ML070820535
| ML070820535 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/2007 |
| From: | Shortell T Constellation Energy Group |
| To: | Caruso J Operations Branch I |
| Sykes, Marvin D. | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML060800077 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML070820535 (148) | |
Text
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Scenari O ut Ii ne Form ES-D-1 s ready to be placed in service, following maintenance.
Event Description 1 FWO2C C(TS Feedwater Booster Pump 13 auto trips. The pump is a HPCl SRO) component and must be declared inoperable. SRO enters TS 3.1.8 and the pump must be restored within 15 days.
2 N Transfer pressure control from MPR to EPR per N1-OP-31, F.3.0.
3 RP2OB I (TS Drywell High Pressure Transmitter 201.2-476A fails downscale.
SRO) Transmitter supplies input to RPS, Core Spray and Containment Spray Systems. SRO Tech Spec Entry into LCO 3.6.2 is required.
4 RROSC C (BOP) Recirc Pump 13 Motor Generator Slot temperatures rise. Removal of the pump from service is required, which also requires a power reduction. Actions are taken for the Recirc Pump Trip per SOP-I .3 5 MS05 C(R0) Steam Seal Regulator Failure. Power reduction reveals a pre-existing failure in the Steam Seal Regulator and results in degraded steam seal header pressure and increased condenser air in-leakage. Regulator Bypass must be manually opened to restore seal pressure.
6 RR27 C (ALL) Recirc Master Controller fails low resulting in Restricted Zone entry.
Entry into SOP-I .5. Flow drops to 21 Mlbm/hr and power is 45-50%
R (SRO on APRMs. Cram Rods must be inserted to exit the restricted RO) zone. Power must be reduced to about 30% power to exit region.
7 Override M Loss of Condenser Vacuum due to Steam Seal Regulator Bypass Valve Failure. Enter SOP-25.1. A turbine trip is required when condenser backpressure exceeds 5 inches with generator load
<I 90 MWe. Reactor scrams either manually or automatically.
8 MS04 C Steam Leak in Drywell 20% ramp time 1O:OO minutes. After the scram and initial actions are complete, the steam leak develops.
Drywell pressure exceeds 3.5 psig and EOP entry is required.
Drywell parameters will reach values that require use of Containment Spray.
9 RP26B C Drywell High Pressure Transmitter 201.2-476C fails downscale.
With the A transmitter previously failed the high drywell pressure RPS scram signal, Core Spray and Containment Spray automatic initiation signals are prevented. Crew must take manual actions to initiate these functions.
RPV level instrument readings become erratic. Crew is required to perform RPV Flooding. Event is classified as SAE 2.1.2 2/22/2007 10:24:11 AM 1 of8 NRC Exam Submittal
TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES I ACTUAL I (PER SCENARIO: SEE SECTION D.5.d) I ATTRIBUTES Total Malfunction Count:
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 6 Major not included in this count.
Events 4,5,6,8,9,10 Didnt count Event 1 and 3,
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 because these only require SRO Events 9 and 10 tech spec use.
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Event 6 SOP-I .5and Event 7 SOP-25.1 Abnormal Events Count:
- 4. Major transients (1 -2) 1 Does not include the SRO TS related events. These are Event 7 Loss of Vacuum considered separately.
- 5. EOPs enteredhequiring substantive 2 actions (1-2)
SRO TS Events Event 6 EOP-2 RPV; EOP-4 Pri Containment Event 1 and 3 are SRO Tech Spec evaluation events.
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive 1 actions (0-2)
Event 9 EOP-7 RPV Flooding 1 7. Critical tasks (2-3) I 2 Operators SRO SRO 2 Driscoll ATC RO R2 Hibbert R4 Revelle R5 DeGroot BOP RO R1 French R3 OBrien SRO 1 Minnick 2/22/2007 10:24:11 AM 2 of 8 NRC Exam Submittal
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 1 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 32 RPV FLOODING PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 7/14/06 VALIDATED M. Meier, L. Blum. J. Tsardakas DATE 9/18/06 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING c,Tdlz DATE J/&b7 OPERATIONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CON FIG URAT1ON CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 90 minutes Initial Power Level: 90%, above the 100% Rod Line Mitigating Strategy Code: RL4 Loss of RPV Level Indicators RPV Flooding Required The scenario begins at 90% reactor power, with the Mechanical Pressure Regulator (MPR) in service. The crew will shift pressure control to the Electronic Pressure regulator (EPR) per normal operating procedures. Shortly after assuming the shift, Feedwater Booster Pump 13 automatically trips and the standby booster pump automatically starts. The pump is a HPCl component and must be declared inoperable. SRO enters TS 3.1.8 and the pump must be restored within 15 days. While shiffing regulators, one of the four drywell pressure transmitters fails downscale, preventing that channel from actuating protective functions. The transmitter inputs to RPS, Core Spray, Containment Spray and Automatic Depressurization Systems (ADS). Tech Spec 3.6.2 entry is required.
Recirc Pump 13 Motor Generator experiences an overheating condition and generator slot temperature rises. The crew will reduce power and remove Recirc Pump 13 from service. As turbine load is reduced, a pre-existing failure in the Turbine Steam Seal regulating system is revealed. The turbine seals are normally self-sealing at high power levels. The component failure is only evident as load is reduced from the Recirc Pump trip. Seal header pressure drops below normal values. The crew restores seal header pressure by manually opening the steam seal bypass valve.
A failure of the Recirc Master Flow Controller results in an unplanned power change, as Recirc Flow is reduced to minimum. Plant parameters are such that the Restricted Zone of the Power/Flow Map is entered. The crew implements N1-SOP-1.5 and must exit the Restricted Zone by raising Recirc Flow using individual RRP MA stations or by inserting cram rods. The transient is complicated by a failure of the Turbine Steam Seal Regulator Bypass valve which causes a degraded condenser vacuum, due to loss of steam seals. Vacuum lowers and now NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
results in a required turbine trip due to low load (<I90 MWe) and high backpressure (>5 inches). The crew trips the turbine, but the reactor remains at power, since power is now within turbine bypass valve capability. The crew is expected to manually initiate a scram, due to the degrading conditions. If the crew does not initiate a manual scram, a spurious automatic scram will occur.
Several minutes after the reactor is scrammed, a steam leak inside the drywell develops along with a failure of an additional drywell pressure transmitter. The transmitter failure results in loss of function for actions occurring on high drywell pressure. These functions include loss of automatic scram, automatic start of Core Spray and Containment Spray systems and ADS.
Following the scram, all RPV water level indicators will become erratic. The crew will be required to flood the RPV to the Main Steam Lines per N1-EOP-7, RPV Flooding. The crew will also control Primary Containment parameters by implementing N1 -EOP-4, Primary Containment.
Major Procedures Exercised: N1-SOP-1.3, N1-SOP-1.5, N1-SOP-25.1, N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-4, N 1-EOP-7 EAL Classificat ion : SAE 2.1.2 RPV Flooding is required.
Termination Criteria: RPV Flooding conditions are met. Containment Spray initiated and secured when DWP drops below 3.5 psig.
NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
- -~
I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-236 for NRC Exam. IC-20 or equivalent. Ensure EPR has been removed from service and control established on MPR per N1-OP-31. Reactor power is 90%.
B. PresetslFunction Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- b. RP20B RPS 11 DW PT 201.2-476A FAILED LOW TRG 2 C. RROSC RR PUMP 13 MG SLOT TEMP INCREASE 100% TRG 3 Ramp 1O:OO min
- d. MS05 TURBINE STEAM SEAL REG FAIL CLOSED TRG 3
- e. RR27 MASTER RECIRC FLOW CONTROL FAILS-LOW TRG 4
- g. MS04 STEAM RUPTURE INSIDE PC, 20% Delay 4Min TRG 7 Ramp 1O:OO Min (Event Trigger from Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN) h . RP03 REACTOR SCRAM TRG 8
- 2. Remotes:
- a. FW24 REMOVAL OF HPCl FUSES FU8/FU9, PULL TRG20
- 3. Overrides:
- a. OVR-IA2S5D1171 POS-1 SSR BV 11 CLS POS A, ON TRG 5 STEAM SEAL BYPASS VALVE CONTROL SWITCH
- b. OVR-IA2S5D1172 POS-2 SSR BV 11 OPN POS C, OFF TRG 5 STEAM SEAL BYPASS VALVE CONTROL SWITCH
- 4. Annunciators:
- a. None C. Equipment Out of Service
- 1. None D. Support Documentation
- 1. None E. Miscellaneous NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
- 1. None
- 2. EVENT TRIGGERS/COMPOSITES
- a. trgset 6 zdrpstdn== 1 Mode Switch in Shutdown (RP26B)
- b. trgset 7 zdrpstdn== 1 Mode Switch in Shutdown (MS04) (7 4:OO) 20 1O:OO
- c. trgset 9 pctdwair >240 DW air temperature >240°F (RR99A)
- d. trgset I O pctdwair >240 DW air temperature >240°F (RR87)
NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: ~ I N ID DATE:
PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Lit Control Room Annunciators 0 Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
EvolutiondGeneral Information/Equipment Status:
0 Reactor Power = 90% Loadline = >loo%
0 MPR is in service All requirements are met for operation without the EPR.
EPR setpoint has been lowered from I010 psig to 950 psig, with Shift Manager approval in preparation for placing the EPR back in service.
PART 111: RemarkslPlanned Evolutions:
Transfer control to the EPR per N1-OP-31 F.3.0.
EPR power has been on for 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.
PART IV: To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
0 Review new Clearances (SM) Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
Scenario ID#
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
[WhatHappened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options?
NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1 .O Given a primary system leak into the containment, when torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or before drywell air temperature exceeds 300°F, the crew will initiate Containment Sprays, while in the safe region of the Containment Spray Initiation Limit and prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure limit IAW N1-EOP-4.
CT-2.0 Given the plant with RPV water level unknown due to erratic instrument indication, the crew will flood the RPV to the Main Steam Lines per EOP-7 and establish RPV pressure at least 72 psig above torus pressure.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-1 .O Given a trip of Feedwater Booster Pump 13 the SRO will declare the HPCl component inoperable and enter Tech Spec 3.1.8.
PO-2.0 Given the plant at power with the MPR in service the crew will transfer control to the EPR per N1-OP-31.
PO-3.0 Given downscale failure of a Drywell Pressure transmitter the SRO will declare the instrument inoperable and take the actions required by Tech Spec 3.6.2.
PO-4.0 Given the plant at power and a rising Recirc Pump Motor Generator slot temperature the crew will remove the pump from service.
PO-5.0 Given the plant at power and a failure of the turbine Steam Seal system, the crew will respond per procedures and stabilize condenser vacuum to preclude a turbine trip.
PO-6.0 Given the plant at power and a Recirc master flow controller failure resulting in Restricted Zone entry, the crew will enter and execute N I -
SOP-1.5 to exit the Restricted Zone.
PO-7.0 Given the plant at power and a failure of the turbine Steam Seal system resulting in low turbine load (5 inches), the crew will trip the turbine as required by N I -
SOP-25.1.
NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
PO-8.0 Given erratic indication on RPV water level instruments, the crew will recognize water level is unknown and execute EOP-7 RPV Flooding and flood to the Main Steam Lines.
PO-9.0 Given the plant with LOCA conditions, the crew will initiate Containment Sprays when torus pressure exceeds 13 psig.
PO-10.0 Given the plant with LOCA conditions and Containment Sprays is service, the crew will secure Containment Spray when drywell pressure drops below 3.5 psig PO-11.O Given events that meet the criteria for emergency classification, the SRO will classify the event per EPP-EPIP-01 EAL Matrix.
NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
PLANT RESPONSE 0PER A T 0 R ACT10N S Crew Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.
SRO Directs performance of transferring control to EPR.
EVENT1 FWBP13 Trip CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:
When directed activate malfunction by activating -
BOP TRG 1: Report alarm and respond per H3-3-6 Confirm alarm on computer (E076 FWO2C FEEDWATER BOOSTER PUMP TRIP 13 RX FW BOOST PMP 13 TRIP)
Confirm start of standby pump FWBP 13 trip and FWBP 12 starts. FWBP 13 control switch should be H3-3-6 REACTOR FW BOOSTER P 13 TRIP OL placed in PTL.
SUCTION alarms Dispatch operators to shift Hydrogen Water Chemistry injection from FWBPl3 to FWBP 12.
The following annunciators alarm, but clear after SRO the transient: Acknowledges report.
H3-1-7 REACTOR FW PUMP 11 TRIP Enters Tech Spec 3.1.8 specification OVERLOAD SUCTION HI- LEVEL b. Determines redundant component H3-2-7 REACTOR FW PUMP 12 TRIP inoperability and 15 days to restore.
OVERLOAD SUCTION HI- LEVEL Initiates surveillance requirement H3-3-7 REACTOR FW SHAFT P 13 DlSCH 4.1.8 c for redundant component NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR AC I IONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS PRESS SUCTION operability verification.
7 Notifies WEC 7 Notifies Ops Management 11 Performs crew brielupdate.
NOTE: Event 3 should be entered while Event 2 is in progress. There are no audible alarms associated with the transmitter failure.
EVENT 2 Transfer Control to EPR Note: All actions to place the EPR in service will be Verify EPR power is on ,aminimum conducted from E Console. of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Verify EPR setpoint 1010 psig or EPR Control Light off, as directed by SM.
Record Reactor Pressure EPR setpoint is lowered from 950 psig to about Slowly lower EPR setpoint in move 920 psis before the servo begins to move in the and wait manner while monitoring upscale direction. The setpoint was lowered to 950 servo position.
psig from 1010 psig before crew assumed the shift. WHEN EPR Servo position starts to move upscale THEN raise EPR setpoint until servo stops moving upscale to demonstrate control of EPR servo.
As the EPR setpoint meter moves in the upscale Lower EPR setpoint again in move direction, the EPR will assume control when the and wait manner UNTIL EPR servo servo indication is about the same as the MPR begins to move slowly upscale.
servo setting.
WHEN EPR servo position approaches MPR servo positon, observe the following responses:
Steam Pressure EPR Control light lit NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR A C T I O N S /
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS A2-4-4 TURBINE MECHANICAL PRESS REG IN CONTROL clears Assure EPR has taken control by slowly lowering EPR setpoint in move-and-wait manner until reactor pressure lowers by 1 or 2 psig.
Verify EPR performance as follows:
Slowly raise MPR setpoint UNTIL MPR control light goes off.
Raise MPR setpoint to obtain MPR servo position 8% to 14% lower than EPR Servo position (MPR setpoint is 4-6 psi above EPR setpoint).
Adjust EPR setpoint to return Adjusting the EPR setpoint to re-establish pressure reactor pressure to pre-transfer will change the magnitude of the difference setting recorder in step F.3.2 between the MPR and EPR setpoint.
The MPR setpoint may require adjustment to Adjust MPR setpoint as necessary to establish the required difference in servo position. obtain MPR servo position 8% to 12%
lower than EPR servo position. 0.15 ROLE PLAY: to 0.25 MPR paddle gap.
If dispatched to verify proper paddle gap, wait one Report s EPR in service to SRO.
minute, then report paddle gap is 0.20 inches.
NOTE: There are no alarms associated with the transmitter failure (downscale). At the Lead Examiners discretion a role play as RB operator may be used. Report the downscale condition and gross failure, while on RB rounds.
NRC Scenario 1 -1 1- September 2006
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 3 Drywell High Pressure Transmitter 201.2-476A fails downscale PO-2.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by activating TRG 2:
RP20B RPS 1I DW PT 201.2-476A FAILED LOW CREW Identifies and reports ANALOG TRIP ANALOG TRIP SYSTEM CHANNEL I 1 TROUBLE red light illuminates. Red light is located on upper SYSTEM CHANNEL 11 TROUBLE leff side of F Panel. red light illuminated.
Dispatches operator to Reactor Building 281 to check RPS cabinets May refer to drawing C-I 8014-C sheet ROLE PLAY:
1 and table to determine functions of WHEN dispatched to RPS Cabinets, report Drywell affected instrument.
Pressure transmitter 201.2-476A is downscale with gross failure lit. All other DW pressure transmitters are reading correctly for current DW pressure.
NOTE:
Tech Specs 3.6.2.a, b, d, e, f and I all apply. Declares DWP transmitter inoperable.
3.6.2.a Scram Note ( 0 ) With one channel required Enter Tech Spec 3.6.2 for instruments by Table 3.6.2.a inoperable in one or more that initiate scram, primary coolant or parameters, place the inoperable channel and/or containment isolation, core spray that trip system in the tripped condition within 12 initiation, containment spray initiation hours. and ADS initiation.
3.6.2.b Note (f) also requires tripping channel Determines transmitter must be within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, since channel is common with placed in the tripped condition within RPS. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
3.6.2.d Note (f) requires placing channel in tripped Notifies the WEC.
condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or take the action Notifies Ops Management.
required by Specification 3.6.2.a for that Conducts crew briefhpdate.
parameter. This requires tripping the channel in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. 3.6.2.e Note (c) also applies the same way.
3.6.2.1 is 7 day LCO for CREVS. 3.4.5 must also be NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS entered for CREVS system.
EVENT 4 RECIRC PUMP MOTOR GENERATOR SLOT TEMPERATURE RISES WITH STEAM SEAL REGULATOR FAILED CLOSED PO-3.0 and 4.0 When plant conditions have stabilized, ACTIVATE malfunctions using TRG3:
RROSC, Recirculation MG Set # I 3 Generator 30P Overheating (100% over I O min.) 3esponds to annunciator F2-(2-3)
MS05 TURBINE STEAM SEAL REGULATOR I Observes Process Computer point FAILS LOW A094 and B331, RRMG 13 GEN After about 3 minutes Annunciator SLOT TEMP in high alarm.
F2 (2-3), REACT RECIRC M G SET 13 alarms 7 Dispatches A 0 to verify proper ventilation and inspect 13 RRMG.
ROLE PLAY: 7 Inform SRO of high temperature on As A 0 sent to the MG set, report that ventilation 13 RRMG.
system is operating properly and the motor end of 7 May also reference N1-OP-40, F.1.O
- I 3 RRMG set is extremely hot to the touch. for additional response.
These actions for N1-OP-I F.4.0 Verify proper operation of Recirc MG Area Ventilation Verify proper positioning of TB Truck Bay doors Verify proper operation of Recirc MG Set Area Coolers Verify RRP parameters are within limits Verify total recirculation flow is even balanced between operating RRPs IF generator slot temperatures continue to rise and approach 120°C, NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
INS I KUC I UK HC I IUNW PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS THEN reduce loading on affected Note: Emergency Power Reduction actions are RRMG by lowering power per NI-OP-contained in NI-SOP-?.1. These actions are also 43B (Emergency Power Reduction identified in N1-OP-43B section), as directed by SRO.
Note: -
SRO The SRO should direct one of the following actions Direct Emergency Power Reduction to reduce the load on 13 RRMG: per N1-SOP-1.1 OR Emergency Power Reduction, using NI-SOP- Direct RO to remove RRMG 13 from I . 1 or NI-OP-43B service 13 RRP Shutdown, using Nl-OP-I, Section Checks T.S. 3.1.7 for 4 loop H. 1.0. operation, .98 APLHGR applies.
Trip of 13 RRP Verifies 4 loop thermal limits Expected result is that 13 RRMG and RRP will be Verifies P/F Map updated shutdown due to inability to clear the high When Recirc Pump 13 Discharge temperature condition on RRMG 13. Valve is re-opened, declares APRMs inop, due to reverse flow. (Only applicable if pump was tripped and APRMs are declared inop, while ROLE PLAY: discharge valve is open).
As A 0 sent to the MG set, after the power Notifies Operations Management reduction report that the RRMG appears to be Notifies Chemistry getting hotter, even though the load has been Notifies Reactor Analyst reduced. Provides Reactivity Brief per GAP-OPS-05.
RO If directed, reduces power per N1-SOP-1. I , using all Recirc Master Flow Controller.
NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
l l U 3 I KUL I U K HL I I U l U S l PLANT RESPONSE 0PE R A T 0 R ACT10N S The turbine is self-sealing at high power levels, so a failure of the regulator is not apparent until load is 0 If directed to shutdown 13 RRP per reduced. Steam Seal header pressure drops below N1-OP-I H . l .O performs the following:
normal. Alarm A2-2-5 TURBINE STEAM SEAL Place RRECIRC PUMP 13 HDR PRESS HIGH-LOW alarms. SPEED CONTROL in BAL and null out Deviation Meter (top meter)
Place RRECIRC PUMP 13 SPEED CONTROL AUTO/BAL/MAN switch to MAN Verify open REACTOR R PUMP 13 BYPASS VALVE.
Slowly reduce recirculation Pump 13 flow to 6 to 8x1O6 Ib/hr Close REACTOR R PUMP 13 DISCHARGE VALVE.
WHEN Discharge Valve is closed, place REACTOR RP MOTOR 13 MG SET switch to STOP.
When RRP 13 pump is removed from service Hold in OPEN position for 2 to 3 delete the Malfunction for REACT RECIRC MG seconds REACTOR R PUMP 13 SET 13 GENERATOR OVERHEATING. DISCHARGE VALVE.
