ML041890346

Draft Section C Operating

ML041890346
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	04/19/2004
From:	Hackenberg J AmerGen Energy Co
To:	Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
Conte R
References
50-219/04-301 50-219/04-301
Download: ML041890346 (55)

Text

Scenario Outline ES-D-1 Simulation Facility Oyster Creek Scenario No.

NRC #1 Op Test No.

ILT2004 Examiners Operators CRS Event Malfunction Event No.

No.

Type*

SRO 1

N BOP MAL MSS005A C

SRO PRO URO Event Description Remove EPR from service for maintenance Steam seal exhaust blower trips, start other blower Scenario Summary The scenario begins with the reactor at 100% power with the A CRD Pump out of service. The crew will begin by removing the EPR from service. The running steam seal exhaust blower trips. The crew will start the other exhaust blower. A reference leg leak will develop in a RPV Level instrument. The crew will take manual control of RPV level and transfer to the alternate signal. A loss of power to VMCC 1A2 will result in the crew restoring RPS and resetting the half scram. The Cy Feedwater Pump trips requiring the crew to reduce power to maintain reactor level. The only available CRD pump trips, which will require the crew to scram the reactor. A RWCU leak will occur in the Reactor Building requiring entry into Secondary Containment Control EOP. A RWCU valve will fail preventing the isolation of the leak. Emergency Depressurization will be required to mitigate the primary leak into the Reactor Building.

3 4

5 6

MAL-NSSO1 1 C I

RO Level instrument reference leg leak develops, take manual control of 2%, 300s RPV level, swap instrument signals, return to auto control SRO SRO RO SRO MAL-EDSOO4A C

BOP Loss of Power to VMCC 1A2, restore RPS (Tech Spec)

MAL-CFWOO6C R

BOP C Feedwater Pump Trip leads to Power Reduction to Control Level BKR CRD001 C

RO Only available CRD pump trips - Results in Plant Scram 7

8

~

~~

SRO MAL RCUl3 3%

M Reactor Water Clean-up Leak into the Reactor Building 600s BOP

[HELB]

SRO BOP VLV RCUOOl, 6 C

VLV RCU004,6 VLV RCUOl 1, 5 Reactor Water Clean-up Isolation Valve Failure, V-14-1, 14 & 61 fail to auto close. V-14-61 can be manually closed.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Operator Actions b

Op Test No.: lLT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #1 Event No.:

1 Event

Description:

Remove EPR from service for maintenance ES-D-2 Page 1 of 8 Cause:

Erratic EPR response Automatic Actions:

None Effects:

None Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Direct transfer from EPR to MPR IAW Operating Procedure 315.4, Transferring Pressure Regulators BOP IAW 31 5.4, step 3.3; 0

Slowly lower MPR setpoint by placing MPR Control Switch to lower (7%)

position for approximately one-second periods until MPR relay position indicator moves toward the EPR setting.

0 Adjust EPR control switch so that EPR pressure setpoint is 6-7 psig higher than the pressure at which it had been operating.

c

Operator Actions Op Test No.: ILT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #1 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Cause:

Motor overload causes trip Automatic Actions:

none Effects :

Steam seal exhaust blower trips, start other blower Operator action required to start other blower Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognize condition by reporting alarms; Q-8-C: EXHAUSTER TRIP 0

IAW RAP Q-8-c confirms:

loss of exhauster 0

checks gland steam pressure on panel 7F.

ES-D-2 Page 2of 8 SRO Directs start of other gland steam exhauster BOP Places other gland steam exhauster in service, may refer to procedure 325 0

Starts Exhauster Blower #2 0

Closes V-7-38 0

Opens V-7-39 to maintain Gland Steam Vacuum between 15 and 17.5 inches vacuum BOP Monitors and reports gland steam pressure

Group Heading T U R B I N E V A C / S E A L S 0 c I

ZONFIRMATORY ACTIONS :

%eck gland steam pressure on Panel 7P.

oLx/1-1 OUc/l-2 Reference Drawings :

GB 157B6350, GU 3B-612-19-017 Sh. 186A, 1868 WIOMATIC ACTIONS :

q0NE W A L CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Subject B O P A l a r m Response Procedures Procedure No.

Page 1 of 1 2000-RAP-3024.03 Q

8 c

Revision NO:

118 I

MANUAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS u

[

I 1.0 START standby gland steam exhauster auster can be started co CE a pfant shutdown in accordance with

[

I

[

I I

1

[

I

[

I

[

I

[

I Pro 203 r System #7 Isolation Valve

[

J ommand Center (OCC) h for the Turbine Operating uum and offgas fl cticm of possible stem leak on 3.0 4.0 CORRECT cause of overlo DETERMINE cause of overload on tripped exhauster blower and remt breaker L

roup Heading T U R B I N E V A C / ' S E A L S 3verload trip of either gland steam

>lower.

Q 8

c 30NFIRMATORY ACTIONS:

3heck gland steam pressure on Panel 7F.

SETPOINTS :

33-0 amps ACTUATING DEVICES:

OLX/ 1 - 1 OLX/1-2 Reference Drawings:

GU 33-611-17-017 GE 157B6350, Sh. 186A, 186B 4UTOMATIC ACTIONS:

NONE MANUAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Start standby gland steam exhauster. -termhe cause of overload on tripped exhauster blower. <-Correct cause of overload and reset breaker.

Sub j ect B O P Alarm Response Procedures Procedure No.

Page 1 of 1 2 0 0 0 -RAP - 3 024 0 3 Q

8 c

Re-wision No: 118 I

I

OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION PROCEDURE AmerGem An ExelonlBnbsh Energy Company Title u

Air Extraction and Off Gas System 3.2 Precautions and Limitations 3.2.1 The Main Turbine Steam Seal System must be operating when the turbine is hot and condenser vacuum is present.

3.3 Instructions for Placinq the Steam Seals Exhauster in Service 3.3.1 Place the control switch for the EXHAUSTER BLOWER l(2) on Panel 7F to START and verify that the EXHAUSTER BLOWER ON indicator itlumi nates.

Number 325 Revision No.

54 3.3.2 3.3.3 NOTE With the Mechanical Vacuum Pump in service and Condenser Vacuum Breaker V-2-44 CLOSED, the GLAND STEAM HEADER VACUUM Gage (EPT-5) should read greater than 0 inches of vacuum.

Gradually throttle OPEN the EXHAUSTER VALVE I

V-7-38 (EXHAUSTER VALVE 2: V-7-39) until the vacuum in the GLAND STEAM HEADER increases by 5 to 6 inches of water, above the initial vacuum reading on Panel 7F (EPT-5).

NOTE As steam is admitted to the STEAM SEAL HEADER, the vacuum in the GLAND STEAM HEADER (Panel 7F: EPT-5) will decrease.

7.0

OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION PROCEDURE

AmerGen, An ExelanlBritish Energy Company Title Air Extraction and Off Gas System Number 325 1 R g s i o n No.

3.3.4 Commence warming the STEAM SEAL HEADER in accordance with Procedure 31 8.

CAUTION Throttling of the Exhauster Valve to increase GLAND STEAM HEADER VACUUM (EPT-5) must be performed in 2 to 4 inches of water increments, with a 1 minute delay between each step increase, to prevent an EXHAUSTER BLOWER trip.

WHENthe GLAND STEAM HEADER VACUUM, as read on Panel 7F (EPT-5), decreases below 5 inches of water, THEN perform the following steps:

3.3.4.1 Throttle OPEN the EXHAUSTER VALVE I:

V-7-38 (EXHAUSTER VALVE 2: V-7-39) until a vacuum of I O to 12 inches of water is established in the GLAND STEAM HEADER (Panel 7F: EPT-5).

3.3.4.2Maintain the GLAND STEAM HEADER VACUUM (EPT-5) at 10 to 12 inches of water for a period of 15 minutes from the time that the STEAM SEAL HEADER PRESSURE is established at 6 to 6.5 psig, as read on Panel 7F (EPT-4).

3.3.4.3Throttle OPEN the EXHAUSTER VALVE 1 : V-7-38 (EXHAUSTER VALVE 2: V-7-39) until a vacuum of 15 to 17.5 inches of water is established in the GLAND STEAM HEADER (Panel 7F: EPT-5).

3.3.5 Adjust the EXHAUSTER VALVE 1: V-7-38 (EXHAUSTER VALVE 2: V 39), as necessary, to maintain GLAND STEAM HEADER VACUUM at 15 to 17.5 inches of water as indicated on Panel 7F (EPT-5).

