Text

Tech Spec Pages, Amendment No. 174 Dated July 12, 2002
	ML022030455
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	07/12/2002
From:	; NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD2
To:	; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
	Download: ML022030455 (202)
	v • d • e

SLC System 3.1.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.7.7 Verify each pump develops a flow rate a 41.2 gpm In accordance at a discharge pressure a 1232 psig. with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.1.7.8 Verify flow through one SLC subsystem from pump 24 months on a into reactor pressure vessel. STAGGERED I

TEST BASIS SR 3.1.7.9 Verify all heat traced piping between storage tank 24 months and pump suction is unblocked.

AND Once within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after pump suction piping temperature is restored within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2 SR 3.1.7.10 Verify sodium pentaborate enrichment is Prior to addition to 2 60.0 atom percent B-10. SLC tank HATCH UNIT 2 3.1-19 Amendment No. 174

SDV Vent and Drain Valves 3.1.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.8.1 ---------------------------- NOTE ------------------------------

Not required to be met on vent and drain valves closed during performance of SR 3.1.8.2.

Verify each SDV vent and drain valve is open.

31 days SR 3.1.8.2 Cycle each SDV vent and drain valve to the fully 92 days closed and fully open position.

SR 3.1.8.3 Verify each SDV vent and drain valve:

24 months I

a. Closes in < 60 seconds after receipt of an actual or simulated scram signal; and

b. Opens when the actual or simulated scram signal is reset.

I HATCH UNIT 2 3.1-23 Amendment No. 174

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.11 Verify Turbine Stop Valve - Closure and 24 months Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is a 28% RTP.

SR 3.3.1.1.12 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months SR 3.3.1.1.13 ---------------------------- NOTES ---------------------------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.

2. For Function 1, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 months SR 3.3.1.1.14 (Not used.)

SR 3.3.1.1.15 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months I SR 3.3.1.1.16 ------ .....-------------------

NOTES ------------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.

2. (Not used.)

3. For Function 5, *n" equals 4 channels for the purpose of determining the STAGGERED TEST BASIS Frequency.

Verify the RPS RESPONSE TIME is within limits. 24 months on a I STAGGERED TEST BASIS (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-5 Amendment No. 174

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.17 Verify OPRM is not bypassed when APRM Simulated Thermal Power is a 25% and 24 months recircujation drive flow is < 60% of rated recirculation drive flow.

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-6 Amendment No. 174

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 2 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. Averaae Power Ranae Monitor (continued)

e. Two-out-of-Four Voter 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 NA SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16

f. OPRM Upscale 3(c) SR 3.3.1.1.1 NA SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.17 1,2

3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 - 1085 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16 1,2

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 > 0 inches Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16

5. Main Steam Isolation Valve 8 F SR 3.3.1.1.9 < 10% closed Closure SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16

6. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 < 1.92 psig SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15

7. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High

a. Resistance Temperature 1,2 G SR 3.3.1.1.9 5 57.15 gallons 2

Detector SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 5(a) 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.9 :5 57.15 gallons SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15

b. Float Switch 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.12 < 57.15 gallons SR 3.3.1.1.15 5(a) 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.12 5 57.15 gallons SR 3.3.1.1.15 (continued)

(a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

(c) Each APRM channel provides inputs to both trip systems.

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-8 Amendment No. 174

SRM Instrumentation 3.3.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.2.5 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and 7 days determination of signal to noise ratio.

SR 3.3.1.2.6 ------------------------------ NOTE ---------------------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after IRMs on Range 2 or below.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and 31 days determination of signal to noise ratio.

SR 3.3.1.2.7 ------------------------------ NOTES -------------------------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.

2. Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after IRMs on Range 2 or below.

- erormCANNELCh----------------------

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 months HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-13 Amendment No. 174

Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued'h REQUIRE ENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1.4 NOT E

.---..---.----- ---------- T E-----------------......--

Neutron detectors are excluded.

Verify the RBM: 24 months I

a. Low Power Range - Upscale Function is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is

29% and < 64% RTP.

b. Intermediate Power Range - Upscale Function is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 64% and < 84% RTP.

c. High Power Range - Upscale Function is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is

> 84% RTP.

SR 3.3.2.1.5 Verify the RWM is not bypassed when THERMAL 24 months POWER is < 10% RTP.

SR 3.3.2.1.6 ----------------------------- NOTE ----------------------------

Not required to be performed until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months SR 3.3.2.1.7 ----------------------------- NOTE ----------------------------

Neutron detectors are excluded.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 months I SR 3.3.2.1.8 Verify control rod sequences input to the RWM are Prior to declaring in conformance with BPWS. RWM OPERABLE following loading of sequence into RWM A

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-18 Amendment No. 174

Feedwater and Main Turbine Trip High Water Level Instrumentation 3.3.2.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

.. NO TE -----------------------------------------------------------

When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided feedwater and main turbine high water level trip capability is maintained.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.2.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

92 days SR 3.3.2.2.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable Value shall be - 55.5 inches. 24 months SR 3.3.2.2.3 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST including valve actuation. 24 months I

i _______________________________________________________________

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-21 Amendment No. 174

PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)

T-CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION I COMPLETION TIME F. As required by Required F.1 Initiate action in Action D.1 and referenced Immediately accordance with in Table 3.3.3.1-1. Specification 5.6.6.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTES ---------------------------------------------------------

1. These SRs apply to each Function in Table 3.3.3.1-1.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the other required channel(s) in the associated Function is OPERABLE.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.1 .1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 31 ddays S R 3.3.3.1.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 months I

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-23 Amendment No. 174

Remote Shutdown System 3.3.3.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NO TE ------------------------------------------------------------

When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each required 31 days instrumentation channel that is normally energized.

SR 3.3.3.2.2 Verify each required control circuit and transfer 24 months switch is capable of performing the intended function.

SR 3.3.3.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION for each 24 months required instrumentation channel.

A HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-26 Amendment No. 174

EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more Functions with B.1 Restore EOC-RPT trip 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months EOC-RPT trip capability not capability.

maintained.

OR AND B.2 Apply the MCPR limit 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months MCPR limit for inoperable for inoperable EOC-RPT not made EOC-RPT as specified applicable. in the COLR.

i i C. Required Action and C.1 Remove the associated associated Completion 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months recirculation pump from Time not met. service.

OR C.2 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months POWER to < 28% RTP.

I ______________ L__________

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

. . NOTE ---------------------------------------------------------

When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains EOC-RPT trip capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

92 days SR 3.3.4.1.2 Verify TSV - Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip 24 months Oil Pressure - Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is Ž 28% RTP.

I (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-28 174 Amendment No.

EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The FRQEC 24 months I Allowable Values shall be:

TSV - Closure: _<10% closed; and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low: > 600 psig.

SR 3.3.4.1.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST 24 months including breaker actuation.

SR 3.3.4.1.5 --------------------------- NOTE ------------------------------

Breaker interruption time may be assumed from the most recent performance of SR 3.3.4.1.6.

Verify the EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 24 months on a is within limits.

STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.4.1.6 Determine RPT breaker interruption time.

60 months L_______________________________

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-29 Amendment No. 174

ATWS-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The 24 months I Allowable Values shall be:

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level ATWS-RPT Level: 2 -73 inches; and

b. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure High: <- 1175 psig.

SR 3.3.4.2.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST 24 months including breaker actuation.

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-32 Amendment No. 174

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

.....-------------------....... NOTES ----------------------------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 3.c and 3.f; and (b) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions other than 3.c and 3.f provided the associated Function or the redundant Function maintains initiation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.5.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.5.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 92 days SR 3.3.5.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 months SR 3.3.5.1.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-37 174 Amendment No.

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 2 of 5)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OR OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED FUNCTION FUNCTION ACTION A.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE CONDITIONS VALUE

2. LPCI System (continued)

c. Reactor Steam Dome 1,2,3 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 Pressure - Low > 390 psig (Injection Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1.2 and SR 3.3.5.1.4 5 476 psig SR 3.3.5.1.5 4(a), 5(a) 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 2 390 psig SR 3.3.5.1.2 and SR 3.3.5.1.4 < 476 psig SR 3.3.5.1.5

d. Reactor Steam Dome 1(c), 2(c), 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 Pressure - Low 3(c) k 335 psig (Recirculation SR 3.3.5.1.2 Discharge Valve SR 3.3.5.1.4 Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1.5

e. Reactor Vessel Shroud 1,2,3 2 SR 3.3.5.1.1 Level - Level 0 a >-202 inches SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5

f. Low Pressure Coolant 1,2,3, 1 per C SR 3.3.5.1.4 Injection Pump Start 4(a), 5(a) pump Time Delay Relay SR 3.3.5.1.5 Pumps A, B, D 9 seconds and 5 15 seconds Pump C I

-51 second

g. Low Pressure Coolant 1,2,3, 1 per Injection Pump E SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 1675 gpm 4(a), 5(a) subsystem SR Discharge Flow 3.3.5.1.2 and Low (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.4 5 2215 gpm SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued)

(a),, When associated subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE.

(c) With associated recirculation pump discharge valve open.

HATCH UNIT 2 'a a*-con , ... .. '=t/I Amendment No. 174

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

.-------------..........--------------------------- NOTES -----------------------------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RCIC Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Function 2; and (b) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 1, 3, and 4 provided the associated Function maintains RClC initiation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.5.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days I.

SR 3.3.5.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 92 days i

SR 3.3.5.2.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 months SR 3.3.5.2.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months I:__________________________

4 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-45 Amendment N!o. 174

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME As required by Required 1.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately Action C.1 and referenced channel to OPERABLE in Table 3.3.6.1-1. status.

OR 1.2 Initiate action to isolate Immediately the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NO TES ----------------------------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Primary Containment Isolation Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.6.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 92 days SR 3.3.6.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 184 days I

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-49 Amendment No. 174

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 months SR 3.3.6.1.6 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months SR 3.3.6.1.7 - - ------------------------- NOTE ------------------------------

Channel sensors are excluded.

Verify the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE 24 months on a TIME is within limits. STAGGERED TEST BASIS HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-50 Amendment No. 174

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 3 of 4)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION CA1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

3. HPCI System Isolation (continued)

g. Suppression Pool Area 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.4 < 16 minutes Temperature - Time Delay 1

SR 3.3.6.1.6 15 seconds I Relays

h. Suppression Pool Area 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 1 !r 42°F Differential Temperature SR 3.3.6.1.2 High SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

i. Emergency Area Cooler 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 1 S 169°F Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

4. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Isolation

a. RCIC Steam Line Flow 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 S 307% rated High SR 3.3.6.1.2 steam flow SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

b. RCIC Steam Supply Line 1,2,3 2 SR F 3.3.6.1.1 a 60 psig Pressure - Low SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

c. RCIC Turbine Exhaust 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 5 20 psig Diaphragm Pressure SR 3.3.6.1.2 High SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

d. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 < 1.92 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

e. RCIC Suppression Pool 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.1 F < 169°F Ambient Area SR 3.3.6.1.2 Temperature - High 1 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

f. Suppression Pool Area 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.4 < 31 minutes Temperature - Time Delay SR 3.3.6.1.6 15 seconds Relays (continued)

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-53 Amendment No. 174

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 ACTIONS I F CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 4 COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2.1 Place the associated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem(s) in operation.

OR C.2.2 Declare associated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months SGT subsystem(s) inoperable.

I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

.------ .----.--..........--------------------.......NO TES ----------------------------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Secondary Containment Isolation Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.6.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.6.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 92 days SR 3.3.6.2.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

24 months S R 3.3.6.2.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.

24 months HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-56 Amendment No. 174

LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY S R 3.3.6.3.3 ---------------------- a--------

NOTE -----------------------------.

Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 during each scheduled outage > 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months when entry is made into primary containment.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for 92 days portions of the channel inside primary containment.

SR 3.3.6.3.4 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

92 days SR 3.3.6.3.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

24 months SR 3.3.6.3.6 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.

24 months HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-60 Amendment No. 174

MCREC System Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

.......-------------------- NOTE .............................................................

When a Control Room Air Inlet Radiation - High channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

W---------------------------------------------- ...... W-------------

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months SR 3.3.7.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 31 days SR 3.3.7.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The 92 days Allowable Value shall be < 1 mr/hour.

SR 3.3.7.1.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months I

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-63 Amendment No. 174

RPS Electric Power Monitoring 3.3.8.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

.--------..........--------------------....... NOTE ------------------------------------------------------------

When an RPS electric power monitoring assembly is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into the associated Conditions and Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the other RPS electric power Required monitoring assembly for the associated power supply maintains trip capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.2.1 NOTE------------------------------.

Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, when in MODE 4 for a 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 184 days SR 3.3.8.2.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The 184 days Allowable Values shall be:

a. Overvoltage _ 132 V, with time delay set to

-<4 seconds.

b. Undervoltage > 108 V, with time delay set to <4 seconds.

c. Underfrequency 2 57 Hz, with time delay set to 5 4 seconds.

SR 3.3.8.2.3 Perform a system functional test. 184 days t _______________________________________________________________

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-69 Amendment No. 174

RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentatior 3.4.5 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND not met.

C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months D. All required leakage D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately detection systems inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE ------------------------------------------------------------

When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the other required leakage detection instrumentation is OPERABLE.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.5.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of required primary 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months containment atmospheric monitoring system.

SR 3.4.5.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of 31 days required leakage detection instrumentation.

SR 3.4.5.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of required 24 months I leakage detection instrumentation.

HATCH UNIT 2 3.4-11 Amendment No. 174

ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.7 Verify the following ECCS pumps develop the In accordance with specified flow rate against a system head the Inservice corresponding to the specified reactor pressure. Testing Program SYSTEM HEAD CORRESPONDING NO. OF TO A REACTOR SYSTEM FLOW RATE PUMPS PRESSURE OF CS 2:4250 gpm 1 a 113 psig LPCI a 17,000 gpm 2 2 20 psig SR 3.5.1.8 -------------. ---.. N OT E -----------------------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.

Verify, with reactor pressure _ 1058 psig and 92 days

ý 920 psig, the HPCI pump can develop a flow rate a 4250 gpm against a system head corresponding to reactor pressure.

SR 3.5.1.9 NO T E ---------------------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.

Verify, with reactor pressure 5 165 psig, the HPCI 24 months I pump can develop a flow rate 2 4250 gpm against a system head corresponding to reactor system pressure.

SR 3.5.1.10 NOTE .............................

Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.

A Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated automatic 24 months I initiation signal.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-4 Amendment No. 174

ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.11 ---------------------------- NOTE ------------------------------

Valve actuation may be excluded.

Verify the ADS actuates on an actual or simulated 24 months automatic initiation signal.

SR 3.5.1.12 Verify each ADS valve relief mode actuator 24 months strokes when manually actuated.

SR 3.5.1.13 ----------------------------- NOTE ---------------------------

ECCS injection/spray initiation instrumentation response time may be assumed from established limits.

Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem 24 months ECCS RESPONSE TIME is within limits. I HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-5 Amendment No. 174

ECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.3 Verify, for each required ECCS injection/spray 31 days subsystem, the piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.

SR 3.5.2.4 -------------------------- NOTE -------------------------------

One LPCI subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.

Verify each required ECCS injection/spray 31 days subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.5.2.5 Verify each required ECCS pump develops the In accordance with specified flow rate against a system head the Inservice corresponding to the specified reactor pressure. Testing Program SYSTEM HEAD CORRESPONDING NO. OF TO A REACTOR SYSTEM FLOW RATE PUMPS PRESSURE OF CS > 4250 gpm 1 113 psig LPCI ! 7700 gpm 1

20 psig SR 3.5.2.6 --------------------------- NOTE ------------------------------

Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.

Verify each required ECCS injection/spray 24 months subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal.

A HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-8 Amendment No. 174

RCIC System 3.5.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.3.1 Verify the RCIC System piping is filled with water 31 days from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.

SR 3.5.3.2 Verify each RCIC System manual, power 31 days operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.5.3.3 ---------------------------- NOTE -----------------------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.

Verify, with reactor pressure -51058 psig and 92 days

> 920 psig, the RCIC pump can develop a flow rate > 400 gpm against a system head corresponding to reactor pressure.

SR 3.5.3.4 ---------------------------- NOTE -----------------------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.

Verify, with reactor pressure - 165 psig, the RCIC 24 months pump can develop a flow rate - 400 gpm against a I system head corresponding to reactor pressure.

SR 3.5.3.5 ---------------------------- NOTE -----------------------------

Vessel injection may be excluded.

Verify the RCIC System actuates on an actual or 24 months simulated automatic initiation signal. I A

HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-10 Amendment No. 174

Primary Containment 3.6.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS tncnntin;rilrI SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continqckrlý SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.1.2 Verify drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure does not decrease at a rate > 0.25 inch 24 months I water gauge per minute tested over a 10 minute AND period at an initial differential pressure of 1 psid.

NOTE---------

Only required after two consecutive tests fail and continues until two consecutive tests pass 9 months HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-2 Amendment No. 174

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is In accordance with

Ž 3 seconds and s 5 seconds. the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each automatic PCIV, excluding EFCVs, 24 months actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.

SR 3.6.1.3.8 Verify each reactor instrumentation line EFCV (of 24 months a representative sample) actuates to restrict flow to within limits.

SR 3.6.1.3.9 Remove and test the explosive squib from each 24 months on a shear isolation valve of the TIP system. STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.6.1.3.10 Verify the combined leakage rate for all In accordance with secondary containment bypass leakage paths is the Primary

-50.009 La when pressurized to > Pa. Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.11 Verify leakage rate through each MSIV is In accordance with

-5100 scfh, and a combined maximum the Primary pathway leakage s 250 scfh for all four main Containment steam lines, when tested at Z28.8 psig. Leakage Rate Testing Program However, the leakage rate acceptance criteria for the first test following discovery of leakage through an MSIV not meeting the 100 scfh limit, shall be s 11.5 scfh for that MSIV.

SR 3.6.1.3.12 Replace the valve seat of each 18 inch purge 24 months valve having a resilient material seat.

SR 3.6.1.3.13 Cycle each 18 inch excess flow isolation damper 24 months to the fully closed and fully open position.

HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-12 Amendment No. 174

LLS Valves 3.6.1.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.6.1 Verify each LLS valve relief mode actuator strokes 24 months when manually actuated.

SR 3.6.1.6.2 ---------------------------- NOTE -----------------------------

Valve actuation may be excluded.

Verify the LLS System actuates on an actual or 24 months simulated automatic initiation signal.

HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-16 Amendment No. 174

Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Associated Completion Time not met. AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.7.1 ----------------------------- NOTES --------------------------

1. Not required to be met for vacuum breakers that are open during Surveillances.

2. Not required to be met for vacuum breakers open when performing their intended function.

Verify each vacuum breaker is closed. 14 days SR 3.6.1.7.2 Perform a functional test of each vacuum breaker. In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.1.7.3 Verify the opening setpoint of each vacuum 24 months breaker is - 0.5 psid. I HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-18 Amendment No. 174

Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.7 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Associated Completion Time not met. AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.7.1 ----------------------------- NOTES --------------------------

1. Not required to be met for vacuum breakers that are open during Surveillances.

2. Not required to be met for vacuum breakers open when performing their intended function.

Verify each vacuum breaker is closed. 14 days SR 3.6.1.7.2 Perform a functional test of each vacuum breaker. In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.1.7.3 Verify the opening setpoint of each vacuum 24 months breaker is -<0.5 psid. I HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-18 Amendment No. 174

w Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.8.1 ----------------------------- NOTE --------------------

Not required to be met for vacuum breakers that are open during Surveillances.

Verify each vacuum breaker is closed.

14 days SR 3.6.1.8.2 Perform a functional test of each required vacuum breaker. 31 days AND Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after any discharge of steam to the suppression chamber from the S/RVs SR 3.6.1.8.3 Verify the opening setpoint of each required 24 months vacuum breaker is - 0.5 psid. I HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-20 Amendment No. 174

Primary Containment Hydrogen Recombiners 3.6.3.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.3.1.1 Perform a system functional test for each primary 24 months containment hydrogen recombiner.

