedures Exercised: N1-SOP-1.3, N1-SOP-1.5, N1-SOP-25.1, N1-EOP-2, N I -

EOP-4, N1-EOP-7 EAL Classification: SAE 2.1.2 RPV Flooding is required.

Termination Criteria: RPV Flooding conditions are met. Containment Spray initiated and secured when DWP drops below 3.5 psig.

NRC Scenario 1 July 2006

I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-236 for NRC Exam. IC-20 or equivalent. Ensure EPR has been removed from service and control established on MPR per N1-OP-31. Reactor power is 90%.

B. Presets/Function Key Assignments

1. Malfunctions:

a. See bat file n06scenl .bat

2. Remotes:

a. See bat file n06scenl .bat

3. Overrides:

a. See bat file n06scenl .bat

4. Annunciators:

a. None C . Equipment Out of Service

1. None D. Support Documentation

1. None E. Miscellaneous

1. None

2. EVENT TRIGGERS/COMPOSITES

a. See bat file n06scenl .bat NRC Scenario 1 July 2006

II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

0 Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Lit Control Room Annunciators 0 Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)

(SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:

0 Reactor Power = 90% 0 Loadline = >loo%

0 MPR is in service.

0 All requirements are met for operation without the EPR.

PART III : RemarkslPlanned Evolutions :

0 Transfer control to the EPR per N1-OP-31 F.3.0.

0 EPR power has been on for 25 hours2.893519e-4 days 0.00694 hours 4.133598e-5 weeks 9.5125e-6 months .

PART IV: To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:

0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)

NRC Scenario 1 July 2006

Scenario ID#

INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)

What Happened? Other Options?

NRC Scenario 1 July 2006

Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:

CT-1 .O Given the plant with RPV water level unknown due to reference leg flashing, the crew will flood the RPV to the Main Steam Lines per EOP-7 and establish RPV pressure at least 72 psig above torus pressure.

CT-2.0 Given the plant with a Loss of Coolant Accident, automatic system failures and conditions requiring Drywell Spray, the crew will initiate drywell sprays and secure drywell sprays before DWP becomes negative.

6. Performance Objectives:

PO-1 .O Given a trip of Feedwater Booster Pump 13 the SRO will declare the HPCl component inoperable and enter Tech Spec 3.1.8.

PO-2.0 Given the plant at power with the MPR in service the crew will transfer control to the EPR per N1-OP-31.

PO-3.0 Given downscale failure of a Drywell Pressure transmitter the SRO will declare the instrument inoperable and take the actions required by Tech Spec 3.6.2.

PO-4.0 Given the plant at power and a rising Recirc Pump Motor Generator slot temperature the crew will remove the pump from service.

PO-5.0 Given the plant at power and a failure of the turbine Steam Seal system, the crew will respond per procedures and stabilize condenser vacuum to preclude a turbine trip.

PO-6.0 Given the plant at power and a Recirc master flow controller failure resulting in Restricted Zone entry, the crew will enter and execute N1-SOP-1.5 to exit the Restricted Zone.

PO-7.0 Given the plant at power and a failure of the turbine Steam Seal system resulting in low turbine load (<I90 MWe) and high condenser backpressure (>5 inches), the crew will trip the turbine as required by N1-SOP-25.1.

NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

PO-8.0 Given indication of RPV water level reference leg flashing, the crew will recognize water level is unknown and execute EOP-7 RPV Flooding and flood to the Main Steam Lines.

PO-9.0 Given the plant with LOCA conditions, the crew will initiate Containment Sprays when torus pressure exceeds 13 psig.

PO-10.0 Given the plant with LOCA conditions and Containment Sprays is service, the crew will secure Containment Spray when drywell pressure drops below 3.5 psig PO-I I.O Given events that meet the criteria for emergency classification, the SRO will classify the event per EPP-EPIP-01 EAL Matrix.

NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Crew 1 Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.

SRO KI Directs performance of transferring control to EPR.

EVENT1 FWBP13 Trip CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed activate malfunction by BOP activating TRG 1: Report alarm and respond per H3-3-6 FWOZC FEEDWATER BOOSTER PUMP Confirm alarm on computer TRIP 13 (E076 RX FW BOOST PMP 13 TRIP)

FWBP 13 trip and FWBP 12 starts. Confirm start of standby pump H3-3-6 REACTOR FW BOOSTER P 13 TRIP 0 FWBP 13 control switch should OL SUCTION alarms be placed in PTL.

Dispatch operators to shift Hydrogen Water Chemistry injection from FWBP13 to FWBP 12.

The following annunciators alarm, but clear SRO after the transient: Acknowledges report.

H3-1-7 REACTOR FW PUMP I ? TRIP Enters Tech Spec 3.1.8 NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR AC-1 PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS OVERLOAD SUCTION HI- LEVEL specification b. Determines H3-2-7 REACTOR FW PUMP 12 TRIP redundant component inoperabiIity OVERLOAD SUCTION HI- LEVEL and 15 days to restore.

H3-3-7 REACTOR FW SHAFT P 13 DlSCH 7 Initiates surveillance requirement PRESS SUCTION 4.1.8 c for redundant component opera biIity verification .

7 Notifies WEC I Notifies Ops Management 7 Performs crew briehpdate.

NOTE: Event 3 should be entered while Event 2 is in progress. There are no audible alarms associated with the transmitter failure.

EVENT 2 Transfer Control to EPR 3op Note: All actions to place the EPR in service Verify EPR power is on for will be conducted from E Console. minimum of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Verify EPR setpoint 1010 psig or EPR Control Light off, as directed by SRO.

Record Reactor Pressure EPR setpoint is lowered from I010 psig to Slowly lower EPR setpoint in about 920 psig before the servo begins to move and wait manner while move in the upscale direction. monitoring servo position.

WHEN EPR Servo position starts to move upscale THEN raise EPR setpoint until servo stops moving upscale to demonstrate control of EPR servo.

As the EPR setpoint meter moves in the Lower EPR setpoint again in upscale direction, the EPR will assume control move and wait manner UNTIL NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS when the servo indication is about the same as EPR servo begins to move slowly the MPR servo setting. upscale.

WHEN EPR servo position approaches MPR servo positon, observe the following responses:

0 Steam Pressure EPR Control light lit A2-4-4 TURBINE MECHANICAL PRESS REG IN CONTROL clears Assure EPR has taken control by slowly lowering EPR setpoint in move-and-wait manner until reactor pressure lowers by 1 or 2 psig.

Verify EPR performance as follows:

Slowly raise MPR setpoint UNTIL MPR control light goes off.

Raise MPR setpoint to obtain MPR servo position 8% to 14%

lower than EPR Servo position (MPR setpoint is 4-6 psi above Adjusting the EPR setpoint to re-establish EPR setpoint).

pressure will change the magnitude of the Adjust EPR setpoint to return difference between the MPR and EPR reactor pressure to pre-transfer setpoint. setting recorder in step F.3.2 The MPR setpoint may require adjustment to Adjust MPR setpoint as necessary establish the required difference in servo to obtain MPR servo position 8% to NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

INS I KUC I OK ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE 0PERAT0 R ACT10NS position. 12% lower than EPR servo position. 0.15 to 0.25 MPR ROLE PLAY: paddle gap.

If dispatched to verify proper paddle gap, wait Report s EPR in service to SRO.

one minute, then report paddle gap is 0.20 inches.

NOTE: There are no alarms associated with the transmitter failure (downscale). At the Lead Examiners discretion a role play as RB operator may be used. Report the downscale condition and gross failure, while on RB rounds.

EVENT 3 Drywell High Pressure Transmitter 201.2-476A fails downscale PO-2.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by activating TRG 2:

RP20B RPS 11 DW PT 201.2-476A FAILED CREW LOW Identifies and reports ANALOG ANALOG TRIP SYSTEM CHANNEL I 1 TRIP SYSTEM CHANNEL 11 TROUBLE red light illuminates. Red light is TROUBLE red light illuminated.

located on upper left side of F Panel. Dispatches operator to Reactor Building 281 to check RPS cabinets ROLE PLAY: 7 May refer to drawing C-I 8014-C WHEN dispatched to RPS Cabinets, report sheet 1 and table to determine functions of affected instrument.

NRC Scenario 1 -1 1- September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT10NS Drywell Pressure transmitter 201.2-476A is downscale with gross failure lit. All other DW pressure transmitters are reading correctly for current DW pressure.

NOTE: SRO Tech Specs 3.6.2.a, b, d, e, f and I all apply. Declares DW P transmitter 3.6.2.a Scram Note ( 0 ) With one channel inoperable.

required by Table 3.6.2.a inoperable in one or Enter Tech Spec 3.6.2 for more parameters, place the inoperable instruments that initiate scram, channel and/or that trip system in the tripped primary coolant or containment condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . isolation, core spray initiation, 3.6.2.b Note (f) also requires tripping channel containment spray initiation and within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , since channel is common with ADS initiation.

RPS. Determines transmitter must be 3.6.2.d Note (f) requires placing channel in placed in the tripped condition tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or take the within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

action required by Specification 3.6.2.a for that Notifies the WEC.

parameter. This requires tripping the channel Notifies Ops Management.

in I 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . 3.6.2.e Note (c) also applies the Conducts crew briefhpdate.

same way.

3.6.2.1 is 7 day LCO for CREVS. 3.4.5 must also be entered for CREVS system.

EVENT 4 RECIRC PUMP MOTOR GENERATOR SLOT TEMPERATURE RISES WITH STEAM SEAL REGULATOR FAILED CLOSED PO-3.0 and 4.0 When plant conditions have stabilized, ACTIVATE malfunctions using TRG3:

NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS RROSC, Recirculation MG Set # I 3 3OP Generator Overheating (100% over 10 min.) iesponds to annunciator F2-(2-3)

MS05 TURBINE STEAM SEAL REGULATOR 1 Observes Process Computer point FAILS LOW A094 and B331, RRMG 13 GEN After about 3 minutes Annunciator SLOT TEMP in high alarm.

F2 (2-3), REACT REClRC MG SET 13 alarms 1 Dispatches A 0 to verify proper ventilation and inspect 13 RRMG.

ROLE PLAY: 3 Inform SRO of high temperature As A 0 sent to the MG set, report that on 13 RRMG.

ventilation system is operating properly and 7 May also reference N1-OP-40, the motor end of # I 3 RRMG set is extremely F.1.O for additional response.

hot to the touch.

rhese actions for Nl-OP-I F.4.0 Verify proper operation of Recirc MG Area Ventilation Verify proper positioning of TB Truck Bay doors Verify proper operation of Recirc MG Set Area Coolers Verify RRP parameters are within limits Verify total recirculation flow is even balanced between operating RRPs IF generator slot temperatures continue to rise and approach 120°C, THEN reduce loading on Note: Emergency Power Reduction actions are affected RRMG by lowering power contained in N1 -SOP-I. 1. These actions are per N 1-0P-43B (Emergency also identified in N1-OP-43B Power Reduction section), as directed by SRO.

NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

c INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Note:

The SRO should direct one of the following Direct Emergency Power actions to reduce the load on 13 RRMG: Reduction per N1-SOP-I .IOR Emergency Power Reduction, using N I - Direct RO to remove RRMG 13 SOP-I. I or NI-OP-43B from service 13 RRP Shutdown, using Nl-OP-I, Section Checks T.S. 3.1.7 for 4 loop H. 1.0. operation, .98 APLHGR applies.

Trip of 13 RRP Verifies 4 loop thermal limits Expected result is that 13 RRMG and RRP will Verifies P/F Map updated be shutdown due to inability to clear the high When Recirc Pump 13 Discharge temperature condition on RRMG 13. Valve is re-opened, declares APRMs inop, due to reverse flow.

(Only applicable if pump was tripped and APRMs are declared ROLE PLAY: inop, while discharge valve is As A 0 sent to the MG set, after the power open).

reduction report that the RRMG appears to be Notifies Operations Management getting hotter, even though the load has been Notifies Chemistry reduced . Notifies Reactor Analyst Provides Reactivity Brief per GAP-OPS-05.

RO The turbine is self-sealing at high power levels, i If directed, reduces power per N I -

c so a failure of the regulator is not apparent SOP-1 . I , using all Recirc Master until load is reduced. Steam Seal header Flow Controller.

pressure drops below normal. Alarm A2-2-5 If directed to shutdown 13 RRP TURBINE STEAM SEAL HDR PRESS HIGH- per N1-OP-I H.l.O performs the NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS1 PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS LOW alarms. following:

0 Place RRECIRC PUMP 13 SPEED CONTROL in BAL and null out Deviation Meter (top meter)

Place RRECIRC PUMP 13 SPEED CONTROL AUTO/BAL/MAN switch to MAN 0 Verify open REACTOR R PUMP 13 BYPASS VALVE.

0 Slowly reduce recirculation Pump 13 flow to 6 to 8x1O6 Ib/hr 0 Close REACTOR R PUMP 13 DISCHARGE VALVE.

0 WHEN Discharge Valve is When RRP 13 pump is removed from closed, place REACTOR RP service delete the Malfunction for REACT MOTOR 13 MG SET switch to RECIRC MG SET 13 GENERATOR STOP.

OVERHEATING. 0 Hold in OPEN position for 2 to It will slowly cool down and the alarm will clear. 3 seconds REACTOR R PUMP 13 DISCHARGE VALVE.

0 Align system for 4 Loop operation per section H.

If directed to trip RRMG set:

Trip 13 RRMG set Monitor P/F map (4 loop) lnop APRMs due to reverse flow in idle loop.

Take N1-SOP-1.3.

NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

I RUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS rhese action are from SOP-1.3 10 If directed, executes SOP-I .3 IF Recirc Pump trip results in less than three operating loops THEN SCRAM the reactor per SOP-I (Not Expected)

Verify proximity to resticted zone using PowerlFlow Map (Four Loop)

Notify SRO that APRMs are inoperable.

Close RECIRC PUMP 4 44 DISCHARGE VALVE.

IF RECIRC PUMP / 17 DISCHARGE VALVE is closed, THEN hold open for 2-3 seconds RECIRC PUMP 14 DISCHARGE VALVE.

Notify SRO that APRMs are operable.

During valve stem warmup, restore F Panel controls to normal as follows:

l?

Green flag RECIRC PUMP .Id SB switch.

Place RECIRC PUMP SPEED CONTROL Scenario events will proceed prior to AUTO/BAL/MAN switch to completing the 30 minute warmup period for MAN.

the discharge valve. WHEN 30 minute warmup period NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS has elapsed for discharge valve, THEN Close Recirc Pump 14 discharge valve. (Not expected)

Event 5 Steam Seal Regulator Failure Event is automatically initiated during the power reduction. BOP actions are taken concurrently with actions taken by RO for RRP 13 high slot temperature and the power reduction.

Malfunction initiated with Event 4 using TRG 3:

MS05 TURBINE STEAM SEAL REGULATOR FAILS LOW The turbine is self-sealing at high power levels, 3op so a failure of the regulator is not apparent 3 Report and respond to annunciator until load is reduced. Steam Seal header A2-2-5 TURBINE STEAM SEAL pressure drops below normal. Alarm A2-2-5 HDR PRESS HIGH-LOW TURBINE STEAM SEAL HDR PRESS HIGH- rhese actions are from A2-2-5 LOW alarms. 3 Confirm alarm comp point 1 Maintain Steam Seal Reg pressure 2-5 psig Verify open STEAM SEAL REG BLOCK 11 Verify open STEAM SEAL REG BLOCK 13 When STEAM SEAL REG BY-PASS is Verify closed STEAM SEAL throttled open, Steam Seal Header pressure UNLOAD will rise. Thottle open STEAM SEAL REG BY-PASS.

Report header pressure restored to NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

I N~TRUCTORACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS normal value.

ROLE PLAY: If required direct crew as Ops management, with reactor engineering concurrence, to reduce power below 80%.

Provide RMR, if needed. This must be done prior to inserting next malfunction. If started from too high a power level, a high level trip may occur due to FWLC and FWP valve response times.

EVENT 6 MASTER RECIRC FLOW CONTROLLER FAILS LOW PO-5.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunctions by activating TRG 4: SRO Direct entry into SOP-I .5 for RR27 MASTER RECIRCULATION FLOW unplanned reactor power change.

CONTROLLER FAILS-LOW May direct FWLC placed in manual, due to transient rising Recirc flow signal rapidly reduces to minimum, level.

Recirc flow, reactor power and generator MWe Directs exit from Restricted Zone begin to lower. Reactor power will lower to by Cram Rod Insertion about 50% and core flow will be about 21 Mlbm/hr. Entry into the Power/F/ow map "Restricted Zone" occurs. An RPV HIGH WA TER LEVEL alarm may occur due to the rapid power change and response of the Feed water System.

NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

INS 1 RUCTOK AC 1 IONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 3Q rhese actions are from SOP-1.5 Continuously monitor LPRMs and APRMs for thermal hydraulic instabilities (NONE expected).

NOTE: IF RESRICTED ZONE is entered, The REClRC MASTER controller is failed low, THEN.. .Exit by performing one of therefore flow cannot be raised to exit the the following:

restricted zone. Cram rod insertion is required IF Recirc Pumps are operating to exit the restricted zone. Based on the AND plant conditions permit, Power/Flow Map, power must be reduced from THEN Raise RECIRC MASTER about 50% to about 30% with flow at 21 controller to raise recirc flow.

Mlbm/hr to exit. (CANNOT BE PERFORMED).

Lower reactor power by inserting cram rods to 00.

WHEN directed by SRO, inserts obtains reactivity book and inserts cram rods to 00.

Reactor power lowers as cram rods are Inform Reactor Engineering inserted. If generator MWe e190 MWe and Supervisor.

B499 computer point indicates backpressure is

>5 hg, a turbine trip is required, per SOP-25.1 As power lowers Alarm A2-2-5 TURBINE BOP STEAM SEAL HDR PRESS HIGH-LOW If necessary, adjusts STEAM alarms again. Steam seal pressure must be SEAL REG BY-PASS to maintain 2 manually adjusted as power lowers. to 5 psig NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE 0PERAT0 R ACT10NS Event 7 STEAM SEAL BYPASS FAILURE DEGRADES CON DENSER VACUUM.

PO-6.0 WHEN power is about 30% to 35%, activate BOP overrides to fail STEAM SEAL REG BY-PASS Recognize and report alarm valve closed using TRG 5: 0 Report STEAM SEAL REG BY-ior 2s5di171 (5 0) on PASS is closed and cannot be ior 2s5dil72 (5 0) off opened.

STEAM SEAL REG BY-PASS closes and Report condenser vacuum Steam Seal header pressure drops to 0 psig. lowering.

Alarm A2-2-5 TURBINE STEAM SEAL HDR 0 Executes SOP-25.1 for loss of PRESS HIGH-LO W alarms. Condenser vacuum.

vacuum begins to lower. WHEN vacuum Recognize requirement to trip the lowers to 24 inches, annunciator A 1-3-4 turbine and enter N1-SOP-31.I CONDENSER VACUUM BELOW 24HG 0 Trips the turbine alarms. Per NI-SOP-25. I , If generator MWe 0 Verifies turbine is tripped and 190 M We and B499 computer point indicates bypass valves are controlling backpressure is >5 hg, a turbine trip is reactor pressure.

required, per SOP-25. I 0 Verifies generator tripped 0 Reports FW shifted to HPCl mode due to turbine trip.

NOTE: 7 As required, lower power per SOP-Lowering power in this case will actually make 1. I to stabilize vacuum.

NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

I INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS condenser vacuum worse because lowering Verify proper operation of the power makes the steam seal loss more following:

severe. Increased air in-leakage past seals Circ Water will occur the more power is lowered. SJAE Off Gas System Condensate System Turbine Gland Seal System System Leaks If appropriate, place standby SJAE in service (NOT expected)

F3-4-6 First Stage Bowl Press Low is expected F3-4-6 First Stage Bowl Press in to alarm during power reduction to exit the alarm (Yes/No) Should Be YES Restricted Zone. IF YES.. ..Verify power below 45%

BEFORE Condenser Vacuum NOTE: reaches 22.1 Hgv TRIP the Vacuum Trip 1. Trips turbine at 22.1 turbine and enter SOP-31 . I Vacuum Trip 2. Closes BPV at I O concurrently.

Other actions that may be directed are BEFORE Condenser Vacuum removing 13 FWP from service and starting a reaches 10 Hgv SCRAM the second motor driven feed pump. After the reactor and enter SOP-I HPCl initiation, resetting HPCl may be concurrently.

directed. The scenario will proceed prior to If directed, manually scram the any of these actions being performed. reactor and enters SOP-I Due to degraded condition, the crew may initiate a manual scram after tripping the turbine. If a manual scram is directed, the steam leak will occur after 4:OO minute time delay and MS to shutdown.