3.4 Instructions for Placinq the Standbv Steam Seals Exhauster In Service (325) 8.0

Operator Actions ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: ILT200 Event No.:

3 Page 3of 8 Event

Description:

nstrume-s Downscale, (Tech Spec)

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

/J/;a Effects:

Instrument failure causes downscale response Operator action required to determine Tech Spec implication Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior Recognize condition by any one of the following plant parameters that are changing:

0 0

Feed flow decrease 0

Megawatts thermal decrease 0

Drywell pressure increasing Gemac A and C level increasing Yarway level, and B Gemac decreasing Determines level transmitter malfunction/reference leg leak. Refers to ABN-17 and procedure 317, section 11.7 SRO 0

Directs manual feedwater control to regain reactor level 0

0 0

Directs swap to B GEMAC instrument for automatic level control Directs feedwater control returned to AUTO Evaluate TS sections 3.7, Auxiliary Electrical Power and determines that the EDG may be inoperable and the plant may remain in operation for 7 days BbB Attempts to regain RPV level by performing the following operator actions:

I 0

Places master feedwater controller in Manual and increases feedwater flow by increasing demand signal.

Swaps to alternate Level Select signal by performing the following:

0 0

0 0

0 Place LEVEL TRANSMITTER SELECT to the B Gemac Select the S display on Master feed controller Match S display readout to the P display readout When S equals P, places Master feed controller to AUTO Maintains(returns) level in(to) normal band or as directed

Operator Actions ES-D-2 L

Op Test No.: ILT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #1 Event No.: 4 Page 4of 8 Event

Description:

Cause:

Breaker malfunction causes trip Automatic Actions:

Effects:

Loss of Power to VMCC 1A2, restore RPS (Tech Specs)

RPS System 1 half scram Operator action required to transfer RPS power supply and reset the half scram Time Position BOP SRO BOP RO SRO Applicants Actions Or Behavior Recognize condition by reporting alarms; 0

9XF-3-a: PROT SYS PNL 1 PWR LOST 9XF-1 -c: VLDP-1 PWO TRANSFER Diagnoses the loss of power to VMCC 1 A2 based on the VLDP-1 transfer and/or other indications/alarms Directs execution of ABN-50, Loss of VMCC 1A2 Executes ABN-50 0

Restores RPS IAW section 3.0 0

0 0

0 0

0 Confirm VMCC-1B2 breaker, C4L is closed Confirm disconnect switch SW-733-169 (Lower Cable Spreading Room) is OFF and the Kirk Key removed Confirm the Kirk Key inserted and disconnect switch, SW-733-170, is ON.

Confirm closed EPA breaker #5 Confirm closed EPA breaker #6 PLACE the POWER SELECT switch in the TRANS position When power is restored to PSP-1, then RESET; Half scram, Main steam isolation, APRM lights on Panel 3R, APRM flow converters in Panels 3R and 5R, and associated annunciators 0

Confirms VLDP transfer 0

Declares V-14-33, 35 INOP 0

Declares C Battery INOP - Monitors volts 0

Reviews Attachment 50-3 for loads Follow-up Actions 0

Monitors 1-8 sump (312.9, 351.1,2) 0 Initiates troubleshooting (Notifies WWM) 0 Monitors C Battery Room temperature (328.1) 0 Evaluate TS sections 3.7, Auxiliary Electrical Power and determines that the plant must be in cold shut down in 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> due to loss of power 0

Evaluate TS section 3.3.D.4,5 for Reactor Coolant System Leakage and recognizes that UlLR monitoring capability must be determined

V I T A L P O W E R A C Sub j ect E L E C T R I C A L A l a r m Response Procedures P R O T S Y S P N L 1 P W R L O S T Procedure No.

Page 1 of 2 2000 -RAP-3 024.- 02 9 X F a Reviision EJQ:

81 IES :

Loss of power to Protection System Panel #1 (PsP-1).

CONFIRMATORY ACTIONS:

P W R L O S T 9 X F a I

SETPOINTS :

None Verify the following loss of power ala=

and iindications:

Loss of Power Alarms:

Enqravinq RPS MG SET 1 TRIP SCRAM CONTACTOR OPEN Loss of Power Indications:

Indi c at ion ACTIJATING DEVICES :

Relay K1 Reference Drawings:

GU 33-611-17-022 BR 3013, Sh. 1 GE 9133911 GU 3C-733-11-010 SCRAM SOLENOIDS lights exthguished TRANS OUTPUT and GEN OUTPUT lighks extinguished HALF SCRAM IRMs 11 through 14 fail downscale APRMs 1 through 4 fail downnscale LPRMs A and C fail downscaZe ROD BLOCK REACTOR PROTECTIONS MG SET-1 v o l e indicates zero Locat ion G-2-c G-1-c Locat ion 6R & 4F 6R 6R 4F 4F 4F 4F 4F I

I (PANELXF)

~ Group Heading V I T A ' L P O W E R A C P R O T S Y S P N L 1

P W R L O S T CONFIRMATORY ACTIONS (continued) :

P W R L O S T 9 X F a If power is 1ost.to both Protection System Panels 1 and 2, the following ~ 5 1 1 occur:

FULL SCRAM 4F ALL RECIRC PUMPS TRIP 3F REACTOR isolation 11F PRIMARY CONTAINMENT isolation 11F SECONDARY CONTAINMENT isolation TURBINE-GENERATOR trip 7F ROPS function disabled 14XR Subject E L E C T R I C A L AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

None Procedure No.

Page 2 of 2 2000-RAP-3024.02 9 X F - 3 - a MANUAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Refer to Technical Specification 3.7 for limitations on continued plant operation.

Refer to the following Procedures for instructions on manual corrective amions:

2000-OPS-3024.10e, "Electrical Distribution: Reactor Protection System-Diagnostic and Restoration Actions".

408.12, "Operation of Reactor Protection System Panel 1-1 and Transfo-r PS-lt'.

Refer to drawing GU 3C-733-11-010 for PSP-1 Panel Schedule Alarm Response procedures Revision No: 81

( PANELXF )

Group Heading X F E R S V I T A L P O W E R A C 9 X F c V L D P - 1 P W R X F E R CAUSES :

subject Procedure No.

E L E C T R I C A L 2000-RAP-3024 -02 Automatic transfer switch for 460 Volt Vital AC Lighting Distribution Panel transferred to alternate source.

Page 1 of 1 9

X B

1 c

Alarm Response Procedures CONFIRMATORY ACTIONS:

Revision No: 81 SETPOINTS:

Dropout @ 70% v.

Pickup 0 9 0 % v.

ACTUATING DEVICES :

Relays lV, 2V, 3V Reference Drawingsr JC 19643 BR 3013 SH, 1 GU 33-611-17-022 Verify operation of the automatic transfer switch.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

460 volt supply power for the Vital AC Lighting Distribution Panel transfers f m m Vital MCC 1A2 to Vital MCC 1B2.

MANUAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Zheck for a fault or breaker trip on 460 Volt VMCC 1A2. Restore power to 460 Valt m C C 1A2. Refer to Procedure 339 to reset the transfer switch.

Refer to Procedure 2000-OPS-3024.10b, Electrical Distribution - 460 VAC Diagnagtic 2nd Restoration Actions.

I I

Operator Actions ES-D-2

,P Op Test No.: ILT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #1 Event No.:

5 Page 5of 8 Event

Description:

Cause:

• --/,

'C' Feedwater Pump Trips leads to Power Reduction to Control Level Motor malfunction causes overload trip Automatic Actions:

Pump trip alarms Effects:

Reactor power, steam flow and feed flow decrease. Operator action reduces required feedwater flow Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognize condition by reporting alarms; J-1-d: FEED PUMP TRIP A J-24: FEED PUMP OL A IAW RAPS; confirm automatic actions and indications including Feed pump amps, discharge pressure, flow, etc.

SRO

, Direct reduction of Reactor power, using recirculation flow, to within the capacity of the remaining feed pumps (approximately 70% power) IAW ABN-17, Feedwater System Abnormal Conditions RO IAW ABN-17:

0 Reduce recirculation flow by dialing down on the Master Recirc Controller as required to reduce Reactor power and prevent scram on RPV low level and keep feed flow within the capacity of the remaining feed pumps.

0 Monitor Reactor parameters BOP BOP Monitor Feedwater pumps and flow Direct Equipment Operator to investigate feed pump and its breaker

G ro u p H e adi n g B O P F E E D P U M P S 1 A Alarm Response Procedures J d t

Revision No: 121 F E E D P U M O L 2 P A

CAUSES:

Motor overload.

