Text

Rev. 117 to Technical Requirement Manual, Unit 1, Part 2
	ML20303A181
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	09/29/2020
From:	; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20303A202	List: ML20303A178; ML20303A179; ML20303A180; ML20303A181; ML20303A182; ML20303A183; ML20303A184; ML20303A186; ML20303A187; ML20303A188; ML20303A189; ML20303A192; ML20303A193; ML20303A194; ML20303A195; ML20303A196; ML20303A197; NL-20-1084, 8 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Reference Drawings, Part 2;
References
	NL-20-1084
	Download: ML20303A181 (200)
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{{#Wiki_filter:HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 11.0-1 T 11.0 LOSS OF FUNCTION DIAGRAMS A. Purpose Loss of Function Diagrams (LFDs) provide a means for evaluating the affects of the loss of one or more instrument channels on the capability of the associated instrument logic to perform its intended safety function. In fulfilling this purpose, the LFDs provide the following: The number of channels associated with a given instrument function. The configuration of the instrument channels in the trip systems. The number and combinations of channels required to be operable in order for instrument function capability to be maintained. B. General Rules for Use: LFDs are channel-based, that is, they are designed to be used to determine instrument function capability given a loss of one or more channels. For the purposes of determining loss of function, the LFDs show what constitutes a channel. However, in identifying the beginning and end of a channel for the purpose of determining channel functional test scope, the LFD should not be used for this purpose; instead, the TRM definition Channel Functional Test Scope should be used. As in typical elementary logic, the energy trace is from the sensor to the actuated device. Consequently, inoperability of a component in the energy trace can directly or indirectly affect the ability of a downstream component in the trace to function. However, the opposite is not always true; that is, the downstream component since it does not provide input to the upstream component does not affect the ability of the upstream component to function. As such, loss of a component anywhere other than in the channel cannot in all cases be traced back to evaluate the affect of the loss on a channel(s). Consequently, since the LFDs are channel-based, in such cases, the LFD cannot be used to determine instrument function capability. Instead, the elementary logic must be consulted to determine the affect of the loss on the supported system. LFDs are designed to be used with the instrumentation specifications found in the Technical Specifications, the TRM, and the ODCM. Typically, an LFD is provided for each instrumentation specification line item. However, some instruments provide more than one instrument function and an LFD may not provide sufficient information to ascertain all of the functions provided by the instrument. In order to identify all instrument functions performed by a particular instrument, Table 10.1-1, Master Equipment Cross Reference, Sorted by MPL, must be consulted. For a given MPL, this sort will identify all LFDs for the instrument functions that are served by the instrument. The complete logic from sensor to the actuation logic/actuated device is not reflected in the LFDs. A dashed line is used to denote cases where the logic

HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 11.0-2 was not included. Elementary diagrams used to develop the LFD are referenced on the LFD in the event information on the omitted logic is needed. The drawings show the channels and the trip logics associated with a particular instrument function and how the channels and the trip logics are related in the trip systems. The LFDs are ordered alphabetically by the system abbreviation and then sequentially by the sketch number. The LFD sketches are condensed elementaries and, therefore, the same rules of use that apply to elementaries also apply to the LFDs. The loss of function statement typically found at the bottom of the LFD identifies the channel combinations required to be operable in order for instrument function capability as defined in the instrumentation specification to be maintained. In some cases, the associated instrument specification contains an action statement that requires tripping the inoperable channel within a prescribed period of time. The LFD takes credit for this requirement in that it specifies for these cases that in order for instrument function to be maintained, the prescribed combinations of channels must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. The following is a list of abbreviations and their meanings used in the drawings that may be unfamiliar to the user: AU - Alarm Unit EPM - RPS Electric Power Monitoring ITU - Indicating Trip Unit LRM - Log Radiation Monitor MTU - Master Trip Unit PRM - Process Radiation Monitoring PS - Pressure Switch RWLH - Reactor Water Level High RIS - Radiation Indicating Switch SAU - Single Alarm Unit STU - Slave Trip Unit

T 11.0 LOSS OF FUNCTION DIAGRAMS LIST OF DIAGRAMS Diagram No. Title Revision No. HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 11.0-i Revision 60 LFD-1-CRB-01 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.2.1-1, Item 1.a, Control Rod Block, Rod Block Monitor, Low Power Range - Upscale 12 LFD-1-CRB-02 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.2.1-1, Item 1.b, Control Rod Block, Rod Block Monitor, Intermediate Power Range - Upscale 12 LFD-1-CRB-03 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.2.1-1, Item 1.c, Control Rod Block, Rod Block Monitor, High Power Range - Upscale 12 LFD-1-CRB-04 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.2.1-1, Item 1.d, Control Rod Block, Rod Block Monitor - Inop 12 LFD-1-CRB-05 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.2.1-1, Item 1.e, Control Rod Block, Rod Block Monitor - Downscale 12 LFD-1-CRB-06 (1 sheet) N/A 12 LFD-1-CRB-07 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.2.1-1, Item 2, Control Rod Block, Rod Worth Minimizer LFD-1-CRB-08 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.2.1-1, Item 3, Control Rod Block, Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position LFD-1-CRB-09 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 1.a, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, SRM - Detector Not Full In 60 LFD-1-CRB-10 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 1.b, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, SRM - Upscale 60 LFD-1-CRB-11 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 1.c, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, SRM - Inoperative 60 LFD-1-CRB-12 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 1.d, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, SRM - Downscale 60 LFD-1-CRB-13 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 2.a, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, IRM - Detector Not Full In 60 LFD-1-CRB-14 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 2.b, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, IRM - Upscale 60 LFD-1-CRB-15 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 2.c, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, IRM - Inoperative 60

List of Diagrams (Continued) Diagram No. Title Revision No. HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 11.0-ii Revision 113 LFD-1-CRB-16 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 2.d, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, IRM - Downscale 60 LFD-1-CRB-17 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 3.a, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, APRM - Simulated Thermal Power - Upscale 60 LFD-1-CRB-18 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 3.b, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, APRM - Simulated Thermal Power - Upscale (Setdown) 60 LFD-1-CRB-19 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 3.c, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, APRM - Inoperative 60 LFD-1-CRB-20 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 3.d, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, APRM - Neutron Flux - Downscale 60 LFD-1-CRB-21 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 3.e, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, APRM - Low LPRM Count 60 LFD-1-CRB-22 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 3.f, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, APRM - Reactor Recirculation Flow - Upscale 60 LFD-1-CRB-23 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 4, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, SDV Level - High 60 LFD-1-ECCS-01 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 1.a, Core Spray System RWL - Low Low Low, Level 1 6 LFD-1-ECCS-02 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 1.b, Core Spray System Drywell Pressure - High 93 LFD-1-ECCS-03 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 1.c & TS 3.3.5.2-1, Item 1.a, Core Spray System Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low 113 LFD-1-ECCS-04 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 1.d & TS 3.3.5.2-1, Item 1.b, Core Spray System Core Spray Pump Discharge Flow - Low 113 LFD-1-ECCS-05 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.a, LPCI System RWL - Low Low Low, Level 1 6 LFD-1-ECCS-06 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.b, LPCI System Drywell Pressure - High 93

List of Diagrams (Continued) Diagram No. Title Revision No. HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 11.0-iii Revision 113 LFD-1-ECCS-07 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.c & TS 3.3.5.2-1, Item 2.a, LPCI System Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low 113 LFD-1-ECCS-08 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.d, LPCI System Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low Recirc Disch Valve Permissive LFD-1-ECCS-09 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.e, LPCI System Reactor Vessel Shroud, Level 0 LFD-1-ECCS-10 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.f, LPCI System LPCI Pump Start - Time Delay Relay LFD-1-ECCS-11 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.g & TS 3.3.5.2-1, Item 2.b, LPCI System LPCI Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass) 113 LFD-1-ECCS-12 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.a, HPCI System RWL - Low Low, Level 2 6 LFD-1-ECCS-13 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.b, HPCI Initiation Drywell Pressure - High 93 LFD-1-ECCS-14 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.c, HPCI System Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 LFD-1-ECCS-15 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.d, HPCI System Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low LFD-1-ECCS-16 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.e, HPCI System Suppression Pool Water Level - High LFD-1-ECCS-17 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.f, HPCI System HPCI Pump Disch Flow - Low (Bypass) LFD-1-ECCS-18 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 4.a/5.a, ADS Trip System RWL - Low, Low, Low - Level 1 6 LFD-1-ECCS-19 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 4.b/5.b, ADS Trip System Drywell Pressure - High 93 LFD-1-ECCS-20 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 4.c/5.c, ADS Trip System ADS Initiation Timer LFD-1-ECCS-21 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 4.d/5.d, ADS Trip System RWL - Low, Level 3 (Confirmatory)

List of Diagrams (Continued) Diagram No. Title Revision No. HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 11.0-iv Revision 116 LFD-1-ECCS-22 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 4.e/5.e, ADS Trip System Core Spray Pump Discharge Press - High LFD-1-ECCS-23 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 4.f/5.f, ADS Trip System LPCI Pump Discharge Pressure - High LFD-1-ECCS-24 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 4.g/5.g, ADS Trip System ADS Low Water LVL Actuation Timer LFD-1-ECCS-25 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.5-1, Item 2, HPCI Turbine Trip HPCI Turbine Exhaust Pressure - High 60 LFD-1-ECCS-26 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.5-1, Item 3, HPCI Turbine Trip HPCI Pump Suction Pressure - Low 60 LFD-1-ECCS-27 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.5-1, Item 5, RCIC Turbine Trip RCIC Turbine Exhaust Pressure - High 104 LFD-1-ECCS-28 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.5-1, Item 6, RCIC Turbine Trip RCIC Pump Suction Pressure - Low 60 LFD-1-ECCS-29 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.5-1, Items 7.a and 7.b, RCIC Pump Discharge Flow - High, Low 82 LFD-1-EPM-01 TS 3.3.8.2, RPS Electric Power Monitor Trips 33 (1 sheet) LFD-1-LLS-01 (2 sheets) TS 3.3.6.3-1, Item 1, Low-Low Set Instrumentation - Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High 103 LFD-1-LLS-02 (2 sheets) TS 3.3.6.3-1, Item 2, Low-Low Set Instrumentation - Low-Low Set Pressure Setpoints 103 LFD-1-LLS-03 (2 sheets) TS 3.3.6.3-1, Item 3, Low-Low Set Instrumentation - Tailpipe Pressure Switch 103 LFD-1-LOP-01 (3 sheets) TS 3.3.8.1-1, Items 1.a and 1.b, 4.16 kV Emergency Bus, Loss of Voltage and Time Delay 116 LFD-1-LOP-02 (3 sheets) TS 3.3.8.1-1, Items 2.a and 2.b, 4.16 kV Emergency Bus, Degraded Voltage and Time Delay 116

List of Diagrams (Continued) Diagram No. Title Revision No. HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 11.0-v Revision 116 LFD-1-LOP-03 (1 sheet) DELETED 116 LFD-1-MCREC-01 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.7.1, MCREC System Initiation Control Room Air Inlet Radiation - High LFD-1-MCREC-02 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.7-1, Item 1, MCREC System Instrumentation, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 60 LFD-1-MCREC-03 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.7-1, Item 2, MCREC System Instrumentation, Drywell Pressure - High 93 LFD-1-MCREC-04 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.7-1, Item 3, MCREC System Instrumentation, Main Steam Line Flow - High 60 LFD-1-MCREC-05 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.7-1, Item 4, MCREC System Instrumentation, Refueling Floor Area Radiation - High 60 LFD-1-MCREC-06 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.7-1, Item 5, MCREC System Instrumentation, Main Control Room Intake Radiation - Downscale LFD-1-MSLR-01 (2 sheets) TRM T3.3.11, Main Steam Line Radiation High - High 0/60 LFD-1-PCIS-01 (2 sheets) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 1.a, Main Steam Line Isolation - Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 LFD-1-PCIS-02 (2 sheets) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 1.b, Main Steam Line Isolation - Main Steam Line Pressure - Low LFD-1-PCIS-03 (2 sheets) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 1.c, Main Steam Line Isolation - Main Steam Line Flow - High LFD-1-PCIS-04 (2 sheets) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 1.d, Main Steam Line Isolation - Condenser Vacuum - Low LFD-1-PCIS-05 (2 sheets) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 1.e, Main Steam Line Isolation - Main Steam Tunnel Temperature - High

List of Diagrams (Continued) Diagram No. Title Revision No. HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 11.0-vi Revision 93 LFD-1-PCIS-06 (4 sheets) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 1.f, Main Steam Line Isolation - Turbine Building Area Temperature - High LFD-1-PCIS-07 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.a, Primary Containment Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 20 LFD-1-PCIS-08 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.b, Primary Containment Isolation, Drywell Pressure - High 33 LFD-1-PCIS-09 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.c, Primary Containment Isolation, Drywell Radiation - High LFD-1-PCIS-10 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.d, Primary Containment Isolation, Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation - High 24 LFD-1-PCIS-11 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.e, Primary Containment Isolation, Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation - High 53 LFD-1-PCIS-12 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 3.a, HPCI System Isolation - HPCI Steam Line Flow - High LFD-1-PCIS-13 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 3.b, HPCI System Isolation - HPCI Steam Supply Line Pressure - Low LFD-1-PCIS-14 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 3.c, HPCI System Isolation - HPCI Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure - High LFD-1-PCIS-15 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 3.d, HPCI System Isolation - Drywell Pressure - High 93 LFD-1-PCIS-16 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 3.e, HPCI System Isolation - HPCI Pipe Penetration Room Temperature - High LFD-1-PCIS-17 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Items 3.f and 3.g, HPCI System Isolation - Suppression Pool Area Ambient Temperature - High, and Suppression Pool Area Temperature - Time Delay Relays LFD-1-PCIS-18 N/A LFD-1-PCIS-19 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Items 3.h and 3.g, HPCI System Isolation - Suppression Pool Area Differential Temperature - High, and Suppression Pool Area Temperature - Time Delay Relays

List of Diagrams (Continued) Diagram No. Title Revision No. HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 11.0-vii Revision 113 LFD-1-PCIS-20 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 3.i, HPCI System Isolation - Emergency Area Cooler Temperature - High LFD-1-PCIS-21 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 4.a, RCIC System Isolation RCIC Steam Line Flow - High LFD-1-PCIS-22 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 4.b, RCIC System Isolation RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure - Low LFD-1-PCIS-23 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 4.c, RCIC System Isolation RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure - High LFD-1-PCIS-24 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 4.d, RCIC System Isolation Drywell Pressure - High LFD-1-PCIS-25 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Items 4.e and f, RCIC System Isolation RCIC Suppression Pool Ambient Area Temperature - High, and Suppression Pool Area Temperature - Time Delay Relays LFD-1-PCIS-26 N/A LFD-1-PCIS-27 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Items 4.f and g, RCIC System Isolation Suppression Pool Area Temperature Time Delay Relays, and RCIC Suppression Pool Area Differential Temperature - High LFD-1-PCIS-28 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 4.h, RCIC System Isolation Emergency Area Cooler Temperature - High LFD-1-PCIS-29 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 5.a, RWCU System Isolation Area Temperature - High LFD-1-PCIS-30 (2 sheets) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 5.b, RWCU System Isolation Area Ventilation Differential Temperature - High LFD-1-PCIS-31 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 5.c, RWCU System Isolation SLC System Initiation LFD-1-PCIS-32 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 5.d & TS 3.3.5.2-1, Item 4.a, RWCU System Isolation Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 113 LFD-1-PCIS-33 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 6.a, RHR SDC System Isolation, Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High

List of Diagrams (Continued) Diagram No. Title Revision No. HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 11.0-viii Revision 113 LFD-1-PCIS-34 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 6.b & TS 3.3.5.2-1, Item 3.a, RHR SDC System Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 113 LFD-1-PRM-01 (1 sheet) ODCM 2-1, Item 1, Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation High LFD-1-PRM-02 (1 sheet) ODCM 3-1, Item 1.a, Reactor Building Vent Stack Monitoring System, Radiation High LFD-1-PRM-03 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.8-1, Item 1, Offgas System Isolation Post-Treatment Radiation Upscale 60 LFD-1-PRM-04 (1 sheet) TRM T3.3.8-1, Item 2, Offgas System Isolation Post-Treatment Radiation Monitor Downscale 60 LFD-1-PRM-05 (1 sheet) ODCM 3-1, Item 3.a, Main Stack Monitoring System, Noble Gas Activity Monitor 104 LFD-1-RCIC-01 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.3-1, Item 1, RCIC System Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 113 LFD-1-RCIC-02 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.3-1, Item 2, RCIC System Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 113 LFD-1-RCIC-03 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.3-1, Item 3, RCIC System Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low 113 LFD-1-RCIC-04 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.5.3-1, Item 4, RCIC System Suppression Pool Water Level - High 113 LFD-1-RPS-01 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 1.a, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - IRM Neutron Flux - High LFD-1-RPS-02 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 1.b, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - IRM Inop LFD-1-RPS-03 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.a, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - APRM Neutron Flux - High (Setdown) 12

List of Diagrams (Continued) Diagram No. Title Revision No. HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 11.0-ix Revision 66 LFD-1-RPS-04 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.b, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - Simulated Thermal Power -High 12 LFD-1-RPS-05 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.c, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - Neutron Flux - High 12 LFD-1-RPS-06 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.d, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - APRM Inop 12 LFD-1-RPS-07 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.e, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - APRM Two-out-of-Four Voter Circuit 12 LFD-1-RPS-07a (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.f, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - OPRM Upscale 26 LFD-1-RPS-08 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 3, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High LFD-1-RPS-09 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 4, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 LFD-1-RPS-10 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 5, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure LFD-1-RPS-11 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 6, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation, Drywell Pressure - High LFD-1-RPS-12 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 7.a, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High, Resistance Temperature Detector LFD-1-RPS-13 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 7.b, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High, Float Switch LFD-1-RPS-14 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 8, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - Turbine Stop Valve - Closure 66 LFD-1-RPS-15 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 9, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low 33

List of Diagrams (Continued) Diagram No. Title Revision No. HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 11.0-x Revision 33 LFD-1-RPS-16 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 10, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation, Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position LFD-1-RPS-17 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 11, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation, Manual Scram LFD-1-RPS-18 (1 sheet) TS SR 3.3.1.1.11, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Bypass, Items 8 and 9 33 LFD-1-RPT-01 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.4.1.a.1, EOC-RPT, TSV Closure LFD-1-RPT-02 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.4.1.a.2, EOC-RPT, TCV Fast Closure LFD-1-RPT-03 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.4.2.a, Reactor Vessel Water Level - ATWS-RPT Level 6 LFD-1-RPT-04 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.4.2.b, ATWS-RPT, Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High LFD-1-RPT-05 (1 sheet) TS SR 3.3.4.1.2, EOC-RPT Instrumentation Bypass Below 28 Percent Power 33 LFD-1-RWLH-01 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.2.2, Feedwater and Main Turbine Trip High Water Level Instrumentation LFD-1-SCIS-01 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.2-1, Item 1, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 LFD-1-SCIS-02 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.2-1, Item 2, Drywell Pressure - High LFD-1-SCIS-03 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.2-1, Item 3, Secondary Containment Isolation Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation - High LFD-1-SCIS-04 (1 sheet) TS 3.3.6.2-1, Item 4, R/F Exhaust Radiation - High

TRIP SYSTEM "A" TRIP SYSTEM "B" Channel r Channel A I I - -~ - -lCSl-I 1 K614A 1 I I 1 IC51B-1 I Kl I I ___________ I Trip Logic I I lCSl-1 I I 1

K614A 1

Kl I I I I 1 ___ 1 _______ I I I ICIIA~ I Kl I I I B I I I - -~ -lCSl-I 1 K614B 1 I I 1 IC51B-1 I I ,KI ________ I Trip Logic L----- Actuation Logic I I

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1 I lCSl-I 1 i K614S: 7I Kl _1_ - I I I ICIIA~ K2 ~-;> Contacts Open to Actuate Control Rod Withdrawal Block (Typical of 4) l..

*r Kl T K2 I

I Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability; In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an RBM Low Power Range - Upscale condition, one channel must be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17828 {-17831 H-44709 H-44710 H-44713 Prepared By: -==F-='---* Reviewed By: ~G;.J~~--- LFD-l-CRB-01 TS 3.3.2.1-1, Item 1.a Control Rod Block, Rod Block Monitor Low Power Range - Upscale TRMRev.12

TRIP SYSTEM "A" Channel A r TRIP SYSTEM "B" Channel L-I I - -~ lCSl-I 1 K614A 1 I I , 1C51B-1 I Kl I 1_ - I Trip Logic I 1C51- : 1

K614A, Kl I

I I I I 1_ - _I - _1 I I lCllA~ Kl I L---- Actuation Logic Contacts Open to ...L Actuate Control Rod,_ _______________ - K 1 Withdrawal Block I (Typical of 4) K2 T I I Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block B I 1 ---~ -lCSl-1 K614S: 1 1C51B-I I ,Kl ________ I Trip Logic I I I ICSI-I 1

K614B 1

I I I Kl _1_ - I I I lCllA~ K2 l-;> Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability; In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an RBM Intermediate Power Range - Upscale condition, one channel must be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. B:-17828 ti-17831 H-44709 H-44710 H-44713 Prepared By: Reviewed By: LFD-l-CRB-02 TS 3.3.2.1-1, Item 1.b Control Rod Block, Rod Block Monitor Intermediate Power Range - Upscale TRMRev.12

TRIP SYSTEM "A" r- - Channel A I I - -~ - ICSI-I I I 1

K614A,

, 1C51B-I Kl I 1_ - I Trip Logic I I ---1--------, 1 I 1C51-1 1

K614A, Kl I

I I I 1 ___ 1 _______ I I I lCllA~ I Kl 1 r TRIP SYSTEM "B" Channel B I I 1 - - -~ -1C51-1 1 K614B 1 I I 1 1C51B-I I ,Kl ________ I Trip Logic I

