Information Notice 1993-33, Potential Deficiency of Certain Class IE Instrumental and Control Cables

Potential Deficiency of Certain Class IE Instrumental and Control Cables

ML031070494
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	04/28/1993
From:	Grimes B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-93-033, NUDOCS 9304230163
Download: ML031070494 (12)

I . . K)

UNITED STATES

-

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 28, 1993 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 93-33: POTENTIAL DEFICIENCY OF CERTAIN CLASS IE

INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL CABLES

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

PurDose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees to a potential deficiency in the environmental

qualification of certain Class 1E instrumentation and control cables. It is

expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to

their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate to avoid similar

problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not

NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response to this

notice is required.

Description of Circumstances

Sandia National Laboratories, under contract to the NRC, tested cables to

determine the long-term aging degradation behavior of typical instrumentation

and control cables used in nuclear power plants and to determine the potential

for using condition monitoring for assessing residual life. The results of

this testing are described in NUREG/CR-5772, "Aging, Condition Monitoring, and

Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) Tests of Class IE Electrical Cables," Volumes

1, 2, and 3. The tests were conducted on cross-linked polyolefin/poly- ethylene, ethylene propylene rubber, and miscellaneous Class lE cable types.

The test program generally followed the guidance of Institute of Electrical

and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 323-1974, "IEEE Standard for

Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," and IEEE

Standard 383-1974, "IEEE Standard for Type Test of Class IE Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections." IEEE Standard 323-1974 is an industry- established standard endorsed by the NRC for qualifying Class 1E equipment for

nuclear power generating stations, and IEEE Standard 383-1974 is an industry- established standard for type test of Class IE electric cables, field splices, and connections for nuclear power generating stations.

The test program consisted of two phases; both phases used the same test

specimens. Phase 1 consisted of simultaneous thermal and radiation aging of

the cables at approximately 100 *C (212 *F) and 0.10 kGy per hour (10 kilorads

per hour), respectively. Three different sets of cable specimens were tested

in this phase: one was aged to a nominal lifetime of 20 years, a second to

40 years, and a third to 60 years. Phase II was a sequential accident

exposure consisting of 1100 kGy (110 megarads) of high-dose-rate irradiation

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IN 93-33 April 28, 1993 at the rate of 6 kGy per hour (600 kilorads per hour) followed by a simulated

exposure to LOCA steam. The test profile was similar to the one given in IEEE

Standard 323-1974 for "generic' qualification. The cables were energized at

110 V dc during the accident simulation. Insulation resistance was measured

on line throughout the test. No chemical spray was used during the steam

exposure, but a post-LOCA submergence test was performed on the cables that

were aged to a nominal equivalent of 40 years.

Cable types that failed during the accident tests or that exhibited marginal

insulation resistances were Rockbestos Firewall III, BIW Bostrad 7E, Okonite- Okolon, Samuel Moore Dekoron Dekorad Type 1952, Kerite 1977, Rockbestos

RSS-6-104/LE Coaxial, and Champlain Kapton. The list of cables included in

the test program and a summary of the test results from NUREG/CR-5772 are

shown in Attachments 1 and 2, respectively.

In addition, the Sandia National Laboratories (under contract to NRC) has also

tested cables in a separate program to determine the minimum insulation

thickness necessary for installed cable to perform its intended function

should the insulation be damaged during installation, maintenance, or other

activities. During LOCA testing, all 10 of the Okonite-Okolon cable samples

failed. The results of this test program are summarized in NRC Information

Notice 92-81, "Potential Deficiency of Electrical Cables With Bonded Hypalon

Jackets," issued on December 11, 1992.

Discussion

The Sandia National Laboratories test results from NRC-sponsored programs

raise questions with respect to the environmental qualification (EQ) of

certain cables that either failed or exhibited marginal insulation resistance

values. The staff reviewed the test data and noted that cable types

identified as Firewall III, Okonite, Dekorad, and Kapton failed during the

simulated accident exposure, while BIW Bostrad, Rockbestos Coaxial, and Kerite

exhibited marginal insulation resistances. It should be noted that the

insulation resistance of the Rockbestos coaxial cables may be too low to meet

specifications for use in General Atomics radiation monitor circuits, depending on the environment to which the cable will be exposed. The low

insulation resistance of these Rockbestos coaxial cables was the subject of a

10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance," notification by

General Atomics dated March 28, 1989.