SR 3.6.3.1.2 Visualfy examine each primary containment 24 months hydrogen recombiner enclosure and verify there is no evidence of abnormal conditions.

SR 3.6.3.1.3 Perform a resistance to ground test for each 24 months heater phase. I HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-30 Amendment No. 174

Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND C.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.

I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMFINT-q SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify all secondary containment equipment 31 days hatches are closed and sealed.

SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify each secondary containment access door is 31 days closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit, then at least one door shall be closed.

SR 3.6.4.1.3 NO T E ----------------------------

The number of standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem(s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration.

Verify required SGT subsystem(s) will draw down the secondary containment to > 0.20 inch 24 months on a of vacuum water gauge in _ 120 seconds. I STAGGERED TEST BASIS (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-34 Amendment No. 174

Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.4 ----------------------------- NOTE ------------------------------

The.......

n v QuyoVnl, requireo Tor this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System,' for the given configuration.

Verify required SGT subsystem(s) can maintain 24 months on a Z 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge in the I STAGGERED secondary containment for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months at a flow rate TEST BASIS 5 4000 cfm for each subsystem.

I HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-35 Amendment No. 174

SCIVs 3.6.4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.2.1 NOTES----------------------------.

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2. Not required to be met for SCIVs that are open under administrative controls.

Verify each secondary containment isolation 31 days manual valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.

SR 3.6.4.2.2 Verify the isolation time of each power operated 92 days and each automatic SCIV is within limits.

SR 3.6.4.2.3 Verify each automatic SCIV actuates to the 24 months I isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

I A

HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-38 Amendment No. 174

SGT System 3.6.4.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Two or more required SGT E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately subsystems inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

F. Two or more required SGT F.1 ----------- NOTE -----------

subsystems inoperable LCO 3.0.3 is not during movement of applicable.

irradiated fuel assem blies ------------------------------

in the secondary containment, during CORE Suspend movement of Immediately ALTERATIONS, or during irradiated fuel OPDRVs. assemblies in secondary containment.

AND F.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND F.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.3.1 Operate each required SGT subsystem for 31 days

> 10 continuous hours with heaters operating.

SR 3.6.4.3.2 Perform required SGT filter testing in accordance In accordance with Swith the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). the VFTP SR 3.6.4.3.3 Verify each required SGT subsystem actuates on 24 months an actual or simulated initiation signal.

HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-41 Amendment No. 174

PSW System and UHS 3.7.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.1 Verify the water level in each PSW pump well of 14 days the intake structure is 2 60.7 ft mean sea level (MSL). AND 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months when water level is

-<61.7 ft MSL SR 3.7.2.2 ----------------------------- NOTE -----------------------------

Isolation of flow to individual components or systems does not render PSW System inoperable.

Verify each PSW subsystem manual, power 31 days operated, and automatic valve in the flow paths servicing safety related systems or components, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.2.3 Verify each PSW subsystem actuates on an actual 24 months or simulated initiation signal.

HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-5 Amendment No. 174

DG 1B SSW System 3.7.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 Verify each DG 1B SSW System manual, power 31 days operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.3.2 Verify the DG 1 B SSW System pump starts 24 months I automatically when DG 1 B starts and energizes the respective bus.

HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-7 Amendment No. 174

MCREC System 3.7.4 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Two MCREC subsystems ------------------ NOTE -----------------

inoperable during LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

movement of irradiated fuel ------------...............-----------

assemblies in the secondary containment, F.1 Suspend movement of Immediately during CORE irradiated fuel ALTERATIONS, or during assemblies in the OPDRVs. secondary containment.

AND F.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND F.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.1 Operate each MCREC subsystem ? 15 minutes. 31 days SR 3.7.4.2 Perform required MCREC filter testing in In accordance with accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing the VFTP Program (VFTP).

SR 3.7.4.3 Verify each MCREC subsystem actuates on an 24 months actual or simulated initiation signal. I (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-10 Amendment No. 174

MCREC System 3.7.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.4 Verify each MCREC subsystem can maintain a 24 months on a positive pressure of a 0.1 inches water gauge STAGGERED I relative to the turbine building during the TEST BASIS pressurization mode of operation at a subsystem flow rate of :- 2750 cfm and an outside air flow rate 5 400 cfm.

HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-11 Amendment No. 174

Control Room AC System 3.7.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.1 Verify each control room AC subsystem has the 24 months I capability to remove the assumed heat load.

0 HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-15 Amendment No. 174

Main Turbine Bypass System 3.7.7 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Main Turbine Bypass System LCO 3.7.7 The Main Turbine Bypass System shall be OPERABLE.

OR LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR),"

limits for an inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System, as specified in the COLR, are made applicable.

APPLICABILITY: THERMAL POWER > 25% RTP.

ACTIONS I ----------

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the LCO A.1 Satisfy the requirements not met. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months of the LCO.

B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL associated Completion 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months POWER to < 25% RTP.

Time not met.

L SURVEILLANCE REOUIRFMFNT~q SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENT.0, SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.7.1 Verify one complete cycle of each main turbine 31 days bypass valve.

S R 3.7.7.2 Perform a system functional test.

24 months S R 3.7.7.3 Verify the TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME is within limits. 24 months I-HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-18 Amendment No. 174

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.6 ---------------------------- NOTE ------------------------------

This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Verify automatic and manual transfer of unit power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the 24 months I alternate offsite circuit.

SR 3.8.1.7 ---------------------------- NOTES ----------------------------

1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2, except for the swing DG.

For the swing DG, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2 using the Unit 2 controls. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

2. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.

Verify each DG rejects a load greater than or 24 months equal to its associated single largest post-accident load, and:

a. Following load rejection, the frequency is

-<65.5 Hz; and

b. Within 3 seconds following load rejection, the voltage is > 3740 V and < 4580 V.

(continued)

I HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-10 Amendment No. 174

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.8 NO T ES

1. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2, except for the swing DG.

For the swing DG, this Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2 using the Unit 2 controls. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

2. If grid conditions do not permit, the power factor limit is not required to be met. Under this condition, the power factor shall be maintained as close to the limit as practicable.

3. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.

Verify each DG operating at a power factor _ 0.88 24 months does not trip and voltage is maintained _ 4800 V I during and following a load rejection of a 2775 kW.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-11 Amendment No. 174

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.9 ------------------- NOTES ----------------------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.

2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Verify on an actual or simulated loss of offsite 24 months power signal:

a. De-energization of emergency buses;

b. Load shedding from emergency buses; and

c. DG auto-starts from standby condition and:

1. Energizes permanently connected loads in - 12 seconds,

2. Energizes auto-connected shutdown loads through automatic load sequence timing devices,

3. Maintains steady state voltage

> 3740 V and < 4243 V,

4. Maintains steady state frequency

> 58.8 Hz and 5 61.2 Hz, and

5. Supplies permanently connected and auto-connected shutdown loads for a 5 minutes.

(continued)

A HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-12 Amendment No. 174

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY I

SR 3.8.1.10 NOTES ---------------------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.

2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Verify on an actual or simulated Emergency Core 24 months Cooling System (ECCS) initiation signal each DG auto-starts from standby condition and:

a. In 5 12 seconds after auto-start achieves voltage a 3740 V, and after steady state conditions are reached, maintains voltage

? 3740 V and5_4243 V;

b. In _512 seconds after auto-start achieves frequency ? 58.8 Hz, and after steady state conditions are reached, maintains frequency 2 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz; and

c. Operates for a 5 minutes.

I ______________________________

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-13 Amendment No. 174

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.11 ---------------- NO TE -------

T E-----------

This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Verify each DG's automatic trips are bypassed on 24 months I actual or simulated loss of voltage signal on the emergency bus concurrent with an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal except:

a. Engine overspeed;

b. Generator differential current; and C. Low lube oil pressure.

I.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-14 Amendment No. 174

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.12 --------------------------- NOTES -----------------------------

1. Momentary transients outside the load and power factor ranges do not invalidate this test.

2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2, unless the other two DGs are OPERABLE. If either of the other two DGs becomes inoperable, this Surveillance shall be suspended. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

3. If grid conditions do not permit, the power factor limit is not required to be met. Under this condition, the power factor shall be maintained as close to the limit as practicable.

4. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.

Verify each DG operating at a power factor < 0.88 24 months operates for > 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s:

a. For ? 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months loaded > 3000 kW; and

b. For the remaining hours of the test loaded

> 2775 kW and

2825 kW.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-15 Amendment No. 174

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.13 NOTES---------------------------.

1. This Surveillance shall be performed within 5 minutes of shutting down the DG after the DG has operated > 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months loaded

> 2565 kW. Momentary transients outside of load range do not invalidate this test.

2. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.

3. For the swing DG, a single test at the specified Frequency will satisfy this Surveillance for both units.

Verify each DG starts and achieves, in 24 months

-512 seconds, voltage a 3740 V and frequency

ý 58.8 Hz; and after steady state conditions are reached, maintains voltage 2 3740 V and s 4243 V and frequency a 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz.

+

SR 3.8.1.14 NOTE -------------------------------

This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Verify each DG: 24 months

a. Synchronizes with offsite power source while loaded with emergency loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power;

b. Transfers loads to offsite power source; and

c. Returns to ready-to-load operation.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-16 Amendment No. 174

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.15 ------------------ --------- NOTE O.-

This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Verify with a DG operating in test mode and connected to its bus, an actual or simulated ECCS 24 months I initiation signal overrides the test mode by:

a. Returning DG to ready-to-load operation; and

b. Automatically energizing the emergency load from offsite power.

SR 3.8.1.16 ----------------------------- NOTE -----------------------------

This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Verify interval between each sequenced load block 24 months is within +/- 10% of design interval for each load sequence timing device.

(continued)

I HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-17 Amendment No. 174

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continudl SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.17 .......---- NOTES --------------------

1. All DG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.

2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Verify, on an actual or simulated loss of offsite 24 months power signal in conjunction with an actual or I simulated ECCS initiation signal:

a. De-energization of emergency buses;

b. Load shedding from emergency buses; and

c. DG auto-starts from standby condition and:

1. Energizes permanently connected loads in < 12 seconds,

2. Energizes auto-connected emergency loads through automatic load sequence timing devices,

3. Achieves steady state voltage

> 3740 V and < 4243 V,

4. Achieves steady state frequency 2 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz, and

5. Supplies permanently connected and auto-connected emergency loads for a 5 minutes.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-18 174 Amendment No.

- a Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.3.1 Verify each Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil storage 31 days tank contains > 33,320 gallons of fuel.

SR 3.8.3.2 Verify each required DG lube oil inventory is 31 days

> 400 gallons.

SR 3.8.3.3 Verify fuel oil total particulate concentration of In accordance with Unit 2 and swing DG stored fuel oil are tested in the Diesel Fuel Oil accordance with, and maintained within the limits Testing Program of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.

SR 3.8.3.4 Verify each required DG air start receiver pressure 31 days is > 225 psig.

SR 3.8.3.5 Verify each Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil transfer 31 days subsystem operates to automatically transfer fuel oil from the storage tank to the day tank.

SR 3.8.3.6 Check for and remove accumulated water from 184 days each Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil storage tank.

SR 3.8.3.7 Verify each Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil transfer 24 months subsystem operates to manually transfer fuel from the associated fuel oil storage tank to the day tank of each required DG.

A HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-25 Amendment No. 174

DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

........------------------------------------- NOTE -----------------------------------------------------------

SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8 are applicable only to the Unit 2 DC sources. SR 3.8.4.9 is applicable only to the Unit 1 DC sources.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.1 Verify battery terminal voltage is ?- 125 V on float 7 days charge.

SR 3.8.4.2 Verify no visible corrosion at battery terminals and 92 days connectors.

OR Verify battery connection resistance is within limits.

SR 3.8.4.3 Verify battery cells, cell plates, and racks show no 24 months visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.

SR 3.8.4.4 Remove visible corrosion, and verify battery cell to 24 months I cell and terminal connections are coated with anti-corrosion material.

SR 3.8.4.5 Verify battery connection resistance is within 24 months limits.

SR 3.8.4.6 Verify each required battery charger supplies 24 months Z 400 amps for station service subsystems, and

ý 100 amps for DG subsystems at a 129 V for a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

(continued)

I HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-28 Amendment No. 174

DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.7 ---.-.-----------.----.NO T E S ------.

1. The modified performance discharge test in SR 3.8.4.8 may be performed in lieu of the service test in SR 3.8.4.7.

2. This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3, except for the swing DG battery. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Verify battery capacity is adequate to supply, and 24 months maintain in OPERABLE status, the required emergency loads for the design duty cycle when subjected to a battery service test.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 Amendment No. 174 3.8-29

Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals (continued) 5.5.5 Component Cyclic or Transient Limit This program provides controls to track FSAR Section 5.2, cyclic and transient occurrences, to ensure that reactor coolant pressure boundary components are maintained within the design limits.

5.5.6 Inservice Testing Program This program provides controls for inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components including applicable supports.

a. Testing frequencies specified in Section Xl of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda are as follows:

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and Applicable Required Frequencies Addenda Terminology for for Performing Inservice Inservice Testina Activities Testina Activities Weekly At least once per 7 days Monthly At least once per 31 days Quarterly or every 3 months At least once per 92 days Semiannually or every 6 months At least once per 184 days Yearly or annually At least once per 366 days

b. The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are applicable to the frequencies for performing inservice testing activities;

c. The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to inservice testing activities; and

d. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be construed to supersede the requirements of any Technical Specification.

5.5.7 Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP)

The VFTP will establish the required testing of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) filter ventilation systems at the frequencies specified in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Sections C.5.c and C.5.d, or: 1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, 2) following painting, fire or I

chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system, or 3) after every 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of charcoal adsorber operation.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 5.0-10 Amendment No. 174

SLC System B 3.1.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.7.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS to ensure that no significant boron precipitation occurred. The 31 day Frequency of this Surveillance is appropriate because of the relatively slow variation of boron concentration between surveillances.

SR 3.1.7.7 Demonstrating that each SLC System pump develops a flow rate ? 41.2 gpm at a discharge pressure a 1232 psig ensures that pump performance has not degraded during the fuel cycle. This minimum pump flow rate requirement ensures that, when combined with the sodium pentaborate solution concentration requirements, the rate of negative reactivity insertion from the SLC System will adequately compensate for the positive reactivity effects encountered during power reduction, cooldown of the moderator, and xenon decay.

This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance. Such inservice inspections confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this Surveillance is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.1.7.8 and SR 3.1.7.9 These Surveillances ensure that there is a functioning flow path from the sodium pentaborate solution storage tank to the RPV, including the firing of an explosive valve. The replacement charge for the explosive valve shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of that batch successfully fired. The pump and explosive valve tested should be alternated such that both complete flow paths are tested every 48 months at alternating 24 month intervals. The Surveillance may be performed in separate steps to prevent injecting boron into the RPV. An acceptable method for verifying flow from the pump to the RPV is to pump demineralized water from a test tank through one SLC subsystem and into the RPV. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

The 24 month Frequency of SR 3.1.7.8 is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 4.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.1-39 R.evisi. 35

SLC System B 3.1.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.7.8 and SR 3.1.7.9 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Demonstrating that all heat traced piping between the sodium pentaborate solution storage tank and the suction inlet to the injection pumps is unblocked ensures that there is a functioning flow path for injecting the sodium pentaborate solution. An acceptable method for verifying that the suction piping is unblocked is to pump from the storage tank to the test tank.

The 24 month Frequency is acceptable since there is a low probability that the subject piping will be blocked due to precipitation of the boron from solution in the heat traced piping. This is especially true in light of the temperature verification of this piping required by SR 3.1.7.3.

However, if, in performing SR 3.1.7.3, it is determined that the temperature of this piping has fallen below the specified minimum, SR 3.1.7.9 must be performed once within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after the piping temperature is restored to within the Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-2.

The 24 month Frequency of SR 3.1.7.9 is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 4.

SR 3.1.7.10 Enriched sodium pentaborate solution is made by mixing granular, enriched sodium pentaborate with water. Isotopic tests on the granular sodium pentaborate to verify the actual B-10 enrichment must be performed prior to addition to the SLC tank in order to ensure that the proper B-10 atom percentage is being used.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.62.

2. FSAR, Section 4.2.3.4.3.

3. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

4. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment. 174. I HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.1-40 Revision 35

SDV Vent and Drain Valves B 3.1.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.8.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS position ensures that the SDV vent and drain valves will perform their intended functions during normal operation. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that the valves are in the correct position.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, which ensure correct valve positions.

SR 3.1.8.2 During a scram, the SDV vent and drain valves should close to contain the reactor water discharged to the SDV piping. Cycling each valve through its complete range of motion (closed and open) ensures that the valve will function properly during a scram. The 92 day Frequency is based on operating experience and takes into account the level of redundancy in the system design.

SR 3.1.8.3 SR 3.1.8.3 is an integrated test of the SDV vent and drain valves to verify total system performance. After receipt of a simulated or actual scram signal, the closure of the SDV vent and drain valves is verified.

The closure time of 60 seconds after receipt of a scram signal is based on the bounding leakage case evaluated in the accident analysis (Ref. 1). Similarly, after receipt of a simulated or actual scram reset signal, the opening of the SDV vent and drain valves is verified. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.1.1 and the scram time testing of control rods in LCO 3.1.3 overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 5.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.1-44 Rev'isicr 35

a SDV Vent and Drain Valves B 3.1.8 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 4.2.3.2.2.3.

2. 10 CFR 100.

3. NUREG-0803, "Generic Safety Evaluation Report Regarding Integrity of BWR Scram System Piping," August 1981.

4. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment. 174. I B 3.1-45 Re,,isian 35 HATCH UNIT 2

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 8. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed APPLICABILITY and, along with the actions of the End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) System, ensures that the MCPR SL is not exceeded.

Turbine Stop Valve - Closure signals are initiated from position switches located on each of the four TSVs. Two independent position switches are associated with each stop valve. One of the two switches provides input to RPS trip system A; the other, to RPS trip system B. Thus, each RPS trip system receives an input from four Turbine Stop Valve - Closure channels, each consisting of one position switch. The logic for the Turbine Stop Valve - Closure Function is such that three or more TSVs must be closed to produce a scram. In addition, certain combinations of two valves closed will result in a half-scram. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER > 28% RTP. This is normally accomplished automatically by pressure switches sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, opening of the turbine bypass valves may affect this Function.

The Turbine Stop Valve - Closure Allowable Value is selected to be high enough to detect imminent TSV closure, thereby reducing the severity of the subsequent pressure transient.

Eight channels of Turbine Stop Valve - Closure Function, with four channels in each trip system, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function if the TSVs should close. This Function is required, consistent with analysis assumptions, whenever THERMAL POWER is a 28% RTP. This Function is not required when THERMAL POWER is < 28% RTP since the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High and the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux - High Functions are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins.

9. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Fast closure of the TCVs results in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited. Therefore, a reactor scram is initiated on TCV fast closure in anticipation of the transients that would result from the closure of these valves. The Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Function is the primary scram signal for the generator load rejection event analyzed in Reference 2. For this event, the reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-16 Peiic 35

,a RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 9. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY absorbed and, along with the actions of the EOC-RPT System, ensures that the MCPR SL is not exceeded.

Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low signals are initiated by the electrohydraulic control (EHC) fluid pressure at each control valve. One pressure switch is associated with each control valve, and the signal from each switch is assigned to a separate RPS logic channel. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER 2 28% RTP. This is normally accomplished automatically by pressure switches sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, opening of the turbine bypass valves may affect this Function.

The Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Allowable Value is selected high enough to detect imminent TCV fast closure.