It will slowly cool down and the alarm will clear. Align system for 4 Loop operation per section H.
If directed to trip RRMG set:
Trip 13 RRMG set Monitor P/F map (4 loop) h o p APRMs due to reverse flow in idle loop.
NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS These action are from SOP-1.3 Bop If directed, executes SOP-1.3 IF Recirc Pump trip results in less than three operating loops THEN SCRAM the reactor per SOP-1 (Not Expected)
Verify proximity to restricted zone using Power/Flow Map (Four Loop)
Notify SRO that APRMs are inoperable.
Close RECIRC PUMP 13 DISCHARGE VALVE.
IF RECIRC PUMP 13 DISCHARGE VALVE is closed, THEN hold open for 2-3 seconds RECIRC PUMP 13 DI SCHARG E VALVE.
Notify SRO that APRMs are operable.
During valve stem warmup, restore F Panel controls to normal as follows:
Green flag RECIRC PUMP 13 SB switch.
Place RECIRC PUMP 13 SPEED CONTROL AUTO/BAL/MAN switch to MAN.
Scenario events will proceed prior to completing WHEN 30 minute warmup period has the 30 minute warmup period for the discharge elapsed for discharge valve, THEN valve. Close Recirc Pump 13 discharge valve. (Not expected)
NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event 5 Steam Seal Regulator Failure Event is automatically initiated during the power reduction. BOP actions are taken concurrently with actions taken by RO for RRP 13 high slot temperature and the power reduction.
Malfunction initiated with Event 4 using TRG 3:
MS05 TURBINE STEAM SEAL REGULATOR FAILS LOW The turbine is self-sealing at high power levels, so RO a failure of the regulator is not apparent until load is Report and respond to annunciator reduced. Steam Seal header pressure drops below A2-2-5 TURBINE STEAM SEAL HDR normal. Alarm A2-2-5 TURBINE STEAM SEAL PRESS HIGH-LOW HDR PRESS HIGH-LOW alarms. These actions are from A2-2-5 Confirm alarm comp point Maintain Steam Seal Reg pressure 2-5 psig Verify open STEAM SEAL REG BLOCK 11 Verify open STEAM SEAL REG When STEAM SEAL REG BY-PASS is throttled BLOCK 13 open, Steam Seal Header pressure will rise. Verify closed STEAM SEAL UNLOAD Thottle open STEAM SEAL REG BY-PASS.
Report header pressure restored to normal value.
ROLE PLAY: If required direct crew as Ops management, with reactor engineering concurrence, to reduce power below 80%. Provide RMR, if needed. This must be done prior to inserting next malfunction. If started from too high a power level, a high level trip may occur due to NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
TNSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS FWLC and FWP valve response times.
EVENT 6 MASTER RECIRC FLOW CONTROLLER FAILS LOW PO-5.0 CONSOLE 0P ERAT0R When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunctions by activating TRG 4:
Direct entry into SOP-I .5 for unplanned reactor power change.
RR27 MASTER RECIRCULATION FLOW May direct FWLC placed in manual, CONTROLLER FAILS-LOW due to transient rising level.
Directs exit from Restricted Zone by Recirc flow signal rapidly reduces to minimum.
raising Recirc flow or by Cram Rod Recirc flow, reactor power and generator MWe Insertion begin to lower. Reactor power will lower to about 50% and core flow will be about 21 Mlbmlhr. Entry into the Power/Flow map "Restricted Zone" occurs.
An RPV HIGH WATER LEVEL alarm may occur due to the rapid power change and response of the Feedwater System.
RO These actions are from SOP-I .5 NOTE: Continuously monitor LPRMs and The RECIRC MASTER controller is failed low, but APRMs for thermal hydraulic flow can be raised by placing the individual RRPs instabilities (NONE expected).
to manual and raising flow from F Panel.
Cram rod insertion may still be required to exit the IF RESRICTED ZONE is entered, restricted zone. Raising flow will also raise power, THEN.. .Exit by performing one of the so exiting the restricted zone by raising flow alone, following (as directed):
NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
c INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 0PER A T 0 R ACT10N S will probably not result in exiting the zone. Based Raise Recirc Flow by placing on the Power/Flow Map, power must be reduced individual MA stations to MANUAL from about 50% to about 30% with flow at 21 and raining individual RRP pump Mlbm/hr to exit. flows OR Lower reactor power by inserting cram rods to 00. WHEN directed by SRO, inserts cram rods to 00.
Inform Reactor Engineering Supervisor.
Reactor power lowers as cram rods are inserted. If generator MWe <I90 MWe and B499 computer point indicates backpressure is >5 hg, a turbine trip is required, per SOP-25. I As power lowers Alarm A2-2-5 TURBINE STEAM RO/BOP SEAL HDR PRESS HIGH-LOW alarms again. If necessary, adjusts STEAM SEAL Steam seal pressure must be manually adjusted as REG BY-PASS to maintain 2 to 5 psig power lowers.
Event 7 STEAM SEAL BYPASS FAILURE DEGRADES CON DENSER VACUUM.
PO-6.0 RO/BO P WHEN power is about 30% to 35%, activate Recognize and report alarm overrides to fail STEAM SEAL REG BY-PASS Report STEAM SEAL REG BY-PASS valve closed using TRG 5: is closed and cannot be opened.
ior 2s5dil71 (5 0) on Report condenser vacuum lowering.
ior 2s5dil72 (5 0) off Executes SOP-25.1 for loss of STEAM SEAL REG BY-PASS closes and Steam vacuum.
NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
c*
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Seal header pressure drops to 0 psig. Alarm A2 Recognize requirement to trip the 5 TURBINE STEAM SEAL HDR PRESS HIGH- turbine and enter N1-SOP-31.1 LOW alarms. Condenser vacuum begins to lower. Trips the turbine WHEN vacuum lowers to 24 inches, annunciator Verifies turbine is tripped and bypass A1-3-4 CONDENSER VACUUM BELOW 24HG valves are controlling reactor alarms. Per NI-SOP-25. I , If generator MWe < I 9 0 pressure.
MWe and B499 computer point indicates Verifies generator tripped backpressure is >5 hg, a turbine trip is required, Reports FW shifted to HPCl mode per SOP-25.I due to turbine trip.
NOTE: As required, lower power per SOP-1 .I Lowering power in this case will actually make to stabilize vacuum.
condenser vacuum worse because lowering power Verify proper operation of the makes the steam seal loss more severe. following:
Increased air in-leakage past seals will occur the Circ Water more power is lowered. SJAE Off Gas System Condensate System Turbine Gland Seal System System Leaks If appropriate, place standby SJAE in service (NOT expected)
F3-4-6 First Stage Bowl Press Low is expected to F3-4-6 First Stage Bowl Press in alarm during power reduction to exit the Restricted alarm (Yes/No) Should Be YES Zone. IF YES ....Verify power below 45%
BEFORE Condenser Vacuum reaches NOTE: 22.1 Hgv TRIP the turbine and enter Vacuum Trip 1. Trips turbine at 22.1 SOP-31 .Iconcurrently.
Vacuum Trip 2. Closes BPV at I O BEFORE Condenser Vacuum reaches Other actions that may be directed are removing 10 Hgv SCRAM the reactor and enter 13 FWP from service and starting a second motor SOP- 1 concu rrent Iy .
driven feed pump. After the HPCl initiation, If directed, manually scram the reactor NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
gv STRUCTOR-ACTI0 Ns1 PLANT RESPONSE O P E ~ A T O RACTIONS resetting HPCl may be directed. The scenario will and enters SOP-1 proceed prior to any of these actions being performed.
Due to degraded condition, the crew may initiate a manual scram after tripping the turbine. If a manual scram is directed, the steam leak will occur after 4:OO minute time delay and MS to shutdown.
IF a manual scram IS NOT initiated by the crew after tripping the turbine CONSOLE OPERATOR initiates an automatic scram by activating malfunction using TRG 8:
RP03 REACTOR SCRAM SRO Directs a manual scram based on degraded plant OR IF automatic scram occurs directs scram actions to be implemented.
Repeats back Scram Report Enters EOP-2 RPV Control on on RPV water level < 53inches These actions from EOP-2 Directs entry into SOP-1 (SCRAM)
IF water level is unknown exit this procedure and enter EOP-7 to flood the RPV (L-2) (Expected to occur later, when level indications become NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS erratic.)
Directs level restored and maintained between 53 inches and 95 inches using one or more of the following systems (L-3):
Condenstate/FW CRD Core Spray (EOP-1 Att 4) 0 Bypass Core Spray IV interlocks Directs RPV pressure stabilized 800 to 1000 psig using Turbine bypass valves.
If needed, directs use of Alternate Pressure Control Systems (P-5)
EC ERV CI Others (Not expected)
May direct closing MSlVs prior to automatic closure on lowering vacuum NOTE -
RO When the reactor is scrammed and the Mode When directed, initiates a manual Switch is in SHUTDOWN, malfunctions are scram by pacing Mode Switch to activating by TRG 6 and TRG 7: SHUTDOWN or using Manual Scram The steam leak will not become apparent until pushbuttons and implements SOP-I about four minutes after the scram. Reactor Scram.
RP26B RPS IIDW PT 201.2-476C FAILED LOW Provides Scram Report MS04 STEAM LINE RUPTURE INSIDE PRIMARY Perform SOP-I Scram Verification CONTAIMENT 20% 1O:OO MINUTE RAMP AFTER steps 4:OO minute time delay ...ms04 (7 4:OO) 20 1O:OO Confirm all rods inserted to position 04 or beyond using Full Core Display.
Observe power decreasing NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Place IRMs on Range 9 Insert IRM and SRM detectors Downrange IRMs as necessary Verify turbine and generator tripped.
Maintain RPV pressure in the directed band, below 1080 psig using one or more of the following (unless given other direction from EOP-2):
Turbine Bypass Valves Emergency Condensers ERVs Others (Not expected)
BOP Performs RPV Level Control at F Panel.
Restore level 53 to 95 inches as directed.
IF 13 FWP is running and level is recovering:
Verify at least one motor FWP running.
NOTE: Failure to give 29-01 a close signal, will Terminate 13FWP injection:
I cause FWP13 FCV to swing and results in Place 13 FWP Valve Controller in pressure and flow swings when NR level MAN and dial to 0 output.
instruments begin to swing. This is because FWP Verify >53 inches.
13 FCV receives its setpoint setdown control Disengage clutch.
signals, even with MA controller in MANUAL. Give 29-01 BV close signal.
Control Motor FWP Injection:
Verify >53 inches and rising Verify 11 and 12 FWP valve controllers in MAN and dial to 0 NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR A C T I O N S 7 ~
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS output.
At E Panel, reset HPCl 11 and 12 using pushbuttons.
NOTE: Placing a FWP BYPASS valve in AUTO set Place one FWP BYPASS valve in at 65 to 70 inches, will cause FWP pressure and AUTO set at 65 to 70 inches.
flow swings when NR level instruments begin to Verify level stable and secure Znd swing. FWP, if running.
If required, close running FWP discharge BV.
If directed, closes MSlVs Event 8 Steam Leak inside Drywell. DWP Transmitter 201.2-476C failed downscale.
After 4 minutes, malfunction MS04 begins to ramp.
Steam leakage into the drywell begins with CREW temperature and pressure rise. The D WP Recognize and report rising DWP downscale transmitter failure results in failure of one RPS Channel ( I I ) to trip when DWP exceeds 3.2 psig. Other automatic system responses are failure of Core Spray System to start on High DWP. The Containment Spray System auto start is also affected by the transmitter failures.
ACTIONS FOR HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE N I - -
SRO EOP-4 Primary Containment Control. Executes May direct manual containment all legs concurrently. Major actions and legs isolation to be initiated.
executed during EOP-4. Enters EOP-4 on high DWP above 3.5 psig Containment Spray Initiated? (Step 1 NO)
Directs lockout of all Containment NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
c INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
I.
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Spray Pumps (Step 2)
PO-10.0 and PO-I 1.O Executes PCP Leg Drywell and Torus pressure and temperature rise If Cont Sprays are running, THEN due to steam leakage. stop sprays when DWP drops below 3.5 psig. (PCP-1 Override) Action is expected to occur after spray is initiated).
Maintain PC pressure below 3.5 psig (EOP 1 Att I O ) (PCP-2)
Torus pressure exceeds 13 psig. If Torus Pressure exceeds 13 psig, THEN Go to 17 (which is PCP-3). . .(PCP-2, Expected)
Inside Containment Spray Initiation Limit Fig K? (PCP-3 YES)
Directs All Recirc Pumps tripped.
Directs all drywell cooling fans tripped.
CT-I .O Operate Cont Spray (EOP 1 Att 17)
Keep trying to lower PC pressure below 3.5 psig. (PCP-5)
If cannot stay Inside PSP Fig L curve, THEN Go to 18 (which is PCP-8)
(Perform a Blowdown per EOP-8 Not expected).
These actions are expected by SRO when level indicators become erratic:
Determines and announces RPV water level is unknown WHEN RPV level indicators become erratic and water level can no longer be determined, Exits EOP-2 and enters EOP-7 RPV Flooding (from L-2 NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS and L-4)
Executes TT Leg 2 Maintain Torus temperature below 85°F using Torus Cooling (EOP 1 Att
- 16) (TT-2) 3op BOP Actions to start torus cooling per EOP-1 7 If directed, starts Torus Cooling per 6 Attachment 16 3 Torus Cooling shall be placed in service within 15 minutes of Torus temperature 2 85°F 7 Close CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:
111; 80-45 112 or 121; 80-40 and 80-45 122; 80-40 Verify closed 80-1 15, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 12 Verify closed 80-1 14, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 11 Verify closed Cont Spray Discharge IV using keylock switch for selected loop:
L3 111; 80-16 0 112; 80-36 C1 121;80-15 0 122; 80-35 Verify open CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:
111; 80-40 112; 80-44 121;80-41 NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
INS I KUC; I UK AC; I IUNW PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 122; 60-45 Fully open 80-1 18, CONT SPRAY TEST TO TORUS FCV Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP in selected loop.
Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP in selected loop.
WHEN torus water reaches desired temperature stop Containment Spray pump.
Stop all operating Raw Water Pumps If desired, return system to standby per N1-OP-14.
Report status to SRO.
PO-I 0.0, CT-1 .O 3op When directed, trips all Recirc Pumps.
When directed, trips drywell cooling fans.
Verify started Containment Spray BOP Actions for containment spray per EOP-1 Pump Illor 122.
Attachment 17 Verify started at least one of the other three Containment Spray When Containment Spray is initiated, Drywell Pumps.
pressure lowers below 3.5 psig. IF 80-1 18 is open for Torus Cooling, THEN Open Containment Spray CONSOLE OPERATOR Discharge IV for Containment WHEN Drywell temperature drops below 200°F Spray Loop in Torus Cooling and the crew is injecting to establish flooding Mode.
pressure, THEN delete malfunctions RR99A and Close 80-1 18 RR87: Verify open 80-40 and 80-45 This stops the erratic indication on all level meters. IF EDG loading permits, THEN start Containment Spray Raw NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
11\13 I K U L I U K HL I I U I U 3 1 . -
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Water Pump for associated loop.
PO-11.o 3op Drywell pressure lowers with Containment Spray in 1 Reports DWP below 3.5 psig operation until DWP drops to 3.5 psig 1 Stops Containment Spray by placing all Containment Spray Pumps in Pull To Lock.
When Drywell temperature exceeds 240 OF, RPV water level instrument readings become erratic and RPV water level can no longer be determined.
Event 8 RPV Level Instrument Readings Become Erratic PO-9.0 2REW 7 Recognize and report erratic level When Drywell Air Temperature PCTDWAIR indication and fuel zone indications of exceeds 240°F trigger 9 and 10 activate flashing malfunctions:
RR99A ERRATIC LEVEL INDICATION, ALL 3Rq These actions are expected by SRO METERS AND RECORDERS when water level indicators become RR87 FUEL ZONE LEVEL INSTRUMENT erratic FLASHING 7 Determines and announces RPV Fuel Zone digital display indications begin flashing.
water level is unknown A l l water level indications become erratic.
Exits EOP-2 and enters EOP-7 RPV Flooding (from L-2 and L-4)
These actions are directed from EOP-7 RPV Flooding NOTE: The following actions may lead to Are all rods inserted to at least fluctuating FWP flow and pressure as NR level position 04? (Step 1 YES) indications swing: a IF RPV water level can be Placing FWP Bypass Controller to AUTO. Leaving determined.. ..RETURN TO RPV NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS any f WP MA CONTROL in AUTO (with HPCl CONTROL (Step 12 Not expected) fuses pulled) will result in valve swings as sensed Torus water level? (Step 13 Above 8 level swing. feet)
Failure to close FWP 13 Blocking Valve will result Directs Open 3 ERVs (Step 14) and in swings from FWPl3. Setpoint Setdown will still OK to exceed 1OO°F/hr cooldown control FWP 13 valve, even with controller in manual.
Can 3 ERVs be opened? (Step 15 YES)
Directs Close MSlVs and EC Steam Isolation Valves (Step 16)
CT-2.0 Control injection to establish and maintain 3 ERVs open AND RPV pressure at least 72 psi above torus pressure using (Step 17):
CondensatelFW, OK to bypass high level trips CRD Core Spray, Bypass IV Interlocks Alternate Injection Systems (Detail E)
Detail E Systems are:
Containment Spray Raw Water to Core Spray (EOPI Att 5)
Fire Water (EOP 1 Att 19)
Liquid Poison Test Tank (EOP 1 Att 12)
Liquid Poison Boron Tank (EOP 1 Att 13)
If you cannot restore and maintain RPV pressure at least 72 psi above torus pressure with 3 ERVs open.. .THEN FLOOD THE DRYWELL, exit all EOPs and enter all SAPS (Step 17)
NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
INS I KUL I UK HL I I U l U S l PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 7 Record time of RPV pressure at least 72 psi above torus pressure with 3 ERVs open (Stepl8).
7 WAIT for RPV water level instruments to be available AND DWT at 319 ft c212 AND Flooding conditions met for at least 101 minutes (Step 19) ...to proceed.
VOT expected to proceed past this WAIT block in the scenario 32 CONSO LE OPERATOR I] If directed, initiates manual If dispatched to pull HPCl Fuses, activate remote containment isolation at E Console.
using TRG 20: 3 If directed, injects with FW24 PULL HPCI FUSES, PULL, 3:OO min delay. CondensateIFW system.
After the 3:OO minute time delay, remote becomes 3 If directed, pulls HPCl fuses.
active. As operator dispatched, REPORT HPCl 3 If directed, starts second CRD Pump.
fuses are pulled. I If directed establish injection with Core Spray systems.
Starts Core Spray Pumps Install Core Spray Jumpers Throttles open injection valves CT-2.0 I] Using any injection systems directed, establishes injection to maintain 3 ERVs open and RPV pressure at least 72 psig above torus pressure.
NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
?YN3jI K U L I UK HC; 1 IONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 0PER A T 0 R ACT10NS TERMINATION CRITERIA RPV Flooding conditions are met. Containment Spray initiated and secured when DWP drops below 3.5 psig.
EVENT 9 SRO Classification SRO PO-I 1.o Classify the event as SAE 2.1.2, RPV Flooding is required.
NRC Scenario 1 September 2006
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA, NRC Exam VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events Unit 2 Loss of Steam Seals March 2006 B. Commitments
- 1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Description Crew performs N1-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valve Operability Test for EC Loop 12 IVs per Section 8.2.
Steam IV 39-08R fails to fully close during testing. Valve must be declared inoperable and isolated per Tech Spec 3.2.7. EC Loop 12 now remains inop and unavailable when the steam line is isolated (TS 3.1.3.b, 7 day)
ERVI 11 inadvertently opens. The crew enters SOP-I .4. An emergency power reduction to 85% is performed. The ERV will close after the fuses are pulled. Tech Spec 3.1.5 must be entered because the valve is now inoperable. TS 3.2.9 may also require entry.
Recirc Flow Master Controller fails as-is, preventing the power reduction by normal methods. The crew will operate individual Recirc Flow controls at F panel or insert cram rods to complete the emergency power reduction.
EC 11 tube leak (50% with 5 minute ramp time). EC 11 isolation is required. Both EC loops are now inoperable. Tech Spec 3.1.3 specification e now applies and an orderly shutdown is required.
A steam leak develops in the turbine building condenser area with severity at 15%. Turbine Vibration rises following the load reduction. The crew will initiate a manual scram due to degraded plant conditions or when turbine bearing vibration exceeds 12 mils.
ATWS. Following the scram control rods will not fully insert and power will remain within turbine bypass valve capability, at about 25%. The MSIVs will close on high temperature and heat will be rejected to the torus. Liquid Poison Pump 11 trips. Alternate Boron Injection is directed.
Control Rod Drive Pump 12 trips during the scram transient.
Starting CRD Pump 11 is necessary for driving control rods.
Containment Spray Pump 111 trips, after control rods are fully inserted. Pump is initially running in the Torus Cooling mode. Since Torus temperature is still high due to heat added during the event, the system must be realigned to start an alternate Containment Spray Pump.