L------

.L

~~~~a: ,- Kl I I I I I I Actuation Logic I Contacts Open to Actuate Control Rod Withdrawal Block (Typical of 4) ________________ J... Kl I K2 T I I Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minimum Channel Reguirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an RBM High Power Range - Upscale condition, one channel must be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. "~,J 7828 j:17831 H-44709 H-44710 H-44713 Prepared By: ~~!#!J!:,!__-I Reviewed By. LFD-l-CRB-03 TS 3.3.2.1-1, Item 1.c Control Rod Block, Rod Block Monitor High Power Range - Upscale TRMRev. 12

TRIP SYSTEM "A" .--- Channel A Trip Logic I I I }CS!- I 1 j_ K614A 1 I I K3 I T I 1_ - I_ - I I ICIIA~ I Kl *-;> I r TRIP SYSTEM "B" Channel B I I - -~ -JCS!- I 1 K614B 1 I I 1 IC51B-1 I I ,K3 ________, Trip Logic I I

L------

1 I ICSI-I I 1 K614B 1 I I --- T K3 ___ : I ICIIA~ K2 *-;> I I I I Actuation Logic Contacts Open to ..l Actuate Control Rod _________ - _ - - - - - - KI Withdrawal Block I (Typical of 4) K2 T Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability; In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an RBM Inoperable condition, one channel must be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. "9:-17828 i-17831 H-44709 H-44710 H-44713 ..------,-M=.;----:-----i LFD-l-CRB-04 TS 3.3.2.1-1, Item 1.d Control Rod Block, Rod Block Monitor Prepared By: --"'!!!!~:!;f!!!!!,,!____I Inop i-----------1 Reviewed By: TRM Rev. 12

TRIP SYSTEM "A" .- - - Channel A Trip Logic I I lCSl-I I I 1

K614A 1

K2 I I I I I I I ICIIA~ I Kl r TRIP SYSTEM "B" Channel B I I - -~ lCSl-I 1 K614B 1 I I 'IC5IB-I I ,K2 ________, Trip Logic I

L-------

1 I lCSl-I 1 ..lt K614B: T K2 I ICIIA~ K2 L* > ~---- L...--- Actuation Logic Contacts Open to Actuate Control Rod.. ____ ~ ___________ J_ KI Withdrawal Block I (Typical of 4) K2 T I I Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minimum Channel Reguirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an RBM Downscale condition, one channel must be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. 't.f-17828 .-I-17831 H-44709 H-44710 H-44713 LFD-l-CRB-05 TS 3.3.2.1-1, Item l.e Control Rod Block, r------1/4,1+-,i----1 Rod Block Monitor - Prepared By: Downscale Reviewed By: TRMRev. 12

This page is intentionally left blank. LFD-l-CRB-06 NIA Prepared By: NIA Reviewed By: NIA TRMRev. 12

TRIP SYSTEM r-----------------------------, Channel Rod Worth Minimizer ICI 1-J600 ICll- <( J601-Kl ;> ----- -----..

~----------

I Actuation Logic : I 1 i KIT - --------- I I I I

Activates a Control Rodi Withdrawal Block I

Minimum Channel Requirements for S,ystern Initiation Capability; In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability associated with the Rod Worth Minimizer, one channel must be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17831 H-17117 LFD-l-CRB-07 TS 3.3.2.1-1, Item 2 Control Rod Block, ,-Prep--are-d-By-: _K....,-/J,M-,-(....,{1 __ -1 IJlod Worth Minimizer ii Revieweday:.;:if~AC:!:M.-e-: Rev. 0 12/8/9~

TRIP SYSTEM "A" TRIP SYSTEM "B" Channel Channel A Reactor Mode Switch 1C71A-Sl ((}-------, Trip Logic I

--[fl-------

I I i !CH-) B Reactor Mode Switch 1C71A-Sl Trip Logic [D------- 1 L - ~~ - ~---------- Actuation Logic Contacts Open to l.. Actuate Control Rod _____________ - _ - - Kl Withdrawal Block I (Typical of 4) K2 T I I.. Activates a Control Rod I Withdrawal Block Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown, one channel must be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. LFD-l-CRB-08 TS 3.3.2.1-1, Item 3 Control Rod Block, Reactor Mode Switch - Elem. Ref. H-17828 H-17831 , Shutdown Position r--Prcp_an:_d-By-: _Ka...v_.,,,.__.., -l'"'"' v~._---..11--i:..., Reviewed Bv~°4: /j~ Rev. 0 12/8/9.<

Trip System "A" Trip System "B"

~,---------,

I I Channels I Channels I Al A2 I Bl B2 I JC51C-K9A I Trip Logic Trip Logic JCSJC-1 lCSic-1 K9A T K9D T I I 1C5Ic-l. JC51Acl. K9C T K9B T I I I ..--..1.--- I Contact Opens ~ 1Cll- ~:=~ot JCJJ-Kl of4) Kl L----------L---------- Actuation Logic Kl..!:_ _ - - - - Contact Opens I To Activate K2 T Block (fypical of2) Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minimum Channel Requirements for System Ioitiatiog CapabQity In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an SRM detector-not-full-in condition, one channel must be functional or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17122 H-17123 H-17175 H-17828 H-17831 LFD-I-CRB-09 TRM T3.3.2-l, Item I.a Control Rod Block ....-----==-----1 Instrumentation, SRM - Prep.-ed By;....c.,,(____;...,:"-=-- D r ot Fun In 1tmewec19y.. TRM REV. 60

Trip System "A" Trip System "B"

~,---------,

Channels Al A2 I

j I

I I I

lCSJ-

JC51-1 K4 Trip 1

K4 Trip 1 umtz2A:, um1z2c: Trip Logic

ics1: -1-----~

K4 TTri 1 I p I I UnitZ2A1

-----+------

~ i csi ~ :r-----~ K4 TTrip 1umtZ2C 1 I 'i\\') Contact Opem on SRM Upscale ('fypical of 4) Channels Bl B2 L----------L---------- Actuation Logic Kl -b_ - - - - - Contact Opens I 1o Activate K2 Block T ('fypical or2> I I Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation CapabQity In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an SRM upscale condition, one channel must be functional or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17167 H-17175 H-17828 H-17831 LFD-l-CRB-10 TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 1.b Control Rod Block ,------..--.------1 Instrumentation, Preplffil By: ~"'-----~-- SRM - U scale Reviewed By* TRM REV. 60

__ Tri__p §J!!e..!!1 :_A:_ _ -, I _ _ItiP System :._B" _ -, I I Al Channels 11 Channels A2 11 Bl B2 I I I I I - i i ---- ------, I... --- I I I I II I I

JC51-1 }CS)-

1C51-1

1C51-

Kl Trip

Kl Trip 1*

Kl

Kl UnitZ2A:

Unitz2c: UnitZ2B: Umtz20: Trip Logic I Trip Logic ~1cs1-l-----, I i'ics1=-1-----,

~---,

I Kl TTrip I I I

Kl TTrip

~ -----+ Y!lll ~~: ~ - - - - - + Y!liJ ~m_, I ICSJ- :1.----- ~ I

- lcsl.: --..r.----- ~

I 1 I I I

Kl Trip 1

, Kl 11iip 1 Unit Z2C 1 Unit Z2B '

-----1------'

I

1------*

I I ICll-Inoperative I ICll- =Opens I ~ K I ('fypical of 4) Kl L----------L---------- Actuation Logic Kl.b_ _ _ _ _ _ Contact Opens I To Activate K2T Block ('fypical of 2) I I Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minimum Channel Requirements for S_ystem Initiation CagabQity In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an SRM inoperative condition, one channel must be functional or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17167 H-17175 H-17828 H-17831 LFD-I -CRB-11 TJ.3.2-1, Item Le Control Rod Block ..-----~----rlnstrumentation, SRM - --..-.-=---1Inoperative Reviewed BY.* 1-----T--R_M_RE_V. ___ 6_0 _ _,

Trip System "A" Trip System "B"

~,---------,

I Channels I I Channels Al A2 11 Bl B2 I I I I I I I I I I,. ----------, I I I I I I 1 JCS] 11: IC5]- 1 5 1 1 cs I - 1 1 1 1 C I - I K2 Trip 1 K2 Trip K2 rip

K2 Trip

! _____ JJ.Pi.!Z:i.i\\: !.. _____ _µ_n!_t~~~: I 1 ____ UnitZ2B, , _____ UnitZ2D, Trip Logic I Trip Logic

ics1:-J;::==:J ___,

1 1 1

ics1:-1-----:

K2 TTrip K2 TTri 1 1 UnitZ2A: I u ~ z20'

-----+ ------

I . -----+ -!ll! - - _,

-icsi~-_r-----~

11

-icsi~-_r-----~: K2 TTrip I; K2 TTrip I Unit Z2C I I

I I u. Z2B I _____ T _____, 1 I

-----7-!llL __,

eontact Opens I ) ICll- ~~ '1 lCII-KI (fypicalof4) I K2 ~----------L----~----- Actuation Logic Kl ~ - - - - - Contact Opens I To.Activate K2 Block T (fypical or 2) I I Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation CapabUity In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an SRM downscale condition, one channel must be functional or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem.Ref. H-17167 H-17175 H-17828 H-17831

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" Channels AIA AIB A2A A2B Channels BIA BIB B2A B2B JCSIC-JCSJC-K9E K9J Trip Logic Trip Logic ICSIC-.l ___ l ~ICSIC : ~ J_1cs1c-1 1---j_ ICSJC-K9E T 1'

K9F T 1

T K9G 1 T K9H Fmm Trip

Fmm Trip I

I : I System"B" : , SyS1em"A"I

I I

J. I 1 5 J. 1 .l ICSJC-: I j_ ICSIC-lCSIC-I I IC IC- - - - ~ I I K9J T I : _.!'=.?~ _ + __ ~ ____ !

______ -T K9L I

I T K9M I L----- I _____ J I I .--~--, I ) Cont.act Opens ) with Detector Not IC I I lilt ~;n(fypical K2 - ~----------L---------- Actuation Logic Kl.!:_ _ - - - - Cont.act Opens I ToAC1ivate K2 T Block (fypical of2) Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minimum Channel Requirements for 8.Y*tem Initiation Capability In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an IRM not full in condition, one channel must be functional or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17124 H-17125 H-17175 H-17828 H-17831 .. -1, tem.a Control Rod Block ...--------~ Instrumentation, IRM - --==~=---*Detector Not Full In R.evilrwed By: TRMREV. 60 I I

Actuation Logic Kl -!:_ - - - -

Contact Opens I

1b.Adivate Kl Bloc:k T ('lypical or2> Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minimum Chuoet Requircmenu for Sntem Initiatiog C1111bBky In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an IRM upscale condition, one channel must be function al or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17169 H-17170 H-17175 H-17828 H-17831 LFD-l-CRB-14 TRM T3.3.2-1. Item 2.b Control Rod Block ,-------.----,,-----1Instrumentanon, Prep.-ed By: -=c....=..=--1 TRM - Upscale R.eviewectBy: TRM REV. 60

Actuation Logic .L Kl - - - - -

Comact Opens I

1b Activate KlT Block ('lypieal of 2) I I Activates a Control Withdrawal Block Minimum Channd Beaah:emcnts for 5ntem Ipitiadon Capability In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an 1RM inoperative condition, one channel must be functional or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17169 H-17175 H-17170 H-17828 H*l7171 H-17831 H-17172 ..-,tem.c Control Rod Block r------==-------1 Instrumentation, 1RM - Prqwed By. --~----* Inoperative 1-------------~ Rcvi.wed&y: TRM REV. 60

Actuation Logic Kl.!:__ - - -. CoDlactOpms I To Activate K2T ~or2> I I Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minimum Channet RcC11iremcnts for System Initiation CagabQity In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an IRM downscale condition, one channel must be functional or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17169 H-17170 H-17175 H-17828 H-17831 LFD-l-CRB-16

- - - _Irl.P.§_y~e_p _::A_: - _, RccireLoop Flow Xmittcn ~ llllJI...OIM'" - I ~ I j11it1.-r-7 Channels Al I I

-----~---~

I I I 1C518-1 I Kl4 I I I I I

- -- _)_I_ -- -,

I I 11C51B-1 Kl4 I I I 1 lC51-K617A I 11C51-K617C 1 I 214 Volllr Module t 214 Voter Module I Trip Logic I f I 1 1C51B-1 I IC.14 IC51-K617A 1 1 214 Vow Module 1 1_ - - - -_] - - - I I f I 1 IC51B- + _______ -:- _____ _ Kl4 1C51*K617C 1 I 214 Vat.tr Module I I

~---------*

I Contact Opens on 11 APRM Simulated lC A-Thermal Power KI Upscale (Typical of 4) Trip Svstem "B" ..-.---~---- Channels Recite Loop FJowXmin,m

=Za.* h B 1 I

I

IC51B-~ - - -i I

JC.14 I I I I I ~~,~~s-'----. I IC.14 I I I I 11C51-IC617B 1 1C51-K617D 1 12/4 \\'aw Mochllc I I 2/4 Votllr Module I Trip Logic ' f I 1 1C51B-1 1 IC.14 IC51-K617B 1 I 2/4 Vowr Module l 1_ - - -J - - - - - - - - - I r"---- ---------... I f I I IC518-I Kl4 1C51-K617D I 214 Vat.tr Module I ICJIA; K2 *> L---------- Actuation Logic Kl -b_ - - - - - Contact Opens I To Activate K2 Block T ('fypical on> I I Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minimum Channel 8cfluinmen11 for S.V*tcm lgitiation CapahQby; In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an APRM Simulated Thennal Power Upscale condition, one channel must be functional or maintained in the tri ed condition. EJem. Ref. H-17828 H-44707 H-17831 H-44708 H-44705 H-44713

H-44706 Nae I: Farllll m u,.c.. lldcnotanARM...

oanlidllld....... llalloftbt.-illllCIR.11:ircF!os LFD-1 ~RB-17 TRM T3.3.2-l, Item 3.a Control Rod Block Instrumentation, APRM - r------==------1Simulated Thermal Prep.-ec1 By:,,L.:!!!::::,,!o,,._:::::::a._._,Power Upscale TRM REV. 60

__ _!r!P ~~e_!!l ::_A:__-, I Channels I Al A2 I I

----~----~

I I I lC,18-I 1 K14 1 I I I I

IC51-K617A I 2/4 \\'ot* Modale, r.:,~~)*'----:

I Kl4 1 lC5l-K617C 1 t2/4VallrModala 1 Trip Logic f ~~ii ;f-.:,~-~:,~:-1 I 1 2/4 Valilr Modulo I 1_ - * - *.:i - - * - - - - - - I ~---- -----~---~

lCSIB-.J. ________ : ______ _

K14 i 1C51-K617C I 2/4\\'oterModllat I

~-----*---*

I Contact Opens on APRM Simulated 1CllA-ThmnaJ Power K 1 Upscale (Setdown) ical of4) L---------- Trip System "B" Channels Bl B2

IC51B-~ -- - ~

I K.14 I I I I I

IC51-K617B 12/4 Vo&orModalo t

I I ~~,~~)-'----: I Kl4 I I I I I I I 1C51-K6l7D I I 2/4 Voter Modllle I Trip Logic

IC51B* f I

K14 lC51-K617B I 1 214 V...Modllle 1 1_ - - *.:i * - - - - - - - - I r---- ---------*

1C51B-.J.

Kt4 T IC51-K617D !. _ - - __, _ _21~~~~ ICIIA; K2 *> L---------- Actuation Logic Kl -b_ - - - -. Contact Opens I ToAdivate K2 Block T ('l)pical or 2) I I Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minimum Cb,ao*cl RcaukcCPP (or S.V*wn Iafflltiop CuebJJitr; In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an APRM Simulated Thermal Power Upscale (Setdown) condition, one channel must be functional or maintained in the tri ped condition. LFD-I-CRB-18 i Elem. Ref. ,jl-17828 H-44707 H-17831 H-44708 H-4470S H-44713 H-44706 T3.3.2-1, Item 3.b ontrol Rod Block trumentation. APRM - ..-----------=-----~... imulated Thennal PrepM-ed By: --""==-'-"'----1Power Upscale (Setdown lleviewed By: TRMREV. 60

__ _!r~ ~~e_p :_A:_ _.., Channels Al A2 r.~:1:-~----1 I K2 I I I I I

1CSl*K617A I 2/4 VOis Modul*

I a.---------- I I

1cs1e-)

1 I K2 I I I I 11C!1-K617C I 12/4V_,Modulll I Trip Logic

~

I I I I 1C51B* I 1 K2 T 1C!l*K617A 1 I 2/4 'Vaeir Modale I

- - - - -.J - - - - - - - - -*

f"'---- -----------

l.

I I IC!IB- + __

___
_, ___
__ _

'.K2T I I 1 1C51*K617C I 1 t 2/4 \\Tola-MocluJo I I

- ---~*-********

I Contact Opens on APRM Inoperative ICllA-(fypicalof4) Kl Trip System "B" I Channels I I Bl B2 I I I I i---------1 i---- I I I I f1:,~~~----~ I K2 I I I I I I I 11C51*K617B 1 I 2/4 \\'aw Modus I

1cs1e.:)

1 I K2 I I I I I I I 1 1C51-K617D 1 I 2/4 Vdaf MocluJo I Trip Logic I I I I 1C518-J_ I 1 K2 T 1C5l-K617B 1 I 2/4\\TdlrModaa1411

1. * -

*J * - * * * * * **I r----- ---------..

I

l.

I 1 1C51B* 1 K2 T 1C51-IC617D I 2/4\\'0MrModuktl

~----------

,c~A~ L _ Actuation Logic Kl _L - - - - - Colllact Opens I To Activate K2 Block T (1ypical of2> I I Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minimum Qaggel RcQuinmcn1a for Symm Initiation CaahUitJ; In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an APRM Inoperative condition, one channel must be functional or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17828 H-44707 H-17831 H-44708 H-44705 H-44713 H-44706 LFD-I-CRB-19 TRM 13.3.2-1, Item 3.c Contro1 Rod Block Instrumentation, APRM ,------=-==------rlnoperative

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" I Channels I Al Channels I I A2 Bl B2 I I I I I I I I I

---~---:

I IC!IB* I I K3 I I I I I

IC51-K617A 12/4VoterModlal.

I I 1 )I 1 I I 1 JC5JB-I I K3 I I I I 1 IC51-IC617C I t 2/4 \\Tow Moclldc I Trip Logic I I

1c,1s-~- - - ~

I K3 I I I I I I I 11C51-IC6178 1 12/4 \\Tow Modu1ts I ~~,~~s-'----. I K3 I I I I I I 1 IC5l*K617D 1 I 2/4 'VoterMoclulo I Trip Logic I

1C51B-t I

I K3 1C51-K617A 1 I 2/4 'Voter Modulo I ,_ - - - -J- - - - - - - - -' I t I I 1C518-I 1 K3 IC51-K6178 1 I 214 \\'ow Moclalc I ,_ - - - -J- - - - - - - - _, r---* -*-------.. 1, f ~~;B~ i: ~ ~ ~ ~: _-: ------J -1 1 K3 T 1C51-K617C I I 1 1 2/4 Voter Modul, 1 1 1 1 - - - - -~-I--~:n~t-~ on I l APRM Neutron Flux I IC llA-Downscale ('typical of 4) I

I I JC518-I I

I 1 K3 IC51-K617D 1 1 214 Vollll'Modalc 1 ICIIA; K2 *> .Kl L~--~------ L---------- Actuation Logic Kl.b_ - - - - - Contact Opens I To Activate Kl T Block ('lypical of2) Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minimum Channel RcluimncnJI for Systam Initiation C1p1bllity; In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an APRM Neutron Flux Downscale condition. one channel must be functional or maintained in the trip~d condition. LFI). I-CRB-20 I I Elem. Ref. H-17828 H-44707 H-17831 H-44708 H-44705 H-44713 H-44706 TRM T3.3.2-1, Item 3.d Control Rod Block Instrumentation, APRM - r-----:-:--=----;Neutron Flux Pnpared By: ----~-- Downscale r----------1 TRM REV. 60 11.eviewed By:

Trin System "A" __ 7 ______ _, Channels Al A2 I I

JC5JB-~ -- - ~

I KJJ I I I I I

1C51-K617A Is' I I

I 1 JC5J&,; I I K33 I I I I 1 JC5l*K617C I I 2/4 Vot<< Modul* 12/4 Volar Module I Trip Logic

1cs1e,; f I

K33 JC51-K617A I I 2/4 Vat. Module 1 , _____ J _________,

JC5JB,;.J,,..,_ _______ -:- _____

1 1 K3J T IC51-K617C 1 1 I '2/4Vot..Module1 I

* * * * *I* * - - * - - - *
I Contact Opens on APRM Low LPRM lCllA-Count(fypicalof4)

Kl I __ TEe_Sx_s~m_"!!"_ Channels Bl B2 I I I I I 1C5JB* 1 I K33 I I I I K33 I I

-----~---~

I I

1cs1e,;)

I I I I 1 JC51-K617D I I 2/4 \\10Ar Moduli! I I I iJC51-K617B 1 12/4 \\'akrModm9 I Trip Logic I f I 1 JC51B-I K33 1C51-K617B I 1 2/4VOllll'ModallJ' 1_ -

- -J - * - * * * - -
I

~---- ---------.. I

I 1 IC51B*

1 K3J JC51-K617D I 2/4 VIiiar Module I

~---------J ICJJA; K2 *>

L..---------- L.---------- Actuation Logic ..L Kl - - - - -

CoDlaCt Opens I

To Activate K2 T Block ('Iypical of2) I I Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minimum Changd BcguircmCQfl ror System Initiation CaD1bQUy; In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an APRM Low LPRM Count condition, one channel must be functional or maintained in the tripped conditio..-. ---------J LFD-I-CRB-21 Elem. Ref. ,H-17828 H-44707 H-17831 H-44 708 H-44705 H-44713 H-44706 TRM T3.3.2-l, Item 3.e Control Rod Block Instrumentation. APRM - ....-----,=--~Low LPRM Count Reviewed By: TRM REV. 60

___ If!E ~~e_p ::__ A:_ _ -, '1 Recirc Loop Channels Flow Xmiuen Recin:: Loop I "I /\\:!... Af-- Al A2 Fl :. A. I

71BJl~liC, I 1;* c r -t_ --

!,=::11 I 1---i I I I I I I I 1,

JC51B-~ - - -i f1:,~~)-L ---.

I 1 JOI 1 1 K31 I I I 1

I

1CSI-IC617A 1

1C51-K617C I

I ~~4-V~~*~ _ _ ~~4-V~~~: I I Trip Logic I I i-----f---------~ I I 1'i!J:'" 1C'1*K617A I

_ ----.J - ='~ '::"'!'"~:

I I f ;;if~~~_;.; :.j. ------1 1 I 2f4VGfcrMaaJel I

~---------*

I I S Contact Opens on I/ APRM Reactor -1 I JCllA-RecirculationFlow Kl U e (Typical of 4) I L--------------- Trip System "B" Channels i---~----; I I 1 lCSlB* 1 I JOI I I I I I I I 11CSl*K617B 1 12/4 VGfcr Module I I I f.~,~~)-'----: I JOI I I I I 1 ICS1-K617D 1 I 2/4 Vear Module I Trip Logic . f I 1 ICSI&- 1 I KJI 1C51-K617B 1 1 2/4 VoilorModule 1 1_ - - -J - - - - - - - - - I I f I I lCSlB-I JOI 1C5l*K617D I 2/4 Voilor Module I ICIJA; Kl*> L-------------- Actuation Logic Kl.,b _ - - - - Contact Opens I ToAcdvate K2 Block T (1ypicalor2> I I

Activates a Control Rod Withdrawal Block Minbngm ChaucJ BcQuh:cmcnta ror lntcm Initiadog CanhQltJ; In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on an APRM Reactor Recirculation Flow Upscale condition, one channel must be functional or maintained in the n-u* U2s=QJ:ml!'1&Dsm...__ __ _J Elem. Ref.

-tl-17828 H-44707 H-17831 H-44708 H-44705 H-44713 H-44706 NOii 1: Farthl a-... clMIICllFl*U.-. lllnnon olaiAPRN ION ~apnllle. ball ol111tllll0Ciatld a..flow................. LFD-I-CRB-22 TRM TI.3.2-1, Item 3.f Control Rod Block Instrumentation, APRM - ,----~==----1Reactor Recirculation ~----- Flow Upscale Reviewed By* TRMREV.60

Trip System

~-----~-------------1 -Channel I I

Contact Opens on SOVHigh Level Level Switch_

lCll* NOUE Trip Logic I I ______________ J. ICll-T K27 Contact Opens on SDVHigh Level I I < ICll-( K2 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

~-------~-----1 Actuation Logic I

I I Kl -b _ _ _ _ _ Contact Opens T To Activate 1 Block 1 ('fypical of2) Activates a Control Withdrawal Block Miaimam Chappel Rcaulrcmenu for 8.J*tw lpftiltlou Ca11hilitf; In order to maintain Control Rod Withdrawal Block capability on a Scram Discharge Volume high level condition, the one channel must be functional or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-178*28 H-17831 H-17832 ,..,,L-FD--l--C.... RB----2-3---i TRM TJ.3.2:-1, Item 4 Control Rod Block ,-------==-----1 Instrumentation. SDV Prepared By: Z::V C. Level - High Reviewed By:~-"/' TRM REV. 60

Trip System Contact. Closes on HPCI 'Iiubine Exhaust PmsuR: High ~) A E41-N6S6B MTU Channels E21-K307B E41-N6S6D MTU Trip Logic J_ E21-K307B E21-J_ K308B Actuation Logic I ~= CJoses I-____ 1 E41-Actuation --r Kl I I t f Trip HPCI 1\\ubine Minimum Channel Bequiremeots for System 'Irip Capability; In order to maintain HPCI turbine trip capability with regard to a HPCI turbine exhaust pressure-high signal, at Jeast one channel must be r unctional. Elem. Ref. H-17159 H-17160 H-19824 LFD-l-ECCS-25 TRMTI.3.5-1, Item2 HPCI Turbine Trip HPCI Turbine Exhaust .-Pre,we--d-By-= _,µ=-~-c..,,,...-----1 Pressure-High R.eviewectey:.,.0-..>. if TRM REV. 60

Contacts Close on RWL Low-Lvl 1 Vl~ical aces) Jtjp _§yst~ _:~ Channels Al A2 B21-B21-N691A N691C MTU MTU I I fill-~ K7A fill-~ K8A Trip Logic lm1-lm1-

E--r7B E21-E2I-K8A L.-

K8B Actuation Logic "A" Jtjp ~~t~m...:ir: Channels Bl B2 B21-B21-N691B N691D MTU MTU I I fill-~ K7B fill-~ K8B Trip Logic 1E21-lE21-E-rm E21 E21-K8A L.- K8B Actuation Logic "B" Initiation of CS Subsystems "A" and "B" (Except Valve Initiation of CS Subsystems "A" and "B" (Except ~e IE21-F004B Does Not Receive an Open Signal and 1E21-F004A Does Not Receive an Open Signal and Valve IE21-F0 lSB Does Not Receive a Closed Signal); ~e 1E21-F015A Does Not Receive a Closed Signal); EDG's IA, IC, lB; PSWP41-F310A,B,C,D Valves; EDG's IA, IC, lB; PSWP41-F310A,B,C,D Valves; Lock-out Auto-start of Cond. and Cond. Booster Lock-out Auto-start of Cond. and Cond. Booster Pumps Pumpsfor50 secs.; Trip ofCRDPump "A"; Trip of for50 secs.; TripofCRD Pump "B"; Trip ofD/W D/W Cooling System; Trip of T/B Chiller "A"; Trip of Cooling System; Trip of T/B Chiller "B"; Trip of Coolin Tower ACB 135313. Coo* Tower ACB 135312. Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain initiation capability for Core Spray, the EDG's, the PSW turbine building isolation valves, and the above noted load shed and sequence logic on a RWL-Level 1 signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Al & A2 LFD-l-ECCS-01 Elem. Ref. Al & B2 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item La H-13380 H-17102 H-19826 Bl & A2 Core Spray System H-13385 H-17109 H-19829 Bl&B2 RWL-LowLowLow, H-17047 H-17114 H-19830 PreparedBy:....::r(:e~ Level I H-17101 H-19823 1----------1 TRMRev. 6

,_Trip~~t~m~'~' _ Channels I Al A2 I Ell-N694A MTU I E21-< KSA ( Ell-N694C MTU I E21-< K6A ( Trip Logic Contact 1 1 ~~ll ______ E21-E21- ~~~) I T K5A TKSB

I I E21-1E21-I K6A K6B I

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ___..J Actuation Logic "A" ,....Trip~l::§t~m_:'~' _ Channels Bl B2 Ell-N694B MTU I ~:;~ Ell-N694D MTU I f6i~ Trip Logic 1 E2I-1E2I-1 K5A JKSB Ii--E2-I-----1E2I-K6A K6B ___.J Actuation Logic "B" Initiation of CS Subsystems "A ff and "B" (Except Va1ve Initiation of CS Subsystems ff A ff and "B" (Except Va1ve 1E2I-F004B Does Not Receive an Open Signal and 1E21-F004A Does Not Receive an Open Signal and Valve IE21-FOISB Does Not Receive a Closed Signal); Valve IE2I-FOI5ADoes Not Receive a Closed Signal); EDG's IA. IC, IB; PSW P41-F3IOA,B,C,D Valves; EDG's IA. IC, IB; PSWP41-F3IOA,B,C,D Va1ves; Lock-out Auto-start of Cond. and Cond. Booster Lock-out Auto-start of Cond. and Cond. Booster Pumps Pumps for 50 secs.; Trip of CRD Pump "A"; Trip of for 50 secs.; Trip of CRD Pump "B"; Trip ofD/W D/W Cooling System; Trip of T/B Chiller" A"; Trip of Cooling System; Trip of T/B Chiller "Bff; Trip of Coolin Tower ACB 135313. Coolin Tower ACB 135312. Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain initiation capability for Core Spray, the EDG'S, the PSW turbine building isolation valves,and the above noted load shed and sequence logic on a Drywell Pressure-High signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Al & A2 LFD-l-ECCS-02 Elem. Ref. Al & B2 S Bl & A2 T 3.3.5.1-1, Item l.b H-13380 H-17102 H-19826 Bl &Bl Core Spray System H-13385 H-17109 H-19827 ,... Drywell Pressure-High H-17047 H-17114 H-19830 H-17101 H-19823 TRMRev. 93

Trip System "A" r------- l Channels I Al A2 I I I I I I I I B21-N690A MTU I E21-< K.9A? B21-N690C MTU I E21-< K.19A( Trip Logic Contact Closes on I l l Reactor Steam E21-E21-Dome Pressure r ----- ,~r-~_1~--i~_1_, }~K-~-:-_--~1:: Contact Closes to Effect Actuation er *ca1 2H~s> I Kl9A K19B I E21-I KlOA Actuation Logic "A" lm1-TKloA i Pennissive to Open CS Injection Valves E21-F004A E21-F005A & B Trip System "B" r------- Channels I Bl B2 I B21-N690B MTU I E21-< K9B ( B21-N690D MTU I E21-< Kl9B( I I I I I I I I Trip Logic I I lm1-lm1-I IK9A IK9B E21-F.21-,1 Kl9A K.19B E21-K20B I I

..I Actuation Logic "B" lm1-TK2os Permissive to Open CS lnj ection Valves E21-F004B E21-F005A & B Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability:

In order to maintain Core Spray system initiation capabiliW on a Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition for modes 4 and S only. Credit cannot be taken for tripped channels in modes 1, 2, and 3. Al & A2 LFD-l-ECCS-03 Elem. Ref. Al & B2 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 1.c ff.17109 Bl &A2....---------1TS 3.3.5.2-1, Item 1.a H-19827 Bl & B2 PniparedBy: _......_ __ core Spray System H-19830 RmewtdBy: Reactor Steam Dome L_ ______ ..1_ _______ -1..::.::==.:::..z:::t~==f Pressure-Low Rev. 1 12/06/18

Trip System "A" r-----------------~ I I ChannelA I I I I I I I I I I I I I E21-I I N6SJA I I MTU I I I I I I I I I 621-1 K.33JC I I I I I I I I I l _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _I Actuation Logic "A" Comac:t Closes 1 Contact Cloles on CS Flow E21* on CS FJow E21-K33JC Low - -. - K331C Not Low OpensCSMin Flow Valve "A* F.21-F031A CJoaes cs Min Flow Vim: *A* Bll-F031A Trip System "B" I I 1 Channel B I I I l I I I I I I I I I B21-I I N651B 1 I MTU I I I I I I I I 621-I I X'.331D I I I I I I I I I L-----------------~ Actuation Logic B" 1 CODllctCloses Contact Closes °"'l-on CS Flow on CS Flow ~ N, _ Low MLAJW E21-ICJ31D

K331D OpemCSMin FlowVilve"B" E21*F031B ClolelCSMin PlowValw"B" E21-F031B Minimum Channel Regirementl for System Initiation CapabUitia:

In order to maintain Core Spray system initiation capability with regard to minimum flow valve operability, channel A or B must be operable. LFD-l-ECCS-04 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 1.d Elem. Ref. TS 3.3.5.2-1, Item 1.b H-19828 Core Spray System H-19831 -,..,_.--8Y-:-... ~~-"""---_-_-_""'1core Spray Pump H-17111 Discharge Flow-Low L _______,L _________ .J..:....

.::*::*::td::By~: C::JL,;!::!:::.,(..=:1=~

Rev. 1 12/06/18

,. 'fri_p_ S_y§t~m ~*~: Channels Al A2 B21-N691A MTU I ~~~~ B21-N691C MTU I ~~~ Trip Logic Contact 1 1 Closes on RWL Low Ell-. Ell-Level I ~ T - - - - - - K7 A K7B (Typical E-{ 8 Places) I I Ell-Ell-I K8A K8B I Ell-K125A 1 "IO Sec" Timer I 0

.--E-ll--...., ~

I K70A 8 , "10 Sec" ~ 1 Timer .. Ir!P_ S_y§t~I_!l ~*~ *~ Channels Bl B2 B21-N691B MTU I ~~~ B21-N691D MTU I ~Mi~ Trip Logic 1Ell-* 1Ell-E__JK7B ~Ell-KSA K8B Ell-Kl25B 1 "10 Sec"

Tuner I

l"'"""=E..,..,ll---,

1 K126 , "10 Sec" I Tuner

~..,...,--,0 I

Ell- ~ I K70B 8 1 "IO Sec" i:zJ I I I

--.... ~

I Tuner --;' Q .~~-,~ , _________ _J Actuation Logic "A" I Ell-

K75A r

- "10 Sec" Q Timer g L---- Actuation Logic "B" I Ell- ...:I

K75B r "0.2 Sec" e Timer g InitiationofLPCI Subsystems "A" and "B" (Except InitiationofLPCI Subsystems "A" and "B" (Except Vcllves 1Ell-F017B and 1Ell-F048B Do Not Vcllves 1Ell-F017A and 1Ell-F048A Do Not Receive an Open Signal and Cnntainmeut Spray Receive an Open Sigoal and Containment Spray Vcllves, Steam Condensing Mode Vcllves and the Valves, Steam Condensing Mode Vcllves and the Test Return Line Valve of the "B" Subsystem Do Test Return Line Valve of the "A" Subsystem Do Not Receive a Close s*

) Not Receive a Close Si ) Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain initiation capability for the LPCI system on a RWL-Level 1 signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Al & A2 Al&B2 Bl&A2 Bl&B2 Elem. Ref. LFD-l-ECCS-05 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.a LPCI System RWL-Low Low Low, H-17763 H-19826 H-17766 H-19829 H-19823 H-19830 .-Prepared--By-: :-~;;~-;:~;:_-=;Levell TRMRev. 6

Trip System "A" Channels Al A2 Ell-Ell-N694A N694C MTU MTU I I ~~~ > t~ > Trip Logic Contact 1 1 Closes on ff h ~~ '"J ______ E-{EJ~ i1~ Ell- ,T~~C:!) I I Ell-Ell-I K6A K6B Actuation Logic "A" K125A 1 "10 Sec" I Tuner I I I Ell-I I K70A I "10 Sec" I Tuner I I Ell-I K75A "10 Sec" Toner Initiation of LPCI Subsystems "A" and "B" (Except Valves 1Ell-F017B and 1Ell-F048B Do Not Receive an Open Signal and Containment Spray Valves, Steam Condensing Mode Valves and the Test Return Line Valve of the "B" Subsystem Do Not Receive a Close Si ) 0 -* C'l:l u u t:rJ * - I C (z. -l r C ~ ~ - _ 1)iP _S_y~t~~ :~" Channels Bl B2 Ell-Ell-N694B N694D MTU MTU I ~~~>~> Trip Logic 1 Ell-1 Ell-e__J KSB ~Ell-K6A K6B Ell-K125B "10 Sec" Tuner I Ell- ~ K126 1 "10 Sec"

Tuner

, ___ s I Ell-i' I V., K70B U "l0Sec" ~ I I I Tuner - Ell-g Actuation Logic "B" i-------.i K7SB tlO "02 Sec"~ Tuner ~ InitiationofLPCI Subsystems "A" and "B" (Except Valves 1Ell-F017Aand 1Ell-F048A Do Not Receive an Open Signal and Containment Spray Valves, Steam Condensing Mode Valves and the Test Return Line Valve of the "A" Subsystem Do Not Receive a Close Si Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain initiation capability for the LPCI system on a Drywell Pressure-High signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17763 H-19827 H-17766 H-19830 H-19823 H-19826 LFD-l-ECCS-06 Al&A2 Al&B2 Bl & A2 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.b LPCI System ___ B_l _&_B_2 _____...-----1 Drywell Pressure-High TRMRev. 93

r ___ Trip _§~t~m~*~*- _ 1 1 ___ Iri.£ ~fil.C!!! 13.:_ __ I Channels I Channels I I Al A2 I I Bl B2 .I I I I I I I 11

~

I B21-N690A MTU Ell*<!_ :.-.z K34A ? K37A ( B21-N690C MTU I I B21-B21-I N690B N690D 11 MTU MTU I ~~~ ~~ ii ~~~i~~ ~;~ ~~ !

,---* *

i+ *.. * * * * --'

I I I

~

I I '--~---L--t-------~ ~--------------t---r--~1--, I Conlact Trip Logic

: 11 :

Trip Loo1c 1 Cloaes On 1 F.21 1 ' I 1 ~ 1 E' --IK!4A ~er----* 11 , ______ ~ :~I I =w ii~A 821-11 1 ________ J :;~;. Ell-I T K3SBJ T K37BJ I < Ell-I I < Ell-I ? Kl17A I ? K117B

L-----------~

Actuation Actuation Contact CIOlato Effect Acwation llwical lPlaces) Logic "A" 1 Ell*

TK117A I

Pennillivc to OpcnLPCI htjection Valves Ell-F015A & B, Ell-F017A Logic "B" 1 Ell-TK117B I

PennillM to OpenLPCI lqjectionv.lva Bll-l3015A & B, Ell-l3017B Minimum Channel Requirement for Sytem Initiation Capability:

In order to maintain LPCI system initiation capability on a Reactor S1elm Dome Presaure-Low signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition for modes 4 and 5. Credit cannot be taken for tripped channels in modes I, i---2....,, _an__,d 3. Al & A2 Elem. Ref. Al & B2 H-19827 Bl & A2 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.c H-19830 Bl & Bl TS 3.3.5.2-1, Item 2.a H-17109

LPCI System H-17763 Pnpancl&y: ------Reactor Steam Dome LFD-l-ECCS-07 H-17766 am.-11y:

Pressure-Low L!:~~:....L.-----------i..===~~1.-~====~Rev. 1 12/06/18

r __ Trip SY§t~m_:'~"- _ Channels B21-N641C STU Ell-~ KIOSA Contact Closes on Reactor Steam Dome Press Low (Typical 8 Places) Al A2 B21-B21-N690C N690E MTU MTU Ell-~ K90A Tri* Logic Ell-1 EU-e__J K90B ~Ell-K105A K105B A L _________ -1 r __ Tri.Q ~stem 13.:_ _ Channels B21-N641B STU Ell-< KIOSB( Bl B2 B21-N690B MTU B21-N690F MTU Ell-< K90B ( Trip Logic 1 Ell-1 Ell- ~ K90B ~Ell-K105A KI05B E11-K44B L _________ -1 Actuation Logic "A" Actuation Logic "B" Contact Closes to Effect Actuation (Typical 2 Places) .L Ell-T K44A I I I + Permissive to Close Reem: Pump Discbalge v.ilves B31-F031A & B .L Ell-T K44B I I I + Pennissive to Close Reem: Pump Discbalge Valves B31-F031A & B Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order for a Recirc Pump Disch Valve close permissive to be capable of initiating on a Reactor Steam Dome Pressure Low signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be operable. LFD-l-ECCS-08 Elem. Ref. H-19827 H-19830 H-17765 H-17768 Al & A2 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.d Al & BI LPCI System B2 & A2 Reactor Steam Dome BI & B2 Pressure-Low ..--------- Recirc Disch Valve Prepared By: -7"~---1 Permissive Reviewed By: Rev.0 11/16/94