IF a manual scram IS NOT initiated by the NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR A C T ~ O N S ~

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS crew after tripping the turbine CONSOLE OPERATOR initiates an automatic scram by activating malfunction using TRG 8:

RP03 REACTOR SCRAM SRO 3 Directs a manual scram based on degraded plant OR IF automatic scram occurs directs scram actions to be implemented.

SRO 0 Repeats back Scram Report 0 Enters EOP-2 RPV Control on on RPV water level < 53inches These actions from EOP-2 Directs entry into SOP-1 (SCRAM)

IF water level is unknown exit this procedure and enter EOP-7 to flood the RPV (L-2) (Expected to occur later, when reference legs flash)

Directs level restored and maintained between 53 inches and 95 inches using one or more of the following systems (L-3):

Condenstate/FW CRD Core Spray (EOP-1 Att 4)

NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Bypass Core Spray IV interlocks Directs RPV pressure stabilized 800 to 1000 psig using Turbine bypass valves.

If needed, directs use of Alternate Pressure Control Systems (P-5)

EC ERV Others (Not expected)

May direct closing MSlVs prior to automatic closure on lowering vacuum NOTE -

RO When the reactor is scrammed and the Mode When directed, initiates a manual Switch is in SHUTDOWN, malfunctions are scram by pacing Mode Switch to activating by TRG 6 and TRG 7: SHUTDOWN or using Manual The steam leak will not become apparent until Scram pushbuttons and about four minutes after the scram. implements SOP-I Reactor Scram.

RP26B RPS 1I DW PT 201.2-476C FAILED Provides Scram Report LOW Reduce RECIRC MASTER flow 25 MS04 STEAM LINE RUPTURE INSIDE to 43 Mlbmlhr PRIMARY CONTAIMENT 20% 1O:OO MINUTE Perform SOP-I Scram Verification RAMP AFTER 4:OO minute time steps delay ...ms04 (7 4:OO) 20 1O:OO Confirm all rods inserted to position 04 or beyond using Full Core Display.

Observe power decreasing NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

W R U C T O R ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Place IRMs on Range 9 Insert IRM and SRM detectors Downrange IRMs as necessary Verify turbine and generator tripped.

Maintain RPV pressure in the directed band, below 1080 psig using one or more of the following (unless given other direction from E 0P-2):

Turbine Bypass Valves Emergency Condensers 0 ERVs 0 Others (Not expected) 3op 2 Performs RPV Level Control at F Panel.

1 Restore level 53 to 95 inches as directed.

0 IF 13 FWP is running and level is recovering :

Verify at least one motor FWP running.

NOTE: Failure to give 29-01 a close signal, will 7 Terminate 13FWP injection:

cause FWP13 FCV to swing and results in Place 13 FWP Valve Controller pressure and flow swings when NR level in MAN and dial to 0 output.

instruments begin to swing after reference legs Verify >53 inches.

flash. This is because FWP 13 FCV receives Disengage clutch.

its setpoint setdown control signals, even with Give 29-01 BV close signal.

MA controller in MANUAL.

NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

I INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 7 Control Motor FWP Injection:

Verify >53 inches and rising Verify 11 and 12 FWP valve controllers in MAN and dial to 0 output.

At E Panel, reset HPCl 11 and 12 using pushbuttons.

NOTE: Placing a FWP BYPASS valve in Place one FWP BYPASS valve AUTO set at 65 to 70 inches, will cause FWP in AUTO set at 65 to 70 inches.

pressure and flow swings when NR level Verify level stable and secure instruments begin to swing after reference legs 2"d FWP, if running.

flash. If required, close running FWP discharge BV.

3 If directed, closes MSlVs Event 8 Steam Leak inside Drywell. DWP Transmitter 201.2-4766 failed downscale.

After 4 minutes, malfunction MS04 begins to ramp.

Steam leakage into the drywell begins with CREW temperature and pressure rise. The D WP Recognize and report rising DWP downscale transmitter failure results in failure of one RPS Channel ( I I ) to trip when DWP exceeds 3.2 psig. Other automatic system responses are failure of Core Spray System to start on High DWP. The Containment Spray System auto start is also affected by the transmitter failures.

NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

? -

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTIONS FOR HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE SRO N1-EOP-4 Primary Containment Control. May direct manual containment Executes all legs concurrently. Major isolation to be initiated.

actions and legs executed during EOP-4. Enters EOP-4 on high DWP above 3.5 psig Containment Spray Initiated? (Step 1 NO)

Directs lockout of all Containment Spray Pumps (Step 2)

PO-I 0.0 and PO-I 1.O Executes PCP Leg Drywell and Torus pressure and temperature If Cont Sprays are running, THEN rise due to steam leakage. stop sprays when DWP drops below 3.5 psig. (PCP-1 Override)

Action is expected to occur after spray is initiated).

Maintain PC pressure below 3.5 psig (EOP 1 Att IO) (PCP-2)

Torus pressure exceeds 13 psig. If Torus Pressure exceeds 13 psig, THEN Go to 17 (which is PCP-3). . .(PCP-2, Expected)

Inside Containment Spray Initiation Limit Fig K? (PCP-3 YES)

Directs All Recirc Pumps tripped.

Directs all drywell cooling fans tripped.

Operate Cont Spray (EOP 1 Att 17)

Keep trying to lower PC pressure below 3.5 psig. (PCP-5)

If cannot stay Inside PSP Fig L NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS curve, THEN Go to 18 (which is PCP-8) (Perform a Blowdown per EOP-8 Not expected).

ihese actions are expected by SRO vhen reference leg flashing occurs 1 Determines and announces RPV water level is unknown 1 WHEN RPV reference leg flashing occurs and water level can no longer be determined, Exits EOP-2 and enters EOP-7 RPV Flooding (from L-2 and L-4)

Ro ixecutes TT Leg 3 Maintain Torus temperature below 85°F using Torus Cooling (EOP 1 Att 16) (TT-2)

BOP BOP Actions to start torus cooling per EOP-1 If directed, starts Torus Cooling per Attachment 16 Attachment 16 Torus Cooling shall be placed in service within 15 minutes of Torus temperature 285°F Close CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:

111; 80-45 112 or 121: 80-40 and 80-45 NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 122; 80-40 1 Verify closed 80-1 15, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 12 1 Verify closed 80-1 14, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 11 1 Verify closed Cont Spray Discharge IV using keylock switch for selected loop:

111; 80-16 112; 80-36 121;80-15 122; 80-35 7 Verify open CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:

0 111; 80-40 112; 80-44 121;80-41 122; 80-45 11 Fully open 80-1 18, CONT SPRAY TEST TO TORUS FCV Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP in selected loop.

Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP in selected loop.

WHEN torus water reaches desired temperature stop Containment Spray pump.

CI Stop all operating Raw Water Pumps If desired, return system to standby NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS per N 1- 0 P - I 4.

11 Report status to SRO.

PO-I 0.0 BOP When directed, trips all Recirc Pumps.

When directed, trips drywell cooling fans.

BOP Actions for cont inment spray per EOP-1 Verify started Containment Spray 7 Pump 111 or 122.

Verify started at least one of the When Containment Spray is initiated, Drywell other three Containment Spray pressure lowers below 3.5 psig. Pumps.

IF 80-1 18 is open for Torus Cooling, THEN CONSOLE OPERATOR Open Containment Spray WHEN Drywell temperature drops below Discharge IV for Containment 200°F and the crew is injecting to establish Spray Loop in Torus Cooling flooding pressure, THEN delete malfunctions Mode.

RR99A and RR87: Close 80-1 18 This stops the erratic indication on all level Verify open 80-40 and 80-45 meters. IF EDG loading permits, THEN start Containment Spray Raw Water Pump for associated loop.

PO-I 1.o BOP Drywell pressure lowers with Containment o Reports DWP below 3.5 psig Spray in operation until D WP drops to 3.5 psis Stops Containment Spray by placing all Containment Spray NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

PLANT RESPONSE 0PERAT0 R ACT10NS Pumps in Pull To Lock.

CT-3.0 1 Stops Containment Spray before DWP becomes negative.

When Drywell temperature exceeds 240 OF, reference leg flashing occurs and RPV water level can no longer be determined.

Event 8 RPV Level Instrument Reference Leg Flashing PO-9.0 CREW 7 Recognize and report erratic level IF conditional event triggers fail to activate indication and fuel zone indications RR99Aand RR87 .....THEN manually activate of flashing both malfunctions using TRG 9 and I O .

When Drywell Air Temperature PCTDWAIR exceeds 240°F trigger 9 and 10 activate SRO malfu nctions: These actions are expectec b RR99A ERRATIC LEVEL INDICATION, ALL when reference leg flashing occurs METERS AND RECORDERS Determines and announces RPV RR87 FUEL ZONE LEVEL INSTRUMENT water level is unknown FLASHING 0 Exits EOP-2 and enters EOP-7 Reference leg flashing occurs. Fuel Zone RPV Flooding (from L-2 and L-4) digital display indications begin flashing. All water level indications become erratic.

These actions are directed from EOP-7 RPV Flooding NOTE: The following actions may lead to 0 Are all rods inserted to at least fluctuating FWP flow and pressure as N R level position 04? (Step 1 YES)

NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

c2 INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS indications swing: 0 IF RPV water level can be Placing FWP Bypass Controller to AUTO. determined.. ..RETURN TO RPV Leaving any FWP MA CONTROL in AUTO CONTROL (Step 12 Not expected)

(with HPCl fuses pulled) will result in valve Torus water level? (Step 13 Above swings as sensed level swing. 8 feet) 0 Directs Open 3 ERVs (Step 14)

Failure to close FWP 13 Blocking Valve will and OK to exceed 100°F/hr result in swings from FWP13. Setpoint coo Idown Setdown will still control FWP 13 valve, even with controller in manual.

0 Can 3 ERVs be opened? (Step 15 YES) 0 Directs Close MSlVs and EC Steam Isolation Valves (Step 16)

CT-2.0 0 Control injection to establish and maintain 3 ERVs open AND RPV pressure at least 72 psi above torus pressure using (Step 17):

CondensatelFW, OK to bypass high level trips CRD Core Spray, Bypass IV Interlocks Detail E Systems are: 0 Alternate Injection Systems Containment Spray Raw Water to Core Spray (Detail E)

(EOPI Att 5)

Fire Water (EOP 1 Att 19)

Liquid Poison Test Tank (EOP 1 Att 12)

Liquid Poison Boron Tank (EOP 1 Att 13)

If you cannot restore and maintain NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

c INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS RPV pressure at least 72 psi above torus pressure with 3 ERVs open...THEN FLOOD THE DRYWELL, exit all EOPs and enter all SAPS (Step 17) 3 Record time of RPV pressure at least 72 psi above torus pressure with 3 ERVs open (Stepl8).

J WAIT for RPV water level instruments to be available AND DWT at 319 ft <212 AND Flooding conditions met for at least 101 minutes (Step 19).. .to proceed.

NOT expected to proceed past this JVAlT block in the scenario RO CONSOLE OPERATOR cl If directed, initiates manual If dispatched to pull HPCl Fuses, activate containment isolation at E remote using TRG 20: Console.

FW24 PULL HPCl FUSES, PULL, 3:OO min If directed, injects with delay. CondensatelFW system.

After the 3 : O O minute time delay, remote If directed, pulls HPCl fuses.

becomes active. As operator dispatched, ' If directed, starts second CRD REPORT HPCl fuses are pulled. Pump.

If directed establish injection with Core Spray systems.

CT-2.0 Starts Core Spray Pumps Install Core Spray Jumpers NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Throttles open injection valves Using any injection systems directed, establishes injection to maintain 3 ERVs open and RPV pressure at least 72 psig above torus pressure.

I T ERMI NATION CRITERIA RPV Flooding conditions are met.

Containment Spray initiated and secured when DWP drops below 3.5 psig.

EVENT 9 SRO Classification SRO PO-I 1.o Classify the event as SAE 2.1.2, RPV Flooding is required.

NRC Scenario 1 September 2006

V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA, NRC Exam VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events Unit 2 Loss of Steam Seals March 2006 B. Commitments

1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED

n06scenl t e s t . b a t c h s c e n a r i o 1 f i l e c r e a t e d 7/11/06 A UPDATED 7/20 TO ADD RROID MALFUNCTION, NEEDED AN ADDITIONAL EVENT.

A UPDATED 7 / 2 1 CHANGED R R O l D TO RROgC BECAUSE I T I S A BETTER EVALUATION EVENT.

A UPDATED 8/9 Added FWOZC, NEEDED A SECOND SRO T S AND T H I S I S H P C I COMPONENT.

A UPDATED 8 / 2 1 Based on t e s t r u n w i t h OpS, on 8/18/06.

A UPDATED 9/18 Based on v a l i d a t i o n r u n w i t h Ops. Sequence i s s u e s .

A t h i s can be used t o i l l u s t r a t e how t h e more common t y p e s o f s i m u l a t o r e v e n t s can be e n t e r e d A e n t e r " b a t n 0 6 s c e n l . b a t " i n command l i n e t o open, w i t h i n t h e C I t o be used f o r scenari 0.

b a s i c s y n t a x i s i m f m a l f ( t r i g g e r d e l a y ) v a l u e ramp t i m e i n i t i a l v a l u e as needed A (1 0 ) means manual t r i g g e r 1 w i t h 0 d e l a y (Boolean)

A (3 10) 1 means manual t r i g g e r 3 w i t h 10 sec d e l a y and VALUE i s 1 d e l a y ( I n t e g e r )

A (1 0) 50 1:OO means manual t r i g g e r 1 w i t h 0 d e l a y ( V a r i a b l e - A n o l a g )

trigger-delay-value-ramp-time-in1 t i a l v a l u e A (0 0) means manual t r i g g e r 0 w i t h 0 d e l a y v a l u e 1 ( A n n u n c i a t o r as I n t e g e r 1 c r y w o l f 2 i s o f f i m f as m a l f u n c t i o n )

A r e s e t t o I C 236 I C - 2 0 w i t h MPR i n s e r v i c e p e r ~ 1 - O P - 3 1 Power a t 90%

Arst 236 AEvents a r e sequenced so t h a t p l a n t i s a t reduced power when r r 2 7 i s i n i t a i t e d . T h i s prevents h i g h water l e v e l t r i p s Adue t o t h e r a p i d d r o p i n r e c i r c f l o w .

AEVENT 1 FEEDWATER BOOSTER PUMP T R I P 13 i m f fwO2c (1 0)

AEVENT 2 Transfer Pressure c o n t r o l TO EPR N 1 - O P - 3 1 AEVENT 3 DRYWELL H I G H PRESSURE TRANSMITTER F A I L LOW 201.2-476A i r n f rp20b (2 0)

AEVENT 4 R E C I R C PUMP 1 3 MG SLOT TEMPERATURES R I S E .

/\EVENT 5 STEAM SEAL REGULATOR FAILURE CAUSES DEGRADING SEAL HEADER PRESSURE A m s 0 5 i s on a t r i g g e r 3 o n l y t o p r e v e n t i t s ' unexpected a c t u a t i o n e a r l i e r t h a n intended.

i m f r r 0 9 c (3 0) 100 1O:OO i m f ms05 (3 0)

AEVENT 6 R E C I R C MASTER CONTROLLER F A I L S LOW CAUSES RESTRICTED ZONE ENTRY i r n f r r 2 7 (4 0 )

AEVENT 7 STEAM SEAL BYPASS F A I L S CLOSED i o r 2 s 5 d i 1 7 1 ( 5 0 ) on i o r 2s5di172 ( 5 0 ) o f f AEVENT 8 STEAM LEAK I N DRYWELL AEVENT 9 DRYWELL H I G H PRESSURE TRANSMITTER F A I L LOW 201.2-476C

/ \ I n i t i a t e d upon manual scram, mode s w i t c h t o shutdown AAssign c o n d i t i o n o f Event T r i g g e r 6 and 7 t r u e when Mode s w i t c h i s p l a c e d i n SHUTDOWN t r g s e t 6 " z d r p s t d n = = 1" t r g s e t 7 " z d r p s t d n = = 1" AAssign an i t e m t o be i n t i a t e d when c o n d i t i o n o f t r i g g e r 5 and 6 becomes t r u e t r g 6 " i m f rp26b (6 0 ) "

t r g 7 " i m f ms04 (7 4:OO) 20 1O:OO" AIf crew does n o t scram a f t e r t r i p p i n g t u r b i n e , i n s e r t s p u r i o u s scram Page 1

n06scenl A I f crew scrams manually a f t e r t r i p p i n g t u r b i n e , t h i s i s n o t necessary.

i m f rp03 (8 0 )