Event is classified as SAE 2.2.2 2/22/2007 10:24:11 AM 3of8 NRC Exam Submittal
Facilitv: Nine Mile Point 1 Scenario No.: NRC-02 Op-Test No.: NRC TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES (PER SCENARIO: SEE SECTION D.5.d)
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8)
I ACTUAL ATTRIBUTES Total Malfunction Count:
Major is not included in this count.
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)
Event 8 CRD Pump Trip Event 9 Abnormal Events Count:
Containment Sprav Pump Trip Does not include the SRO TS
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4)
Event 3 SOP-I .4 Event 5 EC Tube Leak
- 4. Myor transients ( I -2)
I 2 1
related events. These are considered separately.
Event 6 Turbine High Vibration and Steam SRO TS Events Leak into the Turbine building Event 2,3 and 5 are SRO Tech
- 5. EOPs enteredhequiring substantive 1 Spec evaluation events.
actions (1-2)
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive 1 actions (0-2)
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) I 3 Operators SRO SRO 1 Minnick ATC RO R1 French R3 OBrien SRO 2 Driscoll BOP RO R2 Hibbert R4 Revelle R5 DeGroot 2/22/2007 10:24:1 1 AM 4of8 NRC Exam Submittal
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 2 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 38 FAILURE TO SCRAM PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 7/18/06 VAL1DATED GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING OPERATIONS MANAGER I- M. Meier, L. Blum, J. Tsardakas NA Exam Security DATE 9/18/06 DATE DATE 2h?7 CON FlGU RAT1ON CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 90 minutes Initial Power Level: 100%, above the 100% Rod Line Mitigating Strategy Code: AT1 ATWS Level Controlled below -41 inches. No RPV Blowdown The crew assumes the shift with the plant operating at rated conditions and Containment Spray Pump 122 removed from service for maintenance. The crew will perform Nl-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test, on the Emergency Condenser (EC) Loop 12 Isolation Valves (IVs) per Section 8.2. This test consists of stoke time tests for EC Steam Isolation Valves. A valve failure will result in entry into Tech Specs for the failed coolant and containment isolation valve When the surveillance on the EC Loop 12 IVs is addressed, the crew will respond to an inadvertent opening of an ERV. The crew will perform an emergency power reduction to about 85%. A failure of the Master Recirc Flow Controller will require the crew to either take manual control of the pump MA stations or insert the cram rods to complete the power reduction. The ERV will be closed when the crew pulls the control power fuses. The SRO must also assess the Tech Spec impact of the inoperable ERV.
ECI 1 vent radiation monitor alarms and the crew determines that a tube leak exists, based on confirmed alarms and rising shell water level. The crew will isolate ECI 1 to stop the release.
The SRO reviews Tech Specs and determines with ECI 1 inoperable Tech Spec 3.1.3.b applies. However, with a confirmed EC Tube Leak a plant shutdown is required. Additionally both EC are now inoperable and unavailable for pressure control.
Following the power reduction, turbine vibration will rise and steam leak in the turbine building develops. These reach a severity level that requires a turbine trip and a reactor scram.
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
When the crew inserts a reactor scram, many control rods fail to insert and power remains at 20 to 30% power. Because of the steam leak into the turbine building, the main condenser will only be available as a heat sink for a short period of time after the scram before the MSlVs are closed, on high steam tunnel temperature. The crew will terminate and prevent injection to lower reactor water level and suppress reactor power. When the main condenser is lost as a heat sink, the crew will maintain reactor pressure using the ERVs and will place torus cooling in service. Because of the rising torus water temperature the crew will inject Liquid Poison (LP).
Liquid poison injection fails and the crew will direct use of alternate boron injection. The SRO will direct the actions of EOP-3 and EOP-4 including alternate control rod insertion per EOP-3.1. The crew will be able to insert control rods, after starting a CRD pump, using the Reactor Manual Control System (RMCS) and manual reactor scrams will be successful in inserting the control rods. The SRO will be required to reduce the pressure control band to remain within the heat capacity temperature limit. The loss of both Emergency Condensers adds additional heat to the torus due to more frequent operation of the ERVs to control reactor pressure. After all rods are inserted, the Containment Spray Pump operating in Torus Cooling mode trips. The system must be realigned and an alternate pump started to continue Torus Cooling.
Major Procedures: N1-SOP-I .4, Nl-OP-I 3, N1-EOP-3, N1-EOP-4 EAL Classification: SITE AREA EMERGENCY 2.2.2 Termination Criteria: All control rods inserted, EOP-3 exited, EOP-2 entered and crew directed to restore reactor water level restored to 53-95 inches.
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-242; IC-20 or equivalent LP Pump 12 and Containment Spray 122 are out of service.
B. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. LPOIA LIQUID POISON PUMP TRIP 11, TRUE INSERTED
- b. LPOIB LIQUID POISON PUMP TRIP 12, TRUE INSERTED C. ECO9B EC LOOP 12 STM IV FAIL TO CLOSE 122, 50% INSERTED
- d. RD33A ROD BANK 1 INSERT FAIL POSITION, 20 INSERTED
- e. RD33B ROD BANK 2 INSERT FAIL POSITION, 12 INSERTED
- f. RD33C ROD BANK 3 INSERT FAIL POSITION, 20 INSERTED
- g. RD33D ROD BANK 4 INSERT FAIL POSITION, 10 INSERTED
- h. RD33E ROD BANK 5 INSERT FAIL POSITION, 14 INSERTED
- k. ECO6A EC TUBE LEAK 111, 50% Ramp 5:OO min TRG 5 I. MS12 STEAM RUPTURE TB COND AREA, 15% Ramp 4:OO min TRG 6
- m. TU02 TURBINE HIGH VIBRATION, 75% Ramp 8:OO min TRG 6
- n. MSOI STEAM RUPTURE OUTSIDE PC, 2% Delay 3 min TRG 7 Ramp 1:00 min. (Event Trigger from Mode Sw to SHUTDOWN)
- p. CTOIA CONT SPRAY PUMP TRIP 111 TRG 9
- 2. Remotes:
- b. AD07 ACCOUSTIC MONITOR ALM, RESET TRG 21
- c. FW24 REMOVAL OF HPCl FUSES FU8/FU9, PULL TRG 22
- 3. Overrides.
- a. OVR-9DS93L05154 ON NP02B G, OFF LP 12 GREEN LT INSERTED
- 4. Annunciators:
- a. None NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
t C. Equipment Out of Service
- 1. Liquid Poison Pump 12 (reference tag taped near keylock switch)
- 2. Containment Spray Pump 122 (red clearance applied to pump cs, in PTL)
D. Support Documentation
- 1. Working copy of Nl-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test, for EC Loop 12 IVs per Section 8.2. Initial complete so that 39-1OR is next valve to be tested.
E. Miscellaneous
- 1. Update Divisional Status Board (LP 12 and Cnt Sp 122)
- 2. Protected Equipment
- a. Containment Spray Pumps 111 112
- b. Core Spray Pumps 111 112
- c. EDG102
- d. EVENT TRIGGERS/COMPOSITES
- a. trgset 7 "zdrpstdn== 1" Mode Switch in Shutdown (MSOI)
- b. trgset 8 "zdrpstdn== 1" Mode Switch in Shutdown (RD35B)
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFFGOINGSHIFT: n N ID DATE:
PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART It: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA)
Lit Control Room Annunciators Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Reactor Power = 100°/~ Loadline = 103%
0 122 Containment Spray Pump 00s for repair. TS 3.3.7.b (day 1 of 15 day LCO).
0 Complete N 1-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test, for EC Loop 12 IVs per Section 8.2, starting at 8.2.5 for 39-10R.
Liquid Poison Pump 12 is out of service for motor repairs. TS 3.1.2.b (day 1 of 7 day LCO).
PART 111: RemarkslPlanned Evolutions:
Maintenance continues to work on Containment Smav Pump 122.
PART IV: To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SMICRS)
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
Scenario ID#
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
I What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options?
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1 .O Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power generation and Torus water temperature approaching 11O'F, the crew will utilize Torus cooling, control rod insertion and RPV pressure control to preclude violation of the HCTL in accordance with EOP-3.
CT-2.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power above 6% or unknown and RPV water level above -41 inches, terminate and prevent all injection except Boron and CRD in accordance with EOP-1, Att. 24.
CT-3.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with control rods NOT inserted to at least position 04 and the reactor will not stay shutdown without boron, the crew will insert all control rods to at least position 04 per EOP-3.1, Alternate Control Rod Insertion.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-I .o Given a quarterly surveillance for Reactor Coolant Isolation Valves, the crew will recognize the failure of a valve to operate correctly in accordance with N1-ST-Q4.
PO-2.0 Given a valid EC vent radiation monitor alarm, the crew will respond in accordance with the ARPs, N1-OP-I 3.
PO-3.0 Given the plant with a stuck open ERV, the crew will implement SOP-I .4 and close the ERV before torus temperature reaches 110°F.
PO-4.0 Given the plant requiring an emergency power reduction and the master flow controller failed as-is, the crew will perform the power reduction by operating individual pump MA stations in manual in accordance with N I -
SOP-I .4 PO-5.0 Given the plant with indications of an Emergency Condenser Tube Leak, the crew will isolate the affected Emergency Condenser in accordance with ARP and normal operating procedures.
PO-6.0 Given the plant with a steam leak in the Turbine Building the crew will initiate a manual scram in accordance with N1-SOP-I.
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
PO-7.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power generation the crew will insert control rods using the RMCS and repetitive scrams in accordance with N1-EOP-3 and N1-EOP-3.1.
PO-8.0 Given an ATWS condition accompanied by a loss of the Main Condenser and liquid poison pump failures, the crew will recognize the challenge to HCTL and inject liquid poison using alternate boron injection methods in accordance with N1-EOP-3.2.
PO-9.0 Given the plant with elevated torus water temperature AND a trip of the operating Containment Spray Pump, the crew will start an alternate pump in torus cooling per EOP-4 and EOP-1 Attachment 16.
PO-10.0 Given events that meet the criteria for emergency classification, the SRO will classify the event per EPP-EPIP-01 EAL Matrix.
PO-11.o Given the plant or plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required actionshotifications.
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Crew Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.
Event 1 Perform Surveillance Surveillance test continues SRO PO-I .o Direct BOP to complete Nl-ST-Q4, Section 8.2.
Per NI-ST-Q4, 4.4.e, the valve must be declared Acknowledge 39-08R has dual inoperable immediately, No retest is allowed.
indication when performing close to open stroke test and contact FIN Team or maintenance.
Determine isolation valve is inoperable and enter tech Spec 3.2.7 and requirement to isolate the penetration using 39-10R Determine TS 3.1.3.b remains effective, since EC Loop 12 will be isolated.
Perform the test, starting at step 8.2.5 Obtain SRO permission to continue N1-ST-Q4, Section 8.2.
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Annunciators FI-3-2 RPS CH 1I MAIN STEAM Cycle 39-10R, EC STEAM ISOLATION and F4-3-7 RPS CH 12 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE 121, AND:
ISOLATION are expected to actuate when EC valves 39-IOR and 39-08R are stroked closed.
Test 39-1OR Record open to close stroke time for 39-10R. (224.3 and ~ 3 2 . 8sec). [ ~ 3 8 sec for TS] . (221.5 and 535.8 sec for LST}
Record close to open stroke time for 39-IOR. (225.4 and 134.3 sec) .
(222.4 and 137.4 sec for LST}
Independent verification may be obtained later, due to crew resources. Obtains Independent verification in valve open position.
Test 39-08R, step 8.2.6 Record open to close stroke time for 39-08R. (217.0 and 123.0 sec). [ 538 sec for TS] . (r15.0 and 125.0 sec for LST}
EVENT 2 39-08R valve Fails to Fully Close Recognize dual indication for 39-08R and valve appears to have not fully PO-1 I.o closed.
Preset malfunction ECOSB Stops the test to notify SRO of failed When 39-08R is cycled in the closed direction, the component .
red light remains on. The valve must be declared May dispatch operator to determine inoperable and no retesting is allowed.
condition of valve locally.
Role Play: If sent to determine condition of 39-08R, If directed, remove EC12 from service report valve appears to be about half open.
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
I K T R U C T O R ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS per N1-OP-13, H.8.2 Directs operator to secure EC KeepfuII Report EC Keepfull secured Verify closed the following valves:
05-04R, EMERG COND VENT ISOLATION VALVE 121 05-12, EMERG COND VENT ISOLATION VALVE 122 0 39-13R, EMERG CONDSR STM SUPPLY DRAIN IV 121 39-14R, EMERG CONDSR STM SUPPLY DRAIN IV 122 39-08R, EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 122 39-10R, EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 121 0 39-06, EMERG CNDSR COND RET ISOLATION VALVE 12 If directed, closes39-10R to isolate the line to comply with Tech Specs.
NRC Scenario 2 -1 1- September 2006
INS I KUL I U K HL I I U l U S l PLANT RESPONSE 0PE R A T 0 R ACT10N S SRO 39-08R is identified as a coolant system isolation Acknowledges report of 39-08R failure valve in NIP-DES-04 List of Controlled Lists, to indicate full closed. Nine Mile Point Unit I Reactor Recognize EC Loop 12 must now Coolant System Isolation Valves. These are also remain inoperable (3.1.3.b)
Primary Containment Isolation Valves, per the attachment table Note 9.
Recognize valve is a Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valve.
Enter Tech Spec 3.2.7 specification b.
A valve in the line must be closed to comply with b. If not closed, then specification c requires a normal orderly shutdown initiated within one hour.
Tech Spec 3.2.7 and per specification b, in the Direct EC removed from service per event that any isolation valve becomes inoperable N1-OP-13 H.8.2 the system shall be considered operable provided May directs line isolated by closing at least one valve in each line having an inoperable 39-1OR or initiates a normal orderly valve is in the mode corresponding to the isolated shutdown.
condition.
Refer to Tech Spec 3.3.4, since these valves are identified as PC Isolation Valves, in NIP-DES-04 note.
Tech Spec 3.3.4 requires that one valve in the line be closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 0PER A T 0 R ACT10N S Event 3 ERVI I 1 opens PO-3.0 Event 4 RECIRC MASTER CONTROLLER FAILS AS-IS During Emergency Power Reduction PO-4.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:
When directed by the lead evaluator activate Directs entry into SOP-1.4 malfunction using TRG 3 IF average torus temperature approaches 11OOF, THEN prior to AD05 ERVI 1I INADVERTENTLY OPENS reaching 11OOF, directs a reactor RR28 RECIRC MASTER CONTROLLER FAILS scram AS-IS Directs emergency power reduction to approximately 85% per SOP-1.1 Electromatic Relief Valve ERVI I I opens. Declares ERV inoperable and enters ERVI 1 I red pilot and red ERVl I I accoustic TS 3.1.5. Specification a states that monitor light are lit. Blue continuity light all six solenoid actuated pressure extinguishes. Generator MWe lowers as MHC relief valves shall be operable.
regulating system responds to the drop in RPV Specification b states that if a is not pressure. met be 110 psig or less within ten F2-4-7 MAIN STM LINE ELECTROMATIC RELIEF hours.
VALVE OPEN IF ERV fuses are pulled at JB Panel FI-4-8 STEAM LINE DETECTION SYS FLOW 11 and 12 on RB 237 then Tech Spec OFF NORM 3.2.9 should be referenced. The H3-4-5 PRESS/SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES FLOW pressure relief function is lost for the effected valve. The spec is still met When lowering power with the Master Recirc Flow with the other five ERVs able to Controller, no change in core flow or reactor power perform the pressure relief function.
occurs because the controller is failed as-is. If Torus water temperature exceeds Power can be reduced by either taking control of 85F, enters EOP-4 NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
I N S m O R ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS the pump individual MA stations at F Panel or by Directs Containment Spray locked insetfing cram rods. out 0 Directs Torus Cooling placed in Torus water temperature rises and exceeds 80 O F . service EOP-1 Attachment 16.
FI-2-8 (F4-2-1) CORE LEVEL TORUS TEMP MONITOR SYS I I (12) TROUBLE annunciators alarm.
ROLE PLAYS: These actions are from SOP-I .4 When dispatched to Aux Control Room as NAO, RO report ERVI 11 acoustic monitoring indicates flow 7 Monitors Reactor power, level, through ERVI 11. pressure and torus water temperature 7 When directed, performs emergency As NAO in Aux Control Room if asked to report power reduction per SOP1 .I status of ERV AFTER FUSES ARE PULLED, Reports failure of MASTER RECIRC report ERV is closed based on Acoustic FLOW CONTROLLER to reduce flow Monitoring. Takes manual control of Recirc Pumps at F Panel to individually lower Recirc Flow, if directed. (Nl-OP-I F . l .O)
Inserts cram rods, if directed.
BOP Recognize and report ERV open Enter and execute SOP-I .4 IF average torus temperature approaches 1IOOF, THEN prior to reaching 11OOF, scrams the reactor, as directed by SRO NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Determines which ERV is open Informs SRO of required emergency If dispatched and directed to pull ERV fuses on power reduction RB237 activate REMOTE using TRG 20: Perform one or all of the following to attempt to close the stuck open ERV:
ADO1 ERV 111 FUSES, Pull 2:OO minute time Depress ADS Timer Reset delay. pushbuttons.
After time delay and remote is active, report fuses Cycle control switch for ERV 111.
pulled for ERVI 11 in the reactor building. Pull control power fuses in F Panel Pulling fuses on RB 237 will also close the ERV. for ERVI 11 (Detail 1.4-1)
Dispatch an operator to JB Panel If directed to reset the Acoustic monitor channels in 11 and 12 on RB 237 to pull the Aux Control Room activate REMOTE using appropriate control power fuses at TRG 21 : local cabinet (Detail 1.4-2).
AD07 ACOUSTIC MONITOR ALM RESET Report acoustic monitor reset, when appropriate.
When fuses are pulled the ERV closes. Fuses are located inside F Panel. Electrical Safety PPE is needed to enter panel and pull the fuses. F15 6A POS F30 6A NEG are the correct fuses for E R V I 11. Pulling these fuses will close the ERV.
When fuses are pulled, the normal control room IF ERV closes THEN reset the light indication is lost. When the ERV closes, Accoustic Monitor.
generator MWe rises. The ERV position is IF ERV remains open THEN scram confirmed to be closed from the Aux Control Room per SOP-I (Not expected to scram) using Acoustic Monitoring.
When ERV closes, report condition to SRO.
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 0PE R A T 0 R ACT10NS NOTE: Dispatches operator to Aux Control These actions are directed and performed Room Panel IS49 to perform the concurrently with above actions to close the ERV, following:
per the SOP. Check for Red Hi-Alarm light lit.
Compare meter reading for alarming channel to other channels.
Select channel to audio monitor.
Monitor and maintain Torus water temperature as follows:
13 Initiate Torus Cooling per Attachment 2 (this procedure).
Record Torus water temperature every five minutes per N1-ST-V5 BOP If directed, lockout Containment Spray Pumps by placing pump switches in PTL If directed, starts Torus Cooling per Attachment 16 Torus Cooling shall be placed in service within 15 minutes of Torus temperature 2 85°F Close CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:
111; 80-45 112 or 121; 80-40 and 80-45 122; 80-40 Verify closed 80-1 15, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 12 Verify closed 80-1 14, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 11 NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Verify closed Cont Spray Discharge IV using keylock switch for selected loop:
111; 80-16 0 112; 80-36 0 121;80-15 0 122; 80-35 Verify open CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:
0 111; 80-40 0 112; 80-44 0 121;80-41 0 122; 80-45 Fully open 80-1 18, CONT SPRAY TEST TO TORUS FCV Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP in selected loop.
Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP in selected loop.
WHEN torus water reaches desired temperature stop Containment Spray Pump.
Stop all operating Raw Water Pumps If desired, return system to standby per N1-OP-14.
Report status to SRO.
Event 5 EC 11 Tube Leak PO-5.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:
When directed by the lead evaluator, insert 0 Acknowledge report K1-1-2, EMER malfunction by activating TRG 5: COND VENT 11 RAD MONITOR, in NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
__I INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS alarm.
ECOGA, Emergency Condenser Tu be Leak I 1I Direct actions of K1-1-2, EMER (50%; ramp 5 0 0 minutes)
COND VENT 11 RAD MONITOR.
Diagnose ECI 1 tube leak (rising EC K1-1-2, MER COND VENT I 1 RAD MONITOR, vent radiation levels and rising EC alarms. water level).
EMERG COND RMON I I I and EMERG COND RMON I12 on J panel in alarm and radiation levels Direct EC 11 be isolated rising.
Assess EPIP-EPP-01 , Attachment 1, EAL Matrix and determine the effluent NOTE: If ECI I is not isolated based on confirmed monitoring threshold has NOT been radiation levels and rising shell water level, then reached by referencing Category MER COND 1 11-1 12 LEVEL HIGH-LOW, Will 5.1 .I, 5.1.2, and Table 3. (May alarm on high level in approximately five (5) evaluate later, due to crew resource minutes.
limitations).
