ML052030466
| ML052030466 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 06/04/2004 |
| From: | Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2004-0282 | |
| Download: ML052030466 (2) | |
Text
NMC i Commied to Nuclear Eircellenc' Point Beach Refueling Outage Edition
&-74,'V W
DAY 62 I
TODAY
.e June 4, 2004
,I I
CONTACT INFORMATION Control Room Emergency -x291i Work Control Center - x6703 OCC - x 7190 - Option 1 Lessons Learned - x7190 - Option 2 Plant Status - x7190.- Option 3 j
Accomplishments
- TS-30 Leak Check of ISI-867B Check Valve
- IT-290 TDAFWP Overspeed Test
- Filled Main Generator with Hydrogen
- Established a Vacuum in Main Generator
- Align Si Accumulators L
IA Personnel Last 24 Hours Outa o
Safety Date Recordable - 0 Recordable - 1*
I Disabling - 0 Disabling -0
'OSHA Recordable - Back strain.
l,
Last 24 Hours Outage to Date ALARA l'.
0.338 85.948 R Dose as of the end of Day 60 Schedule Focus Areas/Priorities
- RCS Heatup to NOT/NOP /
- IT-230 RCS Pressure Test /
- Resolve Leakage on 1MS-228, Header Drain & Trap Isolation In accordhac w e t dom f Iomon At extmppo n s FOI goe-or V-74
.,..... I 1. I I..
June 4, 2004 OUTAGE GOALS NUCLEAR SAFETY.
G PEFOM NC GOAL ACTUAL PERFORMANCE____
Unplanned orangelred paths None None Reactor trips (either unit)
None 1
Safeguards actuation (either unit)
Loss of shutdown cooling None None Loss of Rx.vessel level control None None INDUSTRIAL SAFETY PERFORMANCE Lost time accidents None None Personnel Injuries (OSHA recordable)
None RADIOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE Radiation exposure (Excludes additional dose from any head or BMI repair 92 R 85.948 R contingencies)
Personnel contaminations 5 18w 12
>5K CPM Radiological events (defined as unplanned uptake w/assigned dose >10 mrem or
- 1 event 1
dose event based on ED alarms Radmaterial event (defined as any rad e
material outside RCA:2 100 CPM)
HUMAN PERFORMANCE GOAL ACTUAL Security Violations s 12 loggable events 4
Station human performance clock
-resets None 4
Rework
- 51%
On Goal SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE Outage Duration I
L.
(excludes extensions due to s 30 days Off Goal extended head or BMI inspections)
Mod Implementation 100% of Rev 0 On Goal
> 85% schedule Schedule Compliance compliance with Off Goal outage milestone Emergent work (during 2% late additions On Gcar implementation) s 5% Emergent On_
Scope Complete 2 95% of On Goal
- Rev 0 scope -
100% of Scheduled Operator Burdens Operator Burdens On Goal
..complete Post Outage availability c
150 days of peaton Available at continuous operation a Iater date BUDGET PERFORMANCE Within -2% t0%o Seouly outage budget.,
Challenged Operating Experience OE9804 - Reactor Power Exceeded the Licensed Power Limit During saturation of a letdown ion exchanger, the operators did not maintain power below 100.0 percent. The Core Operating Limits Supervisory System (COLSS) alarm annunciated at 100.0 percent, and the operators did not take prompt action to reduce power to' clear the alarm. Although they were borating frequently, they were not aggressive enough to reduce power sufficiently to clear the alarm. Reactor power was'as high as 100.2 percent power with the COLSS alarm in solid for approximately 1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The maximum shift average was 99.97 percent Rx power.
Lessons Leamed: Management's expectation was that the COLSS alarm would be promptly cleared. This expectation was not clearly understood by the operating crew. They erroneously felt that since they were actively borating, and reactor power was being controlled, they were meeting the intent of the ARP. In addition, the SRO was frequently distracted by activities he was supervising In support of a'refueling outage on the other unit.
'Human Performance Don't be left In the dark:
An RP Tech went to change out air samples on sping-24. Lighting was out in the area. When he went to turn off power to the pump, the switch wasn't working. The RPT was told in the past that if switch wasn't working, that we can open the electrical box on the back of the sping'irid that you can turn off the pump from there. The darkest area was behind the sping. He opened the electrical box in the dark and saw two switches, but couldn't read them. He then went to get a flashlight., With the flashlight, he read two switches and they both look like they said pump. He turned them both off and changed the samples. When he closed the electrical box with the flashlight, he saw a piece of duct tape on the outside of the door, showing to turn off the top switch.
When confronted with the two switches, the RPT should have stopped and asked for help.
Safety Snippet Never gamble with more than you can handle Two situations to review here. One was a RP worker and contractor trying to maneuver material through a security door. Rather than calling security, they figured they could 'beat the door.' They beat it all right. And the contractor suffered a leg injury from the steel hitting him. The second was an OAII carrying a large box through a door. She ended up catching hitting her hand on the doorframe.
How can we prevent these injuries?