As part of the NRC-sponsored aging research program, the Sandia National

Laboratories searched licensee event reports (LERs) to find LERs that might be

related to cable aging. In NUREG/CR-5461, "Aging of Cables, Connections, and

Electrical Penetrations Assemblies Used in Nuclear Power Plants," the Sandia

National Laboratories concluded that although cables are highly reliable

IN 93-33 April 28, 1993 devices under normal plant operating conditions, with no evidence of

significant increases in failure rate with aging, the performance experience

with these components under actual accident conditions is small. The current

LER data provide a very limited database for this purpose. The only

significant data for cables subjected to design-basis events comes from EQ

testing.

Depending on the application, failure of these cables during or following

design-basis events could affect the performance of safety functions in

nuclear power plants. NRC Generic Letter 88-07, "Modified Enforcement Policy

Relating to 10 CFR 50.49, 'Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment

Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants'," provides relevant information

on dealing with potential EQ deficiencies. In Generic Letter 88-07, the NRC

stated, in part:

When a potential deficiency has been identified by the NRC or

licensee in the equipment (i.e., a licensee does not have an

adequate basis to establish qualification), the licensee is

expected to make a prompt determination of operability (i.e., the

system or component is capable of performing its intended design

function), take immediate steps to establish a plan with a

reasonable schedule to correct the deficiency, and have written

justification for continued operation, which will be available for

NRC review.

The licensee may be able to make a finding of operability using

analysis and partial test data to provide reasonable assurance

that the equipment will perform its safety function when called .

upon. In this connection, it must also be shown that subsequent

failure of the equipment, if likely under accident conditions, will not result in significant degradation of any safety function

or provide misleading information to the operator.

lIE 7 U.

IN 93-33 April 28, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Paul Shemanski, NRR

(301) 504-1377 Ann Dummer, NRR

(301) 504-2831 Satish Aggarwal, RES

(301) 492-3829 Attachments:

1. "Cables Included in the Test Program"

2. "Summary of Tested, Failed, and Marginal Insulation

Resistance Cables"

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Attachment 1 IN 93-33 April 28, 1993 CABLES INCLUDED IN THE TEST PROGRAM

Supplier Description

1. Brand Rex 30 mil XLPE Insulation, 60 mil CSPE Jacket, 12 AWG, 3/C,

600 V

2. Rockbestos Firewall III, 30 mil XLPE Insulation, 45 mil Neoprene

Jacket, 12 AWG, 3/C, 600 V

3. Raychem Flamtrol, 30 mil XLPE Insulation, 12 AWG, 1/C, 600 V

4. Samuel Dekoron Polyset, 30 mil XLPO Insulation, 45 mil CSPE Jacket, Moore 12 AWG, 3/C and Drain, 600 V

5. Anaconda Anaconda Y Flame-Guard FR-EP, 30 mil EPR Insulation, 45 mil

CPE Jacket, 12 AWG, 3/C, 600 V

5a. Anaconda* Anaconda Flame-Guard EP, 30 mil EPR Insulation, 15 mil AWG,

Individual CSPE Jackets, 45 mil Overall CSPE Jacket, 12

3/C, 1000 V

6. Okonite Okonite-Okolon, 30 mil EPR Insulation, 15 mil CSPE Jacket,

12 AWG, 1/C, 600 V

7. Samuel Dekoron Dekorad Type 1952, 20 mil EPDM Insulation, 10 milAWG,

Moore Individual CSPE Jackets, 45 mil Overall CSPE Jacket, 16

2/C TSP, 600 V

8. Kerite Kerite 1977, 70 mil FR Insulation, 40 mil FR Jacket, 12 AWG,

1/C, 600 V

8a. Kerite Kerite 1977, 50 mil FR Insulation, 60 mil FR Jacket, 12 AWG,

1/C, 600 V

9. Rockbestos RSS-6-104/LE Coaxial Cable, 22 AWG, 1/C Shielded

10. Rockbestos 30 mil Firewall Silicone Rubber Insulation, Fiberglass

Braided Jacket, 16 AWG, 1/C, 600 V

11. Champlain 5 mil Polyimide (Kapton) Insulation, Unjacketed, 12 AWG, 1/C

12. BIW** Bostrad 7E, 30 mil EPR Insulation, 15 mil Individual CSPE V

Jackets, 60 mil Overall CSPE Jacket, 16 AWG, 2/C TSP, 600

• This cable was only used for the multiconductor samples in the 3-month

chamber.

order of

• • The IR values in BIW Report B915 are approximatelytheoneSandia

observed during National

magnitude higher than the values

Laboratories testing.