APULL H P C I FUSES FU8/FU9 i r f fw24 (20 3:OO) pull A h h h h h A A A A A h h A A C O N D I T I O N A L EVENT

~~~~~~~~hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AThese Event t r i q_q_ e r s do n o t show on IS summary w i t h s c e n a r i o loaded u n t i l t h e y become TRUE Acheck Extreme ACE t r i m e r ( D i s t o l i c o n ) t o v e r i f y t h e c o n d t i o n shows UD i n t h e event a c t i o n column t o - e n s u r e t r i g g e r loaded Aonly one e v e n t can be p l a c e d on a t r i g g e r f o r p r o p e r f u n c t i o n o f t r g AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAA AEVENT 10 RPV LEVEL INSTRUMENT REFERENCE LEG FLASHING AAssign c o n d i t i o n o f Event T r i g g e r 8 t r u e when D r y w e l l A i r temperature exceeds 240 F t r g s e t 9 "pctdwai r >240" t r g 9 " i m f r r 9 9 a (9 0)"

AAssign c o n d i t i o n of Event T r i g g e r 9 t r u e when Drywe11 A i r temperature exceeds 240 F t r g s e r 10 "pctdwai r >240" t r g 10 " i m f r r 8 7 (10 0)"

Aend o f s e t u p Page 2

Initial ATTACHMENT 17: AUTO or MANUAL INITIATION of CONT SPRAY Sheet 1 o f 4 1.o PURPOSE (C2) To confirm proper alignment of Containment Spray System after Automatic OR Manual initiation for App J Water Seal.

To provide alternate Torus Cooling through Cont Spray, spray mode, when normal lineup can NOT be established due to Cont Spray operation in accordance with EOP(s)/SAP(s).

2.0 PROCEDURE 2.1 When directed by EOP's to spray the Containment for Pressure or Temperature Control, then secure Containment Sprays when Drywell Pressure drops below 3.5 psig.

OR When directed by EOP's/SAP's to spray the Containment for Combustible Gas Control (EOP-4.2, SAP-2) or Primary Containment Flooding (SAP-I), Then secure Containment Sprays before Drywell pressure reaches 0 psig.

2.1.I Verify started, Containment Spray Pump 111 or 122.............................................................

2.1.2 Verify started, at least one of the other three Containment Spray Pumps .............................

2.1.3 IF 80-1 18 is open for Torus Cooling, THEN 1. Open Containment Spray Discharge IV for the Containment Spray Loop@) in Torus Cooling mode. ........................................................

2. Close 80-1 18,..............................................................................................

3. Verify open 80-40 and 80-45.......................................................................

4. IF EDG Loading permits.

THEN Start RAW Water pumps associated with running Containment Spray Pumps. .....................................................................................

2.1.4 IF 80-40 fails closed, THEN Open 80-44. ............................................................................................................

NIA, 80-40 did not fail closed .................................................................................................

Page 49 N1-EOP-l Rev 06

Initial ATTACHMENT 17(Cont)

Sheet 2 of 4 2.1.5 IF 80-45 fails closed, THEN Open 80-41..............................................................................................................

NIA, 80-45 did not fail closed.................................................................................................

2.1.6 IF 80-118 has failed open, AND Diesel loading permits, THEN Start all available Containment Spray pumps ...........................................................

2.1.7 IF Torus Cooling is requiredAND Emergency DieselGeneratorloading permitted THEN Start All available Containment Spray Rawwater Pumps..........................................

w

(-) NIA, Torus cooling not required......................................................................................

2.2 To supply Containment Spray Sparger from RawWater perform the following:

0 Loop 1I (RAW WATER PUMP 121) refer to Step 2.3 ..............................................

0 Loop 12, (RAW WATER PUMP 112), refer to Step 2.4 .............................................

IF Containment Spray RAW Water was used to spray the containment AND is no longer requiredto lower containment pressure AND Directedby the SM or CRS THEN Returnsystem to normalstandby lineup per N1-OP-14, Section G, DrainingContainmentSpray RAW Water HeatExchanger Tube and Shell side for the selected ContainmentSpray Loop selected ...........................

2.4 Supply Raw Water to Containment Spray Loop I 1 as follows:

2.4.1 Place CONT SPRAY RAW WTR 121 INTERTIEcontrol switch to CNT SPR 111 position:

a. Verify closed 93-26, DIS VLV 111 ............................................................................

b. Verify open 93-73, CNT SPR 121.............................................................................

Page 50 N l-EOP-l Rev 06

Initial ATTACHMENT 17(Cont)

Sheet 3 of 4 2.4.2 Unlock and close 93-13, BV-121 CONT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP DISCHARGE (screenhouse)..................................................................................................

2.4.3 Throttle open 93-13, 4-6 turns ...............................................................................................

2.4.4 Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP 121 .....................................................

2.4.5 WHILE maintaining CSRW Pump 121 motor amps less than 76 amps, throttle 93-13 as necessary to maximize flow rate ............................................................................................

2.4.6 IF Containment Spray RAW Water was used to spray the containment AND is no longer required to lower containment pressure AND Directed by the SM or CRS THEN 1. Shutdown SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP 121.....................................................

2. Open 93-13, BV-121 CONT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP DISCHARGE (screenhouse)....................................................................................................

3. Return system to normal standby lineup per N1-OP-14, Section G, Draining Containment Spray RAW Water Heat Exchanger Tube and Shell side for the selected Containment Spray Loop selected ...........................

2.4 Supplv raw water to Containment Sprav Loop 12 as follows:

2.4.1 Place CONT SPRAY RAW WTR 112 INTERTIE control switch to CNT SPR 122 position:

a. Verify closed 93-28, DIS VLV 122 .............................................................................

b. Verify open 93-72, CNT SPR 122 .............................................................................

2.4.2 Unlock and close 93-16, BV-112 CONT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP DISCHARGE (Screenhouse) .................................................................................................

2.4.3 Throttle open 93-16, 4-6 turns ...............................................................................................

2.4.4 Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP 112 .....................................................

2.4.5 WHILE maintaining CSRW Pump 112 motor amps less than 76 amps, throttle 93-16 as necessary to maximize flow rate.......................................................................................

Page 51 N1-EOP-l Rev 06

Initial ATTACHMENT 17(Cont)

Sheet 4 of 4 2.4.6 IF Containment Spray RAW Water was used to spray the containment AND Is no longer required to lower containment pressure AND Directed by the SM or CRS THEN 1, Shutdown SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP 112 .....................................................

2. Open 93-16, BV-112 CONT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP DISCHARGE (screenhouse). ....................................................................................................

3. Return system to normal standby lineup per N1-OP-14, Section G, Draining Containment Spray RAW Water Heat Exchanger Tube and Shell side for the selected Containment Spray Loop selected ...........................

Page 52 N1-EOP-1 Rev 06

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: NMPI Scenario No.: NRC 2 Op-Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators Initial Conditions: IC20 100% Reactor Power Turnover: Complete NI-ST-Q4 Section 8.2.39-13R, 39-14R,05-04R, and 05-12 testing is done. Test Steam IVs39-10R and 39-08R. LP Pump 12 is out of service since 0600 today. TS LCO 3.1.2 Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 Crew performs N1-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valve Operability Test for EC Loop 12 IVs per Section 8.2.

~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~

2 ECO9B C (TS Steam IV 39-08R fails to fully close during testing. Valve must be SRO) declared inoperable and isolated per Tech Spec 3.2.7. EC Loop 12 now remains inop and unavailable when the steam line is isolated (TS 3.1.3.b, 7 day) 3 AD05 ERVl I 1 inadvertently opens. The crew enters SOP-I .4. An emergency power reduction to 85% is performed. The ERV will close after the fuses are pulled. Tech Spec 3.1.5 must be entered because the valve is now inoperable. TS 3.2.9 may also require entry.

4 RR28 Recirc Flow Master Controller fails as-is, preventing the power reduction by normal methods. The crew will operate individual Recirc Flow controls at F panel or insert cram rods to complete the emergency power reduction.

5 ECOGA C (BOP) EC 11 tube leak (50% with 5 minute ramp time). EC 11 isolation is required. Both EC loops are now inoperable. Tech Spec 3.1.3 specification e now applies and an orderly shutdown is required.

6 MS12 M (ALL) A steam leak develops in the turbine building condenser area with severity at 15%. Turbine Vibration rises following the load TU02 reduction. The crew will initiate a manual scram due to degraded plant conditions or when turbine bearing vibration exceeds 12 mils.

7 RD33 C (ALL) ATWS. Following the scram control rods will not fully insert and power will remain within turbine bypass valve capability, at about RP09 30%. The MSIVs will close on high temperature and heat will be MSOI rejected to the torus.

8 RD35B I c(Ro) I Control Rod Drive Pump 12 trips during the scram transient.

Starting CRD Pump 11 is necessary for driving control rods.

9 CTOIA C (BOP) Containment Spray Pump 111 trips, after control rods are fully inserted. Pump is initially running in the Torus Cooling mode. Since Torus temperature is still high due to heat added during the event, the system must be realigned to start an alternate Containment Spray Pump.

10 Event is classified as SAE 2.2.2 10/21I2006 6:39:44 AM 3 of 8 NRC Exam Draft Exam Submittal

TARG ET Q UANTITAT1VE ATT R IBUTES ACTUAL (PER SCENARIO: SEE SECTION D.5.d) ATTRl BUTES Total Malfunction Count:

-1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 6 Major is not included in this Events 3,4,5,7,8,9 count.

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 Event 8 CRD Pump Trip Event 9 Abnormal Events Count:

Containment Sprav Pump Trip Does not include the SRO TS

3. Abnormal events (2-4) 2 related events. These are Event 3 SOP-I .4 Event 5 EC Tube Leak considered separately.

4. Major transients (1 -2) 1 Event 6 Turbine High Vibration and Steam SRO TS Events Leak into the Turbine building Event 2 , 3 and 5 are SRO Tech

5. EOPs enteredlrequiring substantive 1 Spec evaluation events.

actions (1-2)

EOP-4 Primary Containment

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive 1 actions (0-2)

EOP-3 Failure To Scram

7. Critical tasks (2-3) 3 CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS:

CT-1.O Maintain below HCTL CT-2.0 Terminate and prevent RPV injection during ATWS.

CT-3.0 Restore and maintain RPV water level above -109 inches.

10/21/ZOO6 6:39:44 AM 4 of 8 NRC Exam Draft Exam Submittal

NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 2 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 35 FAILURE TO SCRAM PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 7/18/06 VAL1DATED M. Meier, L. Blum, J. Tsardakas DATE 9/18/06 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE Ay+/h+

0PERATlONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CON FI GURAT10N CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Length: 90 minutes Initial Power Level: loo%, above the 100% Rod Line The crew assumes the shift with the plant operating at rated conditions and Containment Spray Pump 122 removed from service for maintenance. The crew will perform N1-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test, on the Emergency Condenser (EC) Loop 12 Isolation Valves (IVs) per Section 8.2. This test consists of stoke time tests for EC Steam Isolation Valves. A valve failure will result in entry into Tech Specs for the failed coolant and containment isolation valve When the surveillance on the EC Loop 12 IVs is addressed, the crew will respond to an inadvertent opening of an ERV. The crew will perform an emergency power reduction to about 85%. A failure of the Master Recirc Flow Controller will require the crew to either take manual control of the pump MA stations or insert the cram rods to complete the power reduction. The ERV will be closed when the crew pulls the control power fuses. The SRO must also assess the Tech Spec impact of the inoperable ERV.

ECI 1 vent radiation monitor alarms and the crew determines that a tube leak exists, based on confirmed alarms and rising shell water level. The crew will isolate ECI 1 to stop the release.

The SRO reviews Tech Specs and determines with ECI 1 inoperable Tech Spec 3.1.3.b applies. However, with a confirmed EC Tube Leak a plant shutdown is required. Additionally both EC are now inoperable and unavailable for pressure control.

Following the power reduction, turbine vibration will rise and steam leak in the turbine building develops. These reach a severity level that requires a turbine trip and a reactor scram.

When the crew inserts a reactor scram, many control rods fail to insert and power remains at 30-45% power. Because of the steam leak into the turbine building, the main condenser will NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

only be available as a heat sink for a short period of time after the scram before the MSlVs are closed, on high steam tunnel temperature. The crew will terminate and prevent injection to lower reactor water level and suppress reactor power. When the main condenser is lost as a heat sink, the crew will maintain reactor pressure using the ERVs and will place torus cooling in service. Because of the rising torus water temperature the crew will inject Liquid Poison (LP).

The SRO will direct the actions of EOP-3 and EOP-4 including alternate control rod insertion per EOP-3.1. The crew will be able to insert control rods, after starting a CRD pump, using the Reactor Manual Control System (RMCS) and manual reactor scrams will be successful in inserting the control rods. The SRO will be required to reduce the pressure control band to remain within the heat capacity temperature limit. The loss of both Emergency Condensers adds additional heat to the torus due to more frequent operation of the ERVs to control reactor pressure. After all rods are inserted, the Containment Spray Pump operating in Torus Cooling mode trips. The system must be realigned and an alternate pump started to continue Torus Cooling.

Major Procedures:

EAL Classification: SITE AREA EMERGENCY 2.2.2 Termination Criteria: All control rods inserted, EOP-3 exited, EOP-2 entered and crew directed to restore reactor water level restored to 53-95 inches.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

~ ~-

SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-20 or equivalent LP Pump 12 and Containment Spray 122 are out of service.

6 . Presets/Function Key Assignments

1. Malfunctions:

See bat file n06scen2.bat

2. Remotes:

3. Overrides:

a. None

4. Annunciators:

a. None C. Equipment Out of Service

1. Liquid Poison Pump 12 (reference tag taped near keylock switch)

2. Containment Spray Pump 122 (red clearance applied to pump cs, in PTL)

D. Support Documentation

1. Working copy of Nl-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test, for EC Loop 12 IVs per Section 8.2. Initial complete so that 39-10R is next valve to be tested.

E. Miscellaneous

1. Update Divisional Status Board (LP 12 and Cnt Sp 122)

2. Protected Equipment

a. Containment Spray Pumps 111 112

b. Core Spray Pumps 11 1 112

c. EDGl02 d . EVENT TRIGGERSlCOMPOSITES

a. trgset 9 "zdrpstdn== 1" Mode Switch in Shutdown NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

0 Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Lit Control Room Annunciators 0 Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)

(SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:

0 Reactor Power = 100% 0 Loadline = 103%

0 122 Containment Spray Pump 00s for repair. TS 3.3.7.b (day 1 of 15 day LCO).

0 Complete N1-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test, for EC Loop 12 IVs per Section 8.2, starting at 8.2.5 for 39-IOR.

Liquid Poison Pump 12 is out of service for motor repairs. TS 3.1.2.b (day 1 of 7 day LCO).

PART 111: RemarkslPlanned Evolutions:

Maintenance continues to work on Containment Smav Pumo # I 12 PART IV: To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:

0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE)

Shift Crew Composition (SMICRS)

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

I Scenario ID#

4STRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)

What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other 0ptions?

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:

CT-1.O Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power generation and Torus water temperature approaching 11O'F, the crew will utilize Boron injection, Torus cooling, control rod insertion and RPV pressure control to preclude violation of the HCTL in accordance with EOP-3.

CT-2.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power above 6% or unknown and RPV water level above -41 jnches, terminate and prevent all injection except Boron and CRD in accordance with EOP-1, Att. 24.

CT-3.0 d Given a failure of the reactor to scram w' h power above 6% AND RPV level above -84 inches AND ERVs open AND torus water temperature above 1IOOF, the crew will terminate and prevent injection and restore injection to restore and maintain water level above -109 inches, when allowed by EOP-3.

CT-4.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with control rods NOT inserted to at least position 04 and the reactor will not stay shutdown without boron, the crew will insert all control rods to at least position 04 per EOP-3.1, Alternate Control Rod Insertion.

B. Performance Objectives:

PO-I .O Given a quarterly surveillance for Reactor Coolant Isolation Valves, the crew will recognize the failure of a valve to operate correctly in accordance withN 1-ST-Q4.

PO-2.0 Given a valid EC vent radiation monitor alarm, the crew will respond in accordance with the ARPs, N1-OP-I 3.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

PO-3.0 Given the plant with a stuck open ERV, the crew will implement SOP-I .4 and close the ERV before torus temperature reaches 1 10°F.

PO-4.0 Given the plant requiring an emergency power reduction and the master flow controller failed as-is, the crew will perform the power reduction by operating individual pump MA stations in manual in accordance with N1-SOP-I .4 PO-5.0 Given the plant with indications of an Emergency Condenser Tube Leak, the crew will isolate the affected Emergency Condenser in accordance with ARP and normal operating procedures.

PO-6.0 Given the plant with a steam leak in the Turbine Building the crew will initiate a manual scram in accordance with N1-SOP-1.

PO-7.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power generation the crew will insert control rods using the RMCS and repetitive scrams in accordance with N1-EOP-3 and N1-EOP-3.1.

PO-8.0 Given an ATWS condition accompanied by a loss of the Main Condenser, the crew will recognize the challenge to HCTL and Inject liquid poison in accordance with N1-OP-12 PO-9.0 Given the plant with elevated torus water temperature AND a trip of the operating Containment Spray Pump, the crew will start an alternate pump in torus cooling per EOP-4 and EOP-1 Attachment 16.

PO-I 0.0 Given events that meet the criteria for emergency classification, the SRO will classify the event per EPP-EPIP-01 EAL Matrix.

PO-I 1.O Given the plant or plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required action slnotif ications .

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Crew 0 Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.

Event IPerform Surveillance Surveillance test continues Direct BOP to complete Nl-ST-Q4, PO-I .o Section 8.2.

Per Nl-ST-Q4, 4.4.e, the valve must be Acknowledge 39-08R has dual declared inoperable immediately. No retest is indication when performing close to open stroke test and contact FIN allowed. Team or maintenance.

Determine isolation valve is inoperable and enter tech Spec 3.2.7 and requirement to isolate the penetration using 39-1OR Determine TS 3.1.3.b remains effective, since EC Loop 12 will be isolated.

BOP Perform the test, starting at step 8.2.5 0 Obtain SRO permission to continue N1-ST-Q4, Section 8.2.

Annunciators F1-3-2 RPS CH 11 MAIN Cycle 39-10R, EC STEAM STEAM ISOLATION and F4-3-7 RPS CH 12 ISOLATION VALVE 121, AND:

MAIN STEAM ISOLATION are expected to actuate when EC valves 39-?OR and 39-08R are stroked closed.

Test 39-10R Record open to close stroke time NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

I T R U C T O R ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE 0PERAT0R ACT IONS for 39-10R. (224.3 and 532.8 sec).

[ 538 sec for TS] . (221.5 and 535.8 sec for LST}

0 Record close to open stroke time for 39-10R. (225.4 and 534.3 sec) .

(222.4 and 537.4 sec for LST}

Independent verification may be obtained later, 0 Obtains Independent verification in valve open position.

due to crew resources.

Test 39-08R3,step 8.2.6 0 Record open to close stroke time for 39-08R. (217.0 and 523.0 sec).

[ 538 sec for TS] . (215.0 and 525.0 sec for LST}

EVENT 2 39-08R valve Fails to Fully Close 0 Recognize dual indication for 39-08R and valve appears to have not fully closed.

PO-I I.o 0 Stops the test to notify SRO of Preset malfunction ECO9B failed component.

When 39-08R is cycled in the closed direction, 0 May dispatch operator to determine condition of valve the red light remains on. The valve must be locally.

declared inoperable and no retesting is 0 If directed, closes39-10R to a110wed. isolate the line to comply with Tech Role Play: If sent to determine condition of 39- Specs.

08R, report valve appears to be about half open.

SRO Acknowledges report of 39-08R 39-08R is identified as a coolant system failure to indicate full closed.