Four channels of Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Function with two channels in each trip system arranged in a one-out-of-two logic are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. This Function is required, consistent with the analysis assumptions, whenever THERMAL POWER is

> 28% RTP. This Function is not required when THERMAL POWER is < 28% RTP, since the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure High and the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux - High Functions are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins.

10. Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position The Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position Function provides signals, via the manual scram logic channels, to each of the four RPS logic channels, which are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation channels and provide manual reactor trip capability.

This Function was not specifically credited in the accident analysis, but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

The reactor mode switch is a single switch with four channels, each of which provides input into one of the RPS logic channels.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-17 Pevisian 35

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.12 REQUIREMENTS (continued) A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.9 is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 9.

The 24 month Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.12 is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.12 is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 20.

SR 3.3.1.1.10 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. For the APRM Functions, this test supplements the automatic self-test functions that operate continuously in the APRM and voter channels. The APRM CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST covers the APRM channels (including recirculation flow processing applicable to Function 2.b only), the two-out-of-four voter channels, and the interface connections to the RPS trip systems from the voter channels. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 184 day Frequency of SR 3.1.1.1.10 is based on the reliability analysis of References 13 and 17. (NOTE: The actual voting logic of the two-out-of-four voter channels is tested as part of SR 3.3.1.1.15.)

For Function 2.a, a Note that requires this SR to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 is provided. Testing of the MODE 2 APRM Function cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers or lifted leads. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.

SR 3.3.1.1.11 This SR ensures that scrams initiated from the Turbine Stop Valve Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is z 28% RTP. This involves calibration of the bypass (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-27 Revisian 35

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.11 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS channels. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint. Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from turbine first stage pressure), the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed during the calibration at THERMAL POWER;> 28% RTP to ensure that the calibration is valid.

Ifany bypass channel's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the Functions are bypassed at ? 28% RTP, either due to open main turbine bypass valve(s) or other reasons), then the affected Turbine Stop Valve - Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions are considered inoperable. Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass). If placed in the nonbypass condition (Turbine Stop Valve - Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions are enabled), this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history, drift of the associated instrumentation, and Reference 20.

SR 3.3.1.1.13 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. For MSIV - Closure, SDV Water Level - High (Float Switch), and TSV - Closure Functions, this SR also includes a physical inspection and actuation of the switches. For the APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High Function, this SR also includes calibrating the associated recirculation loop flow channel.

Note 1 states that neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal.

Changes in neutron detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the 7 day calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.2) and the 1000 effective full power hours LPRM calibration against the TIPs (SR 3.3.1.1.8). A second Note is provided that requires the IRM SRs to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1.

Testing of the MODE 2 IRM Functions cannot be performed in (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-28 Pev-s-ian 35

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.13 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads or movable links. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.

Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history, drift analysis of the associated instrumentation (if applicable),

and Reference 20.

SR 3.3.1.1.14 (Not used.)

SR 3.3.1.1.15 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The functional testing of control rods (LCO 3.1.3), and SDV vent and drain valves (LCO 3.1.8), overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 20.

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST for APRM Function 2.e simulates APRM and OPRM trip conditions at the two-out-of-four voter channel inputs to check all combinations of two tripped inputs to the two-out-of-four logic in the voter channels and APRM related redundant RPS relays.

SR 3.3.1.1.16 This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. This test may be performed in one measurement or in overlapping segments, with verification that all components are (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-29 Revisian 35

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.16 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS tested. The RPS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 10.

RPS RESPONSE TIME for APRM two-out-of-four Voter Function 2.e includes the output relays of the voter and the associated RPS relays and contactors. (The digital portions of the APRM and two-out-of-four voter channels are excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because self-testing and calibration check the time base of the digital electronics.) Confirmation of the time base is adequate to assure required response times are met. Neutron detectors are excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because the principles of detector operation virtually ensure an instantaneous response time.

Note 1 allows neutron detectors to be excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because the principles of detector operation virtually ensure an instantaneous response time.

RPS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on an 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Note 3 requires STAGGERED TEST BASIS Frequency to be determined based on four channels per trip system, in lieu of the eight channels specified in Table 3.3.1.1-1 for the Main Steam Line Isolation Valve - Closure Function. This Frequency is based on the logic interrelationships of the various channels required to produce an RPS scram signal. This Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences. The 24 month Frequency, on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, is also based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 20.

Note: SR 3.3.1.1.16 for Function 2.e confirms the response time of that function, and also confirms the response time of loop components common to APRM - Two Out of Four Voter logic and other RPS loops.

SR 3.3.1.1.17 This SR ensures that scrams initiated from OPRM Upscale Function 2.f will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER, as indicated by APRM Simulated Thermal Power, is

> 25% RTP and core flow, as indicated by recirculation drive flow, is

< 60% rated core flow. This normally involves confirming the bypass setpoints. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint. The actual (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-30 Pevisicia 35

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.17 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Surveillance ensures that the OPRM Upscale Function is enabled (not bypassed) for the correct values of APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation drive flow. Other Surveillances ensure that the APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation flow properly correlate with THERMAL POWER and core flow, respectively.

If any bypass setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the OPRM Upscale Function is bypassed when APRM Simulated Thermal Power is Z 25%

and recirculation drive flow is < 60% rated), then the affected channel is considered inoperable for the OPRM Upscale Function.

Alternatively, the bypass setpoint may be adjusted to place the channel in a conservative condition (unbypass). If placed in the unbypass condition, this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 20.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 7.2.

2. FSAR, Chapter 15.

3. FSAR, Section 6.3.3.

4. FSAR, Supplement 5A.

5. FSAR, Section 15.1.12.

6. NEDO-23842, "Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal in the Startup Range," April 18, 1978.

7. FSAR, Section 15.1.38.

8. P. Check (NRC) letter to G. Lainas (NRC), "BWR Scram Discharge System Safety Evaluation," December 1, 1980.

9. NEDO-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System," March 1988.

10. Technical Requirements Manual.

11. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

".1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-31 Re-vi*s-ian 35

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES REFERENCES 12. NEDO-32291, "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected (continued) Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1994.

13. NEDC-3241OP-A, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option II Stability Trip Function," October 1995.

14. NEDO-31960-A, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," November 1995.

15. NEDO-31960-A, Supplement 1, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology,"

November 1995.

16. NEDO-32465-A, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology and Reload Applications," March 1996.

17. NEDO-3241OP-A, Supplement 1, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function,"

November 1997.

18. Letter, L.A. England (BWROG) to M.J. Virgilio, "BWR Owners' Group Guidelines for Stability Interim Corrective Action,"

June 6, 1994.

19. NEDO-32291 -A, Supplement 1, "System Analyses for the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1999.

20. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment. 174.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-32 Pk-dsian 35

SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.2.5 and SR 3.3.1.2.6 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Determination of the signal to noise ratio also ensures that the detectors are inserted to an acceptable operating level. In a fully withdrawn condition, the detectors are sufficiently removed from the fueled region of the core to essentially eliminate neutrons from reaching the detector. Any count rate obtained while the detectors are fully withdrawn is assumed to be "noise" only.

The Note to the SR 3.3.1.2.6 allows the Surveillance to be delayed until entry into the specified condition of the Applicability (THERMAL POWER decreased to IRM Range 2 or below). The SR must be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after IRMs are on Range 2 or below. The allowance to enter the Applicability with the 31 day Frequency not met is reasonable, based on the limited time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed after entering the Applicability and the inability to perform the Surveillance while at higher power levels.

Although the Surveillance could be performed while on IRM Range 3, the plant would not be expected to maintain steady state operation at this power level. In this event, the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency is reasonable, based on the SRMs being otherwise verified to be OPERABLE (i.e.,

satisfactorily performing the CHANNEL CHECK) and the time required to perform the Surveillances.

SR 3.3.1.2.7 Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at a Frequency of 24 months verifies the performance of the SRM detectors and associated circuitry. The Frequency considers the plant conditions required to perform the test, the ease of performing the test, and the likelihood of a change in the system or component status. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 2. The neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION (Note 1) because they cannot readily be adjusted. The detectors are fission chambers that are designed to have a relatively constant sensitivity over the range and with an accuracy specified for a fixed useful life.

Note 2 to the Surveillance allows the Surveillance to be delayed until entry into the specified condition of the Applicability. The SR must be performed in MODE 2 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of entering MODE 2 with IRMs on Range 2 or below. The allowance to enter the Applicability with the 24 month Frequency not met is reasonable, based on the limited time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed after entering the Applicability and the inability to perform the Surveillance while at higher power levels.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-40 Revision 35

SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.2.7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Although the Surveillance could be performed while on IRM Range 3, the plant would not be expected to maintain steady state operation at this power level. In this event, the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency is reasonable, based on the SRMs being otherwise verified to be OPERABLE (i.e.,

satisfactorily performing the CHANNEL CHECK) and the time required to perform the Surveillances.

REFERENCES 1. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 125, April 30, 1993.

2. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment- 35. I HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-41 Pevisicn 35

Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES BACKGROUND been normalized. The Inoperable trip will occur during the nulling (continued) (normalization) sequence, if: the RBM channel fails to null, too few LPRM inputs are available, a module is not plugged in, or the function switch is moved to any position other than "Operate."

The purpose of the RWM is to control rod patterns during startup and shutdown, such that only specified control rod sequences and relative positions are allowed over the operating range from all control rods inserted to 10% RTP. The sequences effectively limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase during a CRDA. Prescribed control rod sequences are stored in the RWM, which will initiate control rod withdrawal and insert blocks when the actual sequence deviates beyond allowances from the stored sequence. The RWM determines the actual sequence based position indication for each control rod. The RWM also uses APRM power signals to determine when the reactor power is above the preset power level at which the RWM is automatically bypassed (Ref. 2). The RWM is a single channel system that provides input into both RMCS rod block circuits.

With the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, a control rod withdrawal block is applied to all control rods to ensure that the shutdown condition is maintained. This Function prevents inadvertent criticality as the result of a control rod withdrawal during MODE 3 or 4, or during MODE 5 when the reactor mode switch is required to be in the shutdown position. The reactor mode switch has two channels, each inputting into a separate RMCS rod block circuit. A rod block in either RMCS circuit will provide a control rod block to all control rods.

1. Rod Block Monitor The RBM is designed to prevent violation of the MCPR SL and the cladding 1% plastic strain fuel design limit that may result from a single control rod withdrawal error (RWE) event. The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the RWE event are summarized in Reference 3. A statistical analysis of RWE events was performed to determine the RBM response for both channels for each event. From these responses, the fuel thermal performance as a function of RBM Allowable Value was determined. The Allowable Values are chosen as a function of power level. Based on the specified Allowable Values, operating limits are established.

The RBM Function satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 10).

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-43 Revision 35

Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.1.2 and SR 3.3.2.1.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed for the RWM to ensure that the entire system will perform the intended function. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the RWM is performed by attempting to withdraw a control rod not in compliance with the prescribed sequence and verifying a control rod block occurs. This test is performed as soon as possible after the applicable conditions are entered. As noted in the SRs, SR 3.3.2.1.2 is not required to be performed until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after any control rod is withdrawn at

< 10% RTP in MODE 2, and SR 3.3.2.1.3 is not required to be performed until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after THERMAL POWER is < 10% RTP in MODE 1. This allows entry into MODE 2 (and if entered during a shutdown, concurrent power reduction to < 10% RTP) for SR 3.3.2.1.2 and THERMAL POWER reduction to < 10% RTP in MODE 1 for SR 3.3.2.1.3 to perform the required Surveillances if the 92 day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months allowance is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SRs. The 92 day Frequencies are based on reliability analysis (Ref. 8).

SR 3.3.2.1.4 The RBM setpoints are automatically varied as a function of power.

Three Allowable Values are specified in Table 3.3.2.1-1, each within a specific power range. The power at which the control rod block Allowable Values automatically change are based on the APRM signal's input to each RBM channel. Below the minimum power setpoint, the RBM is automatically bypassed. These power Allowable Values must be verified periodically to be less than or equal to the specified values. If any power range setpoint is nonconservative, then the affected RBM channel is considered inoperable. Alternatively, the power range channel can be placed in the conservative condition (i.e.,

enabling the proper RBM setpoint). If placed in this condition, the SR is met and the RBM channel is not considered inoperable. As noted, neutron detectors are excluded from the Surveillance because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal. Neutron detectors are adequately tested in SR 3.3.1.1.2 and SR 3.3.1.1.8. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 12.

(continued)

Revisicn 35 B 3.3-49 UNIT 2 HATCH UNIT HATCH 2 B 3.3-49 R~misicri 35

,* -U Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.1.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The RWM is automatically bypassed when power is above a specified value. The power level is determined from APRM power signals. The I automatic bypass setpoint must be verified periodically to be

> 10% RTP. If the RWM low power setpoint is nonconservative, then the RWM is considered inoperable. Alternately, the low power setpoint channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass). If placed in the nonbypassed condition, the SR is met and the RWM is not considered inoperable. The 24 month Frequency is based on Reference 12.

SR 3.3.2.1.6 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed for the Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position Function to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position Function is performed by attempting to withdraw any control rod with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position and verifying a control rod block occurs.

As noted in the SR, the Surveillance is not required to be performed until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, since testing of this interlock with the reactor mode switch in any other position cannot be performed without using jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links. This allows entry into MODES 3 and 4 if the 18 month Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months allowance is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 12.

SR 3.3.2.1.7 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

A (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-50 Revisicn 35

Aa Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.1.7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

As noted, neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal.

Neutron detectors are adequately tested in SR 3.3.1.1.8.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 12.

SR 3.3.2.1.8 The RWM will only enforce the proper control rod sequence if the rod sequence is properly input into the RWM computer. This SR ensures that the proper sequence is loaded into the RWM so that it can perform its intended function. The Surveillance is performed once prior to declaring RWM OPERABLE following loading of sequence into RWM, since this is when rod sequence input errors are possible.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 7.6.2.2.5.

2. FSAR, Section 7.6.8.2.6.

3. NEDC-30474-P, "Average Power Range Monitor, Rod Block Monitor, and Technical Specification Improvements (ARTS)

Program for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plants," December 1983.

4. NEDE-2401 1-P-A-US, "General Electrical Standard Application for Reload Fuel," Supplement for United States, (revision specified in the COLR).

5. Letter from T.A. Pickens (BWROG) to G.C. Lainas (NRC),

"A mendment 17 to General Electric Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A," BWROG-8644, August 15, 1986.

6. NEDO-21231, "Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence,"

January 1977.

"A A (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-51 Pev-ision 35

Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES REFERENCES 7. NRC SER, "Acceptance of Referencing of Licensing Topical (continued) Report NEDE-2401 1-P-A," "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, Revision 8, Amendment 17,"

December 27,1987.

8. NEDC-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Control Rod Block Instrumentation,"

October 1988.

9. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes To Surveillance Test Intervals And Allowed Out-Of-Service Times For Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.

10. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

11. NEDC-3241OP-A, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM)

Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function," October 1995.

12. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment. 174.

I

,1$

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-52 Pevisicn 35

Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation B 3.3.2.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly REQUIREMENTS reduce the probability that the feedwater pump turbines and main (continued) turbine will trip when necessary.

SR 3.3.2.2.1 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function.

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

Due to the high turbine trip and reactor scram potential incurred when valving reactor water level differential pressure transmitters into and out of service, it is acceptable to perform the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for this logic from the input of the alarm unit.

This is consistent with the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST definition requiring the signal to be injected "as close to the sensor as practicable." Additionally, due to the physical location of the turbine trip relays and their close proximity to other sensitive equipment, accessibility is extremely limited. Verification of relay actuation and associated relay contact status by accessing the relay introduces a high potential for turbine trip and reactor scram. One contact from each turbine trip relay energizes an amber light indicating relay actuation. Therefore, it is acceptable to terminate the test at the turbine trip relay, utilizing light indication for relay status. These allowances are only acceptable if the CHANNEL CALIBRATION and the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST overlap both the initiation and termination point of this CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST such that the entire trip logic is tested.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on reliability analysis (Ref. 2).

SR 3.3.2.2.2 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history, drift analysis of the associated instrumentation, and Reference 4.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-57 Revisicn 35

Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation B 3.3.2.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.2.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the feedwater and main turbine valves is included as part of this Surveillance and overlaps the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. Therefore, if a valve is incapable of operating, the associated instrumentation channels would also be inoperable. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 4.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 15.1.7.

2. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-Of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.

3. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

4. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment ,174.

.1 HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-58 9*-=visian 35

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status REQUIREMENTS or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. The (continued) Note is based upon a NRC Safety Evaluation Report (Ref. 2) which concluded that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability of properly monitoring post accident parameters, when necessary.

SR 3.3.3.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 31 days ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel against a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including isolation, indication, and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency of 31 days is based upon plant operating experience, with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one channel of a given Function in any 31 day interval is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of those displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.3.1.2 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 24 months.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies the channel responds to measured parameter with the necessary range and accuracy.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 4.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-68 Revision 35

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3.1 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," Revision 2, December 1980.

2. NRC Safety Evaluation Report, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97,N dated July 30, 1985.

3. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

4. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174.

I HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-69 Pevision 35

Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.3.2.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The Frequency is based upon plant operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare.

SR 3.3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.3.2.2 verifies each required Remote Shutdown System transfer switch and control circuit performs the intended function. This verification is performed from the remote shutdown panel and locally, as appropriate. Operation of equipment from the remote shutdown panel is not necessary. The Surveillance can be satisfied by performance of a continuity check, or in the case of the DG controls, the routine Surveillances of LCO 3.8.1 (since local control is utilized during the performance of some of the Surveillances of LCO 3.8.1).

This will ensure that ifthe control room becomes inaccessible, the plant can be placed and maintained in MODE 3 from the remote shutdown panel and the local control stations. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 4.

SR 3.3.3.2.3 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. The test verifies the channel responds to measured parameter values with the necessary range and accuracy.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 4.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19.

2. Technical Requirements Manual.

3. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

4. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment. 174.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-74 Pe-,si-n 35

a -

EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES APPLICABLE relay) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting SAFETY ANALYSES, values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis.

LCO, and The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected APPLICABILITY for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip (continued) setpoints are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environmental effects (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

The specific Applicable Safety Analysis, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

Alternatively, since this instrumentation protects against a MCPR SL violation, with the instrumentation inoperable, modifications to the MCPR limits (LCO 3.2.2) may be applied to allow this LCO to be met.

The MCPR penalty for the EOC-RPT inoperable condition is specified in the COLR.

Turbine Stop Valve - Closure Closure of the TSVs and a main turbine trip result in the loss of a heat sink and increases reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux that must be limited. Therefore, an RPT is initiated on a TSV - Closure signal before the TSVs are completely closed in anticipation of the effects that would result from closure of these valves. EOC-RPT decreases reactor power and aids the reactor scram in ensuring that the MCPR SL is not exceeded during the worst case transient.

Closure of the TSVs is determined by measuring the position of each valve. While there are two separate position switches associated with each stop valve, only the signal from one switch for each TSV is used, with each of the four channels being assigned to a separate trip channel. The logic for the TSV - Closure Function is such that two or more TSVs must be closed to produce an EOC-RPT. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER > 28% RTP. This is normally accomplished automatically by pressure switches sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, opening of the turbine bypass valves may I affect this Function. Four channels of TSV - Closure, with two channels in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude an EOC-RPT from this Function on a valid signal. The TSV - Closure Allowable Value is selected to detect imminent TSV closure.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-77 Pevisia 35

EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES APPLICABLE Turbine Stop Valve - Closure (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and This protection is required, consistent with the safety analysis APPLICABILITY assumptions, whenever THERMAL POWER is 2 28% RTP. Below 28% RTP, the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High and the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Neutron Flux - High Functions of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) are adequate to maintain the necessary margin to the MCPR Safety Limit.

Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Fast closure of the TCVs during a generator load rejection results in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited. Therefore, an RPT is initiated on TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low in anticipation of the transients that would result from the closure of these valves.