Trip System "A" Channel A B21-N685A MTU E21-K368A .-----___,Trip Logic Contact Closes 1 on Reactor El I Vessel Shroud ~ - - - - - Level "O" K36SA ('fypical 2 Places) Ell-Kl4A Actuation Logic "A" Contact Closes 1 to Effect E 11-Actuation ~ - -T Kl4A (Typical 2 Places) 1 I

Permissive to Open RHR.

Full Flow Test, Containment Spray, and Torus Spray "A" Valves Trip System "B" Channel B B21-N685B MTU Trip Logic 1 E21-K368B Ell-Kl4B Actuation Logic "B" 1 Ell-T Kl4B I I + Permissive to Open RHR. Full Flow Test, Containment Spray, and Torus Spray "B" Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain LPCI mode initiation capability (i.e., automatically securing other modes of RHR) with Reactor Water Level at or below Level-0, at least one channel must be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-19823 H-19826 H-17763 H-17766 H-17772 H-17774 .-------rr-----1 LFD-1-ECCS-09 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.e LPCI System Reactor Vessel Shroud Level-0 Prepared By: 6 rf:"~::;---1-----------1 Reviewed By: ~,£ R Rev. 0 11/16/94 l.

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" ,- - - - Channel;- - - - l,- - - - Channei; - - - l i! ~ *'~ : : ~I~ ~t ~? ~~ : I K70A K75A K125A I I K125B Kl26 K70B K75B I "10 SEC" "10 SEC" "10 SEC" "10 SEC" "10 SEC" "10 SEC" "0.2 SEC" I TIMER TIMER TIMER I I TIMER TIMER TIMER TIMER I I ___ Trip Logic I I Trip Logic I I 81:S:t 1 Ell-1 Ell-1 Ell-1 I 1 Ell-1 Ell-1 Ell-1 Ell-1 I ~: --T K70A T K75A TK125A I I T Kl25B T Kl26 T K70B T K75B I Out I I I I I I I I I I Vlr::) < Ell- < Ell- < Ell-I < Ell- < Ell- < Ell- < Ell-( K18A (K21A (K127A I I (Kl27B (Kl21B ( K18B ( K21B I l ___________ I l ___________ I Actuation Logics Contact 1 Ell-1 Ell-1 Ell-I "A" Division 1 Ell-1 Ell-1 Ell-1 Ell-Closes to I Effect I Start Signal Actuation T K18A TK127B TK21B I LFD-l-ECCS-05 TK18B TK127A TK21A TK121B ~~ical I LFD-I-ECCS-06 aces) I I I I I I I Start LPCI Pump Start LPCI Pump Start LPCI Pump Start LPCI Pump Ell-C002A Ell-C002C Ell-C002B Ell-C002D

No timer is associated with the "A" division start signal for pump Ell-C002C, consequently, even if channel "B4" is inoperable, pump El 1-C002C is still capable of being started provided the "A" division initiation logic is operable.

Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain LPCI initiation capability with regard to the LPCI Pump Start Timers, one of the following combinations of channels is required to be operable: (Al or Bl) and(* orB4) or (A2 or B2) and (A3 or B3) It is noted that when a timer fails such that it would actuate faster than required, the possibility exists of the pump associated with the failed timer overloading the associated Emergency Diesel Generator thereby affecting two low pressure ECCS pumps unless the pump is prevented from starting. Elem. Ref. H-17764 H-17765 H-17767 H-17768 H-17782 LFD-1-ECCS-10 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.f LPCI System LPCT Pump Start-Time .-Preparc--d ay--~= ~;:~::i;_:_~ Delay Relay Rev. 0 3/30/95

Actuation Logic "A" Actuation Logic "B" Contact Closes on LPCIPmp Disch FlowLow _J E21* T K369A I I Open I PumplA Min Flow Valve EJJ-F007A E21-K369A Close LPCI Pump IA Min Flow Valve Ell-F007A Contact Closes on LPCIPmJ'I Disch flow Not Low Contact Closes on LPCIPmp Di!Cb PlowLow Open LPCI Pump IB Min Flow Valve Ell-F007B E21-IC3698 CloseLPCI Pump 1B Min Plow Valve EIJ-F007B Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation CapabDity: Conlad Closelon ~~ Not Low In order to maintain LPCI initiation capability regarding minimum flow protection, at least one of the two channels must be operable. Elem. Ref. LFD-1-ECCS-11 H-19823 H-19826 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 2.g H-17763 TS 3.3.5.2-1, Item 2.b H-17766 LPC I System H-17773 ,...Pn_pamt_ey_:_.,jlll;"";i,..:~--'--_-_:-_-t_.LPCI Pump Discharge H-17775 _,,..<{' Flow-Low (Bypass) L ______ _J_ ________ _i_=Rm::,::*""'=d.::By:.:..::.~k,=* ~=~Rev. 1 12/06/18

Trip System Channels Al A2 Bl B2 B21-N691A MTU B21-N692A STU B21-N692C STU B21-N691C MTU B21-N691B MTU E41- < ~1-( K41 (K42 Trip Lo!ic Contact Closes on 1 WL Low-Level E41-E41-(Typical 4 Places) ~K52 ~E41-K42 K53 ,K3 B21-B21-B21-N692B N692D N691D STU STU MTU ~FAI-K52 ~FAI-K53 Actuation Logic Contact Closes __ 1 E41-to Effect Actuation T K2,K3 I I Initiate HPCI Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain HPCI Initiation capability on Reactor Water Low Level-2, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17159 H-19826 H-17160 H-19829 H-19823 H-19830 Al&A2 Al&B2 Bl&A2 Bl&B2 LFD-l-ECCS-12 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.a HPCI System RWL-Low Low, ~Prepared--By.-r:,...;l,-.-.(.-lk_em_r_---iLevel2 TRMRev. 6

Trip System Al Ell-N694A A2 Ell-N694C Channels Bl B2 Ell-Ell-N694B N694D MTU MTU MTU MTU I E2t-\\. KSA ( I E21.\\. K6A ( Trip Logic Contact 1 1 ~~~11 E21-E21-Pressure {,1~)14 e__J KSB G.7 E21-K.6A K6B E41-K4,KS I I Ell~ KSB Ell~ K68 L--------------------- Actuation Logic Contact Closes to Effect Actuation _______.l. E41-T K4,KS I I I t Initiate HPCI Minimum Channel Requirement for System Initiaton Capability: In order to maintain HPCI initiation capability on High Drywell Pressure, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17109 H-19827 H-171S9 H-19830 H-19823 H-19826 LFD-l-ECCS-13 Al&A2 Al&B2 Bl&A2 Bl&B2 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.b HPCI Initiation ,---------~---1 Drywell Pressure-High TRMRev. 93

Trip System

~

Channel A Channel B B21-N693B MTU E21-K363B B21-B21-N695B 1------1 N693D MTU STU E21-K366B Trip Logic ~---~ Contact Closes on Reactor Vessel Water Level High-Level 8 (T_ypical 2 Places) 1 E21-I K363B E21-T K366B ~~~ _____________________ J Actuation Logic Contact Closes to Effect Actuation 1 E41-K12 Trip HPCI Twbine Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to ensure a HPCI turbine trip on a RPV Water Level High-Level 8 signal, both channels must be operable. Elem. Ref. H-17159 H-17160 H-19826 LFD-l-ECCS-14 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.c HPCI System Reactor Vessel Water Prepared By: -JC/.'-'-"~--1 Level-High, Level 8 .. ~, Reviewed By:.i',A.I\\ Rev. 0 11/16/94

_____ Trip Sy~em ____ _ A E41-N002 Channels B E41-N003 Level Level Switch Switch

Trip Logic I

1 I Contact L E41-I Qi,el!s on 7 Condensate / I N002 1 Stora e Tanlc - - - - - - I Lowfevel I fir~:)

t;{ _______ _j E41-Kl7 Actuation Logic Contact 3/4 Closes to - - - - - - -

E41-Effect Kl7 Actuation I I I,, I Opens HPCI Pump Suction From Suppression Pool Valves E41-F041 I and E41-F042, Closes Pump Suction From CST Valve E41-F004. Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain the ability to automatically transfer the HPCI pump suction from the CST to the Suppression Pool on a Low Condensate Storage Tanlc Water Level signal, one of the channels must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17159 H-17163 H-17164 Prepared By: ll j) /J Reviewed By: ~-:. T.., (:_ LFD-l-ECCS-15 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.d HPCI System Condensate Storage Tanlc Level-Low Rev.O 11/16/94

Channel A E41-N662B MTU Contact Closes on Supp Pool Water Level-Hi (Typical 2 Places) Trip System Trip Logic ________ 1 E21-1 E21- ~t1D Channel B E41-N662D MTU E21-K371D L _____________________ J Actuation Logic Contact Closes to Effect Actuation

_1 E41-T K19 I

I

Opens HPCI Pump Suction From Suppression Pool Valves E4 l-F04 l and E4 l-F042, Closes Pump Suction From CST Valve E41-F004.

Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain the ability to automatically transfer the HPCI pump suction from the CST to the Suppression Pool on a Suppression Pool Water Level-High signal, at least one channel must be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-19832 H-17159 H-17163 H-17164 LFD-l-ECCS-16 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.e HPCI System Suppression Pool .-------------1 Water Level-High Prepared By: -,11-....,,__._'----I Rev. 0 11/16/94

Trip System r--------------7 I Channel A I I E4t-I I N051 I I I I E4t-I N651 I MTU I ~lfp~~ -{ E21-I Disch Flow K309B High I I I L--------------...J Trip Logic Contact Closes to Effect Actuation 1 E21- - K309B Contact Closes to Effect Actuation I. E21- + K309B I Close HPCI Min Flow Bypass Valve E41-F012 I

Open HPCI Min Flow Bypass Valve E41-F012 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability:

In order to maintain HPCI Initiation capability regarding minimum flow protection, this channel must be operable. Elem. Ref. H-19824 H-17159 H-17163 LFD-l-ECCS-17 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 3.f HPCI System HPCI Pump Disch Flow-Low ,-P-re-par_e_d B-y-: :1..=;'JK::**=-===~ (Bypass) Reviewed By: A.'.~C-'.f t--R-ev ___ o ____ l_l/_1_6/_9_4--1

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" r------------r------------ Channels Channels I I I Al A2 Bl B2 Contact Closes on RWLLow-Level 1 CI'vo"cal 6:Pfices) I B21-N691A MTU B21-N691C MTU Trip Logic

.l E21-

.l E21- .l E21- ..L E21-K370C - -T K361A K361A T K370C B21-

K6A, K27A

_B..... 21--- I _B..... 21--- K754A B21*> K756A "13 Min"

K7A, "13 Min" Timer K28A Tuner RefDwg RefDwg LFD-l-ECCS-24 LFD-I-ECCS-24 B21-K752A "2Min"

..L E21-T K361B I B21-~

K6B, K27B B21-K752B "2Min" B21-N691B MTU B21-N691D MTU Trip Logic I

B21-K754B "13 Min" Tuner J_ E21-K310D -p----7 B21-~ B21-K7B K756B K28B "13 Min" Timer Ref Dwg CCS-24 LFD-1-E RefDwg LFD-l-ECCS-24 Timer I Tuner Ref~ Ref~ L~~~~-------JL~~~~-------J Actuation Logic "A" Actuation Logic "B" Contact closes ..L B21- ..L B21-to effect actuation - - - - -I K6A,K27 A I K6B,K27B ('fypical 4 Places) B21-B21-K7A,K28A K7B,K28B Initiate ADS Valves B21-F013B,D,E,F,J,K & L Initiate ADS Valves B21-F013B,D,E,F,J,K & L Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initation Capability: In order to maintain ADS initiation capability on a RWL-Level I signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref.

H-17754 H-19826 H-17755 H-19829 H-17759 H-19830 H-19823 Al andA2 Bl andB2 LFD-l-ECCS-18 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 4.a/5.a ADS Trip system RWL-Low, Low, Low

.-Prepare--d-By_:_4_(!._<1r_<<_r11_,~ Levell Reviewed TRMRev.6

Trip System "A" Contact Closes on DWPress High ~E:;:) Channels Al A2 Ell-N694A MTU I B21-< K2A ( Ell-N694C MTU I B21-< KJA ( Trip Logic ___ J_ B21-T K2A J_ B21-T K3A I B21- ~ K6A,K27A r> B21- ~ K7A,K28A r> B21-K7S2A "2Min" Tuner RefDwg L - - ~-~s~ - - - - - Actuation Logic "A" J_ B21-g,=. Closes K6A,K27A Actuation (fypical I 4 Places) B21-K7A.,K28A Initiate ADS Valves B21-F013B,D,E,F,J,K & L Trip System "B" Channels Bl B2 Ell-N694B MTU I B21-< K2B ( Ell-N694D MTU I B21-< KJB ( Trip Logic J_ B21-T K2B J_ B21-T K3B I B21- ~ K6B,K27B (" B21* ~ K7B,K28B ;> B21-K7S2B "2Min" Timer RefDwg L - - _LFD__:-~S~ - - - - - Actuation Logic "B" J_ B21-I K6B,K27B 821-K7B,K28B Initiate ADS Valves B21-F013B,D,E,F,J,K & L Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain ADS initiation on a Drywell Pressure - High signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17754 H-19827 H-1775S H-19830 H-19823 H-19826 Al andA2 Bl andB2 LFD-l-ECCS-19 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 4.b/5.b ADS Trip System ,----------,,----1 Drywell Pressure-High TRMRev. 93

Trip System "A"

7 Channel I

A I B21-K752A "2Min" Timer Trip Logic Contact Closes After Time-Out ITvpical 2 Places) ___ l B21-TK752A I ~ B21-(K6A,K27A I I I I I I I I I Trip System "B"

7 Ch;mel I

B21-K752B "2Min" Timer Trip Logic l B21-T K752B I ~ B21-( K6B,K27B I I I I I I I I I I L- - ___ J L _ ______ ____ J Actuation Logic Contact closes 1 to effect B21-actuation - - - - -T K6A, K27A (Typical 2 places) I I

Permissive to initiate ADS Valves B21-F013B,D,E,F,J,K & L Actuation Logic 1 B21-T K6B,K27B I

I

Pennissive to initiate ADS Valves B21-F013B,D,E,F,J,K & L Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability:

In order to maintain ADS initiation capability on a "2 Minute" Timer Permissive signal, either channel A or B and its associated logic must be operable. Elem. Ref. H-17754 H-17755 LFD-l -ECCS-20 TS 3.3.5.1-1, ltem4.c/5.c ADS Trip System ,-P-re-par-ed_B_y_: --,.Jl_,.~-g----1 ADS Initiation Timer --cu>"'+-~--1--1--------1 Reviewed By: fi[ I' Rev. 0 11 /J 6/94

Trip System "A" ChannelA B21-N695A MTU E21-K367A Trip Logic .-C-on_tac_t _ ___,, 1 Closes on RWL Low-E21-Level 3 ~ - - - <Typical 2 T K367 A Places) I 821-< K6A,K21A( I B21-K752A "2MIN" TIMER Ref.dwg LFD-l-ECCS-20 ..... _________ J Actuation Logic "A" 1 821-T K6A,K27A Pennissive to Initiate ADS Vcllves B21-F013B,D,E,F,J,K & L _ _!rip ~ystem ~B" __ Channel B B21-N695B MTU E21-K367B Trip Logic 1 E21-T K3678 I 821-< K68,K27B( I B21-K752B "2MIN" TIMER Ref.dwg LFD-l-ECCS-20 ..... _________ J Actuation Logic "B" 1 821-T K6B,K27B Permissive to Initiate ADS Valves B21-F013B,D,E,F,J,K & L Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain ADS initiation capability due to a RWL-Level 3 Confinnation signal, either channel A or B must be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17754 H-17755 H-19823 H-19826 LFD-l-ECCS-21 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 4.d/5.d ADS Trip System RWL-Low Level 3 .... Prepare--d ey---. ::,...ll.-b::s==== (Confirmatory) .Jc& Reviewed By: Rev.O 11/16/94

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" r-----------1 Channels r-----------1 Channels Al A2 E21-N652A E21-N655A .-------,I MTU Contact Closes on 1...._ _ MTU CS Pump Discharge Press Hi (Typical 8 Places) < E21- ? K25A E21- ?K23A Trip Logic

1 E21-1 E21-1 E21-1 E21-L -

-T K25A T K25B T K23A T K23B I I B21-B21-Bl B2 E21-N652B MTU E21- ?K25B E21-N655B MTU E21- ?K23B Trip Logic 1 E21-1 E21-1 E21-1 E21-T K25A T K25B T K23A T K23B I I B21-B21- ? K6A,K27A ? K7A,K28A l ___________ J ? K6B,K27B ? K7B,K28B l ___________ J Actuation Logic "A" Contact 1 Closes to Effect B21-Actuation IK6A,K27A (Typical 4 Places) B21-K7A,K28A Initiation of ADS Valves B21-F013B,D,E,F,J,K & L Actuation Logic "B" 1B21-I K6B,K27B B21-K7B,K288 Initiation of ADS Vctlves B21-F013B,D,E,F,J,K & L Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain ADS initiation capability for a Core Spray Pump Discharge Pressure-High permissive, channels in one of the following combinations must be operable. Elem. Ref. H-19828 H-19831 H-17109 H-17754 H-17755 Al andA2 Al andB2 Bl and A2 Bl and B2 LFD-l-ECCS-22 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 4.e/5.e ADS Trip System Core Spray Pump Discharge ,....Prq,are--d-By_: __ -..,.,,-.... -:_:_-:._-:._-:._: Press-High Reviewed By: Rev.O 11/16/94

Trip System "A" r------------, Channels Al A2 A3 A4 Ell-N655A MTU Ell-N656A MTU Ell-N655C MTU Trip Logic Ell-N656C MTU C ta t I From Trip System "8" I on C I I Closes on 1 1 1 1 1 1 LPCI Pwnp _ _ E21-E21-E21-E21-Discharge T KJOlC TK303C, TK3020 TK304D: Press Hi L _ _ J '- t.-.= - -.= J- - - - - * (Typical r r 8 Places) I I

<-~¥.i7A (K27A,K28A Actuation Logic "A" Contact Closes to Effect Actuation (Typical 4 Places) 1 B21-I K6A,K27A B21-K7A,K28A Initiation of ADS Valves B21-F013B,D,E,F,J,K & L Trip System "B" r-----------,

Channels Bl B2 B3 B4 ~ Ell-N655B MTU Ell-N656B MTU Ell-N655D MTU I I Ell-I N656D I MTUI E21-I K304D I I Trip Logic I I ~ From Trip ~m "A" I I I I 1 E21-1 E21-

1 E21-1 E21-I T KJOlD TK303D : TK302C TK304C :

L - r - J I.. t_--= r--= i - - - - - I I I ---7:-:~fm (K27B,K28B L ___________ I Actuation Logic "B" 1 B21-I K6B,K27B B21-K7B,K28B Initiation of ADS Valves B21-F013B,D,E,F,J,K & L Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initation Capability: In order to maintain ADS initiation capability for a LPCI Pump Discharge Pressure-High signal, at least one channel must be operable. Elem. Ref. H-17754 H-17755 H-17764 H-17767 H-19827 H-19830 LFD-1-ECCS-23 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 4.f/5.f ADS Trip system .------,..-----1 LPCI Pump Discharge Prepared By: --~3...;;;..6_-1 Pressure-High Reviewed By:,4 ~(,,{' Rev. 0 11116/94

Trip System "A"

- - - - Channel; - - - J Al A2 I

I B21-B21-K754A K756A I I "13 Min" "13 Min" I Timer Timer I I Trip Logic I Contact I I Closes ..l B21- ..l B21-I After I Time Out T K754A T K756A (Typical I I I 4 Pbco,) )Ko!t1A y1!~8A : L __________ _ Actuation Logic "A" Contact Closes to Effect Actuation (Typical 4 Places) 1 B21-I K6A, K27A B21-J K7A, K28A Initiation of ADS Valves B21-F013B,D,E,F,J,K & L I Trip System "B" 1-----------, I Channels I Bl B2 I I B21-B21-D~B D~B I I "13 Min" "13 Min" I Timer Timer I I Trip Logic I I I ..l B21- ..l B21-I I i K7548 i K7568 I >K6fiim >K7=~8B : L __________ _ Actuation Logic "B" I 1 B21-I K6B, K27B B21-J K7B, K28B Initiation of ADS Valves I B21-F013B,D,E,F,J,K & L Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain ADS initiation capability with regard to the ADS low water level timers, one of the following channel combinations must be operable: Elem. Ref. H-17754 H-17755 H-17759 Al andA2 Bl and B2 LFD-l-ECCS-24 TS 3.3.5.1-1, Item 4.g/5.g ADS Trip System ADS LowWaterLVL .-Pr-e-pared-B-y:-...,..Jl-~-6---1 Actuation Timer ,v Reviewed By:*,. '(.,(' Rev. 0 11 /16/94

Trip System Contact. Closes on HPCI 'Iiubine Exhaust PmsuR: High ~) A E41-N6S6B MTU Channels E21-K307B E41-N6S6D MTU Trip Logic J_ E21-K307B E21-J_ K308B Actuation Logic I ~= CJoses I-____ 1 E41-Actuation --r Kl I I t f Trip HPCI 1\\ubine Minimum Channel Bequiremeots for System 'Irip Capability; In order to maintain HPCI turbine trip capability with regard to a HPCI turbine exhaust pressure-high signal, at Jeast one channel must be r unctional. Elem. Ref. H-17159 H-17160 H-19824 LFD-l-ECCS-25 TRMTI.3.5-1, Item2 HPCI Turbine Trip HPCI Turbine Exhaust .-Pre,we--d-By-= _,µ=-~-c..,,,...-----1 Pressure-High R.eviewectey:.,.0-..>. if TRM REV. 60

Trip System Contact Channel A @;0 E41-N6S3 MTU ~i;,\\i, Trip Logic Closes on .l E2 ~ -------~;'.a L ___________ _ Conlact Closes to Effect Actuatio.n Actuation Logic 1841* - - - - - - - - -T fC.9 I I I I, I Trip KPCI Turbine I Minimum Channel Requirements for Sy,tem Trip Capability: In order to maintain HPCI turbine trip capability with regard to a HPCI pump suction pressure-low signal, this channel must functional. Elem. Ref. H-171S9 H-17160 H-19824 LFD-l-BCCS-26 TRM 1'3.3.S-1, Item 3 HPCI Turbine Trip .------...!"""""'::r.:--::::----t HPCI Pump Suction Prep.-ec1 By: /..,.,.,,,..-/ C Pressure-Low Reviewed 9y;-l,2>,/,.f' TRM REV. 60

E51-N056A A E51-N656A MTU E21-K307A Elem. Ref. H-17148 H-17153 H-19821 Prepared by: __________________ Reviewed by: _________________ LFD-1-ECCS-27 TRM T3.3.5-1, Item 5 RCIC Turbine Trip RCIC Turbine Exhaust Pressure-High TRM REV. 104 Trip System Trip Logic Contact Closes on RCIC Turbine Exhaust Pressure High (Typical 2 Places) E21-K307A E51-N056C B E51-N656C MTU E21-K308A E21-K308A Actuation Logic Minimum Channel Requirements for System Trip Capability: In order to maintain RCIC turbine trip capability with regard to a RCIC turbine exhaust pressure-high signal, at least one channel must be functional. Channels E51-K6 Contact Closes to Effect Actuation E51-K6 Trip RCIC Turbine 1

1 I

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I .----__L_- .----__L_- I I I I I I ~~- I I ~--,-- I I I I I I I I I I I i ---.L .L i I I I L.---------r-----~ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ---+ I t

Trip System Contact Channel A ~ ES1-N683 MTU ~~\\:.. Trip Logic CIOllell on .l Ell §:. -------;::~~ ?K7 L ___________ _ Contact Close8 to Effect Actuation Actuation Logic 1ES1-

T K7 I

I I I t I Trip R.CIC Turbine I Minimum Channel Requirements for System Trip Capability: In order to maintain RCIC turbine trip capability with regard to a RCIC pump suction pressure-low signal, this channe] must be functional. Elem. Ref. H-17148 H-17153 H-19821 LFD-l-ECCS-28 TRM T3.3.S-1. Item 6 RCIC Turbine Trip. .-------=---""""' RCIC Pump Suction Pnpsed By: "/_,.,-, / r Pressure-Low Rmcweci&y,;~...d TRM REV. 60

Trip System ,---------7 I Ch~nel I I ~ I I ~05~ I I .T I I E51-I N651 I MTU I I ~ ~ici~ I I I I.----, Trip Logic

1 I

~~ I Closes on... -'t E21-I RCIC

~ K309A I

Pump I Discharge I E51-1 Flow-Low K19 Contact ~oo L _________ ~ High ~-1 1 Pressure

E21-Actuation Logic I

K312A 1 Contact Contact Closes on 1------ E51-E21- ---*----i Closes on RCIC T K19 K309A I RCIC Pump I Pressure Pump Discharge Discharge Flow-Low Opens RCIC Closes RCIC Flow Not Minimum Flow Minimum Flow Low Valve E51-F019 Valve E51-F019 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain RCIC initiation capability with regard to minimum flow functionality, this channel must be functional. Elem. Ref. H-17148 H-17152 H-19821 LFD-1-ECCS-29 TRM T3.3.5-1, Items 7.a and 7.b, RCIC Pump Discharge Flow-High, Low

RPS MG SET "A" EPM ASSEMBLY "A" .L __ <;:_7_1_:lE~7~----G I 27-3A °v __ <;:_?_H~?-~~~---9 I 81-3A ~ _ C71-K 756A ___ -fro'\\ .l.~1J:K7~JA.. fov\\ + 59-3A V C71-K756A TIME DELAY 62-3A + 62-3A ~

~~-****

TRIP RELAY S2-3A C71-P003A J_.C11:K.:Z,.u:; __ fov\\

+ 59-3C V C71-K756C TIME DELAY 62-3C C71-~3C RPS MG SET "B" EPM ASSEMBLY "B" .L __ ~?J.:K?.~7-~... -e 1_~;;::m-1L.Q I 81-3B ~ .. ~?J.:K?.~~~----fro" J_.~1J:K7~.rn.. fov\\ + 59-3B V C71-K756B TIME DELAY 62-3B + 62-3B ~ .... 9-~---*** TRJP RELAY 52-3B C71-P003B EPM ASSEMBLY "D" .L __ 9-7_1_:K?.~~-Q *.. Q I 27-3D 'v __ <;:_?_1_:K?.~~-Q... Q I 81-3D ~ --~7.1.:~?.~~Q... -fro'\\ J_.C1l:K'l,JP... fov\\ + 59-3D V C71-K756D TIME DELAY 62-3D + 62-3D. ~ .... 9-~...... TRIP RELAY 52-3D C71-P003D RPS ALTERNATE POWER EPMASSEMBLY "E" .L __ ~_?J.:K?.~7-~.... Q I 27-3E 'v --~7.1.:K?.~~-l?.... Q I 81-3E ~ .. 9-7_1_:K?.~~J.... -fro'\\ J_.~1 J:K7~.rn.. ~ + 59-3E V C71-K756E TIME DELAY 62-3E + 62-3E ~

~~---*** TRIP RELAY 52-3E C71-P003E J_.C1l:K'l,Jf... fov\\

+ 59-3F V C71-K756F TIME DELAY 62-3F C71-P003F Minimum Channel Requirements for Svstem Initiation Capability: ln order to maintain RPS-EPM trip capabiJity~ one EPM assembly for each of th¢ inservice power supplies must be operable. Elem. Ref. H-17197 H-17499 LFD-l-EPM-01 TS 3.3.8.2 .------,r; 1,-..._, **,,_~---1 RPS Electric Power Prepared By: d\\~'-3;, Monitor Trins Reviewed By: JJ...... ' \\\\..... - I TRM Rev. I I IJ

1B21-N120A Logic A Channel 1B21-N620A MTU 1E21A-K337A Elem. Ref. H-17755 H-19823 H-19822 H19833 Prepared by: __________________ Reviewed by: _________________ LFD-1-LLS-01 Sheet 1 of 2 TS 3.3.6.3-1, Item 1 Low-Low Set Instrumentation Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High Rev. 1 05/11/2016 Division I Trip Logic Contact Closes on High Pressure (Typical of 2) See LFD-1-LLS-03, Logic A See LFD-1-LLS-03, Logic A 1E21A-K337A 1E21A-K313A Contact Closes on High Pressure (Typical of 2) Actuation Logic See LFD-1-LLS-02, Logic A 1E21A-K313A 1E21A-K338A 1E21A-K340A Initiation of opening of LLS S/RV 1B21-F013H 1B21-N120C Logic C Channel 1B21-N620C MTU 1E21A-K370A Trip Logic See LFD-1-LLS-03, Logic C See LFD-1-LLS-03, Logic C 1E21A-K370A 1E21A-K314A Actuation Logic See LFD-1-LLS-02, Logic C 1E21A-K314A 1E21A-K371A 1E21A-K372A Initiation of opening of LLS S/RV 1B21-F013G Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: See Sheet 2 of 2.

1 I

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I L_--;-- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I _l I I I 1 r-T ___ -c=c=;-----1 1 I DI

-=;=---,--=-,--,i l 111 I

l-1._~ ~ ~~,, I I 1-.-, I

_L_I I

I I I I _L -- ___ I i t:--_:-_:-_: -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ - j I ( L---------- L---

1 I

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I .l r _! ___ -_-::-:_-:_-:------: : I r -,- ,..L I I I..L..L..L..L 1~ *** ,TT 11 I I I J ~..y=-----=--:::-:... _ - - - - -: ( ___________ j ..L T

1 IJ--

I IT I I..L I ..L. .J I I ------- _ 1__. __ I I

1B21-N120B Logic B Channel 1B21-N620B MTU 1E21A-K337B Elem. Ref. H-17755 H-19826 H-19825 H19834 Prepared by: __________________ Reviewed by: _________________ LFD-1-LLS-01 Sheet 2 of 2 TS 3.3.6.3-1, Item 1 Low-Low Set Instrumentation Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High Rev. 1 05/11/2016 Division II Trip Logic Contact Closes on High Pressure (Typical of 2) See LFD-1-LLS-03, Logic B See LFD-1-LLS-03, Logic B 1E21A-K337B 1E21A-K313B Contact Closes on High Pressure (Typical of 2) Actuation Logic See LFD-1-LLS-02, Logic B 1E21A-K313B 1E21A-K338B 1E21A-K340B Initiation of opening of LLS S/RV 1B21-F013A 1B21-N120D Logic D Channel 1B21-N620D MTU 1E21A-K370B Trip Logic See LFD-1-LLS-03, Logic D See LFD-1-LLS-03, Logic D 1E21A-K370B 1E21A-K314B Actuation Logic See LFD-1-LLS-02, Logic D 1E21A-K314B 1E21A-K371B 1E21A-K372B Initiation of opening of LLS S/RV 1B21-F013C Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to initiate a LLS S/RV, its associated reactor steam dome pressure Logic AND its associated Logic from LFD-1-LLS-02 AND LFD-1-LLS-03 must be operable.

1 I

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I L_--;-- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I _l I I I 1 r-T ___ -ccccc,-----1 1 I DI

-=;=---,--=-,--, l l 111 I

1-1._~ ~ ~~., I I I-,_: __ L_:.;_c'::' __ : ___ 1 I i 7---~-----_-_-____ ] I ( L---------- L--- ..L 1--,

1 I IJ--

I

1 I

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I .l

11 r -:=---=------==-=-~-..:::

11 I r -,- J... J.....1-..1-I I J.....L T I-.-, I I I I 11 I I I .l ___ l ~}c_-_-_c_-:::-::. __ - - - - i ( ___________ j ..L T

1 IJ--

I u :_;_ I IT - - - -=_.J:_ _____ _ _____:l'...____ IT I I..L I ..L. .J I I ------- __j.,___ __ I I

1B21-N120A Logic A Channels 1B21-N620A MTU 1E21A-K338A Elem. Ref. H-17755 H-19823 H-19822 H19833 Prepared by: __________________ Reviewed by: _________________ LFD-1-LLS-02 Sheet 1 of 2 TS 3.3.6.3-1, Item 2 Low-Low Set Instrumentation - Low-Low Set Pressure Setpoints Rev. 1 05/11/2016 Division I Trip Logic Contact Closes on High Pressure & Opens on Low Pressure (Typical of 4) See LFD-1-LLS-01, Logic A 1E21A-K340A Initiation of opening of LLS S/RV 1B21-F013H Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: See Sheet 2 of 2. 1B21-N621A STU 1B21-N122A 1B21-N643A MTU 1B21-N622A STU A1 A2 1E21A-K340A 1E21A-K338A 1E21A-K313A 2B21-N120C Logic C Channels 1B21-N620C MTU 1B21-N621C STU 2B21-N122C 1B21-N622C MTU C1 C2 1E21A-K371A 1E21A-K372A Trip Logic 1E21A-K372A 1E21A-K371A See LFD-1-LLS-01, Logic C 1E21A-K314A Initiation of opening of LLS S/RV 1B21-F013G J_ 1 r---- 1 f I --------1 I I I IT I I I I _I_ - I I I I I I L-----~-------------- 1 I y r-------------------- J_ 1 T f I --------1 I I I IT I I I I - I I I I I I

7-----------

1 I

1B21-N120B Logic B Channels 1B21-N620B MTU 1E21A-K338B Elem. Ref.

H-17755 H-19826 H-19825 H19834 Prepared by: __________________ Reviewed by: _________________ LFD-1-LLS-02 Sheet 2 of 2 TS 3.3.6.3-1, Item 2 Low-Low Set Instrumentation - Low-Low Set Pressure Setpoints Rev. 1 05/11/2016 Division II Trip Logic Contact Closes on High Pressure & Opens on Low Pressure (Typical of 4) See LFD-1-LLS-01, Logic B 1E21A-K340B Initiation of opening of LLS S/RV 1B21-F013A Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to initiate a LLS S/RV, its associated low-low set pressure setpoint Logic AND its associated Logic from LFD-1-LLS-01 AND LFD-1-LLS-03 must be operable. 1B21-N621B STU 1B21-N122B 1B21-N643B MTU 1B21-N622B STU B1 B2 1E21A-K340B 1E21A-K338B 1E21A-K313B 1B21-N120D Logic D Channels 1B21-N620D MTU 1B21-N621D STU 1B21-N122D 1B21-N622D MTU D1 D2 1E21A-K371B 1E21A-K372B Trip Logic 1E21A-K372B 1E21A-K371B See LFD-1-LLS-01, Logic D 1E21A-K314B Initiation of opening of LLS S/RV 1B21-F013C J_ 1 r---- 1 f I --------1 I I I IT I I I I _I_ - I I I I I I L-----~-------------- 1 I y r-------------------- J_ 1 T f I --------1 I I I IT I I I I - I I I I I I

7-----------

1 I

Logic A Channels 1B21-N302A PS Elem. Ref.

H-17755 H-19833 Prepared by: __________________ Reviewed by: _________________ LFD-1-LLS-03 Sheet 1 of 2 TS 3.3.6.3-1, Item 3 Low-Low Set Instrumentation Tailpipe Pressure Switch Rev. 1 05/11/2016 Division I Trip Logic Initiation of opening of LLS S/RV 1B21-F013H Trip Logic 1E21A-K314A Actuation Logic Minimum Channel Requirements for LLS S/RV Initiation Capability: See Sheet 2 of 2. 1B21-N302B PS 1B21-N302H PS A1 A2 A3 1B21-N302J PS 1B21-N302F PS 1B21-N302G PS A4 A5 A6 See LFD-1-LLS-01, Logic A 1E21A-K337A 1B21-N302A 1B21-N302B 1B21-N302H 1B21-N302J 1B21-N302F 1B21-N302G 1E21A-K314A (Actuated from Logic C) 1E21A-K313A Logic C Channels 1B21-N302L PS 1B21-N302C PS 1B21-N302D PS C1 C2 C3 1B21-N302E PS 1B21-N302K PS C4 C5 See LFD-1-LLS-01, Logic C 1E21A-K370A 1B21-N302L 1B21-N302C 1B21-N302D 1B21-N302E 1B21-N302K 1E21A-K313A (Actuated from Logic A) Contact Closes on High S/RV Tailpipe Pressure (Typical of 11) Actuation Logic 1E21A-K313A 1E21A-K338A 1E21A-K340A See LFD-1-LLS-02, Logic A 1E21A-K314A 1E21A-K371A 1E21A-K372A See LFD-1-LLS-02, Logic C Initiation of opening of LLS S/RV 1B21-F013G r- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -,r- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 1-,- - - - - - - - - -I 1..!.. I f-=--~--~--~ 1 1 T T T IL------------ 1 ----- I I I 11 I 11 I 11 I 1-, - - - - - - - - - -I I..!.. I j-=--~ --~ --~ 1 T T I L_ I--------------------------------------------- ..l ..l IT ---------1 I..L I IT I I..L I Lf _________.J 1 T ---------1 I..L I IT I I..L I LJ---------.J I

Logic B Channels 1B21-N301A PS Elem. Ref. H-17755 H-19606 H-19834 Prepared by: __________________ Reviewed by: _________________ LFD-1-LLS-03 Sheet 2 of 2 TS 3.3.6.3-1, Item 3 Low-Low Set Instrumentation Tailpipe Pressure Switch Rev. 1 05/11/2016 Division II Trip Logic Initiation of opening of LLS S/RV 1B21-F013A Trip Logic 1E21A-K314B Actuation Logic Minimum Channel Requirements for LLS S/RV Initiation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to initiate a LLS S/RV, its associated tailpipe pressure switch Logic AND its associated Logic from LFD-1-LLS-01 AND LFD-1-LLS-02 must be operable. The tailpipe pressure switch Logic is operable if at least one pressure switch is operable OR at least one pressure switch AND Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High channel in the opposite Logic in the same Division are operable. 1B21-N301B PS 1B21-N301H PS B1 B2 B3 1B21-N301J PS 1B21-N301F PS 1B21-N301G PS B4 B5 B6 Logic D Channels 1B21-N301L PS 1B21-N301C PS 1B21-N301D PS D1 D2 D3 1B21-N301E PS 1B21-N301K PS D4 D5 See LFD-1-LLS-01, Logic B 1E21A-K337B 2B21-K14L 2B21-K14C 2B21-K14D 1B21-K14E 1B21-K14K 1E21A-K313B (Actuated from Logic B) Contact Closes on High S/RV Tailpipe Pressure (Typical of 11) Actuation Logic 1E21A-K313B 1E21A-K338B 1E21A-K340B See LFD-1-LLS-02, Logic B 1E21A-K314B 1E21A-K371B 1E21A-K372B See LFD-1-LLS-02, Logic D Initiation of opening of LLS S/RV 1B21-F013C 1B21-K14A 1B21-K14B 1B21-K14H 1B21-K14L 1B21-K14C 1B21-K14D 1B21-K14E 1B21-K14K 1B21-K14J 1B21-K14F 1B21-K14G 1B21-K14A 1B21-K14B 1B21-K14H 1B21-K14J 1B21-K14F 1B21-K14G 1E21A-K314B (Actuated from Logic D) 1E21A-K313B See LFD-1-LLS-01, Logic D 1E21A-K370B r----------------------,~---------------------- ~'- - - - - - - - - -, I : I I= I I : I 11 ] J_ J_ J_ 1 .,~-- Ii I T T 111 I ~'- - - - - - - - - -, I : I

1 I

1-c __________ I 1 J_ J_ J_ J_ T T T 1 1 1

r- ---17 I

11 L___J I I I

L----------------------

..l IT---------, I..L I IT I I..L I Lr---------.J ..l T r-------------, I..L I IT I I..L I LJ---------.J I

Trip System: IE 4.16KV Bus Channels Contacts Close on Loss of Voltage (Typical of2) A

l.

27-EAX - - - - - - - - - 1 27-EAX2 Contacts Close , -

on Loss of Voltage (Typical of 14)

TEBX2 I I .1. 27-I EAX3 27-TEBXJ O Actuation Logic I I I i Initiates Load Shedding, Load Sequencing, EDG I A Supply Breaker Closure, anc l E Bus Normal and Alternate Supply Breaker Lockout Elem. Ref. H-13382 H-17111 H-17768 H-13412 H-17763 7 H-17109 H-17764 H-53343 27-3 : 27-EAX 27-EAXI I I 27-6 I 27-EAXl j_ 27-EBX j_ 27-EAX3 Actuation Logic B 27-EBX2 27-EBXl 27-EBXI j_ 27-EBXJ Contacts Open on Loss of Voltage (Typical of 2) Initiates the EDG IA Initiates Trip of the IE Bus Normal Supply Breaker and Closure of the Alternate Su 1 Breaker Minimum Channel Requirmamts for System Initiation Capability See Sheet 3 for minimum channel requirements. Prevents Start of CS A and RHR A Pumps Until Voltage is Restored LFD-l-LOP-01 Sheet I of3 TS 3.3.8.1-1, Items I.a and l.b, 4.16KV Emergency Bus, Loss ,-------,,---~ of Voltage and Time Prq,ared By: ~~~~-I Delay t----------1 Rev. 11 6 3/5/2020 27-EAX5, 27-EBX4, 116 3/5/2020

Trip System: IF 4.16KV Bus Channels Contacts Close on Loss of 1/4>ltage (Typical of 2) A l_ 27-FAX - - - - - - - - - 1 27-FAX2 Contacts Close on Loss of Voltage (Typical of 14) l_21-

IFAX2 27-TFBX2 I

I J..21-IFAX3 27-TFBXJ O Actuation Logic I I I