ROLE PLAYS: Determine that with ECI 1 isolated (inoperable) Tech Spec 3.1.3.b If asked as Chemistry to perform sampling and/or applies.
EC Effluent Dose Assessment, acknowledge the request. With EC 12 already isolated, then Tech Spec 3.1.3 specification e If informed of the EC tube leak, acknowledge the applies. A normal orderly shutdown report. must be initiated within one hour.
IF asked as RP to evaluate dose rates on 340 el RB, acknowledge the report.
Request Chemistry to perform sampling AND EC Effluent Dose Assessment NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
a PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS IF an EC tube leak is confirmed perform shutdown actions in accordance N1-OP-13 H.lO.O Brief crew on event impact.
Notifies Ops Management of required plant shutdown.
Recognize/report K1-1-2, EMER COND VENT 11 RAD MONITOR, in alarm.
Recognize/report rising water level in EC11.
Diagnose ECI 1 tube leak (rising EC vent radiation levels and rising EC water level).
Acknowledge direction to perform actions of K1-1-2.
These actions are from K I 2 Confirm computer points E478 and E 480 in alarm Recognize/report EMERG COND RMON 111 and EMERG COND NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
INS I K U L I U K HL I I U I U W PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS RMON 112 on J panel in alarm and radiation levels rising.
Inform SRO to assess effluent dose.
With SRO concurrence, isolate ECI 1, as follows Close 39-07R, EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 112 Close 39-09R, EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 111 Close 39-05, EMERG CNDSR COND RET ISOLATION VALVE 11 Close 39-1 1R, EMERG CNDSR STM SUPPLY DRAIN IV 111 Close 39-12R, EMERG CNDSR STM SUPPLY DRAIN IV 112 Close 05-01R, EMERG COND VENT ISOLATION VALVE 111 Close 05-1 1, EMERG COND VENT ISOLATION VALVE 112 Reference N1-OP-13, H.lO.O IF an EC Tube Leak is confirmed, THEN initiate normal shutdown in accordance with N1-OP-43C.
NOTE: WHEN the next event is initiated (Turbine Building Steam Leak), the crew is likely to direct a NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
5
. m T - RUCTO R ACT I0NS /
manual scram due to degraded plant conditions.
IF the crew does not manually scram, the high turbine vibration conditions will result in procedure required trip of turbine and scram.
Event 6 Steam Leakage Into the Turbine Building and Turbine Vibration Rises PO-6.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:
When directed by the lead evaluator, insert malfunction by activating TRG 6:
MS12 Steam line Rupture In TB Condenser Area (15% 4:OO minute ramp time)
Acknowledges reports and directs TU02, Main Turbine High Vibration Bearing #5 action for steam leak.
and #6 (75% 8:OO minute ramp time).
If warranted, acknowledge report vibration is rising; 12 mils require Steam leakage into Turbine Building causes MAIN FIRE PANEL 2-1 TURB BLDG 261 LOCAL immediate removal of the turbine from PANEL NO1 FIRE alarm to actuate. service.
HI-4-8 AREA RADIATION MONITORS (E495 Direct Turbine Building local area TB261 CP AREA) alarms. evacuation per EPP-5.
Ll-3-3 CONTINUOUS AIR RAD MONITOR (F329 Direct a reactor scram and entry into TB NG AIR) alarms. SOP-1, Reactor Scram. Due to steam leak or turbine vibration.
Direct a turbine trip and entry into SOP-31 .I, Turbine Trip, if vibration reaches 12 mils.
IF the reactor is not tripped and vibration continues to rise, then:
A2-3-5, TURBINE SUPERVISORY SYSTEM, in alarm.
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Computer points 5444 (BRG #5) and B445 (BRG
- 6) in alarm ROLE PLAYS:
If asked as maintenance or WEC to investigate, acknowledge the request.
If reports to management personnel are received, acknowledge the reports.
EVENT 7 FAILURE TO SCRAM PO-7.0 When directed, initiates a manual CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: scram and implements SOP-1 Verify TRG 7 actuates the following malfunction Reactor Scram.
AFTER 3:OO minute delay, when Mode Switch is Provides Scram Report placed in SHUTDOWN: Reduce RECIRC MASTER flow 25 to MSOI STEAM LINE RUPTURE OUTSIDE 43 Mlbm/hr PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (7 3:OO) 2 1:OO Perform SOP-1 Scram Verification (2% with 1:00 ramp, 3 minutes after MS to SD) steps Other malfunctions activated NOW by Mode Confirm all rods inserted to position Switch: 04 or beyond using Full Core Display.
Verify TRG 8, RD35B CRD Pump 12 trip after Report ALL RODS ARE NOT FULL IN 1:00 minute delay. If ALL RODS IN cannot be confirmed THEN continue and confirm when scram is reset.
When the reactor is scrammed all rods DO NOT Verify turbine and generator tripped.
fully insert due to hydraulic lock of the Scram Maintain RPV pressure below 1080 Discharge Volume (SDV). Power remains about psig using one or more of the 20%-30%, but is within Bypass Valve (BPV) following (unless given other direction capability (of 45%). Pressure is controlled by the from EOP-2):
BPVs, until the MSlVs eventually close due to high Turbine Bypass Valves NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS steam tunnel temperature from the steam leak. Emergency Condensers (Not available) 0 ERVs 0 Others (Not expected)
R spond to Fire alarms and radiati I alarms At Fire Panel, closes Turbine Building Roof Vents.
If directed, evacuates the Turbine Building.
Recognizeh-eportvibration is rising; 12 mils require immediate removal of the turbine from service.
SRO SRO ACTIONS WITH FAILURE TO SCRAM Acknowledge report control rods failed to insert (ATWS).
Enter EOP-2, RPV Control on power above 6% and scram required. THEN exit and go to EOP-3, Failure to Scram because all rods are not inserted to at least 04.
Enter and execute EOP-4, Primary Containment Control when torus temp reaches 85°F NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
INS I KUC I UK HC I IONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS These are EOP-2, RPV CONTROL actions I Answer all rods in to at least 04 NO 3 Answer will the reactor stay shutdown without boron NO.
These are EOP-3, FAILURE TO SCRAM actions 7 Direct Bypass ADS.
ZI Direct prevent Core Spray injection per EOP-1, Attachment 4.
hese are EOP-3 Level Actions Direct verify containment isolations per SOP-40.2 when RPV level reaches low-low level (+5 inches) or main condenser vacuum reaches 7 in hg. (Low priority)
Direct MSlV jumpers installed per EOP-1, Attachment 2.
When RPV injection is terminated and prevented, With reactor power >6% and RPV RPV water level lowers and approaches -41 level above -41 inches, go to a.
inches. As level lowers, reactor power lowers and NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
may drop below the APRM downscale setting of 6%.
Directs terminate and prevent injection using EOP-1, Attachment 24.
Directs level lowered to at least -
41 inches When level drops below -41 inches directs level band -84 to -41 inches.
NOTE:
IF torus temperature is above 1IOOF, Reactor power is most likely to be below 6% when let level continue to drop until reactor torus temperature reaches 110°F. Terminating power ~ 6 % RPV level reaches -
and preventing injection and controlling water level 84 inches all ERVs remain closed between -109 inches and -84 inches is highly with DWP below 3.5 psig. (NOT unlikely.
expected)
Direct level band between -1 09 inches and the level it was lowered to using Cond/FW and CRD. (NOT expected)
Determine WAIT UNTIL 600 gallons boron injected (860 gallons in LP tank) all rods inserted to 04 reactor will stay shutdown without boron.
Proceed to WAIT block L-I 1 and WAITS until 600 gallons boron injected (860 gallons in LP tank).
THEN direct level restored to +53 inches to +95 inches.
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACT1ONSl PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS These are EOP-3 Power Actions Directs Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.
Directs initiation of ARI Directs verify trip of RRPs.
Directs execution of EOP-3.1.
Injecting Liquid poison after torus temperature Direct LP injection and alternate boron reaches 1 I O OF is still required. This contributes to injection. (Expected to occur before staying below HCTL. torus temperature reaches 110°F).
Record LP tank level: approximately 1460Gallons.
Direct verification RWCU isolates.
May answer is main condenser available YES but MSlVs are closed due to MSL high temperature. Must answer NO in step Q-13.
These are EOP-3 Pressure actions ECs are NOT available for pressure control due to Direct pressure band below 1080 psig component malfunctions.
using ERVs. (800 to 1000 psig)
CT-1 .O SRO Is expected to readjust RPV pressure band IF torus temperature cannot be as often as needed to stay below HCTL. maintained below HCTL, THEN maintain RPV pressure below the NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ -
limit. (OK to exceed 100"Flhr cooldown rate). (Step P-3 override)
(CT)
These EOP-4 actions may have already been These EOP-4, PRIMARY directed, if EOP-4 was entered due to earlier CONTAINMENT CONTROL actions scenario events (ERV opening).
3 Direct lockout of all containment spray pumps TORUS TEMP 7 Direct torus cooling per EOP-1, Attachment 16, to maintain torus temp below 85°F.
Monitor HCTL (FIG M) and reduce reactor pressure band as necessary to stay in GOOD region.
u When informed of Containment Spray Pump trip, directs an alternate loop to be placed in service per EOP-1 Attachment 16.
BOP Terminate and prevent injection level control BOP actions per EOP-1 Attachment 24.
CT-2 .O When directed terminate and prevent injection using EOP-1, Attachment 24.
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
11\21 I KUL I U K HL- I PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS J Perform one of the following:
Expected operator response is to close Place FEEDWATER ISOLATION FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE 11 and 12 to VALVE 11 and FEEDWATER stop injection, until HPCl fuses are removed.
ISOLATION VALVE 12 to CLOSE.
Place FEEDWATER PUMP 11 and FEEDWATER PUMP 12 control switches in PTL.
VALVE CONTROL stations are placed in MAN and Select MAN on FW 11 VALVE dialed to zero so that they remain closed when the CONTROL and rotate knurled knob HPCl fuses are pulled.
full ccw.
Select MAN on FW 12 VALVE CONTROL and rotate knurled knob full ccw.
HPCl fuses are pulled to establish manual injection Select MAN on FW 13 VALVE using the Feedwater Pump discharge level control CONTROL and rotate knurled knob valves.
full ccw.
Direct A 0 to pull FU-8 and FU-9 (HPCI fuses) in Panel IS34.
CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: Verify closed FEEDWATER PUMP 13 WHEN directed to Pull HPCl Fuses, activate BLOCKING VALVE.
trigger TRG 22 FW24 REMOVAL OF HPCl FUSES Verify FEEDWATER 11 BYPASS VALVE in MAN and at zero.
Verify FEEDWATER 12 BYPASS VALVE in MAN and at zero.
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Inform SRO when level reaches target level (-41inches corrected) as directed by SRO.
IF terminating and preventing injection with torus temperature above 11OOF, THEN inform SRO when power <6%
or RPV level reaches TAF (-84 c
inches).
CT-2.0 When directed establish injection and maintain level between -1 09 inches and level it was lowered to using CondlFW. Expected -84 inches to -41 inches.
CT-1.O Controls pressure in assigned bands, as directed by SRO to stay below HCTL When re-injecting per EOP-I Aftachmenf 24, BOP THROTTLE INJECTION, BOP injects as follows Perform one of the following:
REOPEN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE 11 and FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE 12 if closed to terminate injection.
OR RESTART FEEDWATER PUMP NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 0PE R A T 0 R ACT10N S 11 and/or FEEDWATER PUMP 12 by placing its control switch in START if placed in PTL to terminate injection.
Adjust FW 11 VALVE CONTROL and/or FW 12 VALVE CONTROL by rotating knob to establish injection and maintain desired level band.
Monitor and report if 600 gallons boron injected (860 gallons in LP tank).
Monitor and report if all rods inserted to 04.
Event 8 CRD Pump 12 Trip When directed to restore level to +53 RD35B CRD Pump 12 trip actuated after the inches to +95 inches using Cond/FW scram.
When loss of CRD pump 12 is CRD Pump 12 trips resulting in loss of a high recognized, start CRD pump 11 pressure injection source and pressure source for control rod insertion. CRD Pump I I must be manually started either as an injection source or to provide drive pressure while implementing EOP-
- 3. I , Alternate Control Rod Insertion.
When directed, RO enters M Panel to install EOP
-RO jumpers identified in EOP-3.
When directed prevent Core Spray injection per EOP-1, Attachment 4.
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EOP-I Attachment 4, Prevent Core Spray Injection Obtain tools and safety equipment form EOP toolbox at SM desk.
Bypass Core Spray IV interlocks by installing jumpers at EOP ISOLATION BYPASS JUMPER SUBPANEL (inside Panel N, between I N I A and 1N1B):
Jumper 17: 40-01, INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV121 BYPASS Jumper 18: 40-11, INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV111 BYPASS Jumper 19: 40-06, CORE SPRAY TEST VALVE1 1 BYPASS Jumper 24: 40-09, INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV122 BYPASS Jumper 25: 40-10, INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV112 BYPASS Jumper 26: 40-05, CORE SPRAY TEST VALVE12 BYPASS If directed, verify containment isolations per SOP-40.2 when RPV level reaches low-low level (+5 inches) or main condenser vacuum reaches 7 NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS in hg.
7 If directed install MSlV jumpers per EOP-1, Attachment 2.
EOP-I Attachment 2, MSlV Lo-Lo Isolation Bypass Obtain tools and safety equipment form EOP toolbox at SM desk.
Bypass Core Spray IV interlocks by installing jumpers at EOP ISOLATION BYPASS JUMPER SUBPANEL (inside Panel N, between 1N I A and 1N1B):
Jumper 1: MSlV LO/LO ISOL.
BYPASS RELAY 11K19A Jumper 2: MSlV LO/LO ISOL.
BYPASS RELAY 11K20A Jumper 8: MSlV LO/LO ISOL.
BYPASS RELAY 12K19A Jumper 9: MSlV LO/LO ISOL.
BYPASS RELAY 12K20A NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
INS I KUC I O R A C 1 IUNW PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS BOP ACTIONS FAILURE TO SCRAM Inject per LIQUID POISON INJECTION When directed inject liquid poison.
PO-8.0 LPOIA LIQUID POISON PUMP TRIP 11, TRUE preset malfunction becomes effective.
System 7 7 is started and immediately trips. If not Place keylock switch to SYS 11.
already isolated, R WCU isolates.
Confirm RED LIGHT ON and GREEN LIGHT OFF for pump started.
Report failure of LP Pump 11 Dispatches operators to RB to use alternate boron injection systems per EOP-3.2.
CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:
WHEN dispatched to inject boron with hydro pump active REMOTE using TRG 23:
LP04 ALT BORON INJ VIA HYD PMP, RUN DELAY 12:OO ROLE PLAY: After 12 minute delay and LP04 becomes active, report to control room that liquid poison is being injected using the hydro pump.
RO RO actions for Alternate Control Rod Insertion, EOP-3.1. Verify at I ast one CRD pump is running. If not previously performed, Section 3 and 4 are implemented to manually drive recognize CRD Pump 12 tripped and control rods and by repeated manual scrams. starts CRD Pump 11.
Reactor Mode Switch to REFUEL.
Both SECTION 3 and SECTION 4 require NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
INS I KUC; I W K HC; I IONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS the following actions Place ARI OVERRIDE switch in OVERRIDE at F Panel.
Install RPS SCRAM LOGIC RELAY BYPASS JUMPERS, by performing the following:
Obtain tools and safety equipment form EOP toolbox at SM desk.
Defeat RPS logic relays by installing jumpers at EOP ISOLATION BYPASS JUMPER SUBPANEL (inside Panel N, between 1N I A and 1N1B):
Jumper 5: BYPASS RELAY 11K7 TO RELAY 11K51B Jumper 6: BYPASS RELAY 11K8 TO RELAY 11K52B Jumper 12: BYPASS RELAY 12K7 TO RELAY 11K51B Jumper 13: BYPASS RELAY 12K8 TO RELAY 12K52B When scram channels are reset, CHI I and CHI2 Reset the scram by depressing Ch 11 white pilot solenoid group lights are on. The SDV and Ch 12 RESET buttons.
begins draining.
CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:
WHEN the scram is reset, delete ALL RD33 malfunctions:
RD33A, RD33B, RD33C, RD33D, RD33E IF RWM is enforcing blocks, bypass the RWM.
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Insert rods to 00 using EMER ROD IN starting with high power regions of core (use LPRM indications).
Perform one or more of the following to establish higher drive water pressure:
Fully open CRD FCV CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:
IF dispatched to close 44-167, manually activate Close 44-04 CONTROL ROD REMOTE DRIVE WATER CONT V RD06 CRD ACCUMULATOR HEADER Close 44-167 Charging Header IS0LATlON Blocking Valve RB237 ROLE PLAY: Report valve is closed.
MANUAL SCRAMS (Section 4)
Direct A 0 to verify open 44-167 (CRD-12), Charging Water Header Blocking valve (RB El 237 west hall).
WHEN ....SDV drained (following clear):
0 FI-1-8, RPS CH 11 SCRAM DUMP VOL WTR LVL HIGH 0 F3-1-4, CONT ROD DRIVE SCRAM DUMP VOLUME WTR LVL HIGH 0 F4-1-1, RPS CH 12 SCRAM DUMP VOL WTR LVL HIGH AND .... Either Reactor Pressure or CRD When the SDV is drained and another manual Charging Water Pressure >450 psig.
scram is inserted, ALL RODS WILL f ULLY NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS INSERT. THEN....manually scram by CT-3.0 depressing the Ch 11 and Ch 12 scram buttons.
IF....control rods move inward, THEN ....reset scram and repeat steps.
II Provides a Scram report. Report all rods fully inserted.
Event 9 Containment Spray Pump Trip PO-9.0
- CAUTIONXXX*X******X****X*X****
IF a different pump is started for torus cooling, trip THAT pump using the appropriate CTOI B,C or D malfunction CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: Bop When all rods are fully inserted, activate 0 Report Containment Spray Pump malfunction using TRG 11 : tripped CTOIA CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP TRIP II 1 0 Starts an alternate containment spray pump in torus cooling per EOP-1 Containment Spray Pump I I 1 trips resulting in a Attachment 16 loss of torus cooling. An alternate pump should be Realigns Loop BVs for selected started, since torus temperature is still significantly Pump above 85°F (EOP-4 condition). Entering EOP-I Closes Containment Spray IV to Attachment I6 and re-performing steps for another prevent spraying drywell loop will correctly align the system in the torus Starts alternate Containment cooling mode. Spray Pump Reports torus cooling in service.
After all rods are fully inserted, exits EOP-3 and enter EOP-2 NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
__cql INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO If all rods in then:
Direct stopping LP injection.
Exit EOP-3 and Enter EOP-2 Direct restoring level to +53 inches to
+95 inches using Cond/FW and CRD.
I TERM INAT10N C RITERIA Control Rods Inserted RPV water level being restored to normal band 53 to 95 inches.
EVENT 10 SRO SRO Classify event as SITE AREA EMERGENCY per 2.2.2.)
NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA. NRC Exam VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events None 6 . Commitments
- 1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 2 September 2006
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: NMPI Scenario No.: NRC 3 Op-Test No.: NRC Initial Conditions IC226 845 psig and 2% power, with one turbine Bypass Valve partially open.
Turnover: Continue plant Startup per N1-OP-43A and complete section E.3.0. After assuming the shift, raise pressure and continue startup. Place 2"d RWCU Pump in service. Raise pressure to 918 psig with EPR in service. IRM 17 Upscale tripped (NMI OG) and bypassed at start of scenario.
1 Event No. I Malf. No. Event Type*
N (BOP)
~ ~~ ~
Event Description At about 900 psig RPV Pressure, place 2"d RWCU Pump in service R (RO) Raise RPV Pressure from 845 psig using MPR to 918 psig with EPR in service.
NM13A I TS (RO IRM 11 INOP trip. Requires bypassing, consulting Tech Specs and SRO) resetting RPS Channel 11 trip.
CW02A C (BOP) Service Water Pump 11 trips resulting in rising RBCLC and TBCLC temperatures. Service Water Pump 12 is manually started.
5 RM1U REACTOR BUILDING VENT RAD MONITOR fails inoperable.
Requires TS 3.6.2.j entry. Input into RB Emergency Ventilation System automatic initiation. Trip channel within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
RD02R3 Control Rod Drifts out. The rod is fully inserted and the HCU is I031 valved out per Annunciator Response Procedure F3-2-6 CONTROL ROD DRIFT.
7 1 RR54 I (BOP) RPV Narrow range water level transmitter failed upscale. RPV level slowly lowers requiring FW LCV placed in manual and level restored manually. N1-SOP-I 6.1 is entered.
M (ALL) Emergency Condenser Steam Leak into Reactor Building with Failure to Isolate. Requires a manual scram. More than one EC08A Reactor Building General Area temperature eventually exceeds EC08B 135"F, requiring an RPV Blowdown, later in the scenario.
9 10 I RP05B RP28 HV03A C (BOP)
RPS Fails to trip but manual initiation of ARI pushbutton results in complete rod insertion.
RB Ventilation failure. Manual action is required to trip and isolate normal ventilation and start RBEVS, if Reactor Building radiation HV03B levels are above 5 mr/hr. If below this value operation of normal ventilation can continue per EOP-5.