CONFIRMATORY ACTIONS:

Check feedpump motor amps.

SETPOINTS:

ACTUATING DEVICES:

Relay 74 Reference Drawings:

GE 223R0173 Sh 7 GU 3E-611-17-01 I AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

Eireaker trips at 1040 amps.

MANUAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

1.

?.

Check pump bearing and motor temperatures.

If overload persists, reduce reactor power as necessary and remove pump from service.

Page 1 of 1 2000-RAP-3024.03 J d Panel J

Operator Actions L-Op Test No.: ILT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #1 Event No.:

6 ES-D-2 Page 6of 8 Event

Description:

'B' CRD Pump trips - Results in Plant Scram Cause:

Breaker malfunction causes CRD pump trip Automatic Actions:

Pump trip alarms with subsequent low Charging Water pressure alarms Effects:

Requires operator action to scram reactor on Accumulator LeveVPressure Rod Block illuminated Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior RO BOP Recognize condition by reporting alarms; H-2-C: PUMP B OL H-7-C: CHARG WTR PRESS LO IAW RAP H-2-c confirms:

0 Check CRD system flow 0

Check position of CRD pump minimum flow valve 0

a a

D y

c, 0

Recognizes loss of only available CRD pump Diagnoses the loss of CRD charging pressure at panel 4F SRO 0

0 Per RAP H-7-c, directs manual scram when Accumulator LeveVPress May enter ABN-01 and direct recirculation flow reduced to 8.5 x 1 O4 gpm Rod Block illuminates (indication of 2"d accumulator trouble alarm) x RO 0

0 0

0 verifies power decrease inserts SRMs and IRMs Scrams the reactor when Accumulator LeveVPressure Rod Block illuminates and enters ABN-1 Depresses both manual scram push buttons Places mode switch in SHUTDOWN verifies reactor shutdown, rods fully inserted to 00, 02 or 04 I"

- NO

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #1 Event No.: 7 Page 7of 8 Event

Description:

Reactor Water Clean-up (RWCU) Leak into the Reactor Building Cause:

RWCU pipe leak Automatic Actions:

RWCU auto isolation Effects:

Operator action required Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior RO BOP Recognize condition by observing indications or reporting alarms:

D-1 -d/ D-2-d: RWCU HELB 0

Increase in unidentified leak rate 0

Increase in containment parameters IAW RAPS; confirm automatic actions and indications including RWCU system status, area temperatures, area radiation levels SRO Enter and execute EOP 3200.1 1, Secondary Containment Control 0

Direct the RWCU system isolation be verified RO Recognize that RWCU is not fully isolated.

BOP 0

Attempt to isolate the RWCU system and report the failure of the isolation valves. See Event 8 for details.

c

- Group Heading C L E A N U P S Y S T E M R W C U H E L B 0

I CAUSES:

D - 1 - d High ambient temperature in Cleanup Pump area, indicating possible RWCU HELB downstream of isolation valves.

SETPOINTS:

160°F Increasing i ACTUATING DEVICES:

TSH-215-006 TSH-215-007 or K

Reference Drawings:

GE 237E566 Sh. 1 GU 3E-611-17-006 Subject NSSS Alarm Response-Procedures Check temperature indicator on Panel 1 OR for affected area(s)/cmponent(s).

Procedure No.

Page 1 of 1 2000-RAP-3024.01 D - 1 - d Revision No: 121 Check Alarm D-8-d.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

Isolation of Cleanup System Valves V-16-1, V-16-2, V-I 6-1 4, and V-16-61 if alarm D-2-d is received concurrently.

NOTE: The closure of the isolation valves will cause the operating Cleanup Pump@) to trip.

MANUAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

If high temperature confirmed without system isolation, immediately isolate the CU System by closing If the system is manually isolated and V-16-2 is open, then Bypass the V-16-2 torque switch by V-16-1, V-16-2, V-16-14, and V-16-61.

removing the bypass plug from BP14 and inserting into BP13 (EOP BYPASS PLUG PANEL behind Panel 3F), then close V-16-2.

B Enter Procedure EMG-3200-11 Secondary Containment Control.

B Check radiation level indication for CU equipment on Panel 2R.

D Check Cleanup System area for source of high temperature (steam leak, fire) if conditions permit.

(Panel D/19)

Group Heading C L E A N U P S Y S T E M R W C U H E L B D d High ambient temperature in Cleanup Pump area, indicating possible RWCU HELB downstream of isolation valves.

160°F Increasing

! CONFIRMATORY ACTIONS:

TSH-215-008 TSH-215-009 or Reference Drawings:

GE 237E566 Sh. 1 GU 3E-611-17-006 Subject N S S S Alarm !?espc)!?se Procedures Check temperature indicator on Panel 1 OR for affected area(s)/component(s).

Check Alarm D-8-d.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

Isolation of Cleanup System Valves V-16-1, V-16-2, V-16-14, and V-16-61 if alarm D-1 -d is received Procedure No.

Page 1 of 1 2000-RAP-3024.01 D d Revision No: 121 concurrently.

NOTE: The closure of the isolation valves will cause the operating Cleanup Pump(s) to trip.

MANUAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

If high temperature confirmed without system isolation, immediately isolate the CU System by closing If the system is manually isolated and V-16-2 is open, then Bypass the V-16-2 torque switch by V-16-1, V-16-2, V-16-14, and V-16-61.

removing the bypass plug from BP14 and inserting into BP13 (EOP BYPASS PLUG PANEL behind Panel 3F), and then close V-16-2.

Enter Procedure EMG-3200-11 Secondary Containment Control.

Check radiation level indication for CU equipment on Panel 2R.

Check Cleanup System area for source of high temperature (steam leak, fire) if conditions permit.

Isolate or shutdown equipment as necessary to control leak.

I I

(Panel D/20)

Operator Actions Op Test No.: ILT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #1 Event No.:

8 ES-D-2 Page 8of 8 Event

Description:

Reactor Water Clean-up Isolation Valve Failure Cause:

Breaker malfunction prevents auto valve closure Automatic Actions:

none Effects:

Incomplete RWCU system isolation. Operator action required mitigate unisolable leak Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior RO BOP Identify failure of RWCU system to fully isolate. Attempts to close V-14-1, 14 &

61. Able to close V-14-61. Unable to close V-14-1 & 14.

SRO Determine that a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment.

Before exceeding Max Safe temperatures, enterheenter EOP 3200.01 A, RPV Control - No ATWS.

BOP Record and/or report area temperature and radiation indicati CT SRO Directs Emergency Depressurization IAW EOP 3 Depressurization - No ATWS 0

0 Direct bypassing Reactor Overfill Protection System (ROPS)

Direct manually opening all EMRVs RO Bypass ROPS CT BOP Opens all EMRVs

---/,

RO Control reactor level during the depressurization TERMINATION CRITERIA:

Once ED is performed and reactor is depressurizing, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator, the scenario may be terminated POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:

ALERT: primary containment isolation required and isolation valves malfunction causing unisolated release path or confirmed leak-rate exceeds 50 gpm from reactor coolant system. EAL: H-lc or H-2

Scenario Outline ES-D-1 Simulation Facility Oyster Creek Scenario No.

NRC #4 Op Test No.

I LT2004 Examiners Operators CRS PRO URO 4

Scenario Summary The scenario begins with the reactor startup in progress at 5-1 0% power with mode switch in RUN.

Control rods will be moved to raise power. The crew will swap the Service Water Pumps. Running CRD pump trips, start standby pump. Reactor Level Instrument RE02A Fails Downscale causing the Core Spray to start but EDG #2 does not start and idle. Core Spray will be manually secured. APRM 4 will then fail upscale requiring the crew to evaluate Tech Specs, bypass the APRM, and reset the half scram. The running RBCCW pump trips requiring the standby pump to be started. An RPV steam leak will result in increase in Drywell temperature and pressure. Drywell pressure will increase requiring Drywell Sprays using the Containment Spray system. The drywell spray valve fails to automatically realign and must operated manually to permit sprays to function.