isolation valve in NIP-DES-04 List of Recognize EC Loop 12 must now Controlled Lists, Attachment 6 Nine Mile Point remain inoperable (3.1.3.b)

Unit I Reactor Coolant System Isolation Recognize valve is a "Reactor NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Valves. These are also Primary Containment Coolant System Isolation Valve.

Isolation Valves, per the attachment table Note Enter Tech Spec 3.2.7

9. specification b. A valve in the line must be closed to comply with b. If not closed, then specification c requires a normal orderly shutdown initiated within one hour.

Tech Spec 3.2.7 and per specification b, in Directs line isolated by closing 39-1OR or initiates a normal orderly the event that any isolation valve becomes shutdown.

inoperable the system shall be considered May direct EC removed from operable provided at least one valve in each service per N1-OP-13 H.17.2 line having an inoperable valve is in the mode Refer to Tech Spec 3.3.4, since corresponding to the isolated condition. these valves are identified as PC Isolation Valves, in NIP-DES-04 note.

Tech Spec 3.3.4 requires that one valve in the line be closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Event 3 E R V I I I opens PO-3.0 Event 4 RECIRC MASTER CONTROLLER FAILS AS-IS During Emergency Power Reduction PO-4.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by the lead evaluator activate SRO malfunction using TRG 3 Directs entry into SOP-I .4 IF average torus temperature AD05 ERVI 11 INADVERTENTLY OPENS approaches 11OOF, THEN prior to RR28 RECIRC MASTER CONTROLLER reaching 1 10°F, directs a reactor FAILS AS-IS NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERAT0R ACT10NS scram Electromatic Relief Valve ERV111 opens. Directs emergency power ERVI 1 I red pilot and red ERV1 11 accoustic reduction to approximately 85%

monitor light are lit. Blue continuity light per SOP-I .I extinguishes. Generator MWe lowers as MHC Declares ERV inoperable and regulating system responds to the drop in RPV enters TS 3.1 5 . Specification a pressure. states that all six solenoid actuated F2-4-1 MAIN STM LINE ELECTROMATIC pressure relief valves shall be RELIEF VALVE OPEN operable. Specification b states F1-4-8 STEAM LINE DETECTION SYS FLOW that if a is not met be 110 psig or OFF NORM less within ten hours.

When lowering power with the Master Recirc Flow Controller, no change in core flow or IF ERV fuses are pulled at JB reactor power occurs because the controller is Panel 11 and 12 on RB 237 then failed %s-is. Power can be reduced by either Tech Spec 3.2.9 should be taking control of the pump individual MA referenced. The pressure relief stations at F Panel or by inserting cram rods. function is lost for the effected valve. The spec is still met with the other five ERVs able to perform the pressure relief function.

If Torus water temperature exceeds 85OF, enters EOP-4 0 Directs Containment Spray locked out 0 Directs Torus Cooling placed in service EOP-1 Attachment 16.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

$d INSTRUCTOR ACT1ONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS ROLE PLAYS: rhese actions are from SOP-1.4 When dispatched to Aux Control Room as 10 NAO, report ERVI 1Iacoustic monitoring 7 Monitors Reactor power, level, indicates flow through ERVI 11. pressure and torus water As NAO in Aux Control Room if asked to report temperature status of ERV AFTER FUSES ARE PULLED, II When directed, performs report ERV is closed based on Acoustic Monitoring. emergency power reduction per SOP1 . I c3 Reports failure of MASTER RECIRC FLOW CONTROLLER to reduce flow Takes manual control of Recirc Pumps at F Panel to individually lower Recirc Flow, if directed.

Inserts cram rods. if directed.

BOP Recognize and report ERV open Enter and execute SOP-1.4 IF average torus temperature approaches 11OOF, THEN prior to reaching 11OOF, scrams the reactor, as directed by SRO CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Determines which ERV is open Informs SRO of required If dispatched and directed to pull ERV fuses on RB237 activate REMOTE using TRG 4: emergency power reduction Perform one or all of the following ADO1 ERV 1 1 1 FUSES, Pull 2:OO minute time delay. to attempt to close the stuck open After time delay and remote is active, report ERV:

fuses pulled for ERVI 11 in the reactor building.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

I m U C T O R ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Depress ADS Timer Reset If directed to reset the Acoustic monitor pushbuttons.

channels in the Aux Control Room activate REMOTE using TRG 5: 0 Cycle control switch for ERV 111.

AD07 ACOUSTIC MONITOR ALM RESET Report acoustic monitor reset, when 0 Pull control power fuses in F appropriate .

Panel for ERVI 11 (Detail 1.4-1)

When fuses are pulled the ERV closes. Fuses 0 Dispatch an operator to JB are located inside F Panel. Electrical Safety Panel 11 and 12 on RB 237 to PPE is needed to enter panel and pull the fuses. F15 6A POS F30 6A NEG are the pull appropriate control power correct fuses for ERVI 11. Pulling these fuses fuses at local cabinet (Detail will close the ERV, 1.4-2).

When fuses are pulled, the normal control IF ERV closes THEN reset the room light indication is lost. When the ERV Accoustic Monitor.

closes, generator MWe rises. The ERV position is confirmed to be closed from the Aux IF ERV remains open THEN scram Control Room using Acoustic Monitoring.

per SOP-I (Not expected to scram)

When ERV closes, report condition to SRO.

NOTE: Dispatches operator to Aux Control These actions are directed and performed Room Panel 1S49 to perform the concurrently with above actions to close the ERV, per the SOP. following:

Check for Red Hi-Alarm light lit.

Compare meter reading for alarming channel to other channels.

Select channel to audio monitor.

Monitor and maintain Torus water NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

m U C T O R ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS temperature as follows:

Initiate Torus Cooling per Attachment 2 (this procedure).

Record Torus water temperature every five minutes per N 1-ST-V5 BOP If directed, lockout Containment Spray Pumps by placing pump switches in PTL 0 If directed, starts Torus Cooling per Attachment 16 Torus Cooling shall be placed in service within 15 minutes of Torus temperature 285°F 0 Close CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:

0 111; 80-45 112 or 121; 80-40 and 80-45 0 122; 80-40 Verify closed 80-1 15, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 12 Verify closed 80-1 14, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 11 0 Verify closed Cont Spray Discharge IV using keylock switch for selected loop:

0 111;80-16 0 112; 80-36 NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERAT0R ACT10NS 121;80-15 122; 80-35 7 Verify open CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:

111; 80-40 112; 80-44 0 121;80-41 0 122; 80-45 11 Fully open 80-1 18, CONT SPRAY TEST TO TORUS FCV 7 Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP in selected loop.

I Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP in selected loop.

WHEN torus water reaches desired temperature stop Containment Spray pump.

Stop all operating Raw Water Pumps If desired, return system to standby per N1-OP-14.

Report status to SRO.

Event 5 EC 11 Tube Leak PO-5.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: SRO When directed by the lead evaluator, insert Acknowledge report K1-1-2, EMER malfunction by activating TRG 6: COND VENT 11 RAD MONITOR, in alarm.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS ECOGA, Emergency Condenser Tube Leak Direct actions of K1-1-2, EMER 111 (50%; ramp 5:OO minutes) COND VENT 11 RAD MONITOR.

Diagnose E C I 1 tube leak (rising K1-1-2, MER COND VENT I 1 RAD EC vent radiation levels and rising M 0N I TOR, ala rms . EC water level).

EMERG COND RMON 1 1 1 and EMERG COND RMON 112 on J panel in alarm and Direct EC I 1 be isolated.

radiation levels rising.

Assess EPIP-EPP-01, Attachment NOTE: If E C I I is not isolated based on 1, EAL Matrix and determine the confirmed radiation levels and rising shell effluent monitoring threshold has water level, then MER COND I 11-1 12 NOT been reached by referencing LEVEL HIGH-LOW, will alarm on high level in Category 5.1 .I, 5.1.2, and Table 3.

approximately five (5) minutes. (May evaluate later, due to crew resource limitations).

ROLE PLAYS: Determine that with E C I 1 isolated (inoperable) Tech Spec 3.1.3.b If asked as Chemistry to perform sampling applies.

and/or EC Effluent Dose Assessment, acknowledge the request. With EC 12 already isolated, then Tech Spec 3.1.3 specification e If informed of the EC tube leak, acknowledge applies. A normal orderly shutdown the report. must be initiated within one hour.

IF asked as RP to evaluate dose rates on 340 el RB, acknowledge the report.

Request Chemistry to perform sampling AND EC Effluent Dose Assessment IF an EC tube leak is confirmed perform shutdown actions in accordance N1-OP-13 H.lO.O Brief crew on event impact.

Notifies Ops Management of required plant shutdown.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR A C i I U N S -

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RATOR ACT10NS BOP Recognize/report K1-1-2, EMER COND VENT 11 RAD MONITOR, in alarm.

Recognize/report rising water level in ECI 1.

Diagnose ECI 1 tube leak (rising EC vent radiation levels and rising EC water level).

Acknowledge direction to perform actions of K1-1-2.

These actions are from K1-1-2 Confirm computer points E478 and E 480 in alarm Recognize/report EMERG COND RMON 111 and EMERG COND RMON 112 on J panel in alarm and radiation levels rising.

Inform SRO to assess effluent dose.

With SRO concurrence, isolate ECI 1, as follows Close 39-07RI EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 112 0 Close 39-09R, EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 111 Close 39-05, EMERG CNDSR COND RET ISOLATION VALVE 11 Close 39-11R, EMERG CNDSR STM SUPPLY DRAIN IV 111 NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Close 39-12R7EMERG CNDSR STM SUPPLY DRAIN IV 112 Close 05-01R, EMERG COND VENT ISOLATION VALVE 11I Close 05-1 I,EMERG COND VENT ISOLATION VALVE 112 Reference N1-OP-13, H.lO.O IF an EC l u b e Leak is confirmed, THEN initiate normal shutdown in accordance with N1-OP-43C.

NOTE: WHEN the next event is initiated (Turbine Building Steam Leak), the crew is likely to direct a manual scram due to degraded plant conditions. IF the crew does not manually scram, the high turbine vibration conditions will result in procedure required trip of turbine and scram.

Event 6 Steam Leakage Into the Turbine Building and Turbine Vibration Rises PO-6.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by the lead evaluator, insert malfunction by activating TRG 7:

MS12 Steam line Rupture In TB Condenser SRO Area (15% 4:OO minute ramp time)

Acknowledges reports and directs TU02, Main Turbine High Vibration Bearing action for steam leak.

5 and #6 (75% 8:OO minute ramp time).

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

rmSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERAT0R ACT10NS If warranted, acknowledge report vibration is rising; 12 mils require Steam leakage into Turbine Building causes MAIN FIRE PANEL 2-1 TURB BLDG 261 immediate removal of the turbine LOCAL PANEL NO1 FIRE alarm to actuate. from service.

H1-4-8 AREA RADIATION MONITORS (E495 Direct Turbine Building local area TB261 CP AREA) alarms. evacuation per EPP-5.

L1-3-3 CONTINUOUS AIR RAD MONITOR Direct a reactor scram and entry (F329 TB NGAIR) alarms. into SOP-1, Reactor Scram. Due to steam leak or turbine vibration.

Direct a turbine trip and entry into SOP-31 .I,Turbine Trip, if vibration reaches 12 mils.

IF the reactor is no tripped and vibration continues to rise, then:

A2-3-5, TURBINE SUPERVISORY SYSTEM, in alarm.

Computer points 6444 (BRG #5) and 6445 (BRG #6) in alarm ROLE PLAYS:

If asked as maintenance or WEC to investigate, acknowledge the request.

If reports to management personnel are received, acknowledge the reports.

EVENT 7 FAILURE TO SCRAM -RO PO-7.0 When directed, initiates a manual CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: scram and implements SOP-1 Verify TRG 8 actuates the following Reactor Scram.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RATOR ACT10NS malfunction AFTER 3 : O O minute delay, when Provides Scram Report Mode Switch is placed in SHUTDOWN: Reduce RECIRC MASTER flow 25 MSOI STEAM LINE RUPTURE OUTSIDE to 43 Mlbm/hr PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (8 3:OO) 2 1 :00 Perform SOP-I Scram Verification (2% with 1:00 ramp, 3 minutes after MS to SD) steps Other malfunctions activated NOW by Mode Confirm all rods inserted to Switch: position 04 or beyond using Full Verify TRG 9, RD35B CRD Pump 12 trip Core Display.

after 1:00 minute delay. Report ALL RODS ARE NOT FULL IN If ALL RODS IN cannot be confirmed THEN continue and confirm when scram is reset.

When the reactor is scrammed a//rods DO Verify turbine and generator NOT fully insert due to hydraulic lock of the tripped.

Scram Discharge Volume (SDV). Power Maintain RPV pressure below remains about 30%-45%, but is within Bypass 1080 psig using one or more of the Valve (BPV) capability (of 45%). Pressure is following (unless given other controlled by the BPVs, until the MSlVs direction from EOP-2):

eventually close due to high steam tunnel Turbine Bypass Valves temperature from the steam leak. Emergency Condensers 0 ERVs Others (Not expected)

BOP Respond to Fire alarms and radiation alarms At Fire Panel, closes Turbine NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

IN> I KUL I U K HL I IUI\S/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERAT0R ACT10NS Building Roof Vents.

If directed, evacuates the Turbine Building.

Recognize/report vibration is rising; 12 mils require immediate removal of the turbine from service.

SRO ACTIONS WITH FAILURE TO SCRAM 3 Acknowledge report control rods failed to insert (ATWS).

3 Enter EOP-2, RPV Control on power above 6% and scram required. THEN exit and go to EOP-3, Failure to Scram because all rods are not inserted to at least 04.

Enter and execute EOP-4, Primary Containment Control when torus temp reaches 85°F These are EOP-2, RPV CONTROL actions Answer all rods in to at least 04 NO.

Answer will the reactor stay shutdown without boron NO.

SRO These are EOP-3, FAILURE TO NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SCRAM actions Direct Bypass ADS Direct prevent Core Spray injection per EOP-1, Attachment 4.

'hese are EOP-3 Level Actions Direct verify containment isolations per SOP-40.2 when RPV level reaches low-low level (+5 inches) or main condenser vacuum reaches 7 in hg.

Direct MSlV jumpers installed per EOP-1, Attachment 2.

When RPV injection is terminated and With reactor power >6% and RPV prevented, RPV water level lowers and level above -41 inches, go to B.

approaches -4 I inches. As level lowers, reactor power lowers and may drop below the APRM downscale setting o f 6%.

Directs terminate and prevent injection using EOP-1, Attachment 24.

Directs level lowered to at least

-41 inches When level drops below -41 inches directs level band -84 to -41 inches.

IF torus temperature is above 1IOOF, let level continue to drop until reactor power <6% RPV level reaches -84 inches all ERVs remain closed with DWP below 3.5 psig.

Direct level band between -1 09 inches and the level it was lowered NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE 0PERATOR ACT1ONS to using Cond/FW and CRD.

Determine WAIT UNTIL 600 gallons boron injected (860 gallons in LP tank) 3 all rods inserted to 04 OR reactor will stay shutdown without boron.

Proceed to WAIT block L-11 and WAITS until 600 gallons boron injected (860 gallons in LP tank).

THEN direct level restored to +53 inches to +95 inches.

These are EOP-3 Power Actions Directs Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.

Directs initiation of ARI.

Directs verify trip of RRPs.

Directs execution of EOP-3.1 CT-I .O Direct LP injection. (Expected to Injecting Liquid poison after torus temperature occur before torus temperature reaches 110°F).

reaches 1 IO OF is still required. This contributes to staying below HCTL.

Record LP tank level:

approximately 1460Gallons.

Direct verification RWCU isolates.

May answer is main condenser available YES but MSlVs are closed due to MSL high temperature. Must answer NO in step Q-13.

These are EOP-3 Pressure actions NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS ECs are NOT available for pressure control Direct pressure band below 1080 due to component malfunctions. psig using ERVs. (800 to 1000 Psig)

CT-I .O SRO is expected to readjust RPVpressure IF torus temperature cannot be maintained below HCTL, THEN band as often as needed to stay below HCTL. maintain RPV pressure below the limit. (OK to exceed 100OFlhr cooldown rate). (Step P-3 override) (CT)

SRO These EOP-4 actions may have already been These EOP-4, PRIMARY directed, if EOP-4 was entered due to earlier CONTAINMENT CONTROL actions scenario events (ERV opening).

Direct lockout of all containment spray pumps TORUS TEMP Direct torus cooling per EOP-1, Attachment 16, to maintain torus temp below 85°F.

Monitor HCTL (FIG M) and reduce reactor pressure band as necessary to stay in GOOD region.

When informed of Containment Spray Pump trip, directs an alternate loop to be placed in service per EOP-1 Attachment 16.

BOP Terminate and prevent injection level BOP NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACT10NS control actions per EOP-1 Attachment 24. Nhen directed terminate and CT-2.0 wevent injection using EOP-1, Utachment 24.

Perform one of the following:

Expected operator response is to close Place FEEDWATER FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE 11 and 12 ISOLATION VALVE 11 and FEEDW ATE R ISOLAT I0N to stop injection, until HPCl fuses are removed. VALVE 12 to CLOSE.

Place FEEDWATER PUMP 11 and FEEDWATER PUMP 12 control switches in PTL.

VALVE CONTROL stations are placed in MAN Select MAN on FW 11 VALVE and dialed to zero so that they remain closed CONTROL and rotate knurled knob full CCW.

when the HPCl fuses are pulled.

Select MAN on FW 12 VALVE CONTROL and rotate knurled knob full CCW.

HPCI fuses are pulled to establish manual Select MAN on FW 13 VALVE injection using the Feedwater Pump discharge CONTROL and rotate knurled knob full CCW.

level control valves.

Direct A 0 to pull FU-8 and FU-9 (HPCI fuses) in Panel IS34.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: Verify closed FEEDWATER PUMP WHEN directed to Pull HPCl Fuses, activate 13 BLOCKING VALVE.

triggerTRG 25 irf fw24 (25) pull Verify FEEDWATER 11 BYPASS VALVE in MAN and at zero.

Verify FEEDWATER 12 BYPASS NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

n\lSTRUC T O R C T I oN SI PLANT RESPONSE OPERAT0 R ACT10NS VALVE in MAN and at zero.

Inform SRO when level reaches target level (-41inches corrected) as directed by SRO.

IF terminating and preventing injection with torus temperature above 1IOOF, THEN inform SRO when power ~ 6 % RPV level reaches TAF (-84 inches).

CT-3.0 When directed establish injection and maintain level between -109 inches and level it was lowered to using CondlFW.

CT-1.O Controls pressure in assigned bands, as directed by SRO to stay below HCTL When re-injecting per EOP-I Attachment 24, BOP THROTTLE INJECTION, BOP injects as follows Perform one of the following:

o REOPEN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE 1Iand FEEDWATER ISOLATIO N VALVE 12 if closed to terminate injection.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

~-

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS RESTART FEEDWATER PUMP 11 and/or FEEDWATER PUMP 12 by placing its control switch in START if placed in PTL to terminate injection.

Adjust FW 11 VALVE CONTROL and/or FW 12 VALVE CONTROL by rotating knob to establish injection and maintain desired level band.

Monitor and report if 600 gallons boron injected (860 gallons in LP tank).

Monitor and report if all rods inserted to 04.

Event 8 CRD Pump 12 Trip When directed to restore level to

+53 inches to +95 inches using CRD Pump 12 trips resulting in loss of a high Cond/FW.

pressure injection source and pressure source for control rod insertion. CRD Pump I I must When loss of CRD pump 12 is be manually started either as an injection recognized, start CRD pump 11.

source or to provide drive pressure while implementing EOP-3. I , Alternate Control Rod Insertion.

When directed, RO enters M Panel to install

-RO NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EOP jumpers identified in EOP-3. 7 When directed prevent Core Spray injection per EOP-1, Attachment 4.

fOP-I Attachment 4, Prevent Core Spray Injection Obtain tools and safety equipment form EOP toolbox at SM desk.

Bypass Core Spray IV interlocks by installing jumpers at EOP ISOLATION BYPASS JUMPER SUBPANEL (inside Panel N, between 1N I A and 1N1B):

Jumper 17: 40-01, INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV121 BYPASS Jumper 18: 40-1 1, INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV111 BYPASS Jumper 19: 40-06, CORE SPRAY TEST VALVE1 1 BYPASS Jumper 24: 40-09, INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV122 BYPASS Jumper 25: 40-10, INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV112 BYPASS Jumper 26: 40-05, CORE SPRAY TEST VALVE12 BYPASS Verify containment isolations per SOP-40.2 when RPV level reaches low-low level (+5 inches) or main condenser vacuum reaches 7 in hg.

If directed install MSlV jumpers per EOP-1, Attachment 2.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

9 INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EOP-1 Attachment 2, MSlV Lo-Lo Isolation Bypass Obtain tools and safety equipment form EOP toolbox at SM desk.

0 Bypass Core Spray IV interlocks by installing jumpers at EOP ISOLATION BYPASS JUMPER SUBPANEL (inside Panel N, between 1N I A and 1N1B):

Jumper 1: MSlV LO/LO ISOL.

BYPASS RELAY 11K19A Jumper 2: MSlV LO/LO ISOL.

BYPASS RELAY 11K20A Jumper 8: MSlV LO/LO ISOL.

BYPASS RELAY 12K19A 0 Jumper 9: MSlV LO/LO ISOL.

BYPASS RELAY 12K20A BOP ACTIONS FAILURE TO SCRAM BOP Inject per LIQUID POISON INJECTION (OP-When directed inject liquid poison.

12 H.1.O) PO-8.0 System I 1 is started and injects boron to the Place keylock switch to SYS 11.

core. If not already isolated, RWCU isolates.

Confirm RED LIGHT ON and GREEN LIGHT OFF for pump started.

LIQUID POISON EXPL VALVE 11 CONTINUITY light OFF.

LIQUID POISON EXPL VALVE 12 CONTINUITY light OFF.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Verify LIQUID POISON HDR PR value is greater than reactor pressure.

Verify CU RETURN ISOLATION VALVE 1 (INSIDE) 33-01 closed.