11 FW03A C (BOP) Loss of Feedwater Pumps following control rod insertion. This complicates post blowdown level control. Injecting with Feedwater FWO3B Booster Pumps or Core Spray is necessary to maintain RPV Water Level.
12 I SRO Classify Site Area Emergency 3.4.1 and 4.4.1
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2/22/2007 10:24:11 AM 5 of 8 NRC Exam Submittal
Facility: Nine Mile Point 1 Scenario No.: NRC-03 Op-Test No.: NRC TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES I ACTUAL 2 and 3 AND 4 and 5 events can (PER SCENARIO; SEE SECTION D.5.d) I ATTRIBUTES be run simultaneously, to improve efficiency.
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8)
Events 3,4,6,7,9,10,1I
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)
I 7 3 Total Malfunction Count:
Event 9 RPS failure Event 10 RB Major not included in this count.
Ventilation failure and Event 11 Loss of FW
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Abnormal Events Count:
Event 6 Rod Drift Event 7 FWLC Does not include the SRO TS
- 4. Major transients (1 -2) 1 related events. These are Event 8 EC Steam Leak with Isolation considered separately.
Failure
- 5. EOPs enteredhequiring substantive 2 SRO TS Events actions (1-2) Event 3 and 5 are SRO Tech EOP-2 RPV and EOP-5 Sec Cont Spec evaluation events.
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive 2 actions (0-2)
EOP-3 Failure To Scram; EOP-8 RPV Blowdown
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 4 2/22/2007 10:24:11 AM 6 of 8 NRC Exam Submittal
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 3 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 35 LOW POWER WITH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT EOP ENTRYAND RPV BLOWDOWN REQUIRED PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 7/14/06 VAL1DATED M. Meier, L. Blum, J. Tsardakas DATE 9/19/06 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING GJ{,a_- DATE 2k3!>
OPERATIONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CON FI GURAT10N CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 90 minutes Initial Power Level: 2% Power. RPV Pressure is 845 psig with Bypass valve open.
Mitigating Strategy Code: SC1 Secondary Containment. RPV Blowdown required.
The scenario begins at about 2% reactor power, during plant startup. RPV pressure is 845 psig. The crew will start the second Reactor Water Cleanup Pump per normal operating procedures. Plant startup continues and RPV pressure is raised to 918 psig and pressure control is established on the Electronic Pressure Regulator (EPR). As pressure is raised, IRM 11 failure due to an inop trip occurs resulting in a trip of RPS Channel 11. The crew will bypass the failed instrument and reset the resulting RPS channel trip.
Service Water Pump 11 trips occurs requiring a standby pump to be placed in service. Control Rod 30-31 will drift out. The rod is fully inserted and isolated. With power level below RWM setpoint the RWM must be bypassed to insert the drifting rod. The startup can now continue by pulling control rods. Reactor Building radiation monitor 11 inop condition occurs. Tech Spec entry into 3.6.2.j is required because the monitor is part of RB Emergency Ventilation initiation instrumentation.
RPV Narrow Range level input to Feedwater Level Control System (FWLC) fails upscale. With the level transmitter failed high, an RPV water level transient results requiring crew to take manual control of level control valve to prevent an automatic protective trip function per N I -
SOP-16.1, Feedwater Failures. When level is stabilized the crew will maintain manual level control.
The major transient begins when an Emergency Condenser steam leak into Reactor Building occurs. Automatic and manual attempts to isolate the leak will be unsuccessful. Entry in EOP-5, Secondary Containment Control is required and the reactor will be manually scrammed.
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
When the manual scram is initiated RPS Channel 12 fails to trip. The crew enters EOP-3 Failure To Scram and takes initial actions to mitigate the event. When the crew manually initiates ARI, all control rods will fully insert and EOP-3 is exited. The crew transitions back to EOP-2 RPV Control. After the transition back into EOP-2, the operating Feedwater Pumps trip, complicating post scram level control. When Reactor Building general area temperatures exceed 135°F in more than one area, an RPV Blowdown using EOP-8 is required. Reactor Building Ventilation system malfunctions requires manual action to mitigate steam leak into the building which could lead to a release.
Major Procedures Exercised: N1-SOP-16.1, N1-SOP-1.5, N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-5, N1-EOP-8 EAL Classification: SAE 3.4.1 Main Steam Line, EC steam line or Reactor Water Cleanup isolation failure AND release pathway, outside normal process system flowpaths from unisolable system exists outside primary contain ment SAE 4.1 .IPrimary system is discharging into RB resulting in RB general area temperatures >135"F in two or more areas, N1-EOP-5 Termination Criteria: RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained above TAF with all rods fully inserted.
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-226 or equivalent. Reactor Power 2% RPV Pressure 845 psig Initial IC006 was at 500 psig. Shifted RWCU to High Pressure PCV and raised pressure to 845 psig by raising MHC pressure setpoint. Pulled some control during the pressure increase to raise power, but probably didnt have to. Currently, pulling rods is at RWM Group 15. This should allow the crew to increase pressure by only using MPR pressure set. Pulling control rods is not required to accomplish scenario objectives.
Ensure IRM 17 bypassed and half scram is reset.
Shift one IRMlAPRM recorder to FAST in each RPS Channel B. PresetslFunction Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. NMIOG IRM CHANNEL 17 FAIL UPSCALE INSERTED
- d. AD07A ERVI 11 FAIL SHUT BURNT OUT SOLENOID INSERTED
- e. HV03A RBEVS CH 11 FAIL TO AUTO INITIATE INSERTED
- f. HV03B RBEVS CH 12 FAIL TO AUTO INITIATE INSERTED
- h. CW02A SERVICE WATER PUMP TRIP 11 TRG 2 I. RMI U RX BLDG VENT RAD MON INOP TRG 3
- j. RD02R3031 CONTROL ROD FAILURE DRIFT OUT TRG 4
- k. RD03R3031 CONTROL ROD FAILURE ACCUM TROUBLE TRG12 I. RR54 RX VESS LVL TRANS (LOCAL-FW CONTROL) FAIL HIGH TRG 6
- m. EC02 EC STEAM LEAK OUTSIDE PC 4% Ramp 5:OO min TRG 7
- 2. Remotes:
- a. RD07 RESET ROD DRIFT ALARM, RESET TRG 5
- b. FW24 REMOVAL OF HPCl FUSES FU8/FU9. PULL TRGIO
- 3. Overrides:
- a. None
- 4. Annunciators:
- a. None NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
b C. Equipment Out of Service
- 1. IRM 17 failed and is bypassed D. Support Documentation
- 1. Working copy of N1-OP-43A. Section 1.O and E.2.0 are complete. E.3.0 is in progress and signed off complete including E.3.20. The next step is E.3.21, for starting the second RWCU pump at 900 psig. The 900 psig Drywell Inspection is NOT required.
- 2. Working copy of N1-OP-31 with sign-offs indicating step E.4.11 is in progress.
E. Miscellaneous
- 1. EVENT TRIGGERS/COMPOSITES
- a. None NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Lit Control Room Annunciators 0 Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
0 Reactor Power = 2% 0 Loadline = NA RPV Pressure is 845 psig with a bypass valve partially open. MPR in control.
N1-OP-43A in progress at step E.3.21 Drywell Inspection at 900 psig is complete.
N1-OP-31 in progress at step E.4.11 IRM 17 is failed upscale and is bypassed. Tech Spec LCO is being complied with.
PART 111: RemarkslPlanned Evolutions:
0 Start the second RWCU Pump.
Raise RPV pressure to 918 psig and place EPR in service.
0 Continue startup and complete section E.3.0
~ ~
PART IV: To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
1 Scenario ID#
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What we did? Why? (Goals) Other 0ptions?
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1 .O Given an unisolable Emergency Condenser steam leak and secondary containment temperature approaching maximum safe values in one area, the crew will enter EOP-2 RPV Control and initiate a manual reactor scram before performing an RPV Blowdown.
CT-2.0 Given a condition requiring scram and failure of an RPS Channel to trip, the crew will manually initiate Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) per N1-EOP-3 to shutdown the reactor.
CT-3.0 Given an unisolable Emergency Condenser steam leak and secondary containment temperature above maximum safe values in more than one area, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown per EOP-C2.
CT-4.0 Given a loss of Feedwater Pumps following a scram, the crew will restore and maintain RPV water level above -84 inches using Alternate Injection Systems per EOP-2.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.o Given the plant during a reactor startup, the crew will place the second RWCU pump in service per normal operating procedures.
PO-2.0 Given the plant during a reactor startup, the crew will raise pressure to 918 psig per N1-OP-43A.
PO-3.0 Given the plant during startup conditions, the crew will establish pressure control on the Electronic Pressure Regulator (EPR).
PO-4.0 Given the plant during startup conditions and an IRM failure, the crew will bypass the failed channel and reset the tripped RPS channel. The SRO enters Tech Specs.
PO-5.0 Given the plant during startup conditions and a Service Water Pump trip, the crew will start the standby pump per station procedures.
PO-6.0 Given the plant during startup conditions and an inop condition on Reactor Building Rad Monitor 11, the SRO will enter Tech Specs.
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
PO-7.0 Given the plant during startup conditions and a drifting control rod, the crew will fully insert and valve out the affected HCU per ARP F3-2-6 and N1-OP-5.
PO-8.0 Given a failed RPV level instrument resulting in lowering RPV water level, the crew will manually control level to avoid a reactor scram per NI-SOP-16.1 Feedwater Failures PO-9.0 Given an EC steam leak and general area temperatures approaching 135"F, the crew will manually scram per N1-EOP-5 and EOP-2.
PO-10.0 Given an EC steam leak and general area temperatures in two areas exceeding 135"F, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown per NI-EOP-8.
PO-11.o Given a failure of Reactor Building Ventilation to isolate AND RB Vent monitor reading above 5 mr/hr, the crew will isolate RB Ventilation and start RBEVS per N1-EOP-5.
PO-12.0 Given a failure of Reactor Building Ventilation to isolate AND RB Vent monitor reading below 5 mr/hr, the crew will recognize that an isolation should have occurred. With readings below 5 mr/hr, operation of normal ventilation is allowed per N1-EOP-5.
PO-13.0 Given events that meet the criteria for emergency classification, the SRO will classify the event per EPP-EPIP-01 EAL Matrix.
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACT1ONS Crew III Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down panels, and tests annunciators.
EVENT 1 Place 2ndRWCU PUMP In Service. SRO PO-I .o Directs the second RWCU Pump Crew places the second RWCU Pump (Pump 12) placed in service per N1-OP-3.
in service per N1-OP-3 Section E.7.0. The crew is expected to place the second pump in service before raising pressure. The crew may raise Monitor NON-REGENERATIVE HX pressure to 900 psig before placing the pump in outlet temperature (F359) AND service. REGENERATIVE HX inlet temperature (F363) UNTIL system parameters stabilize AND ensure temperatures do not exceed 120°F.
IF NON-REGENERATIVE HX outlet temperature (F359) OR REGENERATIVE HX inlet temperature (F363) approach or exceed 12OoF,THEN lower Cleanup system flow using RMC-33-151, CLEANUP SYS FLOW.
Verify adequate thermal margin exists to core thermal power limits. (Not a concern for this power level).
Perform the following to start CLEANUP PUMP 12:
RWCU System Flow is indicated on dual pen chart Verify closed 33-16, CLEANUP recorder P/FR-35-150. Flow is the RED PEN and PUMP 12 DISCHARGE VALVE.
reads out in 0-400 X 7 O3 Ibm/hr, Adjust 33-40, CLEANUP SYS FLOW, using RMC-33-151 to NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS System Flow in gpm can be determined using FC- establish cleanup system flow 33- 169 and adjusting the fhumbwheel to null the between 180 X 1O3 and 220 X IO3 meter on the controller tape setting. Ibm/hr (360-440 gpm).
0 Verify open 33-158, CLEANUP PUMP RECIRC VALVE 12.
As system flow is lowered, CLEANUP SYSTEM 0 Verify cleanup system pressure as PRESSURE PI-35-131A pressure rises. If flow is indicated on PI-35-131A is being reduced too rapidly high pressure system isolation maintained 80 to 100 psig.
may occur at 130 psig. 0 Start Cleanup Pump 12 Slowly jogs open 33-16, CLEANUP PUMP 12 DISCHARGE VALVE while maintaining approximately 80 to 100 psig system pressure.
0 Maintain pump discharge pressure less than 1400 psig by opening 33-40, CLEANUP SYS FLOW using RMC-33-151.
0 WHEN 33-36 CLEANUP PUMP I 2 DISCHARGE VALVE is fully open adjust 33-40, CLEANUP SYS FLOW using RMC-33-151 to maintain desired system flow 250 X 1O3 and 380 X 1O3 Ibm/hr (500 to 760 gpm).
Continue at 7.6 (of procedure) 0 Verify cleanup system computer point inputs to core thermal power calculations are in scan and updating. May contact STA or Reactor Engineer to verify points in scan.
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Adjust thumbwheel on FC-33-169 to indicate current system flow rate After CLEANUP PUMP 12 is in service the crew in gpm.
will continue raising RPV Pressure to 918 psig, if Report CLEANUP PUMP 12 is in not previously done. service.
EVENT 2 -
SRO Raise RPV Pressure From 845 psig to 918 psig Directs startup continued per N1-OP-and place EPR in service. 43A E.3.21 PO-2.0 Functions as Reactivity SRO.
NOTE: At the Examiners discretion, EVENT 3 May direct control rod withdrawal to can be initiated while EVENT 2 is in progress, if raise power. (Not expected) desi red. Directs pressure raised by adjusting MPR setpoint.
As MPR setpoint is raised Bypass Valves (BPVs) -
RO throttle closed then reopen as RPV pressure rises 0 Manually adjusts MPR setpoint by from 845 psis to the new MPR setpoint. As the bumping MECHANICAL PRESSURE MPR is adjusted Annunciator AI-4-6 TURBINE BY- REG switch to RAISE PASS VALVES OPEN clears and alarms, as the 0 Continue to raise RPV pressure to BPV close when setpoint is raised and re-open as about 900 psig.
pressure rises to the new setpoint. 0 Allows BPV to regulate pressure at As RPV pressure rises above 850 psig, 900 psig while starting second RWCU Annunciator F1-4-7 jF4-4-2) RPS CH I I (12) Pump, if not previously started.
REACTOR PRESS LOW clears. 0 If directed, commences pulling control Annunciator F3-1-1 APRM 15-18 may also rods to establish BPV position or intermittently alarm as some APRM downscale power increase.
conditions clear and alarm.
Reactor coolant temperature also rises from 525 OF (large E window display on K Panel). The crew monitor heat-up rate, NRC Scenario 3 -1 1- September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACT1ONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 3 IRM 11 INOP TRIP.
PO-4.0. This event can be initiated at any point up until 918 psis is reached, in the scenario as determined by the NRC Lead Examiner. It may be done simultaneously with the RWCU pump start or prior to the pump staff.
CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: SRO When directed by the Lead Examiner, active Acknowledges report malfunction using TRG 1: Consults Tech Spec 3.6.2.a and NM13A IRM 11 FAILURE-INOP 3.6.2.g and determines minimum IRM I I INOP TRIP is generated. RPS CHANNEL numbers of channels are still operable 11 trips and four white scram pilot solenoid lights for each trip system.
and one red backup scram light extinguish on F Directs IRM 11 bypassed Panel. At E Console for IRM I ? ,the white Directs RPS CH 11 reset DOWNSCALEANOP light is lit. IRM I 1 reading on Notifies WEC chart is downscale. Notifies Ops management The Rod Block Monitor panel on E Console blue Conducts Crew Brief/Update SRM 11&12 IRM 11,12,13&14 APRM 11,12,13&14 lights are lit.
The following Annunciators actuate: RO F l - I - I R P S CH 1I REACT NEUTRON MONITOR Reports alarms to SRO FI-2-1 RPS CH 11 AUTO REACTOR TRIP These actions are from F I 1 F14-I RPS CH I I REFUEL INST TRIP Confirms RPS Channel 11 tripped.
F2-3-6 IRM 11-14 Confirms alarm using available F3-4-4 ROD BLOCK indications.
Confirm other channels of neutron At backpanel, IRM IlDrawer white DOWNSCALE monitoring are normal.
and INOP lights are lit and the meter is downscale. Consult Tech Specs (Notifies SRO)
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 3 WHEN the cause of the alarm is corrected, reset RPS Channel 11.
rhese additional actions are from F1 1 7 Determine which sensor in RPS Channel 11 caused trip. (Determines IRM 11 inop condition).
3 Confirms RPS Channel 12 sensors normal based on plant conditions.
(Determines RPS 12 sensors normal).
Theses applicable actions are from F2-3-6 Confirm alarm on computer printout.
(6193 is expected).
Observe E Console to determine condition: Observes DOWNSCALE OR INOP light is on. The UPSCALE lights are off.
IF instrument is malfunctioning, THEN refer to N 1-0P-38B Consult Tech Spec 3.6.2.a and 3.6.2.g (Notifies SRO).
SRO determines and directs IRM I I is to be These actions are in OP-38B H.l.O for bypassed per N1-OP-38 H. 1.0 Bypassing IRM at E Console CI Confirm requirements of Tech Specs will be met after IRM is bypassed.
(Action completed by SRO).
Place IRM BYPASS switch in BYPASS (IRM 11) position.
Confirm IRM BYPASS light lit on panel E.
Confirm IRM BYPASS light lit on IRM NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 0PERATO R ACT10NS auxiliaries drawer (back panels).
SRM-IRM AUXILIARIES drawer is a separate Confirm computer printout IRM 11 drawer from the IRM channel drawers with status BYPASS YES lights, located in same vicinity. Report IRM 11 bypassed to SRO SRO determines and directs RPS Channel I I to These actions are required to reset be reset. RPS Channel 11 trip RO Depress REACTOR TRIP RESET When the trip is reset, the RPS Channel I 1 four pushbutton on E Console white pilot lights and one red light illuminate and Observe RPS Channel 11 four white associated annunciators clear. pilot lights illuminate Report RPS Channel 11 trip is reset.
EVENT 4 Service Water Pump I 1 trips PO-5.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:
When directed by the Lead Examiner, active malfunction using TRG 2: SRO CWOZA SERVICE WATER PUMP TRIP 11 Acknowledges report SERVICE WTR PUMP I 1 trips. Directs starting Service Water Pump The following annunciators actuate: 12 H1-1-2 SERVICE WTR PUMP I 1 TRIP Notifies WEC 0 VERLOAD Notifies Ops management Conducts Crew Brief/Update BOP HI-4-2 R. BUILDING SW PRESS / SERV W Reports alarms PUMP HDR PRESS Reports Service Water Pump 11 H1-4-1 R. BUILDING COOLING WTR PRESS- tripped TEMP MAKEUP FLOW These actions are from H I 2 Confirm alarm on computer printout.
When Service Water Pump 12 is started, header Start Service Water Pump 12. (Pump pressures and system temperatures return to starts) normal values. IF Service Water Pump 12 will NOT NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 0PE R A T 0 R ACT10NS start, THEN enter N1-SOP-18.1. (NA; Pump 12 starts)
Place Service Water Pump 11 control switch to STOP. May be delayed until after the WEC is contacted.
Also refers to HI-4-2, but actions in either ARP are effective in mitigating the pump trip.
EVENT 5 RX BLDG VENT RAD MON 11 INOP PO-6.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:
When directed by the Lead Examiner, active malfunction using TRG 3:
RMIU RX BLDG VENT RAD MON 11 INOP Reports alarm.
Ll-4-3 RB VENT RAD MONITOR OFF NORMAL Observes back panel reading of alarms. instrument.
Reports downscale indication to SRO.
Notifies RP.
SRO Acknowledges status reports Channel 12 can still automatically start RBEVS, if 5 Enters TS 3.6.2.j. Determines mr/hr setpoint is reached. channel must be tripped within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or the action required in 3.6.2.a must be taken (Enter TS 3.4.4).
Notifies WEC Notifies Ops management Conducts Crew Brief/Update NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 6 Control Rod Drifts Out PO-7.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:
When directed by the Lead Examiner, active malfunction using TRG 4: SRO RD02R3031 30-31 CONTROL ROD FAILURE Acknowledges report DRIFT OUT Directs control rod inserted per ARP WHEN rod is inserted and valved out, then Notifies Reactor Engineering delete this malfunction. Notifies WEC WHEN directed to reset drift alarm in Aux Notifies Ops management Control Room; activate REMOTE using TRG Conducts Crew Brief/Update 5:
RD07 RESET ROD DRIFT ALARM Control Rod 30-31 drifts outward. These actions are from F3-2-6 and SOP-I .5 The following annunciator actuates: RO F3-2-6 CONTROL ROD DRIFT Confirm rod is drifting by observing F Panel RPlS indication AND/OR the process computer.
Enters SOP-I .5 for rod drift Identifies rod 30-31 is drifting out.
Turn ON Control Rod Power When drifting rod is selected and driven in, the rod Selects drifting rod 30-31 and inserts will insert to notch 00. to notch 00 using EMERGENCY ROD IN.