SRO MAL-NSS007H I

BOP Reactor Level Instrument Fails Downscale, Core Spray starts but EDG MAL-DGN003A does not idle 6

7 8

APRM 4 Fails Upscale (Tech Spec)

Ro I 5 I MAL-NIS020D MAL-RBC001A C

BOP Running RBCCW pump trips MAL-NSSO17A SRO 1%, 300s M

RO Steam leak develops in the Drywell leads to spraying DW 2%, 1800s BOP SRO VLV CNS008, C

BOP Containment Spray Valve fails to realign automatically when sprays opt 6 are required

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Operator Actions k

d Op Test No.: ILT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #4 Event No.:

1 Event

Description:

Cause:

Complete power ascension Pull rods to raise power Automatic Actions:

None Effects:

None Time Position SRO RO BOP ES-D-2 Page 1 of 9 Applicant's Actions Or Behavior Review rod withdrawal sequence from turnover Finished Group 7-2, Pull 20, Step 3 Next action, complete Group 7-2, Pull 20, Step 4 and then complete Group 7-3 Step 21 (all 4 rods from 8 to 12)

Direct resumption of power ascension IAW 201 0

0 Verify rod selected is correct Begins to pull rods in sequence IAW Rod Withdrawal Sequence For each rod selected:

0 verifies rod 0

selects rod 0

0 verifies correct notch 0

initials completed action notch withdraws rod to position 12 0

0 Assist in verifying correct rod Second check on rod movements

Operator Actions Event No.:

i/

Op Test No.: lLT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #4 Event

Description:

Cause:

Equipment rotation Swap Service water pumps Automatic Actions:

none Effects:

none Time Position SRO BOP Applicant's Actions Or Behavior Direct that Service water pumps be Service Water System wapped IAW Op 2

ES-D-2 Page 2of 9 rating Procedure 322, IAW 322, section 5.0; 0

0 0

Dispatch Equipment Operator to the Intake and establish communication with the control room Start idle pump by placing its control switch to START at 5F/6F Stop originally running pump by placing its control switch to STOP at 5F/6F Verify discharge check valve closure by observing NO reverse rotation of the now idle pump OPEN operating pump continuous vent valve and confirm flow from it

Operator Actions Op Test No.: ILT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #4 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

Running CRD pump trips (Tech Specs)

Cause:

Breaker problem causes pump trip Automatic Actions:

none Effects:

Operator action required to start standby pump Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior RO Recognize condition by reporting alarms; H-l-c: PUMP A OL H-7-C: CHARG WTR PRESS LO IAW RAP H-1 -c confirms:

0 0

the running CRD pump has tripped availability of standby CRD pump ES-D-2 Page 3of 9 SRO 0

Direct start of standby CRD pump Direct reference to 3024.08, Control Rod Hydraulics - Diagnostic and Restoration Actions Notify Work Management to troubleshoot and repair the pump Evaluate TS sections 3.4., Emergency Cooling and determines that the CRD pump may be inoperable and the plant may remain in operation for 7 days 0

0 0

Starts standby CRD pump.

Monitor CRD parameters and valve positions Refers to 3024.08, Control Rod Hydraulics - Diagnostic and Restoration Actions to determine cause of equipment problem

Operator Actions ES-D-2 L,

Op Test No.: ILT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #4 Event No.: 4 Page 4of 9 Event

Description:

Reactor Level Instrument RE02 Fails Downscale, Core Spray starts but EDG does not idle (Tech Spec)

Cause:

Instrument failure Automatic Actions:

Core Spray starts but EDG does not idle Effects:

Requires operator action to secure Core Spray system and determine Tech Spec Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognize condition by reporting alarms; 0

B-l-e: SYSTEM 1 AUTOSTART B-l-f: SYSTEM 2 AUTOSTART L

IAW RAP B-1 -e & 1 -f confirms:

0 both Core Spray systems are running 0

verifies #2 EDG has idle started and that #1 EDG failed to start and idle.

0 Using multiple indications verifies that a valid lo-lo signal does not exist Based on alarms and indications, reports that both Core Spray systems started due to RE02 failure, but that #1 EDG did not idle.

SRO 0

0 0

Confirms that a valid 10-10 signal does not exist Requests Work Management assistance and/or may direct the I&C technician to investigate the problem Evaluate TS 3.7.C.2, Auxiliary Electrical Power, and enters a 7 day LCO Directs URO/BOP to secure core spray in accordance with Procedure 308 BOP Secures Core Spray IAW 308 section 5.0:

0 0

Depresses OVERRIDE push buttons and then depresses ACTUATED push buttons to reset Core Spray Logic Confirm the parallel isolation valves are closed Secures running booster pumps and then main pumps in each system Verify system is in standby readiness

Group Heading C O R E S P R A Y Procedure No.

I I i 2QOO-RAP-3O24 -01 i S Y S T E M 1 A U T O S T A R T Page 1 of 1 B e Low low reactor water level

- OR -

High drywell pressure CONFIRMATORY ACTIONS:

B e i

1

~

SETPOINTS:

90" above TAF Drywell press.

2.9 psig ACTUATING DEVICES:

RE 0 2AY 5 REG 2BY5 REO 2CY5 RE02DY5 (Panel 18R & 19R Relay Modules P.S. RV46 A, B, C, D Reference Drawings :

NU 506036003 GU 33-611-17-004 Sh. 1 Verify low low reactor water level o r high drywell pressure.

Confirm System 1 pumps and diesel generators running.

UJTOMATIC ACTIONS:

starts Core Spray pumps and diesel generators.

W A L CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

If drywell pressure exceeds 3 psig, enter Procedures EMG-3200.02, Primary lontainment Control and EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control - No ATWS or EMG-3200.01B, RPV Jontrol with ATWS.

rhis alarm indicates that a parameter has exceeded or has the potential to exceed an Zmergency Action Level (EAL). Enter Procedure EPIP-OC-.Ol, "Classification of 3rnergency Conditions11. EAL - EPV Level sub j ec t N S S S Alarm Response Procedures (PanelB/21)

~ Group Heading C O R E S P R A Y Procedure No.

S Y S T E M 2 A U T O S T A R T I

Low low reactor water level

- OR -

High drywell pressure CONFIRMATORY ACTIONS:

2 SETPOINTS:

90" above TAF Drywell press.

2.9 psig B

1 f

ACTUATING DEVICES:

REO 2AY5 REO 2 BY 5 REO 2 CY5 REO 2DY 5 (Panel 18R & 19R Relay P.S. RV46 A, B, C, D Modules )

Reference Drawings:

Nu 506036003 GU 3E-611-17-004 Sh. 1 Verify low low reactor water level or high drywell pressure.

Confirm core spray system pumps and diesel generators running.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

Starts Core Spray pumps and diesel generators.

MANUAL, CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

If drywell pressure exceeds 3 psig, enter Procedures EMG-3200.02, Primary Containment Control and EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control - No ATWS or EMG-3200.01B, RPV Control with ATWS.

This alarm indicates that a parameter has exceeded or has the potential to exceed an Emergency Action Level (EAL). Enter Procedure EPIP-OC-.O1, "Classification of Emergency Conditions". EAL - EPV Level Subject N S S S Page 1 of 1 2000-RAP-3024.01 B

1 f

Alarm Response Procedures Revision No: 127

( PanelB/3 2

)

Operator Actions i/

Op Test No.: lLT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #4 Event No.:

5 ES-D-2 Page 5of 9 Event

Description:

APRM 4 Fails Upscale (Tech Spec)

Cause:

Instrument failure causes upscale response Automatic Actions:

none Effects:

Requires operator action to bypass APRM and reset the half scram Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior RO Recognize condition by reporting alarms; G-1-f: APRM HI-HI/INOP G-3-f: APRM HI G-l-d: CHANNEL I G-1 -c: SCRAM CONTACTOR OPEN IAW Response to Alarm Procedures (RAPS); confirm automatic action and indications including RPS system 1 scram lights out on 4F and APRM 4 indications on 4F.

Based on alarms and indications, reports RPS system 1 half scram due to APRM 4 failing upscale.

SRO 0

Refers to Procedure 403, LPRM-APRM System Operations 0

0 Requests Work Management assistance and/or may direct the I&C technician to investigate the problem Evaluate TS 3.1, Protective Instrumentation, to ensure that it permits the APRM to be bypassed Directs APRM 4 to be bypassed and the half scram to be reset RO Bypass APRM input IAW 403 section 5.3.3:

0 0

0 0

0 Reset the half scram Check Section 5.4 and Tech Spec Section 3.1 to determine if channel may bebypassed Bypasses APRM 4 by placing the joystick in bypass Verify on 3R/5R that selected APRM indicates it is bypassed Update Attachment 403-2 as determined by US BOP

Group Heading R E A C T O R / R P S G - l - c S C R A M C O N T A C T O R Any of the Reactor Protection System automatic or manual scram relays tripped.