Verify CU SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE 11 (INSIDE) 33-02 closed Verify CU SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE 12 (OUTSIDE) 33-04 closed.

Report boron injecting to SRO.

RO actions for Alternate Control Rod Insertion, EOP-3.1.

RO Section 3 and 4 are implemented to manually 3 Verify at least one CRD pump is drive control rods and by repeated manual running. If not previously scrams. performed, recognize CRD Pump 12 tripped and starts CRD Pump 11.

Reactor Mode Switch to REFUEL.

Both SECTION 3 and SECTION 4 require the following actions Place ARI OVERRIDE switch in OVERRIDE at F Panel.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACT1ONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Install RPS SCRAM LOGIC RELAY BYPASS JUMPERS, by performing the following:

Obtain tools and safety equipment form EOP toolbox at SM desk.

Defeat RPS logic relays by installing jumpers at EOP ISOLATION BYPASS JUMPER SUBPANEL (inside Panel N, between 1N I A and 1N1B):

Jumper 5: BYPASS RELAY 11K7 TO RELAY 11K51B Jumper 6: BYPASS RELAY 11K8 TO RELAY 11K52B Jumper 12: BYPASS RELAY 12K7 TO RELAY l l K 5 1 B Jumper 13: BYPASS RELAY 12K8 TO RELAY 12K52B When scram channels are reset, CHI 1 and Reset the scram by depressing Ch C H I 2 white pilot solenoid group lights are on. 11 and Ch 12 RESET buttons.

The SDV begins draining.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

WHEN the scram is reset, delete ALL RD33 malfunctions:

RD33A, RD33B, RD33C, RD33D, RD33E Bypass the RWM.

Insert rods to 00 using EMER ROD IN starting with high power regions NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

c<

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS of core (use LPRM indications).

MANUAL SCRAMS (Section 4)

Direct A 0 to verify open 44-167 (CRD-12), Charging Water Header Blocking valve (RB El 237 west hall).

WHEN ....SDV drained (following clear):

o F1-1-8, RPS CH 11 SCRAM DUMP VOL WTR LVL HIGH o F3-1-4, CONT ROD DRIVE SCRAM DUMP VOLUME WTR LVL HIGH o F4-1-1, RPS CH 12 SCRAM DUMP VOL WTR LVL HIGH AND.. ..Either Reactor Pressure or When the SDV is drained and another manual CRD Charging Water Pressure scram is inserted, ALL RODS WILL FULLY

>450 psig.

INSE R T.

CT-4.0 THEN....manually scram by depressing the Ch 11 and Ch 12 scram buttons.

IF....control rods move inward, THEN ....reset scram and repeat steps.

Provides a Scram report. Report all rods fully inserted.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS IF a different pump is started for torus cooling, trip THAT pump using the appropriate CTOI B,C or D malfunction CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: BOP When all rods are fully inserted, activate Report Containment Spray Pump malfunction using TRG 11: tripped CTOIA CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP TRIP Starts an alternate containment 111 spray pump in torus cooling per EOP-1 Attachment 16 Containment Spray Pump I I I trips resulting in Realigns Loop BVs for selected a loss of torus cooling. An alternate pump Pump should be started, since torus temperature is Closes Containment Spray IV still significantly above 85 OF (EOP-4 condition). to prevent spraying drywell Entering EOP-1 Attachment 16 and re- Starts alternate Containment performing steps for another loop will correctly Spray Pump align the system in the torus cooling mode. Reports torus cooling in service.

After all rods are fully inserted, exits EOP-3 and enter EOP-2 SRO If all rods in then:

Direct stopping LP injection.

Exit EOP-3 and Enter EOP-2 0 Direct restoring level to +53 inches to +95 inches using Cond/FW and CRD.

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACT1ONS T ERMI NATION C RITERIA Control Rods Inserted RPV water level being restored to normal band 53 to 95 inches.

EVENT 10 SRO SRO Classify event as SITE AREA EMERGENCY per 2.2.2 .)

NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA, NRC Exam VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events None B. Commitments

1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 2 September 2006

' Appendix D, Rev. 9 Scenario 0utline Form ES-D-1 Event Event TYPe* Description 1 R Raise RPV Pressure from 845 psig to 918 psig with EPR in service.

2 N (BOP) At about 900 psig RPV Pressure, place 2ndRWCU Pump in service 3 NM13A I TS (RO IRM 11 INOP trip. Requires bypassing, consulting Tech Specs and SRO) resetting RPS Channel 11 trip.

4 CW02A Service Water Pump 11 trips resulting in rising RBCLC and TBCLC temperatures. Service Water Pump 12 is manually started.

5 RM1U I TS REACTOR BUILDING VENT RAD MONITOR fails inoperable.

(SRO) Requires TS 3.6.2.j entry. Input into RB Emergency Ventilation System automatic initiation. Trip channel within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

~

6 RD02R3 C (RO) Control Rod Drifts out. The rod is fully inserted and the HCU is 03 1 valved out per Annunciator Response Procedure F3-2-6 CONTROL ROD DRIFT.

7 RR54 I (BOP) RPV Narrow range water level transmitter failed upscale. RPV level slowly lowers requiring FW LCV placed in manual and level restored manually. N1-SOP-16.2 is entered.

8 EC02 M (ALL) Emergency Condenser Steam Leak into Reactor Building with Failure to Isolate. Requires a manual scram. More than one EC08A Reactor Building General Area temperature eventually exceeds EC08B 135"F, requiring an RPV Blowdown, later in the scenario.

9 RP05B C(R0) RPS Fails to trip but manual initiation of ARI pushbutton results in complete rod insertion.

RP28 10 HV03A C (ALL) RB Ventilation failure. Manual action is required to trip and isolate normal ventilation and start RBEVS, if Reactor Building radiation HV03B levels are above 5 mr/hr. If below this value operation of normal ventilation can continue per EOP-5.

11 FWO3A C (BOP) Loss of Feedwater Pumps following control rod insertion. This complicates post blowdown level control. Injecting with Feedwater FWO3B Booster Pumps or Core Spray is necessary to maintain RPV Water Level.

12 SRO Classify Site Area Emergency 3.4.1 and 4.4.1 10/21/2006 6:39:44 AM 5of8 NRC Exam Draft Exam Submittal

Facilitv: Nine Mile Point I Scenario No.: NRC-03 Op-Test No.: NRC TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES ACTUAL 2 and 3 AND 4 and 5 events can (PER SCENARIO; SEE SECTION D.5.d) ATT RIBUTES be run simultaneously, to

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 7 improve efficiency.

Events 3,4,6,7,9,10,11

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3 Total Malfunction Count:

Event 9 RPS failure Event I O RB Major not included in this count.

Ventilation failure and Event 11 Loss of FW

3. Abnormal events (2-4)

Event 6 Rod Drift Event 7 FWLC

4. Major transients (1-2)

I 2 1

Abnormal Events Count:

Does not include the SRO TS related events. These are Event 8 EC Steam Leak with Isolation considered separately.

Failure

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive 2 SRO TS Events actions (1-2) Event 3 and 5 are SRO Tech EOP-2 RPV and EOP-5 Sec Cont Spec evaluation events.

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive 2 actions (0-2)

EOP-3 Failure To Scram; EOP-8 RPV Blowdown

7. Critical tasks (2-3) 4 CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS:

CT-1.O Initiate scram before blowdown CT-2.0 Insert rods using ARI CT-3.0 Blowdown when 2 areas above 135 CT-4.0 Restore and maintain level above TAF with Alternate Injection Svstems 10/23/2006 1 1: I 0:02 AM 6 of 8 NRC Exam Draft Exam Submittal

?

NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 3 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 38 LOW POWER WITH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT EOP ENTRYAND RPV BLOWDOWN REQUIRED PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 7/14/06 VALIDATED M. Meier, L. Blum, J. Tsardakas DATE 9/19/06 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING 0PERAT1ONS

<72;%-

/

DATE /o/a,k&uc; MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CONF I GU RAT10N CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Length: 90 minutes Initial Power Level: 2% Power. RPV Pressure is 845 psig with Bypass valve open.

The scenario begins at about 2% reactor power, during plant startup. RPV pressure is 845 psig. The crew will continue the startup raising pressure to 918 psig and establishing pressure control on the Electronic Pressure Regulator (EPR). As pressure is raised to about 900 psig, the second Reactor Water Cleanup Pump is started per normal operating procedures. IRM 11 failure due to an inop trip occurs resulting in a trip of RPS Channel 11. The crew will bypass the failed instrument and reset the resulting RPS channel trip.

Service Water Pump 11 trips occurs requiring a standby pump to be placed in service. Control Rod 30-31 will drift out. The rod is fully inserted and isolated. With power level below RWM setpoint the RWM must be bypassed to insert the drifting rod. The startup can now continues by pulling control rods. Reactor Building radiation monitor 11 inop condition occurs. Tech Spec entry into 3.6.2.j is required because the monitor is part of RB Emergency Ventilation initiation instrumentation.

RPV Narrow Range level input to Feedwater Level Control System (FWLC) fails upscale. With the level transmitter failed high, an RPV water level transient results requiring crew to take manual control of level control valve to prevent an automatic protective trip function per N2-SOP-16.1, Feedwater Failures. When level is stabilized the crew will maintain manual level control.

The major transient begins when an Emergency Condenser steam leak into Reactor Building occurs. Automatic and manual attempts to isolate the leak will be unsuccessful. Entry in EOP-5, Secondary Containment Control is required and the reactor will be manually scrammed.

When the manual scram is initiated RPS Channel 12 fails to trip. The crew enters EOP-3 Failure To Scram and takes initial actions to mitigate the event. When the crew manually NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

'ihitiates ARI, all control r The crew transitions back to EOP-2 RPV Control. After the transition back into EOP-2, the operating Feedwater Pumps trip, complicating post scram level control. When Reactor Building general area temperatures exceed 135°F in more than one area, an RPV Blowdown using EOP-8 is required. Reactor Building Ventilation system malfunctions requires manual action to mitigate steam leak into the building which could lead to a release.

Major Procedures Exercised: N1-SOP-16.1, N1-SOP-18.1, N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-5, N1-EOP-8 EAL Classification: SAE 3.4.1 Main Steam Line, EC steam line or Reactor Water Cleanup isolation failure AND release pathway, outside normal process system flowpaths from unisolable system exists outside primary containment SAE 4.1.IPrimary system is discharging into RB resulting in RB general area temperatures >135"F in two or more areas, N1-EOP-5 Termination Criteria: RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained above TAF with all rods fully inserted.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-226 or equivalent. Reactor Power 2% RPV Pressure 845 psig Initial IC006 was at 500 psig. Shifted RWCU to High Pressure PCV and raised pressure to 845 psig by raising MHC pressure setpoint. Pulled some control during the pressure increase to raise power, but probably didnt have to.

Currently, pulling rods is at RWM Group 15. This should allow the crew to increase pressure by only using MPR pressure set. Pulling control rods is not required to accomplish scenario objectives.

Ensure IRM 17 bypassed and half scram is reset.

Shift one IRM/APRM recorder to FAST in each RPS Channel B. Presets/Function Key Assignments

1. Malfunctions:

a. See bat file n06scen3,bat

2. Remotes:

a. See bat file n06scen3,bat

3. Overrides:

a. See bat file n06scen3.bat

4. Annunciators:

a. None C. Equipment Out of Service

1. IRM 17 failed and is bypassed D. Support Documentation

1. Working copy of N1-OP-43A. Section 1.O and E.2.0 are complete. E.3.0 is in progress and signed off complete including E.3.20. The next step is E.3.21, for starting the second RWCU pump at 900 psig. The 900 psig Drywell Inspection is NOT required.

2. Working copy of N1-OP-31 with sign-offs indicating step E.4.11 is in progr e s .

E. Miscellaneous

1. EVENT TRIGGERS/COMPOSlTES

a. See bat file n06scen3,bat NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

0 Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Lit Control Room Annunciators Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)

(SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:

0 Reactor Power = 2% 0 Loadline = NA 0 RPV Pressure is 845 psig with a bypass valve partially open. MPR in control.

0 N1-OP-43A in progress at step E.3.21 0 Drywell Inspection at 900 psig is complete.

0 N1-OP-31 in Droaress at ster, E.4.11 0 IRM 17 is failed upscale and is bypassed. Tech Spec LCO is being complied with.

PART 111: RemarkdPlanned Evolutions:

0 Raise RPV pressure to 900 psig and start the second RWCU Pump.

0 Raise RPV pressure to 918 psig and place EPR in service.

0 Continue startur, and comdete section E.3.0

~~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~

PART IV: To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:

0 Review new Clearances (SM) Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)

ATC RO BOP RO NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

I Scenario ID#

INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)

What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options?

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

111. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:

CT-1 .O Given an unisolable RWCU leak and secondary containment temperature approaching maximum safe values in one area, the crew will enter EOP-2 RPV Control and initiate a manual reactor scram before performing an RPV Blowdown.

CT-2.0 Given a condition requiring scram and failure of an RPS Channel to trip, the crew will manually initiate Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) per N1-EOP-3 to shutdown the reactor.

CT-3.0 Given an unisolable RClC steam leak and secondary containment temperature above maximum safe values in more than one area, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown per EOP-C2.

CT-4.0 Given a loss of Feedwater Pumps following a scram, the crew will restore and maintain RPV water level above -84 inches using Alternate Injection Systems per EOP-2.

B. Performance Objectives:

PO-1.o Given the plant during a reactor startup, the crew will raise pressure to 918 psig per N 1-0P-43A.

PO-2.0 Given the plant during a reactor startup, the crew will place the second RWCU pump in service per normal operating procedures.

PO-3.0 Given the plant during startup conditions, the crew will establish pressure control on the Electronic Pressure Regulator (EPR).

PO-4.0 Given the plant during startup conditions and an IRM failure, the crew will bypass the failed channel and reset the tripped RPS channel. The SRO enters Tech Specs.

PO-5.0 Given the plant during startup conditions and a Service Water Pump trip, the crew will start the standby pump per station procedures.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

PO-6.0 Given the plant during startup conditions and an inop condition on Reactor Building Rad Monitor 11, the SRO will enter Tech Specs.

PO-7.0 Given the plant during startup conditions and a drifting control rod, the crew will fully insert and valve out the affected HCU per ARP F3-2-6 and N1-OP-5.

PO-8.0 Given a failed RPV level instrument resulting in lowering RPV water level, the crew will manually control level to avoid a reactor scram PO-9.0 per N1-SOP-I 6.1 Feedwater Failures Given a RWCU leak and general area temperatures approaching 135OF, the crew will manually scram per N2-EOP-5 and EOP-2.

PO-10.0 Given a RWCU leak and general - area temperatures in two areas

---cc exceeding 135"F, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown per N I -

EOP-8.

PO-I 1.o Given a failure of Reactor Building Ventilation to isolate AND RB Vent monitor reading above 5 mr/hr, the crew will isolate RB Ventilation and start RBEVS per N1-EOP-5.

PO-12.0 Given a failure of Reactor Building Ventilation to isolate AND RE3 Vent monitor reading below 5 mr/hr, the crew will recognize that an isolation should have occurred. With readings below 5 mrlhr, operation of normal ventilation is allowed per N1-EOP-5.

PO-13.0 Given events that meet the criteria for emergency classification, the SRO will classify the event per EPP-EPIP-01 EAL Matrix.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Crew Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down panels, and tests annunciators.

EVENT 1 SRO Raise RPV Pressure From 845 psig to 918 Conducts Shift Briefing psig and place EPR in service. Directs startup continued per N I -

PO-1.o OP-43A E.3.21 Functions as Reactivity SRO.

NOTE: May direct control rod withdrawal The SRO may direct the RWCU pump start to raise power. (Not expected) prior to raising pressure to 900 psig. The When RPV pressure is procedure step states When the reactor approaching 900 psig, directs the pressure reaches 900 psig, verify the second second RWCU Pump placed in cleanup pump in service.. ... This would allow service per N1-0P-3.

the condition where both pumps are in service After Cleanup Pump 12 is in when pressure reaches 900 psig. service, directs pressure raised to 918 psig.

As MPR setpoint is raised Bypass Valves RO (BPVs) throttle closed then reopen as RPV Manually adjusts MPR setpoint by pressure rises from 845 psig to the new MPR bumping MECHANICAL setpoint. As the MPR is adjusted Annunciator PRESSURE REG switch to RAISE AI-4-6 TURBINE BY-PASS VALVES OPEN Continue to raise RPV pressure to clears and alarms, as the BPV close when about 900 psig.

setpoint is raised and re-open as pressure Allows BPV to regulate pressure at rises to the new setpoint. 900 psig while starting second RWCU Pump.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERAT0R ACT10NS Annunciator F3-1-1 APRM 15-18 may also II If directed, commences pulling intermittently alarm as some APRM downscale control rods to establish BPV conditions clear and alarm. position or power increase.

Reactor coolant temperature also rises from 525°F (large E window display on K Panel).

The crew monitor heat-up rate.

As RPV pressure rises above 850 psig, Annunciator F1-4-7 (F4-4-2) RPS CH 11 (12)

REACTOR PRESS LOW clears.

EVENT 2 Place zndRWCU PUMP In Service. 3op PO-2.0 Mo nito r N0N- REGENERATIV E NOTE: At the Examiners discretion, EVENT HX outlet temperature (F359) AND 3 can be initiated while EVENT 2 is in REGENERATIVE HX inlet progress, if desired. temperature (F363) UNTIL system RPV pressure is stabilized at 900 psig by parameters stabilize AND ensure throttling of BPVs. When pressure reaches temperatures do not exceed 900 psig, the crew places the second RWCU 120°F.

Pump (Pump 12) in service per N1-OP-3 IF NON-REGENERATIVE HX Section E. 7.0. outlet temperature (F359) OR REGENERATIVE HX inlet temperature (F363) approach or exceed 12OoF,THEN lower Cleanup system flow using RMC-33-1 51, CLEANUP SYS FLOW.

Verify adequate thermal margin exists to core thermal power limits.

(Not a concern for this power Ieve1).

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Perform the following to start CLEANUP PUMP 12:

Verify closed 33-16, CLEANUP R WCU System Flow is indicated on dual pen PUMP 12 DISCHARGE chart recorder P/FR-35-150. Flow is the RED VALVE.

PEN and reads out in 0-400 X IO3Ibm/hr. Adjust 33-40, CLEANUP SYS FLOW, using RMC-33-151 to System Fldw in gpm can be determined using establish cleanup system flow FC I69 and adjusting the thumbwheel to between 180 X IO3 and 220 X null the meter on the controller tape setting. IO3 Ibm/hr (360-440 gpm).

Verify open 33-1 58, CLEANUP PUMP RECIRC VALVE 12.

As system flow is lowered, CLEANUP Verify cleanup system pressure SYSTEM PRESSURE PI-35-131A pressure as indicated on PI-35-131A is rises. If flow is reduced too rapidly high being maintained 80 to 100 pressure system isolation may occur at 130 psig.

psig. Start Cleanup Pump 12 Slowly jogs open 33-1 6, CLEANUP PUMP 12 DISCHARGE VALVE while maintaining approximately 80 to 100 psig system pressure.

Maintain pump discharge pressure less than 1400 psig by opening 33-40, CLEANUP SYS FLOW using RMC-33-151.

WHEN 33-36 CLEANUP PUMP 12 DISCHARGE VALVE is fully open adjust 33-40, CLEANUP SYS FLOW using RMC-33-151 NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

- ~~ ~

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS to maintain desired system flow 250 X I O 3 and 380 X I O 3 Ibm/hr (500 to 760 gpm).

Continue at 7.6 (of procedure)

Verify cleanup system computer point inputs to core thermal power calculations are in scan and updating. May contact STA or Reactor Engineer to verify points in scan.

Adjust thumbwheel on FC 169 to indicate current system After CLEANUP PUMP 12 is in service the flow rate in gpm.

crew will continue raising RPV Pressure to 918 Report CLEANUP PUMP 12 is in psig, if not previously done. service.

EVENT 3 IRM 11 INOP TRIP.

PO-4.0. This event can be initiated at any point up until 9 18 psis is reached, in the scenario as determined by the NRC Lead Examiner. It may be done simultaneously with the RWCU pump start or prior to the pump start.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: SRO When directed by the Lead Examiner, active Acknowledges report malfunction using TRG 1: Consults Tech Spec 3.6.2.a and NM13A IRM 11 FAILURE-INOP 3.6.2.g and determines minimum NRC Scenario 3 -1 1- September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE 0PERATOR ACT10NS IRM I I INOP TRIP is generated. RPS number of channels are still CHANNEL I I trips and four white scram pilot operable for each trip system.

solenoid lights and one red backup scram light 7 Directs IRM 11 bypassed extinguish on f Panel. At E Console for IRM 3 Directs RPS CH 11 reset I I, the white DOWNSCALE/INOP light is lit. I Notifies WEC IRM I I reading on chart is downscale. 11 Notifies Ops management The Rod Block Monitor panel on E Console 7 Conducts Crew Brief/Update blue SRM 11&12 IRM 11,12,13&14APRM 11,12,13&14 lights are lit.

The following Annunciators actuate: RO FI-I-IRPS CH I 1 REACTNEUTRON Reports alarms to SRO MONITOR These actions are from F1-1-1 f 1-2-1 RPS CH I 1 AUTO REACTOR TRIP Confirms RPS Channel 11 tripped.

F14-1 RPS CH I 1 REFUEL INST TRIP Confirms alarm using available F2-3-6 IRM 11-14 indications.

F3-4-4 ROD BLOCK Confirm other channels of neutron monitoring are normal.

At backpanel, IRM 1 I Drawer white Consult Tech Specs (Notifies SRO)

DOWNSCALE and INOP lights are lit and the WHEN the cause of the alarm is meter is downscale. corrected, reset RPS Channel 11.