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Determines rod can be fully inserted.
CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: Release Emergency Rod In Switch.
While isolating HCU, in order to simulate Determines rod did not remain fully depressurizing the accumulator BEFORE inserted by observing the rod position.
contacting control room, activate malfunction using Select and hold Emergency Rod In TRG 12: Switch to maintain rod fully inserted.
RD03R3031 30-31 CONTROL ROD ACCUM When rod is fully inserted, direct Failure isolation of HCU 30-31 per OP-5.
(Dispatches Operator/Directs task to Annunciator f3-2-5 alarms be performed in Reactor Building).
When HCU is isolated and the malfunction is WHEN HCU is isolated, release deleted, the rod will remain at notch position 00 Emergency Rod In Switch.
(full in).
ROLE PLAYS: Determine rod is no longer drifting out.
After isolating and depressurizing the HCU, THEN Informs SRO to refer to TS 3.3.3 as operator dispatched report HCU is isolated, with When directed by SM, exits SOP-I .5 cooling water maintained.
Activating TRG 5 REMOTE RD07, THEN as operator dispatched report rod drift alarm has been reset.
When the Rod Drift Alarm is reset in the Aux Control Room Annunciator f3-2-6 CONTROL ROD DRlf T clears.
EVENT 6 RPV Level Transmitter Failed HIGH PO-8.0 This event has the potential to lead to an automatic reactor scram. If this occurs, then activate TRG 7 to initiate the EC steam leak. The scenario can proceed under these conditions.
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
ir INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:
When directed by the Lead Examiner, active malfunction using TRG 6:
RR54 RPV LEVEL TRANSMITTER (LOCAL FW CONTROL FAILS HIGH F2-3-3 REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL HIGH-LOW SRO alarms Acknowledge status reports GEMAC level transmitter REACTOR LEVEL Direct entry into N1-SOP-16.1 COLI I (ID59A) fails upscale. Dual pen RX Feedwater Failures VESSEL LEVEL - TOTAL FW FLOW recorder Notifies WEC ID14 on F Panel, level indication pegs high. It will Notifies Ops management remain high until level column 12 is selected, at Conducts Crew Brief/Update which point, the recorder input is from Column 12.
FWLC input from a failed water level instruments results in slowly lowering RPV water level, as FWP I I BYPASS VALVE closes in response to the sensed high level condition.
Yarway water level instruments L136-09 and 36-10 and GEMAC Col 12 level transmitter ID596 all start to slowly lower.
These actions are from F2-3-3 NOTE: BOP Annunciator response action will mitigate the Confirm vessel level by monitoring transient. The crew will be expected to also enter leveI indi cat ions.
SOP-16.1 Feedwater Failures. These actions are Observe steam flow/ feed flow also effective in mitigating the transient. mismatch.
As FWP I I valve is re-opened, actual RPV water Take manual control of mis-operating level will begin to rise, as observed on other system that are feeding or draining the instruments. vessel.
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Depresses MAN pushbutton for FWP 11 BYPASS VALVE at F panel.
Adjusts FWP 11 BYPASS VALVE output signal to restore and maintain level as directed.
Determine cause AND return level to normal. (Cause is failed COL 11 instrument).
These actions are from SOP-16.1 IF RPV level is lowering THEN Reduce reactor power per SOP-1.Ias necessary to maintain level. (Not expected to reduce power)
Problem with FWLC, FW Pumps OR FW heating? FWLC FCV Lockup? NO FWLC Malfunction? YES Using available FCVs take manual control of FWLC at MA stations placing controllers in Manual AND attempt to control RPV level.
Depresses MAN pushbutton for FWP 11 BYPASS VALVE at F panel.
Adjusts FWP 11 BYPASS VALVE output signal to restore and maintain level as directed.
NOTE: Can level be maintained > 53 inches?
It is NOT required for the crew to transition to OP- YES 16 to transfer the level column to 12. FW may Restore level to 65 to 83 inches.
remain in MAN for the remainder of the scenario. IF feed/ steam flow OR narrow range NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
~ ~~
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS level instrument is malfunctioning THEN Shift Reactor Pressure/ level Columns or FW modes per N1-OP-16 Section F and return FWLC to auto.
EVENT 8 EC Steam leak into Secondary PO-9.0, 10.0, I 1.o, 12.0 Containment with Isolation Failure Console Operator: Refer to Attachment for reporting Reactor Building general area temperatures. Blowdown when evaluators are ready to allow the scenario to continue.
CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:
When RPV level is stabilized and directed by the Lead Examiner, active malfunction using TRG 7:
EC02 STEAM LEAKAGE OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (4% 5:OO minute ramp)
EC08A EC LOOP 11 STM IV FAIL TO CLOSE Ill 100%
EC08B EC LOOP I 1 STM IV FAIL TO CLOSE 112 100%
Emergency Condenser steam leakage info the -
SRO Secondary Containment begins. The following Enters and executes EOP-5 due to annunciators actuate: Area temperature above any alarm KI-4-3 MER COOLING SYSTEM I ? STEAM setpoint (Detail 1)when K1 4-3 LEAK AREA THIGH alarms.
(with computer points (2190, CI89, CI87) Activates the Emergency Plan, if Followed shortly by required. (Expected later).
K1-4-5 MER COOLING SYSTEM I 2 STEAM IF Reactor Building Ventilation LEAK AREA THIGH Exhaust radiation levels exceed 5 (with computer points C193 and C194) mr/hr THEN Verify RB Ventilation HI-4-8 AREA RAD MONITORS (EOP) isolation and EVS initiation.
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Area Rad Monitors # I 8 (RB 340) and #22 (RB 281) 7 IF Reactor Building Ventilation alarm and are above Detail R values. Also, RB isolates AND Exhaust radiation level PNG monitor goes into ALERT alarm. is below 5 mr/hr THEN Restart RB Ventilation. (SC-2) (Not Expected) rhese actions are from As steam leak rate rises, RPV pressure begins to rEMPERATURElRADlATlON Leg lower. Turbine Bypass Valves are regulated Directs operation of area unit coolers closed. Pressure and power continue to lower as and RB Ventilation as required. (SC-RPV pressure lowers. Eventually, as RCS coolant 3) temperature begins to rapidly lower, a large power IF any area temperature or radiation excursion may occur. level is above its alarm setpoint (Detail R, T), THEN Go to 27 (which is SC-5). . ...(SC-3) (Expected because ARM
- I 8 is exceeding and also Detail T values exceeded with K1-4-3 and C189 and C190)
IF a primary system is discharging into Fire panel Alarms actuate the reactor building AND the 2-1 1-7 REAC BLDG 318 LOCAL PANEL NO 7 discharge cannot be isolated THEN FIRE Go to 28 (which is SC-9) (Expected, 2-1 4-7 REAC BLDG 318 LOCAL PANEL NO 7 because based on temperatures, TROUBLE radiation levels and fire alarms, crew 2-2 1-2 DIESEL FIRE PUMP #I RUNNING is expected to determine the source 2-2 2-2 ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP #I STARTED as a primary system EC steam line)
Fire systems actuate in RB 318 areas. Directs action to isolate EC 11 (all discharges into affected areas) (SC-6)
After about a minute LI-3-6 (4-6) EMERG VENT SYS CHANNEL 11 Proceeds to WAIT block SC-7 and (12) RELAY OPERATE WAITS until 2 or more general areas Reactor Building Supply and Exhaust Fans should are above Max Safe Values. Also NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS trip and RB isolation dampers close. Malfunction concurrently executes the actions in HVO3A and B prevent the isolation from occurring. 28, since a primary system is discharging into the reactor building.
BEFORE any area temperature, When RPV pressure lowers below 850 psig, a radiation or water levels reaches a turbine trip signal is generated from actuation of Max Safe Value (SC-9) (Detail Vacuum Trip I . The turbine trip results in HPCl S).. ... Directs a manual scram and actuation. ENTER RPV CONTROL EOP-2, CT-I .O while continuing here in EOP-5 (SC-IO) (Expected, because the unisolable leak is increasing Sec Containment temperatures and radiation levels).
While WAITING in block SC-I land executing Proceeds to WAIT block SC-11 and EOP-2 RPV Control, the SRO should determine WAITS until 2 or more general areas that RPV Blowdown is anticipated and direct are above Max Safe Values.
rapidly depressurizing the RPV using ECs and IF anticipating RPV Blowdown, directs Bypass Valves per override step P-I of EOP-2. use of EC and BPVs to rapidly depressurize. (EOP-2 P-I Override)
WHEN notified that 2 or more general When the second area (RB 298 West) is reportec areas are above Max Safe approximately 6 minutes after being Values.. ..proceeds to step SC-12 and dispatched.. .. . . directs entry to EOP-8, RPV Blowdown while continuing here in EOP-5 (SC-12) (Expected)
These actions are directed when EOP-2 is entered from EOP-5 step SC-10 NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 0PE R A T 0 R ACT10N S Event 9 RPS failure -
SRO Directs a manual scram from EOP-5 SRO Entry into EOP-2 for scram, including the step SC-10 (CT) transition t o EOP-3, due to RPS failure. Control Repeats back Scram Report and rods should be quickly inserted with manual acknowledge RPS failure to trip.
ARI initiation and transition back to EOP-2 Enters EOP-2 RPV Control occurs.
All rods in to at least 04? (Step 2 ) NO Will reactor stay shutdown without boron? (Step 3) NO Exits EOP-2 and Enter EOP-3 (Step 4)
Transition from EOP-2 to EOP-3 These actions are directed when EOP-3 is entered from EOP-2 step 4 SRO Entry into EOP-3 -
SRO IF all rods are inserted to at least 04 OR the reactor will stay shutdown without boron THEN stop injecting boron (injection is not expected) and return to RPV Control, exit this EOP-3 and enter EOP-2. (Step 1) Expected after manual ARI initiation.
Directs Bypass ADS Directs Prevent Core Spray injection per EOP-1 Attachment 4 (Install Core Spray Jumpers) (Step2)
All legs are implemented concurrently but These actions are from POWER LEG priority may be given to POWER leg first.
Directs Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN.
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 0PER A T 0 R ACT10N S
((2-1) (Already done)
CT-2.0 Directs verify ARI initiation. (Q-2)
When ARI is manually initiated, control rods will Turbine Generator on-line? (Q-3) NO fully insert. EOP-3 will be exited per override step (May direct based on timing) 1 and EOP-2 is entered. Directs EOP-3.1. ((2-7) (May direct based on timing).
WHEN informed of all rods are inserted to at least 04 OR the reactor will stay shutdown without boron Transition from EOP-3 to EOP-2 THEN stop injecting boron (injection is not expected) and return to RPV Control, exit this EOP-3 and enter EOP-2. From override step 1.
SRO Entry into EOP-2 These actions are directed when EOP-2 is entered from EOP-3, after rod insertion Repeats back Scram Report and acknowledge.
Enters EOP-2 RPV Control All rods in to at least 04? (Step 2)
YES 13 Directs entry into SOP-1 (SCRAM)
IF water level is unknown exit this procedure and enter EOP-7 to flood the RPV (L-2) (Not expected)
CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: Directs level restored and maintained IF directed to pull HPCl fuses WAIT three minutes, between 53 inches and 95 inches active REMOTE using TRG I O : using one or more of the following FW24 REMOVAL OF HPCl FUSES FU8/ FU9 systems (L-3):
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS THEN report HPCl fuses are pulled. Condenstate/FW CRD Core Spray (EOP-1 Att 4)
When FWP trips, level control strategy should Bypass Core Spray IV interlocks change, since level cannot be maintained above 53 in ch es .
Alternate Injection Systems (Detail E) are: IF RPV water level cannot be restored Containment Spray Raw Water to Core Spray and maintained above 53 inches (EOPI Att 5) THEN directs level maintained Fire Water (EOP 1 Att 19) above -84 inches TAF. Use Liquid Poison Test Tank (EOP 1 Att 12) Alternate Injection Systems if Liquid Poison Boron Tank (EOP 1 Att 13) needed (Detail E) L-3 (CT)
RPV Level Control through 13 FW FCV (EOP-1 5)
RPV Level Control through 11 and 12 FW FCV (EOP-1 Attachment 26)
Anticipating blowdown on more than one area IF RPV Blowdown is anticipated exceeding Max Safe temperature values is THEN rapidly depressurize the RPV expected. using EC and turbine bypass valves.
OK to exceed 100"Flhr cooldown rate.
(P-I override) (Expected to direct use of EC and BPVs to depressurize).
Directs RPV pressure stabilized 800 to 1000 psig using Turbine bypass valves.
If needed, directs use of Alternate Pressure Control Systems (P-5)
EC ERV Others (Not expected)
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS BOP Actions on EC Steam Leak Report annunciators.
Confirm alarm on computer printout.
Enter N1-EOP-5. (Notifies SRO of entry condition).
Verify system isolation.
Attempts to manually close EC Steam IVS.
Reports failure of EC isolation valves to close.
Dispatches operator RB to take local area temperatures.
Reports local area temperature to the SRO.
BOP Actions when reactor scrammed BOP Performs RPV Level Control at F Panel.
Restore level 53 to 95 inches as directed.
BOP Actions when EOP-3 is entered BOP When directed, Bypass ADS using keylock switches at F Panel 0 When directed, Prevent Core Spray injection per EOP-1 Attachment 4 (Install Core Spray Jumpers) at EOP ISOLATION BYPASS JUMPER SUBPANEL (inside N Panel)
- I 7 40-01 INSIDE CORE SPRAY DISCHARGE IV121 BYPASS
- I 8 40-1 1 INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV111 BYPASS NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACT ION S 0 # I 9 40-06 CORE SPRAY TEST VALVE 11 BYPASS 0 #24 40-09 INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV122 BYPASS
- 25 40-10 INSIDE CS DISCHARGE IV112 BYPASS 0 #26 40-05 CORE SPRAY TEST VALVE 12 BYPASS Throttle Core Spray Inboard IVs (40-01, 40-09, 40-10 and 40-1 1) as necessary.
Event 9 RPS Failure -
RO When scram is initiated RPS Channel I I trips but When directed, initiates a manual Channel 12 does nof. The crew enters transitions scram by pacing Mode Switch to to EOP-3. When directed to verify ARI in the SHUTDOWN or using Manual Scram POWER leg, the RO actuates manual ARI at F pushbuttons and implements SOP-I Panel. The scram air header depressurizes affer Reactor Scram.
the ARI valves actuate. All confrol rods fully insert. Provides Scram Report, including CT-2.0 failure of RPS Channel 12 to trip.
When directed to verify ARI depresses MANUAL ARI pushbutton F Panel.
Reports ARI successful When all rods are full in, provides a Pdscram report.
Reduce RECIRC MASTER flow 25 to 43 Mlbm/hr Perform SOP-I Scram Verification steps Confirm all rods inserted to position 04 or beyond using Full Core Display.
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS If ALL RODS IN cannot be confirmed THEN continue and confirm when scram is reset.
Observe power decreasing Insert IRM and SRM detectors Downrange IRMs as necessary Verify turbine and generator tripped.
Maintain RPV pressure below 1080 psig using one or more of the following (unless given other direction from EOP-2):
Turbine Bypass Valves Emergency Condensers ERVs Others (Not expected)
WHEN ready to provide temperature data to require the RPV Blowdown, reports can be made from those dispatched to monitor temperatures.
Reactor Building temperatures continue to rise and when RB 298 West is reported to be 141 O F (more than one general area temperature is reported to be above 135°F). . ..EOPis entered.
SRO Actions for EOP-8 SRO Updates crew of transition to EOP-8 IF RPV water level is unknown THEN Exit this procedure and enter EOP-7 (Step 2) Not expected Are all rods inserted to at least position 04? YES (Step 3)
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Drywell Pressure? BELOW 3.5 psig (Step IO)
Directs ECs initiated (Step 12)
Torus water level? ABOVE 8 feet (Step13)
Directs 3 ERVs opened. (Step 14)
OK to exceed 10O0F/hr.
Do NOT use hi/lo lo/lo rosemounts below 500 psig Evaluates override conditions for Step 15, WAIT until shutdown cooling pressure interlock clears 120 psig. (Step 16)
Subsequent steps are not expected to be performed during scenario.
Malfunctions become effective -
BOP HV03A RBEVS CH 11 FAIL TO AUTO INITIATE Determine failure of RB Ventilation to HV03B RBEVS CH 12 FAIL TO AUTO INITIATE trip and isolate by observing supply and exhaust fans still operating with When RB Vent Radiation levels exceed 5 mdhr on containment isolation dampers still the operable vent monitor, RB Normal Ventilation open.
should trip and both RBEVS trains should start. Report failure to SRO.
NOTE: EOP-5 (step SC-2) allows RB Ventilation restarted, if isolated and radiation levels are below I 5 mr/hr, NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS BOP Actions to Start RBEVS OP-I 0 H.1 .O Verify open 202-36 EM VENTILATION FROM REACTOR BLDG BV.
Verify closed the following:
202-47 EM VENTILATION TIE BV 202-74 EM VENTILATION LOOP ROLE PLAY:
As RP acknowledge RBEVS is being placed in 11 COOLING BV service. 202-75 EM VENTILATION LOOP 12 COOLING BV Notify RP of placing RBEVS in service.
Place RBEVS 11 (12) in service:
Place 202-37 (38) to OPEN Verify open 202-37 (38)
Start 202-53 (33) EVS FAN 11 (12)
Verify open 202-34 (35)
Confirm proper operation of 202-50 (51) Inlet FCV by lights and flow indicat ion.
Report RBEVS manually started.
Stops the following fans:
202-01 RB Supply Fan 11 202-02 RB Supply Fan 12 202-05 RB Exhaust Fan 11 202-06 RB Exhaust fan 12 Close Containment isolation dampers 202-15 RB Supply Isolation Valve 11 202-16 RB Supply Isolation Valve 12 202-32 RB Exhaust Isolation Valve NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 11 202-31 RB Exhaust Isolation Valve 12 EVENT 11 Loss of Feedwater Pumps CT-4.0 3op CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: Report loss of feedwater pumps After rods are inserted by ARI and before RPV Use injection sources as directed Blowdown is directed, activate malfunction using If directed, executes EOP-1 TRG a: Attachment 25 or 26 to control level FW03A FWP TRIP 11 using FWBP and FW Level Control FW03B FWP TRIP 12 Valves 11,12 or 13.
CT-4.0 Injects, using systems directed by SRO to restore and maintain level above -84 inches.
After feedpumps trip, inventory will be lost during the RPV Blowdown. FWBP or Core Spray Pumps can be used to maintain RPV water level above TAF (-84 inches).
Injecting using FWP I 1 or 12 FCV required pulling HPCl fuses to establish control with valves. If using 13 FCV, these fuses are not required to be removed.
BOP Actions for Blowdown BOP If directed, initiate ECs (CT)
When directed open 3 ERVs (CT)
Monitor RPV pressure.
NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS If Torus water temperature reaches 85 4 SRO All legs are executed concurrently, but major Enters EOP-4 on high torus water actions are taken to control the rising torus water temperature, if required temperature, after EOP entry. Directs Containment Spray lock out Executes Torus Temperature Leg Maintain Torus temperature below 85°F using Torus Cooling (EOP 1 Att
- 16) (TT-2)
BOP If directed, lockout Containment Spray Pumps by placing switches in PTL.
If directed, starts Torus Cooling per BOP Actions to start torus cooling per EOP-1 6 Attachment 16 Torus Cooling shall be placed in service within 15 minutes of Torus temperature 2 85°F Close CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:
111; 80-45 112 or 121; 80-40 and 80-45 0 122; 80-40 Verify closed 80-1 15, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 12 Verify closed 80-1 14, CONT SPRAY TO RAD WASTE IV 11 Verify closed Cont Spray Discharge IV using keylock switch for selected loop:
0 111; 80-16 0 112; 80-36 0 121;80-15 122; 80-35 NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Verify open CONT SPRAY BYPASS BV for selected loop:
111; 80-40 112; 80-44 121;80-41 122; 80-45 Fully open 80-1 18, CONT SPRAY TEST TO TORUS FCV Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY RAW WATER PUMP in selected loop.
Start CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP in selected loop.
WHEN torus water reaches desired temperature stop Containment Spray pump.
Stop all operating Raw Water Pumps If desired, return system to standby per N1-OP-14.
Report status to SRO.
TERMINAT10N C RITERIA RPV Blowdown complete. RPV water level restored and maintained above TAF. All rods fully inserted.
EVENT 12 SRO Classification SRO PO-13.0 Classify the event as SAE 3.4.1 and 4.4.1 NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA, NRC Exam VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events B. Commitments
- 1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 3 September 2006
ATTACH MENT INSTRUCTORUSEASCONSOLEOPERATOR TIME LINE FOR ACTION AND REPORTS FOR STEAM LEAK REPORT TEMPERATURES WHEN EVALUATORS ARE READY TO ALLOW BLOWDOWN I
3 : O O Kl-1-1 RX BLDG AREA TEMP HIGH alarms Cue crew that computer points alarming H318 W INST RM AREA TEMP F 125°F H319 W INST RM AREA TEMP F 125°F DISPATCHED TO MONITOR + 5:OO I Report as NAO in field:
RB 261 West temperature is 123°F AND RB 281 West temperature is 137°F (one general area above max safe value Detail S 135°F RB 298 West temperature is 141°F. (This is the second are above max Safe).