Initiates Load Shedding, Load Sequencing, EOG 1B Supply Breaker Closure, an<l IF Bus Normal and Alternate Supply Breaker Lockout Elem. Ref.

H-13413 >e---oi~~ H-17764 ~~--- H-17765 27-3 : 27-FAX 27-FAXl 27-FAXI J_ 27-FAX3 Actuation Logic 27-FBX J_ B 27-FBX2 27-FBXl 27-FBXl.l 27-FBX3 Contacts Open on Loss of Voltage (Typical of 2) Actuation Logic Initiates the EOG lB Initiates Trip of the lF Bus Normal Supply Breaker and Closure of the Alternate Su I Breaker Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability See Sheet 3 for minimum channel requirements. Prevents Start ofRHR C and D Pumps Until Voltage is Restored LFD-l-LOP-01 Sheet 2 of3 TS 3.3.8.1-1, Items I.a and l.b, 4.l 6KV Emergency Bus, Loss of Voltage and Time Delay Rev. 116 3/5l2_Q20 _ 27-FAX5, 27-FBX4, 116 3/5/2020

Trip System: I G 4.16KV Bus Channels I I I. Cootacts Close on Loss of '1/4>ltage (Typical of 2) A l.. 27-0AX 27-GAX2 Contacts Close , -

on Loss of~ltage - - - -

I (Typical Of 14) l..21-

I GAX2 27-TGBX2 I

I l..21-IGAX3 27-TGBXJ O Actuation Logic I I I ,I, Initiates Load Shedding, Load Sequencing, EDG 1 C Supply Breaker Closure, and 1 G Bus Normal and Alternate Supply Breaker Lockout Elem. Ref. H-13382 H-17111 76 H-13414 H-17765 H-53345 H-17109 H-17766 B 27-GAX 27-GAXl 27-GBXI 27-0AXl l.. 27-GBX J.. 27-GBXIJ.. 27-GAX3 27-GBX2 27-GBX3 Actuation Logic Initiates Trip of the 1 G B Normal Supply Breaker and Closure of the Alternate Su I Breaker Minimum Channel Requiremmts I I Contacts Open on Loss of ~ltage (Typical of 2) Prevents Start of CS B and RHR B Pumps Until Voltage is Restored for System Initiation Capability: LFD-l-LOP-01 In order to maintain Diesel Generator function Sheet 3 of 3 initiation capability on a loss of voltage condition,1-T-S-3.-3-.8-.-1--l-, -Ite-ms--1-.a__, both channels associated with each of two and I.b, 4. l 6KV emergency busses are required to be operable. Emergency Bus, Loss of Voltage and Time Delay Rev. 116 3/5/2020 27-GAX5, 27-GBX4, 116 3/5/2020

TRIP SYSTEM: 1 E 4.1 6KV BUS CHANNELS A B C 1--------f----, 27-41 I .l I ...-----., _____ J I ! CONTACTS CLOSE ON LOSS OF VOLTAGE (TYP. OF 9) I I I _l L----- 27-4 7-EAX 27-EAX1 .l J~7-EAX r27-EAX2 r-001 27-EAX3 CONTACTS CLOSE ON LOSS OF VOLTAGE . OF 12) TRIP .127- .127- .127- .127- .127- .l27- ~ EAX3 ~EC3 ~EC3 27-27-27-27-27-27-T EBX2 I EBX3 I EAX2 I EAX3 I EBX2 T EBX3 I I I 0 ACTUATION LOGIC I I INITIATES LOAD SHEDDING, LOAD SEQUENCING, REG. TRANSFER. IF ALTERNATE OFFSITE SUPPLY IS UNAVAILABLE, THIS SIGNAL WILL ALSO CLOSE EDG 1A SUPPLY BREAKER AND LOCK OUT THE NORMAL AND ALTERNATE SUPPLY BREAKERS. CONTACTS CLOSE ON LOSS OF VOLTAGE (TYP. OF 12) ELEM. REF. .127- .127- .127- .l27- ~ EC1 ~EC1 27-27-27-27-I EAX4 I EAX5 I EBX4 T EBX5 I 0 ACTUATION LOGIC I I

INITIATES TRIP OF THE 1E BUS NORMAL SUPPLY BREAKER AND CLOSURE OF THE ALTERNATE SUPPLY BREAKER H-13382 H-17111 H-17768 H-13412

~ H-17776 H-17109 H-17764 -5334 27-7- 27-7- 27-27-EAX5 EBX EBX5 EC EC4 EC5 .l .l .l .l r-EBX 27-EBX2 r-EBX1 27-EBX3 r-EC 27-EC2 r-EC1 27-EC3 LOGICS CONTACTS CLOSE ON ~---.127-EAX.127-EBX.l27-EC4 LOSS OF VOLTAGE OR OR OR (TYP. OF 3) 27-EAX5 27-EBX4 27-EC5 CONTACTS OPEN ON LOSS OF VOLTAGE (TYP. OF 5) MINIMUM CHANNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEM INITIATION CAPABILITY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN EDG FUNCTION INITIATION CAPABILITY DURING A DEGRADED VOLTAGE CONDITION, TWO OUT OF THREE CHANNELS ASSOCIATED WITH EMERGENCY BUS 1 E ARE REQUIRED. I J, I I I I 0 ACTUATION LOGIC I l_ __ INITIATES START OF EDG 1A 27-EAX OR 27-EAX1 27-EAX4 OR 27-EAX5 27-EBX4 OR 27-EBX5 ACTUATION LOGIC 27-EBX OR 27-EBX1 27-EC4 OR 27-EC5 PREVENTS START OF CS A AND RHR A PUMPS UNTIL LFD-1-LOP-02 VOLTAGE IS RESTORED SHEET 1 OF 3 TS 3.3.8.1-1, ITEMS 2.A AND 2.B, 4.16KV EMERGENCY BUS, DEGRADED VOLTAGE AND TIME DELAY REV.O 12/16/94 116 3/5/2020

TRIP SYSTEM: 1 F 4.16KV BUS CHANNELS A B C 27-41 I .l I

+-----J 27-4 CONTACTS CLOSE ON LOSS OF VOLTAGE (TYP. OF 9) 7-27-I FAX FAX1 I I

.l .l L----- r-FM 27-FAX2 r-F,X, 27-FAX3 CONTACTS CLOSE ON LOSS OF VOLTAGE . OF 12) .127- .127- .127- .l27- ~FAX3 ~FC3 27-27-27-27-TFBX2 IFBX3 IFAX2 IFAX3 I I I TRIP .127- .l27- ~FC3 27-27-Jrnx2 Jrnx3 0 ACTUATION LOGIC I J. INITIATES LOAD SHEDDING, LOAD SEQUENCING, REG. TRANSFER. IF ALTERNATE OFFSITE SUPPLY IS UNAVAILABLE, THIS SIGNAL WILL ALSO CLOSE EDG 1B SUPPLY BREAKER AND LOCK OUT THE NORMAL AND ALTERNATE SUPPLY BREAKERS. .127- .l27-8FC1 27-27-IFAX4 IFAX5 I .127- .l27-8FC1 27-27-JFBX4 Jrnxs 0 ACTUATION LOGIC CONTACTS CLOSE ON LOSS OF VOLTAGE (TYP. OF 12) l INITIATES TRIP OF THE 1 F BUS NORMAL SUPPLY BREAKER AND CLOSURE OF THE ALTERNATE SUPPLY BREAKER ELEM. REF. ~ H-13413 H-17768 H-17764 ~ H-17765 27-7- 27-7- 27-27-FAX5 FBX FBX5 FC FC4 FC5 .l .l .l .l r-rn, 27-FBX2 r-ffiXI 27-FBX3 r-FC 27-FC2 r-FCI 27-FC3 LOGICS CONTACTS CLOSE ON .l .l .l LOSS OF VOLTAGE ,____ 27-FAX 27-FBX 27-FC4 (TYP. OF 3) OR OR OR 27-FAX5 27-FBX4 27-FC5 CONTACTS OPEN ON LOSS OF VOLTAGE (TYP. OF 5) MINIMUM CHANNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEM INITIATION CAPABILITY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN EDG FUNCTION INITIATION CAPABILITY DURING A DEGRADED VOLTAGE CONDITION, TWO OUT OF THREE CHANNELS ASSOCIATED WITH EMERGENCY BUS 1 F ARE REQUIRED. I I

I I I I 0 ACTUATION LOGIC I

L_ __ + INITIATES START OF EDG 1B 27-FAX OR 27-FAX1 27-FAX4 OR 27-FAX5 27-FBX4 OR 27-FBX5 ACTUATION LOGIC 27-FBX OR 27-FBX1 27-FC4 OR 27-FC5 PREVENTS START OF RHR C AND D PUMPS UNTIL VOLTAGE IS RESTORED LFD-1-LOP-02 SHEET 2 OF 3 TS 3.3.8.1-1, ITEMS 2.A AND 2.B, 4.16KV EMERGENCY BUS, DEGRADED VOLTAGE AND TIME DELAY REV.O 12/16/94 116 3/5/2020

TRIP SYSTEM: 1 G 4.1 6KV BUS CHANNELS A B C 27-41 .i I ....-----------J 27-4 CONTACTS CLOSE ON LOSS OF VOLTAGE (TYP. OF 9) 7-27-7- 27-7- 27-27-I Gt,;/. GAX5 GBX GBX5 GC GC4 GC5 I I .l .l L-----r-~, 27-GAX2 r-00 27-GAX3 CONTACTS CLOSE ON LOSS OF VOLTAGE . OF 12) TRIP .127- .127- .127- .127- .127- .127- ~ Gt,;f.3 ~GC3 ~GC3 27-27-27-27-27-27-T GBX2 I GBX3 I GAX2 I Gt,;i.3 I GBX2 T GBX3 I I I D ACTUATION LOGIC I INITIATES LOAD SHEDDING, LOAD SEQUENCING, REG. TRANSFER. IF ALTERNATE OFFSITE SUPPLY IS UNAVAILABLE, THIS SIGNAL WILL ALSO CLOSE EDG 1C SUPPLY BREAKER AND LOCK OUT THE NORMAL AND ALTERNATE SUPPLY BREAKERS. .127- .127- .127- .127- .127- .127- ~ Gt,;1.1 ~GC1 ~GC1 27-27-27-27-27-27-T GBX T GBX1 T Gt,;/.4 T Gt,;1.5 T GBX4 T GBX5 I CONTACTS CLOSE ON LOSS OF VOLTAGE (TYP. OF 12) ELEM. REF. I I D ACTUATION LOGIC I ,L INITIATES TRIP OF THE 1G BUS NORMAL SUPPLY BREAKER AND CLOSURE OF THE ALTERNATE SUPPLY BREAKER H-13382 H-17111 H-17767 H-13414 H-17765 ~ H-17109 H-17766 .l .1 .l .l r-GBX 27-GBX2 r--, 27-GBX3 r-~ 27-GC2 r-~1 27-GC3 LOGICS CONTACTS CLOSE ON .l .l .l LOSS OF VOLTAGE 27-Gt,;i. 27-GBX 27-GC4 (TYP. OF 3) OR OR OR 27-Gt,;i.5 27-GBX4 27-GC5 CONTACTS OPEN ON LOSS OF VOLTAGE (TYP. OF 5) MINIMUM CHANNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEM INITIATION CAPABILITY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN EDG FUNCTION INITIATION CAPABILITY DURING A DEGRADED VOLTAGE CONDITION, TWO OUT OF THREE CHANNELS ASSOCIATED WITH EMERGENCY BUS 1 G ARE REQUIRED. I ,L I I I D ACTUATION LOGIC I I I l_ __ INITIATES START OF EDG 1C 27-Gt,;i. OR 27-GAX1 27-Gt,;i.4 OR 27-GAX5 27-GBX4 OR 27-GBX5 ACTUATION LOGIC 27-GBX OR 27-GBX1 27-GC4 OR 27-GC5 PREVENTS START OF CS B AND RHR B PUMPS UNTIL VOLTAGE IS RESTORED LFD-1-LOP-02 SHEET 3 OF 3 TS 3.3.8.1-1, ITEMS 2.A AND 2.8, 4.16KV EMERGENCY BUS, DEGRADED VOLTAGE AND TIME DELAY REV.O 12/16/94 116 3/5/2020

LFD-1-LOP DELETED

Trip System "A" r-------------- Channel A IZ41-R615A RIS I 1 1Z41-1 1Z41-I K80 1 !.. __________, GISA-1 Trip Logic I I Contacts __ :~1-IZ41--: 1241_ Open On

+

-~SJ - -'GISA-1 Inlet High Radiation 1 (Typical of 2) __ -GI. __ _ I I I I I I 1 1Z41-1 1Z41 1 K82 1 !.. _________ -* GISA-1 Actuation Logic 1 Contacts -1 _ - - __ Close On

1Z41-$ : 1 1241_

Inlet High

K82 Radiation

GISA-1

'al f 2., (Typ1c o I

Initiation ofMCREC Train 11A' Trip System "B" r--------------

Channel B IZ41-R615B RIS I I 1 1Z41-1 1Z41-I K80 1 !.. __________, GISB-1 Trip Logic I I f 1-1241-- ~1241

T K80 1 -,- -

- GISB-1 I I

----t----:

I I 1 1Z41-1 1Z41 1 K82 1 !.. _________ -* GISB-1 Actuation Logic I I I I

KS2

1Z41-I }Z4}-$

I - - - - - - - - - GISB-1 I Initiation ofMCREC Train 11A 11 and Train "B 11 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain MCREC System initiation capability for the pressurization mode on Control Room air inlet high radiation, at least one channel is required to be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref H-17069 H-17073 H-17070 H-17121 H-17071 H-17142 LFD-1-MCREC-0 I TS 3.3.7.1 MCREC System .-------,,..,...._---1Initiation Control Room Prepared By: ;;tl!!..~~~~IAir Inlet Radiation - Hig Reviewed By:

Rev. 0 1/12/95

Trin Svstem "A"

~-~---------

Channels Al A2 1B21* N691A M I I I IEl{ Ki!? 1B21-N691C I .~{ J!? Trip Logic ______..Lrn.21-1 K7A 1E21-KBA j_ 11i21-K7B 1E21-K8B ~-------- -------- CoDlact Closes Actuation OnLow Reactor W1aer1.eve1 Logic "A" rn-.*.-1 ofs Initiation of MCREC Train "A" and Train "B" Trin Svstem "B" -- :.t""- -:.,,,, _ - Channels Bl B2 1B21-N691B MTU I I 1E2~ K~? 1B21-N691D MTU I I I IF.21 Ki~? Trip Logic lF.21-..L K7A 1E2I* KIA j_ 1E21-K7B JE21-KSB Actuation Logic "B" Initiation of MCREC Train "A" and Train "B" Minimum Clwmel Requirelllenfl for System Inltiadon Capabllitt: In order to maintain MCREC System initiation capability on Reactor Water Level

Low Low Low (Level 1 ), channels in one of the following combinations must be either functional or maintained in the tripped condition.

LFD-l-MCREC-02 TRM 13.3.7-1, Item 1 MCREC System Instrumentation, Reactor Vessel Water Elem. Ref. H-17109 H-19826 B-17121 B-19829 B-19823 B-19830 AlandA2 AlandB2 BlandA2 BlandB2,.----,.,-----,----1Level-LowLowLow, Prep.:ed By: ~=--=:::.=..-1 Level I Reviewed By: 1---T~R"'"'"'.M~R---E---V:-. 6-0--1

Trin Svstem "B" Tr!,P S_ystem "A" - - - - - Ch~els- - - - - -! ---~-~-J----~---- 1 I Channels 1 Al A2 1Ell-N694A I 1E2{ Ki!> 1Ell-N694C I 1E2{ K~!> Trip Logic _____ )-1E21-I KSA j_ 1B21-K5B I I I I I I I I I Bl B2 lEll-lBll-N694B N694D I I I I 1~§> KSB ,~1> K6B Trip Logic 1£21-j_ j_ 1E21-KSA KSB 1E21* 1E21-JB.21-1E21-K6A K6B K6A K6B Comet Closes OnHipDJywell PnilSSum (lypical Qf8 Actuation Logic "A" Initiation of MCREC Train "A.. and Train "B" Actuation Logic "B" Initiation of MCREC Train "A" . "B" Minimum Channel Regb-ements for Spt* Initiation Capablbz: In order to maintain MCRBC System initiation capability on high Drywe11 preume, channels in one of the following combinations must be either functional or maintained in the tripped condition. Al and A2 Elem. Ref. H-17109 H-19827 H-17121 H-19830 I H-19823 H-19826 Aland.B2 LFD-l-MCREC-03 TRMRev. 93

Trin System "A" ~-----~------------ CODlaCl:Opem I ToCause Actual.ion ~ (l'ypic:al of 4) I I Channels I I 1A71-< K3A ? MSL*A* A2A ~ ~~ I A2B ~ ~~ I ___ A2c Trip Logic "A" I .1 I IOA --- 1 Trin System "B"

~------------

Channels BJA MaL*A* ~ ~IM:p.IJ 1 a:a 1 - N61i17B BIB~' 0117 Blc M!lf."C' ~ ~IM.+D'.J B1D -.-r 1 ~ ~~ I Trip Logic "B" I I I I I I Actuation Logic Contaet Closes = ---------~ K.BA (fypicalofl> T Initiation of MCREC Train "A" and Train "B" Actuation Logic Initiation of MCREC Train "A" and Train 11B" Minimum Cunael B.equlnmenu for System Initiation Capablllty: In order to maintain MCREC System initiation capability on Main Steam Line high flow, channels in one of the following combinations must be either functional or maintained in the tripped condition. Blem. References H-19809 H-17810 H-19812 H-178ll H-19815 H-17818 H-19818 H-17121 One Al and One Bl Channel for Each Main Steam Line OR One A2 and One B2 Channel for Each Main Steam Line LFD-l-MCRBC-04 TRMT3.3.7-1, l1em3 MCRBC System .-----------' Instrumentation. Main Prep.-.d By: z:;.2L C. Steam Linc Flow - Hiah ReviewedBy: ~,/,p' TRM REV. 60

Trin System "A"

~------------

Channel A 1D21-K002B AU ~IB Trip Logic I r---------, I I I , _________ i_l, 1021-1

t KlB

1D21-

..... Co_n_tac_t,_,,,C.,...lose-,.... ! _ _I ________ : K002B On R.efueli.og I Fl.oor~on I I I Actuation Logic "A" I I Initiation of MCREC Train ff A ff and Train *B 11 Trip Svstem "B"

-~----------

Channel B 1D21-K0020 AU ~1B Trip Logic ,._t _______, , _________ Ll 1021-1

t KlB

1D21-ContactClosa

_ _I_ _______ : K002D On R.efuelioa I

Floor Atea Hip I Radiation I I Actuation Logic "B" I I Initiation of MCREC Train *A* and Train *e* Minimum Channel R.equirementl for Sytem lnitiadoa CapabDity: In order to maintain MCREC System initiation cai:ability on Unit 1 Refueling Floor area high radiation, either channel A or channel B must be functional or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17854 H-17121 L 5 TRM T3.3.7-1, Item 4 MCREC System Instrumentation, 1 }'fep.-e--d-B-y:---=c::..-c.--l R.efbellaa Floor Area Radiation - Hiab R.eviewedBv;,...Qµ,,ep TRM REV. 60

Trip System "A" r-------------- Contacts Open On a Downscale Signal Channel A 1Z41-R615A RIS I I 1 1Z41- , 1Z41-I K81 1 ~ __________, GISA-1 (Typical of4) Trip Logic I

l--1.-1241-.:

1z4j_-l-:

- : ~ Tl - -~81 _:

-~~l -T __ :

1241-I 1241-Gl5A-l I I Gl5B-l L-----r----- 1 ~ - ---;-- - -: I I 1Z41-I K82 I 1Z41- ~ - - - - - - - - - _, GISA-1 Actuation Logic -c-- ontacts , --- - -,- -, ______ - _ Close On 1 1Z41-!, 1 1241_ a Downscale

K82 Signal

- - - - - -,- - - GlSA-l {Typical of2' I t Initiation ofMCREC Train "A' Trip System "B" r-------------- Channel B 1Z41-R615B RIS I I IZ41- , 1241-1 K81 I ~ __________, Gl5B-l Actuation Logic I I I

K82

IZ4l-

1Z41-*

- - - - - - - - - Gl5B-l I I t Initiation ofMCREC Train "A" and Train "B" Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain MCREC System initiation capability for the pressurization mode on a Main Control Room Intake Radiation Monitor downscale signal, each channel must be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. ,,..,~-r-,r77"'WK"l'~'X'7"-~ Elem. Ref. H-17121 H-17142 TRM T3.3.7-l, Item 5 MCREC System Instrumentation, Main ..-----.,......,.....-----1control Room Intake Reviewed By:

Trin Svstem "A" J""_ ~- - Channels Al A2 1D11-K603A LRM 1A71~ K44!? 1D11-K603C LRM I 1A71~ K44t;> Tr!P* Svstem "B" Channels Bl B2 1D11-K603B LRM I 1A71~ K44:-;> 1D11-K603D LRM 1A7lf K44~-;> Refer to sheet 2 of 2 for the trip logic, actuation logic and the minimum channels required to maintain functional capability regarding isolation of the Reactor Water Sample line and tripping of the Steam Packing Exhausters and the Mechanical Vacuum Pump. Both functions must be considered in determining the channel minimum reauirements. Elem. Ref. H-13377 H-17790 H-17811 H-17076 H-17804 H-17812 H-17077 H-17805 H-17814 H-17789 H-17810 H-19556 LFD-1-MSLR-0 1 Sheet 1 of2 TRMT3.3.ll Main Steam Line .--------~ Radiation High-High Rev. 0 3/30/95

Trip of Steam Packing Exhausters and Mechanical Vacuum Pump I Trip Logic I I Trip Logic .. I I l.1A71B-J. 1A71B-I I 1A71B-l. J. 1A71B-I ~~ --I K44A I K44B I I K44C I I K44D I i::

E QC T JKA44C7IB-T I

T T o ~, 'o ~-__ ___. 1A71B-I 1A71B-1A71B-I c:: ;..;, ~ 5 i K44D I K44A - I K44B t J ~ t I Trip I I I Trip

lj~*.1 I

18 j J} 1~:~- ;> System "A" I 1C61- ;> System "B" 1----~-------' 1i~- Actuation Logic ~~: a D .-T-rip_o_f_S_team--Pac-ki-ng-F.x-hau_sten Radiation High-High - ic"61-*: - - - - - - - - - - - -

1N33-COOIA & Band Mechanical Signal (1ypical of2)

K45 Vacuum Pump 1N62-C002 Mbaimwm Channcl BCClitcmCAII for System Initiation CapahUkf; In order to maintain trip capability of the Steam Packing Exhausters and the Mechanical Vacuum Pump on a Main Steam Line Radiation high - high condition, channels in one of the following combinations must either be functional or maintained in the tripped condition. Al or A2 and Bl orB2 Closure of the Reactor Water Sample Valves r----------1r----------, I Trip Logic I I Trip Logic I 1A71B1 1 1 1 I

K44A IA71B-11
1A71B-

)A71B-I 1Tnp 1-: T K44B I I Tnp T K44n T K44C I !System I I System I "A" I "B" I 11 I Contacts ()_pen On & I I I Main Steam Line Radiation High

Hip I

I Sima! ('lypical of 4) r:::---------:::-:--:----1....& 1-----------. Closure oflnboard Group II !ciosure of Outboard Group I Valve 1B31-F020l Valve 1B31-F019 I Minimum Channel Regutnments for System Isolation Capability: LFD-l-MSLR-01 In order to maintain isolation capability of the Reactor Water Sample line on a l-:S=hc~et~2=o~f~2~---1 Main Steam Line Radiation high - high condition, channels in one of the foitowing TRM T3.3.1 l combinations must either be functional or maintained in the tripped condition. Main Steam Line Aland Bl

Radiation High-High OR Pnp-d By: :::z:::;?L C Elem. Ref.: See sheet 1. I A2 and B2 Reviewed By:.#zy / £J I

TRMREV.60

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" r------------ Channels Channels Al A2 Bl B2 1B21-1B21-1B21-1B21-N681A N681C N681B N681D MTU MTU MTU MTU I I I I I I I I I 1A71B-<;> IA71B-~ IA71B-<;> IA71B-~ K7A K7C K7B K7D Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: Elem. Ref H-17810 H-17816 H-17811 H-19809 H-17812 H-19812 H-178I3 H-19815 H-17814 H-19818 H-178\\5 See Sheet 2 of 2. LFD-1-PCIS-0 1 Sheet I of2 ... 1-1, Item l.a r------......,..,.._-----f Main Steam Line Isolation - l'rcpan:d By: Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level I Rev. 0 1/13/95

Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Isolation Function r-------------- 1 Trip Logic "A" r-------------- 1 Trip Logic "B" I I I I I I I I ..L 1A71B- ..L 1A71B-I ..L 1A71B- ..L 1A71B-I..-----, r-r* K7A I K7A I I K7B I K7B I I Contacts Open I onLowLow 1A71B-1A71B* I 1A71B-1A71B-I I Low Reactor .J K7C K7C I I i KID i KID I I WaterLevel I 1 1 I (f ypical of 8) I I I 1A71B-< < lA7lB*, l, , - - - - - _I_ -1A71B-) ) 1A71B* I I Kl4 > >K52 I ',,, : I KSI ? ?Kt6 I Actuation Logic Actuation Logic Contacts Open onLowLow Low Reactor Water Level (f ypical of 4) .llA71B- ~ - -7::K14 I .l 1A71B-T-4-~K51 .J Initiation of closure of inboard Main Steam Line Isolation Valves ' ' ' ' ' ' ',, ,.,1. 1A71B- .l 1A71B-T.__K_52_-,--_ __,T K16 Initiation of closure of outboard Main Steam Line Isolation Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the main steam lines on low low low reactor vessel water level, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Al or A2 AND Bl orB2 Drain Line and Reactor Water Sample Line Valve Isolation Function ~-------------- 1 Trip Logic "A" I,.,,,,...-,--.,...,....-, Trip Logic "B" I Contact Opens I I I I on Low Low - - J..IA71B-J_IA71B-I I ?IA71B-JIA71B-I LowReactor _, F7A K7B I KID K7C I Water Level (From I (From 1 I (fypical of 4) Channel I I Channel I I IA71B-Bl) I I 1A71B-A2) I L - 1£?6_ - I L - .!(5.2 - I Actuation Logic Actuation Logic J_ 1A71B-J_ 1A71B- ~ ~ ~~ I Initiation of closure of inboard MSL Drain I I Initiation of closure of outboard MSL Drain I and Reactor Water Sample Group 1 valves and Reactor Water Sample Group 1 valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the main steam line drain and reactor water sample lines on low low low reactor vessel water level, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. LFD-1-PCIS-0 1 Elem Ref. Sheet 2 of 2 H-17810 H-17816 Al and Bl TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item l.a H-17811 H-19809 OR Main Steam Line Isolation. H-17812 H-19812 H-17813 H-19815 A2 and B2 Reactor Vessel Water Level* H-17814 H-19818 LowLowLow. Level 1 H-17815 Rev. 0 1/13/95

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" Channels Channels Al A2 Bl B2 1B21-1B21-1B21-1B21-N015A N015C N015B N015D PS PS PS PS I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1A71B-~ K7A 1A71B-~ K7C 1A71B-~ K7B 1A71B-~ K70 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: Elem. Ref. H-17810 H-17814 H-17811 H-17815 H-17812 H-17816 H-17813 See Sheet 2 of 2. LFD-l-PCIS-02 Sheet lof2 1 us 3.3.6.l-1, Item Lb w;;.,. Main Steam Line Isolation - Pn:plll'edBy: ~~:!!=.___ Main Steam Line A /. /) Reviewed By: # Jv -lu.,,,r,__ Pressure - Low Rev. O 1/13/95

Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Isolation Function r-------------- r-------------- 1 Trip Logic "A" 1 Trip Logic "B" I _L _L I I _L _L I 1A71B-1A71B-I 1A71B-1A71B-I r-K7A 1 K7A 1 K7B 1 K7B 1 Contacts Open I I onLowMain 1A71B-IA71B-I 1A71B-1A71B-I I Steam Line K7C K7C I I i KID i KID I I Pressure 1 1 I 1 1 1 I (Typical of 8) I I I I 1A71B_< ~ IA71B-.. l.. ,------1--IA71B-j j IA71B-I I Kl4 )> )>Ks2 I........ I KSI ( (K16 I ~ - L Actuation Logic Actuation Logic Contacts Open onLowMain Steam Line Pressure (Typical of 4) I J_IA71B-J_ 1A71B-1

- - T._K_1_4 ___

__

...,T_. ~~s! _______ ~ .J Initiation of closure of inboard Main Steam Line Isolation Valves ..........................,1 1A71B-J_ 1A71B-T.___K_S2 _____ ___,T Kl6 Initiation of closure of outboard Main Steam Line Isolation Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the main steam lines on low main steam line pressure, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Al or A2 AND Bl or B2 Drain Line and Reactor Water Sample Line Valve Isolation Function 1 Trip Logic "A" I.-=--,--.,..,,,,...--, Trip Logic "B" I Contact Opens I I I I "'i,rw Mam - -,!L IA71B- _LIA 71B-I I ? IA71B-TIA 71B-I Stearn Lme -* F7A K7B I KID K7C I Pressure (From I I (From I (Typical of 4) Channel I I Channel I I 1A71B-Bl) I I 1A71B-A2) I L - - ~6- - I L - - ics1 - - - - - - - - - -

Actuation Logic Actuation Logic

_L 1A71B- _L 1A71B-r ~ r~ I Initiation of closure of inboard MSL Drain I I Initiation of closure of outboard MSL Drain I and Reactor Water Sample Group 1 valves and Reactor Water Sample Group 1 valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the main steam line drain and reactor water sample lines on low main steam line pressure, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. .-L="'F""'D""'-~t"""-P"""C=1=s-....,.o--2----f Elem Ref. Al and Bl Sheet 2 of2 H-17810 H-17814 OR TS.3.3.6.1-.1, Item.Lb Main Steam Lme Isolation - H-17811 H-17815 A2 andB2 Main Steam.Line H-17812 H-17816 Pressure -Low H-17813 Rev. 0 1/13/95

Trip System "A"

~

Channels Al-A Al-B Al-C Al-D A2-A A2-B A2-C A2-D

1 1B21-N686C MTU 1B21-N687C MTU 1B21-N688C MTU IC7IA-IC71A-IC71A-IC71A-IC71A-IC71A-IC71A-IC71A-K301A K302A K303A K304A K30IC K302C K303C K304C lC71A-1.

IC7IA-IC71A-1. IC71A-Con~t Op~ K301A I IC?IA-K303A I IC?IA-K301C I IC7IA-K303C I IC7IA-on High ~tn ~ - - - - - K302A -r-K304A K302C -r-K304C I Steam Lme ~ - - 1 Flow (fypical IA 71B- < IA 71B- < I ofl6) K7A K7C

J Tri~ System "B"

~

Channels Bl-A Bl-B Bl-C Bl-D B2-A B2-B B2-C B2-D 1B21-N686B MTU IC7IA-K301B 1B21-N687B 1B21-N688B 1B21-N689B MTU MTU MTU IC7IA-IC71A-K302B K303B IC71A-J. KJOIB I IC71A-K302B IC71A-K304B 1C7IA-K30JB I IC71A- ~ K304B 1A71B-< K7B 1B21-N686D MTU IC71A-K301D 1B21-N687D MTU 1B21-N688D MTU 1B21-N689D MTU IC71A-1C7IA-IC71A-K302D K303D K304D IC71A-J. IC71A-K301D I I C71A-K303D I I C71A-K302D -r-K304D I IA7IB- < KID ? Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: LFD-l-PCIS-03 Elem Ref. H-17810 H-17816 H-17811 H-19809 H-17812 H-19812 H-17814 H-19815 H-17815 H-19818 See Sheet 2 of 2. Sheet 1 of2

Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Isolation Function r-------------- r-------------- 1 Trip Logic "A" 1 Trip Logic "B" I J_ J_ I J_ J_ I 1A71B-1A71B-I I IA71B-1A71B-I.....----, r -r* K7A I K7A I I K7B I K7B I 1 Contacts Open I onHighMain 1A71B-1A71B-I 1A71B-1A71B-I I Steam Line

K7C K7C I

I i KID i KID I I Flow(Iypical 1 I 1 I I of 8) 1 I 1 I 1A71B-~ ~ 1A71B-,l, ,------1--IA71B-) ) 1A71B-I I K14 > >K52 I ',,, : I K51 (' ('K16 I I. - I. - Actuation Logic Actuation Logic Contacts Open on High Main Steam Line Flow (Typical of4) I j_IA71B- .l 1A71B-1 ~ - -,-._K_1_4 ___ __,T.-. ~K51 I ~ J Initiation of closure of inboard Main Steam Line Isolation Valves .. '....l 1A71B- .l 1A71B-T..__K5_2_,__ _ __.T Kl6 Initiation of closure of outboard Main Stearn Line Isolatio11 Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate a main steam line on high main steam line flow, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. One A channel AND one B channel for EACH main steam line Drain Line and Reactor Water Sample Line Valve Isolation Function ~-------------- ~-------------- Trip Logic "A" Trip Logic "B" I Contact Opens I I I I on High Mam - - J..IA71B-J_IA71B-I I i!A71B-T!A71B-I StearnLme

-' F7A K7B K7C I Flow (Typical (From I

I (From 1 I of 4) Channel I I Channel I I IA71B-Bl) I I 1A71B-A2) I L ____ ~6- ________ I l __.!(51 __________ I Actuation Logic Actuation Logic ..i tA71B- ..l tA71B- ~ ~ ~~ I Initiation of closure of inboard MSL Drain I I Initiation of closure of outboard MSL Drain I and Reactor Water Sample Group 1 valves and Reactor Water Sample Group 1 valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the main steam line drain and reactor water sample lines on high main steam line flow, channels in one of the following combinations must be either onerable or maintained in the tripped condition. LFD-t-PCTS-03 Elem Ref Sheet 2 of 2 H-17810 H-17816 One Al channel and one Bl channel for EACH main steam line TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 1.c H-17811 H-19809 OR MainSteamLinelsolation-H-17812 H-19812 One A2 channel and one B2 channel for EACH main steam line Main Steam Line H-17814 H-19815 i-:-F=lo;.:.,:w'---..:.aH::.:.iia:.:.:....h ___ ~ H-17815 H-19818 Rev. 0 1/13/95

Trip System "A" Channels Al 1B21-N056A VACSW I I I I I I I I 1A71B-< K7A A2 1B21-N056C ~ACS" I I I I I I I I 1A71B-< K7C Trip System "B" Channels Bl 1B21-N056B VACSW I I I I I I I I 1A71B-< K7B B2 1B21-N056D VACSW I I I I I I I I 1A71B- < KID Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: Elem Ref. H-17810 H-17814 H-17811 H-17815 H-17812 H-17816 H-17813 See Sheet 2 of 2. LFD-l-PCIS-04 Sheet 1 of2 J _ TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 1.d ..------ilJ.rJ~.-_-----1 Main Steam Line Isolation - Prepared By: --=!~L~J-~-.,/-, -J/ Condenser Vacuum -Low ReviewedBy:,:/).:.J...+ch/,//44(_. t---------1 ~ Rev. 0 1/13/95

Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Isolation Function r-------------- r-------------- 1 Trip Logic "A" Trip Logic "B" I J_ J_ I I J_ J_ I 1A71B-1A71B-I 1A71B-1A71B-I r -I-K7A I K7A I I K7B I K7B I 1 Contact Opens I I onLow 1A71B-1A71B-I 1A71B-1A71B-I I Condenser K7C K7C I I i K7D i K7D I Vacuum 1 1 I I I (f ypical of 8) 1 1 I 1 1 I 1A71B_.( < IA71B---l-- ,------1--1A71B-) ) IA71B-I I K14 > >K52 I -------- I KSl I IK16 I ~-------------- L-------------- ~------------ Actuation Logic ............ Actuation Logic Contact Opens onLow Condenser Vacuum (fypical of 4) ..l_1A71B-j_ 1A71B- ........J_ 1A71B-j_ 1A71B- ~ - - T,_K_1_4 ___ __.T-. ~KSl T.__K_52 ___ ___.T K16 I

~

.J Initiation of closure of inboard Main Steam Line Isolation Valves Initiation of closure of outboard Main Steam Line Isolation Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the main steam lines on low condenser vacuum, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Al or A2 AND Bl orB2 Drain Line and Reactor Water Sample Line Valve Isolation Function Trip Logic "A" Trip Logic "B" I.-------, I Contact Opens J_ I I on Low - - - 1A71B-J_IA71B-I I I I t!A71B-TIA7IB-I I Vacuum (From Condenser ,.._, F7A K7B I I K7D K7C 1 (From I (fypical of 4) Channel I I Channel I I 1A71B-Bl) I I IA71B-A2) I l - - ~6- - I , __ _!::51 _ - _1 Actuation Logic Actuation Logic J_ 1A71B-J_ 1A71B-r ~ r~ I Initiation of closure of inboard MSL Drain I I Initiation of closure of outboard MSL Drain I and Reactor Water Sample Group 1 valves and Reactor Water Sample Group 1 valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the main steam line drain and reactor water sample lines on low condenser vacuum, channels in one of the following combinations must be either onerable or maintained in the tripped condition. LFD-1-PCIS-04 Elem Ref. Al and Bl Sheet 2 of 2 H-17810 H-17814 OR TS_3.3.6.1-_l,Item_l.d H-17811 H-17815 A2 and B2 Mam Stearn Lme Isolation - H-17812 H-17816 Condenser Vacuum-Low H-17813 Rev. 0 1/13/95

Trip System "A" Channels Al-A Al-B Al-C Al-D A2-A A2-B A2-C A2-D I 1B21-N623A MTU 1B21-N624A MTU 1B21-N625A MTU 1B21-N626A MTU 1B21-N623C MTU 1B21-N624C MTU 1B21-N625C MTU 1B21-N626C MTU 1C71A-1C71A-IC71A-IC71A-1C71A-IC71A-IC71A-IC71A-K337A K338A K340A K341A K337C K338C K340C K341C 1C71A-.l. 1C71A-IC71A-.l. IC71A-Con~t Opt:118 K337A I 1c7IA-K340A I IC7IA-K337C I IC71A-K340C I lC7lA-nHighMam ~ - - - - - K338A -r K341A K338C -r K341C Steam Tunnel 1 1 emperature 1A71B- <( 1A71B- <( ypicalofl6) K7A K7C I

J Tri~ System "B" Channels Bl-A Bl-B Bl-C Bl-D B2-A B2-B B2-C B2-D 1B21-N623B MTU 1C71A-K337B 1B21-N624B MTU 1C71A-K338B IC71A-.l.

1B21-N625B MTU 1C71A-K340B 1B21-N626B MTU IC71A-K341B 1B21-N623D MTU 1C71A-K337D 1B21-N624D MTU 1C71A-K338D 1B21-N625D MTU 1C71A-K340D IC71A-1C71A-.l. IC71A-1B21-N626D MTU lC71A-K34lD K33m I IC71A-K338B K340B I 1C71A-K3370 I IC71A-K340D I 1C71A- "T" K341B K338D -r K341D I 1A71B- ~ IA71B- ~ I K7B KID I

J Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: LFD-l-PCIS-OS Elem. Ref.

H-17810 H-17816 H-17811 H-19810 H-17812 H-19813 H-17813 H-19816 H-17814 H-19819 H-17815 See Sheet 2 of 2. Pn:parcd By: Sheet 1 of2 .l-1., Item.e Line Isolation - am Tunnel turc - Hi h Reviewed By: =-i~~=l::.IL..:.!...I,,,~ t---,. _ -1 1/13/95

Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Isolation Function r-------------- 1 Trip Logic "A" r-------------- 1 Trip Logic "B" I J_ IA7I-J_ IA7IB-I Contacts Open

-I-K7A I K7A I

I onHighMain 1A7IB-IA71B-I Steam Tunnel *.! T K7C T K7C I I J_ J_ I I IA 7IB-IA 71B-I K7B I K7B I IA 71B-IA 7IB-I K7D ..,.. K7D I I I I I Temperature 1 1 I 1 I (Typical of 8) I I I Actuation Logic IA71B-< < 1A71B--l_ ,------1--IA71B_) j 1A71B-I Kl4 I !KS2 I --,, : I KSI ? ?Kt6 I ~-------------- ~ ~-------------- ~---------, Actuation Logic Contacts Open on High Main Steam Tunnel Temperature (Typical of 4) j_IA7IB-J_ IA71B-1 ---._J. IA71B-J. IA71B-

- - T'-'K=l'-'-4--*....---_,T_. ~~S: _______ ~

T KS2 T KI6 J Initiation of Initiation of closure closure of inboard of outboard Main Main Steam Line Steam Line Isolation Isolation Valves Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the main steam lines on high main steam tunnel temperature, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. One Al channel or one A2 channel AND One BI channel or one B2 channel Drain Line and Reactor Water Sample Line Valve Isolation Function ~-------------- ~-------------- Trip Logic "A" Trip Logic "B" I Contact Opens I I I r onllighMam __,!..IA71B- .LIA71B-I r ?IA71B-JIA71B-I steam Twmel -* F7A K7B I I KID K7C I I Temperature (From (From 1 (Typical of 4) Channel I I Channel I I IA71B-Bl) I I IA71B-A2) I l - - ~6- - I l - .!,(51 - I Actuation Logic Actuation Logic J_IA71B-J.~71B-r~ r~ I Initiation of closure of inboanl MSL Drain I I Initiation of closure of outboanl MSL Drain I and Reactor Water Sample Group I valves and Reactor Water Sample Group I valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the main steam line drain and reactor water sample lines on high main steam tunnel temperature, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. ,...L~FD=---=-1-=.p:,-::c=1s:::--..,,.05~---4 ff.r.J:m* ~~816 One Al channel and one Bl channel Sheet2 of2 H-I7811 H-19810 OR TS.3.3.6.1-1, Item 1._e Main Steam Line Isolation - H-178I2 H-I9813 One A2 channel and one B2 channel M

Ste T

1 H-17813 H-I98I6 am am un~e H-17814 H-19819 Temperature-H1gh H-I7815 Rev. 0 1/13/95

Trin System "A"

~-----------

Al-B Al-C Al-D Al-E Al-F Al-G Al-H Al-I Al-J Al-K Al-L Al-N Al-0 Al-P Channels I !=;:;;;~::t=: ~~::::t:::=:

=::=:!==:::::t::::

=::;;;;;::=::t=:

=:;;;;;:::::::::t:::=:

I I I IA71B-~ K7A A2-B A2-C A2-D A2-E A2-F A2-G A2-H A2-I A2-J A2-K A2-L A2-N A2-0 A2-P

==::::t:::=:

=::=:!==:::::t::::

===:::t=::: ~~::::t:::=:

=:;;;;;:::::::::t:::=:

I IA71B-~ K7C Tf!P. 0 Svstem "B" -J---------- Bl-B Bl-C Bl-D Bl-E Bl-F B1-G Bl-H Bl-I B1-J B1-K B1-L B1-N B1-0 B1-P Channels I

=====+/-:: ~~::::t:::=:

==::::t:::::: ~~::::t:::::: ~~::::t:::=:

=====:::::t::::

=:!==:::::t::::

I I IA71B-~ K7B B2-B B2-C B2-D B2-E B2-F B2-G B2-H B2-I B2-J B2-K B2-L B2-N B2-0 B2-P ~~::::t:::=: !::;:;;;;=:::I=::: =~=a=: ~~::::t:::=: ~~+=: I IA71B-~ KID Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: Elem Ref. H-17810 H-17814 H-17811 H-17815 H-17812 H-17816 H-17813 H-16071 See Sheet 2 of 4. LFD-l-PCIS-06 Sheet 1 of 4 ... -,teml. .------.......,.----------1 Main Steam Line Isolation PrepanclBy:....=!::!!..!:!:~!::!....--- Reviewed By*~~ Turbine Building Area Tern rature - Hi h Rev. O 4/4/95

Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Isolation Function r-------------- r-------------- 1 Trip Logic "A" Trip Logic "B" I J_ J_ I I J_ J_ I 1A71B-1A71B-1A71B-1A71B-I Contacts Open r -I-K7A I K7A I I K7B I K7B I I on High 1A71B-1A71B-I 1A71B-1A71B-I I Turbine I T K7C T K7C I I KID .,.. KID Building Area I I I I I I I I I I I I Temperature 1 1 I 1 1 I (Typical of 8) 1 1 I 1 1 I I 1A71B_< < 1A71B-,L, ,------1--1A71B_) ) 1A71B-I I K14 ? ?K52 I -,,_ : I K51 >Kl6 I 1.--------------

~--,--,,

Actuation Logic Actuation Logic Contacts Open on High Turbine Building Area Temperature (Typical of 4) J_lA71B- ~--i::Kl4 I J_ 1A71B-T~~K51 J Initiation of closure of inboard Main Steam Line Isolation Valves I --' -,.,l 1A71B-J_ 1A71B-T...__K_52_....--_ ___,T Kl6 ~ Initiation of closure of outboard Main Steam Line Isolation Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the main steam lines on high turbine building area temperature, channels in one of the combinations listed on Sheet 3 must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Drain Line and Reactor Water Sample Line Valve Isolation Function 1 Trip Logic "A" 1 Trip Logic "B" I I Contact upens I I I on High J_ J_ J_ J_ I Turbine --F-1A71B-1A71B-I I FlA71B-1A71B-I I Building Area 1 K7 A K7B I I KID K7C I Temperature (From 1 (From 1 I I (Typical of 4) Channel I Channel I 1A71B-Bl) I I 1A71B-A2) I L - - ~6- - I L - - ~51 - - - - - - - - - - I Actuation Logic Actuation Logic J_ 1A71B-J_ 1A71B- ~ ~ ~~ I Initiation of closure of inboard MSL Drain I I Initiation of closure of outboard MSL Drain I and Reactor Water Sample Group 1 valves and Reactor Water Sample Group 1 valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the main steam line drain and reactor water sample lines on high turbine building area temperature, channels in one of the combinations listedr-::-,on=S~h...,,,ee...,,t,,..,4=..,,...,,.----1 must be either operable or maintamed in the tripped condition. LFD-1-PCIS-06 Elem Ref. Sheet 2 of 4 H-17810 H-17814 TS.3.3.6.1-11 Item 1/ Mam Steam Line Isolation - H-17811 H-17815 Turbine Building Area H-17812 H-17816 Temperature-High H-17813 H-16071 Rev. o 4/4/95

Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Isolation Function Any ONE of the following instruments: Nl0lA Nl0lC N102A N102C N103A N103C N104A N104C N105A N105C N106A N106C N107A N107C N108A N108C NlllA Any ONE of the following instruments: NlllC N112A N112C N113A N113C N114A N114C N115A N115C N116A Nl16C Elem Ref. H-17810 H-17814 H-17811 H-17815 H-17812 H-17816 H-17813 H-16071 AND Any ONE of the followin& instruments: Nl0lB NIOlD N102B N102D N103B N103D N104B N104D N105B N105D N106B N107B N107D N108B N108D Any ONE of the following instruments: Nll0D NlllB NlllD N112B N112D N113B N113D N114B N114D N115B N115D N116B N116D LFD-1-PCIS-06 Sheet 3 of 4 TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 1.f Main Steam Line Isolation - Turbine Building Area Temnerature - High Rev. 0 4/4/95

Drain Line and Reactor Water Sample Line Valve Isolation Function Any ONE of the Any ONE of the following instruments: following instruments: NI0IA Nl05A .AM! NI0IB Nl05B Nl02A Nl06A Nl02B Nl06B Nl03A Nl07A Nl03B Nl07B Nl04A Nl08A Nl04B Nl08B NlllA QR Any ONE of the Any ONE of the foDowing instruments: following instruments: NI0IC Nl05C AM! NI0ID N104D Nl02C Nl06C Nl02D Nl05D N103C Nl07C Nl03D Nl07D Nl04C Nl08C Nl08D AND Any ONE of the Any ONE of the following instruments: following instruments: N112A Nll4A ~ NlllB N114B Nll3A Nll5A N112B N115B Nll6A Nll3B Nll6B QR_ Any ONE of the Any ONE of the following instruments: following instruments: NlllC Nll4C AM! Nll0D Nll3D N112C Nll5C NlllD Nll4D Nll3C Nll6C Nll2D Nll5D Nll6D LFD-t-PCIS-06 Elem Ref. Sheet4 of4 H-17810 H-17814 TS 3.3.6.1-11 Item 1.f H-17811 H-17815 Main Steam Line Isolation - Turbine Building Area H-17812 H-17816 Temperature - High H-17813 H-16071 Rev. 0 4/4/95

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" r---------------- r---------------- Channe}S Channe}S Al A2 Bl B2 1B21-N680A MTU 1B21-N680C MTU 1B21-N680B MTU 1B21-N680D MTU I I I I I I 1A71B~ 1A7IB.(.. 1A71B< 1A71B-( K6A K6C ;>........... K6B >> K6D ;> '~ Contacts Open on Low Level Trip Logic >,----t::~-~..... -.. -.. ~-' Trip Logic .l ~, .l .l -:.,- 1A71B-1A71B- ...... *.,.. 1A71B-1A71B-K6A K6B K6C K6D ~JY4)ical I I I I I I I 1A71B ~ 1A71B Division 1 Division 2 Trip Relays Trip Relays

J

-*---------------J. Actuation Logic Actuation Logic Contacts Open to Cause Actuation (Typical) 1 1A71B 1 1A71B .,.. Division I I Trip Relays Initiation of closure of PCIS inboard Valve Groups 2, 10, and 11 .,.. Division 2 Trip Relays I I I - Initiation of closure of PCIS outboard Valve Groups 2, 6, 10, and 11 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to isolate Valve Groups 2, 6, 10, and 11 on low reactor water level (Level 3), channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17810 H-19809 H-17811 H-19812 H-17812 H-19815 H-17814 H-19818 Al and Bl OR A2 andB2 L D-l-PCIS-07 Reviewed By:

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" r---------------- Channe}S r---------------- 1 Channels Al A2 Bl B2 1 1C71-N650A 1C71-N650C 1C71-N650B 1C71-N650D MTV MTU MTU MTU I I I I I I I I 1A7JB-s 1A71B-) 1A71B5;> KSA KSC KSB I 1A71B-< KSD > Contacts ~on High Drywell Pressure ~'P:oical . Trip Logic ,,,----t:~-:..t--~-' Trip Logic .l _v' .l .l --,- 1A71B-1A71B- ...... *-,- 1A71B-1A71B-KSA KSB I KSC KSD I I I I I 1A71B ~ IA71B Division 1 Division 2 Trip Relays Trip Relays

J ----------------J Actuation Logic Actuation Logic Contacts Open to 1

1 Cause Actuation 1 A 7 lB 1A71B i Division2

Trip Relays (Typical)

Division 1 Trip Relays I

Initiation of closure of PCIS inboard Valve Groups 2, 10, and 11 I

I

Initiation of closure of PCIS outboard Valve Groups 2, 10, and 11 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to isolate Valve Groups 2, 10, and 11 on high drywell pressure, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition.

Elem. Ref. H-17810 H-19809 H-17811 H-19812 H-17812 H-19815 H-17814 H-19818 Al and Bl OR A2 andB2 TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.b Primary Containment .----~'"""'"T'---ilsolation, Drywell Prepared By: ~9ze~=::::- Pressure - High Reviewed By: TRMRev.11

Trip System "A" Channel A 1D11-K621A Trip Logic 1 C61-J_ Contacts Open K83 - - - - - - - - on High Rad. T (fypica1 or2> I I 1C61-( K85 > L------------ Actuation Logic 1C61- :t=- ---, Contacts Open K85 I To Cause I - I I - Actuation (fypical of2) Closure of inboard Group 2 PCIS valves (1 T48 Vent and Purge valves only) Trip System "B" Channel I B

1 1D11-K621B Trip Logic 1C61-J_

K84 T I I 1C61-( K86 > L------------ Actuation Logic 1C61-J_ K86 1 I I I I I - Closure of outboard Group 2 PCIS valves (1T48 Vent and Purge valves only) Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability; In order to maintain Group 2 PCIS isolation capability of the Vent and Purge Valves on drywell high radiation, at least one of the two channels must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17802 H-17803 H-19643 LFD-l -PCTS-09 TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.c Primary Containment .....----__,.-__,,.---1,lsolation Prepared By=~.a.:::i..~L..J....&&41 Drywell Radiation-High Reviewed By: ev. 0 1/13/9

Trip System "A" r-----------------~ Channels Al A2 I I I I I I I 1D11-K609A ITU 1D11-K609C ITU J I Trip Logic Contacts on Rx. Bldg. I High Rad. .l 1 (Typical of 4) 1D11-K609A ICSIA-

_________ ~ Z2B

__________________ J .-----1----, C°:,ta~use

1D11-

',, - + -ICSiA-Actuation 1 K80.....

1 (T:. 1 f 2) _____.. ____, Z2B yp1ca o I Initiation of closure of PCIS inboard Valve Groups 2 (Vent and Purge Valves Only), I 0, and 11 Trip System "B" r-----------------~ Channels Bl B2 IOI l-K609B ITU 1D11-K609D ITU ~-- - Trip Logic ..L -I I I I I I I I 1D11-K609C 1D11-I K609D I I I , IDll-1C51A-1 KIO I I I I I I 1 Z2D __________________ J I ---1-*-*1 I I I 1D11-I 1C51A-I K80...- I ., ____., ____, Z2D I Initiation of closure of PCIS outboard Valve Groups 2 (Vent and Purge Valves Onl, 10, and 11 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to isolate Valve Groups 2, I 0, and 11 on Reactor Building Exhaust High Radiation, channels in one of the foHowing combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. (.d-17802 H-19563 H-17803 H-19564 H-19561 H-19566 Al and Bl OR A2andB2 S 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.d rimary Containment solation ,-----r11--+--+---1Keactor Bui )ding Exhaust PreparedBy: --~--- adiation-High i---------------4 Reviewed By: TRM Rev..;l. /,f

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" r-----------------~ r-----------------~ Channels Channels Al A2 l Bl B2 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I r-~-, ~-'--. I I I 1D11-1D11-I K611A K611C I I ITU ITU I I I I I 1D11-K611B ITU 1D11-K611D ITU I I I i :- -s '>-- ~---l I I, I I I I I I I Trip Logic 1 ,~ I I 1', I I I I Contacts 9P I Trip Logic 1 iro!:t:i;~t I \\ 1 , High Rad. I 1 1 ', I J_ : (Typical of 4) J_ I I J_ J_

1011-J-1n1i=-t----~

10~1:1 J1011-

' K611A K611B : I K611C K611D I ~-----~ I I l ~ ---;* ----: I I I I I I

lDll-

1C51A-I I

lDll-

1C51A-I I

I K80 1 Z2A I I I K80 1 Z2C I I_ - - - - _1.::.. :...:-.::.. :_-.::.. :...:-.::.. - - - - - J I_ - - - - _-.::_ :_-.::. :_-.::. :_-_: _ - - - - J ____ ___ 1 Contacts Open I ~c~~

ID 11-

....,. - ~ - - - - - Actuation 1 K80...,..:,. 1 1C51A- (Typical of2)

r----' Z2A I

Initiation of closure of PCIS inboard Valve Groups 2 (Vent and Purge Valves Only), 10, and 11 f" - - - ---I I I I lDll-I 1C51A-I K80...,.. 1 ~ - - - - r - - - -, Z2C I Initiation of closure of PCIS outboard Valve Groups 2 (Vent and Purge Valves Only), 10, and 11 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to isolate Valve Groups 2, 10, and 11 on Refueling Floor Exhaust High Radiation, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17802 H-19563 H-17803 H-19564 H-19561 H-19566 Al and Bl OR A2 andB2 LFD-l -PCIS-11 TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 2.e Primary Containment Isolation r------,.--.,...---1 Refueling Floor Exhaust Prepared By:, _.......,.~--1 Radiation - High Reviewed By* TRMRev. 53

Trip System "A" Channel A 1E41-N657A MTU 1E21A-K333A Trip Logic .l. 1E21A-1 T K333A Contact I Closes on 1 HighFlow 1 ('fypical of2) ( IE~~-> L ____ K~3 _____ _ Actuation Logic Contact Closes 1 on High Flow IE4l-('fypical of 2) T K43 I

Initiation of closure ofHPCI inboard Group 3 valves Trip System "B" Channel B

1E41-N657B MTU Trip Logic J. 1E21A-T K333B I I I - !~~- - Actuation Logic 1 IE41-T K33 Initiation of closure of HPCI outboard Grou 3 valve and valve 1E41-F041 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the HPCI steam supply and torus suction lines on high flow, at least one channel is required to be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. 1-----------, Elem. Ref. H-17157 H-17163 H-17159 H-19822 H-17160 H-19825 LFD-l-PCIS-12 TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 3.a ...----......------ HPCI System Isolation-

.:....:.:...:.....::=::..:.-..:.::0=a:-:n

..., HPCI Steam Line Flow -Hi Rev. 0 1/13/95

Trip System "A" Channels Al IE41-N658A MTU I I I A2 IE41-N658C MTU !E21l IE21A-K331t > K332A Trip Logic j_ 1E21A-

I K331A Contacts lEllA-Clos:;: Low lK332A icalof 4 1E41-

_ _ ___ K_i8 _______ ~ Actuation Logic Contact Close onLow Pressure ical of2) I I I 1 1E41- --t K48 + Initiation of closure ofHPCI inboard Group 3 valves Trip System "B" Channels Bl IE41-N658B MTU I I B2 1E41-N658D MTU IE21l IE21A-K331~ > K332B Trip Logic j_ 1E21A-I K331B 1E21A-K332B 1E4!) L - - - - ~ 11 - - - - - - - Actuation Logic I I I 1 IE41-T KlS I I Initiation of closure ofHPCI outboard Group 3 valve and valve 1E41-F041 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the HPCI steam supply and torus suction lines on low pressure, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17157 H-17163 H-17159 H-19822 H-17160 H-19825 LFD-l-PCIS-13 Al andA2 OR Bl and B2 TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 3.b HPCJ System Jsolation-r-----.-r----:--l""t----i-pcJ Steam Supply Line ressure - Low Rev. 0 1/13/95

Trip System "A" Channels Al IE41-N655A MTU A2 1E41-N655C MTU 1E21A-K336A Trip Logic J. 1E21A- ~------r* K335A Con~ Close lEllA-onHigh lK336A Pressure icalof 4 1E41-K46 L _____________ _. Actuation Logic Contact Closes l on High Pressure - -. IE4 l-('fypical of 2) T K 46 I Initiation of closure ofHPCI inboard Grou 3 valves Trip System "B" Channels Bl B2 1E41-N655B 1E41-N655D MTU MT Trip Logic J. 1E21A-I K335B l i~;~~- 1E4 K2 1E21A-K336B L-------------- Actuation Logic l lE41-T K2s I I Initiation of closure of HPCI outboard Grou 3 valve and valve 1E41-F041 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to isolate the HPCI steam supply and torus suction lines on high turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. Al and A2 LFD-l-PCIS-14 H-17157 H-17163 OR ... 1-1, tern.c H-17159 H-19822 Bl andB2 HPCISystemlsolation-8 Prepared 8 h cJ HPCI Turbine Exhaust H-17160 H-19 2S y: 0 n . ~r._ Diaphragm Pressure - High Reviewed By: ~h,J Rev. O 1/13/95

1Ell-N694C MTU Actuation Logic Contact Closes on High 1 Drywell Plessure in Conjunction With Low... ___ 1E41-Steam Line Piessure T K56 ('fypical of 2) Initiation of closure of HPCI inboard Grou 8valve Actuation Logic 1 IE41-T K57 Initiation of closure of HPCI outboard Group 8 valve Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the turbine exhaust line on high drywell pressure, channels in one of the following combinations must be either _____ o_er.... ab_le or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. Al and A2 and A3 LFD-l-PCIS-15 H-17109 H-19822 OR TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 3.d H-171S7 H-19823 Bl andB2andB3 HPCISystemlsolation-H-171S9 H-1982S ____. Drywell Pressure-High H-17160 H-19826 H-19586 TRMRev. 93

Trip System "A" Channel A IE41-N671A MT 1E21A-K362C Trip Logic _l_ 1E21A- ~ -----T-K362C Contact Closes onHigh Temperature 1 ('fypical of2) ( 1B21B- ;> L - _K121_ - Actuation Logic I I I Contact Closes onHigh 1 1B21B-Temperature - - -t K32A ('fypical of 2) Trip System "B" Channel B IE41-N671B MTU 1E21A-K362D Trip Logic J_ 1E21A-T K362D I I I IB21B~ K32B- ;> Actuation Logic I I I 1 1B21B-T K32B I I Initiation of closure ofHPCI inboard Grou 3 valves Initiation of closure of HPCI outboard Grou 3 valve and valve 1E4 I-F04 l Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the HPCI steam supply and torus suction lines on high pipe penetration room temperature, at least one channel is required to be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17157 H-17748 H-17160 H-19829 H-17163 H-19832 H-17746 LFD-l-PCIS-16 Reviewed By: .e nRoom

Trip System "A" Channel A 1E51-N666C Trip Logic ______.J_ 1E21A-Contact Clos T K368c onHigh Temperature ical of2) 1E51-M603A TIMER ' I 1B21{ K32!> Actuation Logic I Contact Closes l on High 1B21B-Temperature T K32A (fypical of 2) Trip System "B" Channel B IE51-N666D MT Trip Logic .l. 1E21A-T K368D 1E51-M603B TIMER I 1B21{ L.. - - _K~=.? -- - -- Actuation Logic I I I 1 IB21B-T K32B I I Initiation of closure ofHPCI inboard Grou 3 valves Initiation of closure ofHPCI outboard Grou 3 valve and valve 1E41-F041 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the HPCI steam supply and torus suction lines on high suppression pool area ambient temperature, at least one channel including its associated timer is required to be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. LFD-l -PCTS-17 El Ref

* * - :.1.tems *

.g em. HPCI System ISOiation - H-17157 H-17748 SuppressionPoolArea H-17160 H-19829 .-------.--.----Ambient Temperature-High, and H-17163 H-19832 Prepared By: -=-~::!.,....!!::!..!;1.!.~Suppression Pool Area Temperature H-177 46 Reviewed By: lavs I 13 95

This page is intentionally left blank. LFD-l-PCIS-18 NIA Prepared By: NIA Reviewed By: NIA Rev.O 12/19/94

Trip System "A" Channel IE51-N663C MT A 1E51-N665C MTU 1E21A-K342C 1E51-N664C MT Trip Logic ...,,Co,_n,....tac,....t"'""'C,..,..lo,....se.....-s onHighDiff. _ J_ IE21A-Temperature T K342C (fypical of2) IE51-M603A TIMER I IB21~ K32!~ - -ActuationLogic- - I I Contact Closes 1 on High Diff'. J_ IB2 IB-Temperature - -T K32A (fypical of 2) Initiation of closure ofHPCI inboard Group 3 valves Trip System "B" Channel B 1E51-N663D IE51-N664D MT IE51-N665D MTU 1E21A-K342D MT Trip Logic _l 1E21A-T K342D I I IE51-M603B TIMER I IB21~ K32=~ L------------ Actuation Logic I I I _l IB21B-T K32B I I

Initiation of closure of HPCI outboard Group 3 valve and valve 1E41-F041 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability:

In order to maintain the capability to isolate the HPCI steam supply and torus suction lines on high suppression pool area differential temperature, at least one channel including its associated timer is re uired to be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17157 H-17748 H-17160 H-19828 H-17163 H-19831 Prepared By:-=-.,_,__,_,...........,_~~ H-17746

Trip System "A" Channel A 1E41-N670A MT Trip Logic J_ 1E21A- ,. -----T-K361C Contact Closes onHigh Temperature (fypical of 2) f> 1B21B-L - - !3~ - Actuation Logic Contact Closes onHigh Temperature (fypical of2) I I I 1 1B21B- --T K32A I I Initiation of closure ofHPCI inboard Group 3 valves Trip System "B" Channel B 1E41-N670B MTU Trip Logic J_ 1E21A-T K361D I I I 1B21~ K32:*> Actuation Logic I I I 1 1B21B-T K32B I

Initiation of closure ofHPCI outboard Group 3 valve and valve 1E4 I-F04 l Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability:

In order to maintain the capability to isolate the HPCI steam supply and torus suction lines on high emergency area cooler temperature, at least one channel is required to be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17157 H-17748 H-17160 H-19829 H-17163 H-19832 H-17746 LFD-l-PCIS-20

Trip System "B" Trip System "A" Channel A 1E51-N657A MTU 1E21A-K303A Trip Logic Contacts Close onHighFlow ical of2) J. 1E21A-

-;- K303A I

I I I ~ I I IES~ Kl~-;> Actuation Logic Contacts Close 1 to Cause ~ _ _ _ _ rn*s1-Actuation K 12 (fypical of 2) Initiation of closure ofRCIC outboard Group 4 valve 1E5 l-F008 Channel B 1E51-N657B MTU 1E21A-K303B Trip Logic j_ 1E21A-K303B I I I I IES{ K;~-;> Actuation Logic 1 IESI- -r K32 Initiation of closure of RCIC inboard Group 4 valve 1E5 l-F007 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to isolate the RCIC steam supply line on high flow, at least one channel is required to be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-19821 H-17149 H-19824 H-17151 H-17148 LFD-l-PCIS-21 11/10/94

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" r---------------- Channe}S r---------------- Channe}S Al A2 1E51-N658A MTU 1E21A-K301A 1E51-N658C MTU 1E21A-K302A Trip Logic .l 1E21A-Contacts ~ - - -r* K301A f~~on IE21A-Pressure... - - - * ~K302A (Iypical of 4) 1ESI-K13 Bl B2 1E51-N658B MTU 1E21A-K301B 1E51-N658D MTU 1E21A-K302B Trip Logic 1ESI-K34 .l IE21A-I K301B IE21A-K302B

J ----------------J Actuation Logic Comacts Close to 1 IESI-Cause Actuation... - - *

(fypical of 2) i KIJ I Initiation of closure of RCIC outboard Group 4 valve 1E51-F008 Actuation Logic 1 IESI- -;- K34 I I

Initiation of closure of RCIC inboard Group 4 valve 1E51-F007 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to isolate the RCIC steam supply line on RCIC steam supply line low pressure, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition.

Elem. Ref. H-19821 H-17149 H-19824 H-17151 H-17148 Al andA2 OR Bl and B2 LFD-l-PCIS-22 TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 4.b RCIC System Isolation r-----=-:-~-~-tRCIC Steam Supply Line ~,......,..--~ressure - Low Rev. 0 1/13/95

Trip System "A" Channels Al A2 1E51-N685A 1E51-N685C MTU MTU 1E21A-K305A .....---T---rip Logic Contacts Close on High Pressure (fypical of 4) J_ 1E21A- ---I-K305A lE21A-l K306A IES K27 Actuation Logic Contacts Close 1 to Cause IES I-Actuation - - - =r-- K27 I ical of2) 1E21A-K306A Initiation of closure ofRCIC outboard Group 4 valve 2E5 l-F008 Trip System "B" Channels Bl B2 1E51-N685B 1E51-N685D MTU 1E21A-K305B MT Trip Logic IES K3 J_ 1E21A-I K30SB "T" 1E21A-K306B Actuation Logic l rns1- "'T'" K37 I I I... 1E21A-K306B Initiation of closure of RCIC inboard Group 4 valve 2E5 l-F007 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the RCIC steam supply line on high RCIC turbine exhaust pressure, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-19821 H-17149 H-19824 H-17151 H-17148 Al andA2 OR Bl andB2 m4.c ~stem Isolation Turbine Exhaust agm Pressure - 1113195

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" ,---cha~~---- 1,---cha~~---- l>>rywell Pressure I RCIC Steam Line Pressure 1 I l>>rywell Pressure: RCIC Steam Line Pressure 1 I Al A2 A3 I I B 1 1 B2 B3 I I I I I I I.-------. II I lEll-1E51-1E51-I I N694A N658A N658C I MTU MTU MTU 11 I I I 1Ell-N694B MTU 1E51-1E51-N658B N658D MTU MTU I < 1E21-1E21A-1E21A-I I ( 1E21-1E21A-1E21A-I KSA K301A K302A I I KSB K301B K302B 1Trip Logic, Trip Logic I 1Trip Logic Trip Logic I Contacts I Contacts J_ 11 I J_ Close on I Close on - -, + lE2lA-I 1E21A-High I Low , I K301A t I I K301B I Pres'!W'C I Pressure ~.. 1E21A-I I 1E21A-I I of6) lESl-I I lESl- ~E*cal

(fypical

~

K302A t 1 ~ K302B 1

J_tE-51* __ 1 _________ ~

K13

1 I J_ 1ES1-K34

. : I K 13 q I K34 ti I 1E21A- _______________ J I 1E21A- _______________ J I } KSA I I } KSB I I ) 1:!~- I I ) 1:1~- I ~-----------J~-----------~ Actuation Logic Actuation Logic Contacts Close on High Drywell Pressure in Conjunction With Low Steam Line Pressure (fypical of2) __ l lE51- "'!"" K47 I - Initiation of closure of RCIC inboard Group 9 valve 1E51-F104 l lESI- "'!"" K48 I - Initiation of closure ofRCIC outboard Group 9 valve 1E51-F 105 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to isolate the RCIC exhaust vacuum breaker line on high drywell pressure, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17109 H-19821 H-17148 H-19824 H-17149 H-19827 H-17150 H-19830 LFD-1-PCTS-24 Al and A2 and A3 OR Bl and B2 and B3 TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 4.d RCIC System Isolation r------,--~---,.--------:1onrwell Pressure - High 1113/95

Trip System "A" Channel A IE21A-K367C Trip Logic Contacts Close onHigh Temperature ical of2) __ )-IE21A-i K367C I 1E51-M602A TIMER I I < 1B21B-L ______ >-K_:1~ ___ _ Actuation Logic Contacts Close onHigh Temperature ('fypical of2) I - - -~ 1B21B-i K31A I I., Initiation of closure of RCIC outboard Group 4 valve IE51-F008. Trip System "B" Channel B 1E21A-K367D Trip Logic ..L 1E21A-i K367D I I 1E51-M602B TIMER I I I < 1B21B-L. - - >-K_:I~ - - - - Actuation Logic I J...1B21B-i K31B Initiation of closure ofRCIC inboard Grou 4 valve 1E51-F007. Minimum Channel Requirement, for System Isolation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to isolate the RCIC steam supply line on high suppression pool ambient area temperature, at least one channel including its associated timer is required to be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. EJem. Ref. H-17148 H-17748 H-17149 H-19829 H-17151 H-19832 LFD-l-PCIS-25 1 1 5

This page is intentionally left blank. LFD-l-PCIS-26 NIA Prepared By: NIA Reviewed By: NIA Rev.O 12/19/94

Trip System "A" r------------- Channel 1E51-N663A A 1E51-N664A M 1E21A-K339C ___ Trip Logic Contacts 1 Close on ~ - - - - - - 1E21A-High i K339C Diff. 1E51-Te1111_>. M602A ('fyp1cal or2) TIMER 1B21B-K31A Actuation Logic Contacts Close 1 on High Diff. ~ _ _ _ IB21B-Te1111_>Cmture i K31A ('fyptcal of 2) Initiation of closure ofRCIC outboard Grou 4 valve 1E51-F008 Trip System "B" r------------- Channel B 1E51-N663B 1E51-N664B M 1E21A-K339D Trip Logic l rn21A-i K339D 1E51-M602B TIMER 1B21B-K31B Actuation Logic 11B21B-i K31B I Initiation of closure of RCIC inboard Group 4 valve 1E5 l-F007 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to isolate the RCIC steam supply line on high suppression pool area differential temperature, at least one channel including its associated timer is required to be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17148 H-17748 H-17149 H-19828 H-17151 H-19831 LFD-1-PCTS-27

Trip System "A" Channel A 1E51-N661A MTU IE21A-K364C Trip Logic Contacts Close

_J. IE21A-on High 1,- K364C I- -

I Temperature ('fypical of 2) IB21~ K31! Actuation Logic Conlllels Close 1 on High _ _ _ IB2 IB-Temperature K31A ('fypical Of 2) I Initiation of closure ofRCIC outboard Group 4 valve 1E51-F008 Trip System "B" Channel B 1E51-N661B MTU 1E21A-K364D Trip Logic .l. rn21A-i K364D I I I IB21~ K31: Actuation Logic 11B21B* 7 K31B I I + Initiation of closure of RCIC inboard Group 4 valve 1E5 l-F007 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to isolate the RCIC steam supply line on high emergency area equipment cooler temperature, at least one channel is required to be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem.Ref. H-17148 H-17748 H-17149 H-19829 H-17151 H-19832 LFD-l-PCIS-28 TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 4.h RCIC System Isolation .-----:-;----:.-~.....-f.l:!.mergency Area Cooler ~~-"'"...Ll.4M!'l¥.w.perature - High Revi Rev. 0 1/13/95

Trip System "A" r----------, Channels Al A2 A3 Pump Room Heat Exchg. Room CUPS Room 1G31-N662E MTU 1G31-N662A MTU Trip Logic j_ 1C71A-1 I K365A I I 1 ...1.. IC71A-Contacts Open OnHighAmb. Temperature (Typical of 6) ~ K368A ...L 1C71A- -r K371A <( 1A71B-K28 Actuatiqn Logic 1A71B- ...1..

----- K28-

"T" Contacts Open i To Cause Actuation I (Typical of 2) 1 I.., Closure of Inboard Group 5 PCIS Valve 1 G31-F00 1 Trip System "B" r----------, Channels Bl B2 B3 Pump Room Heat Exchg. Room CUPS Room 1G31-N662H MTU Trip Logic j_ 1C71A-7 K365D I ...1.. 1C71A- "'!'" K368D ..l. 1C71A- -. K371D <( 1A71B-K65 1G31-N662M MTU Actuatiqn Logic 1A71B-...1.. K65 "T" I I I I I I I I

Closure of Outboard Group 5 PCIS Valve 1 G3 l-F004 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to isolate the RWCU system on high area temperature, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition.

Elem. Ref. H-16231 H-17817 H-17818 H-19811 H-19820 Al or Bl AND A2 orB2 AND A3 orB3 LFD-l-PCIS-29 TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 5.a ,-------,--,.-__,,.---1RWCU System Isolation "¥"'1-"'--"'~""'""""_,,...'l'a Temperature - High 1/13/95

Trip System "A" r----~--------------, Channels Al A2 A3 Pump Room IG31-N661E MTU IG31-N662E MTU Heat Exchg. Room CUPS Room IG31-N661A IG31-N662A IG31-N661J IG31-N662J MTU MTU MTU MTU IG31-N663A MTU Trip Logic IC71A- ~ __________.. K366A 7 I I I IC71A- ~ K369A 7 Contacts Open 2C71A- ~ On High Diff. K372A Temperature IA?IB- <( (Typical of 3) 1G31-N663J MTU K28 > L __________________ _ Elem. Ref. Actuatic;,n Logic IA7 IB- -i: _ - - * ,...C_on_ta_ct_s -Open--. K28 T To Cause Actuation I.. Closure of Inboard Group 5 PCIS Valve I G31-F00 1 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability; See Sheet 2 of 2 for statement of minimum channel requirements. -30 H-16231 H-17817 H-17818 H-19811 H-19820 6.1-1 Item 5.b System Isolation ntilation Diff. ature-Hi 1/13/95

Trip System "B" r-------------------, Channels Bl B2 B3 Pump Room 1G31-N661D 1G31-N662D Heat Exchg. Room 1G31-N661H 1G31-N662H CUPS Room 1G31-N661M 1G31-N662M MTU MTU M MTU MTU MTU 1G31-N663D MTU 1G31-N663H MTU Trip Logic 1C71A- ~-----------, K366D ~ I IC71A-K369D 7 Contacts Open 1C71A-On High Diff. K372D Temperature IA?IB- < (Typical of3) 1G31-N663M MTU K6S > L __________________ _ Actuati9n Logic 1A71B- ~- - - ~ ,....C-on-tac_ts_Open__., K65 °T To Cause Actuation I.. Closure of Outboard Group 5 PCIS Valve I G31-F004 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability; In order to maintain Group 5 PCIS isolation capability on high ventilation differential temperature, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-16231 H-17817 H-17818 H-19811 H-19820 AlorBl AND A2orB2 AND A3 orB3 FD-l-PCIS-30 Sheet2 of2 TS 3.3.6.1-1 Item 5.b RWCU System Isolation Area Ventilation Diff. Tern erature - Hi Rev. 0 1/13/95

Trip System Channel I I 1C41A-Sl I I Control I Switch I I I Trip Logic I I J_ I I IC41A-Sl 7- - - - - - - - - - ~ I I I I I I I Contacts Open I I ~ On Standby IA7IB-K27 Liquid Control I I Initiation I L ___________ _ Actuation Logic f JA71B- ~--, 1(27 I I I 1 __ I I I.. Contacts Close To Cause Actuation Closure of Outboard Group 5 PCIS Valve 1G31-F004 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation Capability In order to maintain the capability to isolate the RWCU system on Standby Liquid Control System initiation, this channel must be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17120 H-17817 H-17818 LFD-l-PCIS-31 TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 5.c ...---------,.----,---1RWCU System Isolation Prepared By: Sh/ /_, /,....1

SLC System Initiation Re
Lh.~

~r -- Rev. 0 1/13/95

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" r-----....... -----1 r-----------1 I Channels I I Channels I I Al A2 I I Bl B2 I I I I I 1B21* N681A 1B21-N681C I I

~ ___

I I I 1B21-1B21-I N681B N681D I I MTU I IB21* 1B21-I I 1B21-1B21-I N682A N682C I I N682B N682D I STU STU I I STU STU I I I I I I I 1A71B-< 1A71B.(.... I.-~ __... ____ -~A71B- ~A71B-I K.lA > K.IC -;>.............. K.1B KID ......... l: I I Trip Logic ... I : 1.......... Trip Logic 1A71B-.l .l t .l .l 1A71B-I ~---iii-1i~:-.------------1-' I 1f.~- KID I 1A71B-D6 I I I I I I 1A71B-IC27 I I I Actuation Logic ~--~B--j~ 1

OOIUl'e oflnbolrd Group 5 PCIS Valve I GJ I-POOi Actuation Logic 1A718- "~

.K27 OOIIR of Outbolnl Group 5 PCIS Valve IGJ l-P004 Milt* O**n!!,...,,.., '* lt*tw Ie!eden C.,hQkY; In order to maintain the capabilitJ to ilOlate the R.WCU 1Yltem on low low reactor water level. clwmel1 in one of the followina cambinaliona 1IIUlt be either operable or main11ined in the tripped condidcm. Eem.Ref. H-17810 H-19809 H-17111 H-19812 H-17817 H-19815 H-17818 H-19818 Al and Bl Oil A2andB2 LPD-l-PCIS-32 TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 5.d TS 3.3.5.2-1, Item 4.a .-----~--,-.. RWCU System Isolation ~~11&,..\\,G..,..Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level2 Rev. 1 12/06/18

Trin Svstem "A"

~-~---------

Channel A 1B31-N679A MTU I !At K2~1)> Trip Logic J_ 1A71-TK29A I I Contact Opens On I Reactor Steam Dome ~ Pressure - High 1 A 71- .. __ ic~ o~2 _ _ _ _ -Kl~ _____ _

=A-ctuation Logic Contact Closes.

~ lA?l-to Effect Actuation - - - -.: (fypical of 2) ___, K29 Automatic Closure of SDC Isolation Valve IEI l-F009 Tr!P* Svstem "B" Channel 1 B 1B31-N679D MTU ( 1A71-K30A Trip Logic J_ 1A71-TK30A I I I - - - - - ---~ ~~-- -- - - - Actuation Logic .:,t 1A71- ~- K30 Automatic Closure of SOC Isolation Valve lEI I-FOOS Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation capability on a Reactor Steam Dome Pressure -High signal, either channel "A" or "B" is required to be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17817 H-19809 H-17818 H-19818 LFD-l-PCIS-33 TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 6.a RHR SDC System Note: This is not a PCIS function; however, it is an SDC isolation function. Therefore, automatic isolation capability of 1Ell-F009 is required even though it is not a PCIS valve. Isolation, Reactor ,--------..-------1 Steam Dome Prepared By: cJ....~~~:.....I Pressure - High Reviewed By: ev. 0 1/15/95

I - _ ':[ri_p_S_y!t~J!l ~*~: - - -. Channels. I - _ Iri_p_ Sy!t~l_!l ~*~: - - - Channels 1 Al Bl A2 B2 I I 1B2J-N680A I IA~ Jl? 1B21-N680B ( JA7l- ? K6B Trip Logic J. JA71* J. I I I I I I I I I I JB21-N680C I I I 1:J:~ 1B21-N680D I I I IA~ KlJ? Trip Logic L JA71* J. IA71-I I I r----T... _K6_A ____ r~- T.._KAC _J K6D I I I I Conllcl Opms On I I I I ~~ j IA71* ~~~------?~~------ IA71.: I L-------- -Kl~------* ________ ctuation Logic Cmnaa Co* .i,, IA7l* to Eft'ect.Aclaadan * - - - --;- K29 ~fl2) --- AutclDatic CIOSUR of SDC Isolation Valve 1 Ell-F009 Actuation Logic Awmatic Closme of SDC Isolation Valve 1 E 11-FOOI Minimum Channel Regairemenll for Su** lpldadop Capabllltr; In order to maintain RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation capability on a Reactor Veuel Water Level - Low, Level 3 sipal, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Aland Bl OR LFD-I-PCIS-34 Elem. Ref. A2 and B2 TS 3.3.6.1-1, Item 6.b H-17789 H-17818 Note:TbisisnotaPCISfimction;howcver,iti1an TS 3.3.5.2-1, Item 3.a H-17790 H-19809 SDC isolation function. Therefore, automatic RHR SOC System H-1781 O H-19812 isolation capability of JEI 1-F009 i1 Isolation, Reactor H-17811 H-19815 thoughitisnotaPCISvalve.......,....---By:-. -!tA--+----tVessel Water Level-1H J~-~17~8~1:._7 _ _:H:_:*:_:1:98:_:1:8 _L ________ J!**~*==_.~.,~: :!:!~!::!:::~ Low, Level 3 L TRM Rev. 113

