ML060380082

RAI, Response to GL-2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design-Basis Accidents at Pressurized-water Reactors

ML060380082
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	02/10/2006
From:	Pickett D Plant Licensing Branch III-2
To:	Singer K Tennessee Valley Authority
Pickett D, NRR/DLPM, 415-1364
References
GL-04-002, TAC MC4730
Download: ML060380082 (9)

Text

February 10, 2006 Mr. Karl W. Singer Chief Nuclear Officer and Executive Vice President Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

SUBJECT:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1, REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RE: RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 2004-02, POTENTIAL IMPACT OF DEBRIS BLOCKAGE ON EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION DURING DESIGN-BASIS ACCIDENTS AT PRESSURIZED-WATER REACTORS (TAC NO. MC4730)

Dear Mr. Singer:

On September 13, 2004, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors, as part of the NRCs efforts to assess the likelihood that the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and containment spray system (CSS) pumps at domestic pressurized water reactors (PWRs) would experience a debris-induced loss of net positive suction head margin during sump recirculation. The NRC issued this GL to all PWR licensees to request that addressees (1) perform a mechanistic evaluation using an NRC-approved methodology of the potential for the adverse effects of post-accident debris blockage and operation with debris-laden fluids to impede or prevent the recirculation functions of the ECCS and CSS following all postulated accidents for which the recirculation of these systems is required, and (2) implement any plant modifications that the above evaluation identifies as being necessary to ensure system functionality. Addressees were also required to submit information specified in GL 2004-02 to the NRC in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 50.54(f). Additionally, in the GL, the NRC established a schedule for the submittal of the written responses and the completion of any corrective actions identified while complying with the requests in the GL.

By letter dated March 7, 2005, as supplemented by letters dated July 21, 2005, and September 1, 2005, Tennessee Valley Authority provided a response to the GL. The NRC staff is reviewing and evaluating your response along with the responses from all PWR licensees.

The NRC staff has determined that responses to the questions in the enclosure to this letter are necessary in order for the staff to complete its review. Please note that the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations Division of Component Integrity is still conducting its initial reviews with respect to coatings. Although some initial coatings questions are included in the enclosure to this letter, the NRC might issue an additional request for information regarding coatings issues in the near future.

K. W. Singer February 10, 2006 Please provide your response within 60 days from the date of this letter. If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-1364.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Douglas V. Pickett, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-390

Enclosure:

Request for Additional Information cc w/encl: See next page

K. W. Singer February 10, 2006 Please provide your response within 60 days from the date of this letter. If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-1364.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Douglas V. Pickett, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-390

Enclosure:

Request for Additional Information cc w/encl: See next page Distribution:

PUBLIC RidsNrrDorlDpr RArchitzel LPLII-2 Reading File WBateman THaffera RidsNrrDorlLpld JLehning RidsNrrPMDPickett RidsNrrLACSola HWagage RidsOgcRp MMurphy SLu RidsAcrsAcnwMailCenter PKlein JHannon MScott MYoder RidsRgn2Mailcenter RidsNrrPMJHopkins BSingal (BKS1)

Accession No.: ML060380082 *per e-mail NRR-088 OFFICE LPL2-2/PM LPL2-2/LA DSS/SSIB DCI/CSGB LPL2-2/BC NAME DPickett CSola DSolorio* EMurphy* MMarshall DATE 02/08/2006 02/08/2006 2/6/06 02/08/2006 02/10/2006 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Mr. Karl W. Singer Tennessee Valley Authority WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT cc:

Mr. Ashok S. Bhatnagar, Senior Vice President Mr. Glenn W. Morris, Manager Nuclear Operations Corporate Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority and Industry Affairs 6A Lookout Place Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street 4X Blue Ridge Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Mr. Larry S. Bryant, Vice President Nuclear Engineering & Technical Services Mr. Paul L. Pace, Manager Tennessee Valley Authority Licensing and Industry Affairs 6A Lookout Place Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1101 Market Street Tennessee Valley Authority Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 P.O. Box 2000 Spring City, TN 37381 Mr. Robert J. Beecken, Vice President Nuclear Support Mr. Jay Laughlin, Plant Manager Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 6A Lookout Place Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street P.O. Box 2000 Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Spring City, TN 37381 Mr. Michael D. Skaggs Senior Resident Inspector Site Vice President Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Watts Bar Nuclear Plant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Tennessee Valley Authority 1260 Nuclear Plant Road P.O. Box 2000 Spring City, TN 37381 Spring City, TN 37381 County Executive General Counsel 375 Church Street Tennessee Valley Authority Suite 215 ET 11A Dayton, TN 37321 400 West Summit Hill Drive Knoxville, TN 37902 County Mayor P. O. Box 156 Mr. John C. Fornicola, Manager Decatur, TN 37322 Nuclear Assurance and Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority Mr. Lawrence E. Nanney, Director 6A Lookout Place Division of Radiological Health 1101 Market Street Dept. of Environment & Conservation Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Third Floor, L and C Annex 401 Church Street Nashville, TN 37243-1532 Ms. Ann P. Harris 341 Swing Loop Road Rockwood, Tennessee 37854

GL 2004-02 RAI Questions Plant Materials

1. (Not applicable).