These additional actions are from F I 1 Determine which sensor in RPS Channel 11 caused trip.

(Determines IRM 11 inop condition).

Confirms RPS Channel 12 sensors normal based on plant conditions.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS (Determines RPS 12 sensors normal).

Theses applicable actions are from F2-3-6 Confirm alarm on computer printout. (BI 93 is expected).

Observe E Console to determine condition: Observes DOWNSCALE OR INOP light is on. The UPSCALE lights are off.

IF instrument is malfunctioning, THEN refer to N1-OP-38B Consult Tech Spec 3.6.2.a and 3.6.2.g (Notifies SRO).

SRO determines and directs IRM I I is to be These actions are in OP-38B H.1.O bypassed per N1-OP-38 H. 1.0 for Bypassing IRM at E Console Confirm requirements of Tech Specs will be met after IRM is bypassed. (Action completed by SRO).

Place IRM BYPASS switch in BYPASS (IRM 11) position.

Confirm IRM BYPASS light lit on panel E.

SRM-IRM AUXILIARIES drawer is a separate Confirm IRM BYPASS light lit on drawer from the IRM channel drawers with IRM auxiliaries drawer (back status lights, located in same vicinity. panels).

Confirm computer printout IRM 11 BYPASS YES NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 7 Report IRM 11 bypassed to SRO SRO determines and directs RPS Channel I 1 These actions are required to reset to be reset. RPS Channel 11 trip RO Depress REACTOR TRIP RESET When the trip is reset, the RPS Channel 11 pushbutton on E Console four white pilot lights and one red light Observe RPS Channel 11 four illuminate and asso ciated annunciators clear. white pilot lights illuminate Report RPS Channel 11 trip is reset.

EVENT 4 Service Water Pump 11 trips PO-5.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by the Lead Examiner, active malfunction using TRG 2: SRO CWO2A SERVICE WATER PUMP TRIP 1I Acknowledges report SERVICE WTR PUMP I I trips. Directs starting Service Water The following annunciators actuate: Pump 12 H1-1-2 SERVICE WTR PUMP 11 TRIP Notifies WEC OVERLOAD Notifies Ops management Conducts Crew BriefIUpdate BOP HI-4-2 R. BUILDING SW PRESS/SERV W Reports alarms PUMP HDR PRESS Reports Service Water Pump 11 H I 1 R. BUlLDlNG COOLING WTR PRESS- tripped TEMP MAKEUP FLOW These actions are from H I 2 Confirm alarm on computer When Service Water Pump 12 is started, printout.

header pressures and system temperatures Start Service Water Pump 12.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS return to normal values. (Pump starts)

IF Service Water Pump 12 will NOT start, THEN enter N1-SOP-18.1. (NA; Pump 12 starts)

Place Service Water Pump 11 control switch to STOP. May be delayed until after the WEC is contacted.

Also refers to HI-4-2, but actions in either ARP are effective in mitigating the pump trip.

EVENT 5 RX BLDG VENT RAD MON 11 INOP PO-6.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by the Lead Examiner, active malfunction using TRG 3:

R M I U RX BLDG VENT RAD MON 11 INOP BOP Reports alarm.

L1-4-3 RB VENT RAD MONITOR OFF Observes back panel reading of NORMAL alarms. instrument.

Reports downscale indication to SRO.

Notifies RP.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO 0 Acknowledges status reports Channel 12 can still automatically start Enters TS 3.6.2.j. Determines RBEVS, if 5 mr/hr setpoint is reached. channel must be tripped within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or the action required in 3.6.2.a must be taken.

Notifies WEC Notifies Ops management Conducts Crew Brief/Update EVENT 6 Control Rod Drifts Out PO-7.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by the Lead Examiner, active malfunction using TRG 4: SRO RD02R3031 30-31 CONTROL ROD FAILURE Acknowledges report DRIFT OUT Directs control rod inserted per 0 WHEN rod is inserted and valved out, ARP then delete this malfunction. Notifies Reactor Engineering 0 WHEN directed to reset drift alarm in Notifies WEC Aux Control Room; activate REMOTE Notifies Ops management using TRG 5: Conducts Crew BrieflUpdate RD07 RESET ROD DRIFT ALARM Control Rod 30-31 drifts outward. These actions are from F3-2-6 RO The following annunciator actuates: Confirm rod is drifting by observing F3-2-6 CONTROL ROD DRIFT F Panel RPlS indication AND/OR the process computer. Identifies NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS rod 30-31 is drifting out.

If more than one rod is drifting, then manually scram and enter N I -

SOP-I. (NA; only one rod drifting).

When drifting rod is selected and driven in, the Selects drifting rod 30-31 and rod will insert to notch 00. inserts to notch 00 using EMERGENCY ROD IN.

For OUTWARD Drifting rod:

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: Apply continuous insert signal While isolating HCU, in order to simulate using EMERGENCY ROD IN to depressurizing the accumulator BEFORE maintain rod full in.

contacting control room, activate malfunction Valve out affected HCU 30-31 using TRG 12: per N1-OP-5 H HCU Isolation.

RD03R3031 30-31 CONTROL ROD ACCUM (Dispatches Operator/Directs Failure task to be performed in Reactor Building).

Annunciator F3-2-5 alarms WHEN HCU is isolated, release When HCU is isolated and the malfunction is EMERGENCY ROD IN switch.

deleted, the rod will remain at notch position 00 (full in).

ROLE PLAYS: WHEN rod drift condition is After isolating and depressurizing the HCU, corrected, THEN depress control THEN as operator dispatched report HCU is rod drift reset push button Aux isolated, with cooling water maintained. Control Room Cab IS20.

Contact Reactor Engineering.

After activating REMOTE RD07, THEN as Initiate OD-7, Option 2 to update operator dispatched report rod drift alarm has control rod position scan.

been reset.

When the Rod Drift Alarm is reset in the Aux Control Room Annunciator F3-2-6 CONTROL NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RATOR ACT10NS ROD DRIFT clears.

EVENT 6 RPV Level Transmitter Failed HIGH PO-8.0 This event has the potential to lead to an automatic reactor scram. If this occurs, then activate TRG 7 to initiate the EC steam leak.

The scenario can proceed under these conditions.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by the Lead Examiner, active malfunction using TRG 6:

RR54 RPV LEVEL TRANSMITTER (LOCAL FW CONTROL FAILS HIGH F2-3-3 REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL HIGH- SRO LOW alarms 11 Acknowledge status reports GEMAC level transmitter REACTOR LEVEL Direct entry into N1-SOP-I 6.1 COL I 1 (ID59A) fails upscale. Dual pen RX Feedwater Failures VESSEL LEVEL - TOTAL FW FLOW recorder Notifies WEC ID14 on F Panel, level indication pegs high. It Notifies Ops management will remain high until level column 12 is Conducts Crew Brief/Update selected, at which point, the recorder input is from Column 12.

FWLC input from a failed water level instruments results in slowly lowering RPV NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS waterlevel, as FWP I 1 BYPASS VALVE closes in response to the sensed high level condition.

Yanlvay water level instruments Ll36-09 and 36-10 and GEMAC Col 12 level transmitter ID59B all start to slowly lower.

These actions are from F2-3-3 NOTE: BOP Annunciator response action will mitigate the Confirm vessel level by monitoring transient. The crew will be expected to also level indications.

enter SOP-I 6. I Feedwater Failures. These 0 Observe steam flow/ feed flow actions are also effective in mitigating the mismatch.

transient . 0 Take manual control of mis-operating system that are feeding As FWP 11 valve is re-opened, actual RPV or draining the vessel.

water level will begin to rise, as observed on 0 Depresses MAN pushbutton for other instruments. FWP 11 BYPASS VALVE at F panel.

Adjusts FWP 11 BYPASS VALVE output signal to restore and maintain level as directed.

0 Determine cause AND return level to normal. (Cause is failed COL 11 NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERAT0R ACT10NS instrument).

These actions are from SOP-16.1 BOP IF RPV level is lowering THEN Reduce reactor power per SOP-1.I as necessary to maintain level.

(Not expected to reduce power)

Problem with FWLC, FW Pumps OR FW heating? FWLC FCV Lockup? NO FWLC Malfunction? YES Using available FCVs take manual control of FWLC at MA stations placing controllers in Manual AND attempt to control RPV level.

o. Depresses MAN pushbutton for FWP 11 BYPASS VALVE at F panel.

Adjusts FWP 11 BYPASS VALVE output signal to restore and maintain level as directed.

Can level be maintained > 53 inches? YES Restore level to 65 to 83 inches.

NOTE: IF feed/ steam flow OR narrow It is NOT required for the crew to transition to range level instrument is OP-16 to transfer the level column to 12. FW malfunctioning THEN Shift Reactor may remain in MAN for the remainder of the Pressure/ level Columns or FW scenario. modes per N 1- 0 P - I 6 Section F and return FWLC to auto.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

s, QI I~STRUCTORACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE 0PERAT0R ACT10NS EVENT 8 EC Steam leak into Secondary PO-9.0, 10.0, 11.0, 12.0 Containment with Isolation Failure Console Operator: Refer to Attachment for reporting Reactor Building general area temperatures. Blowdown when evaluators are ready to allow the scenario to continue.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When RPV level is stabilized and directed by the Lead Examiner, active malfunction using TRG 7:

EC02 STEAM LEAKAGE OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (4% 5 0 0 minute ramp)

EC08A EC LOOP 11 STM IV FAIL TO CLOSE Ill 100%

EC08B EC LOOP I 1 STM IV FAIL TO CLOSE 112 100%

Emergency Condenser steam leakage into the SRO Secondary Containment begins. The following Enters and executes EOP-5 due to annunciators actuate: %rea temperature above any K1-4-3 MER COOLING SYSTEM 11 STEAM alarm setpoint (Detail T) when K1 LEAK AREA THIGH 4-3 alarms.

(with computer points C190, C189, C187) Activates the Emergency Plan, if followed shortly by required. (Expected later).

K1-4-5 MER COOLING SYSTEM 12 STEAM IF Reactor Building Ventilation LEAK AREA THIGH Exhaust radiation levels exceed 5 (with computer points C 193 and C 194) mr/hr THEN Verify RB Ventilation NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACT1ONSl PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS HI-4-8 AREA RAD MONITORS (EOP) isolation and EVS initiation.

Area Rad Monitors # I 8 (RB 340) and #22 (RB 7 IF Reactor Building Ventilation 281) alarm and are above Detail R values. isolates AND Exhaust radiation Also, RB PNG monitor goes into ALERT alarm. level is below 5 mr/hr THEN Restart RB Ventilation. (SC-2) (Not Expected)

These actions are from As steam leak rate rises, RPV pressure begins T EMPERATU RElRADIAT ION Leg to lower. Turbine Bypass Valves are regulated Directs operation of area unit closed. Pressure and power continue to lower coolers and RB Ventilation as as RPV pressure lowers. Eventually, as RCS required. (SC-3) coolant temperature begins to rapidly lower, a IF any area temperature or large power excursion may occur. radiation level is above its alarm setpoint (Detail R, T), THEN Go to 27 (which is SC-5). . ...(SC-3)

(Expected because ARM # I 8 is exceeding and also Detail T values exceeded with K1-4-3 and C189 and C190)

IF a primary system is discharging Fire panel Alarms actuate into the reactor building AND the 2-1 1-7 REAC BLDG 318 LOCA PANEL 10 discharge cannot be isolated 7 FIRE THEN Go to 28 (which is SC-9) 2-1 4-7 REAC BLDG 318 LOCAL PANEL NO (Expected, because based on 7 TROUBLE temperatures, radiation levels and 2-2 1-2 DIESEL FIRE PUMP #I RUNNING fire alarms, crew is expected to 2-2 2-2 ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP #I STARTED determine the source as a primary Fire systems actuate in RB 318 areas. system EC steam line)

Directs action to isolate EC 11 (all NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

L INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS After about a minute discharges into affected areas)

LI-3-6 (4-6) EMERG VENT SYS CHANNEL (SC-6) 11 (12) RELAY OPERATE Proceeds to WAIT block SC-7 and Reactor Building Supply and Exhaust Fans WAITS until 2 or more general should trip and RB isolation dampers close. areas are above Max Safe Values.

Malfunction HV03A and B prevent the isolation Also concurrently executes the from occurring. actions in 28, since a primary system is discharging into the reactor building .

BEFORE any area temperature, When RPV pressure lowers below 850 psig, a radiation or water levels reaches a turbine trip signal is generated from actuation Max Safe Value (SC-9) (Detail of Vacuum Trip 1. The turbine trip results in S). . ...Directs a manual scram HPCl actuation. and ENTER RPV CONTROL EOP-CT-1 .O 2, while continuing here in EOP-5 (SC-IO) (Expected, because the unisolable leak is increasing Sec Containment temperatures and radiation levels).

While WAITING in block SC-I land executing Proceeds to WAIT block SC-11 EOP-2 RPV Control, the SRO should and WAITS until 2 or more general determine that RPV Blowdown is anticipated areas are above Max Safe Values.

and direct rapidly depressurizing the RPV IF anticipating RPV Blowdown, using ECs and Bypass Valves per override directs use of EC and BPVs to step P-1 of EOP-2. rapidly depressurize. (EOP-2 P-I Override)

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACT ION S/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 1 WHEN notified that 2 or more When the second area (RB 298 West) is general areas are above Max Safe reported approximately 6 minutes after being Values ....proceeds to step SC-12 dispatched.. . . .. and directs entry to EOP-8, RPV Blowdown while continuing here in EOP-5 (SC-12) (Expected) rhese actions are directed when FOP-2 is entered from EOP-5 step sc-I0 Event 9 RPS failure Directs a manual scram from SRO Entry into EOP-2 for scram, including EOP-5 step SC-IO (CT) the transition to EOP-3, due to RPS failure.

Repeats back Scram Report and Control rods should be quickly inserted acknowledge RPS failure to trip.

with manual ARI initiation and transition Enters EOP-2 RPV Control back to EOP-2 occurs.

All rods in to at least 04? (Step 2)

NO Will reactor stay shutdown without boron? (Step 3) NO Exits EOP-2 and Enter EOP-3 Transition from EOP-2 to EOP-3 (Step 4)

These actions are directed when EOP-3 is entered from EOP-2 step 4 SRO Entry into EOP-3 SRO IF all rods are inserted to at least 04 OR the reactor will stay shutdown without boron THEN stop injecting boron (injection is not NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

c INSTRUCTOR ACT1ONSl PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS expected) and return to RPV Control, exit this EOP-3 and enter EOP-2. (Step 1) Expected after manual ARI initiation.

1 Directs Bypass ADS 1 Directs Prevent Core Spray injection per EOP-1 Attachment 4 (Install Core Spray Jumpers)

(Step2)

A l l legs are implemented concurrently but rhese actions are from POWER priority may be given to POWER leg first. ,EG Directs Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN. (Q-I) (Already done)

CT-2.0 Directs verify ARI initiation. (Q-2)

When A RI is manually initiated, control rods Turbine Generator on-line? (Q-3) will fully insert. EOP-3 will be exited per NO (May direct based on timing) override step 7 and EOP-2 is entered. Directs EOP-3.1. (Q-7) (May direct based on timing).

WHEN informed of all rods are inserted to at least 04 OR the reactor will stay shutdown without Transition from EOP-3 to EOP-2 boron THEN stop injecting boron (injection is not expected) and return to RPV Control, exit this EOP-3 and enter EOP-2. From override step 1.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

~ ~- -~

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO Entry into EOP-2 These actions are directed when EOP-2 is entered from EOP-3, after rod insertion Repeats back Scram Report and acknowledge.

Enters EOP-2 RPV Control All rods in to at least 04? (Step 2)

YES Directs entry into SOP-I (SCRAM)

IF water level is unknown exit this procedure and enter EOP-7 to flood the RPV (L-2) (Not expected)

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: Directs level restored and IF directed to pull HPCl fuses WAIT three maintained between 53 inches and minutes, active REMOTE using TRG IO: 95 inches using one or more of the FW24 REMOVAL OF HPCl FUSES FU81 FU9 following systems (L-3):

THEN report HPCl fuses are pulled. Condenstate/FW CRD 0 Core Spray (EOP-1 Att 4)

When FWP trips, level control strategy should Bypass Core Spray IV change, since level cannot be maintained interlocks above 53 inches.

Alternate Injection Systems (Detail E) are: IF RPV water level cannot be Containment Spray Raw Water to Core Spray restored and maintained above 53 (EOPI Att 5) inches THEN directs level Fire Water (EOP 1 Att 19) maintained above -84 inches Liquid Poison Test Tank (EOP 1 Att 12) TAF. Use Alternate Injection Liquid Poison Boron Tank (EOP 1 Att 13) Systems if needed (Detail E) L-3 RPV Level Control through 13 FW FCV (EOP- (CT)

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACT1ONSl PLANT RESPONSE 0PERAT0 R ACT10NS 1 Attachment 25)

RPV Level Control through 11 and 12 FW FCV (EOP-1 Attachment 26)

Anticipating blowdown on more than one area IF RPV Blowdown is anticipated exceeding Max Safe temperature values is THEN rapidly depressurize the expected. RPV using EC and turbine bypass valves. OK to exceed 1OO°F/hr cooldown rate. (P-I override)

(Expected to direct use of EC and BPVs to depressurize).

0 Directs RPV pressure stabilized 800 to 1000 psig using Turbine bypass valves.

0 If needed, directs use of Alternate Pressure Control Systems (P-5)

EC ERV Others (Not expected)

BOP Actions on EC Steam Leak BOP Report annunciators.

Confirm alarm on computer printout.

Enter N1-EOP-5. (Notifies SRO of entry cond ition).

Verify system isolation.

Attempts to manually close EC Steam IVs.

Reports failure of EC isolation NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

I INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS valves to close.

7 Dispatches operator RB to take local area temperatures.

7 Reports local area temperature to the SRO.

BOP Actions when reactor scrammed 3op 7 Performs RPV Level Control at F Panel.

7 Restore level 53 to 95 inches as directed.

BOP Actions when EOP-3 is entered 3op 7 When directed, Bypass ADS using keylock switches at F Panel 1 When directed, manually initiates ARI at F Panel J When directed, Prevent Core Spray injection per EOP-1 Attachment 4 (Install Core Spray Jumpers) at EOP ISOLATION BYPASS JUMPER SUBPANEL (inside N Panel)

I 7 40-01 INSIDE CORE SPRAY DISCHARGE IV121 BYPASS

I 8 40-1 1 INSIDE CS DISCHARGE I V l l l BYPASS

I 9 40-06 CORE SPRAY TEST VALVE 11 BYPASS

24 40-09 INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV122 BYPASS

25 40-10 INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV112 BYPASS NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS n #26 40-05 CORE SPRAY TEST VALVE 12 BYPASS o Throttle Core Spray Inboard IVs (40-01, 40-09,40-IO and 40-

11) as necessary.

Event 9 RPS Failure 10 When scram is initiated RPS Channel 1I trips When directed, initiates a manual but Channel 12 does not. The crew enters scram by pacing Mode Switch to transitions to EOP-3. When directed to verify SHUTDOWN or using Manual A RI in the POWER leg, the RO actuates Scram pushbuttons and manual ARI at F Panel. The scram air header implements SOP-I Reactor Scram.

dept-essurizes after the A R1 valves actuate. All Provides Scram Report, including control rods fully insert. failure of RPS Channel 12 to trip.

CT-2.0 When directed to verify ARI depresses MANUAL ARI pushbutton F Panel.

Reports ARI successful When all rods are full in, provides a zndscram report.

Reduce RECIRC MASTER flow 25 to 43 Mlbm/hr Perform SOP-I Scram Verification steps Confirm all rods inserted to position 04 or beyond using Full Core Display.

If ALL RODS IN cannot be confirmed THEN continue and confirm when scram is reset.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Observe power decreasing Place IRMs on Range 9 Insert IRM and SRM detectors Downrange IRMs as necessary Verify turbine and generator tripped.

Maintain RPV pressure below 1080 psig using one or more of the following (unless given other direction from EOP-2):

Turbine Bypass Valves Emergency Condensers ERVs Others (Not expected)

WHEN ready to provide temperature data to require the RPV Blowdown, reports can be made from those dispatched to monitor temperatures. Reactor Building temperatures continue to rise and when RB 298 West is reported to be 141 O F (more than one general area temperature is reported to be above 135 OF). . ..EOP is entered.

SRO Actions for EOP-8 SRO Updates crew of transition to EOP-8 IF RPV water level is unknown THEN Exit this procedure and enter EOP-7 (Step 2) Not expected Are all rods inserted to at least NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS position 04? YES (Step 3)

Drywell Pressure? BELOW 3.5 psig (Step I O )

Directs ECs initiated (Step 12)

Torus water level? ABOVE 8 feet (Step?3)

Directs 3 ERVs opened. (Step 14)

OK to exceed 100°F/hr.

Do NOT use hi/lo lo/lo rosemounts below 500 psig Evaluates override conditions for Step 15, WAIT until shutdown cooling pressure interlock clears 120 psig.

(Step 16)

Subsequent steps are not expected to be performed during scenario.

Event 10 RBEVS Fail To Start PO-11.o, 12.0 Malfunctions become effective -

BOP HV03A RBEVS CH 1IFAIL TO AUTO Determine failure of RB Ventilation INITIATE to trip and isolate by observing HV03B RBEVS CH 12 FAIL TO AUTO supply and exhaust fans still I NITI AT E operating with containment isolation dampers still open.

When RB Vent Radiation levels exceed 5 Report failure to SRO.

mrihr on the operable vent monitor, RB Normal Stops the following fans NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Ventilation should trip and both RBEVS trains 202-01 RB Supply Fan 11 should start. NOTE: EOP-5 (step SC-2) allows 202-02 RB Supply Fan 12 RB Ventilation restarted, if isolated and 202-05 RB Exhaust Fan 11 radiation levels are below 5 rnr/hr. 202-06 RB Exhaust fan 12 Close Containment isolation dampers 202-15 RB Supply Isolation Valve 11 202-16 RB Supply Isolation Valve 12 202-32 RB Exhaust Isolation Valve 11 202-31 RB Exhaust Isolation Valve 12 BOP Actions to Start RBEVS OP-I 0 H.1.O Verify open 202-36 EM VENTILATION FROM REACTOR BLDG BV.

Verify closed the following:

0 202-47 EM VENTILATION TIE BV 0 202-74 EM VENTILATION LOOP 11 COOLING BV 0 202-75 EM VENTILATION LOOP 12 COOLING BV Place RBEVS 11 (12) in service:

Place 202-37 (38) to OPEN 0 Verify open 202-37 (38)

Start 202-53 (33) EVS FAN 11 (12)

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Verify open 202-34 (35)

Confirm proper operation of 202-50 (51) Inlet FCV by lights and flow indication.

Report RBEVS manually started.