Scram relay tripped.

CONFIRMATORY ACTIONS:

ACTUATING DEVICES:

Relays:

1K21A, 1K51, 1K52, 2K21 A, 2K51,2K52 Reference Drawings:

GE 237E566 Sheet 2,3,6, & 7 GU 3E-611-17-009 Sh. 1 If necessary, check scram relay panels to determine which d a y has tripped. Verify proper RPS MG set operation at Panel 6RnR.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

Reactor scram with coincident Channel I and Channd II trips.

MANUAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Check other Reactor Protection System alarms at Panel 5FBF to determine cause of trip. For reactor scram verify automatic actions and perform followup actions as defined in Procedure 2000-ABN-3200.01, "Reactor Scram". If RPS bus voltage is lost, refer to Procedure 2000-OPS-3024,1Oe, "RPS Restoration - Diagnostic 8 Restoration".

E half scram signal is present and the condition has cleared, THEN reset the half scram upder direction of Unit Supervisor

/

/'

Procedure No.

Subject

/

Page 1 of 1 N S S S 2000-RAP-3024.01 Alarm Response Procedures 1

G - 1 - C rnvision No. 127 (Panel G/12)

Group Heading R E A C T O R N E U T R O N M O N I T O R S These trips are inputs to RPS Channel I:

G d NOTE:

Below trips are operable only in STARTUP or REFUEL modes.

SETPOl NTS:

IRM HI HI or hop:

Level greater than 1 18% on 125% scale or 38% on 40% scale or channel inoperative.

ACTUATING DEVICES:

NOTE:

Below trips are operable only in RUN mode.

Subject NSSS Alarm Response Procedures IRM HI HI Inop/APRM scale or channel Downscale:

inoperative coincident with APRM Level greater than 11 8% on or 125% scale or 38% on 40%

channel less than 2%.

Procedure No.

Page 1 of 2 2000-RAP-3024.01 G d Revision No. 127 NOTE:

Below trip is operable in all modes of operation.

APRM HI HI 3r INOP:

Level greater than

(.95 x Flow) + 60%

(For flow greater than 7.68 x lo4 gpm' (For less than 7.68 x 1 O4 gpm) with a maximum value of 11 8% or channel inoperative.

(.98 x flow) + 37.7%

ON FIR MAT0 RY ACT1 0 N S :

I Reference Drawings:

GE 237E455 Sh. 1A GU 3E-611-17-009 Sh. 1 I

4UTOMATIC ACTIONS:

3eactor scram coincident with Channel I I trip.

(Panel GI1 8)

Group Heading R E A C T O R N E U T R O N M O N I T O R S C H A N N E L I

~

MANUAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

G d For half scram signal, check IRMs and APRMs to determine cause of trip. Correct cause as follows and reset half scram.

Subject N S S S Alarm Response Procedures IRM HI HI or lnop Check IRM recorders at Panel 4F and IRM cabinets at Panels 3R and 5R.

For high alarm, adjust range switch in affected unit one position higher to maintain level between high and low trips. For inoperative unit, check for loss of high voltage power to the detector unit, selector switch in other than operate, or the module disconnected. One high or inoperative channel in each protection system may be bypassed in accordance with procedure 402.4, IRM Bypass Operation.

Procedure No.

Page 2 of 2 2000-RAP-3024.01 G - t - d Revision No. 127 IRM HI HI Inop/APRM Downscale:

A+RM HI HI or hop Determine which APRM has caused alarm by noting Dnscl or hop light on Panel 4F. Check for downscale LPRM inputs to affected channel at Panels 3R and 5R. Verify failed LPRMs with TIP trace and bypass affected units in accordance with Procedure 403. Re-adjust affected APRM as required.

Determine cause of trip by checking APRM recorders at Panel 4F and APRM cabinets at Panels 3R and 5R. For high APRM, reduce reactor power by inserting control rods. For inoperative unit, check the affected APRM cabinet for improper mode switch position, Status LED on the FCTR Card lit solid red, module removed, or more than three LPRM inputs bypassed. Refer to Procedure 403.

or For full scram condition, verify automatic actions and perfom followup actions as defined in Procedure 2000-ABN-3200.0tI Reactor Scram.

I I

~\\

(Panel G/19)

\\

Group Heading R E A C T O R N E U T R O N H I - H I / I N O P I

CAUSES:

G - I - f I

M O N I T O R S Core power exceeding predetermined level for the existing recirculation flow condition as described

(.95 x Flow) +- 60°/0 (For flow greater than 7.68 x lo4 gpm)

(For less than 7.68 x 1 O4 gpm)

Maximum value of 1 18%

(-98 X flow) + 37.7%

or module inoperable, indicating mode switch on APRM drawer not in operate position, module removed, or more than three LPRM inputs bypassed.

These are trip signal inF)uts to Reactor Protection System Channel I.

CONFIRMATORY ACTIONS:

SETPO INTS:

(.95 x Flow) + 60%

(For flow greater than 7.68 x lo4 gpm)

(For less than 7.68 x lo4 gpm)

(Maximum Setpoint of 11 8% power) or Module Inoperable.

(.98 x flow) + 37.7%

ACTUATING DEVICES:

RJ19A and RJ19B Reference Drawings:

GE 237E566 Sh. 1 A & 1 B GE 706E812 Sh. 19 & 22 GU 3E-611-17-009 Sh. 1 For half scram signal, determine cause of trip by checking APRM recorders at Panel 4F and APRM cabinets at Panels 3R and 5R. /'

r- --

\\

4UTOMATIC ACTIONS:

?eactor scram coincident with Channel II trip.

MANUAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

=or high APRM, reduce reactor power by inserting control rods in accordance with the rod sequence. For noperative unit, check the affected APRM cabinet for improper mode sviiitch position, module removed Status LE@

in the FCTR Card is list solid red, or more than three LPRM inputs bypassed. Refer to Procedure 403. For full.

jcram condition, verify automatic actions and perform followup actions as defined in Procedure 2000-ABN-3200.01, Reactor Scram.

f failure of APRM channels results in conditions less conservative than those permitted by Technical W - ~

Specifications, shutdown the reactor. If all APRM indication is lost, manually scram the reactor per Procedure 2000-ABN-3200.01, Reactor Scram. Use IRMs and SRMs to monitor reactor power.

Subject N S S S Alarm Response Procedures Procedure No.

Page 1 of 1 2000-RAP-3024.01 G - I - f Revision No. 127 (Panel G/35)

Group Heading R E A C T O R N E U T R O N M O N I T O R S CAUSES:

G f Core power has exceeded the predetermined level for the existing recirculation flow condition.

SETPOINTS:

(0.90 x 1 o-6w)

+ 53.1 with a maximum value of 108%

ACTUATING DEVICES:

RJlSA, B, C, D Reference Drawings:

GE 706E812 Sh. 19,22, 26 & 29 GU 3E-613-17-009 Sh. 1 CONFIRMATORY ACTIONS:

Verify high APRM at Panel 4F. w control rods were not moved, check recirculation flow, feedwater flow and temperature, reactor presyfre, and reactor water level to determine causL,,,-

/f AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

Rod withdrawal block. 1

\\

MANUAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

derify alarm transfer point has been reset at affected unit. Check APRM channel for LPRM failurk6a rod block setpoint is exceeded by 4%,

sypassing an APRM power by inserting contmt-fods. Refer a0 Procedure 403 before Subject N S S S Alarm Response Procedures Procedure No.

Page 1 of 1 2000-RAP-3024.01 G f Revision No. 127 (Panel G/37)

Operator Actions Op Test No.: ILT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #4 Event No.:

6 ES-D-2 Page 6of 9 Event

Description:

Running RBCCW pump trips Cause:

Breaker electrical problem causes pump trip Automatic Actions:

none Effects :

Operator action required to start standby pump to prevent reactor scram Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognize condition by reporting alarms; C-4-C: PUMP 1-2 TRIP 0

IAW RAP C-4-c confirms:

0 0

0 pump status and system pressure on 13R the running RBCCW pump has tripped availability of standby RBCCW pump CT SRO 0

Direct start of st Direct Failure Response and repair the pump BOP 0

Starts standby RBCCW pump.

0 0

Monitor RBCCW and Service Water parameters Refers to ABN-19, RBCCW Failure Response and 2000-OPS-3024.21, RBCCW System Diagnostic and Restoration procedure to determine follow-up actions

Group Heading R B C C W Sub j ect N S S S c c Procedure No.