2. Identify the amounts (i.e., surface area) of the following materials that are:

(a) submerged in the containment pool following a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA),

(b) in the containment spray zone following a LOCA:

- aluminum

- zinc (from galvanized steel and from inorganic zinc coatings)

- copper

- carbon steel not coated

- uncoated concrete Compare the amounts of these materials in the submerged and spray zones at your plant relative to the scaled amounts of these materials used in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) nuclear industry jointly-sponsored Integrated Chemical Effects Tests (ICET) (e.g., 5x the amount of uncoated carbon steel assumed for the ICETs).

3. Identify the amount (surface area) and material (e.g., aluminum) for any scaffolding stored in containment. Indicate the amount, if any, that would be submerged in the containment pool following a LOCA. Clarify if scaffolding material was included in the response to Question 2.

4. Provide the type and amount of any metallic paints or non-stainless steel insulation jacketing (not included in the response to Question 2) that would be either submerged or subjected to containment spray.

Containment Pool Chemistry

5. Provide the expected containment pool pH during the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) recirculation mission time following a LOCA at the beginning of the fuel cycle and at the end of the fuel cycle. Identify any key assumptions.

6. For the ICET environment that is the most similar to your plant conditions, compare the expected containment pool conditions to the ICET conditions for the following items:

boron concentration, buffering agent concentration, and pH. Identify any other significant differences between the ICET environment and the expected plant-specific environment.

7. For a large-break LOCA (LBLOCA), provide the time until ECCS external recirculation initiation and the associated pool temperature and pool volume. Provide estimated pool temperature and pool volume 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after a LBLOCA. Identify the assumptions used for these estimates.

Enclosure

Plant-Specific Chemical Effects

8. Discuss your overall strategy to evaluate potential chemical effects including demonstrating that, with chemical effects considered, there is sufficient net positive suction head margin available during the ECCS mission time. Provide an estimated date with milestones for the completion of all chemical effects evaluations.

9. Identify, if applicable, any plans to remove certain materials from the containment building and/or to make a change from the existing chemicals that buffer containment pool pH following a LOCA.

10. If bench-top testing is being used to inform plant specific head loss testing, indicate how the bench-top test parameters (e.g., buffering agent concentrations, pH, materials, etc.)

compare to your plant conditions. Describe your plans for addressing uncertainties related to head loss from chemical effects including, but not limited to, use of chemical surrogates, scaling of sample size and test durations. Discuss how it will be determined that allowances made for chemical effects are conservative.

Plant Environment Specific

11. Provide a detailed description of any testing that has been or will be performed as part of a plant-specific chemical effects assessment. Identify the vendor, if applicable, that will be performing the testing. Identify the environment (e.g., borated water at pH 9, deionized water, tap water) and test temperature for any plant-specific head loss or transport tests. Discuss how any differences between these test environments and your plant containment pool conditions could affect the behavior of chemical surrogates.

Discuss the criteria that will be used to demonstrate that chemical surrogates produced for testing (e.g., head loss, flume) behave in a similar manner physically and chemically as in the ICET environment and plant containment pool environment.

12. For your plant-specific environment, provide the maximum projected head loss resulting from chemical effects (a) within the first day following a LOCA, and (b) during the entire ECCS recirculation mission time. If the response to this question will be based on testing that is either planned or in progress, provide an estimated date for providing this information to the NRC.

ICET 1 and ICET 5 Plants

13. Results from the ICET #1 environment and the ICET #5 environment showed chemical products appeared to form as the test solution cooled from the constant 140 oF test temperature. Discuss how these results are being considered in your evaluation of chemical effects and downstream effects.

Trisodium Phosphate Plants

14. (Not applicable).

15. (Not applicable).

16. (Not applicable).

Additional Chemical Effects Questions

17. (Not applicable).

18. (Not applicable).

19. (Not applicable).

20. (Not applicable).

21. (Not applicable).

22. (Not applicable).

23. The Watts Bar GL 2004-02 response indicates that the critical parameters in the ICET

1. 5 bound the plant parameters. This response also indicates the post-accident pH in the Watts Bar sump ranges from 7.5-10 pH, but will generally be less than the value used in testing. Given the ICET #5 pH ranged between 8 and 8.5, discuss how your plant-specific chemical effects evaluation accounts for potential pH levels greater than those tested in ICET #5.

24. (Not applicable).