~~~~em _____ _

Channel Dll-K002 Pre-Amplifier I Dl 1-K604 Radiation Monitor I Gl l-N079 Radiation Monitor I Relay ~ De-energizes on Radiation D 11-Level High Zl3-Kl0 I I I I I I I I I I I I L ________________ J Actuation Logic Contact Opens to Effect Actuation l Dll-Zl3-Kl0 T I I I

Close Low Level Waste Discharge to Canal Valves Gll-F184 and Gll-F185 Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability:

In order to maintain automatic isolation capability of the liquid radwaste discharge line (to the river) on a Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation-High signal, this channel must be operable. Elem. Ref. H-19533 H-19560 LFD-1-PRM-01 ODCM 2-1, Item I Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line ....-----=.--r----1 Radiation High Prepared By: ~~ Reviewed By: l 9 6 Rev. 0 11 /16/94

Trip System Channels Relay Energizes on Radiation Level High (Typical 2 Places) A D11-K619A Ratemeter DI 1-KN020A Contact Opens to Effect Actuation (Typical 2 Places) Trip Logic Dll-KN020A Dll-KN0208 I B D11-K619B Ratemeter DI 1-KN0208 ~-----------~----------- Deactivate Normal Range Reactor Building Vent Stack Radiation Monitoring System. Initiate Reactor Building Vent Stack Post-Accident Radiation Monitoring System. Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain accident range monitoring automatic initiation capability due to a reactor building vent stack monitor high radiation signal, at least one channel must be operable. Elem. Ref. H-19559 H-19596 H-19661 H-19662 LFD-1-PRM-02 ODCM 3-1, Item 1.a Reactor Building Vent Stack Monitoring System r-----~~------1 Radiation High Reviewed By: Rev.O 11 /16/94

Trip System .---------------------~ A Channels B I PREAMP 1D11-K751A RIS 1D11* K615A I

mu-1 K9 IDllA-:

_ ------~*~~-*

Trip Logic ..l IDII-: 1 ilDJIA-T K9 : ~ z:n,\\. -, ----..! ---~--~ L---- Contacts Open on Post-Treatment Radiation Monitor Upscale (1ypicalof2) IN62*