EVENT 11 Loss of Feedwater Pumps CT-4.0 BOP 7

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: Report loss of feedwater pumps After rods are inserted by ARI and before RPV Use injection sources as directed Blowdown is directed, activate malfunction If directed, executes EOP-1 using TRG 8: Attachment 25 or 26 to control FW03A FWP TRIP 11 level using FWBP and FW Level FW03B FWP TRIP 12 Control Valves 11, I 2 or 13.

CT-4.0 Injects, using systems directed by SRO to restore and maintain level above -84 inches.

After feedpumps trip, inventory will be lost during the RPV Blowdown. FWBP or Core Spray Pumps can be used to mainfain RPV water level above TAF (-84 inches).

Injecting using FWP 11 or 12 FCV required pulling HPCl fuses to establish control with valves. If using 13 FCV, these fuses are not required to be removed.

BOP Actions for Blowdown -

BOP If directed, initiate ECs (CT)

When directed open 3 ERVs (CT)

Monitor RPV pressure.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS If Torus water temperature reaches 85 OF SRO All legs are executed concurrently, but major Enters EOP-4 on high torus water actions are taken to control the rising torus temperature, if required water temperature, after EOP entry. Directs Containment Spray lock out Executes Torus Temperature Leg Maintain Torus temperature below 85°F using Torus Cooling (EOP 1 Att 16) (TT-2)

BOP If directed, lockout Containment Spray Pumps by placing switches in PTL.

BOP Actions to start torus cooling per EOP-1 6 If directed, starts Torus Cooling per Attachment 16 Torus Cooling shall be placed in service within 15 minutes of Torus temperature 2 85°F Close CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:

0 111; 80-45 112 or 121; 80-40 and 80-45 0 122; 80-40 Verify closed 80-1 15, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 12 0 Verify closed 80-1 14, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 11 13 Verify closed Cont Spray NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Discharge IV using keylock switch for selected loop:

0 111; 80-16 112; 80-36 0 121;80-15 0 122; 80-35 Verify open CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:

111; 80-40 0 112; 80-44 0 121;80-41 0 122; 80-45 Fully open 80-1 18, CONT SPRAY TEST TO TORUS FCV Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP in selected loop.

Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP in selected loop.

WHEN torus water reaches desired temperature stop Containment Spray pump.

Stop all operating Raw Water Pumps If desired, return system to standby per N 1-0P- 14.

Report status to SRO.

NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS TERM I NATION CRIT ERIA RPV Blowdown complete. RPV water level restored and maintained above TAF. All rods fully inserted.

EVENT 12 SRO Classification SRO PO-I 3.0 Classify the event as SAE 3.4.1 and 4.4.1 NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA, NRC Exam VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events B. Commitments

1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 3 September 2006

Form ES-D-1 Facility: NMPI Scenario No.: NRC 4 Op-Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators Initial Conditions IC20 Reduce Power to 95% with RCS Flow.

Turnover: Feedwater Pump 12 is out of service for repairs. Red Clearance applied. HPCl LCO in effect.

-~

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Description 1 R Return Dower to 100% bv raising Recirc Flow.

2 Switch CRD Stabilizing Valves from A and B to E and F per NI-OP-5, Section F.4.1

~ ~

3 NM19C APRM 13 fails upscale resulting in half scram and Tech Spec entry.

Bypassing channel and resetting half scram is required.

4 RRO6A Recirc Pump 11 seal leakage requires pump removal from service.

Pump suction valves fails to fully close resulting in partial loop RR07A isolation. Tech Spec 3.1.7.e is entered for 4 loop operation.

Overrides 5 TC06 Electrical Pressure Regulator Failure Oscillations. The EPR is removed from service and the Mechanical Pressure Regulator (MPR) is placed in service

~

6 TC08 M (ALL) Mechanical Pressure Regulator Failure Low. The MPR fail low resulting in rapid pressure and power rise. An automatic reactor scram occurs 7 ED07 C Electric Fault on Emergency AC Powerboard PB102. Diesel (BOP) Generator 102 automatically starts, but does not close in on the bus due to the fault. DG102 must be manually shutdown due to loss of power to the diesel auxiliaries. Downstream 600 VAC Powerboard PBI 6B must be re-energized from an alternate source.

8 FW03B C (ALL) Motor Driven Feedwater Pump 12 trips resulting in a loss of high pressure feed. Additional high pressure injection sources (CRD and Liquid Poison) must be started as directed from EOP.

9 RR29 C (ALL) A small LOCA (approximately 14%) occurs which reduces vessel inventory and level lowers to top of active fuel. Containment Spray system operation is required due to elevated Drywell pressure.

10 CSOl B C (ALL) Core Spray Pump 112 trips and Core Spray Pump 122 suction strainer becomes plugged. Injection can be restored using CSOSD Feedwater Booster Pumps, after depressurizing the RPV.

11 SRO Classifv event as ALERT 3.1. I

( N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 10/21/2006 6:39:44 AM 7of8 NRC Exam Draft Exam Submittal

TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES ACTUAL (PER SCENARIO; SEE SECTION D.5.d) ATTRIBUTES Total Malfunction Count:

1 . Total malfunctions (5-8) 6 Major not included in this count.

Events 3.4.5,7,8,9.10

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Event 7,8,9,10 Abnormal Events Count:

3. Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Does not include t h e SRO TS Event 4,5 related events. These are

4. Major transients (1-2) 1 considered separately.

Event 6

5. EOPs enteredhequiring substantive - SRO TS Events 2

actions (1 -2) Event 3 and 4 EOP-2 RPV and EOP-4 Pri Cont

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive 1 actions (0-2)

Alternate Level Control of EOP-2

7. Critical tasks (2-3)

CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS: 2 CT-1.O Initiate Containment Spray CT-2.0 Restore and maintain RPV level above -109 inches 10/23/2006 1:I 9:40 PM 8of8 NRC Exam Draft Exam Submittal

NMP STMULATOR-SCENARIO NRC Scenario 4 REV. I! No. of Pages: 38 LOCA WITH DEGRADED CORE SPRAY SYSTEMS PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 10/13/06 VAL I DATED G. Spears, S. Evanchik, G Rabalais DATE 10/17/06 GEN SUPERVISO OPS TRAINING C72TAF DATE &;kd3,AA OPE RAT1ONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CON FIG URAT1ON CONTROL NA Exam Securitv DATE SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Length: 90 minutes Crew assumes the shift with the plant at 95% power with 11 FWP out of service for repairs.

The crew is directed to restore reactor power to 100% following performance of N1-ST-W 1, Control Rod Exercising and Operability Test. Following the power reduction the crew is 7C directed to swap CRD Stabilizing Valves from A and B to E and F. After this, 13 APRM will fail upscale, producing a half scram that may be reset. Crew will bypass the failed APRM, reset the half-scram and review Technical Specifications for the failed instrument.

After the Technical Specifications review, a seal leak develops on 11 Reactor Recirculation Pump. Crew will remove that pump from service, attempt to isolate it, and review Technical Specifications.

Reactor pressure will then begin to oscillate. Crew will recognize a failing EPR, place the MPR in control, move the EPR to its high stop, and review Technical Specifications for operation without a backup regulator. When the plant is stable, the MPR will fail, causing a reactor scram. Crew enters EOP-2 on low RPV water level.

After scram actions are complete, Powerboard 102 will develop a fault; EDG 102 will start, but its output breaker will not close. The Crew crossties PB 16B and PB 16A and restore loads.

Shortly afterwards, 12 FWP will trip, leaving only CRD pumps and Liquid Poison pumps for high-pressure injection.

A medium break LOCA begins to develop inside Primary Containment. Crew enters EOP-4 on high drywell pressure. When Core Spray pumps start, one of the operable pumps will trip.

Recognizing its inability to maintain level above TAF with high-pressure injection, the crew aligns alternate injection sources, and enters EOP-8 for blowdown.

NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

~

One Core Spray Pump is available, but its injection capability is limited by suction strainer clogging. The Condensate System remains available for injection using the Feedwater Booster Pumps through the Feed Pump level control valves, after pressure is reduced by performing an RPV Blowdown. Crew will restore and maintain RPV water level above -109 inches.

Major Procedures: N1-EOP-2, 4, and 8 EAL Classification: Alert EAL 3.1.I Termination Criteria: RPV Blowdown completed, RPV Water Level > -84 inches and rising and Drywell pressure reduced below 3.5 psig NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-20 or equivalent. Reduce Power to 95%. FWP 11 INOP.

CRD Stabilizing Valves A and B in service.

B. Presets/Function Key Assignments

1. Malfunctions:

a. See bat file n06scen4.bat

2. Remotes:

a. See bat file n06scen4.bat

3. Overrides:

a. See bat file n06scen4.bat

4. Annunciators:

a. None C. Equipment Out of Service

1. Feedwater Pump FWP 11 with red clearance applied to control switch.

2. Feedwater Blocking Valve Closed for FWP 11 and red clearance applied.

D. Support Documentation I . Reactivity Maneuver Request Form, (Page 1, Attachment 1 to GAP-OPS-05) to support performance of power restoration following performance of N1-ST-w1.

2. N1-OP-43B F.2 through F.6 signed off and performing step 2.7

a. Setup C875 instantaneous MWth in window

b. Depress LPRM Dnsc bypass pushbutton on E panel.

E. Miscellaneous

1. Red Clearance for FWP I 1 and blocking valve.

2. Protected Equipment Signs placed on the following with FWP 11 inoperable:

13 Condensate Pump 13 FW Booster Pump 0 12FWP PB12(R122)

Diesel Generator 103 Offsite Breaker R40

3. EVENT TRI GG ERS/COMPOSITES

a. See bat file n06scen4,bat NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: UN I D DATE:

PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, RO, CRE)

PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

0 Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)

RO Log (RO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Lit Control Room Annunciators Computer Alarm Summary (RO)

(SM, CRS, STA, RO, CRE)

Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:

Reactor Power = 95% Loadline = >lOOo/~

FWP 11 is out of service.

0 Raise reactor power to 100% in accordance with RMR and NI-OP-43B, following performance of N1-ST-W1, Control Rod Exercising and Operability Test by Drevious shift.

0 N1-OP-43B in progress to restore power to loo%, with rod exercising completed.

PART I I I: RemarkdPlanned Evolutions:

Return Dower to 100%

0 Swap Stabilizing Valves from A and B to E and F.

PART IV: To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:

0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SMICRS)

NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

I Scenario ID I

INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)

What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other 0pt ions?

NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:

CT-1.O Given a primary system leak into the containment, when torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or before drywell air temperature exceeds 300°F, the crew will initiate Containment Sprays, while in the safe region of the Containment Spray Initiation Limit and prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure limit IAW N I -

EOP-4.

CT-2.0 Given degraded RPV injection sources the crew will depressurize the RPV and inject with Preferred and Alternate Injection Systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above -109 inches IAW N1-EOP-2, such that Severe Accident Procedure (SAP) entry is not required.

B. Performance 0bjectives:

PO-I .O Given the plant at less than rated power the crew will raise power to rated, per N1-OP-43B and the RMR provided.

PO-2.0 Given the plant at power, the crew will transfer CRD stabilizing valves in accordance with N1-OP-5.

PO-3.0 Given the plant at power and a failed APRM the crew will bypass the instrument and reset the tripped RPS channel in accordance with Nl-ARP-F2 (F2-1-6) and N1-OP-38C.

PO-4.0 Given the plant at power and a failed APRM the SRO will ensure compliance with the limitations imposed by Technical Specifications (TS 3.6.2.a and 3.6.2.g).

PO-5.0 Given the plant at power with a failure of Reactor Recirculation Pump mechanical seals, the crew will remove the pump from service and isolate the loop in accordance with N1-SOP-1.2.

NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

PO-6.0 Given the plant at power with 4 loop operation, the SRO will ensure compliance with the limitations imposed by Technical Specifications (TS 3.1.7).

PO-7.0 Given the plant at power with a failure of automatic pressure control system (EPR), the crew will place the MPR in service in accordance with N1-ARP-A2 (A2-4-4) and N 1-SOP-31.2.

PO-8.0 Given the plant at power with an automatic reactor scram, the crew will implement scram action and enter EOPs in accordance with N1-SOP-I , EOP-2 and EOP-4.

PO-9.0 Given the plant at power with a loss of PB102 the crew will shutdown the affected diesel and reenergize PB16B in accordance with N 1-ARP-A4 (A4-1-6).

PO-I 0.0 Given an event requiring activation of the Emergency Plan, the SRO will correctly classify the event per the EAL Matrix.

NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Take the simulator out of freeze before the 3rew crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown and J Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks briefing. Allow no more than 5 minutes for down the panels, and tests panel Walkdown annunciators.

Event 1 Power Restoration to 100%

PO-I .o Conducts reactivity brief for power restoration, if not previously NOTE: Reactivity briefing, procedure review performed.

and RMR review should occur prior to scenario start, in secure briefing room. Reviews Reactivity Maneuver Request Form, if not previously performed.

Directs RO to restore power to 100% using recirculation flow in accordance with the RMR and N I -

OP-43B.

Provides Reactivity SRO monitoring Acknowledges direction from SRO Obtains copy RMR form Begins raising Master Recirculation Flow Controller while monitoring APRM and Total Recirculation Flow indications NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 3 Reports to SRO when power restoration is complete.

BOP Monitors individual RRP for response Individual M/A-Speed Control stations trending uniformly Individual RRP indications trending normally for speed increase Monitors feed water controls for proper response FWP 13 FCV responding to power change RPV Water Level remains within program band (65 - 75)

SRO Event 2 CRD Stabilizing Valve Swap 0 Direct BOP to swap CRD PO-2.0 Stabilizing Valves from A-B to E-F per N1-OP-5, Section F.4.1 Role Play: As Operator, when requested, -

BOP report: Acknowledges direction from SRO.

BV-44-175 is OPEN Performs N 1-0P-5, Section F.4.1, BV-44-184 is OPEN Switching Stabilizing Valves from A After Stabilizing Valve Transfer Switch and B to E and F.

selected to E and F and requested by Control Directs NAO to perform valve Room, report: lineups for transfer.

BV-44-176 is CLOSED Places Stabilizing Solenoid Valves NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

P&NTRESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT10NS BV-44-183 is CLOSED Transfer Switch to E and F Role Play: When requested to confirm exhaust position on Panel F flow report: EXHAUST FLOW 6.0 GPM I Directs NAO to confirm stabilizing exhaust line flow between 5.8 and 6.5 gpm.

Event 3 APRM 13 Failure PO-3.0 and PO-4.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION When stabilizing valve operation is completed, insert malfunction by activating TRG 1:

RO NM19C APRM CHANNEL 13 FAIL UPSCALE J Recognize/report RPS Channel 11 APRM 13 Fails Upscale trip The following annunciators alarm 3 Reports APRM 13 Upscale F2-1-6 APRM 11-14 Fl-1-1 RPS CH I I REACT NEUTRON MO NIT0R F1-2-1 RPS CH 11 REACTOR AUTO TRIP F3-4-4 ROD BLOCK SRO: PO-3 Role Play: As WEC/Mgmt. acknowledge report Acknowledges report from RO from SRO. Advise that you will provide Directs RO/BOP to follow ARPs for requested assistance. failed APRM, Half-SCRAM and The APRM will not be repaired during the ROD BLOCK scenario. Contacts WEWManagement and informs them of failed instrument.

NOTE: Technical Specification requirements Requests assistance in correcting from Tables 3.6.2.a and 3.6.2.g are satisfied problem.

NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACT10NS with only one APRM failed.

PO-4.0 Reviews Technical Specifications for impact of failed instrument.

0 TS 3.6.2.a requires 2 operable trip systems and 3 operable channels per system to cause a SCRAM on High Flux 0 TS 3.6.2.g requires 2 operable trip systems and 3 operable channels per system to initiate a ROD BLOCK on High Flux Determines that APRM 13 may be bypassed Directs RO to bypass APRM 13 and reset RPS Channel 11 trip.

BOP Acknowledges direction from SRO Obtains ARP F2-1-6 and executes 0 Verifies alarm computer points B183 (ROD BLOCK) and DO52 (UPSCALE HlHl FLUX)

Observes LPRM-APRM Auxiliaries Drawer (Panel G) and determines that APRM 13 has an upscale condition If required, bypass APRM per N 1-0P-38C.

NRC Scenario 4 -1 1- October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 30""

Obtaindreviews ARP F1-1-1 Confirm RPS Channel 11 tripped Confirms other channel readings are normal/

Obtains/reviews ARP F1-2-1 Determines that failed APRM caused trip When cause is corrected (APRM is bypassed), reset RPS Channel 11 Obtains/reviews ARP F3-4-4 Confirms alarm by observing computer point C067 RWM ROD BLOCK Determines caused by failed APRM When directed to verify APRM 13 bypassed, observes APRM 13 bypass light on Panel "G" (LPRM-APRM AUXILIARIES DRAWER)

RO When APRM 13 is bypassed F2-1-6, F3-4-4 Completes RO actions for ARP and Fl-1-1 should all clear. F2-1-6 The LPRM-APRM Auxiliaries drawer will Determines that APRM 13 has indicate the HlHl condition until the APRM is UPSCALE/HI-HI condition bypassed then the BYPASS indicating light will Monitors other APRM channels to also be illuminated. determine that power is NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

I NSTRUCTORCTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACT10NS Following the bypassing of APRM 13 and the stablehnchanged reset of the half-scram, all annunciators will be Verifies proper power to flow ratio clear. on 5-LOOP Operating Curve Bypass APRM Bypasses APRM 13 per N1-0P-38C Places APRM BYPASS joystick on Panel E to APRM 13 position Confirm APRM BYPASS light lit on E Panel.

Confirm APRM BYPASS light lit on LPRM-APRM auxiliaries drawer (G Panel).

Confirm computer printout APRM BYPASS YES.

Reset RPS Channel 11 Trip After APRM bypassed reset RPS Channel 11 trip Verifies Fl-1-1 clear

~1 Depress SCRAM RESET pushbutton on E Verifies F1-2-1 clear and resets annu nciato rs Report APRM 13 bypassed and ARP actions completed to SRO NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event 4 RRP I 1 Failure of Both Seals PO-5.0 and PO-6.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by Lead Evaluator or after actions for failed APRM are completed insert malfunctions by activating TRG 2:

RRO6A, RRP 11 Inner HP Seal BOP 75% with 1O:OO minute ramp time Recogtizedreports annunciator RR07A, RRP I 1 Outer LP Seal F2-1-1 25% with 1O:OO minute ramp time SRO Acknowledges report from BOP Directs execution of ARP Directs entry into SOP-1.2 High pressure seal pres, ure will rem in BOP essentially unchanged at approximately Reviews/executes ARP F2-1-1 system pressure at about 1040 psig. Low Enters SOP-1.2 for seal failure pressure seal pressure will gradually rise from Confirms alarm computer point initial value of about 510 psig. ARP F2-1-1 A072 RRP 11 SEAL LEAK requires if seal pressure reaches 625 psig, DET FL SOP1.2 is to be entered. Initial indications are Monitors DWEDT and DWFDT that only a single seal has failed. Drywell level recorders conditions will begin to deteriorate and Contacts Engineering for increased drywell humidity and in-leakage to evaluation .

the DWEDT will be indicated. When Drywell Monitors drywell pressure and parameters are impacted, the failure is temperature considered catastrophicJJin SOP- I . 2 and the Monitors and compares RRP NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS pump must be tripped and isolated. Seal Pressure indications Determines that HP Seal has failed based on rising pressure CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: of LP Seal If necessary and directed by the Lead Determines that LP Seal Evaluator, malfunction RR07A severity level failure is occurring due to LP can be raised to about 30% to lower seal Seal pressure changes in pressure. Drywell parameters.

2 When Drywell pressure begins to rise, notifies SRO.

Role Play: As WECIMgmt. when contacted regarding the seal leakage inform the SRO 7 Acknowledge report from BOP that you will provide what assistance is 7 Inform the WEC/Mgmt. of the required. leaking RRP seals 7 Determine that the pump should be isolated Review Technical Specifications for impact of seal leakage and removal of pump from service Tech Spec 3.2.5 identifies RCS leakage be limited to e2 GPM/day increase for identified leakage.

This will apply until the RRP is isolated.

t~ Tech Spec 3.1.7.e requires that power be maintained below 90.5%

until the isolated loop has valve motor breakers locked open and RRP Motor circuit breaker removed May direct RRP 11 removed from NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INTTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS service, per OP.

When informed of rising Drywell pressure, directkoncur with tripping pump per SOP-1.2.

Direct BOP that discharge and suction valves SHOULD NOT be reopened 2 - 3 seconds after closing.

Provide reactivity management oversight for removing the pump from service.

Evaluates EAL 2.1 for RPV Water level, due to changes in containment leakage.

BOP SRO may direct the pump removed from If directed to shutdown the pump, service per operating procedures. The most prior to determination that a likely sequence is that the pump will remain in catastrophic failure has occurred:

