|
|---|
Category:- No Document Type Applies
MONTHYEARML22034A3992022-02-16016 February 2022
Enclosure 1 - IP 71130.03 Cy 2021 - IR 8 Baseline Inspection Completion
ML22034A3972022-02-16016 February 2022
Enclosure 2 - IP 92707 CY2021 - IR 8 Baseline Inspection Completion
ML22034A3952022-02-16016 February 2022
Enclosure 3 - IP 96001 CY2021 - IR 8 Baseline Inspection Completion
ML16285A3202016-10-12012 October 2016
ROP PI Frequently Asked Questions (Faqs): 13-04
ML16159A4002016-06-16016 June 2016
Iepra Ror for Point Beach SE Section 3.4
ML16159A4022016-06-16016 June 2016
Fpra Ror for Point Beach SE Section 3.4
ML15261A7492015-09-14014 September 2015
NRC Supplement to NRC Letter - Notification of NRC Inspection and Request for Information Dated May 1, 2015 - NextEra Energy Point Beach Nuclear Plant (Msh)
ML16072A0362015-06-0303 June 2015
Receipt of Cd Containing Revised I/O Files from NextEra Point Beach Nuclear Plant Flood Hazard Re-Evaluation Report
ML15014A1602015-01-14014 January 2015
Attachment 2 - NRC Working Group Recommendations to Revise the Substantive Cross-Cutting Issue Process
ML15014A1532015-01-14014 January 2015
Attachment 1- NEI Comments on NRC Working Group Recommendations to Revise the Substantive Cross-Cutting Issue Process
ML14314A5122014-11-13013 November 2014
Enclosure 2 - Frequently Asked Questions (Faqs) Discussed During the October 22 2014 Reactor Oversight Process Public Meeting
ML14147A0112014-06-20020 June 2014
Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident
ML14149A1532014-05-0101 May 2014
FOIA/PA-2014-0074 - Resp 4 - Partial. Group F (Records Already Publicly Available)
ML12056A0522012-03-12012 March 2012
Enclosure 6 - List of Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status
ML1017301232010-06-0909 June 2010
Green Ticket Tritium Releases
ML0806704192008-03-0707 March 2008
CDBI Findings
ML0732400242007-10-25025 October 2007
Examples of Max Thermal Power License Conditions
ML0726203022007-09-28028 September 2007
Amendment to Indemnity Agreement No. B-41, Amendment No. 14
ML0726303192007-09-14014 September 2007
P. Paquin Ltr Amendment to Certificate of Compliance No. 6574 for the Model No. 3-82B Package (TAC L24116)/ Register User List
ML0635404332006-12-20020 December 2006
Enclosure 2 - Consent and Hearing Waiver Form - the Nuclear Management Company, LLC
ML0634705992006-12-14014 December 2006
Plant Service List
ML0627903812006-09-29029 September 2006
Exhibit 26 to Case No. 2-2002-004, Interview Report
ML0626801502006-09-22022 September 2006
Escort Ratio for Visitors
ML0626503122006-09-0101 September 2006
Liquid Radiation Release Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report (Enclosure)
ML0626504142005-11-0303 November 2005
RIII-2005-A-0062 Closure
ML0626802782005-08-29029 August 2005
3rd ARB Action Plan RIII-05-A-0062 (Point Beach)
ML0626802752005-08-22022 August 2005
2nd ARB Action Plan, RIII-05-A-0062 (Point Beach)
ML0626504072005-07-19019 July 2005
Action Request - Corrective Action Program (CAP)
ML0626802642005-07-18018 July 2005
Initial ARB Action Plan RIII-05-A-0062 (Point Beach)
ML0518603982005-07-15015 July 2005
NRC Actions Under the Reactor Oversight Process for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
ML0518903972005-07-0101 July 2005
Log Entries Report
ML0518903962005-07-0101 July 2005
U1R28 Outage Risk Plan Ppg Outage Management
ML0518903952005-07-0101 July 2005
U1R28 Add/Delete Log
ML0626504032005-06-22022 June 2005
Action Request - Corrective Action Program (CAP) (CAP065250)
ML0626503992005-06-10010 June 2005
Action Request - Corrective Action Program (CAP) (CAP065041)
ML0626504012005-06-10010 June 2005
Action Request - Corrective Action Program (CAP) (CAP065035)
ML0515202282005-05-24024 May 2005
EP FFD Questions Not Asked
ML0514700842005-05-24024 May 2005
COLR 28 Replaced with COLR 29 Prior to Vessel Removal. Attach: 04/14/2004 Condition Evaluation 013784. Attach: 04/12/2004 CAP 055612. Attach: Undated Bullet Nose Disconnected & Removed with Head
ML0515202262005-05-24024 May 2005
2SI-825B Not Full Open with Handwritten Notations
ML0515202242005-05-24024 May 2005
Phone Line Through Containment Hatch While Fuel Movement in Progress
ML0515202232005-05-24024 May 2005
Loss of SFP Cooling Due to Breaker Miss Alignment
ML0515202212005-05-24024 May 2005
2SI-825B Not Full Open with Handwritten Notations
ML0515202192005-05-24024 May 2005
U1R28 Interim Exit Meeting Notes
ML0515202182005-05-24024 May 2005
Tsac Not Entered When Source Range Audible Count Rate Removed from Service
ML0515202072005-05-24024 May 2005
Questions for Followup Based on Last Outage ISI Summary Report
ML0514700772005-05-24024 May 2005