Page 1 of 1 2000-RAP-3024.01 4

CAUSES :

Overload trip of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Pump 1-2.

CONFIRMATORY ACTIONS:

SETPOINTS:

Breaker tripped Overload trip setpoint is 300 amps ACTUATING DEVICES:

30T Relay Reference Drawings:

BR E1126 GU 33-611-17-005 Sh. 1 Check pump status on Panel 13R and system pressure at Panel 13R on PI-IA18.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

NONE MANUAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

1.

Start any available RBCCW pump.

2.

RPV Temperature is >212OF IF RBCCW to the drywell is not restored within one minute, THEN perform the following:

a) -

IF the reactor is in the Startup or Run modes, THEN scram the reactor in accordance with Proc. 2000-ABN-3200.01, Reactor Scram.

b)

Trip all recirc pumps, and refer to Proc. 2000-ABN-3200.02, C)

Confirm that the suction and main discharge valves in at least 1 recirc d)

Refer to Proc. 2000-ABN-3200.19, RBCCW Failure Response, Recirculation Pump Trip.

loop are open.

and 2000-OPS-3024.21, RBCCW System Diagnostic and Restoration Actions.

3.

RPV Temperature is I212OF Refer to Proc. 2000-ABN-3200.19, RBCCW Failure Response, and 2000-OPS-3024.21, RBCCW System Diagnostic and Restoration Actions.

Alarm Response Procedures Revision No: 126 c c (PANEL C)

Operator Actions 11 Op Test No.: lLT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #4 Event No.: 7 ES-D-2 Page 7of 9 Event

Description:

Steam leak develops in the Drywell Cause:

Main Steam line breaks Automatic Actions:

none Effects:

Operator action required to vent drywell and scram reactor prior to 3 psig Time Position Amlicants Actions Or Behavior Recognize condition by reporting; RO 0

Unidentified leak-rate change Bop 0

Containment pressure and temperature change C-3-f; DW PRESS HVLO 0

0 Reference RAP C-3-f, DW PRESS HVLO Direct venting of Containment IAW procedure 312.1 1, Section 4.3, Nitrogen System and Containment Atmosphere Control.

Direct monitoring of Containment and investigate potential in-leakage paths using 2000-OPS-3024.09, Drywell Cooling System Diagnostic procedure SRO ii BOP Vent Containment IAW procedure 312.1 1 0

Vent the drywell via the Torus by opening Torus vent valves V-28-47 and V-28-1 8 on panel 11 F.

OR Vent the drywell via the drywell by opening drywell vent valves V-23-21 and V-23-22 on panel 12XR.

0 RO BOP Identify the cause of the high drywell pressure condition as directed.

SRO Before drywell pressure reaches 3.0 psig, directs manual scram IAW ABN-1 scram pushbuttons on 4F before Drywell pressure to SHUTDOWN Verifies power decrease 0

Inserts SRMs and IRMs Report that all control have inserted on the scram

3roup Heading T O R U S / D R Y W E L L USES :

C f Iigh or low pressure in the Drywell, or

!ailed transmitter loop.

SETPOINTS:

ONFIRMATORY ACTIONS:

ACTUATING DEVICES:

High 1.4 psig LOW 1.0 psig Recorder 12XR-6 (PT-51)

Reference Drawings:

SN 15081.02-ETLD-007 GE 112C2827 GU 33-611-17-005 Sh. 1 erify abnormal pressure at Panel 4F, PI-622-1407. If digital indicator is lashing, most probable cause is a failure of PT-51. If this is the case, isregard indication on recorder 12RX-6.

&ject N S S S Alarm Response Procedures UTOMATIC ACTIONS:

Procedure No.

Page 1 of 1 2000-RAP-3024.01 c

3 f

Revision No: 126 ONE ANUX CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

(//

i/,

etermine the cause of the hi/low Drywell pressure.\\ Add Nitrogen or vent in ccordance with Procedure 312.11, Nitrogen System and Containment Atmosphere ontrol as necessary to adjust pressure within normal operating band (greater than

.I# and less than 1. 3 # ).

If Primary Containment requires venting, the potential xists for airborne activity to be higher than normal.

o vent through the Standby Gas Treatment System in accordance with Procedure 3309 -

tandby Gas Treatment System. Stack and Reactor Building radiation monitors shall e monitored whenever the PrimarylContainment is vented.

f frequent or persistent high pressure alarms are occurring, check containment emperature, Torus water level A, Drywell Cooler operation (including RBCCW flow a amperature) and potential in-leakage paths to determine the cause of the high ressure condition. Refer to Procedure 2000-OPS-3024.09, Drywell Cooling System -

iagnostic & Restoration Actions, or 2000-OPS-3024.21, Reactor Building Closed

>ding Water System - Diagnostic and Restoration Actions.

E frequent or persistent low pressure alarms are occurring, check for proper

?eration of the Nitrogen Makeup System, Drywell Cooling System, and check mtainment valve lineup to determine the cause of the low pressure condition. Refer 3 Procedure 2000-OPS-3024.06, Containment Ventilation System - Diagnostic &

?storation Actions.

m: Any leak resulting in an increase in Torus level shall be calculated and Consideration should be given added to the Unidentified Leakage Rate, in accordance with Procedure 106.

I (PANEL C)

Operator Actions ES-Dd Page 8of 9 ii Op Test No.: ILT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #4 Event No.:

8 Event

Description:

Containment Spray Valve fails to realign automatically when sprays are required Cause:

Breaker malfunction prevents valve movement Automatic Actions:

none Effects:

System configuration does not automatically realign. Operator action required to manually open valve Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior SRO Enter and execute EOP 3200.02, Primary Containment Control when Drywell Pressure exceeds 3 psig.

Direct lineup of Containment Spray in the Drywell Spray Mode per Support Procedure 29, Initiation of the Containment Spray System for Drywell Sprays CT CT BOP IAW SP-29; 0

Must initiate containment spray before 281 O F

e V

e s

s U

W h

a d

w k

Lineup Containment Spray in the Drywell Spray mode Report failure of V-21-11, DW Spray Discharge Valve, to open Direct Equipment operator to manually open V-21-11 Spray Drywell when V-21-11 is open and conditions for spraying Drywell are met RO Control Reactor Level and Pressure as Directed TERMINATION CRITERIA:

Once Drywell spray has been initiated and Drywell pressure is being controlled between 4 - 12 psig, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator, the scenario may be terminated POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:

Declares an ALERT due to torus pressure r 12 psig EAL:

Procedure EMG-3200.02 Support Proc. 29 Rev. 16 Attachment G Page 1 of 4 SmPORT PROCEDURE 29 INITIATION OF THE CONTAINMENT SFRAY SYSTEM FOR DRYG?XLL SPRAYS 1.0 PREREOUISITES Manual initiation of Drywell Sprays has been directed by the Emergency Operating Procedures.

2.0 PREPARATION 2. 1 Select the Containment Spray S y s w to be used by confirming either SYSTEM 1 MODE SELECT or SYSTEM 2 MODE SELECT switch in DW SPRAY position (Panel 1F/2F)),

2. 2 Verify that the system TORUS CLG DISCHARGE valve closes and DW SPRAY DISCHARGE valve opens (-el 1 F / 2 F ).

3. 0 PROCEDURE Containment Spray suction strainer plugging may occur due to debris in the Primary Containment and result in a loss of Containment Spray System Flow.

Diesel Generator overload will result if a containment Spray pump and ESW pump are started with a Diesel Generator load of greater than 2860 XW.

IF Bus 1C or ID are being suppnied by an Emergency Diesel Generator, THEN verify that adequate load margin is available so as NOT to exceed EDG load limitt when starting Containment Spray and ESW pumps.

(320002 / 9 )

OVER 337-1

3. 2 3 - 3 3. 4 3. 5 3. 6

- i

.i.

Procedure ELPG-3200.02 Support P r o c - 29 Rev. 16 Page 2 of 4 WHEN directed to initiate Drywell sprays, THEN complete the following:

-1. Confirm all Reactor Recirculation Pumps tripped.

2. Confirm the Drywell Recirc Fans tripped (Panel 11R).

CAUTION NPSH problems will develop on all operating pumps if more than 4 Containment Spray/Core Spray Main pumps are operated at the same time.

I F 4 Containment Spray/Core Spray Main pumps are in operation, THEN do not start additional Containment Spray pumps until Core Spray Main pumps can be secured.