1D11*..l 1 K9 T lDllB-1 Zl2B I

_____ 1 Actuation Logic I

1 i~:S +-----~==a:1 I

I

PREAMP 1D11-K751A I

11D11-1 I I 1 K9 IDIIB-1 1 Zl2B 1 Initiates Closure of Main Stack Isolation Valve IN62-F527, Offgas Condenser and Separator Drain Valves 1N62-F030A and B, Prefilter Water Seal Drain Valves 1N62-Fl I lA and B, and Holdup Line Drain Valve 1N62-F086 Mtnhnum ChMP** Regutmnents (or Sntua &olatjon Canhllity; In order to maintain Offgas System isolation capability on a Post-Treatment Radiation Monitor upscale condition, each channel must be functional or maintained in the tripped condition. LFD-l-PRM-03 I I I I Elem. Ref. H-17076 H-17133 H-17077 H-17134 H-17126 H-19558 H-17127 TRM T3.3.8-l, Item I Offgas System Isolation r----==---~---1Post-Treatment Radiation Prepared By:......_....__=--,Monitor Upscale l.cviewedey* TRM REV. 60

Trip System r - - - A - - - - Channels- - - - - B - - -, 1D11-K7S1A RIS 1D11-K615A

.. I Trip Logic j_ IDIJ-:

,- - - - - - - - - r - - - - - I , IOI IA-T KB : 1 1 Zl2A 1 Contacts Open on L - - - - Post-Treatment Radiation Monitor Downscale (Typical of 2) IN62*

1D11-..l I KB T IDIJB-I Zl2B 1

_____ ) Actuation Logic I I JN62-l _____ Jcontact Opens~ K4A.B T lEtTectA~o!!.J I *

I 1D11-K7S1A 11D11-1 I

I KB IDIJB-1 1 Zl2B 1 Initiates Closure of Main Stack Isolation Valve 1N62-F527, Offgas Condenser end Separator Drain Valves 1N62-F030A and B, Prefilter Water Seal Drain Valves 1N62-Fl 1 lA and B, end Holdup Line Drain Valve 1N62-F086 Migimum Chanael Requirements for Svuem Isolation Capability; I I I I In order to maintain Off gas System isolation capability on a Post-Treatment Radiation Monitor downscale condition, each channel must be functional or maintained in-the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. - H-17076 H-17133 H-17077 H-17134 H-17126 H-19558 H-17127 1-PRM-04 TRM T3.3.8-1, Item 2 Off gas System Isolation r-----=-~~-;Post-Treatment Radiation Prepared By: ---,,,;..,,...............,.__,Monitor Downscale R.cviswed By: TRMREV.60

D11-N071 A B D11-N072 D11-K752A Pre Amplifier D11-K752B Pre Amplifier D11-K600A Radiation Monitor D11-K600B Radiation Monitor Relay Energizers on Radiation Level High-High (Typical 2 Places) D11-KZ12A, C D11-KZ12B, D Contacts Open to Effect Actuation (Typical 2 Places) D11-KZ12B, D D11-KZ12A D11-KZ12A, C D11-KZ12B, D Deactivate Normal Range Off Gas Main Stack Radiation Monitoring System. Initiate Main Stack Post-Accident Radiation Monitoring System. Realign Offgas Main Stack Radiation Sampling Valves for Accident Range Sampling Contacts Close to Effect Actuation (Typical 2 Places) Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain accident range monitoring automatic initiation capability due to a main stack monitor high-high radiation signal, at least one channel must be operable. Elem. Ref. H-19559 H-19596 H-19661 Prepared by: __________________ Reviewed by: _________________ LFD-1-PRM-05 ODCM 3-1, Item 3.a Main Stack Monitoring System, Noble Gas Activity Monitor Rev. 1 08/25/2016 Trip Logic Trip System Channels r---------------------------------------------- I I ~ I --~ _l_ I f T ---T I I _ L--------~---------------------1 --------------- 1 I I I i

B21 B21 B21 B21 B21 B21 B21 B21 N691A N692A N692C N691C N691B N692B N692D N691D MTU STU STU MTU MTU STU STU MTU I I I I Ell-~ Ell- ~ K79A K80A Ell-~ K79B Ellf> KSOB Trip Logic .-Co-ntact--Clo_ses_on--, 1 1 RWL Low-Level 2 - - Ell-Ell-(l)plcal

P'-l ~

Kl911 Ell-Ell-TKSOA JKBOB I ESl- ~ IWO. K.81,K.85 L--------------------~-- Actuation Logic ContactCloses 1.}:;;~ to Effect Actuation - -T -..-,, I K.81,K.85 t j Initiation of RCIC ! Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain RCIC initiation capability due to low reactor water level, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem.Ref. ' H-17148 H-19826 H-17763 H-19829 H-17766 H-19830 H-19823 Al&A2 Al&B2 Bl&A2 Bl&B2 LFD-1-RCIC-0 1 TS 3.3.5.3-1, Item 1 RCIC system Reactor Vessel

.,,._---+Water Level-Prep.-.cl By:.,.,.j<~:l.1llfll~-l Low Low, Level 2 Rm.wed 71JJJ.ll,;...o TRM Rev. 113

Trip System Channel Channel I A B B21-N693A MTU E21- .K363A Contact Closes onRWL High-Level 8 S-Cf11~~) Trip Logic 1 E21- _____ __r::~ K366A E51-K49 B21-B21-N695A __ N693C MTU STU E21-K366A Actuation Logic _Co_n_ta-ct~ 1 Closes ES I-to Effect Actuation T K.49 I I

Closes RCIC Steam SYm>lY Valves and Turbine Cooling water Valve Minimum Channel Requirements for System Trip Capability:

In order to ensure RCIC system trip capability on a RWL-HIGH-Level 8 signal, both channels must be operable. Elem. Ref. LFD-l-RCIC-02 TS 3.3.5.3-1, Item 2 RCIC System Reactor Vessel ,----~~---1 Water Level - High, Prepared By: -+-"-'.......,_;;a. __ 1 Level 8 I H-17148 H-17152 H-19823 H-44120 1--------~ ReviewedBy: d Rev. 1 12/03/18

Trip System Channel Channel A B ES1-N060 E51-N061 Level Level sw:tch Trip Logic sw:tch I I 1 ESl* N060 ~~ I ES1-i =rr.:erLow ---____.~'!"] - - - - - - - - - - ~ ('lypical 2 Places) E51-KS2 Actuation Logic Contact Closes to Effect Actuation Opens RCIC Torus hi>oanl and Outboald Suction v.lves E51-F03 l and ES1-F029, Closes Condensate Stoqge Tank Suction 'Alive E51-F010. Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capabillty: In order to maintain the ability to automatically transfer the RCIC pump suction from the CST to the Suppression Pool on a CST low level signal, one of the two channels must be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17148 H-17152 LFD-l-RCIC-03 TS 3.3.5.3-1. Item 3 RCICSystem ,-----~-,ir----t Condensate Storage Prepared By: r"(!)~ Tanlc Level-Low an.wcc10y: l~S Rev. 1 12/03/18 V

Trip System r----------------------~-~-- A Channels B E51-N062A Level Switch E51-N062B Level Switch I I Trip Logic 1 ESl-ESI-1 ______,, **N062A N062B*"" I I Conaact Closes on Hi&hLevel to Effect Actuation ~=) J ESl- } K51 Actuation Logic Conlact lru1-ClosesTo.------ Effect T K51 Ac1uation I I I

Opens RCIC Tom Inboard and Oulboanl Suction Vi1ves E51-F031 and E51-F029, Closes Condensate Stomp 'link Suction Valve B51-F010.

Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiadon Capability: In order to maintain the ability to automa1ically transfer the RCIC pump suction from the CST to the Suppression Pool on a high Suppression Pool water level signal, one of the two channels must be operable or maintained in the tripped condi1ion. E1em. Ref. H-17148 H-17152 LFD-1-RCIC-04 TS 3.3.5.3-1. Item 4 RCIC System r------rnr--,c--""""I Suppression Pool Prepand By: ~ Water Level-High Rm-*BJ= t..s, Rev. 1 12/03/18

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" Channels Channels 1 AIA AIB A2A A2B BIA BIB B2A B2B I I I I I I I I 1c11i 1c11!. 1c11!. 1c11A~ Kt2!1/ K12ii°> K12t> K12J-> 1c11'£. K12~> 1c11!. Kt2i> 1c11l 1c11l Kt2ci-> K12Ji> Trip Logic IC71A--h-_ ~~~A?;I Kl2E IC71A-Kl4A,E Contacts I Open on IRM IC7IA-1 NeutronFlux Kl2C I High (fypical of8) IC71Ai Kl2G IC71A-Kl4C, G Trip Logic 1C71A-1 K12B I 1C71Al Kl2F IC71A-Kl4B, F 1C71A-1 Kl2D I 1C71A-; Kl2H IC71A-Kl4D,H Actuation Logic Actuation Logic Contacts Open to Cause Actuation (fypical of4) ..l IC71A-

i Kl4A,E I

IC71A-..L Kl4C,Gi I

De-energizes Division 1 Scram Pilot Valves Both divisions of scram

_ pilot valves must - de-energize in order to produce a reactor scram. ..l IC71A-i Kl4B,F I ..L IC71A-i Kl4D,H I

De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on IRM neutron flux high, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition.

Elem. Ref. H-17789 H-17792 H-17790 H-17793 H-17791 AlA or AlB or A2A or A2B AND LFD-1-RP - 1 BIA or BIB orB2A orB2B TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item I.a .-------------aReactor Protection System PreparedBy: -A.lt~;....l...~~ Instrumentation IRM Neutron Flux - High V. 0 1 1 95

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" Channels Channels AIA AIB A2A A2B BIA BIB B2A B2B I I I I 1c11!. 1c11l 1c11l 1c11A! K12!1/ K12t> Kl2t> Kl2~-> 1C71~ Kl2~> 1C7li. Kl2i> IC71l IC711 Kl2ri-> K12fi> Contacts Open to Cause Actuation (fypical of4) Trip Logic Trip Logic IC71A--h._ ~~~~AGI Kl2E IC71A-Kl4A,E Contacts Openonan IC71A-1 ~Inop Kl2C I (fypical of 8) IC71Al Kl2G IC71A-Kl4C, G 1C71A-1 Kl2B I 1C71AG Kl2F IC71A-Kl4B, F 1C71A-1 Kl2D I 1C71A-s Kl2H IC71A-Kl4D,H Actuation Logic Actuation Logic IC71A-Both divisions of scram IC71A- -. Kl4A,E Kl4B,F I _ pilot valves must I - de-energize in order to I IC71A-..L ..L IC71A- _L _L Kl4C,G; produce a reactor scram. Kl4D,H I I ,I, ,I, De-energizes Division 1 De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on an IRM inop signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. AlA or AlB or A2A or A2B AND BIA orBlB orB2A orB2B LFD Elem. Ref. H-17789 H-17792 H-17790 H-17793 H-17791 TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item Lb .---------~Reactor Protection System Prepared By: ~~..,___~~...,Instrumentation - IRMinop ev.O 16 95

Trip System "A" _ 1_. Trip.System."B~' 1--- 1 Al/Bl Channels I I A2/B2 A3/B3 A4/B4: I .----~- I ' EachAPRM Provides Input to All 1 Four Voter Cards Any Two

APRMTrips Will Trip the

! Voter Card Trip Logic I (Typical of 4) lCSl* K617A 2/4 Voter Module 1CS1-K617C 2/4 Voter Module I

I -

- *** - + I I I I 1 Actuation 1 I I Logic I I I I I I I I I I I -I.: 1CSI-K617B 2/4 Vote Module Trip Logic ICSI-K617D 2/4 Voter Module -=---=----~ J I Actuation 1 I Logic Contacts Open to Cause ctuation (Typical of 4) ~-----+J_ IC71A- ,- Kl4A E I I _l_ IC7IA-I +J i Kl4C, G Both divisions of scram pilot valves must de-energize in order to produce a reactor scram. ._ _____,.j_ IC71A-K14B,F I _l_ IC71A- -~ i K14D,H - De-energizes Division I Scram Pilot Valves. __ De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on APRM neutron flux high (setdown), channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17789 H-44705 H-17790 H-44706 H-17791 H-44707 H-17792 H-44708 H-17793 H-44712 Al/B 1 and A2/B2 Al/B 1 and A3/B3 Al/Bl and A4/B4 A2/B2 and A3/B3 A2/B2 and A4/B4 A3/B3 and A4/B4 LFD-1-RPS-03 TS 3.3.1.1-L Item 2.a Reactor Protection System .-------+,-...--------1 Instrumentation - APRM Prepared By:...,,,.~~~-- Reviewed By: _____ Neutron Flux - High (Setdown) TRM Rev. 12

Trip System "A" _ I.. Trip.Syst~m."B~' . 'Recirc Loop 1 r*-.,w Xmitters 'oopAi I~-: I Al/Bl 1B31-N024A j -, I SnNottl. I.. - - -... Channels A2/B2 A3/B3 I A4/B4: I I I I I EachAPRM Provides Input to All - Trip Logic 1 Recirc Loop I Recirc Loop Flow Xmitters,' LoopA I Recirc Loop I Flow Xmitters L-A I IBJl*N014D

Four Voter Cards Any Two APRM Trips Will Trip the Voter Card
(Typical of 4)

, _____ _ ICSI* K617A 2/4 Voter Module ICS1-K617C 2/4 Voter Module I + ***--***--~ Flow Xmitters LoopA 1Bll*N014C LoopB 1Bll*N02*C SnNoctl. - 1Bll~N014B I I LoopB I 1Bll*N024B - SnNOltl. l I I I lCSl-K6178 2/4 Voter Module Trip._ - --Cogic lCSl-K617D 2/4 Voter Module L-B IBJl*N024D Sn Nott 1. I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 Actuation 1 I I_ _,_ - - - -=---=----~ J I I I Logic Actuation 1 I Logic Contacts Open to Cause Actuation (Typical of 4) ~-----+J_ 1C71A-Kl4A,E I _l_ IC71A-I +J i KI4C,G Both divisions of scram pilot valves must de-energize in order to produce a reactor scram. ._ _____,.l_ IC71A-Kl4B,F I _l_ IC71A- -~ -r-Kl4D, H - I De-energizes Division I Scram Pilot Valves ...__.... De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17789 H-44705 ,, 7790 H-44706 H-17791 H-44707 H-17792 H-44 708 H-17793 H-44712 Al/Bl and A2/B2 Al/Bl and A3/B3 Al/Bl and A4/B4 A2/B2 and A3/B3 A2/B2 and A4/B4 A3/B3 and A4/B4 Note I: For the STP High function of an APRM to be considered operable, bo11t of the associated Recite Row ttansmitters 1111131 be operable. LFD-1-RPS-04 TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.b Reactor Protection System ...-----~..,....,--------, Instrumentation - Simulated Thermal Power - High Prepared Ry: ~ Reviewed~- TRM Rev. 12

Trip System "A" _ I.. Trip.Syst~m."B~'. 1--- 1 Al/Bl ______..J Channels I I A2/B2 A3/B3 A4/B4: I 1----~- I ~ I EachAPRM Provides Input to All 1 Four Voter Cards

Any Two APRM Trips Will Trip the 1 VoterCard Trip Logic I (Typical of 4)

I, _____ _ 1CSI-K617A 2/4 Voter Module ICSl* K617C 2/4 Voter Module I

I -

+ I I I I 1 Actuation 1 I I Logic I I I I. I I I I I. I I -1 *. IC51-K617B 214 Voter Module I I Trip Logic IC51-K617D 2/4 Voter Module - - -=---=----~ j I I 1 Actuation 1 I I Logic Contacts Open to Cause Actuation (Typical of 4) ~-----+.l 1C7-1A-Kl4A,E I l_ 1C71A-I +J i Kl4C,G Both divisions of scram pilot valves must de-energize in order to produce a reactor scram. ~-----*.l 1C71A-Kl4B,F I l_ 1C71A-I i Kl4D,H I ~ De-energizes Division 1 Scram Pilot Valves j I ~ __ De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on APRM Neutron Flux - High, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. B:-17789 H-44705 H-17790 H-44706 H-17791 H-44707 H-17792 H-44708 H-17793 H-44712 Al/Bl andA2/B2 Al/Bl and A3/B3 Al/BI and A4/B4 A2/B2 and A3/B3 A2/B2 and A4/B4 A3/B3 and A4/B4 LFD-1-RPS-05 TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.c Reactor Protection System ..------+-,,-..,...-----!Instrumentation - Neutron Prepared Ry: -W!.!o!!;t!~-- Flux - High Reviewed By: _____ TRMRev. 12

Trip System "A" _ I.. Trip.System."B~'. 1 Al/Bl ______...J Channels A2/B2 A3/B3 A4/B4: I ,----~- I

.... :-~ I EachAPRM Provides Input to All 1 Four Voter Cards Any Two APRM Trips Will Trip the I Voter Card Trip Logic I (Typical of 4)

, _____ _ 1C51-K617A 2/4 Voter Module IC51-K617C 2/4 Voter Module I

I -

- *** - + I I I I 1 Actuation 1 I I Logic I I I I I I I I I I -1

IC51-K617B 2/4 Voter Module Trip Logic IC51-K617D 2/4 Voter Module I I______

J ~ I Actuation 1 I Logic Contacts Open to Cause Actuation (Typical of 4) ~----J_ lC71A-K14A,E I l_ 1C71A-I +J ""!'" Kl4C,G Both divisions of scram pilot valves must de-energize in order to produce a reactor scram. J_ IC71A-1 1 '------*-r K14B,F I I _:_ 1C71A-I ""!'" Kl4D, H I De-energizes Division 1 Scram Pilot Valves ~ ...__-----1 De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on APRM Inop, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17789 H-44705 H-17790 H-44706 H-17791 H-44707 H-17792 H-44708 H-17793 H-44712 A 1 IB 1 and A2/B2 Al/Bl and A3/B3 Al/B 1 and A4/B4 A2/B2 and A3/B3 A2/B2 and A4/B4 A3/B3 and A4/B4 LFD-1-RPS-06 TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.d Reactor Protection System ,-------.,.....------11nstrumentation - APRM Prepared Ry: r ReviewedB~ Inop TRM Rev. 12

Trip System "A" Channels Al A2 1 C51-K617 A 2/4 Voter Module 1 C5 l-K617C 2/4 Voter Module I ( 1C71A-Kl2E <' \\C71A- >K12G 1C71A-Kl2A IC71A-Kl2C Trip Logic I I I IC71A---l-_ ~~~:Air Kl2E IC71A-Kl4A, E Contacts Open on Voter Module 1C71A-1 Trip (Typical Kl2C I of8) i~iti 1C71A-K14C, G Trip System "B" Channels Bl B2 1C51-K617D I I I I I 1C51-K617B 2/4 Voter Module 2/4 Voter I I Module I <' \\C71A-1

12H

( 1C71A-K12F 1C71A-K12B IC71A-Kl2D Trip Logic I I I 1C71A-1 Kl2B I ~~~iAr; 1C71A-K14B, F I I I 1C71A-1 Kl2D I ~~~~A-; IC71A-K14D, H ~-------------- ~-------------- Actuation Logic Actuation Logic Contacts J_ 1C71A-Both divisions of scram Open to ,-- K14A, E J_ IC7IA- ,-- K14B, F Cause .-----.i~ pilot valves must Actuation 1 C 71 A-..L de-energize in order to I I ..L 1C71A-(Typical K 14C, G ; produce a reactor scram. Kl4D,H of 4) De-energizes Division 1 Scram Pilot Valves I ~ De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on APRM Voter Module circuit function, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17789 H-17792 H-17790 H-17793 H-17791 H-44712 LFD-l-RPS-07 Al or A2 AND Bl orB2 TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.e Reactor Protection System .-------,*-----1Instrumentation - Prepared Ry: ~ APRM Two-Out-of-Four J Voter Circuit Reviewed By~ TRM Rev. 12

Trip System "A" _ I.. Trip.Sy~t~m."B~' 1--- 1 Al/Bl Channels I A2/B2 A3/B3 A4/B4: I .----~- I .....--.____, I

EachAPRM Provides Input to All Four Voter
Cards
AnyTwo
OPRMTrips
Will Trip the I Voter Card Trip Logic I (Typical of 4)

IC51-K617A 2/4 Voter Module IC51-K617C 2/4 Voter Module I

I -

- *** - + I I

Actuation :

I I Logic I... - -.. I I I I I ~ I. I I -1 *. IC51-K617B 2/4 Voter Module Trip Logic IC51-K617D 2/4 Voter Module -=---=----L-J I Actuation 1 I Logic Contacts Open to Cause Actuation (Typical of 4) ~-----+J_ 1C71A-i K14A,E I _________ l 1c11A-.. ~ i K14C,G Both divisions of scram pilot valves must de-energize in order to produce a reactor scram. .... _____ *J_ 1C71A-i K14B,F I l_ 1C71A- _J -,- K14D, H - I ~ De-energizes Division 1 Scram Pilot Valves I ~ ....__--1 De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on OPRM Upscale, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17789 H-44705 H-17790 H-44706 H-17791 H-44707 H-17792 H-44708 H-17793 H-44712 Al/Bl andA2/B2 Al/Bl andA3/B3 Al/Bl andA4/B4 A2/B2 and A3/B3 A2/B2 and A4/B4 A3/B3 and A4/B4 LFD-l-RPS-07 a TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 2.f Reactor Protection System ......-----,-_~,-----11nstrumentation - OPRM Upscale Reviewed e$-f,;it+. W-~,£ TRMRev."'

Trip System "A" Channels Al A2 I I 1c11i 1c11l KS:> KSC\\-> Trip Logic Contacts Open on High 1 i~~A-GL ~:4) Gl i~1A-1C71A-1C71A-Kl4A, E Kl4C,G Trip System "B" Channels Bl B2 I I 1c11'[_ 1c11l KSBr,,.1/ KSD\\-> 1C71A-1 KSB ~ 1C71A-Kl4B,F Trip Logic I I I 1C71A-1 1:A_; K14D,H) Actuation Logic Actuation Logic Contacts ..l 1C71A-Both divisions of scram 1C71A- .- Kl4A,E i Kl4B,F I _ pilot valves must I r de-eneigize in older to I""' I 1C71A-..!... ..!... 1C71A- ..l Kl4C,G; produce a reactor scram. i K14D,H I I .I. De-energizes Division 1 De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on high reactor vessel steam dome pressure, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17789 H-19809 H-17790 H-19812 H-17791 H-19815 H-17792 H-19818 H-17793 Al or A2 AND Bl orB2 LFD-1-RP - TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 3

'Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - >>---r Prepared By: --Q~'---lill!!:::lo~*..,.I

~"' Vessel Steam Dome Pressure -Hi 1 1 95

Trip System "A" r-'--------, Channels Al A2 1B21-N680A MTU I 1C71A-( K6A > 1B21-N680C MTU I I I ( 1C71A-K6C Trip Logic ..1. Contacts IC71A- - - - - Ope K6A non I LoWRx. ~ 1C71A-K6C Water ~ 1C71A-Level 1C71A-K14A,E (fypical K14C,G L - .:!!._4)_ - Actuation Logic Trip System "B" Channels Bl B2 1B21-N680B MTU I 1C71A-( K6B > 1B21-N680D MTU I ( 1C71A-K6D Trip Logic li~~A-* Ii~~- I 1C71A-( ( 1C71A-K14B, F > >K14D,HI L ________ __. Actuation Logic Contacts ..1. ..1. ___ 1C71A-__ Both divisions of scram 1C71A-K14A,E-,- -,- Kl4B,F I _ pilot valves must I I - d~nergize in onter to ,~ I 1C71A-..L ..L 1C71A-K14C,G; produce a reactor scram. i Kl4D,H I I I.. De-energizes Division 1 De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on low reactor water level (Level 3), channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17789 H-19809 H-17790 H-19812 H-17791 H-19815 H-17792 H-19818 H-17793 Al or A2 AND Bl orB2 -09 TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 4 .-----------fReactor Protection v* f!t, 8 CP+~ System Instrumentation ~ B. *y Reactor Vessel Water R. ___.. 8 *cc;./..-f;....iJ ti. !1 Level - Low Level 3 evie-.. Y-~---.lk4, Rev. 0 11 95

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" Channels I I

Toe "Top Left" limit switch sets in all "A" and "D" MSIVs have switch contacts in both trip systems.

Channels --1

- 1 I

AlA Ala Ale Alo \\ I \\ I A2A \\ ,¥a A?,c,¥0 I I B\\lA 1'1B B,lc 1'1D B,2A B2e B2c B2D I I \\ I \\ \\ 1B;l~ I I 1B2: ~ I , ',, I 1B21-1 I o, I I Trip Logic 28D:. I I !t: I ,..' I .;: 11 22D I I I 11 I I Trip Logic I -,. I 1B21-D I I I I Contacts I ltC71A-l. 1C1tA--L. ___ Open if l.1c11A-K3A T K3B T MSIVs TKJc I I <90% I l1c11A-TKJG I I I I IC71A-l. K3B T 1C71A-l K3F T l1C1tA-I. TDH I. I ~ 1C71A-Open 1C71A-s K14A, E ('fypical K14C, G of8) 1 __________ _ I I I I ...J L. Contacts to Actuation Logic J_ ___ 1C71A-__ K14A,E,. I I 1C71A-..L Both divisions of sciaID pilot valves must - de-eneigize in order to I (_ 1C71A- >K14B,F I IC71A-~ K14D,H > Actuation Logic J_ 1C71A-T' Kl4B,F I I ..L 1C71A-tion pical ) K14C,G; produce a reactor sciaID. ,- K14D,H I I I De-energizes Division I De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Channd Requirements for System Initiation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on Main Steam Isolation Valve closure, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. f<AlA or AlB) ~: (Ale or Alofl LlA2A or A2B) and (A2c or A2D,Ll Elem. Ref. H-17789 H-17793 H-17790 H-17815 H-17791 H-17816 H-17792 H-17943 AND l(BlAorBlB) ~: (Blc orBln>j l.{B2A or B2B) and (B2c or B2D,Ll I J

Trip System "A" r---------, Channels Al A2 1C71-N650A MTU I I I IC71A-(_ K4A ;> 1C71-N650C MTU I I I (_ IC71A-

> K4C Trip Lo-gic

..L 1C71A- "'T" K4A 1 I 1C11A-< K14A,E > L __ _ Contacts Open on High Diywell Pressure ('fypical of4 d:: 1C71A-K4C I < 1C71A- >Kl4C,G Actuation Logic Trip System "B" Channels Bl B2 1C71-N650B MTU I I I IC71A-(_ K4B ;> 1C71-N650D MTU I (_ IC71A-

> K4D Trip Logic 1C71A-d: :

d:: 1C71A-K4B 1 1 K4D I I 1C1lA-< IC71A-Kl4B, F > >Kl4D, HI L ________ _.. Actuation Logic Contacts ..L ___ 1C71A-__ Both divisions of scram 1C71A-Kl4A,E-,- -,- Kl4B,F ..L I pilot valves must I I - de-energize in order to I 1C71A-..L ..L 1C71A-Kl4C,G; produce a reactor scram. Kl4D,H I I De-energizes Division 1 De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on high drywell pressure, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. EJem. Ref. H-17789 H-19809 H-17790 H-19812 H-17791 H-19815 H-17792 H-19818 H-17793 Al or A2 AND Bl orB2 TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 6 ..---------Reactor Protection PrepamlBy: £.- C,Q,.,Jl-System Instrumentation .o/'d Lir&d Drywell Pressure - High Reviewed Ry:~ _,fi._ eV. 0 116 95

Trip System "A" r-----------, Channels Al A2 IC71A-KIA Trip Logic IC71A-KIC

1.

Contacts .l 1C71A- - - - -~non -r lC71A-KlA ~ sJ.:n , KIC i~~~~ ~ ~i~~~~G L _______ _.. Actuation Logic Trip System "B" Channels Bl B2 1C71A-KIB Trip Logic 1C71A-K1D 1C71A- :!:

!: IC71A-K1B KID I

I 1C71A-< IC71A-Kl4B, F > >Kl4D, HI L--------~ Actuation Logic Contacts Open to Cause Actuation ('fypical of4)

l.

___ 1C71A-__ Kl4A,E,-- Both divisions of scram 1C71A- ,-- Kl4B,F

l.

I ~ pilot valves must I I I 1C71A-..L de-eneigize in order to ..L 1C71A-Kl4C,G--;- produce a reactor scram. i Kl4D,H I I De-energizes Division 1 De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Scram Pilot Valves Minim11m Chaood Req1liremenu for S,stem Initiation CapabiJicy: In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on scram discharge volume high level (float switches), channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17789 H-17792 H-17790 H-17793 H-17791 Al or A2 AND Bl orB2 TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 7.b .-----------1Reactor Protection System /) C ~ Instrumentation - Scram Prepared By: Pf6 Dischalge Volume Water . ~~k! Level - High, Float Switch Rcv,ewedRy~ _ ____::{_ Rev. 0 116 95

Trip System "A" ~--------, Channels Al A2 1Cll-N660A Level Switch I I I IC71A-( KIA > 1Cll-N660C Level Switch I ( IC7IA-KIC Trip Logic Contacts 1C71A-..L_ - -. ~non KIA tJ.:n ~ 1C71A-K1C Disch. ~ IC7IA- ~cl 1C71A-KI4A,E ~teal Kl4C,G L---

~

Actuation Logic Trip System "B" Channels Bl B2 1Cll-N660B Level Switch 1C7IA-( KIB > 1Cll-N660D Level Switch (_ IC71A-KID Trip Logic 1C71A-J_ J_ 1C71A-K1B KID I I IC71A-< IC71A-KI4B, F > >K14D, HI L _________ _. Actuation Logic Contacts Open to Cause Actuation (fypical ..L ___ 1C71A-__ K14A,E,- Both divisions of sciam 1C71A- ,- K14B,F ..L f4) I _ pilot valves must I I - de-eneigize in order to I 1C71A-...L ..L 1C71A-K14C,G; produce a reactor sciam. K14D,H I I De-energizes Division I De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on scram discharge volume high level (resistance temperature detectors), channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. Al or A2 AND Bl orB2 H-17789 H-17792 H-17790 H-17793 H-17791 H-17796 TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 7.a .----------Reactor Protection System /J A Instrumentation - Sciam Prepared By: Vk,p (.~ DiscbmR~ Vol~ Water v A Level - High, Res1Stance ~ /, ;J, ,? Temperature Detector Rev,ewedBy:ut)f"ldat'*/l,1/4-:{_ Rev. O I 16 95

Trip System "A" Trip System "B" ~----~------ ----------- Channels Each TSV ~it switch bu two sets of Channels AlA TSV#l IN30-FOOS AlB TSV#2 INJO.F006 I I contletS with one set of ConllCIS loc:ated in each 1ri system. A2A A2B II BIA B1B TSV#3 TSV#4 TSV#l TSV#3 IN>>f'OO'I I NJO.IIGOI I I INJWDDS INJ 1-ncr, .. 11 IC71-11 N006D I I I I B2A TSV#2 INJHOD6 B2B TSV#4 DONIIOI I I I I IC71A-KIOA IC71A*I KUE I I I ~r~- ~~-11 if~ ~r.lA~ irr:-

cro:t 1 I I Trip Logic I

Trip Logic I I I II ro;i.i'ioiiiiiii.iin~iiil I ='.t:-&-:=..~=,.-t 11 =-:.:=.~-.. I e a,s.11. I I

us-11.