Coatings Generic - All Plants

25. Describe how your coatings assessment was used to identify degraded qualified/acceptable coatings and determine the amount of debris that will result from these coatings. This should include how the assessment technique(s) demonstrates that qualified/acceptable coatings remain in compliance with plant licensing requirements for design basis accident (DBA) performance. If current examination techniques cannot demonstrate the coatings ability to meet plant licensing requirements for DBA performance, licensees should describe an augmented testing and inspection program that provides assurance that the qualified/acceptable coatings continue to meet DBA performance requirements. Alternately, assume all containment coatings fail and describe the potential for this debris to transport to the sump.

Plant Specific

26. (Not applicable).

27. (Not applicable).

28. (Not applicable).

29. (Not applicable).

30. The NRC staffs safety evaluation (SE) addresses two distinct scenarios for formation of a fiber bed on the sump screen surface. For a thin bed case, the SE states that all coatings debris should be treated as particulate and assumes 100% transport to the sump screen. For the case in which no thin bed is formed, the staffs SE states that the coatings debris should be sized based on plant-specific analyses for debris generated from within the zone of influence (ZOI) and from outside the ZOI, or that a default chip size equivalent to the area of the sump screen openings should be used (Section 3.4.3.6). Describe how your coatings debris characteristics are modeled to account for your plant-specific fiber bed (i.e. thin bed or no thin bed). If your analysis considers both a thin bed and a non-thin bed case, discuss the coatings debris characteristics assumed for each case. If your analysis deviates from the coatings debris characteristics described in the staff-approved methodology, provide justification to support your assumptions.

31. Your submittal indicated that you had taken samples for latent debris in your containment, but did not provide any details regarding the number, type, and location of samples. Please provide these details.

32. You indicated that you would be evaluating downstream effects in accordance with WCAP 16406-P. The NRC is currently involved in discussions with the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) to address questions/concerns regarding this WCAP on a generic basis, and some of these discussions may resolve issues related to your particular station. The following issues have the potential for generic resolution; however, if a generic resolution cannot be obtained, plant-specific resolution will be required. As such, formal RAIs will not be issued on these topics at this time, but may be needed in the future. It is expected that your final evaluation response will specifically address those portions of the WCAP used, their applicability, and exceptions taken to the WCAP. For your information, topics under ongoing discussion include:

a. Wear rates of pump-wetted materials and the effect of wear on component operation

b. Settling of debris in low flow areas downstream of the strainer or credit for filtering leading to a change in fluid composition

c. Volume of debris injected into the reactor vessel and core region

d. Debris types and properties

e. Contribution of in-vessel velocity profile to the formation of a debris bed or clog

f. Fluid and metal component temperature impact

g. Gravitational and temperature gradients

h. Debris and boron precipitation effects

i. ECCS injection paths

j. Core bypass design features

k. Radiation and chemical considerations

l. Debris adhesion to solid surfaces

m. Thermodynamic properties of coolant

14. Your response to GL 2004-02 question (d) (viii) indicated that an active strainer design will not be used, but does not mention any consideration of any other active approaches (i.e., backflushing). Was an active approach considered as a potential strategy or backup for addressing any issues?

15. The NRC staffs SE discusses a systematic approach to the break selection process where an initial break location is selected at a convenient location (such as the terminal end of the piping) and break locations would be evaluated at 5-foot intervals in order to evaluate all break locations. For each break location, all phases of the accident scenario are evaluated. It is not clear that you have applied such an approach. Please discuss the limiting break locations evaluated and how they were selected.

16. The staffs SE refers to Regulatory Guide 1.82 which lists considerations for determining the limiting break location (staff position 1.3.2.3). Please discuss how these considerations were evaluated as part of the Watts Bar break selection analyses.

17. The licensee did not provide information on the details of the debris characteristics (debris size distribution) assumptions other than to state that the Nuclear Energy Institute and SE methodologies were applied. Please provide a description of the assumptions applied in these evaluations and include a discussion of the technical justification for deviations from the SE-approved methodology.

18. Watts Bar operates with a tritium producing core which requires much higher boron concentration levels in the refueling water storage tank. Please discuss how this might influence a new screen design, particularly from a chemical effects perspective?

19. Has debris settling upstream of the sump strainer (i.e., the near-field effect) been credited or will it be credited in testing used to support the sizing or analytical design basis of the proposed replacement strainers? In the case that settling was credited for either of these purposes, estimate the fraction of debris that settled and describe the analyses that were performed to correlate the scaled flow conditions and any surrogate debris in the test flume with the actual flow conditions and debris types in the plants containment pool.

20. Are there any vents or other penetrations through the strainer control surfaces which connect the volume internal to the strainer to the containment atmosphere above the containment minimum water level? In this case, dependent upon the containment pool height and strainer and sump geometries, the presence of the vent line or penetration could prevent a water seal over the entire strainer surface from ever forming; or else this seal could be lost once the head loss across the debris bed exceeds a certain criterion, such as the submergence depth of the vent line or penetration. According to Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.82, Revision 3, without a water seal across the entire strainer surface, the strainer should not be considered to be fully submerged.

Therefore, if applicable, explain what sump strainer failure criteria are being applied for the vented sump scenario described above.