I
Form ES-D-1 Event Event Type* Description 1 R Return power to 100% by raising Recirc Flow.
2 Switch CRD Stabilizing Valves from A and B to E and F per NI-OP-5, Section F.4.1 3 NM19C APRM 13 fails upscale resulting in half scram and Tech Spec entry.
Bypassing channel and resetting half scram is required.
4 RROGA Recirc Pump 11 seal leakage requires pump removal from service.
Pump suction valves fail to fully close resulting in partial loop RR07A isolation. Tech Spec 3.1.7.e is entered for 4 loop operation.
Overrides 5 TC06 Electrical Pressure Regulator Failure Oscillations. The EPR is removed from service and the Mechanical Pressure Regulator (MPR) is placed in service 6 TC08 M (ALL) Mechanical Pressure Regulator Failure Low. The MPR fails low resulting in rapid pressure and power rise. An automatic reactor scram occurs.
~ ~ ~ ~
7 ED07 Electric Fault on Emergency AC Powerboard PB102. Diesel Generator 102 automatically starts, but does not close in on the bus due to the fault. DG102 must be manually shutdown due to loss of power to the diesel auxiliaries. Downstream 600 VAC Powerboard PI3166 must be re-energized from an alternate source.
8 FW03B Motor Driven Feedwater Pump 12 trips resulting in a loss of high pressure feed. Additional high pressure injection sources (CRD and Liquid Poison) must be started as directed from EOP.
9 RR29 A small LOCA (approximately 14%) occurs which reduces vessel inventory and level lowers to top of active fuel. Containment Spray system operation is required due to elevated Drywell pressure.
10 CSOl B Core Spray Pump 112 trips and Core Spray Pump 122 suction strainer becomes plugged. Injection can be restored using CS05D Feedwater Booster Pumps, after depressurizing the RPV.
11 SRO Classify event as ALERT 3.1 . I 2/22/2007 10:24:1 1 AM 7 of a NRC Exam Submittal
c TARGET QUANTITAT IVE ATTR I B UTES ACTUAL (PER SCENARIO; SEE SECTION D.5.d) ATTRIBUTES Total Malfunction Count:
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 6 Major not included in this count.
Events 3,4,5,7,8,10
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Event 7,8,9,10 Abnormal Events Count:
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Does not include the SRO TS Event 4,5 related events. These are
- 4. Major transients (1-2) 1 considered separately.
Event 6 SRO TS Events
~
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive 2 actions (0-2)
Alternate Level Control of EOP-2 EOP-8 RPV Blosdown
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2 Operators 2/22/2007 11:00:49 AM 8of8 NRC Exam Submittal
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 4 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 35 LOCA WITH DEGRADED CORE SPRAY SYSTEMS PREPARE R G. Bobka DATE 10/13/06 G. Spears, S. Evanchik, G Rabalais c%>/z VAL1DATED DATE 10/17/06 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE 2?k&b7 0PERATI ONS MANAGER NA Exam Securitv DATE CON FI G U RAT10N CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 90 minutes Mitigating Strategy Code: RL2 Small LOCA. RPV Blowdown required to recover level above TAF. Inject with Alternate Systems.
Crew assumes the shift with the plant at 95% power with 11 FWP out of service for repairs.
The crew is directed to restore reactor power to 100% following performance of N1-ST-W1, Control Rod Exercising and Operability Test. Following the power change the crew is directed to swap CRD Stabilizing Valves from A and B to E and F. After this, 13 APRM will fail upscale, producing a half scram that may be reset. Crew will bypass the failed APRM, reset the half-scram and review Technical Specifications for the failed instrument.
After the Technical Specifications review, a seal leak develops on 11 Reactor Recirculation Pump. Crew will remove that pump from service, attempt to isolate it, and review Technical Specifications.
Reactor pressure will then begin to oscillate. Crew will recognize a failing EPR, place the MPR in control, move the EPR to its high stop, and review Technical Specifications for operation without a backup regulator. When the plant is stable, the MPR will fail, causing a reactor scram. Crew enters EOP-2 on low RPV water level.
After scram actions are complete, Powerboard 102 will develop a fault; EDG 102 will start, but its output breaker will not close. The Crew crossties PB 16B and PB 16A and restore loads.
Shortly afterwards, 12 FWP will trip, leaving only CRD pumps and Liquid Poison pumps for high-pressure injection.
A medium break LOCA begins to develop inside Primary Containment. Crew enters EOP-4 on high drywell pressure. When Core Spray pumps start, one of the operable pumps will trip.
NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
Recognizing its inability to maintain level above TAF with high-pressure injection, the crew aligns alternate injection sources, and enters EOP-8 for blowdown.
One Core Spray Pump is available, but its injection capability is limited by suction strainer clogging. The Condensate System remains available for injection using the Feedwater Booster Pumps through the Feed Pump level control valves, after pressure is reduced by performing an RPV Blowdown. Crew will restore and maintain RPV water level above -109 inches.
Major Procedures: N1-SOP-1.2, N1-SOP-31.2, N1-EOP-2, 4, and 8 EAL Classificat ion : Alert EAL 3.1. I Termination Criteria: RPV Blowdown completed, RPV Water Level > -84 inches and rising and Drywell pressure reduced below 3.5 psig NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-244; IC-20 or equivalent. Reduce Power to 95%. FWP 11 INOP.
CRD Stabilizing Valves A and B in service.
B. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. FW03A FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP 11 INSERTED b CSOI B CORE SPRAY PUMP TRIP 112 INSERTED
- k. CS05D CORE SPRAY PMP 122 SUCT CLOG 100% Ramp 0:30 TRG 8
- 2. Remotes:
- a. LP03 LIQUID POISON PUMP WATER SUPPLY, TEST TANK TRG 9
- c. FW24 REMOVAL OF HPCl FUSES FU8/FU9, PULL TRG12
- 3. Overrides:
- a. 5S61 Dl3715 RRP 11 SUCT CONTROL SW OFF POS FAILS TRG16 (Event Trigger hzIrrv02c== 1 RRP 11 Suct Valve green light ON)
- b. 5S61D1380 RRP 11 SUCT CONTROL SW ON POS FAILS TRG17 (Event Trigger hzIrrv02c== 1 RRP 11 Suct Valve green light ON)
- c. 5DS235L03450 RRP 11 SUCT GREEN LIGHT OFF, delay 10 sec TRG18 (Event Trigger hzlrrv02c == 1 RRP 11 Suct Valve green light ON)
- d. 5DS236L03451 RRP 11 SUCT RED LIGHT OFF, delay 10 sec TRG19 (Event Trigger hzlrrv02c == 1 RRP 11 Suct Valve green light ON)
- 4. Annunciators:
- a. None NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
C. Equipment Out of Service
- 1. Feedwater Pump FWP 11 with red clearance applied to control switch.
- 2. Feedwater Blocking Valve Closed for FWP 11 and red clearance applied.
D. Support Documentation
- 1. Reactivity Maneuver Request Form, (Page 1, Attachment 1 to GAP-OPS-05) to support performance of power restoration following performance of N1-ST-W 1.
- 2. N1-OP-43B F.2 through F.6 signed off and performing step 2.7
- a. Setup C875 instantaneous MWth in window
- b. Depress LPRM Dnsc bypass pushbutton on E panel.
E. Miscellaneous
- 1. Red Clearance for FWP 11 and blocking valve.
- 2. Protected Equipment Signs placed on the following with FWP 11 inoperable:
13 Condensate Pump 13 FW Booster Pump 12FWP PB12 (R122)
Diesel Generator 103 Offsite Breaker R40
- 3. EVENT TRIGGERS/COMPOSITES
- a. trgset 5 "zdrpstdn== 1" Mode Switch in Shutdown (ED07)
- b. trgset 6 "zdrpstdn== 1" Mode Switch in Shutdown (FW03B)
- c. trgset 7 "zdrpstdn== 1" Mode Switch in Shutdown (RR29)
- d. trgset 16 "hzlrrv02c== 1" RRP 11 Suct Valve green light ON 5S61 D1371.5 RRP 11 Suct control sw off pos fails
- e. trgset 17 " hzlrrv02c == 1" RRP 11 Suct Valve green light ON 5S61 D1380 RRP 11 Suct control sw on pos fails
- f. trgset 18 " hzlrrv02c == 1" RRP 11 Suct Valve green light ON 5DS235L03450 RRP 11 Suct green light off, delay 10 sec
- g. trgset 19 " hzlrrv02c == 1" RRP 11 Suct Valve green light ON 5DS236L03451 RRP 11 Suct red light off, delay 10 sec NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
It. S HI FT TURNOV ER I NF0RMATI 0N PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, RO, CRE)
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) y RO Log (RO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Lit Control Room Annunciators 0 Computer Alarm Summary (RO)
Evolutions/GeneraI I nfo rmat ion/Equipment Status :
Reactor Power = 95% Loadline = >loo%
FWP 11 is out of service.
Raise reactor power to 100% in accordance with RMR and N1-OP-436, following performance of N1-ST-W1, Control Rod Exercising and Operability Test by previous shift.
N1-OP-439 in progress to restore power to loo%, with rod exercising completed.
PART Ill: RemarkdPlanned Evolutions:
0 Return Dower to 100%
0 Swap Stabilizing Valves from A and B to E and F.
PART IV: To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
0 Review new Clearances (SM) Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
I Scenario ID INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) 0t her 0ptions?
NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
111. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1 .O Given a primary system leak into the containment, when torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or before drywell air temperature exceeds 3OO0F,the crew will initiate Containment Sprays, while in the safe region of the Containment Spray Initiation Limit and prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure limit IAW N1-EOP-4.
CT-2.0 Given degraded RPV injection sources the crew will depressurize the RPV and inject with Preferred and Alternate Injection Systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above -1 09 inches IAW N1-EOP-2, such that Severe Accident Procedure (SAP) entry is not required.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.o Given the plant at less than rated power the crew will raise power to rated, per N1-OP-43B and the RMR provided.
PO-2.0 Given the plant at power, the crew will transfer CRD stabilizing valves in accordance with N1-OP-5.
PO-3.0 Given the plant at power and a failed APRM the crew will bypass the instrument and reset the tripped RPS channel in accordance with N I -
ARP-F2 (F2-1-6) and N1-OP-38C.
PO-4.0 Given the plant at power and a failed APRM the SRO will ensure compliance with the limitations imposed by Technical Specifications (TS 3.6.2.a and 3.6.2.g).
PO-5.0 Given the plant at power with a failure of Reactor Recirculation Pump mechanical seals, the crew will remove the pump from service and isolate the loop in accordance with N1-SOP-I .2.
PO-6.0 Given the plant at power with 4 loop operation, the SRO will ensure compliance with the limitations imposed by Technical Specifications (TS 3.1.7).
PO-7.0 Given the plant at power with a failure of automatic pressure control system (EPR), the crew will place the MPR in service in accordance with Nl-ARP-A2 (A2-4-4) and N1-SOP-31.2.
NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
PO-8.0 Given the plant at power with an automatic reactor scram, the crew will implement scram action and enter EOPs in accordance with N1-SOP-1, EOP-2 and EOP-4.
PO-9.0 Given the plant at power with a loss of PB102 the crew will shutdown the affected diesel and reenergize PB16B in accordance with Nl-ARP-A4 (A4-1-6).
PO-10.0 Given an event requiring activation of the Emergency Plan, the SRO will correctly classify the event per the EAL Matrix.
NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
PLANT RESPONSE 0PE R A T 0 R ACT10NS Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown and briefing. 7 Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks Allow no more than 5 minutes for panel Walkdown down the panels, and tests annunciators.
Event 1 Power Restoration to 100%
PO-I .o Conducts reactivity brief for power restoration, if not previously NOTE: Reactivity briefing, procedure review and performed.
RMR review should occur prior to scenario start, in secure briefing room. Reviews Reactivity Maneuver Request Form, if not previously performed.
Directs RO to restore power to 100%
using recirculation flow in accordance with the RMR and Nl-OP-43B.
Provides Reactivity SRO monitoring Acknowledges direction from SRO Obtains copy RMR form Begins raising Master Recirculation Flow Controller while monitoring APRM and Total Recirculation Flow i ndicat ions Reports to SRO when power restoration is complete.
NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTTONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACT IONS 7 Monitors individual RRP for response Individual M/A-Speed Control stations trending uniformly Individual RRP indications trending normally for speed increase Monitors feed water controls for proper response FWP 13 FCV responding to power change RPV Water Level remains within program band (65 - 75)
Event 2 CRD Stabilizing Valve Swap SRO 0 Direct BOP to swap CRD Stabilizing PO-2.0 Valves from A-B to E-F per N1-OP-5, Section F.4.1 Role Play: As Operator, when requested, report: BOP BV-44-175 is OPEN Acknowledges direction from SRO.
BV-44-184 is OPEN Performs N1-OP-5, Section F.4.1, After Stabilizing Valve Transfer Switch selected to Switching Stabilizing Valves from A E and F and requested by Control Room, report: and B to E and F.
BV-44-176 is CLOSED Directs NAO to perform valve lineups BV-44-183 is CLOSED for transfer.
Role Play: When requested to confirm exhaust flow E Places Stabilizing Solenoid Valves report: EXHAUST FLOW 6.0 GPM Transfer Switch to E and F position on Panel F Directs NAO to confirm stabilizing exhaust line flow between 5.8 and 6.5 gpm.
NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event 3 APRM 13 Failure PO-3.0 and PO-4.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION When stabilizing valve operation is completed, insert malfunction by activating TRG 1:
3Q NM19C APRM CHANNEL 13 FAIL UPSCALE 3 Recognize/report RPS Channel 11 trip APRM 13 Fails Upscale 3 Reports APRM 13 Upscale The following annunciators alarm F2-1-6 APRM 11-14 FI-1-1 RPS CH I 1 REACT NEUTRON MONITOR F1-2-1 RPS CH I 1 REACTOR AUTO TRIP F3-4-4 ROD BLOCK PO-3 Role Play: As WEC/Mgmt. acknowledge report 3 Acknowledges report from RO from SRO. Advise that you will provide requested 3 Directs RO/BOP to follow ARPs for assistance. failed APRM, Half-SCRAM and ROD The APRM will not be repaired during the scenario. BLOCK 7 Contacts WEC/Management and NOTE: Technical Specification requirements from informs them of failed instrument.
Tables 3.6.2.a and 3.6.2.g are satisfied with only Requests assistance in correcting one APRM failed. problem.
PO-4.0 Reviews Technical Specifications for impact of failed instrument.
TS 3.6.2.a requires 2 operable trip systems and 3 operable channels per system to cause a SCRAM on High Flux TS 3.6.2.g requires 2 operable trip NRC Scenario 4 -1 1- October 2006
I NSTRUCTOR ACT-lONSl PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS systems and 3 operable channels per system to initiate a ROD BLOCK on High Flux Determines that APRM 13 may be bypassed Directs RO to bypass APRM 13 and reset RPS Channel 11 trip.
BOP Acknowledges direction from SRO Obtains ARP F2-1-6 and executes cl Verifies alarm computer points B183 (ROD BLOCK) and DO52 (UPSCALE HlHl FLUX)
Observes LPRM-APRM Auxiliaries Drawer (Panel G) and determines that APRM 13 has an upscale cond ition If required, bypass APRM per N I -
Obtains/reviews ARP Fl-1-1 Confirm RPS Channel 11 tripped Confirms other channel readings are normal/
13 Obtains/reviews ARP F1-2-1 Determines that failed APRM caused trip When cause is corrected (APRM is bypassed), reset RPS Channel 11 Obtainslreviews ARP F3-4-4 NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Confirms alarm by observing computer point C067 RWM ROD BLOCK Determines caused by failed APRM When directed to verify APRM 13 bypassed, observes APRM 13 bypass light on Panel G (LPRM-APRM AUXILIARIES DRAWER)
RO When APRM 13 is bypassed F2-1-6, F3-4-4 and Completes RO actions for ARP FI-1-1 should all clear. F2-1-6 The LPRM-APRM Auxiliaries drawer will indicate Determines that APRM 13 has the HlHl condition until the APRM is bypassed then UPSCALE/HI-HI condition the BYPASS indicating light will also be illuminated. Monitors other APRM channels to Following the bypassing of APRM 13 and the reset determine that power is of the half-scram, all annunciators will be clear. stablehnchanged Verifies proper power to flow ratio on 5-Loop Operating Curve Bypass APRM BOP Bypasses APRM 13 per N1-OP-38C Places APRM BYPASS joystick on Panel E to APRM 13 position Confirm APRM BYPASS light lit on E Panel.
Confirm APRM BYPASS light lit on LPRM-APRM auxiliaries drawer (G NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
-INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Panel).
Confirm computer printout APRM BYPASS YES.
Reset RPS Channel 11 Trip -
RO After APRM bypassed reset RPS Channel 11 trip Verifies Fl-1-1 clear Depress SCRAM RESET pushbutton on E Verifies F1-2-1 clear and resets annunciators Report APRM 13 bypassed and ARP actions completed to SRO Event 4 RRP 11 Failure of Both Seals PO-5.0 and PO-6.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:
When directed by Lead Evaluator or after actions for failed APRM are completed insert malfunctions by activating TRG 2:
RROGA, RRP I 1 Inner HP Seal 75% with 1O:OO minute ramp time 7 Recognizes/reports annunciator F2 RR07A, RRP I 1 Outer LP Seal 1 25% with 1O:OO minute ramp time SRO Acknowledges report from BOP Directs execution of ARP Directs entry into SOP-I .2 NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS High pressure seal pressure will remain essentially BOP unchanged at approximately system pressure at Reviews/executes ARP F2-1-1 about 1040 psig. Low pressure seal pressure will Enters SOP-I .2 for seal failure gradually rise from initial value of about 510 psig. Confirms alarm computer point ARP F2-1-1 directs entry into SOP-1.2 if seal A072 RRP 11 SEAL LEAK DET pressure reaches 625 psig or high seal FL flow/leakage exists. Initial indications are that only Monitors DWEDT and DWFDT a single seal has failed. Drywell conditions will level recorders begin to deteriorate and increased drywell humidity Contacts Engineering for and in-leakage to the DWEDT will be indicated. evaluation.
When Drywell parameters are impacted, the failure Monitors drywell pressure and is considered catastrophic in SOP-1.2 and the temperature pump must be tripped and isolated. Monitors and compares RRP Seal Pressure indications Determines that HP Seal has CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: failed based on rising pressure of If necessary and directed by the Lead Evaluator, LP Seal malfunction RR07A severity level can be raised to Determines that LP Seal failure is about 30% to lower seal pressure. occurring due to LP Seal pressure changes in Drywell parameters.
When Drywell pressure begins to rise, notifies SRO.
Role Play: As WEC/Mgmt. when contacted SRO regarding the seal leakage inform the SRO that Acknowledge report from BOP you will provide what assistance is required. Inform the WEC/Mgmt. of the leaking RRP seals Determine that the pump should be isolated Review Technical Specifications for impact of seal leakage and removal of pump from service NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Tech Spec 3.2.5 identifies RCS leakage be limited to <2 GPM/day increase for identified leakage. This will apply until the RRP is isolated.
Tech Spec 3.1.7.e requires that power be maintained below 90.5% until the isolated loop has valve motor breakers locked open and RRP Motor circuit breaker removed May direct RRP 11 removed from service, per OP.
When informed of rising Drywell pressure, direct/concur with tripping pump per SOP-1.2.
Direct BOP that discharge and suction valves SHOULD NOT be reopened 2 -
3 seconds after closing.
Provide reactivity management oversight for removing the pump from service.
Evaluates EAL 2.1 for RPV Water level, due to changes in containment leakage.
BOP SRO may direct the pump removed from service If directed to shutdown the pump, prior per operating procedures. The most likely to determination that a catastrophic sequence is that the pump will remain in service failure has occurred:
and monitored until conditions inside the Drywell Obtainheview copy of N1-OP-I for are affected. When Drywell pressure rises and the shutting down and isolating 11 RRP crew determines that both seals are failed, the Remove 11 RRP from service pump is tripped and isolated per SOP-1.2. Verify 11 RRP M/A station balanced Place 11 RRP M/A control selector
~ switch to MANUAL NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
PLANT RESPONSE 0PE R A T 0 R ACT10N S Reduce speed of pump (RRP Flow) to between 6 - 8 x I O 6 Ibm/hr Close 11 RRP discharge valve by holding switch in CLOSE position Time valve stroke with wall clock, watch or stop watch. Closure time is 2 minutes.
Trip 11 RRP MG Set CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: Isolate 11 RRP This action is performed no matter which Close 11 RRP Suction Valve by method is used to remove pump from service. holding switch in CLOSE When BOP begins closing 11 RRP Suction position Valve, ensure that overrides on triggers 16-19 Time valve stroke with wall clock, activated. This will insert overrides: watch or stop watch. Closure time OVR-5S61D13715 POS A OFF (SWITCH) is 2 minutes.