The EOC-RPT decreases reactor power and aids the reactor scram in ensuring that the MCPR SL is not exceeded during the worst case transient.

Fast closure of the TCVs is determined by measuring the electrohydraulic control fluid pressure at each control valve. There is one pressure switch associated with each control valve, and the signal from each switch is assigned to a separate trip channel. The logic for the TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Function is such that two or more TCVs must be closed (pressure transmitter trips) to produce an EOC-RPT. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER ? 28% RTP. This is normally accomplished automatically by pressure switches sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, opening of the turbine bypass valves may affect this Function. Four channels of TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low, with two channels in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude an EOC-RPT from this Function on a valid signal.

The TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Allowable Value is selected high enough to detect imminent TCV fast closure.

This protection is required consistent with the safety analysis whenever THERMAL POWER is 2 28% RTP. Below 28% RTP, the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High and the APRM Neutron Flux - High Functions of the RPS are adequate to maintain the necessary margin to the MCPR SL.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-78

-evisic*n 35

I -

EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES SUREVILLANCE SR 3.3.4.1.1 REQUIREMENTS (continued) A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on reliability analysis of Reference 4.

SR 3.3.4.1.2 This SR ensures that an EOC-RPT initiated from the TSV - Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is ? 28% RTP.

This involves calibration of the bypass channels. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint. Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from first stage pressure) the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed during the calibration at THERMAL POWER > 28% RTP to ensure that the calibration is valid. If any bypass channel's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the Functions are bypassed at > 28% RTP, either due to open main turbine bypass valves or other reasons), the affected TSV - Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions are considered inoperable. Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass). If placed in the nonbypass condition (Turbine Stop Valve - Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions are enabled), this SR is met with the channel considered OPERABLE.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history, drift of the associated instrumentation, and Reference 7.

SR 3.3.4.1.3 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. For the TSV - Closure Function, this SR also includes a physical inspection and actuation of the switches.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-81 Pexisicn 35

a EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.1.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history, drift of the associated instrumentation (if applicable), and Reference 7.

SR 3.3.4.1.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the pump breakers is included as a part of this test, overlapping the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, to provide complete testing of the associated safety function. Therefore, if a breaker is incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel(s) would also be inoperable.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 7.

SR 3.3.4.1.5 This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 5.

A Note to the Surveillance states that breaker interruption (i.e., trip) time may be assumed from the most recent performance of SR 3.3.4.1.6. This is allowed since the time to open the contacts after energization of the trip coil and the arc suppression time are short and do not appreciably change, due to the design of the breaker opening device and the fact that the breaker is not routinely cycled.

EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Response times cannot be determined at power because operation of final actuated devices is required. Therefore, this Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components that cause serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences. The 24 month Frequency, on a (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-82 Rev-Lsin 35

EOC-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.1.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS STAGGERED TEST BASIS, is also based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 7.

SR 3.3.4.1.6 This SR ensures that the RPT breaker interruption time is provided to the EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME test. Breaker interruption (i.e., trip) time is defined as breaker response time plus arc suppression time. Breaker response time is the time from application of voltage to the trip coil until the main contacts separate. Arc suppression time is the time from main contact separation until the complete suppression of the electrical arc across the open contacts.

Breaker response shall be verified by testing and added to the manufacturer's design arc suppression time to determine breaker interruption time. The breaker arc suppression time shall be validated by the performance of periodic contact gap measurements in accordance with plant procedures. The 60 month Frequency of the testing is based on the difficulty of performing the test and the reliability of the circuit breakers.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 7.6.10.

2. FSAR, Sections 15.1.1, 15.1.2, and 15.1.3.

3. FSAR, Sections 5.5.16.1 and 7.6.10.

4. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases For Changes To Surveillance Test Intervals And Allowed Out-Of-Service Times For Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.

5. Technical Requirements Manual.

6. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

7. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-83 Pevisi.on 35

ATWS-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.4.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 2.

SR 3.3.4.2.3 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history, drift analysis of the associated instrumentation, and Reference 4.

(continued)

I-WATC(-

1 1/3 I *./I I IHINiT fi.,/l *ill l 0

Q.Q-UV Pevisicn 35

ATWS-RPT Instrumentation B 3.3.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.2.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the pump breakers is included as part of this Surveillance and overlaps the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

Therefore, if a breaker is incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel(s) would be inoperable.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 4.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 7.6.10.7.

2. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes To Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times For Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.

3. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

4. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-91 Revisicn 35

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 3.d. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and utilized, since the long term use of HPCI during a DBA requires the APPLICABILITY HPCI suction source to be the suppression pool. As such, this Function meets Criterion 4 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 7).

Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low signals are initiated from two level switches. The Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Function Allowable Value is high enough to ensure adequate pump suction head while water is being taken from the CST.

Two channels of the Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI swap to suppression pool source. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

3.e. Suppression Pool Water Level - High Excessively high suppression pool water could result in the loads on the suppression pool exceeding design values should there be a blowdown of the reactor vessel pressure through the safety/relief valves. Therefore, signals indicating high suppression pool water level are used to transfer the suction source of HPCI from the CST to the suppression pool to eliminate the possibility of HPCI continuing to provide additional water from a source outside containment. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valves must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes. While HPCI is not assumed to be OPERABLE in any DBA or transient analysis, this Function is implicitly assumed if HPCI is to be utilized, since the long term use of HPCI during a DBA requires the HPCI suction source to be the suppression pool. As such, this Function meets Criterion 4 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 7).

Suppression Pool Water Level - High signals are initiated from two level transmitters. The Allowable Value for the Suppression Pool Water Level - High Function is chosen to ensure that HPCI will be aligned for suction from the suppression pool before the water level reaches the point at which suppression pool design loads would be exceeded.

Two channels of Suppression Pool Water Level - High Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI swap to suppression pool source. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-107 Revisio~n 35

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required REQUIREMENTS Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months as follows: (a) for (continued) Functions 3.c and 3.f; and (b) for Functions other than 3.c and 3.f provided the associated Function or the redundant Function maintains initiation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 5) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the ECCS will initiate when necessary.

SR 3.3.5.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.5.1.2 and SR 3.3.5.1.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

"(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-122 Peii 35

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.1.2 and SR 3.3.5.1.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.5.1.2 is based on the reliability analyses of Reference 5. The 24 month Frequency of SR 3.3.5.1.3 is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 7.

SR 3.3.5.1.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history, drift analysis of the associated instrumentation, and Reference 7.

SR 3.3.5.1.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel.

The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.1, LCO 3.5.2, LCO 3.7.2, LCO 3.8.1, and LCO 3.8.2 overlaps this Surveillance to complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 7.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 5.2.

2. FSAR, Section 6.3.

3. FSAR, Chapter 15.

4. NEDC-31376-P, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant, SAFERiGESTR-LOCA, Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis,"

December 1986.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-123 Revision 35

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BAS ES REFERENCES 5. NEDC-30936-P-A, "BWR Owners' Group Technical (continued) Specification Improvement Analyses for ECCS Actuation Instrumentation, Part 2,N December 1988.

6. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

7. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174. I I.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-124 Revisicn 35

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.2.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.5.2.2 and SR 3.3.5.2.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.5.2.2 is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 1. The 24 month Frequency of SR 3.3.5.2.3 is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 3.

SR 3.3.5.2.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history, drift analysis of the associated instrumentation, and Reference 3.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-133 R-,,-isicn 35

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.2.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel.

The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this I Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 3.

REFERENCES 1. GENE-770-06-2, "Addendum to Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications,"

February 1991.

2. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

3. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174. I HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-134 Revision 35

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.b. Main Steam Line Pressure - Low SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Low MSL pressure with the reactor at power indicates that there may APPLICABILITY be a problem with the turbine pressure regulation, which could result (continued) in a low reactor vessel water level condition and the RPV cooling down more than 100°F/hr if the pressure loss is allowed to continue. The Main Steam Line Pressure - Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the pressure regulator failure (Ref. 2). For this event, the closure of the MSIVs ensures that the RPV temperature change limit (100°F/hr) is not reached. In addition, this Function supports actions to ensure that Safety Limit 2.1.1.1 is not exceeded. (This Function closes the MSIVs prior to pressure decreasing below 785 psig, which results in a scram due to MSIV closure, thus reducing reactor power to < 25% RTP.)

The MSL low pressure signals are initiated from four switches that are connected to the MSL header. The switches are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, each switch is able to detect low MSL pressure. Four channels of Main Steam Line Pressure - Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value was selected to be high enough to prevent excessive RPV depressurization.

The Main Steam Line Pressure - Low Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 since this is when the assumed transient can occur (Ref. 2).

This Function isolates the Group 1 valves.

1.c. Main Steam Line Flow - High Main Steam Line Flow - High is provided to detect a break of the MSL and to initiate closure of the MSIVs. Ifthe steam were allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor would depressurize and the core could uncover. Ifthe RPV water level decreases too far, fuel damage could occur. Therefore, the isolation is initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The Main Steam Line Flow High Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the main steam line break (MSLB) (Ref. 2). The isolation action, along with the scram function of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46 and offsite doses do not exceed the 10 CFR 100 limits.

A (continued)

Revisicn 35 B 3.3-141 HATCH UNIT 2 UNIT 2

HATCH B 3.3-141 Re=v-js5in 35

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.c. Main Steam Line Flow - High (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The MSL flow signals are initiated from 16 transmitters that are APPLICABILITY connected to the four MSLs. The transmitters are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, all four connected to one MSL would be able to detect the high flow. Four channels of Main Steam Line Flow - High Function for each unisolated MSL (two channels per trip system) are available and are required to be OPERABLE so that no single instrument failure will preclude detecting a break in any individual MSL.

The Allowable Value is chosen to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded due to the break. The Allowable Value corresponds to

< 183 psid, which is the parameter monitored on control room instruments.

This Function isolates the Group 1 valves.

1.d. Condenser Vacuum - Low The Condenser Vacuum-Low Function is provided to prevent overpressurization of the main condenser in the event of a loss of the main condenser vacuum. Since the integrity of the condenser is an assumption in offsite dose calculations, the Condenser Vacuum Low Function is assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating closure of the MSIVs. The closure of the MSIVs is initiated to prevent the addition of steam that would lead to additional condenser pressurization and possible rupture of the diaphragm installed to protect the turbine exhaust hood, thereby preventing a potential radiation leakage path following an accident.

Condenser vacuum pressure signals are derived from four pressure switches that sense the pressure in the condenser. Four channels of Condenser Vacuum - Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value is chosen to prevent damage to the condenser due to pressurization, thereby ensuring its integrity for offsite dose analysis. As noted (footnote (a) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), the channels are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 when all turbine stop valves (TSVs) are closed, since the potential for condenser overpressurization is minimized. Switches are provided to manually bypass the channels when all TSVs are closed.

This Function isolates the Group 1 valves.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-142 Revisicn 35

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a REQUIREMENTS channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of (continued) required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 4 and 5) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the PCIVs will isolate the penetration flow path(s) when necessary.

SR 3.3.6.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.6.1.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended (co.tinued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-158 Pecontinue35

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.1.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.2 is based on the reliability analysis described in References 4 and 5.

SR 3.3.6.1.3, SR 3.3.6.1.4, and SR 3.3.6.1.5 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.3 is based on the assumption of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. The 184 day Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.4 and the 24 month Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.5 are based on a review of the surveillance test history, drift analysis of the associated instrumentation (if applicable), and Reference 9.

SR 3.3.6.1.6 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel.

The system functional testing performed on PCIVs in LCO 3.6.1.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 9.

SR 3.3.6.1.7 This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The instrument response times must be added to the PCIV closure times to obtain the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-159 Revisim 35

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.1.7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 6. This test may be performed in one measurement, or in overlapping segments, with verification that all components are tested.

A Note to the Surveillance states that channel sensors are excluded from ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME testing. The exclusion of the channel sensors is supported by Reference 8 which indicates that the sensors' response times are a small fraction of the total response time. Even if the sensors experienced response time degradation, they would be expected to respond in the microsecond to millisecond range until complete failure.

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. This Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience that shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.

The 24 month Frequency, on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, is also based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 9.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.3.

2. FSAR, Chapter 15.

3. FSAR, Section 4.2.3.4.2.

4. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation,"

July 1990.

5. NEDC-30851 P-A Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," March 1989.

6. Technical Requirements Manual.

7. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

A A (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-160 Posicn 35

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES REFERENCES 8. NEDO-32291, "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected (continued) Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1994.

9. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174.

I (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-161 Revi-sicn 35

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.2.3 and SR 3.3.6.2.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.6.2.3 is based on the assumption of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. The 24 month Frequency of SR 3.3.6.2.4 is based on a review of the surveillance test history, drift analysis of the associated instrumentation, and Reference 8.

SR 3.3.6.2.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel.

The system functional testing performed on SCIVs and the SGT System in LCO 3.6.4.2 and LCO 3.6.4.3, respectively, overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

This Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power for some of the Functions. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 8.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.3.

2. FSAR, Section 15.

3. FSAR, Section 15.1.40.

4. FSAR, Sections 15.1.39 and 15.1.41.

5. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation,"

July 1990.

6. NEDC-308511P-A Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," March 1989.

" ~(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-169 Rev-sjan 35

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES REFERENCES 7. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical (continued) Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

8. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174. I HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-170 Pevisim 35

LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.3.2, SR 3.3.6.3.3, and SR 3.3.6.3.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The 92 day Frequency is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 3.

A portion of the S/RV tailpipe pressure switch instrument channels are located inside the primary containment. The Note for SR 3.3.6.3.3, "Only required to be performed prior to entering MODE 2 during each scheduled outage > 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months when entry is made into primary containment," is based on the location of these instruments, ALARA considerations, and compatibility with the Completion Time of the associated Required Action (Required Action B.1).

SR 3.3.6.3.5 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history, drift analysis of the associated instrumentation (if applicable),

and Reference 5.

SR 3.3.6.3.6 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a specified channel.

The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.4.3, "Safety/Relief Valves(S/RVs) and LCO 3.6.1.8, "Low-Low Set (LLS) Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)," for S/RVs overlaps this test to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The Frequency of once every 24 months for SR 3.3.6.3.6 is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 5.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-177

LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 7.4.4.

2. FSAR, Section 5.5.17.

3. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.

4. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174.

S HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-178 Reviskn--35

MCREC System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.7.1.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency is based upon the assumption of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

SR 3.3.7.1.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel.

The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.7.4, "Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System," overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

This Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 8.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 7.3.5

2. FSAR, Chapter 6.

3. FSAR, Section 6.4.1.2.2.

4. FSAR, Chapter 15.

5. FSAR, Table 15.1-28.

6. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.

7. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

8. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-184 Revisicn 35

w RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.8.2.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS As noted in the Surveillance, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is only required to be performed while the plant is in a condition in which the loss of the RPS bus will not jeopardize steady state power operation (the design of the system is such that the power source must be removed from service to conduct the Surveillance). The 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is intended to indicate an outage of sufficient duration to allow for scheduling and proper performance of the Surveillance.

The 184 day Frequency and the Note in the Surveillance are based on guidance provided in Generic Letter 91-09 (Ref. 2).

SR 3.3.8.2.2 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The 184 day Frequency is based on Reference 4.

SR 3.3.8.2.3 Performance of a system functional test demonstrates that, with a required system actuation (simulated or actual) signal, the logic of the system will automatically trip open the associated power monitoring assembly. Only one signal per power monitoring assembly is required to be tested. This Surveillance overlaps with the CHANNEL CALIBRATION to provide complete testing of the safety function. The system functional test of the Class 1 E circuit breakers is included as part of this test to provide complete testing of the safety function. If the breakers are incapable of operating, the associated electric power monitoring assembly would be inoperable.

The 184 day Frequency is based on Reference 4.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-198 Revision 35

RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 8.3.1.1.4.B.

2. NRC Generic Letter 91-09, "Modification of Surveillance Interval for the Electrical Protective Assemblies in Power Supplies for the Reactor Protection System."

3. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

4. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment .174. I HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-199 Revisicn 35

S/RVs B 3.4.3 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With 1 S/RV inoperable, no action is required, because an analysis demonstrated that the remaining 10 SRNs are capable of providing the necessary overpressure protection. (See Reference 4.)

With two or more S/RVs inoperable, a transient may result in the violation of the ASME Code limit on reactor pressure. The plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance requires that the S/RVs will open at the pressures assumed in the safety analysis of Reference 1. The demonstration of the S/RV safety lift settings must be performed during shutdown, since this is a bench test, to be done in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valves at nominal operating temperatures and pressures. The S/RV setpoint is +/- 3% for OPERABILITY; however, the valves are reset to +/- 1% during the Surveillance to allow for drift.

The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Supplement 5A.

2. FSAR, Section 15.

3. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

4. NEDC-32041 P, "Safety Review for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 Updated Safety/Relief Valve Performance Requirements," April 1996.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.4-12 Revi~s-icn 35

RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.5.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of required leakage detection instrumentation channels. The calibration verifies the accuracy of the instrument string, including the instruments located inside containment. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 8.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 30.

2. FSAR, Section 5.2.7.2.1.

3. GEAP-5620, "Failure Behavior in ASTM A106B Pipes Containing Axial Through-Wall Flaws," April 1968.

4. NUREG-75/067, "Investigation and Evaluation of cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactors,"

October 1975.

5. FSAR, Section 5.2.7.5.2.

6. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 125, April 30, 1993.

7. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

8. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174. I HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.4-23 Revisimn 35

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.7, SR 3.5.1.8. and SR 3.5.1.9 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS must be passing through the main turbine or turbine bypass valves to continue to control reactor pressure when the HPCI System diverts steam flow. The reactor steam pressure must be > 920 psig to perform SR 3.5.1.8 and t 150 psig to perform SR 3.5.1.9. Adequate steam flow for SR 3.5.1.8 is represented by at least two turbine bypass valves open, or ? 200 MWE from the main turbine-generator; and for SR 3.5.1.9 adequate steam flow is represented by at least 1.25 turbine bypass valves open, or total steam flow > 1E6 lb/hour.

Therefore, sufficient time is allowed after adequate pressure and flow are achieved to perform these tests. Reactor startup is allowed prior to performing the low pressure Surveillance test because the reactor pressure is low and the time allowed to satisfactorily perform the Surveillance test is short. The reactor pressure is allowed to be increased to normal operating pressure since it is assumed that the low pressure test has been satisfactorily completed and there is no indication or reason to believe that HPCI is inoperable. Therefore, SR 3.5.1.8 and SR 3.5.1.9 are modified by Notes that state the Surveillances are not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after the reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.

The 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed is sufficient to achieve stable conditions for testing and provides a reasonable time to complete the SR.

The Frequency for SR 3.5.1.7 and SR 3.5.1.8 is consistent with the Inservice Testing Program pump testing requirements. The 24 month Frequency for SR 3.5.1.9 is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply just prior to or during a startup from a plant outage. The 24 month Frequency of SR 3.5.1.9 is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 18.

SR 3.5.1.10 The ECCS subsystems are required to actuate automatically to perform their design functions. This Surveillance verifies that, with a required system initiation signal (actual or simulated), the automatic initiation logic of HPCI, CS, and LPCI will cause the systems or subsystems to operate as designed, including actuation of the system throughout its emergency operating sequence, automatic pump startup and actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions. This SR also ensures that the HPCI System will automatically restart on an RPV low water level (Level 2) signal received subsequent to an RPV high water level (Level 8) trip and that the suction is automatically transferred from the CST to the suppression pool. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST (continued)

I-lATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-11 PRimdsic 35

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.10 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS performed in LCO 3.3.5.1 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 18.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection/spray during the Surveillance. Since all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the test line, coolant injection into the RPV is not required during the Surveillance.