Attachment 2 IN 93-33 April 28, 1993 Summary of Tested (T), Failed (F),

and Marginal Insulation Resistance (IR)*

Cables

Pre-aged 20 years 40 years

Cable Type T--F/IR 60 years

T--F/IR T--F/IR

Firewall III M 3--0/0 3--0/0 6--1/0

Brand Rex M 3--0/0 3--0/0 3--0/0

Polyset M 3--0/0 3--0/0 6--0/0

Raychem S 2--0/0 2--0/0 3--0/0

Anaconda M 6--0/0 6--0/0 6--0/0

Anaconda S 1--0/0 1--O/O 1--O/O

BIW Bostrad M 2--0/2 2--0/2 4--0/4 BIW Bostrad S 2--O/l 2--0/2 2--0/2 Okonite S 3--0/0 3--0/0 4--1/0

Dekorad M 4--1/0 4--0/0 4--2/0

Dekorad S 2--0/0 2--0/0 2--0/0

Kerite S 2--O/o 2--0/2 3--0/3 Coaxial S 2--0/2 2--0/2 2--0/2 Silicone S 2--0/0 2--0/0 2--0/0

Kapton** S 2--1/0 2--i/? 2--1/0

Totals 39--2/5 39--1/8 50--5/11

• Minimum IR lower than 2500 ohm-1 00 ft for

1000 ft for control cable, or 10 9 ohm-1000 instrument cable, 500 ohm- ft for coaxial cable.

Failed cables that were pre-aged to 40 and

to accident test. 60 years were damaged prior

? No IR measurements were possible.

S Single conductor cables

M Multiconductor cables

i- Attachment 3 IN 93-33 April 28, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

93-32 Nonconservative Inputs 4/21/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

for Boron Dilution for pressurized water

Event Analysis reactors (PWRs).

93-31 Training of Nurses 04/13/93 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Responsible for the Commission medical

Care of Patients with licensees.

Brachytherapy Implants

93-30 NRC Requirements for 04/12/93 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Evaluation of Wipe Commission medical

Test Results; Cali- licensees.

bration of Count Rate

Survey Instruments

93-29 Problems with the Use 04/12/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

of Unshielded Test Leads for nuclear power reactors.

in Reactor Protection

System Circuitry

93-28 Failure to Consider 04/09/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Loss of DC Bus in the for nuclear power reactors.

Emergency Core Cooling

System Evaluation May

Lead to Nonconservative

Analysis

93-27 Level Instrumentation 04/08/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Inaccuracies Observed for nuclear power reactors.

during Normal Plant

Depressurization

93-26 Grease Solidification 04/07/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Causes Molded Case for nuclear power reactors.

Circuit Breaker

Failure to Close

93-25 Electrical Penetration 04/01/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Assembly Degradation for nuclear power reactors.

OL - Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 93-33

.. 44

?ril 28, 1993 Sage 4 of 4 If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Original signed 6y

Brian K.Grimes

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Paul Shemanski, NRR

(301) 504-1377 Ann Dummer, NRR

(301) 504-2831 Satish Aggarwal, RES

(301) 492-3829 Attachments:

1. "Cables Included in the Test Program"

2. "Summary of Tested, Failed, and Marginal Insulation

Resistance Cables

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

PDLR DSSA: SPLB DSSA: SPLB Tech Ed. OGCB: DORS DE: RES DSSA:NRR

• PShemanski *GHubbard *CMcCracken *RSanders *TJKlim *LShao *AThadanli

4/21/93 4D,1 4/21/93 4/12/93 4/21/93 4/22/93 4/23/93 OGCB:DORS

• GMarcus

4/23/93 Document Name: 93-33.IN

AttL.,%ent 3 IN 93-33 April 28, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

93-32 Nonconservative Inputs 4/21/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

for Boron Dilution for pressurized water

Event Analysis reactors (PWRs).

93-31 Training of Nurses 04/13/93 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Responsible for the Commission medical

Care of Patients with licensees.

Brachytherapy Implants

93-30 NRC Requirements for 04/12/93 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Evaluation of Wipe Commission medical

Test Results; Cali- licensees.

bration of Count Rate

Survey Instruments

93-29 Problems with the Use 04/12/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

of Unshielded Test Leads for nuclear power reactors.

in Reactor Protection

System Circuitry

93-28 Failure to Consider 04/09/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Loss of DC Bus in the for nuclear power reactors.

Emergency Core Cooling

System Evaluation May

Lead to Nonconservative

Analysis

93-27 Level Instrumentation 04/08/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Inaccuracies Observed for nuclear power reactors.

during Normal Plant

Depressurization

Grease Solidification 04/07/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Causes Molded Case for nuclear power reactors.

Circuit Breaker

Failure to Close

Electrical Penetration 04/01/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Assembly Degradation for nuclear power reactors.