OVR-5S61Dl380 POS C OFF (SWITCH) 0 Recognize/report when suction OVR-5DS235L03450 Green light OFF valve indication is lost.
OVR-5DS236L03451 Red light OFF AND MANUALLY change and activate seal leak rate malfunctions to new values RROGA set t o 10% with 1:30 min ramp RR07A set t o lOYo with 1:30 min ramp This will simulate the I I RRP Suction MOV breaker tripping after valve 90% closed. Leak will reduce but not stop.
If tripping RRP per SOP-I .2 BOP When DWP rises, trip RRP per SOP-1.2 Place REACTOR RP MOTOR 11 MG SET control switch to STOP.
Close REACTOR PUMP 11 BYPASS VALVE NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
PLANT RESPONSE 0PE R A T 0 R ACT10N S Simultaneously close RRP 11 suction and discharge valves Reports loss of red and green light indication for REACTOR R PUMP 11 SUCTION.
RO Monitor total recirculation flow and APRM power levels while 11 RRP being shutdown Monitor 4-Loop Power Operating Curve and verify allowable region Verify power less than 90.5% after 11 RRP is removed from service If directed, reduces power Role Play: As WEC/Mgmt. acknowledge report SRO from SRO. If requested to determine the problem Acknowledge report from BOP with 11 RRP Suction Valve, report the breaker has Contact WEC/Mgmt and advise of tripped on overload and cannot be reset. problem with 11 RRP Suction Valve.
Directs that troubleshooting be done The seal leak will have reduced significantly. Seal due to pump seal leak.
pressures will not lower due to partially open Direct that BOP monitors RRP 11 Suction Valve. pressures and drywell leakage and report trends.
Verify and directs power reduction if power not less than 90.5% and that ROLE PLAY: operating point within limits on 4-LoOp If contacted as Reactor Engineer, report thermal Power Operating Curve limits are within specifications. Notify WEC/Mgmt. that 11 RRP has been shutdown but not isolated.
NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
- - T*
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 0PER A T 0 R ACT10N S 1 May contact Reactor Engineering to verify thermal limits.
Event 5 EPR Regulator Oscillations PO-7.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:
When actions to isolate 11 RRP have been completed or as directed by Lead Evaluator insert 32 malfunction by activating TRG 3: 7 Recognize/Report Annunciator TC06 EPR Failure - Oscillates A2-4-4, TURBl NE MECHANICAL PRESSURE REGULATOR IN RPV pressure to rise approximately 12 PSlG and CONTROL power to rise 2-3%. Pressure will peak and level off when MPR is in control then begin to lower again. RO will observe control valve position oscillations as well.
CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION As WEC/Mgmt. Acknowledge report of failed EPR. II Acknowledge report by RO Advise SRO that you will provide requested Direct execution of ARP A2-4-4 ass ista nce . Direct entry into SOP-31.2 for (The EPR will not be repaired.) oscillating EPR Notify WEC/Mgmt. of failed EPR BOP Monitor suppressed range pressure recorder/indications (Panel F) and turbine control indications (Panel AI/BI)
NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
INS I K U L I UK HL I IUIUS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS RO Note: This step may be performed by either These actions are in SOP-31.2 operator or concurrently. The required controls are located on the desk section of Panel E. EPR in control? YES Pressure oscillating? YES As MPR setpoint is lowered, pressure will steady Lower MPR setpoint until MPR is in out, as the MPR takes control. Pressure is likely to control be lower by several psig. Raise EPR Setpoint to 1010 psig Verify alarm A2 4-4 MPR IN CONTROL Confirm and report RPV pressure steady on MPR.
Does EPR stroke go to zero? YES Pressure under control? YES Restore pressure to pre-transient value. Adjust MPR setpoint Raises RPV pressure by raising MPR setpoint to return pressure to pre-transient value.
If power is above 90%, there are no thermal limit Refer to N1-OP-31 section H, restrictions with one pressure regulator inoperable. operation with one Regulator Inoperable.
Exits SOP-31.2 SRO Acknowledge report from operator Review Technical Specifications for limitations imposed by operating without backup pressure regulator Directed by TS 3.1.7.c into COLR for MCPR limitations Contacts Reactor Engineering to have NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
PLANT RESPONSE 0PER A T 0 R ACT10N S RE determine current MCPR based on Role Play: As Reactor Engineering inform SRO power level. Advises WEC/Mgmt of that MCPR limits are satisfied. As WEC/Mgmt failed EPR and plant status.
acknowledge report of EPR malfunction and present operational status.
Event 6 MPR Fails Low causes automatic Reactor Scram PO-8.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:
When directed by Lead Evaluator insert malfunction by activating TRG 4:
TC08 MPR Fails Low This failure mode is the loss of pressure signal to MPR. RPV pressure rapidly rises as the MPR -
RO closes turbine CVs. Bypass valves have a delayed Recognizeheport reactor SCRAM open due to MPR failure and EPR setpoint (1010 Place Mode Switch in PSIG) and the resulfing pressure rise will cause a SHUTDOWN reactor scram and ERV actuation. Verify reactor SCRAM Confirm FW LVL SP SETDN INlT WHEN Mode Switch is placed in SHUTDOWN, the light ON, if level below 52 inches following events are triggered by time delay, on Provide SCRAM report:
TRG 5, 6 and 7, respectively: Mode switch position ED07 ELECTRIC FAULT PB102 in 2:30 min RPV pressure (valueltrend)
FW03B FEED PUMP TRIP 12 in 4:30 min RPV level (valuekrend), below 53 RR29 RR LOOP RUPTURE 14% in 6:30 min inches (EOP-2 entry)
Reactor power, APRMs downscale.
Control rod position, as full in.
NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Acknowledges SCRAM report Enters EOP-2 on low RPV water) level (below 53 inches or high pressure (above 1080 psig).
Direct RO to execute SOP-1 Direct BOP to restore and maintain water level (53 inches to 95 inches) using condensate, feed and CRD Verifies no ERV cycling Direct BOPlRO to maintain pressure (800-1000 PSIG) using ECs or Turbine Bypass Valves RO Acknowledge SRO direction Execute SOP-1 actions Reduce RECIRC MASTER flow 25 to 43 x I O 6 Ibm/hr Confirm all rods in Place IRM range switches in Range 9 Insert all IRM/SRM detectors Verify Main Turbine and Generator tripped BOP Acknowledge SRO direction Execute SOP-1 actions for RPV level control Confirm RPV level recovering Verify 12 FWP pump running Place 13 FWP flow control valve NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS in MAN and dial to 0.
Disengage 13 FWP Give 29-10 (FWP 13 Discharge BV) a CLOSE signal.
Verify 11 and 12 FWP controllers in MAN and dialed to 0.
Reset HPCl at E Panel.
Place 12 FWP BYPASS valve in AUTO and set to 65-70 inches.
7 If level reaches 85 inches and rising Verify FWPs are OFF Secure CRD pumps, if required.
Maximize RWCU reject flow Close FW IVs, if required.
Close MSIVs, if required.
3 Establish RWCU reject flow to condenser Open CLEANUP SELECTOR CONDENSER WASTE to COND.
Open reject flow valve using controller RMC-33-165C.
Using Bypass Valve Opening Jack operate Turbine BV as required to maintain pressure in directed band.
Report actions complete to SRO.
2:30 min after scram, initial scram and EOP actions should be complete and the plant stabilized. Next malfunction automatically triggers on TRG5:
ED07 ELECTRIC FAULT PI3102 at 2:30 min NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS The following loads will be lost and nof re-energized when PB I 0 2 trips: 1 Recognize/report loss of PB102 I 1 I and I 1 2 Core Spray Pumps and Core 1 Reports EDG 102 started but did not Spray Topping Piimps close in on powerboard I I I and I 1 2 Containment Spray and 1 Recognize fault on PB102 Containment Spray Raw Water Pumps The following significant loads will be lost but will be re-powered when PB I 6 6 is re-energized: jRq EDG102 Auxiliaries, RBCLC Pump 13, CRD 1 Acknowledge report from RO Pump 1 I , RPS-UPS 162A/B, SBC161A/B, I Directs execution of ARP A4-1-6, ESW Pump 1 1 , M G 1 6 7 POWER BD 102 BUS VOLTAGE LOW 3 Notify WEC/Mgmt of PB102 trip Role Play: As WEC and acknowledge report from SRO. Report that you will have the problem with PB102 investigated. After 10 minutes report that there is a fault on PB102.
32 I Acknowledges direction from SRO 3 Executes ARP A4-1-6 Confirm alarm on computer (F138, D199)
Determine that PB102 cannot be reenergized Place normal supply RIOI 2 in pull-to-lock Place EDG control switch in EMERGENCY STOP Verify 12 CRD Pump in service Verify RBCLC pressure 240 PSlG Reset 86-16 (H panel)
Verify OPEN R1043 Make plant announcement that NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Power Board 16B will be re-energized Close PB16 A-B tie breaker R1042 Contacts WEC to prepare a clearance for R1012 to prevent auto-start of EDGI 02 Informs SRO that actions for ARP are complete Next malfunction automatically triggers on TRG 6: BOP FW03B FEED PUMP TRIP 12 in 4:30 min, Recognizeheport trip of 12 FWP following scram. Report no Feed Pumps available If required start CRD Pump 12 for level control.
Role Play: As WECiMgmt and acknowledge report of 12 FWP trip. Inform SRO that you will dispatch Acknowledge report from BOP personnel to investigate the problem. Recognize only CRD/Liquid Poison (12 FWP will not be returned to service.) pumps available for high pressure After- 10 minutes report that 12 FWP tripped on RPV makeup electrical overload. Evaluate RPV levelhrend When FWP trips, level control strategy should Notify WEClMgmt of problem with 12 change, since level cannot be maintained above 53 FWP. Direct WEC to dispatch inches. operators/maintenance to investigate.
Next malfunction automatically triggers on TRG 7:
RR29 RR LOOP RUPTURE 14% at 6:30 min, following scram.
Drywell pressure/temperature begins to rise. RPV pressure begins to lower, RPV water level begins to lower.
RO Drywell pressure exceeds 2.0 PSlG Recognize/report annunciator K2-4-3, Annunciator K2-4-3 alarms Drywell Pressure Hi-Low NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
PLANT RESPONSE 0PE R A T 0 R ACT10N S 1 Confirm alarm computer point I Report drywell PressureAemperature rising jR0 7 Acknowledge report from RO 3 Direct execution of ARP K2-4-3 3O/BOP II Acknowledge direction from SRO II Monitor primary containment parameters 3 Monitor RPV IeveVpressure RPV Level begins lowering Recognize/report lowering RPV level Start CRD pumps (if not running)
Drywell pressure exceeds 3.5 psig Recognizeheport d rywell pressure Core Spray Pump 122 starts and stays running. above3.5 psig. (EOP-4 and EOP-2 Core Spray pump 1 12 starts but immediately trips. Entry Conditions).
Core Spray Topping Pump 122 also starts. Pumps Recognize/report that Core Spray 1 1 1 and 121 cannot start because of the loss of Pump 112 is not running (tripped).
Pi3 102. Core Spray Pump 122 and Topping Pump are the only available Core Spray Pumps.
Report RPV level below 53 inches and lowering.
SRO Acknowledge reports from operators SRO may direct alternate injection sources be lined Enter EOP-4 and re-enter EOP-2 up (e.g., Fire Water, Liquid Poison pumps to Test on High Drywell Pressure. Re-enter Tank, etc.) EOP-2 on RPV level NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
1NS I KUC I UK HC I I W N W PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Direct Containment Spray Pumps locked out (placed in pull-to-lock)
Directs monitoring of Torus pressure (for reaching 13 psig)
Directs level restored and maintained between 53 inches and 95 inches using one or more of the following systems (L-3):
Condenstate/FW CRD Core Spray (EOP-1 Att 4)
Bypass Core Spray IV interlocks (If using for level control)
Alternate Injection Systems (Detail E) are: IF RPV water level cannot be restored Containment Spray Raw Water to Core Spray and maintained above 53 inches (EOPI Att 5) THEN directs level maintained above -
Fire Water (EOP 1 Att 19) 84 inches TAF. Use Alternate Liquid Poison Test Tank (EOP 1 Att 12) Injection Systems if needed (Detail E)
Liquid Poison Boron Tank (EOP IAtt 13) L-3 RPV Level Control through 13 FW FCV (EOP-1 May direct RPV injection from LP Attachment 25) tank per EOP-1 Attachment 13.
RPV Level Control through 11 and 12 FW FCV (EOP-1 Attachment 26)
Anticipating blowdown on more than one area IF RPV Blowdown is anticipated exceeding Max Safe temperature values is THEN rapidly depressurize the RPV expected. using EC and turbine bypass valves.
OK to exceed 1OO°F/hr cooldown rate.
(P-I override)
Directs RPV pressure stabilized 800 to 1000 psig using Turbine bypass NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 0PE R A T 0 R ACT10N S valves.
1 If needed, directs use of Alternate Pressure Control Systems (P-5)
EC (Expected)
ERV (Not Expected)
Others (Not expected) 32 1 Acknowledge direction from SRO 1 Place all Containment Spray Pumps in
" puII-to-lOC k" I Informs SRO when Torus Pressure reaches 13 psig I Reports Drywell parameters for verifying Containment Spray Initiation Limit A s level lowers, Drywell and Torus pressure rise. 3RO Torus pressure reaches 13 psis requiring Drywell These actions are from EOP-4 Sprays while level is sill lowering but still above -84 I When notified of Torus pressure inches. The crew is expected to be initiating reaching 13 psig, continues to Drywell Sprays, while level continues to lower execute PCP leg toward TAF. Inside Containment Spray Initiation Limit (Fig K)? YES Direct all recirculation pumps verified tripped Direct all drywell cooling fans be tripped Direct RO to initiate Containment Sprays per EOP-1 Attachment 17 Direct RO secure Containment Spray when drywell pressure drops below 3.5 PSlG NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
S I KUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS a
3 Acknowledge direction from SRO zi Verifies all recirculation pumps tripped Observes GREEN RRPMG breaker lights or places RRPMG Control switches to TRIP then neutra I Verifies all drywell cooling fans tripped Places DW Cooling Fan control switches to TRIP then neutral CT-1.O Initiates Containment Sprays 0 Start Containment Spray pump After Drywell Spray is initiated, Drywell and Torus 122 pressure lower, Pressure is not expected to drop 0 Start Containment Spray pump below 3.5 psis until after level is being recovered 121 above -84 inches. Monitor Drywell pressure 0 Report containment spray initiated to SRO 0 Monitors drywell pressure and reports when reduced below 3.5 psig.
As level continues to drop, the SRO determines SRO that level cannot be maintained above -84 inches Determines RPV water level cannot and proceeds to alternate level control leg at EOP- be maintained above -84 inches.
2 step L-4 Directs ADS bypassed.
Directs ECs placed in service.
Maximize injection using Preferred EOP-2 Step L-7 Preferred Injection Systems are: Injection Systems Condenstate/FW (Cant inject due to pressure) Directs CRD maximized NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CRD (Can inject)
Core Spray (One Pump, Cant inject due to pressure)
Are 2 or more subsystems lined up?
NO (L-8)
Alternate Injection Systems (Detail E) are: Start lining up Alternate Injection Containment Spray Raw Water to Core Spray Systems (Detail E)
(EOPI Att 5) Directs EOP-1 Attachment 25 to Fire Water (EOP 1 Att 19) lineup injection from 13 FW FCV.
Liquid Poison Test Tank (EOP 1 Att 12) May also direct EOP-1 Attachment Liquid Poison Boron Tank (EOP 1 Att 13) 26 to lineup injection through 11 RPV Level Control through 13 FW FCV and 12 FW FCV. (Requires pulling (EOP-I Attachment 25) HPCl fuses).
RPV Level Control through 11 and 12 FW FCV (EOP-I Attachment 26)
Available sources (FW and Core Spray) will restore WAITS until level drops to -84 inches.
level above TAF. Blowdown should not be (L-I 0) delayed. Is any subsystem lined up with a pump running? YES CS 122 pump Blowdown is not required to be initiated before Before level drops to -109, enter EOP-level reaches -109 inches. Its ok to open ERVs 8, RPV Blowdown and continue here.
even if below -109 inches.
SRO Updates crew of transition to EOP-8 IF RPV water level is unknown THEN Exit this procedure and enter EOP-7 (Step 2) Not expected 7 Are all rods inserted to at least position 04? YES (Step 3) 7 Drywell Pressure? BELOW 3.5 psig (Step IO)
Directs ECs initiated (Step 12)
Torus water level? ABOVE 8 feet NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
T N S I RUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS (Step13)
Directs 3 ERVs opened. (Step 14)
OK to exceed 10O0F/hr.
Do NOT use hi/lo lo/lo rosemounts below 500 psig Evaluates override conditions for Step 15, WAIT until shutdown cooling pressure interlock clears 120 psig. (Step 16)
Subsequent steps are not expected to be performed during scenario.
Return to EOP-2 for maximizing injection.
Acknowledge reports for Core Spray status.
May direct tripping Core Spray 122 due to cavitation.
CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION:
WHEN 3 ERVs are opened, insert malfunction by activating TRG 8: Bop CS05D, CORE SPRAY PMP 122 SUCT Monitors Core Spray operation for CLOGGING, 100% 0:30 SEC RAMP injection.
Core Spray Pump 122 and Topping Pump 122 Reports fluctuating pump amps for amps will fluctuate. When RPV pressure drops Core Spray Pump 122 and Topping below 365 psis and injection valves open, no flow Pump 122.
is observed from Loop 12. Reports no flow with injection valves open.
If the pumps are allowed to run for an extended If directed, trips pump.
period of time, an automatic pump trip occurs. If pumps automatically trip, report conditions to SRO.
NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS BOP actions for level restoration, using 3op Feedwater Booster Pumps If directed, performs EOP-1 Attachment 25 for lining up 13 FW FCV.
When FWBP pressure (PI-51-61A) is greater than RPV pressure Place LVL SETPOINT SETDOWN to OVERRIDE at F Panel.
Verify open at least one FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES 11 and 12 Verify open FEEDWATER PUMP 13 BLOCKING VALVE When 13 FWP BV is opened and the controller is Select manual on 13 FWP VALVE operated, 13 FWP Flow will rise. RPV water level CONTROL MA will begin to recover, once injection is established. Turn FCV (knurled knob) clockwise to open valve.
Position as necessary to control flow.
Reports water level rising.
Using FWBP injection to the RPV while an Recirc BOP pipe break exists in the Drywell, will result in If directed, performs EOP-1 lowering Hotwell level and rising Torus level. Attachment 26 for lining up 11 and 12 FW FCV.
When FWBP pressure (PI-51-61A) is greater than RPV pressure Verify open at least one FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES 11 and 12 Verify open both FEEDWATER PUMP 11 and 12 BLOCKING VALVES.
CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: Select manual on 11 and 12 FWP If dispatched to pull HPCl fuses trigger remote by VALVE CONTROL MA activating TRG 12: Turn FCV (knurled knob) fully counter-NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS FW24 HPCl Fuses, Pull clockwise to close valves.
THEN report fuses removed. Dispatch operator to remove HPCl fuses FU-8 and FU-9.
Position as 11 and 12 FCVs Pump flows will rise when FCVs are opened. necessary to control flow, while maintaining each below 1.5 E6 Ibmlhr.
Inject with Alternate Injection CT-2 .O Systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above -109 inches.
Reports water level rising IF NEEDED -
RO:
CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTION: Acknowledge direction from SRO If contacted to line u p Fire water to feedwater Contacts WEC/NAO and directs header per EOP-1 Attachment 19, trigger remote lineup of Fire Water to Feed system by activating TRG I O :
FP04, loo%, 10 minute delay After I O minutes, report Firewater is lined up.
NOTE: Use of fire water is not expected, because other injection sources, such as feedwater injection through FWP pump level control valves is still available.
When RPV water level is rising, SRO establishes SRO level band above TAF. Level strategy changes to When level is rising, Go to EOP-2 returning level to 53 to 95 inches. step L-I.
Directs verification of necessary isolations and auto actions. (L-I)
Directs level restored and maintained between 53 inches and 95 inches, using Condensate/FW and CRD. (L-3)
NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
INSTKUC I OR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 3op 1 Restores level to directed band, using RPV level rises and is expected to be returned to CondensatelFW and CRD.
the normal 2Q Drywell pressure c ,ops below 3.5 psig 3 Reports wh IDrywell Pressure drops below 3.5 psig 3 Secures Containment Spray RPV water level continues to rise and is restored above -84 inches. Places control switches for Containment Spray Pumps 121/122 in pull-to-lock Reports Containment Sprays secured TERMINATING CUE 0 RPV Blowdown completed 0 RPV Water Level > -84 inches and rising 0 Drywell pressure reduced below 3.5 psig Event SRO Classification SRO:
Classify the event as an ALERT, EAL 3.1.1 NRC Scenario 4 October 2006
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA, NRC Exam VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events
- 1. None B. Commitments
- 1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 4 October 2006