SR 3.5.1.11 The ADS designated S/RVs are required to actuate automatically upon receipt of specific initiation signals. A system functional test is performed to demonstrate that the mechanical portions of the ADS function (i.e., solenoids) operate as designed when initiated either by an actual or simulated initiation signal, causing proper actuation of all the required components. SR 3.5.1.12 and the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.1 overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 18.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes valve actuation. This prevents an RPV pressure blowdown

"(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-12 Re-simn 35

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.12 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The pneumatic actuator of each ADS valve is stroked to verify that the pilot disc rod lifts when the actuator strokes. Pilot rod lift is determined by measurement of rod travel. The total amount of lift of the pilot rod from the valve closed position to the open position shall meet criteria established by the S/RV supplier. SRs 3.5.1.11 and 3.3.5.1.5 overlap this SR to provide testing of the S/RV relief mode function. Additional functional testing is performed by tests required by the ASME OM Code (Ref. 17).

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 18.

SR 3.5.1.13 This SR ensures that the ECCS RESPONSE TIMES are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis.

Response time testing acceptance criteria are included in Reference 14. A Note to the Surveillance states that the instrumentation portion of the response time may be assumed from established limits. The exclusion of the instrumentation from the response time surveillance is supported by Reference 15, which concludes that instrumentation will continue to respond in the microsecond to millisecond range prior to complete failure.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 18.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.3.2.2.3.

2. FSAR, Section 6.3.2.2.4.

3. FSAR, Section 6.3.2.2.1.

4. FSAR, Section 6.3.2.2.2.

5. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.

6. FSAR, Section 15.1.40.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-13 Revisicn 35

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.1 BASES REFERENCES 7. FSAR, Section 15.1.33.

(continued)

8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.

9. FSAR, Section 6.3.3.

10. NEDC-31376P, "E.I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 SAFER/GESTR-LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Analysis," December 1986.

11. 10 C FR 50.46.

12. Memorandum from R.L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC),

"Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.

13. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

14. Technical Requirements Manual.

15. NEDO-32291, "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1994.

16. NEDC-32041 P, "Safety Review for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 Updated Safety/Relief Valve Performance Requirements," April 1996.

17. ASME, OM Code - 1995, "Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants," Appendix I.

18. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-14 Pevirkn 35

RCIC System B 3.5.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.3.3 and SR 3.5.3.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS pressure. The total system pump outlet pressure is adequate to overcome the elevation head pressure between the pump suction and the vessel discharge, the piping friction losses, and RPV pressure.

The flow tests for the RCIC System are performed at two different pressure ranges such that system capability to provide rated flow is tested both at the higher and lower operating ranges of the system.

Additionally, adequate steam flow must be passing through the main turbine or turbine bypass valves to continue to control reactor pressure when the RCIC System diverts steam flow. Reactor steam pressure must be Ž 920 psig to perform SR 3.5.3.3 and ; 150 psig to perform SR 3.5.3.4. Adequate steam flow is represented by at least one turbine bypass valve open, or for SR 3.5.3.3 Ž 200 MWE from the main turbine-generator and for SR 3.5.3.4 total steam flow

Ž 1E6 lb/hour. Therefore, sufficient time is allowed after adequate pressure and flow are achieved to perform these SRs. Reactor startup is allowed prior to performing the low pressure Surveillance because the reactor pressure is low and the time allowed to satisfactorily perform the Surveillance is short. The reactor pressure is allowed to be increased to normal operating pressure since it is assumed that the low pressure Surveillance has been satisfactorily completed and there is no indication or reason to believe that RCIC is inoperable. Therefore, these SRs are modified by Notes that state the Surveillances are not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after the reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test.

The 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed is sufficient to achieve stable conditions for testing and provides a reasonable time to complete the SR. A 92 day Frequency for SR 3.5.3.3 is consistent with the Inservice Testing Program requirements. The 24 month Frequency for SR 3.5.3.4 is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under conditions that apply just prior to or during a startup from a plant outage. The 24 month Frequency of SR 3.5.3.4 is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 6.

SR 3.5.3.5 The RCIC System is required to actuate automatically in order to verify its design function satisfactorily. This Surveillance verifies that, with a required system initiation signal (actual or simulated), the automatic initiation logic of the RCIC System will cause the system to operate as designed, including actuation of the system throughout its emergency operating sequence; that is, automatic pump startup and actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions. This test also ensures the RCIC System will automatically restart on an RPV (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-26 pfvji 35

RCIC System B 3.5.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.3.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS low water level (Level 2) signal received subsequent to an RPV high water level (Level 8) trip and that the suction is automatically transferred from the CST to the suppression pool. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.2 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 6.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection during the Surveillance. Since all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the test line, coolant injection into the RPV is not required during the Surveillance.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 33.

2. FSAR, Section 5.5.6.

3. Memorandum from R.L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC),

"Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.

4. GE Report AES-41-0688, "Safety Evaluation for Relaxation of RCIC Performance Requirements for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2," July 1988.

5. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

6. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment. 174.

6.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-27 Revaisin 35

Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Maintaining the pressure suppression function of primary containment requires limiting the leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber. Thus, if an event were to occur that pressurized the drywell, the steam would be directed through the downcomers into the suppression pool. This SR measures drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure during a 10 minute period to ensure that the leakage paths that would bypass the suppression pool are within allowable limits.

Satisfactory performance of this SR can be achieved by establishing a known differential pressure between the drywell and the suppression chamber and verifying that the pressure in either the suppression chamber or the drywell does not change by more than 0.25 inch of water per minute over a 10 minute period. The leakage test is performed every 24 months. The 24 month Frequency was I

developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed during a unit outage and also in view of the fact that component failures that might have affected this test are identified by other primary containment SRs. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 9. Two consecutive test failures, however, would indicate unexpected primary containment degradation; in this event, as the Note indicates, increasing the Frequency to once every 9 months is required until the situation is remedied as evidenced by passing two consecutive tests.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.2.

2. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.

4. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

5. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

6. Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," September 1995.

7. NEI 94-01, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J,"

Revision 0, July 26, 1995.

(

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-4 Revisicn 35

Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 BASES REFERENCES 8. ANSI/ANS-56.8-1994, "American National Standard for (continued) Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements," 1994.

9. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174. I HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-5 Revision 35

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits. For these isolation devices inside primary containment, the Frequency defined as "Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is appropriate since these isolation devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since the primary containment is inerted and access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA and personnel safety reasons.

Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these isolation devices, once they have been verified to be in their proper position, is low.

A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open.

SR 3.6.1.3.4 The traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. Actuation and monitoring circuitry is provided in the main control room. Surveillance of explosive charge continuity provides assurance that TIP valves will actuate when required. The circuitry is such that a light illuminates upon loss of explosive charge continuity. Ensuring that the light illuminates when voltage is applied and that it is extinguished when installed in the circuit provides assurance of explosive valve continuity. Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life of the explosive charges, must be followed. The 31 day Frequency is based on operating experience that has demonstrated the reliability of the explosive charge continuity.

SR 3.6.1.3.5 Verifying the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic PCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. MSIVs may be excluded from this SR since MSIV full (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-23 RvZin3

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS closure isolation time is demonstrated by SR 3.6.1.3.6. The isolation time test ensures that each valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that Jisted in the FSAR and that no degradation affecting valve closure since the performance of the last surveillance has occurred. (EFCVs are not required to be tested because they have no specified time limit). The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verifying that the isolation time of each MSIV is within the specified limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed in the DBA analyses. This ensures that the calculated radiological consequences of these events remain within 10 CFR 100 limits. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.3.7 Automatic PCIVs close on a primary containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment following a DBA. This SR ensures that each automatic PCIV will actuate to its isolation position on a primary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.1.6 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function.

The 24 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed only during a unit outage since isolation of penetrations would eliminate cooling water flow and disrupt the normal operation of many critical components. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 9.

SR 3.6.1.3.8 This SR requires a demonstration that each reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valve (EFCV) (of a representative sample) is OPERABLE by verifying that the valve reduces flow to within limits on an actual or simulated instrument line break condition. (The representative sample consists of an approximately equal number of EFCVs, such that each EFCV is tested at least once every 10 years

" ~(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-24 Ievisicn 35

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.8 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS

[nominal]. In addition, the EFCVs in the sample are representative of the various plant configurations, models, sizes, and operating environments. This ensures that any potentially common problem with a specific type of application of EFCV is detected at the earliest possible time.) This SR provides assurance that the instrumentation line EFCVs will perform as designed. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 9. (The nominal 10 year interval is based on performance testing as discussed in NEDO-32977-A, "Excess Flow Check Valve Testing Relaxation" (Ref. 8). Furthermore, any EFCV failures will be evaluated to determine if additional testing in that test interval is warranted to ensure overall reliability is maintained.

Operating experience has demonstrated that these components are highly reliable and that failures to isolate are very infrequent.

Therefore, testing of a representative sample was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.) Any EFCV that fails to check flow during its surveillance test will be documented in the Hatch corrective action program as a surveillance test failure. The failure will be evaluated and corrected and, if the valve is repaired and not replaced, it will be added to the next cycle's surveillance.

SR 3.6.1.3.9 The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is considered adequate given the administrative controls on replacement charges and the frequent checks of circuit continuity (SR 3.6.1.3.4). The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 9.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-25 Revision 35

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.10 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR ensures that the leakage rate of secondary containment bypass leakage paths is less than the specified leakage rate. This provides assurance that the assumptions in the radiological evaluations that form the basis of the FSAR (Ref. 3) are met. The secondary containment bypass leakage paths are: 1) main steam condensate drain, penetration 8; 2) reactor water cleanup, penetration 14; 3) equipment drain sump discharge, penetration 18;

4) floor drain sump discharge, penetration 19; and 5) chemical drain sump discharge, penetration 55. The leakage rate of each bypass leakage path is assumed to be the maximum pathway leakage (leakage through the worse of the two isolation valves) unless the penetration is isolated by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. In this case, the leakage rate of the isolated bypass leakage path is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If both isolation valves in the penetration are closed, the actual leakage rate is the lesser leakage rate of the two valves. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 7).

SR 3.6.1.3.11 The analyses in References 1 and 4 are based on leakage that is less than the specified leakage rate. Leakage through each MSIV must be -<100 scfh, and a combined maximum pathway leakage 5 250 scfh for all four main steam lines when tested at > 28.8 psig. In addition, if any MSIV exceeds the 100 scfh limit, the as left leakage shall be < 11.5 scfh for that MSIV.

The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.3.12 The valve seats of each 18 inch purge valve (supply and exhaust) having resilient material seats must be replaced every 24 months.

This will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure I develops. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveiliance test history and Reference 9.

j. (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-26 Revisicn 35

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.13 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR provides assurance that the excess flow isolation dampers can close following an isolation signal. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 9.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 15.

2. Technical Requirements Manual.

3. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.

4. FSAR, Section 6.2.

5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.

6. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

7. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

8. NEDO-32977-A, "Excess Flow Check Valve Testing Relaxation."

9. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-27 Revision 35

LLS Valves B 3.6.1.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.6.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS mode function. Additional functional testing is performed by tests required by the ASME OM Code (Ref. 2). The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 5.

SR 3.6.1.6.2 The LLS designated S/RVs are required to actuate automatically upon receipt of specific initiation signals. A system functional test is performed to verify that the mechanical portions (i.e., solenoids) of the LLS function operate as designed when initiated either by an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.3.6 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 5.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes valve actuation. This prevents a reactor pressure vessel pressure blowdown.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 5.5.17.

2. ASME, OM Code - 1995, "Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants," Appendix I.

3. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

4. NEDC-32041 P, "Safety Review for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 Updated Safety/Relief Valve Performance Requirements," April 1996.

5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment. 174.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-35 Revisicn 35

Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.7.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS indications of vacuum breaker status available to operations personnel, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

Two Notes are added to this SR. The first Note allows reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers opened in conjunction with the performance of a Surveillance to not be considered as failing this SR. These periods of opening vacuum breakers are controlled by plant procedures and do not represent inoperable vacuum breakers. The second Note is included to clarify that vacuum breakers, which are open due to an actual differential pressure, are not considered as failing this SR.

SR 3.6.1.7.2 Each vacuum breaker must be cycled to ensure that it opens properly to perform its design function and returns to its fully closed position.

This ensures that the safety analysis assumptions are valid. The 92 day Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.7.3 Demonstration of vacuum breaker opening setpoint is necessary to ensure that the safety analysis assumption regarding vacuum breaker full open differential pressure of < 0.5 psid is valid. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 3.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.2.1.

2. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

3. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment .174.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-40 Pevisimn 35

Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.8.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Vacuum Breaker Position Indication," as ACTIONS for inoperable closed position indicator channels. In this case the vacuum breaker is assumed open until otherwise proved to satisfy the leakage test, and this confirmation must be performed within the Technical Specification 3.6.1.8, Required Action B.1 Completion Time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

The 14 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is considered adequate in view of other indications of vacuum breaker status available to operations personnel, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

A Note is added to this SR which allows suppression chamber-to drywell vacuum breakers opened in conjunction with the performance of a Surveillance to not be considered as failing this SR. These periods of opening vacuum breakers are controlled by plant procedures and do not represent inoperable vacuum breakers.

SR 3.6.1.8.2 Each required (i.e., required to be OPERABLE for opening) vacuum breaker must be cycled to ensure that it opens adequately to perform its design function and returns to the fully closed position. This ensures that the safety analysis assumptions are valid. The 31 day Frequency of this SR was developed, based on Inservice Testing Program requirements to perform valve testing at least once every 92 days. A 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide additional assurance that the vacuum breakers are OPERABLE, since they are located in a harsh environment (the suppression chamber airspace).

In addition, this functional test is required within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after a discharge of steam to the suppression chamber from the safety/relief valves.

SR 3.6.1.8.3 Verification of the vacuum breaker opening setpoint is necessary to ensure that the safety analysis assumption regarding vacuum breaker full open differential pressure of 0.5 psid is valid. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 4. It is further justified (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-45 R'sviein 35

Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.8.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS because of other surveillances performed at shorter Frequencies that convey the proper functioning status of each vacuum breaker.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.2.1.

2. NRC No.93-102, NFinal Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

3. Technical Requirements Manual.

4. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174.

I HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-46

,evisicn35

Primary Containment Hydrogen Recombiners B 3.6.3.1 BASES ACTIONS C._1 (continued)

Ifany Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of a system functional test for each primary containment hydrogen recombiner ensures that the recombiners are OPERABLE and can attain and sustain the temperature necessary for hydrogen recombination. In particular, this SR verifies that the minimum heater sheath temperature increases to 2 12001F in < 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months and that it is maintained > 11 50°F and < 1300OF for a 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months thereafter to check the ability of the recombiner to function properly (and to make sure that significant heater elements are not burned out). The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 6.

SR 3.6.3.1.2 This SR ensures there are no physical problems that could affect recombiner operation. Since the recombiners are mechanically passive, except for the blower assemblies, they are subject to only minimal mechanical failure. The only credible failures involve loss of power or blower function, blockage of the internal flow path, missile impact, etc.

A visual inspection is sufficient to determine abnormal conditions that could cause such failures. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 6.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-67 PevLsicn 35

Primary Containment Hydrogen Recombiners B 3.6.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.1.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR requires performance of a resistance to ground test of each heater phase to make sure that there are no detectable grounds in any heater phase. This is accomplished by verifying that the resistance to ground for any heater phase is Ž 1,000,000 ohms.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 6.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.44.

2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.7, Revision 0, March 1971.

4. FSAR, Section 6.2.5.

5. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

6. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-68 Revision 35

Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS subsystem. The SGT subsystems are tested on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, however, to ensure that in addition to the requirements of LCO 3.6.4.3, each SGT subsystem or combination of subsystems will perform this test. The number of SGT subsystems and the required combinations are dependent on the configuration of the secondary containment and are detailed in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 3). The Note to SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 specifies that the number of required SGT subsystems be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration. The 24 month Frequency, on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, of SRs 3.6.4.1.3 and 3.6.4.1.4 is also based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 5.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.

2. FSAR, Section 15.1.41.

3. Technical Requirements Manual.

4. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment - 174.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-82 Rev-sim 35

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS easy, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide added assurance that the isolation devices are in the correct positions.

Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these isolation devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

A second Note has been included to clarify that SClVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the SCIVs are open.

SR 3.6.4.2.2 Verifying that the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic SCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the SCIV will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. The Frequency of this SR was developed based upon engineering judgment and the similarity to PCIVs.

SR 3.6.4.2.3 Verifying that each automatic SCIV closes on a secondary containment isolation signal is required to prevent leakage of radioactive material from secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents. This SR ensures that each automatic SCIV will actuate to the isolation position on a secondary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 5.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-88 Paik 35

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.

2. FSAR, Section 15.1.41.

3. Technical Requirements Manual.

4. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174.

I HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-89 Revision 35

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.3.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR verifies that each required Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT subsystem starts on receipt of an actual or simulated initiation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. This Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 8.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41.

2. Unit 1 FSAR, Section 5.3.

3. FSAR, Section 6.2.3.

4. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.

5. FSAR, Section 15.1.41

6. Technical Requirements Manual

7. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

8. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-96 Revision 35

PSW System and UHS B 3.7.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 5.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 9.2.1.

2. FSAR, Chapter 6.

3. FSAR, Chapter 15.

4. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174. I HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-13 Revis-i"on 35

DG 1B SSW System B 3.7.3 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the DG 1B SSW System flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for DG 1B SSW System operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, and yet be considered in the correct position provided it can be automatically realigned to its accident position, within the required time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

SR 3.7.3.2 This SR ensures that the DG 1B SSW System pump will automatically start to provide required cooling to the DG 1B when the DG 1B starts and the respective bus is energized.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 5.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 9.2.1.

2. FSAR, Chapter 6.

3. FSAR, Chapter 15.

4. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment. 174.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-16 Revisior 35

MCREC System B 3.7.4 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that a subsystem in a standby mode starts on demand and continues to operate. Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they start and function properly.

As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe, testing each subsystem once every 31 days provides an adequate check on this system. Since the MCREC System does not have heaters, each subsystem need only be operated for

> 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the subsystem.

Furthermore, the 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and the two subsystem redundancy available.

SR 3.7.4.2 This SR verifies that the required MCREC testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations).

Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.7.4.3 This SR verifies that on an actual or simulated initiation signal, each MCREC subsystem starts and operates. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.7.1.4 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. This Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 9.

SR 3.7.4.4 This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure and the assumed inleakage rates of potentially contaminated air. The control room positive pressure, with respect to potentially contaminated adjacent areas (the turbine building), is periodically tested to verify proper function of the MCREC System. During the pressurization mode of operation, the MCREC System is designed to slightly pressurize the control room > 0.1 inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to the turbine building to prevent unfiltered inleakage. The MCREC System is designed to maintain this positive A (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-23 Pev-isimo 35

MCREC System B 3.7.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS pressure at a flow rate of < 2750 cfm through the control room in the pressurization mode. This SR ensures the total flow rate meets the design analysis value of 2500 cfm +/- 10% and ensures the outside air flow rate is *400 cfm. The 24 month Frequency, on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 9.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.4.

2. FSAR, Section 9.4.1.

3. FSAR, Chapter 6.

4. FSAR, Chapter 15.

5. FSAR, Section 6.4.1.2.2.

6. FSAR, Table 15.1-28.

7. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

8. Technical Requirements Manual.

9. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174.

A HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-24 Ferdsian 35

Control Room AC System B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS G.1, G.2, and G.3 (continued)

The Required Actions of Condition G are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, with three control room AC subsystems inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and handling of irradiated fuel in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to remove the control room heat load assumed in the safety analysis. The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation.

The 24 month Frequency is appropriate since significant degradation of the Control Room AC System is not expected over this time period.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 4.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Sections 6.4 and 9.4.1.

2. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

3. Technical Requirements Manual.

4. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment. 174.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-30 Bevisian 35

Main Turbine Bypass System B 3.7.7 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)

< 25% RTP. As discussed in the Applicability section, operation at

< 25% RTP results in sufficient margin to the required limits, and the Main Turbine Bypass System is not required to protect fuel integrity during the turbine generator load rejection transient. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1 REQUIREMENTS Cycling each main turbine bypass valve through one complete cycle of full travel demonstrates that the valves are mechanically OPERABLE and will function when required. The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 31 day Frequency.

Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.7.7.2 The Main Turbine Bypass System is required to actuate automatically to perform its design function. This SR demonstrates that, with the required system initiation signals, the valves will actuate to their required position. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and because of the potential for an unplanned transient ifthe Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 5.

SR 3.7.7.3 This SR ensures that the TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME is in compliance with the assumptions of the appropriate safety analysis. The response time limits are specified in Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 3). The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and because of the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

I (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-36 ftnisin 335

Main Turbine Bypass System B 3.7.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 5.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 7.7.4.

2. FSAR, Section 15.1.7.

3. Technical Requirements Manual.

4. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174. I HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-37 Revisim 35

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

SR 3.8.1.6 Transfer of each 4.16 kV ESF bus power supply from the normal off site circuit to the alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the shutdown loads. The 24 month Frequency of the Surveillance is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 14.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that, during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1 or 2 does not have applicability to Unit 1. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 2 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1 or 2 and the Unit 1 test should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1 or 2.

SR 3.8.1.7 Each DG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the DG load response characteristics and capability to reject the largest single load without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency and while maintaining a specified margin to the (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-23 Revision 35

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS overspeed trip. The largest single load for each DG is a residual heat removal service water pump at rated flow (1225 bhp). This Surveillance may be accomplished by: a) tripping the DG output breaker with the DG carrying greater than or equal to its associated single largest post-accident load while paralleled to offsite power or while solely supplying the bus, or b) tripping its associated single largest post-accident load with the DG solely supplying the bus.

Although Plant Hatch Unit 2 is not committed to IEEE-387-1984, (Ref. 11), this SR is consistent with the IEEE-387-1984 requirement that states the load rejection test is acceptable if the increase in diesel speed does not exceed 75% of the difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15% above synchronous speed, whichever is lower. For all DGs, this represents 65.5 Hz, equivalent to 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint.

The voltage and frequency specified are consistent with the nominal range for the DG. SR 3.8.1.7.a corresponds to the maximum frequency excursion, while SR 3.8.1.7.b is the voltage to which the DG must recover following load rejection. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9). The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 14.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that, during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, testing is performed with only the DG providing power to the associated 4160 V ESF bus.

The DG is not synchronized with off site power.

To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 2 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-24 Reds-kn 35

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.8 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a full load without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits. The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping. This Surveillance ensures proper engine generator load response under the simulated test conditions.

This test simulates the loss of the total connected load that the DG experiences following a full load rejection and verifies that the DG does not trip upon loss of the load. These acceptance criteria provide DG damage protection. While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event, and continues to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor < 0.88. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience.

The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9) and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 14.

This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that would challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. Note 2 is provided in recognition that if the offsite electrical power distribution system is lightly loaded (i.e., system voltage is high, it may not be possible to raise voltage without creating an overvoltage condition on the ESF bus. Therefore, to ensure the bus voltage, supplied ESF loads, and DG are not placed in an unsafe condition during this test, the power factor limit does not have to be met if grid voltage or ESF bus loading does not permit the power factor limit to be met when the DG is tied to the grid. When this occurs, the power factor should be maintained as close to the limit as practicable.

To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 3 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG I (*nntin, J*rl*

fe-nfi"AH HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-25 Revisicn 35

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.8 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

SR 3.8.1.9 This Surveillance demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source and is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(1).

This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG. It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time.

The DG auto-start time of 12 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis for responding to a design basis large break LOCA. The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability has been achieved.

The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and auto-connected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, or systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of the connection and loading of these loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs shall be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(1), takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-26 Renisicn 35

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.9 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 14.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 1. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 2 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 1 test should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

SR 3.8.1.10 This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG automatically starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time (12 seconds) from the design basis actuation signal (LOCA signal) and operates for > 5 minutes. The 5 minute period provides sufficient time to demonstrate stability.

The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and autoconnected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the loading logic for loading onto offsite power. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, ECCS injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, low pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of the connection and loading of these loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-27 ,evisian 35

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.10 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with the expected fuel cycle lengths. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 14.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could potentially cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus.

Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1 or 2 does not have applicability to Unit 1. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 2 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1 or 2 and the Unit 1 test should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1 or 2.

SR 3.8.1.11 This Surveillance demonstrates that DG non-critical protective functions (e.g., high jacket water temperature) are bypassed on a loss of voltage signal concurrent with an ECCS initiation signal and critical protective functions (engine overspeed, generator differential current, and low lubricating oil pressure) are available to trip the DG to avert substantial damage to the DG unit. The non-critical trips are bypassed during DBAs and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react appropriately. The DG availability to mitigate the DBA is more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems that are not immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the DG.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-28 ev-jsian 35

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.11 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The 24 month Frequency takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 14.

The SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DG from service. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 1. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 2 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 1 test should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

SR 3.8.1.12 Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(3), requires demonstration once per 24 months that the DGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The first 22 hours2.546296e-4 days 0.00611 hours 3.637566e-5 weeks 8.371e-6 months of this test are performed at > 2775 kW and _52825 kW (which is near the continuous rating of the DG), and the last 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months of this test are performed at > 3000 kW. This is in accordance with commitments described in FSAR Section 8.3 (Ref. 2). The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions. The provisions for prelube and warmup, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, are applicable to this SR.

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor - 0.88. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG could experience. A load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-29 Revision 35

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.12 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(3); takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance; and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 14.

This Surveillance has been modified by four Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that would challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. However, it is acceptable to perform this SR in MODES 1 and 2 provided the other two DGs are OPERABLE, since a perturbation can only affect one divisional DG. If during the performance of this Surveillance, one of the other DGs becomes operable, this Surveillance is to be suspended. The surveillance may not be performed in MODES 1 and 2 during inclement weather and unstable grid conditions. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. Note 3 is provided in recognition that if the offsite electrical power distribution system is lightly loaded (i.e.,

system voltage is high), it may not be possible to raise voltage without creating an overvoltage condition on the ESF bus. Therefore, to ensure the bus voltage, supplied ESF loads, and DG are not placed in an unsafe condition during this test, the power factor limit does not have to be met if grid voltage or ESF bus loading does not permit the power factor limit to be met when the DG is tied to the grid. When this occurs, the power factor should be maintained as close to the limit as practicable. To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 4 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). Ifthe swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-30 Revis_-cn 35

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.13 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 12 seconds. The 12 second time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA.

The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(5). The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 14.

This SR is modified by three Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months at near full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions. Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allows all DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing. To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 3 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). Ifthe swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

SR 3.8.1.14 This Surveillance is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(6) and ensures that the manual synchronization and automatic load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and that the DG can be returned to ready-to-load status when offsite power is restored. It also ensures that the auto-start logic is reset to allow the DG to reload if a subsequent loss of offsite power occurs. The DG is considered to be in ready-to-load status when the DG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive an auto-close signal on bus undervoltage, and the load sequence timers are reset.

The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(6), and takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance.

The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 14.

A (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B63.8-31 Pevisicn 35

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.14 (continued)

REQUIREMENS This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 1. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 2 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 1 test should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

SR 3.8.1.15 Demonstration of the test mode override ensures that the DG availability under accident conditions is not compromised as the result of testing. Interlocks to the LOCA sensing circuits cause the DG to automatically reset to ready-to-load operation if an ECCS initiation signal is received during operation in the test mode. Ready-to-load operation is defined as the DG running at rated speed and voltage with the DG output breaker open. Although Plant Hatch Unit 2 is not committed to this standard, this SR is consistent with the provisions for automatic switchover required by IEEE-308 (Ref. 12),

paragraph 6.2.6(2).

The intent in the requirements associated with SR 3.8.1.15.b is to show that the emergency loading is not affected by the DG operation in test mode. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the emergency loads to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(8); takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance; and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 14.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-32 P*vsin 35

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.15 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 1. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 2 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 1 test should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

SR 3.8.1.16 Under accident conditions, loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load sequence timing devices. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents.

The 10% load sequence time interval tolerance ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated. Reference 2 provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses.

The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(2); takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance; and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 14.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1

"(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-33 -=visicn 35

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.16 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 1. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 2 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 1 test should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

SR 3.8.1.17 In the event of a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

This Surveillance demonstrates DG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.9, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ECCS initiation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 14.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 1. As the (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-34 eis-md- 35

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.17 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 2 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 1 test should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

SR 3.8.1.18 This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised. Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. It is permissible to place all three DGs in test simultaneously, for the performance of this Surveillance.

The 10 year Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9). This SR is modified by a Note.

The reason for the Note is to minimize wear on the DG during testing.

SR 3.8.1.19 With the exception of this Surveillance, all other Surveillances of this Specification (SR 3.8.1.1 through SR 3.8.1.18) are applied only to the Unit 2 DG and offsite circuits, and swing DG. This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 1 DG and offsite circuit are governed by the Unit 1 Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable Unit 1 Surveillances will satisfy both any Unit 1 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 2 SR. Several exceptions are noted to the Unit 1 SRs: SR 3.8.1.6 is excepted since only one Unit 1 circuit is required by the Unit 2 Specification (therefore, there is not necessarily a second circuit to transfer to); SRs 3.8.1.10, 15, and 17 are excepted since they relate to the DG response to a Unit 1 ECCS initiation signal, which is not a necessary function for support of the Unit 2 requirement for an OPERABLE Unit 1 DG.

The Frequency required by the applicable Unit 1 SR also governs performance of that SR for both Units.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-35 Revisicn 35

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.

2. FSAR, Sections 8.2 and 8.3.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, March 1971.

4. FSAR, Chapter 6.

5. FSAR, Chapter 15.

6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.

7. Generic Letter 84-15.

8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.

9. Regulatory Guide 1.108, August 1977.

10. Regulatory Guide 1.137, October 1979.

11. IEEE Standard 387-1984.

12. IEEE Standard 308-1980.

13. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

14. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment 174.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-36 Revisicn 35

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.2 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, 'AC Sources - Operating.*

APPLICABLE The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 4 SAFETY ANALYSES and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

In general, when the unit is shut down the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or loss of all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Postulated worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrences significantly reduced or eliminated, and minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

During MODES 1, 2, and 3, various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed within the ACTIONS. This allowance is in recognition that certain testing and maintenance activitbes must be conducted, provided an acceptable level of risk is not exceeded. During MODES 4 and 5, performance of a significant number of required testing and maintenance activities is also required. In MODES 4 and 5, the activities are generally (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-37 Hzvisicn 35 I

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES APPLICABLE planned and administratively controlled. Relaxations from typical SAFETY ANALYSES MODES 1, 2, and 3 LCO requirements are acceptable during (continued) shutdown MODES, based on:

a. The fact that time in an outage is limited. This is a risk prudent goal as well as a utility economic consideration.

b. Requiring appropriate compensatory measures for certain conditions. These may include administrative controls, reliance on systems that do not necessarily meet typical design requirements applied to systems credited in operation MODE analyses, or both.

c. Prudent utility consideration of the risk associated with multiple activities that could affect multiple systems.

d. Maintaining, to the extent practical, the ability to perform required functions (even if not meeting MODES 1, 2, and 3 OPERABILITY requirements) with systems assumed to function during an event.

In the event of an accident during shutdown, this LCO ensures the capability of supporting systems necessary for avoiding immediate difficulty, assuming either a loss of all offsite power or a loss of all onsite (diesel generator (DG)) power.

The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 1).

LCO One Unit 2 offsite circuit capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s) of LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems Shutdown," ensures that all required Unit 2 loads are powered from offsite power. An OPERABLE Unit 2 DG, associated with a Distribution System Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) bus required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8, ensures that a diverse power source is available for providing electrical power support assuming a loss of the offsite circuit. In addition, some components that may be required by Unit 2 are powered from Unit 1 sources [e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) valve load centers]. For SGT, one qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Unit 1 Class 1E Distribution System, and one Unit 1 DG capable of supplying power to one of the required Unit 1 subsystems of each of the required components, must be OPERABLE. For the LPCI valve load centers, one qualified circuit (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-38 HTN8evisicn 35 I

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES LCO between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E (continued) Electrical Distribution System capable of supplying power to the required LPCI valve load center must be OPERABLE. The circuit can be any of the Unit 1 circuits supplying the 1E and 1G ESF buses and the Unit 2 circuit supplying the 2F ESF bus. Also, one DG capable of supplying power to the required LPCI valve load center must be OPERABLE. The DG can be any one of the Unit 1 DGs (i.e., 1A and 1C DGs) and the swing DG (i.e., DG 1B). It is preferable to use the Unit 1 circuit and a Unit 1 DG to supply power to the LPCI valve load center, since in the case of an LOSP on both units, one LPCI valve load center would be without power if the swing DG was aligned to the opposite unit, thereby rendering one LPCI subsystem inoperable.

Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuits and DGs ensures the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and reactor vessel draindown).

The qualified offsite circuits must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage while connected to their respective ESF buses, and of accepting required loads during an accident. Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 offsite circuits consist of incoming breaker and disconnect to the 1C or 1 D and the 2C or 2D startup auxiliary transformers (SATs), associated 1C or 1D and 2C or 2D SATs, and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to all 4.16 kV ESF buses required by LCO 3.8.8. (However, for design purposes, the offsite circuit excludes the feeder breakers to each 4.16 kV ESF bus.)

The required DGs must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated frequency and voltage, connecting to their respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage, and accepting required loads. This sequence must be accomplished within 12 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with engine hot and DG in standby with engine at ambient conditions. Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillances, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode.

Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY.

"(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-39 ReviLsion 35

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES LCO It is acceptable during shutdown conditions, for a single offsite power (continued) circuit to supply all 4.16 kV ESF buses on a unit. No fast transfer capability is required for offsite circuits to be considered OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment to provide assurance that:

a. Systems providing adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.1.

ACTIONS A._1 An offsite circuit is considered inoperable if it is not available to one required ESF 4160 V bus. If two or more ESF 4.16 kV buses are required per LCO 3.8.8, the remaining buses with offsite power available may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with no offsite power available, appropriate restrictions can be implemented in accordance with the affected required feature(s)

LCOs' ACTIONS.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-40 Revisicn 35 I

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES ACTIONS A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 (continued)

With one or more offsite circuits not available to all required 4160 V ESF buses, the option still exists to declare all required features inoperable (per Required Action A.1). Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With one or more required DGs inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A have been modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to any required ESF bus, ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.8 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit whether or not a bus is de-energized. LCO 3.8.8 provides the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de-energized bus.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.2.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.8.1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in other than MODES 1, 2, and 3. SR 3.8.1.6 is not required to be met since only one Unit 1 and one Unit 2 offsite circuits are required to be OPERABLE. SR 3.8.1.15 is not required to be met because the required OPERABLE DG(s) is not required to undergo periods of (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-41 Peisim 35

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.2.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS being synchronized to the offsite circuit. SR 3.8.1.18 is excepted because starting independence is not required with the DG(s) that is not required to be OPERABLE. Refer to the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.1 for a discussion of each SR.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DG(s) from being paralleled with the offsite power network or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs, and to preclude de-energizing a required 4160 V ESF bus or disconnecting a required offsite circuit during performance of SRs. With limited AC sources available, a single event could compromise both the required circuit(s) and the DG(s). It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required.

This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 1 DG and offsite circuit are governed by the Unit 1 Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable Unit 1 Surveillances will satisfy both any Unit 1 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 2 Surveillance requirement. The Frequency required by the applicable Unit 1 SR also governs performance of that SR for both Units.

REFERENCES 1. NRC No.92-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-42 Revis-in 35

Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air BASES BACKGROUND Each diesel generator (DG) is provided with a storage tank. The 33,320 gallons required to be maintained in each of the Unit 2 and swing DG's fuel oil tanks represent a total volume of oil, together with the volume of oil in the day tanks, sufficient to operate any two DGs at 3250 kW for a period of 7 days (Ref. 1). In addition, it provides excess fuel to also operate the other Unit's required DGs at a load sufficient to maintain power to the components, required to be OPERABLE by the Unit 2 Technical Specifications, for approximately 7 days. This onsite fuel oil capacity is sufficient to operate the DGs for longer than the time to replenish the onsite supply from outside sources.

Fuel oil is transferred from storage tank to day tank by either of two transfer pumps associated with each storage tank. Valving is also available so that fuel oil can be transferred between fuel oil storage tanks and the day tanks. Redundancy of pumps and piping precludes the failure of one pump, or the rupture of any pipe, valve, or tank to result in the loss of more than one DG. All outside tanks, pumps, and piping are located underground.

For proper operation of the standby DGs, it is necessary to ensure the proper quality of the stored fuel oil. The fuel oil property monitored is the total particulate concentration. Periodic testing of the stored fuel oil total particulate concentration is a method to monitor the potential degradation related to long term storage and the potential impact to fuel filter plugging as a result of high particulate levels.

The DG lubrication system is designed to provide sufficient lubrication to permit proper operation of its associated DG under all loading conditions. The system is required to circulate the lube oil to the diesel engine working surfaces and to remove excess heat generated by friction during operation. The onsite storage in addition to the engine oil sump is sufficient to ensure 7 days' continuous operation.

This supply is sufficient to allow the operator to replenish lube oil from outside sources.

Each DG has an air start system with adequate capacity for five successive start attempts on the DG without recharging the air start receivers.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-43 Pavision 35 I

Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient SAFETY ANALYSES analyses in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 2), and Chapter 15 (Ref. 3),

assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE.

The DGs are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System; and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

Since diesel fuel oil and transfer, lube oil, and starting air subsystem support the operation of the standby AC power sources, they satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

LCO Stored diesel fuel oil is required to have sufficient supply for 7 days of full load operation. Three fuel oil storage tanks (the Unit 2 and swing DGs), each Ž 33,320 gallons, and 3 day tanks, each with 500 gallons, will provide the necessary volume. Included in this requirement is the transfer capability automatically from the Unit 2 and swing DGs storage tanks to the associated day tank and manually from each Unit 2 and swing DG storage tank to the day tanks of each required DG. It is also required to meet specific standards for quality.

Additionally, sufficient lube oil supply must be available to ensure the capability to operate at full load for 7 days. This requirement, in conjunction with an ability to obtain replacement supplies within 7 days, supports the availability of DGs required to shut down the reactor and to maintain it in a safe condition for an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA with loss of offsite power. DG day tank fuel oil requirements are addressed in LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," and LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources Shutdown."

The starting air system is required to have a minimum capacity for five successive DG start attempts without recharging the air start receivers. Only one air start receiver per DG is required, since each air start receiver has the required capacity.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources (LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2) are required to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an AOO or a postulated (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-44 Revision 35 I

Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES APPLICABILITY DBA. Because stored diesel fuel oil and transfer, lube oil, and starting (continued) air subsystem support LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2, stored diesel fuel oil and transfer, lube oil, and starting air are required to be within limits when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS Table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each DG. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable DG subsystem. Complying with the Required Actions for one inoperable DG subsystem may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable DG subsystem(s) are governed by separate Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

A._1 With one or more required DGs with one fuel oil transfer pump inoperable, the inoperable pump must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE fuel transfer pump is adequate to perform the fuel transfer function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE pump could result in loss of the associated DG and loss of the fuel oil in the respective tank. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the remaining fuel oil transfer capability, and the low probability of the need for the DG concurrent with a worst case single failure.

B.1 In this condition, the 7 day fuel oil supply for a required DG is not available. However, the Condition is restricted to fuel oil level reductions that maintain at least a 6 day supply. These circumstances may be caused by events such as:

a. Full load operation required for an inadvertent start while at minimum required level; or

b. Feed and bleed operations that may be necessitated by increasing particulate levels or any number of other oil quality degradations.