Start a Containment Spray Pump as follows:

3.4.1 Select a Containment Spray Pump to be started.

3. 4. 2 Place and hold the System Pump Start Permissive Keylock for the selected pump in the appropriate position (Panel 1 F / 2 F ).

3. 4. 3 Start the selected Containment Spray Pump using its control switch (Panel 1 F / 2 F ).

Start an associated ESW Pump using its control switch (Panel 1 F / 2 F ).

CAUTION Operation of Containment Spray pumps with flow above the NPSH or vortex limits may result in equipment damage. When operating beyond any flow limits, periodic evaluations should be made to verify that continued operation beyond these limits is still required.

c 4

Monitor System parameters for expected performance.

L A

(320002/9)

E7-2

L 3.7 Procedure EMG-3200.02 Support Proc. 29 Rev. 16 Attachment G Page 3 of 4 NOTE Valves V-5-147, 166 and 167 240 not seal in when the control switch is taken to CLOSE. The control switch must be held in CLOSE until the valve indicates closed.

Confirm the following RBCCW Isolation valves closed (Panel I F / ~ F ) :

v-5-147 V-5-148 V-5-166 V-5-167 3.8 Diesel generator overload will result if a Containment Spray pump and ESW pump are started with a Diesel Generator Start additional Containment Spray and ESW Pumps in accordance with Steps 3.3 through 3.6 as.directed by the LOS.

1 3.9 IF while performing the following steps, Containment Spray Pumps fail to trip, THEN place the respective syszem MODE SELECT switch in TORUS CLG position.

3.10 Maintain primary containment pressure in a band of 4 to 12 psig 1

i unless otherwise directed by the LOS as follows:

3.10.1 Secure Drywell. Sprays when Drywell pressure drops to 4 psig.

3.10.2 WHEN Torus or Drywell pressure increases to 12 psig, THEN initiate Drywell sprays in accordance with Steps 3.3 through 3.6.

3.11 E any Core Spray Booster pump is running AND Torus Drywell pressure drops to 2 psig, I

THEN confirm termination of Dnryylell Sprays due to NPSH concerns.

i, (320002/9)

OVER E?- 3 I

Procedure EMG-3200. 02 Support Proc. 29 R e v. 16 Attachment G Page 4 of 4 3.12 IF no Core Spray Booster pump is running

( 3 2 0 0 0 2 / 9 )

Torus OR Drywell pressure drops below 1 psig, THEN confirm termination of Drywell Sprays to prevent deinertion of the Primary Containment.

E7-4

Group Heading C O R E S P R A Y 1 High pressure differential across Core Spray System 1 sparger nozzles due to Core Spray line break in the vessel annulus.

B 5

e CONFIRMATORY ACTIONS:

Subject N S S S Procedure No.

Page 1 of 1 2000-RAP-3024.01 SETPOINTS :

0.3 2 0.3 psid Alarm Response Procedures ACTUATING DEVICES:

DPIS RV30A I

Revision No: 127 Reference Drawings:

GE 148F712 GE 885D781 GE 112C2845 Sh. 3 GU 33-611-17-004 Sh. 2 Verify pressure differential at instrument rack RK04.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS :

None MANUAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

If instrument reading is greater than or equal to 1 psid, consider Core Spray System 1 inoperable. Verify operability of System 2.

Notify Licensed Operations Supervisor. Core APLHGR must be brought within 90% of limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Contact Core Engineering by referencing the Core Maneuvering Daily Instructions for guidance on rod movement and power changes.

B e (PanelB/28)

=up Heading R E A C T O R N E U T R O N M O N I T O R S Subject NSSS CONFIRMATORY ACTIONS:

Procedure No.

Page 1 of 1 2000-RAP-3024.04 G f Alarm Response Procedures ACTUATING DEVICES:

I Revision No: 127 RJ18 A, B, C, D RJ19 A, 6, C, D Reference Drawings:

GE 706E812 Sh. 17, 18,20,21, 24,25,27,28,31,32,33,34, 35,36,37 and 38 GU 3E-611-17-009 Sh. 2 Determine which detector is high at Panel 4F. Insure made switch on amplifier of LPRM is in OPERATE position.

If necessary, verify high flux by taking a TIP traoe of theaffected LPRM string as directed by the LOS.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

If the LPRM is an input to an APRM channel, there can be auto action (Le., APRM Rod Block, and/or APRM High)

MANUAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Check that fuel limits are not being exceeded. Refer to Procedure 403 before bypassing an inoperative LPRM.

An alarm may be reset for a chamber that has momentarily exceeded the setpoint by depressing the reset button of the affected LPRM at Panels 3R and 5R. Cmtact Come Engineering for additional guidance as necessary.

G f I

I (Panel G/40)

Scenario Outline ES-D-1 Simulation Facility Oyster Creek Scenario No.

NRC #2 Op Test No.

ILT2004 Examiners Operators CRS Event No.

1 2

PRO Malfunction Event Event No.

Type*

Description N

BOP Swap Reactor Building HVAC Supply fans SRO MAL-PCN004D C

SRO Drywell recirc fan trips URO 3

4 Scenario Summary The scenario begins with the reactor at 99% power with the A CRD pump out of service. The crew will begin by placing an alternate Reactor Building HVAC fan in service and secure the running fan. A Drywell recirculation fans trips and an alternate fan will be started. The RBHVAC ventilation radiation monitor will fail upscale, causing RBHVAC to trip, but the SGTS will fail to start. The crew will start the SGTS manually. A control rod drifts out and it will be restored to its programmed position. The running Service Water pump trips requiring the standby pump to be started. The rod drift will cause a small fuel failure. Power will be reduced to lower radiation levels. A leak in the Torus will require the Reactor to be scrammed and eventually this will lead to Emergency Depressurization. Five rods will fail to insert on the scram.

MAL-RMS005M I

MAL-SCN005 BOP fails to start. (Tech Spec)

RBHVAC Rad Ventilation monitor Fails Upscale, RBHVAC trips, SGTS SRO MAL-C RO Control Rod Drifts Out CRD005-2239

.B8B 5

6 7

1 BOP I I

SRO I SRO MAL-SWS001 B C

BOP Running Service Water pump trips MAL-RXS001,

SRO .00075,120s R

RO Small Fuel Failure leads to Power Reduction to Lower Radiation

-B8p Levels MAL-CSS001 A, SRO 8000.900s M

RO TorusWaterLeak MAL-CRD022 BOP SRO 8

- 1039, -421 1, C

- 2635, -1 423,

- 34.43 RO Five Rods Fail to Insert on the Scram (power > 2%)

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)Omponent, (M)ajor

Operator Actions u Op Test No.: ILT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #2 Event No.:

1 Event

Description:

Swap Reactor Building HVAC Supply fans ES-D-2 Page 1 of 8 Cause:

Equipment rotation Automatic Actions:

none Effects:

none Time Position Aeplicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Direct that RBHVAC fans be swapped IAW Operating Procedure 329, Reactor Building Heating, Cooling and Ventilation System, section 8.3 BOP IAW 329, section 8.3; Dispatch Equipment Operator to Office Building roof to CONFIRM manual inlet dampers are OPEN for fan SF-1 -1 3 and align SF-1 -1 3 discharge dampers approximately equal to SF-1 -12 dampers Start RBHVAC supply fan SF-1 -1 3 by placing its control switch to ON at 1 1 R Stop RBHVAC supply fan SF-1 -12 by placing its control switch to OFF at 11R Verify RB dP is less than -0.25 in WG

Operator Actions L/

Op Test No.: lLT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #2 EventNo.: 2 Event

Description:

Drywell recirc fan trips Cause:

Motor malfunction Automatic Actions:

None Effects:

Operator action required to start alternate fan Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognize condition by reporting alarms; 0

L-4-a: RF 4 TRIP IAW RAP L-4-a confirms:

0 trip of RF-1-4 0

availability of RF-1-3.

SRO Directs start of Recirc Fan 1-3 BOP Places drywell Recirc Fan 1-3 in service ES-D-2 Page 2of 8 RO Monitors and reports drywell parameters including pressure and temperature SRO BOP Refers to procedure 2000-OPS-3024.09 - Drywell Cooling System - Diagnostic and Restoration Actions to determine cause of equipment problem

~ Group Heading H & V D W R E C I R C R F 4 T R I P CAUSES :

Overload trip of Drywell Recirculating Fan RF-1-4.

L 4

a F A N S SETPOINTS:

39.5 amps I

CONFIRMATORY ACTIONS:

Verify fan trip at Panel 11R.

