Information Notice 1993-53, Effect of Hurricane Andrew on Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station and Lessons Learned

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Effect of Hurricane Andrew on Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station and Lessons Learned
ML031070490
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Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/29/1994
From: Grimes B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
-nr IN-93-053, NUDOCS 9404280023
Download: ML031070490 (10)


11 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 29, 1994 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 93-53, SUPPLEMENT 1: EFFECT OF HURRICANE ANDREW ON

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING

STATION AND LESSONS LEARNED

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

PurDose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice (IN)supplement to inform addressees of further lessons learned as a

result of the investigations undertaken to assess the effects of Hurricane

Andrew on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station (Turkey Point); to

expand the scope of the lessons learned to other external events, as

appropriate; and to discuss existing regulatory guidance for various external

events. It is expected that recipients will review the information for

applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to

avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information

notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written

response is required.

Description of Circumstances

In IN 93-53, "Effect of Hurricane Andrew on Turkey Point Nuclear Generating

Station and Lessons Learned," the NRC provided a description of the impact of

Hurricane Andrew on Turkey Point on August 24, 1992. The notice described

several lessons reinforced and lessons learned based on a joint NRC/industry

team review.

Discussion

NRC NUREG-1474, "Effect of Hurricane Andrew on the Turkey Point Nuclear

Generating Station from August 20-30," indicates that two Category 5 hurricane

storms, (wind speed > 249 km/h [155 mph]), and four Category 4 hurricane

storms, (wind speed between 210 and 249 km/h [130 and 155 mph]), have hit the

eastern coast of the United States in the last 60 years. The wind speeds used

in the design of safety-related structures of east-coast plants vary from

177 to 210 km/h [110 to 130 mph]. As the load factor used with the design

wind loading is 1.7, when compared with the code established limit states of

the structures, these structures can withstand Category 4 and low intensity

Category 5 hurricanes (which have a range from 249 to 290 km/h [155 to

180 mph]). Moreover, design against tornado generated loadings (in accordance

9404280023 E Notrces 93-&53 jnJj 4On' vioso/

IN4~A3, Supplement 1 April 29, 1994 with Regulatory Guide 1.76, "Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants,"

and NUREG 0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis

Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," Sections 3.3.1 and 3.5.1.4, or other

provisions accepted by the staff) provides margin against failure of safety- related structures during hurricanes.

Based on NRC and industry experience with plant-specific probabilistic risk

assessments (PRAs), NRC recognized that systematic examinations are beneficial

in identifying plant-specific vulnerabilities. Thus, on November 23, 1988, NRC issued to all licensees a request to conduct systematic examinations of

their plants for internally initiated event vulnerabilities (Generic Letter 88-20, 'Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities" and

on June 28, 1991, expanded the request to include externally initiated event

vulnerabilities (Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, "Individual Plant

Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities").

NUREG-1407, 'Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant

Examination of External Events," provides procedural guidelines for assessing

the adequacy of plant safety systems against external events, such as

earthquakes, tornadoes, external floods, transportation and nearby facility

accidents. Following these guidelines in the implementation of the IPEEE

program will enable licensees to look for vulnerabilities to severe accidents

resulting from such events and identify cost-effective improvements.

It is not clear whether adequate consideration has been given to the failure

(or malfunction) of nonsafety-related structures and equipment in the vicinity

of a nuclear reactor which could jeopardize the proper functioning of

safety-related structures, systems and components. As noted in IN 93-53 and

in NRC NUREG-1474, at Turkey Point, Hurricane Andrew caused damage to a number

of nonsafety structures and equipment:

e all (six) steel-framed turbine canopies collapsed,

  • one of the two chimneys (associated with the two fossil units at the

site) was severely damaged,

  • the base anchors for the vent stack on the Unit 4 containment were

lifted 10 mm [3/8 inch],

  • ductwork from the radioactive waste building to the vent stack failed

due to hurricane generated missiles,

  • the nonsafety high-water tank collapsed, and fell on various

fire-protection pumps and pipes, rendering one of the fire protection

systems inoperable.

In spite of the severe damage to a number of nonsafety items at Turkey Point, the safety-related structures, systems and components of the two nuclear

reactors withstood the storm without damage and the reactors did not pose a

radiological hazard to nearby communities. A systematic evaluation of the

available logs and data by the licensee indicated that there were no

unexpected radiation levels onsite or offsite.

IN 93-53, Supplement 1 April 29, 1994 of Turkey Point for

The licensee had completed the external events analyses indicated a need to

wind and fire in June of 1991. The analysis for wind for Category 5 modify the flood wall and improve the emergency procedureto adequately prepare

hurricanes. The revised procedure allowed the licensee the response to

for severe events, such as Hurricane Andrew. In developing that the potential

Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, the licensee indicated

of chimney failure were

consequences (in terms of core damage frequencies) acceptable. However, considered in the analysis and the results were found explicitly considered.

the potential failure of the high-water tank was not

recommends that

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification," and anchorages) be

nonsafety structures and equipment (including supports failure could reduce

designed to withstand postulated seismic events if their Section 3.3.2 of

the safety function of any of the safety-related features. for postulated

the NRC Standard Review Plan includes a similar provision provisions is that

tornado loadings. The practical implication of these to withstand the

either the nonsafety structures and equipment are designed that the consequences of

postulated events, or an assessment is made to assure of safety-related

their failure would not disable the safety functionsII over I consideration).

structures, systems and components (also termed as pre-1975 plants have been

These documents were issued in 1975. A number of external events.

evaluated for II over I considerations under postulated plants.