"(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-45 ]Pev-s-ime 35

Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)

This restriction allows sufficient time for obtaining the requisite replacement volume and performing the analyses required prior to addition of the fuel oil to the tank. A period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is considered sufficient to complete restoration of the required level prior to declaring the DG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days), the fact that procedures will be initiated to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.

C._1 With a required DG lube oil inventory < 400 gal, sufficient lube oil to support 7 days of continuous DG operation at full load conditions may not be available. However, the Condition is restricted to lube oil volume reductions that maintain at least a 6 day supply. This restriction allows sufficient time for obtaining the requisite replacement volume. A period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is considered sufficient to complete restoration of the required volume prior to declaring the DG inoperable.

This period is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days),

the low rate of usage, the fact that procedures will be initiated to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.

D._1 This Condition is entered as a result of a failure to meet the acceptance criterion for particulates. Normally, trending of particulate levels allows sufficient time to correct high particulate levels prior to reaching the limit of acceptability. Poor sample procedures (bottom sampling), contaminated sampling equipment, and errors in laboratory analysis can produce failures that do not follow a trend. Since the presence of particulates does not mean failure of the fuel oil to burn properly in the diesel engine, since particulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly between Surveillance Frequency intervals, and since proper engine performance has been recently demonstrated (within 31 days), it is prudent to allow a brief period prior to declaring the associated DG inoperable. The 7 day Completion Time allows for further evaluation, resampling, and re-analysis of the DG fuel oil.

" UB(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-46 pL-,jilo 35 I-

Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES ACTIONS E.1 (continued)

With required starting air receiver pressure < 225 psig, sufficient capacity for five successive DG start attempts does not exist.

However, as long as the receiver pressure is a 170 psig, there is adequate capacity for at least one start attempt, and the DG can be considered OPERABLE while the air receiver pressure is restored to the required limit. A period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is considered sufficient to complete restoration to the required pressure prior to declaring the DG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining air start capacity, the fact that most DG starts are accomplished on the first attempt, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.

F. 1 With a Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, D, or E not met, one or more required DG fuel oil transfer subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, one or more required DG fuel oil storage tanks with fuel oil level not within limits for reasons other than Condition B, or the stored diesel lube oil or the required starting air subsystem not within limits for reasons other than addressed by Condition C or E, the associated DG may be incapable of performing its intended function and must be immediately declared inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR provides verification that there is an adequate inventory of fuel oil in the Unit 2 and swing DG storage tanks to support the required DGs' operation for 7 days at the assumed load. (See B 3.8.3.)

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and unit operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period.

SR 3.8.3.2 This Surveillance ensures that sufficient lubricating oil inventory (combined inventory in the DG lubricating oil sump and stored in the warehouse) is available to support at least 7 days of full load operation for each required DG. The 400 gal requirement is based on the DG manufacturer's consumption values for the run time of the DG.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-47 Pe-dJsiam 35

Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Implicit in this SR is the requirement to verify the capability to transfer the lube oil from its storage location to the DG, since the DG lube oil sump does not hold adequate inventory for 7 days of full load operation without the level reaching the manufacturer's recommended minimum level.

A 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient lube oil supply is onsite, since DG starts and run time are closely monitored by the plant staff.

SR 3.8.3.3 This SR verifies that the required Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil testing is performed in a accordance with the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program. Tests are a means of monitoring the potential degradation related to long term storage and the potential impact to fuel filter plugging as a result of high particulate levels. Specific sampling requirements, frequencies, and additional information are discussed in detail in the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.

SR 3.8.3.4 This Surveillance ensures that, without the aid of the refill compressor, sufficient air start capacity for each required DG is available. The system design requirements provide for a minimum of five engine start cycles without recharging. A start cycle is defined by the DG vendor, but usually is measured in terms of time (seconds of cranking) or engine cranking speed. The pressure specified in this SR is intended to reflect the lowest value at which the five starts can be accomplished using one air receiver.

The 31 day Frequency takes into account the capacity, capability, redundancy, and diversity of the AC sources and other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to below normal air start pressure.

SR 3.8.3.5 This Surveillance demonstrates that each required Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil transfer pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank. It is required to (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-48 ,l_._ II LX-t-1V.LU1 .?

Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS support continuous operation of standby power sources. This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pumps are OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for automatic fuel transfer are OPERABLE.

The design of the fuel transfer systems is such that pumps operate automatically in order to maintain an adequate volume of fuel oil in the day tanks during or following DG testing. Therefore, a 31 day Frequency is specified to correspond to the maximum interval for DG testing.

SR 3.8.3.6 Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the required Unit 2 and swing DG fuel storage tanks once every 184 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water in the storage tank may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and from breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequency is based on engineering judgment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent failure of this SR, provided the accumulated water is removed during performance of the Surveillance.

SR 3.8.3.7 This Surveillance demonstrates that each required Unit 2 and swing DG fuel oil transfer pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to each required DG's day tank. It is required to support continuous operation of standby power sources, since fuel from three storage tanks is needed to supply fuel for two DGs to meet the 7 day supply requirement discussed in the Background section of these Bases. This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pumps are OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-49 Revisiicn 35

Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for manual fuel transfer are OPERABLE.

Since the fuel oil transfer pumps are being tested on a 31 day Frequency in accordance with SR 3.8.3.5, the 24 month Frequency has been determined to be acceptable. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 5.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 9.5.4.

2. FSAR, Chapter 6.

3. FSAR, Chapter 15.

4. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment I A

A HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-50 P-visicr- 35

DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating BASES BACKGROUND The DC electrical power system provides the AC emergency power system with control power. It also provides both motive and control power to selected safety related equipment. As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17 (Ref. 1), the DC electrical power system is designed to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions, assuming a single failure.

The DC electrical power system also conforms to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.6 (Ref. 2) and IEEE-308 (Ref. 3).

The station service DC power sources provide both motive and control power to selected safety related and nonsafety related equipment. Each DC subsystem is energized by one 125/250 V station service battery and three 125 V battery chargers (two normally inservice chargers and one standby charger). Each battery is exclusively associated with a single 125/250 VDC bus.

Each set of battery chargers exclusively associated with a 125/250 VDC subsystem cannot be interconnected with any other 125/250 VDC subsystem. The normal and backup chargers are supplied from the same AC load groups for which the associated DC subsystem supplies the control power. The loads between the redundant 125/250 VDC subsystem are not transferable except for the Automatic Depressurization System, the logic circuits and valves of which are normally fed from the Division 1 DC system.

The diesel generator (DG) DC power sources provide control and instrumentation power for their respective DG and their respective off site circuit supply breakers. In addition, DG 2A power source provides circuit breaker control power for the respective Division I loads on 4160 VAC buses 2E and 2F, and DG 2C power source provides circuit breaker control power for the respective Division II loads on 4160 VAC buses 2F and 2G. Each DG DC subsystem is energized by one 125 V battery and two 125 V battery chargers (one normally inservice charger and one standby charger).

During normal operation, the DC loads are powered from the respective station service and DG battery chargers with the batteries floating on the system.

In case of loss of normal power to any battery charger, the DC loads are automatically powered from the associated battery. This will (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-51 Revisim 35 I

DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4 BASES BACKGROUND result in the discharging of the associated battery (and affect the (continued) battery cell parameters).

The DC power distribution system is described in more detail in Bases for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution System - Operating," and LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution System - Shutdown."

Each battery has adequate storage capacity to carry the required load continuously for approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months (Ref. 4).

Each DC battery subsystem is separately housed in a ventilated room apart from its charger and distribution panels. Each subsystem is located in an area separated physically and electrically from the other subsystems to ensure that a single failure in one subsystem does not cause a failure in a redundant subsystem. There is no sharing between redundant Class 1E subsystems such as batteries, battery chargers, or distribution panels.

The batteries for DC electrical power subsystems are sized to produce required capacity at 80% of nameplate rating, corresponding to warranted capacity at end of life. The minimum design voltage limit is 105/210 V.

Each battery charger of DC electrical power subsystem has ample power output capacity for the steady state operation of connected loads required during normal operation, while at the same time maintaining a fully charged battery. Each battery charger has sufficient capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge to its fully charged state within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months while supplying normal steady state loads (Ref. 4).

A description of the Unit 1 DC power sources is provided in the Bases for Unit 1 LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient SAFETY ANALYSES analyses in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 5) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 6),

assume that Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system povides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the DGs, emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation. The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining DC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-52 2evisim n 35 I

DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4 BASES APPLICABLE a. An assumed loss of all offsite AC power sources or all onsite SAFETY ANALYSES AC power sources; and (continued)

b. A postulated worst case single failure.

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 13).

LCO The Unit 2 DC electrical power subsystems - with: 1) each station service DC subsystem consisting of two 125 V batteries in series, two battery chargers, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated bus; and

2) each DG DC subsystem consisting of one battery bank, one battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling - are required to be OPERABLE to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA. In addition, some components required by Unit 2 require power from Unit 1 sources (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System, Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) valve load centers, Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System, and Control Room Air Condition (AC) System). Therefore, the Unit 1 DG DC and the swing DG DC electrical power subsystems needed to provide DC power to the required Unit 1 components are also required to be OPERABLE. Thus, loss of any DC electrical power subsystem does not prevent the minimum safety function from being performed (Ref. 4).

APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure safe unit operation and to ensure that:

a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and

b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 4 and 5, and other conditions in which DC Sources are required, are addressed in the Bases for LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources - Shutdown."

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-53 Rev~isiLcn 35

DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A..1 If one or more of the required Unit 1 DG DC electrical power subsystems is inoperable (e.g., inoperable battery, inoperable battery charger(s), or inoperable battery charger and associated inoperable battery), or if the swing DG DC electrical power subsystem is inoperable due to performance of SR 3.8.4.7 or SR 3.8.4.8, and a loss of function has not occurred as described in Condition E, the remaining DC electrical power subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. In the case of an inoperable required Unit 1 DG DC electrical power subsystem, continued power operation should not exceed 7 days since a subsequent postulated worst case single failure could result in the loss of certain safety functions (e.g., SGT System and LPCI valve load centers). The 7 day Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining DC sources, and is based on the shortest restoration time allowed for the systems affected by the inoperable DC source in the respective system Specification.

In the case of an inoperable swing DG DC electrical power subsystem, since a subsequent postulated worst case single failure could result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a postulated worst case accident, continued power operation should also not exceed 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is based upon the swing DG DC electrical power subsystem being inoperable due to performance of SR 3.8.4.7 or SR 3.8.4.8. Performance of these two SRs will result in inoperability of the DC battery. Since this battery is common to both units, more time is provided to restore the battery, if the battery is inoperable for performance of required Surveillances, to preclude the need to perform a dual unit shutdown to perform these Surveillances. The swing DG DC electrical power subsystem also does not provide power to the same type of equipment as the other DG DC sources (e.g., breaker control power for 4160 V loads is not provided by the swing DG battery). The Completion Time also takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining DC sources.

B.1 If a Unit 2 or swing DG DC electric power subsystem is inoperable (for reasons other than Condition A), the remaining DC electrical power subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent postulated worst case single failure could result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a postulated worst (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-54 RevidLn 35

DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) case accident, continued power operation should not exceed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining the DG DC electrical power subsystem OPERABLE. (The DG DC electrical power subsystem affects both the DG and the offsite circuit, as well as the breaker closure power for various 4160 V AC loads, but does not affect 125/250 V DC station service loads.)

C.1 Condition C represents one Unit 2 station service division with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event, and a potential loss of ability to remain energized during normal operation. It is therefore imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of DC power to the affected division. The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months limit is consistent with the allowed time for an inoperable DC Distribution System division.

If one of the required DC electrical power subsystems is inoperable (e.g., inoperable battery, inoperable battery charger(s), or inoperable battery charger and associated inoperable battery), the remaining DC electrical power subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent postulated worst case single failure could result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a postulated worst case accident, continued power operation should not exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time is based on Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7) and reflects a reasonable time to assess unit status as a function of the inoperable DC electrical power subsystem and, if the DC electrical power subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status, to prepare to effect an orderly and safe unit shutdown.

D1. and D.2 Ifthe DC electrical power subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The Completion Time (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-55 Revisin 35

DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued) to bring the unit to MODE 4 is consistent with the time required in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7).

E..1 Condition E corresponds to a level of degradation in the DC electrical power subsystems that causes a required safety function to be lost.

When more than one DC source is lost, and this results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE The SRs are modified by a NOTE to indicate that SR 3.8.4.1 through REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.4.8 apply only to the Unit 2 DC sources, and that SR 3.8.4.9 applies only to the Unit 1 DC sources.

SR 3.8.4.1 Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge for the batteries helps to ensure the effectiveness of the charging system and the ability of the batteries to perform their intended function. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery (or battery cell) and maintain the battery (or a battery cell) in a fully charged state. Voltage requirements are based on the nominal design voltage of the battery and are consistent with the initial voltages assumed in the battery sizing calculations. The voltage requirement for battery terminal voltage is based on the open circuit voltage of a lead-calcium cell of nominal 1.215 specific gravity.

Without regard to other battery parameters, this voltage is indicative of a battery that is capable of performing its required safety function.

The 7 day Frequency is consistent with manufacturer's recommendations and IEEE-450 (Ref. 8).

SR 3.8.4.2 Visual inspection to detect corrosion of the battery cells and connections, or measurement of the resistance of each inter-cell, H C U(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-56 ]L*dc 35

DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS inter-rack, inter-tier, and terminal connection, provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.

The connection resistance limits are established to maintain connection resistance as low as reasonably possible to minimize the overall voltage drop across the battery and the possibility of battery damage due to heating of connections.

The resistance values for each battery connection are located in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 9).

The Frequency for these inspections, which can detect conditions that can cause power losses due to resistance heating, is 92 days. This Frequency is considered acceptable based on operating experience related to detecting corrosion trends.

SR 3.8.4.3 Visual inspection of the battery cells, cell plates, and battery racks provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.

The 24 month Frequency of the Surveillance takes into consideration the desired plant conditions to perform the Surveillance. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 14.

SR 3.8.4.4 and SR 3.8.4.5 Visual inspection and resistance measurements of inter-cell, inter-rack, inter-tier, and terminal connections provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could indicate degraded battery condition. The anti-corrosion material is used to help ensure good electrical connections and to reduce terminal deterioration. The visual inspection for corrosion is not intended to require removal of and inspection under each terminal connection.

The removal of visible corrosion is a preventive maintenance SR. The presence of visible corrosion does not necessarily represent a failure (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-57 Ped-Jsi-a 35

DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.4 and SR 3.8.4.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS of this SR, provided visible corrosion is removed during performance of this Surveillance.

The connection resistance limits are established to maintain connection resistance as low as reasonably possible to minimize the overall voltage drop across the battery and the possibility of battery damage due to heating of connections. The resistance values for each battery connection are located in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 9).

The 24 month Frequency of the Surveillances takes into consideration the desired plant conditions to perform the Surveillance. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 14.

SR 3.8.4.6 Battery charger capability requirements are based on the design capacity of the chargers (Ref. 4). According to Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 10), each battery charger supply is required to be based on the largest combined demands of the various steady state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the unit during these demand occurrences. The minimum required amperes and duration ensures that these requirements can be satisfied.

The Frequency is acceptable, given the unit conditions required to perform the test and the other administrative controls existing to ensure adequate charger performance during these 24 month intervals. In addition, this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 14.

SR 3.8.4.7 A battery service test is a special test of the battery's capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The discharge rate and test length corresponds to the design duty cycle requirements as specified in Reference 4.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-58 Revisicn 35

DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 10) and Regulatory Guide 1.129 (Ref. 11), which state that the battery service test should be performed during refueling operations or at some other outage. The 24 month Frequency is based on a review of the surveillance test history and Reference 14.

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows the performance of a modified performance discharge test in lieu of a service test.

The modified performance discharge test is a simulated duty cycle consisting of just two rates: the 1 minute rate published for the battery or the largest current load of the duty cycle, followed by the test rate employed for the performance test, both of which envelope the duty cycle of the service test. Since the ampere-hours removed by a rated 1 minute discharge represent a very small portion of the battery capacity, the test rate can be changed to that for the performance test without compromising the results of the performance discharge test.

The battery terminal voltage for the modified performance discharge test should remain above the minimum battery terminal voltage specified in the battery service test for the duration of time equal to that of the service test.

A modified performance discharge test is a test of the battery capacity and its ability to provide a high rate, short duration load (usually the highest rate of the duty cycle). This will often confirm the battery's ability to meet the critical period of the load duty cycle, in addition to determining its percentage of rated capacity. Initial conditions for the modified performance discharge test should be identical to those specified for a service discharge test.

The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DC electrical power subsystem from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy the Surveillance. The swing DG DC battery is exempted from this restriction, since it is required by both units' LCO 3.8.4 and cannot be performed in the manner required by the Note without resulting in a dual unit shutdown.

SR 3.8.4.8 A battery performance discharge test is a constant current capacity test to detect any change in the capacity determined by the (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 8 3.8-59 lpvjio 35

DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.8 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS acceptance test. Initial conditions consistent with IEEE 450 need to be met prior to the performing of a battery performance discharge test. The test results reflect the overall effects of usage and age.

A battery modified performance discharge test is described in the Bases for SR 3.8.4.7. Either the battery performance discharge test or the modified performance discharge test is acceptable for satisfying SR 3.8.4.8; however, only the modified performance discharge test may be used to satisfy SR 3.8.4.8, while satisfying the requirements of SR 3.8.4.7 at the same time.

The acceptance criteria for this Surveillance is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 8) and IEEE-485 (Ref. 12). These references recommend that the battery be replaced if its capacity is below 80% of the manufacturer's rating. Although there may be ample capacity, the battery rate of deterioration is rapidly increasing.

The Frequency for this test is normally 60 months. Ifthe battery shows degradation, or if the battery has reached 85% of its expected application service life and capacity is - 100% of the manufacturers rating, the Surveillance Frequency is reduced to 12 months. However, if the battery shows no degradation but has reached 85% of its expected application service life, the Surveillance Frequency is only reduced to 24 months for batteries that retain capacity ? 100% of the manufacturer's rating. Degradation is indicated, according to IEEE-450 (Ref. 8), when the battery capacity drops by more than 10% of rated capacity from its capacity on the previous performance test or is more than 10% below the manufacturer's rating. All these Frequencies are consistent with the recommendations in IEEE-450 (Ref. 8).

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DC electrical power subsystem from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy the Surveillance. The swing DG DC battery is exempted from this restriction, since it is required by both units' LCO 3.8.4 and cannot be performed in the manner required by the Note without resulting in a dual unit shutdown.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-60 RPV-,SI_" n 35

DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.9 REQUIREMENTS (continued) With the exception of this Surveillance, all other Surveillances of this Specification (SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8) are applied only to the Unit 2 DC sources. This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 1 DC sources are governed by the Unit 1 Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable Unit 1 Surveillances will satisfy both any Unit 1 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 2 SR.

The Frequency required by the applicable Unit 1 SR also governs performance of that SR for both Units.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.

2. Regulatory Guide 1.6.

3. IEEE Standard 308-1971.

4. FSAR, Sections 8.3.2.1.1 and 8.3.2.1.2.

5. FSAR, Chapter 6.

6. FSAR, Chapter 15.

7. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.

8. IEEE Standard 450-1987.

9. Technical Requirements Manual.

10. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977.

11. Regulatory Guide 1.129, December 1974.

12. IEEE Standard 485-1983.

13. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

14. NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment. 174.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-61 Redsicn 35

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.5 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses SAFETY ANALYSES in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2),

assume that Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE.

The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators (DGs), emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3).

LCO The necessary Unit 2 DC electrical power subsystems -- with:

1) each station service DC subsystem consisting of two 125 V batteries in series, two battery chargers, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling; and 2) each DG DC subsystem consisting of one battery bank, one battery charger, and

"(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-62 Pavis-icn 35 1

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.5 BASES LCO the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling -

(continued) are required to be OPERABLE to support required DC distribution subsystems required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown.' In addition, some components that may be required by Unit 2 require power from Unit 1 sources (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and LPCI valve load centers).