Refuel Outage 1R28 Resident Inspector Coverage
ML0514700822005-05-24024 May 2005
Mikes 2004-03 IR Section Write Ups, 2T-34A Accumulator Level Indication
ML0515201472005-05-24024 May 2005
Phone Line Through Containment Hatch While Fuel Movement in Progress
ML0515202132005-05-24024 May 2005
Inservice Inspection Document Request
ML0515201492005-05-24024 May 2005
Transient Combustible Materials in Containment & Turbine Building Without Administrative Controls
2022-02-16
[Table view] |
Text
Point Beach Nuclear Plant RV Head Lift Problem April 22, 2004 On Wednesday, April 21, 2004, Point Beach Unit #1 was in day 18 of a scheduled 30 day refueling outage (1R28). The RV head lift was observed by Duane Karjala, acting Resident Inspector, and Ryan Alexander, DRS RP Inspector. During the lift of the RV head from the vessel, when the head cleared the top of the guide studs, the lift crew supervisor noted that a protective cover (called a conoseal bullet nose), was still on the head, when it should have remained attached to the upper internals.
The bullet nose's function is to protect core exit thermocouple connection wires from refueling water. The bullet nose is installed after the thermocouples are disconnected as part of the head lift preparation activities. The bullet nose is attached to the upper internals with a circular clip along with an O-ring to keep water from entering the bullet nose at the joint. Visual examinations were conducted, as required by procedure, when the head was approximately 1 foot and 4 feet above the vessel flange but no anomalies were identified.
When the anomaly was identified during the lift, the lift was stopped, and the situation was discussed by the lift crew personnel. It was decided to continue with the lift because the procedure does not permit lowering the head when it is above the top of the guide studs. The remainder of the lift was uneventful. s After the head was placed on the storage stand, it was observed that a rag was wrapped around the base of the bullet nose and the rag was held in place with green duct tape.
Preliminary results from the licensee's investigation have determined that the rag and duct tape prevented the bullet nose from sliding through the opening in the head and caused the retaining clip to fail. The retaining clip and O-ring were found still installed at the base of the bullet nose.
It remains to be determined why the rag and duct tape were installed and whether that was a violation of the licensee procedures.
The licensee has developed a recovery plan. Water level in the refuel pool has been raised approximately 2 feet above the RV flange to provide some shielding from the radiation from the upper internals. The plan is to suspend workers in a manlift basket from the polar crane to install the bullet nose.
Ryan Alexander is monitoring the recovery efforts. Photos will be available later today.
Questions or Inconsistencies to be resolved.
- Where is the guidance/procedure requirements for installing and removing the temporary FME protection (rag and duct tape)?
H:\inspectionnotes\BulletNose.wpd L/1-P q
The Director of Site Operations verbally informed us that the installation and removal have been historically performed as skill-of-the-craft activities.
Procedure 1RMP 9096, step 5.6.25 says, "While having cavity stationed person ensure the following, continue head lift to about four feet above RV flange AND hold.
- a. Head lift remains level.
- b. NO control rod drives are moving with head.
- c. NO unusual sound or vibrations are present."
Procedure RP 1A, step 5.37, says, " Lift the reactor vessel head about four feet above the flange with the observers watching control rods and thermocouple guide columns are NOT rising with the head."
Was the step in RP 1A performed and documented? Why are the two procedures inconsistent? Which procedure takes precedence?
During the Just-In-Time information meeting, the pre-job briefing, and the discussion following discovery of the bullet nose problem, it was stated several times by several individuals that once the head is above the guide pins, the procedure requires that it cannot be lowered. This restriction can not be found in 1RMP 9096. What is the source of this restriction?
Log entry on 04/21/2004 at 14:44 says, "Reactor Vessel head is approximately 3 feet from the top of the guide pins. Mechanical General Supervisor reports that it appears a bullet cover for one set of thermocouples appears to have come up with the head." If the head was below the top of the guide pins, could/should the head have been lowered? Why or why not? Was lowering the head adequately evaluated?
H:\inspectionnotes\BulletNose.wpd