service and monitored until conditions inside Obtainheview copy of N1-OP-I for the Drywell are affected. When Drywell shutting down and isolating 11 pressure rises and the crew determines that RRP both seals are failed, the pump is tripped and Remove 11 RRP from service isolated per SOP- I . 2. Verify 11 RRP M/A station balanced Place 11 RRP M/A control selector switch to MANUAL Reduce speed of pump (RRP Flow) to between 6 - 8 x 1O6 Ibm/hr Close 11 RRP discharge valve by holding switch in CLOSE position NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

PLANT RESPONSE 0PERATOR ACT10NS Time valve stroke with wall clock, watch or stop watch. Closure time is 2 minutes.

Trip 11 RRP MG Set CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: Isolate 11 RRP This action i s performed no matter which 0 Close 11 RRP Suction Valve method is used to remove pump from by holding switch in CLOSE service. When BOP begins closing 11 RRP position Suction Valve, ensure that overrides on 0 Time valve stroke with wall triggers 16-19 activated. This will insert clock, watch or stop watch.

overrides: Closure time is 2 minutes.

OVR-5S61 D13715 POS A OFF (SWITCH) 0 Recognize/report when suction OVR-5S61 D1380 POS C OFF (SWITCH) valve indication is lost.

OVR-5DS235L03450 Green light OFF OVR-5DS236L03451 Red light OFF AND MANUALLY change and activate seal leak rate malfunctions to new values RROGA set t o 10% with 1:30 min ramp RR07A set t o 10% with 1:30 min ramp This will simulate the I I RRP Suction MOV breaker tripping after valve 90% closed. Leak will reduce but not stop.

If tripping RRP per SOP-I .2 BOP When DWP rises, trip RRP per SOP-I .2 Place REACTOR RP MOTOR 11 MG SET control switch to STOP.

Close REACTOR PUMP 11 BYPASS VALVE Simultaneously close RRP 1I NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACT1ONSl PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS suction and discharge valves Reports loss of red and green light indication for REACTOR R PUMP 11 SUCTION.

RO Monitor total recirculation flow and APRM power levels while 11 RRP being shutdown Monitor 4-Loop Power Operating Curve and verify allowable region 0 Verify power less than 90.5% after 11 RRP is removed from service If directed, reduces power Role Play: As WEC/Mgmt. acknowledge report SRO from SRO. If requested to determine the Acknowledge report from BOP problem with 11 RRP Suction Valve, report the Contact WEC/Mgmt and advise of breaker has tripped on overload and cannot be problem with 11 RRP Suction reset. Valve.

Directs that troubleshooting be The seal leak will have reduced significantly. done due to pump seal leak.

Seal pressures will not lower due to partially Direct that BOP monitor RRP 11 open Suction Valve. pressures and drywell leakage and report trends.

Verify and directs power reduction if power not less than 90.5% and ROLE PLAY: that operating point within limits on NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

I N S I KUC; I VK HC; I IVNW PLANT RESPONSE 0PERAT0R ACT IONS If contacted as Reactor Engineer, report 4-LOOp Power Operating Curve thermal limits are within specifications. Notify WEC/Mgmt. that 11 RRP has been shutdown but not isolated.

May contact Reactor Engineering to verify thermal limits.

Event 5 EPR Regulator Oscillations PO-7.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When actions to isolate 11 RRP have been completed or as directed by Lead Evaluator RO insert malfunction by activating TRG 3: 7 Recognize/Report Annunciator TC06 EPR Failure Oscillates A2-4-4, TURBINE MECHANICAL PRESSURE REGULATOR IN RPV pressure to rise approximately 12 PSlG CONTROL and power to rise 2-3%. Pressure will peak and level off when MPR is in control then begin to lower again. RO will observe control valve position oscillations as well.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION SRO As WEC/Mgmt. Acknowledge report of failed Acknowledge report by RO EPR. Advise SRO that you will provide Direct execution of ARP A2-4-4 requested assistance. Direct entry into SOP-31.2 for (The EPR will not be repaired.) oscillating EPR Notify WEC/Mgmt. of failed EPR NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE 0PERATOR ACT10NS BOP Monitor suppressed range pressure recorder/indications (Panel F) and turbine control indications (Panel A I / B I )

Note: This step may be performed by either These act,ans are in SOP-31.2 operator or concurrently. The required controls are located on the desk section of Panel E. EPR in control? YES Pressure oscillating? YES As MPR setpoint is lowered, pressure will Lower MPR setpoint until MPR is in steady out, as the MPR takes control. control Pressure is likely to be lower by several psig. Raise EPR Setpoint to 1010 psig Verify alarm A2 4-4 MPR IN CONTROL Confirm and report RPV pressure steady on MPR.

Does EPR stroke go to zero? YES Pressure under control? YES Restore pressure to pre-transient value. Adjust MPR setpoint Raises RPV pressure by raising MPR setpoint to return pressure to pre-transient value.

If power is above 90%, there are no thermal Refer to N1-OP-31 section H, limit restrictions with one pressure regulator operation with one Regulator inoperable. Inoperable.

Exits SOP-31.2 NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO Acknowledge report from operator Review Technical Specifications for limitations imposed by operating without backup pressure regulator Directed by TS 3.1.7.c into COLR for MCPR limitations Contacts Reactor Engineering to Role Play: As Reactor Engineering inform have RE determine current MCPR SRO that MCPR limits are satisfied. As based on power level. Advises WEC/Mgmt acknowledge report of EPR WEC/Mgmt of failed EPR and plant malfunction and present operational status. status.

Event 6 MPR Fails Low causes automatic Reactor Scram PO-8.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

When directed by Lead Evaluator insert malfunction by activating TRG 4:

TC08 MPR Fails Low This failure mode is the loss of pressure signal to MPR. RPV pressure rapidly rises as the -

RO MPR closes turbine CVs. Bypass valves have Recognize/report reactor SCRAM a delayed open due to MPR failure and EPR Place Mode Switch in setpoint ( I 0 10 PSIG) and the resulting SHUTDOWN pressure rise will cause a reactor scram and Verify reactor SCRAM NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

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INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0R ACT1ONS ERV actuation. Confirm FW LVL SP SETDN INlT light ON, if level below 52 WHEN Mode Switch is placed in SHUTDOWN, inches the following events are triggered by time 0 Provide SCRAM report:

delay, on TRG 5, 6 and 7, respectively: Mode switch position ED07 ELECTRIC FAULT PB102 in 2:30 min RPV pressure (valuehrend)

FW03B FEED PUMP TRIP 12 in 4:30 min RPV level (valuehrend), below RR29 RR LOOP RUPTURE 14% in 6:30 min 53 inches (EOP-2 entry)

Reactor power, APRMs downscale.

Control rod position, as full in.

Acknowledges SCRAM report Enters EOP-2 on low RPV water) level (below 53 inches or high pressure (above 1080 psig).

Direct RO to execute SOP-1 Direct BOP to restore and maintain water level (53 inches to 95 inches) using condensate, feed and CRD Verifies no ERV cycling Direct BOP/RO to maintain pressure (800-1000 PSIG) using ECs or Turbine Bypass Valves RO Acknowledge SRO direction NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INS I KUC I OK AC I IONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERAT0R ACT10NS Execute SOP-I actions Reduce RECIRC MASTER flow 25 to 43 x I O 6 Ibm/hr Confirm all rods in Place IRM range switches in Range 9 0 Insert all IRM/SRM detectors Verify Main Turbine and Generator tripped BOP Acknowledge SRO direction Execute SOP-I actions for RPV level control Confirm RPV level recovering Verify 12 FWP pump running Place 13 FWP flow control valve in MAN and dial to 0.

Disengage 13 FWP Give 29-10 (FWP 13 Discharge BV) a CLOSE signal.

Verify 11 and 12 FWP controllers in MAN and dialed to 0.

Reset HPCl at E Panel.

Place 12 FWP BYPASS valve in AUTO and set to 65-70 inches.

If level reaches 85 inches and rising Verify FWPs are OFF NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

m U C T O R ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Secure CRD pumps, if required.

0 Maximize RWCU reject flow Close FW IVs, if required.

0 Close MSIVs, if required.

Establish RWCU reject flow to condenser 0 Open CLEANUP SELECTOR CONDENSER WASTE to COND.

0 Open reject flow valve using controller RMC-33-165C.

Using Bypass Valve Opening Jack operate Turbine BV as required to maintain pressure in directed band.

Report actions complete to SRO.

2:30 min after scram, initial scram and EOP actions should be complete and the plant stabilized. Next malfunction automatically triggers on TRG5:

ED07 ELECTRIC FAULT PB102 at 2:30 min The following loads will be lost and not re- -

RO energized when PB 102 trips: Recognize/report loss of PB102 I 1 I and 112 Core Spray Pumps and Core Reports EDG 102 started but did Spray Topping Pumps not close in on powerboard I I I and 112 Containment Spray and Recognize fault on PB102 Containment Spray Raw Water Pumps The following significant loads will be lost but SRO NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE 0PERAT0R ACT10NS will be re-powered when PB 16B is re- Acknowledge report from RO energized: Directs execution of ARP A4-1-6, EDG102 Auxiliaries, RBCLC Pump 13, POWER BD 102 BUS VOLTAGE CRD Pump 11, RPS-UPS 162A/B, LOW SBClGIA/B, ESW Pump 11, MG167 Notify WEC/Mgmt of PB102 trip Role Play: As WEC and acknowledge report from SRO. Report that you will have the problem with PB102 investigated. After 10 minutes report that there is a fault on PB102.

RO Acknowledges direction from SRO Executes ARP A4-1-6 Confirm alarm on computer (F138, D199)

Determine that PB102 cannot be reenergized Place normal supply R1012 in pull-to-lock Place EDG control switch in EMERGENCY STOP Verify 12 CRD Pump in service Verify RBCLC pressure 240 PSlG Reset 86-16 (H panel)

Verify OPEN R1043 Make plant announcement that Power Board 16B will be re-energized Close PB16 A-B tie breaker NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

R1042 Contacts WEC to prepare a clearance for R1012 to prevent auto-start of EDGI 02 Informs SRO that actions for ARP are complete Next malfunction automatically triggers on BOP TRG 6: 1 Recognizeheport trip of 12 FWP FWO3B FEED PUMP TRIP 12 in 4:30 min, 7 Report no Feed Pumps available following scram. LI If required start CRD Pump 12 for level control.

Role Play: As WEClMgmt and acknowledge SRO report of 12 FWP trip. Inform SRO that you Acknowledge report from BOP will dispatch personnel to investigate the Recognize only CRD/Liquid Poison problem. pumps available for high pressure (12 FWP will not be returned to service.) RPV makeup After I O minutes report that 12 FWP tripped on Evaluate RPV IeveVtrend electrical overload. Notify WEC/Mgmt of problem with When FWP trips, level control strategy should 12 FWP. Direct WEC to dispatch change, since level cannot be maintained operatodmaintenance to above 53 inches. investigate.

Next malfunction automatically triggers on TRG 7:

RR29 RR LOOP RUPTURE 14% at 6:30 min, following scram.

Drywell pressure/temperature begins to rise.

RPVpressure begins to lower, RPV water level begins to lower.

NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS RO Drywell pressure exceeds 2.0 PSlG Recognize/report annunciator K2-Annunciator K2-4-3 alarms 4-3, Drywell Pressure Hi-Low Confirm alarm computer point Report drywell pressure/temperature rising SRO Acknowledge report from RO Direct execution of ARP K2-4-3 RO/BOP Acknowledge direction from SRO Monitor primary containment parameters Monitor RPV level/pressure BOP RPV Level begins lowering Recognize/report lowering RPV level Start CRD pumps (if not running)

Drywell pressure exceeds 3.5 psig Recognize/report drywell pressure Core Spray Pump 122 starts and stays above3.5 psig. (EOP-4 and EOP-2 running. Core Spray pump 112 starts but Entry Conditions).

immediately trips. Core Spray Topping Pump Recognize/report that Core Spray 122 also starts. Pumps 1 11 and 121 cannot Pump 112 is not running (tripped).

start because of the loss of PB102. Core Spray Pump 122 and Topping Pump are the only available Core Spray Pumps.

Report RPV level below 53 inches and lowering.

NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO Acknowledge reports from SRO may direct alternate injection sources be operators lined up (e.g., Fire Water, Liquid Poison pumps Enter EOP-4 and re-enter EOP-to Test Tank, etc.) 2 on High Drywell Pressure. Re-enter EOP-2 on RPV level Direct Containment Spray Pumps locked out (placed in puII - b l o ck) 0 Directs monitoring of Torus pressure (for reaching 13 psig)

Directs level restored and maintained between 53 inches and 95 inches using one or more of the following systems (L-3):

Condenstate/FW CRD Core Spray (EOP-1 Att 4) 0 Bypass Core Spray IV interlocks (If using for level control)

Alternate Injection Systems (Detail E) are: IF RPV water level cannot be Containment Spray Raw Water to Core restored and maintained above 53 Spray (EOPI Att 5) inches THEN directs level Fire Water (EOP 1 Att 19) maintained above -84 inches TAF.

Liquid Poison Test Tank (EOP 1 Att 12) Use Alternate Injection Systems if Liquid Poison Boron Tank (EOP 1 Att 13) needed (Detail E) L-3 0 RPV Level Control through 13 FW FCV 0 May direct RPV injection from NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

I MSTRUCTO R ACT10NS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS (EOP-1 Attachment 25) LP tank per EOP-1 Attachment o RPV Level Control through 1Iand 12 FW 13.

FCV (EOP-1 Attachment 26)

Anticipating blowdown on more than one area IF RPV Blowdown is anticipated exceeding Max Safe temperature values is THEN rapidly depressurize the expected. RPV using EC and turbine bypass valves. OK to exceed 10O0F/hr cooldown rate. (P-I override)

Directs RPV pressure stabilized 800 to 1000 psig using Turbine bypass valves.

If needed, directs use of Alternate Pressure Control Systems (P-5) u EC (Expected)

ERV (Not Expected)

Others (Not expected)

RO 7 Acknowledge direction from SRO Place all Containment Spray Pumps in pull-to-lock Informs SRO when Torus Pressure reaches 13 psig Reports Drywell parameters for verifying Containment Spray Initiation Limit NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

I-CTOR ACTIONS1 PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS As level lowers, Drywell and Torus pressure SRO rise. Torus pressure reaches 13 psig requiring These actions are from EOP-4 Drywell Sprays while level is sill lowering but When notified of Torus pressure still above -84 inches. The crew is expected to reaching 13 psig, continues to be initiating Drywell Sprays, while level execute PCP leg continues to lower toward TAF. Inside Containment Spray Initiation Limit (Fig K)? YES Direct all recirculation pumps verified tripped 13 Direct all drywell cooling fans be trip ped Direct RO to initiate Containment Sprays per EOP-1 Attachment 17 Direct RO secure Containment Spray when drywell pressure drops below 3.5 PSlG RO:

Acknowledge direction from SRO Verifies all recirculation pumps tripped Observes GREEN RRPMG breaker lights or places RRPMG Control switches to TRIP then neutral Verifies all drywell cooling fans tripped Places DW Cooling Fan control switches to TRIP then neutral NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

I N T C T O R ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CT-1 .O 7 Initiates Containment Sprays Start Containment Spray After Drywell Spray is initiated, Drywell and pump 122 Torus pressure lower. Pressure is not Start Containment Spray expected to drop below 3.5 psig until after pump 121 level is being recovered above -84 inches. Monitor Drywell pressure Report containment spray initiated to SRO Monitors drywell pressure and reports when reduced below 3.5 psig.

As level continues to drop, the SRO SRO determines that level cannot be maintained Determines RPV water level above -84 inches and proceeds to alternate cannot be maintained above -84 level control leg at EOP-2 step L-4 inches.

Directs ADS bypassed.

Directs ECs placed in service.

EOP-2 Step L-7 Preferred Injection Systems Maximize injection using Preferred are: Injection Systems Condenstate/FW (Cant inject due to Directs CRD maximized pressure) 0 CRD (Can inject) 0 Core Spray (One Pump, Cant inject due to pressure)

Are 2 or more subsystems lined UP?NO (L-8)

Alternate Injection Systems (Detail E) are: Start lining up Alternate Injection Containment Spray Raw Water to Core Systems (Detail E)

Spray (EOPI Att 5) Directs EOP-1 Attachment 25 Fire Water (EOP 1 Att 19) to lineup injection from 13 FW NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

I NSTRUCTOR ACT1ONSI PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Liquid Poison Test Tank (EOP 1 Att 12) FCV.

o Liquid Poison Boron Tank (EOP 1 Att 13) May also direct EOP-1 RPV Level Control through 13 FW FCV Attachment 26 to lineup (EOP-1 Attachment 25) injection through 11 and 12 FW RPV Level Control through 11 and 12 FCV. (Requires pulling HPCl FW FCV (EOP-1 Attachment 26) fuses).

Available sources (FW and Core Spray) will 3 WAITS until level drops to -84 restore level above TAF. Blowdown should inches. (L-I 0) not be delayed. 3 Is any subsystem lined up with a pump running? YES CS 122 pump Blowdown is not required to be initiated before Before level drops to -109, enter level reaches -109 inches. It's ok to open EOP-8, RPV Blowdown and ERV's even if below -109 inches. continue here.

SRO Actions for EOP-8 SRO Updates crew of transition to EOP-8 IF RPV water level is unknown THEN Exit this procedure and enter EOP-7 (Step 2) Not expected Are all rods inserted to at least position 04? YES (Step 3)

Drywell Pressure? BELOW 3.5 psig (Step IO)

Directs ECs initiated (Step 12)

Torus water level? ABOVE 8 feet (Step13)

Directs 3 ERVs opened. (Step 14)

OK to exceed 10O0F/hr.

0 Do NOT use hi/lo lo/lo NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERAT0R ACT10NS rosemounts below 500 psig Evaluates override conditions for Step 15, WAIT until shutdown cooling pressure interlock clears 120 psig.

(Step 16)

Subsequent steps are not expected to be performed during scenario.

Return to EOP-2 for maximizing injection.

Acknowledge reports for Core Spray status.

May direct tripping Core Spray 122 due to cavitation.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:

WHEN 3 ERVs are opened, insert malfunction by activating TRG 8: BOP CS05D, CORE SPRAY PMP 122 SUCT cl Monitors Core Spray operation for CLOGGING, 100% 0 ~ 3 0 SEC RAMP injection.

Core Spray Pump 122 and Topping Pump 122 Reports fluctuating pump amps for amps will fluctuate. When RPV pressure Core Spray Pump 122 and drops below 365 psig and injection valves Topping Pump 122.

open, no flow is observed from Loop 12. Reports no flow with injection valves open.

If the pumps are allowed to run for an If directed, trips pump.

extended period of time, an automatic pump If pumps automatically trip, report trip occurs. conditions to SRO.

NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

-INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACT1ONS BOP actions for level restoration, using -

BOP Feedwater Booster Pumps If directed, performs EOP-1 Attachment 25 for lining up 13 FW FCV.

When FWBP pressure (PI-51-61A) is greater than RPV pressure Place LVL SETPOINT SETDOWN to OVERRIDE at F Panel.

Verify open at least one FEEDWATE R ISOLATlON VALVES 11 and 12 Verify open FEEDWATER PUMP 13 BLOCKING VALVE When 13 FWP BV is opened and the controller Select manual on 13 FWP VALVE is operated, 13 FWP Flow will rise. RPV water CONTROL MA level will begin to recover, once injection is Turn FCV (knurled knob) clockwise established. to open valve.

Position as necessary to control flow.

Reports water level rising.

Using f WBP injection to the RPV while an BOP Recirc pipe break exists in the Drywell, will If directed, performs EOP-1 result in lowering Hotwell level and rising Torus Attachment 26 for lining up 11 and le vel. 12 FW FCV.

When FWBP pressure (PI-51-61A) is greater than RPV pressure Verify open at least one FEEDWATE R ISO LATI 0N VALVES 11 and 12 NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Verify open both FEEDWATER PUMP 11 and 12 BLOCKING VALVES.

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: Select manual on 11 and 12 FWP If dispatched to pull HPCl fuses trigger remote VALVE CONTROL MA by activating TRG 12: Turn FCV (knurled knob) fully FW24 HPCl Fuses, Pull counter-clockwise to close valves.

THEN report fuses removed. Dispatch operator to remove HPCl fuses FU-8 and FU-9.

Position as 11 and 12 FCVs Pump flows will rise when FCVs are opened. necessary to control flow, while maintaining each below 1.5 E6 Ibm/hr.

CT-2.0 Inject with Alternate Injection Systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above -109 inches.

Reports water level rising IF NEEDED -

RO:

CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: Acknowledge direction from SRO If contacted to line up Fire water to feedwater Contacts WEC/NAO and directs header per EOP-1 Attachment 19, trigger lineup of Fire Water to Feed remote by activating TRG I O : system FP04, loo%, I O minute delay After 10 minutes, report Firewater is lined UP-NOTE: Use of fire water is not expected, because other injection sources, such as feedwater injection through FWP pump level NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

I I _ ~- -

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS control valves is still available.

When RPV water level is rising, SRO jR0 establishes level band above TAF. Level 1 When level is rising, Go to EOP-2 strategy changes to returning level to 53 to 95 step L-I.

inches . 1 Directs verification of necessary isolations and auto actions. (L-I) 7 Directs level restored and maintained between 53 inches and 95 inches, using Condensate/FW and CRD. (L-3) 3op 7 Restores level to directed band, RPV level rises and is expected to be returned using Condensate/FW and CRD.

to the normal 3Q Drywell pressure drops below 3.5 psig II Reports .:hen Drywell Pressure drops below 3.5 psig II Secures Containment Spray RPV water level continues to rise and is restored above -84 inches. Places control switches for Containment Spray Pumps 121/122 in pull-to-lock Reports Containment Sprays secu red TERMINATING CUE RPV Blowdown completed NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0 RPV Water Level > -84 inches and rising Drywell pressure reduced below 3.5 psig Event SRO Classification SRO:

Classify the event as an ALERT, EAL 3.1.1 NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

z V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA, NRC Exam VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events Unit 2 Loss of Steam Seals March 2006 B. Commitments

1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 4 October 2006

ML070820573

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