OL - Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 93-xx

April , 1993 If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Paul Shemanski, NRR

(301) 504-1377 Ann Dummer, NRR

(301) 504-2831 Satish Aggarwal, RES

(301) 492-3829 Attachments: 1. "Cables Included in the Test Program"

2. "Summary of Tested, Failed, and Marginal Insulation

Resistance Cables"

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

PDLR DSSA:SPLB DSSA:SPLB Tech Ed. OGCB:DORS DE:RES R

• PShemanski *GHubbard *CMcCracken *RSanders *TJKim *LShaQ" AThadani

4/21/93 4/21/93 4/21/93 4/12/93 4/2.1/93 4/2z52 ' 4/z3/93 OGCB:DORS DORS:NRR

GMarcup~yd BGrimes >

4/.z3/9W=' 4/ /93w1 Document Name: \EQ1.INF

- -1 k_,A 93-xx

April , 1993 data provide a very limited database for this purpose. The only significant

data for cables subjected to design-basis events comes from EQ testing.

Depending on the application, failure of these cables during or following

design-basis events could affect the performance of safety functions in

nuclear power plants. NRC Generic Letter 88-07, "Modified Enforcement Policy

Relating to 10 CFR 50.49, 'Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment

Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants,'" provides relevant information

on dealing with potential EQ deficiencies. In Generic Letter 88-07, the NRC

stated, in part:

"When a potential deficiency has been identified by the NRC or

licensee in the equipment (i.e., a licensee does not have an

adequate basis to establish qualification), the licensee is

expected to make a prompt determination of operability (i.e., the

system or component is capable of performing its intended design

function), take immediate steps to establish a plan with a

reasonable schedule to correct the deficiency, and have written

Justification for continued operation, which will be available for

NRC review.

The licensee may be able to make a finding of operability using

analysis and partial test data to provide reasonable assurance

that the equipment will perform its safety function when called

upon. In this connection, it must also be shown that subsequent

failure of the equipment, if likely under accident conditions, will not result in significant degradation of any safety function

or provide misleading information to the operator."

If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Paul Shemanski, NRR

(301) 504-1377 Ann Dummer, NRR

(301) 504-2831 Satish Aggarwal, RES

(301) 492-3829 Attachments: 1. "Cables Included in the Test Program"

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

PDLR DSSA:SPLB DSSA:SPLB Tec:h Ed. OGCB!DORS D X ' DSSA:NRR

PShemanski GHubbard CMcCracken RSatnders TJKim LShao AThadani

4/21/93 4/21/93 4/21/93 4/112/93 4/12/93 4/zJ93 4/ /93 OGCB:DORS DORS:NRR ss \hs

GMarcus BGrimes

4/ /93 4/ /93 Document Name: \EQ1.INF

.- <_> q93-xx

4D~r I ,1993 data provide a very limited database for this purpose. The only significant

data for cables subjected to design-basis events comes from EQ testing.

Depending on the application, failure of these cables during or following

design-basis events could affect the performance of safety functions in

nuclear power plants. NRC Generic Letter 88-07, "Modified Enforcement Policy

Relating to 10 CFR 50.49, 'Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment

Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants," provides relevant information

on dealing with potential EQ deficiencies. In Generic Letter 88-07, the NRC

stated, in part:

"When a potential deficiency has been identified by the NRC or

licensee in the equipment (i.e., a licensee does not have an

adequate basis to establish qualification), the licensee is

expected to make a prompt determination of operability (i.e., the

system or component is capable of performing its intended design

function), take immediate steps to establish a plan with a

reasonable schedule to correct the deficiency, and have written

Justification for continued operation, which will be available for

NRC review.

The licensee may be able to make a finding of operability using

analysis and partial test data to provide reasonable assurance

that the equipment will perform its safety function when called

upon. In this connection, it must also be shown that subsequent

failure of the equipment, if likely under accident conditions, will not result in significant degradation of any safety function

or provide misleading information to the operator."

If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Paul Shemanski, NRR

(301) 504-1377 Ann Dummer, NRR

(301) 504-2831 Satish Aggarwal, RES

(301) 492-3829 Attachments: 1. "Cables Included in the Test Program"

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

PDLR'4 r'l DSS A: (B S SA PLB Tech Ed. OGCB:DORS OGCB:DORS DORS:NRR

PShemawski GHubbard CMcCracken RSanders TJKim GMarcus BGrimes

4/21/93 4/21/93 412.//93 4/ /93 4/ /93 4/ /93 4/ /93 Document Name: G:\IN-PAUL.CJF