Therefore, the Unit 1 DG DC and the swing DG DC electrical power subsystems needed to provide DC power to the required Unit 1 components are also required to be OPERABLE. This requirement ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide assurance that:

a. Required features to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;

b. Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.4.

ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, and A.2.4 If more than one DC distribution subsystem is required according to LCO 3.8.8, the DC subsystems remaining OPERABLE with one or more DC power sources inoperable may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-63 Revisicn 35 I

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.5 BASES ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, and A.2.4 (continued)

ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with associated DC power sources inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected system LCOs' ACTIONS. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.5.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.5.1 requires performance of all Surveillances required by SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8. Therefore, see the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.4 for a discussion of each SR.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DC sources from being discharged below their capability to provide the required power supply or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required.

SR 3.8.5.2 This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 1 DC sources are governed by the (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-64 Pbv.isicn 35 I

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.5.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Unit 1 Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable Unit 1 Surveillances will satisfy both any Unit 1 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 2 Surveillance Requirement. The Frequency required by the applicable Unit 1 SR also governs performance of that SR for both Units.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 6.

2. FSAR, Chapter 15.

3. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

J,

.F.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-65 P,,ýsJcn 35 1

Battery Cell Parameters B 3.8.6 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters BASES BACKGROUND This LCO delineates the limits on electrolyte temperature, level, float voltage, and specific gravity for the DC electrical power subsystems batteries. A discussion of these batteries and their OPERABILITY requirements is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources Operating," and LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources - Shutdown.'

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient SAFETY ANALYSES analyses in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2),

assume Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power subsystems provide normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators (DGs), emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining at least one division of DC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions, in the event of:

a. An assumed loss of all offsite AC or all onsite AC power; and

b. A postulated worst case single failure.

Since battery cell parameters support the operation of the DC electrical power subsystems, they satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

LCO Battery cell parameters must remain within acceptable limits to ensure availability of the required DC power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. Cell parameter limits are established to allow continued DC electrical system function even with Category A and B limits not met.

A (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-66 Pe-=visin. 35

Battery Cell Parameters B 3.8.6 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The battery cell parameters are required solely for the support of the associated DC electrical power subsystem. Therefore, these cell parameters are only required when the DC power source is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to the Applicability discussions in Bases for LCO 3.8.4 and LCO 3.8.5.

ACTIONS A Note has been added providing that, for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each battery. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable battery. Complying with the Required Actions for battery cell parameters allows for restoration and continued operation, and subsequent out of limit battery cell parameters may be governed by separate Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

A. 1, A.2, and A.3 With parameters of one or more cells in one or more batteries not within limits (i.e., Category A limits not met or Category B limits not met, or Category A and B limits not met) but within the Category C limits specified in Table 3.8.6-1, the battery is degraded but there is still sufficient capacity to perform the intended function. Therefore, the affected battery is not required to be considered inoperable solely as a result of Category A or B limits not met, and continued operation is permitted for a limited period.

The pilot cell electrolyte level and float voltage are required to be verified to meet the Category C limits within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (Required Action A.1). This check provides a quick indication of the status of the remainder of the battery cells. One hour provides time to inspect the electrolyte level and to confirm the float voltage of the pilot cells.

One hour is considered a reasonable amount of time to perform the required verification.

Verification that the Category C limits are met (Required Action A.2) provides assurance that during the time needed to restore the parameters to the Category A and B limits, the battery is still capable of performing its intended function. A period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is allowed to complete the initial verification because specific gravity measurements must be obtained for each connected cell. Taking into consideration both the time required to perform the required verification and the assurance that the battery cell parameters are not severely degraded, this time is considered reasonable. The (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-67 Re-viicn 35

Battery Cell Parameters B 3.8.6 BASES ACTIONS A.1, A.2, and A.3 (continued) verification is repeated at 7 day intervals until the parameters are restored to Category A and B limits. This periodic verification is consistent with the normal Frequency of pilot cell surveillances.

Continued operation is only permitted for 31 days before battery cell parameters must be restored to within Category A and B limits.

Taking into consideration that, while battery capacity is degraded, sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and to allow time to fully restore the battery cell parameters to normal limits, this time is acceptable for operation prior to declaring the associated DC battery inoperable.

B._1 When any battery parameter is outside the Category C limit for any connected cell, sufficient capacity to supply the maximum expected load requirement is not ensured and the corresponding DC electrical power subsystem must be declared inoperable. Additionally, other potentially extreme conditions, such as not completing the Required Actions of Condition A within the required Completion Time or average electrolyte temperature of representative cells falling below the appropriate limit (65°F for station service and 40°F for DG batteries), also are cause for immediately declaring the associated DC electrical power subsystem inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.6.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that Category A battery cell parameters are consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which recommends regular battery inspections (at least one per month) including voltage, specific gravity, and electrolyte level of pilot cells.

SR 3.8.6.2 The 92 day inspection of specific gravity, cell voltage, and level is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3). In addition, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of a battery overcharge > 150 V, the battery must be demonstrated to meet Category B limits. This inspection is also consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which recommends special inspections following a (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-68 Poii 35

Battery Cell Parameters B 3.8.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.6.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS severe overcharge, to ensure that no significant degradation of the battery occurs as a consequence of such overcharge.

SR 3.8.6.3 This Surveillance verification that the average temperature of representative cells is within limits is consistent with a recommendation of IEEE-450 (Ref. 3) that states that the temperature of electrolyte in representative cells should be determined on a quarterly basis.

Lower than normal temperatures act to inhibit or reduce battery capacity. This SR ensures that the operating temperatures remain within an acceptable operating range. This limit is based on IEEE-450 or the manufacturer's recommendations when provided.

Table 3.8.6-1 This table delineates the limits on electrolyte level, float voltage, and specific gravity for three different categories. The meaning of each category is discussed below.

Category A defines the normal parameter limit for each designated pilot cell in each battery. The cells selected as pilot cells are those whose temperature, voltage, and electrolyte specific gravity approximate the state of charge of the entire battery.

The Category A limits specified for electrolyte level are based on manufacturer's recommendations and are consistent with the guidance in IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), with the extra 1/4 inch allowance above the high water level indication for operating margin to account for temperature and charge effects. In addition to this allowance, footnote a to Table 3.8.6-1 permits the electrolyte level to be above the specified maximum level during equalizing charge, provided it is not overflowing. These limits ensure that the plates suffer no physical damage, and that adequate electron transfer capability is maintained in the event of transient conditions. IEEE-450 (Ref. 3) recommends that electrolyte level readings should be made only after the battery has been at float charge for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The Category A limit specified for float voltage is > 2.13 V per cell.

This value is based on the recommendation of IEEE-450 (Ref. 3),

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-69 HBvisicn 35 1

Battery Cell Parameters B 3.8.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE Table 3.8.6-1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS which states that prolonged operation of cells below 2.13 V can reduce the life expectancy of cells.

The Category A limit specified for specific gravity for each pilot cell is a 1.200 (0.015 below the manufacturer's fully charged nominal specific gravity) or a battery charging current that had stabilized at a low value. This value is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. According to IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), the specific gravity readings are based on a temperature of 77°F (250 C).

The specific gravity readings are corrected for actual electrolyte temperature and level. For each 3 0 F (1.67 0 C) above 77 0 F (250 C),

1 point (0.001) is added to the reading; 1 point is subtracted for each 30 F below 77 0 F. The specific gravity of the electrolyte in a cell increases with a loss of water due to electrolysis or evaporation.

Level correction will be in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations.

Category B defines the normal parameter limits for each connected cell. The term "connected cell" excludes any battery cell that may be jumpered out.

The Category B limits specified for electrolyte level and float voltage are the same as those specified for Category A and have been discussed above. The Category B limit specified for specific gravity for each connected cell is > 1.195 (0.020 below the manufacturer's fully charged, nominal specific gravity) with the average of all connected cells 1.205 (0.010 below the manufacturer's fully charged, nominal specific gravity). These values are based on manufacturer's recommendations. The minimum specific gravity value required for each cell ensures that the effects of a highly charged or newly installed cell do not mask overall degradation of the battery.

Category C defines the limits for each connected cell. These values, although reduced, provide assurance that sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and maintain a margin of safety. When any battery parameter is outside the Category C limit, the assurance of sufficient capacity described above no longer exists, and the battery must be declared inoperable.

The Category C limits specified for electrolyte level (above the top of the plates and not overflowing) ensure that the plates suffer no physical damage and maintain adequate electron transfer capability.

The Category C limit for voltage is based on IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which

"(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-70 Aevisir 35 I

Battery Cell Parameters B 3.8.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE Table 3.8.6-1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS states that a cell voltage of 2.07 V or below, under float conditions and not caused by elevated temperature of the cell, indicates internal cell problems and may require cell replacement.

The Category C Allowable Value of average specific gravity a 1.195, is based on manufacturer's recommendations (0.020 below the manufacturer's recommended fully charged, nominal specific gravity).

In addition to that limit, it is required that the specific gravity for each connected cell must be no less than 0.020 below the average of all connected cells. This limit ensures that the effect of a highly charged or new cell does not mask overall degradation of the battery.

The footnotes to Table 3.8.6-1 that apply to specific gravity are applicable to Category A, B, and C specific gravity. Footnote b of Table 3.8.6-1 requires the above mentioned correction for electrolyte level and temperature, with the exception that level correction is not required when battery charging current, while on float charge, is

< 1 amp for station service batteries and < 0.5 amp for DG batteries.

This current provides, in general, an indication of overall battery condition.

Because of specific gravity gradients that are produced during the recharging process, delays of several days may occur while waiting for the specific gravity to stabilize. A stabilized charger current is an acceptable alternative to specific gravity measurement for determining the state of charge of the designated pilot cell. This phenomenon is discussed in IEEE-450 (Ref. 3). Footnote c to Table 3.8.6-1 allows the float charge current to be used as an alternate to specific gravity for up to 7 days following a battery recharge.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 6.

2. FSAR, Chapter 15.

3. IEEE Standard 450-1987.

4. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-71 evrisicn 35 1

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating BASES BACKGROUND The onsite Class 1E AC and DC electrical power distribution system is divided into redundant and independent AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems.

The primary AC distribution system consists of three 4.16 kV Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) buses each having an offsite source of power as well as a dedicated onsite diesel generator (DG) source.

Each 4.16 kV ESF bus is normally connected to a normal source startup auxiliary transformer (SAT) (2D). During a loss of the normal offsite power source to the 4.16 kV ESF buses, the alternate supply breaker from SAT 2C attempts to close. If all offsite sources are unavailable, the onsite emergency DGs supply power to the 4.16 kV ESF buses.

The secondary plant distribution system includes 600 VAC emergency buses 2C and 2D and associated load centers, and transformers.

There are two independent 125/250 VDC station service electrical power distribution subsystems and three independent 125 VDC DG electrical power distribution subsystems that support the necessary power for ESF functions.

A description of the Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution system is provided in the Bases for Unit 1 LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution System - Operating."

The list of required Unit 2 distribution buses is presented in LCO 3.8.7.

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient SAFETY ANALYSES analyses in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2),

assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.5, Emergency Core (Continued)-A HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-72 Pevisiai 35 I

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES APPLICABLE Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)

SAFETY ANALYSES System; and Section 3.6 Containment Systems.

(continued)

The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit.

This includes maintaining distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

a. An assumed loss of all offsite power sources or all onsite AC electrical power sources; and

b. A postulated worst case single failure.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution system satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

LCO The Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE. The required Unit 2 electrical power distribution subsystems listed in LCO 3.8.7 ensure the availability of AC and DC electrical power for the systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA.

Should one or more buses not listed in LCO 3.8.7 become inoperable due to a failure not affecting the OPERABILITY of a bus listed in LCO 3.8.7 (e.g., a breaker supplying a single MCC faults open), the individual loads on the bus would be considered inoperable, and the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCOs governing the individual loads would be entered. If however, one or more of these buses is inoperable due to a failure also affecting the OPERABILITY of a-bus listed in LCO 3.8.7 (e.g., loss of a 4.16 kV ESF bus, which results in de-energization of all buses powered from the 4.16 kV ESF bus), the Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO for the individual loads are not required to be entered, since LCO 3.0.6 allows this exception (i.e., the loads are inoperable due to the inoperability of a support system governed by a Technical Specification; the 4.16 kV ESF bus). In addition, since some components required by Unit 2 receive power through Unit 1 electrical power distribution subsystems (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)

System, Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) valve load centers, Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System,and Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System), the Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support the required equipment must also be OPERABLE.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-73 Pvisicn 35 I

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES LCO Maintaining the Division 1 and 2 and swing bus AC and DC electrical (continued) power distribution subsystems OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of ESF is not defeated.

Therefore, a single failure within any system or within the electrical power distribution subsystems will not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.

The AC electrical power distribution subsystem requires the associated buses and electrical circuits to be energized to their proper voltages. OPERABLE DC electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses to be energized to their proper voltage from either the associated battery or charger.

In addition, tie breakers between redundant safety related AC and DC power distribution subsystems, if they exist, must be open. This prevents any electrical malfunction in any power distribution subsystem from propagating to the redundant subsystem, which could cause the failure of a redundant subsystem and a loss of essential safety function(s). If any tie breakers are closed, the electrical power distribution subsystem which is not being powered from its normal source (i.e., it is being powered from its redundant electrical power distribution subsystem) is considered inoperable. This applies to the onsite, safety related, redundant electrical power distribution subsystems. It does not, however, preclude redundant Class 1E 4.16 kV ESF buses from being powered from the same offsite circuit.

APPLICABILITY The electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that:

a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and

b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

Electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 4 and 5, and other conditions in which AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems are required, are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown.'

(continued)

I-IATr.I-I IINKrr I In ! *.-"l ! *,,t! II Ievisicn I 0 0.0-&+-

35

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A..1 If one or more of the required Unit 1 AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystems are inoperable, and a loss of function has not occurred as described in Condition F, the remaining AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent postulated worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of certain safety functions (e.g., SGT System and LPCI valve load centers), continued power operation should not exceed 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems, and is based on the shortest restoration time allowed for the systems affected by the inoperable AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem in the respective system Specification.

B.1 If a Unit 2 or swing DG DC electrical power distribution subsystem is inoperable, the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent postulated worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a postulated worst case accident, continued power operation should not exceed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining the DG DC electrical power distribution subsystem OPERABLE. (The DG DC electrical power distribution subsystem affects both the DG and the off site circuit, as well as the breaker closure power for various 4160 VAC loads, but does not affect 125/250 VDC station service loads). The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months time limit before requiring a unit shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because:

a. There is a potential for decreased safety if the unit operators' attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected bus(es) to the actions associated with taking the unit to shutdown within this time limit.

b. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component in the division with AC power. [The redundant component is verified OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 5.5.10, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)."]

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-75 Pevisim 35 I

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.7.a. If Condition B is entered while, for instance, a Unit 2 or swing AC bus is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, LCO 3.8.7.a may already have been not met for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . This situation could lead to a total duration of 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months , since initial failure of LCO 3.8.7.a, to restore the Unit 2 and swing DG DC distribution system. At this time a Unit 2 or swing AC bus could again become inoperable, and Unit 2 and swing DC distribution system could be restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.7.a was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition B was entered. The 16 hour1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet LCO 3.8.7.a indefinitely.

C._1 With one or more required Unit 2 or swing AC buses, load centers, motor control centers, or distribution panels in one subsystem inoperable, the remaining AC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC buses, load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panels must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

The Condition C postulated worst scenario is one 4160 V bus without AC power (i.e., no offsite power to the 4160 V bus and the associated DG inoperable). In this condition, the unit is more vulnerable to a complete loss of Unit 2 AC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the unit operators' attention be focused on minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining buses by stabilizing the unit, and on restoring power to the affected buses. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months time limit before requiring a unit shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because:

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-76 Revisim 35

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued)

a. There is a potential for decreased safety if the unit operators' attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected bus(es) to the actions associated with taking the unit to shutdown within this time limit.

b. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component in the division with AC power. [The redundant component is verified OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 5.5.10, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)."]

The second Completion Time for Required Action C.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.7.a. If Condition C is entered while, for instance, a Unit 2 station service DC bus is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, LCO 3.8.7.a may already have been not met for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months , since initial failure of LCO 3.8.7.a, to restore the Unit 2 and swing AC distribution system. At this time a Unit 2 station service DC bus could again become inoperable, and Unit 2 and swing AC distribution system could be restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.7.a was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition C was entered. The 16 hour1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet LCO 3.8.7.a indefinitely.

D..1 With one Unit 2 station service DC bus inoperable, the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystem is capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure.

The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported.

Therefore, the required Unit 2 DC buses must be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months by powering the bus from the associated battery or charger.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-77 Revisicn 35

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued)

Condition D represents one Unit 2 division without adequate DC power, potentially with both the battery significantly degraded and the associated charger nonfunctioning. In this situation the plant is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all Unit 2 station service DC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the plant, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining division, and restoring power to the affected division.

This 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the majority of components that would be without power. Taking exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate DC power, which would have Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , is acceptable because of:

a. The potential for decreased safety when requiring a change in plant conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while not allowing stable operations to continue;

b. The potential for decreased safety when requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without DC power, while not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected division;

c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time for DC buses is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 3).

The second Completion Time for Required Action D.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.7.a. If Condition D is entered while, for instance, Unit 2 or swing AC bus is inoperable and subsequently restored OPERABLE, LCO 3.8.7.a may already have been not met for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months , since initial failure of LCO 3.8.7.a, to restore the Unit 2 station service DC distribution system. At this time, Unit 2 or swing AC bus could again become inoperable, and Unit 2 station service DC distribution system could be restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-78 Bevs-icn 35 I

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued)

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal *time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This allowance results in establishing the "time zero' at the time LCO 3.8.7.a was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition D was entered. The 16 hour1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential of failing to meet the LCO indefinitely.

E.1 and E.2 If the inoperable distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1 Condition F corresponds to a level of degradation in the electrical power distribution system that causes a required safety function to be lost. When more than one AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystem is lost, and this results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical buses are maintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each required bus. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems, (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-79 Fei:c 35 1

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.7.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 6.

2. FSAR, Chapter 15.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.

4. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

A HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-80 HUB8sicn 35 I

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8.8 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.8 Distribution Systems - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems Operating."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses SAFETY ANALYSES in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC and DC electrical power sources and associated power distribution subsystems during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3).

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-81 (ovision 35 1

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)

LCO Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features. This LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the Unit 2 electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of Technical Specifications required systems, equipment, and components both specifically addressed by their own LCO, and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY. In addition, some components that may be required by Unit 2 receive power through Unit 1 electrical power distribution subsystems (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and Low Pressure Coolant Injection valve load centers). Therefore, the Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support the required equipment must also be OPERABLE.

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

APPLICABILITY The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide assurance that:

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

(continued)

HATCH IJNIT 2 ' Resim 35 VW W V V WNF U - U f-..

I

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS AI1 A-2.1l A-2-2, A-2.4 and A-21; Although redundant required features may require redundant electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare required features associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made, (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the plant safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required residual heat removal-shutdown cooling (RHR SDC) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the RHR SDC ACTIONS would not be entered. Therefore, Required Action A.2.5 is provided to direct declaring RHR SDC inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate RHR SDC ACTIONS.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required distribution subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the plant safety systems may be without power.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-83 lPevisicn 35

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR SAR REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem is functioning properly, with the buses energized. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses.

The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the electrical power distribution subsystems, as well as other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 6.

2. FSAR, Chapter 15.

3. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Improvements," July 23, 1993.

A-HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-84 Revisicn 35 1

ML022030455

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