ACTUATING DEVICES:

OLX Relay Reference Drawings:

GE 157B6350, Sh 96B BR 2011, Sh 1 GU 33-611-17-013 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

Trip of RF-1-4.

MANUAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Place any available Drywell Recirculating Fan in service.

Procedure 2000-OPS-3024.09, Drywell Cooling System - Diagnostic and Restoration Actions.

pressure and temperature closely. During normal power operation, four recirculating fans are required to maintain Drywell temperature.

Refer to If more than one Drywell Recirculating Fan has tripped, monitor Drywell Subject I Procedure No.

B O P Alarm Response procedures 2000-RAP-3024.03 L

4 a

Operator Actions ES-D-2

'u Op Test No.: lLT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #2 Event No.: 3 Page 3of 8 Event

Description:

RBHVAC Rad Ventilation monitor Fails Upscale, RBHVAC trips, SGTS fails to start (Tech Spec)

Instrument failure causes upscale response Cause:

Automatic Actions:

RBHVAC trips Effects:

Operator action required to manually initiate SGTS Time Position RO SRO BOP RO SRO BOP Applicant's Actions Or Behavior Recognize condition by observing indications or reporting alarms; 1OF-l-f: VENT HI 0

Verify high radiation level on redundant indicators on Panel 2R IAW RAPS, confirm Reactor Building isolation and trip of RBHVAC and initiation of Standby Gas Treatment System [SGTS].

Verify that an actual ventilation high radiation condition does NOT exist Recognize and report that the expected start of SGTS did NOT occur.

Direct SGTS be placed in service manually IAW procedure 330 0

Evaluate compliance with TS 3.5 0

Can remain in operation for 7 days if remaining system is operable.

0 Notify Work Management to troubleshoot and repair the instrument.

IAW procedure 330, take the following actions when directed 0

0 0

0 0

Confirm Standby Gas Select switch to SYS 1 on panel 11 R Place Exhaust Fan EF-1-8 to HAND on 11 R Verify EF-1-8 starts, and valves V-28-23, 24 & 26 open After flow is established, verify V-28-24 closes and V-28-28 opens Place V-28-48 control switch to CLOSE and verify GREEN close light LIT Verify RBHVAC secured if directed by supervisor

Operator Actions u Op Test No.: ILT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #2 Event No.: 4 ES-D-2 Page 4of 8 Event

Description:

Cause:

Control Rod 22-39 Drifts Out(/k%ht 9 J"s/

Relay malfunction causes rod motion Automatic Actions:

Rod Drift annunciator alarms Effects:

Requires operator action to reduce reactor power Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior RO Recognize condition by observing indications or reporting alarms; 0

H-6-a: ROD DRIFT 0

Confirm only one rod drifting out IAW RAPS; confirm automatic actions and indications including control rod identification and direction of movement SRO Direct implementation of ABN-6, Abnormal Control Rod Motion 0

Direct the rod to be selected and returned to its programmed position Monitor for indications of fuel failure Notify the Reactor Engineers of abnormal Control Rod Motion b

CT RO Select rod and drive to its programmed position.

BOP IAW ABN-6; Notifies Reactor Engineering Request Reactor coolant sample from Chemistry Monitors Off-Gas and Main steam line radiation Reports observed indications to SRO 1

Operator Actions Op Test No.: ILT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #2 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Running Service Water pump trips Cause:

Motor problem causes pump trip Automatic Actions:

none Effects:

Operator action required to start standby pump Time Position Atmlicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognize condition by reporting alarms; K-1-f: SVC WATER PUMP TRIP 0

IAW RAP K-1 -f confirms:

0 0

the running Service Water pump has tripped availability of standby Service Water pump

'i, SRO 0

Direct start of standby Service Water pump' 0

Direct reference to ABN-18, Service Water Failure Notify Work Management to troubleshoot and repair the pump ES-D-2 Page 5of 8 BOP 0

0 0

Starts standby Service Water pump.

Monitor RBCCW and Service Water parameters Refers to ABN-18, Service Water Failure

Operator Actions ES-D-2 L,-

Op Test No.: ILT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #2 Event No.:

6 Page 6of 8 Event

Description:

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

none Effects:

Small Fuel Failure leads to Power Reduction to Lower Radiation Levels Caused by abnormal control rod motion Main steam and Off-Gas radiation levels increase. Operator action required to lower power to mitigate failed fuel affects. Reactor power, steam flow and feed flow decrease.

Time Position BOP Applicant's Actions Or Behavior Recognize condition by reporting alarms; 1OF-2-C: OFF GAS HI 1OF-1-d: STACK EFFLUENT HI-HI 10F-2-d: STACK EFFLUENT HI 1 OF-1 -k: AREA MON HI 1 OF-1 -c: OFF GAS HI-HI IAW RAP 1 OF-1 -k confirms:

0 0

Verify radiation levels on panel 2R Check Main Steam and Off Gas radiation monitors IAW RAPS; confirm radiation levels and trends indicating failed fuel.

SRO BOP NOTE SRO RO BOP Direct implementation of ABN-26, Increase in Main Steam Line/Off Gas activity Monitors Off-Gas and Main steam line radiation Request Off-Gas sample from Chemistry Request guidance from Reactor Engineering Reactor Engineering may prompt a power reduction in response to the crew's request for assistance.

Direct reduction of radiation levels by lowering Reactor power, using recirculation flow IAW procedure 202.1, Power Operations IAW procedure 202.1 ;

0 Reduce reactor power with recirculation flow as required Monitors Off-Gas and Main steam line radiation

Operator Actions Op Test No.: lLT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #2 Event No.: 7 ES-D-2 Page 7of 8 Event

Description:

Torus Water Leak Cause:

Torus piping failure Automatic Actions:

none Effects :

Torus level decrease. Increasing Secondary Containment Water Levels. Operator action is required to mitigate the Torus level decrease.

L Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognize condition by observing indications or reporting alarms; 0

Torus Water level decrease 0

C-5-e: TORUS LEVEL HI/LO IAW SDRP or RAPS; confirm automatic action and indications including Torus water level at panel 11 F and 16R, confirm Torus intact, direct inspection of Reactor building corner rooms.

SRO BOP Torus level RO 0

0 Announce Entry into EOP 3200.02, Primary Containment Control due to low Announce Entry into EOP 3200.1 1, Secondary Containment Control due to water levels in the Secondary Containment SRO Direct actions IAW EOP 3200.02, Primary Containment Control:

0 0

Attempt to restore Torus level using the Core Spray System per Support Procedure 37 when directed.

Close V-20-91 Open V-20-83 Place CSS #1 Main pump in PTL Place breaker off for V-20-27 Open V-20-27 Spray Drywell when lined up and >12 psig Direct adding water to the Torus using Fire Water per Support Procedure 37 When water level can not be maintained above 110 inches, then Enter EOP 3200.01 A, RPV Control - No ATWS at A and perform it concurrently Recognize that not all rods fully inserted on the scram BOP RO IAW ABN-1:

e 0

0 Depress both manual scram pushbuttons on 4F before 11 0 inches Torus Level Place Reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN Report that not all control have inserted on the scram NOTE: most actions will be driven by the Primary Containment Control procedure before they are reached in Secondary Containment Control.

Operator Actions Before water level drops to 1 10 inches, direct an Emergency Depressurization.

Perform the following actions for EOP for RPV Control -With ATWS when directed:

Power Control 0

Bypass ROPS 0

Initiation of Alternate Rod Injection Manually drive control rods, Close V-15-52 0

LeveVPower control Bypass the following Initiations and Isolations 0

ADS 0

MSlV Low-Low Water Level Isolation 0

RBCCW Drywell Isolation Use Support Procedure - 17 to control level as directed n

0 RO Initiate ARI when directed L,

Op Test No.: ILT2004 Scenario No.: NRC #2 Event No.:

8 L

Event

Description:

Five Rods Fail to Insert on the Scram Cause:

Automatic Actions:

none CRD malfunction causes some rods not to insert Effects:

Operator action required to insert control rods Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior RO 0

Report that not all rods fully inserted on the scram.

ES-D-2 Page 8of 8

CT 0

Open all EMRVs when directed RO BOP 0

Control Reactor level IAW EOPs & ABN 01 ;

0 Control Reactor pressure 0

Perform remaining scram actions TERMINATION CRITERIA:

When the Emergency Depressurization is in progress, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator, the scenario may be terminated POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION: ALERT: Scram signal received and Rx power remains

>2%

EAL: C-1 New EAL MA4