However, this may not be the case for some pre-1975

4, to perform systematic

All licensees were requested in GL 88-20, Supplement to severe

examinations of their plants for plant-specific vulnerabilities

systems and components

accidents from external events which include all plantor the conditional

whose failures contribute to core damage frequency

Section 5 of NUREG-1407 probability of containment failure. Specifically, obtained from the

states that all licensees should compare the information (NUREG 0800) criteria

Plan

review for conformance to the 1975 Standard Review The walkdown should be

and perform a confirmatory walkdown of the plant. be affected by high

concentrated on onsite outdoor facilities that could occurrences.

and offsite

winds, onsite storage of hazardous materials, extent of the results

As noted in GL 88-20, Supplement 4, the quality and which the licensee applies

derived from an IPEEE will depend on the vigor with

to the intent of

the method of examination and on the licensee's commitment the nonsafety items

the IPEEE. Matters relevant to an IPEEE analysis include

loads generated by various credible

(onsite and offsite) whose failures under capability and the

external events could potentially disable safe shutdown

compensatory measures that would alleviate such conditions.

IN 93-53, Supplement I

April 29, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Hans Ashar, NRR

(301) 504-2851 John T. Chen, RES

(301) 492-3919 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Attachment

IN 93-53, Supp. 1 April 29, 1994 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

94-32 Revised Seismic Hazard 04/29/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Estimates for nuclear power reactors.

94-31 Potential Failure of 04/14/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Wilco, Lexan-Type HN-4-L for nuclear power reactors.

Fire Hose Nozzles

90-68, Stress Corrosion Cracking 04/14/94 All holders of 01 or CPs

Supp. 1 of Reactor Coolant Pump for pressurized water

Bolts reactors.

94-30 Leaking Shutdown Cooling 04/12/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Isolation Valves at for nuclear power reactors.

Cooper Nuclear Station

94-29 Charging Pump Trip during 04/11/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

a Loss-of-Coolant Event for pressurized water

Caused by Low Suction reactors.

Pressure

92-51, Misapplication and 04/12/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Supp. 1 Inadequate Testing of for nuclear power reactors.

Molded-Case Circuit

Breakers

94-28 Potential Problems with 04/05/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Fire-Barrier Penetration for nuclear power reactors.

Seals

94-27 Facility Operating 03/31/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Concerns Resulting from for nuclear power reactors.

Local Area Flooding

94-26 Personnel Hazards and 03/28/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Other Problems from for nuclear power reactors.

Smoldering Fire-Retard- ant Material in the

Drywell of a Boiling- Water Reactor

OL - Operating License

CP - Construction Permit

I9 3-53, Supplement 1 April 29, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

orig /s/'d by CIGrimes/for

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Hans Ashar, NRR

(301) 504-2851 John T. Chen, RES

(301) 492-3919 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • See previous concurrence
    • Per memo 9/10/93
      • Per E-mail 4/26/94 OFFICE *TECH ED *AC/OGCB:DRS I S:NRR

NAME MMejac JBirmingham BKGrimes _

DATE 109/10/93 104/25/94 [ j_04/_94_ _ l

OFFICE _ DSIR/SAIB/RES ECGB/DE/NRR C/ECGB/DE/NRR DSIR/SAIB/RES

NAME JChen*** HAshar*** _ GBagchi** CAder***

DATE 04/26/94 104/26/94 09/10/93 04/26/94 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: 93-53SP1.IN

IV63-53, Supplement 1 April xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Hans Ashar, NRR

(301) 504-2851 John T. Chen, RES

(301) 492-3919 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • See previous concurrence
    • Per memo 9/10/93

.&.&.dn-- r - 41 A 1o; 10A

OFFICE *TECH ED *AC/OGCB:DORS D __Rl

NAME MMejac JBirmingham g Grimes

DATE 09/10/93 04/25/94 04/ _'/9 OFFICE DSIR[SB E CGB/DE/__ _CB/DE/NRR DSIR/SAI

NAME JChen*** HAshar*** GBagchi** CAder***

DATE 04/26/94 04/26/94 09/10/93 04/26/94 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: ANDREW3.JLB

-i

"3-53, Supplement 1 April xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Hans Ashar, NRR

(301) 504-2851 John T. Chen, RES

(301) 492-3919 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • See previous concurrence
    • Per memo 9/10/93
      • Per memo 2/15/94 OFFICE *TECH ED *AC/OGCB: R, -D/DORS:NRR l l

NAME MMejac 1"* JBirmingh BKGrimes

DATE 109/10/93 104/25/94 104/ /94 1 OFFICE _ DSIR/SAIB/RES ECGB/DE/NRR C/ECGB/DE/NRR DSIR/SAIB/RES

NAME JChen** HAshar** GBagchi** CAder***

DATE 09/10/93 109/10/93 09/10/93 02/15/94 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: ANDREW3.JLB

. a.

."W'93-53, Supplement 1 April xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Hans Ashar, NRR

(301) 504-2851 John T. Chen, RES

(301) 492-3919 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

E

  • See orevious concurrence

OFFICE

NAME

lDATE

MMeJac

09/10/93

  • AC/OGCB:DORS

JBirmingham

104/25/94 D/DORS:NRR

BKGrimes

104/ /94 urriLIML LnrULUMU4 NMait: RznrIuKLW5 .s

UrrLlAL UUWUMLNI NAM: ANUKtWJ . ULb

'IV 93-53, Supplement 1 April xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Hans Ashar, NRR

(301) 504-2851 John T. Chen, RES

(301) 492-3919 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • See previous concurrence

lOFFICE TECHED AC/OGCB: DO_ D/DORS:NRR _ _R_

NAME IteJac JBirminghtm w BKGrimes _

DATE 09/10/93 04/25/94 04/ /94 nrranol T AA

ralT .- . Ir *1* *as . . .

OFFlIlAL UU6UU~MtN NAML: ANUKtW3 .0L5