~a..::;-l. 1C7l;:r.1:-. _ - - -- - ).. Le11A-11c,1A-I I 1C7IA-..L 1c,1J -t-_ --- --_ J:_ Le11Ao-1tC7JA-I !CHIA T KltE T T T r1oc ,-x100 xi* T 1t1* T T T r*m jKICIH I I I 11 I I ( ]C7JA- ]C71A-< IC71A* IC71A-~ I >K14A.E KlC,O > 11 >Kl-48,F K14D,H > I ..._ __ --- ______ J L- ---- ______..., Actuation Logic Actuation Logic 1C71A* ~ ~ Boda dMsians of scram 1C71A* - --iciii.ift T K148,F . pilac valves must de-I I 1C7JA*.L -.... in arder to .L JC71A-KJC.OT pnda I l'IIIC1Gr scram. i K14D,H I I De-energizes Division I ~ Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Scnun Pilot Valves Minbnm Claaael Reguhulentl for Sy1tem laldatlo CapabJ!: In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on Turbine Stop Valve c oiuie, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-11470 H-17791 H-13445 H-17792 H-17789 H-17793 H-17790 rAlA~Atel LA2A andA2sJ AHll rBIA~B1B7 Ls2A and B2BJ TS 3.3.1.1-1.Item 8 ________ __,Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - Turbine Stop Valve - Closure

Trin Svstem "A"

..t::...:..L.---,-----

Trip System "B" I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I r----------i-.---- Channels Channels I Al A2 Bl B2 I CV#I IN30-F009 CV#3 JN30-F0II 1C71A-K8A 1C71A-K8C Trip Logic Qpens when Contaas oe_en on low ltiavc m. 1 - - TCV trip oil pressure

=~

1, 1 (typical of4). ~- See LFD-1 I (T~!!iaf4.) r----

7 1

I 1C71A- - -.L - - 1C71A-I KSA KSC I. I I L---- ____...J 1C71A-Kl4A,E 1C71A-Kl4C,G 1C71A-K8B I CV#2 JN30-F0I0 Trip Logic CV#4 IN30-F0l2 1C71A-K8D I L---- ____...J 1C71A-1C71A-Kl4B, F Kl4D, H I I I I I I I I I I I I I I L ___________ J ontacts pen to Actuation Logic .L ___ 1C71A-__ K14A,E i I 1C71A-...L Kl4C,G i I

De-energizes Division 1 Scram Pilot Valves Both divisions of scram pilot valves must de-energize in order to produce a reactor scram.

Actuation Logic .L 1C71A- -,- K14B, F I I ...L 1C71A- "'T'" K14D, H I I ,I, De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on Turbine Control Valve fast closure, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-11470 H-17791 H-17789 H-17792 H-17790 H-17793 Al orA2 AND Bl orB2 TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 9

~~__.. __

_.Reactor Protection System Instrumentation - Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low

Trip System "A" Channel A3 Reactor Mode Switch S 1 I I [ill-- I Contacts ()pen When Mode Switch In Shutdown (fypical of 2 Sets of Contacts) ,-------L------, I I I I 1C71A-< KISA > I I ,( 1C71A-KISC Actuation Logic Trip System "B" Channel B3 Reactor Mode Switch S 1 I I [] I .. ------L------, I I I I I IC71A-< KISB > I ,( 1C71A-KISD Actuation Logic Contacts Open to Cause Actuation (fypical of4) - - ---I I I I I Both divisions of scram pilot valves must de-eneigi7.e in older to produce a reactor scram. I J_ I J_ 1C71A-...;..- - 1 -r-1C71A-K15A 1 1 K15C I I L - - r - - - - - -1 I

De-energizes Division 1 Scram Pilot Valves 1C71A- :!:

!: 1C71A-K15B 1

1 K15D I I L - - -r - - - - - -1 I * --1 De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Chaoud Requiremeuu for System Ipitiatiou Capability; In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor on Reactor Mode Switch position (Mode Switch in Shutdown), each channel must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17786 H-17791 H-17792 H-17793 LFIJ-1-R PS-16 TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 10 ,-------------1Reactor Protection PreparedB : !'o,._,p, C.ewJi_.. System lnstrumen~tion Y ~ lJ. Reactor Mode Swttch - .r/.e ~h*.d p.. R "ewed R -;-~V-fU1/4 WI 'mlltinn CVl Y Kev. 0 1/16/95

Trip System "A" Channel A3 Manual Scram Pushbutton S3A I I I Contacts Open When Scram Button is Pressed ('fypical of 2 r------L------1 I I I 1C71A-< KlSA > I ( 1C71A-

> KlSC Actuation Logic Trip System "B" Channel I

B3 I Manual Scram ~shbutton S3B I I I ((] I I I I r------L------, I I I I 1C71A-< KlSB > I I ( 1C71A-

> Kl5D Actuation Logic I

I I I I I Contacts Open to Cause Actuation ('fypical of4) - ----I I I I I Both divisions of scram pilot valves must de-eneigiz.e in older to produce a reactor scram. I J_ I 1C71A- ""T'" Kl5A I ~ 1C71A-Kl5C I L - -1 I

De-energizes Division 1 Scram Pilot Valves 1C71A- ~

~ 1C71A-Kl5B Kl5D I I L - -1 I

____ De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor using the Manual Scram Pushbuttons, each channel must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition.

Elem. Ref. H-17786 H-17791 H-17792 H-17793 L.t*D-l-Ri":s-17 TS 3.3.1.1-1, Item 11 ,---------~Reactor Protection Prepamt By: f l.!ilU.J (' 0 * {L ~ System Instrumentation . U ., 1 Manual Scram Revi~ By*... *-4-1/P<'\\ Rev. 0 1/16/95

Trip System "A" ~ Channels I Al A2 I IC71A-K9A Bypass Logic Contacts open on Turbine Stop Valve Contacts Closure or Control Valve Fast Closure. Open on See LFD-l-RPS-14, LFD-l-RPS-15. IC71A-K9C Reactor I ~~~>,H, n ~ypica1or 1 =r _ L -~ L-- I I I I I I I I I I I I I IC71A1 I I JtC71A-K9A I I K9C I IC7IA-) ) IC7IA-f K14A,E > >K14C,G Actuation Logic Trip System "B" 1 Channels I I Bl B2 IC7IA-K9B Bypass Logic Contacts open on Turbine Sto~ Valve Closure or Control Valve Fast Closure. See LFD-l-RPS-14, LFD-1-RPS-IS. IC71A-K9D I I I n-1-n 1C71A1 I I JtC71A-K9B I I K9D lC11A-) ) 1C71A-K14B, F > >Kl4D, H L----------- Actuation Logic ontacts pen to IC7IA-.i K14A,E; Both divisions of scram IC71A- ,- Kl4B,F .i _ pilot valves must de-I I

energize in order to I

IC71A-..L ...J.. IC7IA-Kl4C,G; produce a reactor scram. Kl4D,H I I ,I, De-energizes Division 1 De-energizes Division 2 Scram Pilot Valves Scram Pilot Valves Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability; In order to maintain the capability to scram the reactor above 28 percent power on Turbine Stop Valve closure or Turbine Control Valve fast closure, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or circuit continuity otherwise interrupted. Elem. Ref. H-17789 H-17790 H-17791 H-17792 H-17793 Al orA2 AND Bl orB2 TS SR 3.3.1.1.11 .-------,.,,-.....~----1Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Bypass, Items 8 & 9 3

Trip System "B" Trip Svstem "A" Channels Al A2 ...,t.... I...... l I I I '~.. Trip Logic I I I I

** 1C7l-I I

era:; 4=:~o~--------------:---+-:

I I I Contact closes I 1 to cause actuation I Bl Channels 1C71-KIOF Trip Logic IC71-i KIOD ........... ~ IC7l-KIOG I I I ( 'fypical of 4 ) I I I I B2

+-------~' '--------1--------

I I 1 I Actuation Logic Actuation Logic I,. Trips Recirc Pumps "A" and 11B II Via Division 1 Breakers CB3A and CB3B I,. Trips Recirc Pumps "A II and 11B II Via Division 2 Breakers CB4A and CB4B Minimum Channel Requirements to Maintain Trip Capability: In order to maintain Recirc pump trip capability on a TSV Closure signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-13445 H-17789 H-17790 H-17822 Al and Bl OR A2 andB2 LFD-l-RPT-01 TS 3.3.4.l.a.l .---------1 EOC-RPT, TSV

_.j~~~£VCLOSURE 1/16/95

Trip System "B" Trip Svstem "A" Channels Al A2 1C71-K8C Bl I I I I I t--* Trip Logic 1 I I I I I 1C71-I I i ~l*f=---------------:---+-: Channels 1C71-K8B Trip Logic 1C71-K8D B2 Contact 1 closes l I I

*;i~ct I

I I to cause acb.Jation I ( Typical of 4 ) I

+--------*

Elem. Ref. H-13444 H-17789 H-17790 H-17822 I I Actuation Logic I 'II' Trips Recirc Pumps 11A 11 and "B II Via Division 1 Breakers CB3A and CB3B I I Actuation Logic I 'II' Trips Recirc Pumps 11A 11 and "B" Via Division 2 Breakers CB4A and CB4B Minimum Channel Requirements to Maintain Trip Capability: In order to maintain Recirc pump trip capability on a TCV Fast Closure signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Al and Bl OR A2 andB2 LFD-l-RPT-02 TS 3.3.4.1.a.2 ...---------1 EOC-RPT, TCV FAST ~4,,...,i:~~17CLOSURE. 1/16/95

Trip Svstem "A" ,l. - Trin Svstem "B"

.t::-~---------

Al 1B21-N691A MTU Channels 1B21-N694A 1B21-N691C A2 1B21-N694C STU MTU STU I Bl 1B21-N691B MTU Channels 1B21-N694B s I 1E21A-<' K616A ;> 1E21.£ I I

-----<' 1E21A-K616~;>,
> K616B

"""~I-,..., I Trip Logic 1 1 -~ _ Trip Logic J_ IE21A-I 1 J_ I 1E21A-r- - - - - -I K616A 1 I K6I6C I I I I I I I IE21A-I 1 I K616B T + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - r - - I - - - - - - rn21A-1 I TK616D I I I B2 IE211 K616~;> Contact Closes ) OnLowLeve12 1B31-Signal (fypical of 4) K43A SIB31-K43C 1831-s ) IB31-K43B K43D Actuation Logic I I 1B31- _L 1B31- _L K43A T K43C T-* I I I I Trips Recirc Pump Trips Recirc Pump "A" Generator Drive "B" Generator Drive Motor Breaker Motor Breaker L----------------- Contact Closes To Cause Actuation Logic Actuation (fypical of 4) _L 1B31- _L 1B31-TK43B TK43D I I I I Trips Recirc Pump Trips Reciic Pump "B" Generator Drive "A" Generator Drive Motor Breaker Motor Breaker Minimum Channel Requirements for System Trip Capability: In order to maintain ATWS-RPT trip capability of the Recirc Pumps on a Reactor Vessel Water Level - ATWS-RPT Level signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17860 H-19826 H-17861 H-19829 H-17902 H-19830 H-17903 H-42173 H-19823 Al and Bl OR A2 andB2 LFD-l-RPT-03 TS 3.3.4.2.a, Reactor Vessel Water Level - ATWS-RPT ,...Ptep_are_d_B_y:-:,:~:::::: Level Reviewed~~ W~ TRMRev.6

1B21-N120A Channels 1B21-N620A MTU 1C11-K3A Elem. Ref. H-17860 H-19822 H-17861 H-19825 H-17902 H-42173 Prepared by: __________________ Reviewed by: _________________ LFD-1-RPT-04 TS 3.3.4.2.b, ATWS-RPT, Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High Rev. 1 08/29/2016 Trip System A Trip Logic Contact Closes on Low Level 2 Signal (Typical of 4) 1C11-K4A Minimum Channel Requirements for System Trip Capability: In order to maintain ATWS-RPT trip capability of the Recirc Pumps on a Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. 1B21-N642A STU 1B21-N122A 1B21-N643A MTU A1 A2 1C11-K3B 1C11-K3A 1B21-N120B Channels 1B21-N620B MTU 1B21-N642B STU 1B21-N122B 1B21-N643B MTU B1 B2 1C11-K4A Trip Logic Trip System B 1B31-K43C 1B31-K43A Actuation Logic Trips ASD A Breaker 1B31-K43A Trips ASD B Breaker 1B31-K43C Contact Closes to Cause Actuation (Typical of 4) 1C11-K4B 1C11-K4B 1C11-K3B 1B31-K43D 1B31-K43B Actuation Logic Trips ASD B Breaker 1B31-K43B Trips ASD A Breaker 1B31-K43D A1 and B1 OR A2 and B2 H-17903 r-------------------- I I ~ I I ~--,,l I I I

---------~

r,,, I I ........, l,, I I .l .................l r------ 1 1 I 1 I I 1 I -*----------------------4----L ____ J I I I I I I I I I ._____I ~ ) i i I I I I I I I I L

r--L

...I... =*-* I I I I I I I I I ...I... I I I ...I... I I I I I I I I ~ i i '------~I '-----I _ ___J i i '------~I '-------1 _ ___J

___ Tfip §rs_!e_!l! *:~*- ___ _ - ~ Channels Al A2 Bypass Logic ConllletS close on Turbine Concrol Valve _ fut CIOIID'e. See LFD-l-RPS-15 Contac:ts close on

Turbine Stop Valve Closure. See LFD-I-RPS-14 I

I IC71A-ie-----t IC71A-i--- K8A I KIOA I IC71A-*-_ IC71A-*-.,__ _ =~ L:_ __ tKii~ :: . l (Typical of 4.) K9A

Actuation o

Logic I

~ Trips Recirc Pumps "A" and "B II Via Division 1 Breakers CB3A and CB3B Trip System "B" Bl Channels 1C71A-K9B B2 Bypass Logic Contac:ts close on Tudline Cootrol Valve ISi Closure. See LFD-I-RPS-15 Contacts close oa Turbine Stop Valve Closure. See LFD-I-RPS-14 I I ~-~tl~l~ tl~l~ I K8D I KlOD t IC71A- '------tiitZ: 1C71A-I

L K8~_

1 ___ :.J KIOG IC71A-I K9C I IC71A-I - !:9~ - - - - - -

Actuation o Logic I

Trips Recirc Pumps "A" and "B

II Via Division 2 Breakers CB4A and CB4B Minimum Channel Requirements to Maintain Trip Capability: In order to maintain the capability to trip the recirc pump breakers above 28 percent power on Turbine Stop Valve closure or Turbine Control Valve fast closure, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or circuit continuity otherwise maintained.. Elem. Ref. fl-13444 H-13445 H-17789 H-17790 H-17822 Al and Bl OR A2andB2 LFD-l-RPT-05 TS SR 3.3.4.1.2 EOC-RPT Instrumentation ,-----""'TN...,..-+--1Bypass Below 28 Percent Prepared By: 7,z:~:-IPower 1----------' Reviewed By* TRM Rev. a ii

Trip System A 1C32-K624A AU Contact Closes on High Water Level (fypical of6) IC32-KIA IC32-KIB Channels B 1C32-K624B AU IC32-KIB Trip Logic IC32-KIB IC32-KIC C IC32-K624C AU IC32-KIC 1C32-K1C IC32-KIA L - - - - - -*- - - - - - - - - -*- - - - - - - - - -*- - - - - - I I I 9 I 9 I Initiation of trip of main turbine and Initiation of trip of main turbine and I both reactor feed pump turbines I both reactor feed pump turbines Initiation of trip of main turbine and both reactor feed pump turbines Minimum Channel Requirements for System Initiation Capability: In order to maintain the capability to trip the main turbine and the reactor feed pump turbines on high reactor water level, channels in one of the following combinations must be either o erable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. A and B LFD-1-RWLH-O 1 H-17842 OR H-17845 Band C OR AandC RevieMl!By: Rev.O 1/16/95

Trip Svstem "A" Trin System "B" _..r::. - - - - - - - - - - - Channels Channels 1 Al 1B21-N681A MTU 1B21-N682A STU I 1B21-N681C A2 MTU 1B21-N682C STU Bl IA7{ IAt ---1

--1At Kt~?

Kt~? --..1 I K.7~? B2 I IAt Kl~? Trip Logic

1----i_

Trip Logic J_ J_ I I I --._J_ 1A71-J_1A71-1A11- +-------r-i----J T Ktc TKID I T KIA T 1A71-I I I I I KlB I I I 1 ~----r----' I ~----r----' I Contact Opens On Low Level 2 f;> Signal ('fypical of 4) 1 C61 _ K72 I IC61-( K76. > ~----------------- L----------------- Actuation Logic~---. Contact Closes 1C61-f-------=: Kn ('fypical of2) Initiation of Unit land 2 SBGT Trains "A" and "B" and Isolation of the Inboard Sec. Cont. Isolation Subsystem Actuation Logic I _L 1C61-T K76 I Initiation of Unit land 2 SBGT Trains "A" and "B" and Isolation of the Outboard Sec. Cont. Isolation Subsystem Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation/Initiation Capability: In order to maintain Secondary Containment isolation capability and SBGT initiation capability on a Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Lvl. 2 signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be either operable or maintained in the tripped condition. Elem. Ref. H-17053 H-17810 H-19815 H-17104 H-17811 H-19818 H-17804 H-19809 H-27761 H-17805 H-19812 H-27767 Al and Bl LFD-l-SCIS-01 OR TS 3.3.6.2-1, Item l A2 and B2 Reactor Vessel Water r-----~~---1

-~~~::::;.t"'Jl'evel-Low Low, Lvl.2 10/19/94

Trip Svstem "A" Trin System "B"

~-----------

Channels Channels Al A2 Bl B2 1C71-N650A 1C71-N650C 1C71-N650B 1C71-N650D MTU MTU MTU MTU I I I I I I 1A71! 1A71-<-----, r-~ 1A71-1A71~ KSA. ;:> KSC ),, I - ;> KSB KS~-;> Trip Logic

~'....,~,

Trip Logic ____ l-1A71- _L__ It-IL 11 ',...,..l. 1A71-l. I T KSA Ti'A,1------ -I --- 1A71-T KSD T I I KSB KSC I I I I I I I ~----T ____, ~----T ____, I I Contact Opens On Hi D/W Press. s Signal (Typical of 4) I C61 _ l c6 l _ K72 I K76 ~----------------- L----------------- Actuation Lo ic Contact Closes 1C61-4-. ____ To Cause K72 r Actuation (Typical of2) Initiation of Unit land 2 SBGT Trains "A" and 11B 11 and Isolation of the Inboard Sec. Cont. Isolation Subsystem Actuati~n Logic I 4, IC61-r K76 I

Initiation of Unit land 2 SBGT Trains 11A 11 and 11B 11 and Isolation of the Outboard Sec. Cont. Isolation Subsystem Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation/Initiation Capability:

In order to maintain Secondary Containment isolation capability and SBGT initiation capability on a Drywell Pressure - High signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be operable or m Elem. Ref. H-17053 H-17810 H-19809 H-27761 H-17104 H-17811 H-19812 H-27767 H-17804 H-17789 H-19815 H-17805 H-17790 H-19818 10/20/94

Trip System "A" r-------------- Al Channels A2 lDll-lDll-K609A K609C ITU ITU ,- --s )-_ Trip Logic I I .1.

---+ ----

Contact Opens On Rx Bldg. High Rad. (Typical) Actuation Logic I I

------I --,

Contact Opens to ICSIA-1 lDll- - - r -- Cause Actuation 1 K80 T Z2B ('fypical of2) I

Initiation of Unit 1 and 2 SBGT Trains 11A 11 and 11B 11 and Isolation of the Inboard Sec. Cont. Isolation Subsystem Trip System "B" r--------------

Channels Bl B2 1Dll-K609B ITU 1Dll-K609D ITU s---- ~ Trip Logic I I I I I .1. I l4- - -* I I K80 1 ICSIA-1

Z2D I_ -

~:.;-_;-_;-_ - Actuation Logic I I I 1 ~

lDll-1 ICSIA-

_ ~!O _ _ y_ -_: Z2D Initiation of Unit 1 and 2 SBGT Trains 11A 11 and "B" and Isolation of the Outboard Sec. Cont. Isolation Sub stem Minimum Channel Requirements for System holation/Initiation Capability:

In order to maintain Secondazy Containment isolation capability and SBGT initiation capability on a Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation - High signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be operable or maintained in the tripped condition. H-19561 H-19563 H-19564 H-19566 Elem. Ref. H-17053 H-17802 H-17803 H-17804 H-17805 H-17104 H-27761 H-27767 Al and Bl OR TS 3.3.6.2-1, Item 3 A2 and B2 Secondary Containment ...--------~ Isolation, Rx. Building LFD-1-SCTS-03 <::2'..:4-,...~~:::::,.t'ln:lriaust Radiation-High Rev. 0 10/20/9

Trip System "A" r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Al Channels A2 1D11-K611A ITU 1D11-K611C ITU Trip Logic I l.. Contact Opens onR/FFloor HighRad. icalof 4 I---- ---------, IC51A-I 1D11-Z2A I K80 I L-------------- Actuation Logic I I 1C51A-: lDll- - - ~ - - Z2A ~-~8.? __ T __ : I I

Contacts Open Cause Actuation

{'fypical of 2) Initiation of Unit 1 and 2 SBGT Trains "A" and "B" and Isolation of the Inboard Sec. Cont. Isolation Subsvstem Trip System "B" r-------------- Channels Bl B2 1D11-K611B ITU 1D11-K611D ITU s----: Trip Logic I I 1 1C51A-, 1 1D11-Z2C I j_ I I I I 1_ K80 _______, Actuation Logic I I I 1D11-1 : 1C51A-

K80 T 1

_________, Z2C I I Initiation of Unit 1 and 2 SBGT Trains "A" and "B" and Isolation of the Outboard Sec. Cont. Isolation Subsystem Minimum Channel Requirements for System Isolation/Initiation Capability: In order to maintain Secondary Containment isolation capability and SBGT initiation capability on a Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation - High signal, channels in one of the following combinations must be o erable or maintained in the tripped condition. H-19561 H-19563 H-19564 H-19566 Elem. Ref. Al and BI H-17802 H-27761 OR H 17803 TS 3.3.6.2-1, Item 4 H-27767 A2 and B2 R/F Exhaust Radiation-LFD-l-SCIS-04 H-17804 .------------1 High H-17805 - 7 04 10/20/9

HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 12.0-1 Revision 1 T 12.0 Safety Function Determination Program 1.0 Introduction This document outlines the Plant Hatch Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP), provides guidance for evaluating the impact of failure to meet multiple Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), and gives appropriate actions for a loss of safety function. The SFDP is required by TS Section 5.5.10. 2.0 Loss of Safety Function

2.1 Background

LCO 3.0.2 directs that if an LCO is not met, its associated Required Actions shall be performed. LCO 3.0.6 provides exception to LCO 3.0.2 for a supported system, structure, or component (SSC) by allowing only the support SSC LCO Actions to be performed if the supported SSC is inoperable solely because its support SSC is inoperable. If a support SSC is inoperable and a loss of safety function does not exist, the Required Actions for the support SSC address the Condition, and the supported SSC Required Actions do not have to be performed. This recognizes that the plant may no longer satisfy single failure criteria and that all of the supported SSC may not meet the definition of OPERABILITY. Appropriate compensation is made by performance of the support system Required Actions. 2.2 Use of LCO 3.0.6 Upon determination that a TS required support SSC is inoperable, the decision may be made to use LCO 3.0.6 for the supported SSCs. A loss of safety function determination shall be performed using the flow chart shown in Attachment 1 as a guide. Attachment 2 provides examples of appropriate determinations. The allowances given by LCO 3.0.6 can be taken only if no loss of safety function exists. 2.3 Actions for a Loss of Safety Function If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered. These may be the Required Actions specified for the loss of safety function or LCO 3.0.3.

HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 12.0-2 Revision 1 2.4 SSC OPERABILITY OPERABILITY determinations precede entry into the SFDP and thus, are not a direct part of the SFDP. OPERABILITY of an SSC is determined using the definition given in TS 1.1, along with the guidance of SR 3.0.1. When equipment that is not addressed in TS is degraded or nonconforming, the impact on TS SSC OPERABILITY shall also be assessed. 3.0 Guidance for Safety Function Determination TS 5.5.10 states that a loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analyses cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program a graduated approach may be taken for determining the safety function of the supported SSC. This approach, detailed below, is graduated from most to least conservative. Even if the least conservative method is used, the requirements of TS 5.5.10 will be met. In determining whether a loss of safety function has occurred, at least one of these methods must be used. Method 1: Redundant Train(a) For this method, the safety function is assumed to be the system function. Confirm the OPERABILITY of the corresponding redundant supported SSC(s). If one or more of the redundant SSCs are found to be inoperable, a loss of safety function may exist. The appropriate actions for a loss of function may be taken or alternatively, one of the following methods may be used. Method 2: LCO Function In certain cases, multiple systems with diverse individual functions are specified under one LCO statement; i.e., in one TS. For these, the safety function may be considered to be broader than the individual system function--it is the TS LCO function, not the system function. An example of this is the TS for ECCS Operating, in which four different systems are included. In this case, the function as stated in the Bases,... to cool the core during a LOCA, may be the safety function to be considered in the SFDP. If a loss of LCO function is determined to exist, the appropriate actions for a loss of safety function may be taken. Alternatively, the following method may be used. (a) The term train may be interchanged with subsystem or division.

HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 12.0-3 Revision 1 Method 3: Safety Analysis In this approach, the function of the SSC in the FSAR accident analyses is considered to be the safety function. If the SSC in question is not credited in the analyses, or if the accident function it performs is intact, then no loss of safety function exists. However, if the function is lost, then the actions for a loss of safety function must be taken. 4.0 Additional Requirements and Information 4.1 Non-TS SSCs A situation may exist where a TS support SSC provides support to an SSC not addressed in TS, which may in turn support a supported SSC addressed in TS. The interrelationships between TS and non-TS support and supported SSCs shall be considered in the loss of safety function determination. 4.2 Subsequent Inoperabilities While taking the Required Actions of the support SSC as allowed by LCO 3.0.6, the impact of subsequent additional SSC inoperabilities on previous SFDP evaluations shall be considered. 5.0 Extending Supported SCS Completion Times 5.1 Singular Support SSC Inoperability When entering the supporting SSC Required Actions as allowed by LCO 3.0.6, the Completion Times for the supported SSCs might potentially be extended longer than their allowed Required Action Completion Times if they are shorter than those of the support SSC. If there is no loss of safety function, it is acceptable to extend the Completion Time of the supported SSC an amount equal to but not exceeding the Completion Time of its support SSC. 5.2 Multiple Support SSC Inoperabilities Once a supported SSC LCO is not met solely based on a support SSC inoperability, subsequent support SSC inoperabilities have additional limitations. This is to ensure that the supported LCO will not be in a situation of not being met for an inappropriate amount of time. Provided there is no loss of function, the Required Actions of the support SSC Condition(s) continue to apply to each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the particular support SSC Condition. However, when a subsequent support SSC is discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, the overall time that the supported SSC LCO is not met shall be limited to the more restrictive of either:

a. The first support SSC Completion Time, plus an additional 24 hours; or

HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 12.0-4 Revision 1

b. The subsequent support SSC Completion Time as measured from discovery of the subsequent inoperability.

To apply this Completion Time extension, two criteria must first be met. The subsequent support SSC inoperability.

a. Must exist concurrently with the first inoperability; and

b. Must remain inoperable or not within limits after the first inoperability is resolved.

Should this extended Completion Time expire with the subsequent support SSC remaining inoperable or not within limits, the Completion Time for the subsequent support SSC inoperable Condition shall be considered expired. The Required Actions defined for that Condition shall be entered. Examples regarding Completion Time tracking are included in Attachment 2. 6.0 Conclusions Regarding the Use of LCO 3.0.6 The exception permitted by LCO 3.0.6 is justified as follows. The actions necessary to ensure safe operation of the plant are specified in the support SSC LCO Required Actions and the SFDP requires evaluation of loss of safety function. The SFDP directs that appropriate actions be taken if a loss of safety function exists. This approach eliminates the confusion and inconsistency associated with entry into multiple LCO Conditions and Required Actions.

HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 12.0-5 Revision 5 ATTACHMENT 1 (Sheet 1 of 2) TS Required SSC INOP Is INOP SSC a Support SSC? >-----No---~ Perform LCO Required Actions Yes Identify Inoperable Supported SSCs o INOP Support SSC Required Actions directly address Supported SSCs? No EITHER Perform both Support & Supported SSC Required Actions OR Enter LCO 3.0.6 IF LCO 3.0.6 entered, perform Support SSC LCO Required Actions, AND Begin SFDP SFDP (continued on page 2) Yes Yes Perform directly addressed Supported SSC LCO Required Actions o Supporte SSCs exist that are not directly addressed? No No further actions required.

HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 12.0-6 ATTACHMENT 1 (Sheet 2 of 2) No SFDP (continued from page 1) No No Supported SSC INOP that in turn supports a Yes SSC have a edundant is IN No No Loss of Safety Function exists. No additional Actions required. Yes Yes Yes No No EITHER consider a Loss of Safety Function exists, AND perform Supported SSC Required Actions, OR Continue to next step. Yes Yes EITHER consider a Loss of Safety Function exists, AND perform Supported SSC Required Actions, OR continue to next step Yes Yes No A Loss of Safety Function exists Perform Required Actions of the Su orted SSC LCO No

HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 12.0-7 ATTACHMENT 2 SCENARIO NO. 1: At 0100, with Unit 2 in RUN, the Unit 2 4160V F bus (a.k.a. swing bus) is determined to be inoperable. No other TS SSC inoperabilities exist. The 4160V F bus is a support SSC, addressed by TS LCO 3.8.7. Required Action C requires restoring the bus to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. The following is the loss of function determination for the supported systems: RHR Pumps 2C and 2D: For LCO 3.5.1, because Core Spray, ADS, and HPCI are OPERABLE, no loss of safety function exists. RHR Pumps 2C and 2D: For LCO 3.6.2.3, suppression pool cooling is not considered inoperable because only one pump per subsystem is required. RHR Pumps 2C and 2D: For LCO 3.6.2.4, suppression pool spray is not considered inoperable because only one pump per subsystem is required. RHR Pump 2C: For LCO 3.7.1, because the other subsystem is OPERABLE, no loss of safety function exists. PSW Pumps 2C and 2D: For LCO 3.7.2, because PSW can perform its safety function with one pump per subsystem, no loss of safety function exists. CRD Pump 2B: This is a non-TS SSC, but it supports control rods, TS LCO 3.1.3. With redundant CRD pumps operable, the safety function of the control rods is not affected. Diesel Bldg. MCC 1B (1R24S026): This is part of the 4160V F bus subsystem, addressed by TS 3.8.7. This supports distribution cabinet 1K (1R24S030) and ultimately the DG 1B. The DG 1B is inoperable, and LCO 3.8.1 Condition B required several different actions with Completion Times ranging from 1 hour to 7 days. With redundant DGs OPERABLE, no loss of safety function exists.

== Conclusions:== No loss of safety function exists. LCO 3.0.6 may be entered with a completion time of 8 hours to restore the inoperable bus to OPERABLE status, beginning at 0100.

HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 12.0-8 Revision 35 SCENARIO NO. 2: At 0500, with Unit 2 in RUN, Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low (Level 1) channels A, B, and C are determined to be inoperable. This leaves only channel D operable. This instrumentation supports ECCS by providing initiation for Core Spray, LPCI and ADS; and, also, supports initiation of the DGs and isolation of the PSW Turbine Building valves. Since all these supported functions require at least two channels, entry must be made into the Required Actions for LCO 3.3.5.1. These Actions directly specify declaring supported features inoperable (due to loss of initiation capability in both Divisions). As stated in LCO 3.0.6, when the support SSC Required Actions provide direction for supported SSCs, the applicable supported SSC Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered. This effectively precludes the use of LCO 3.0.6 in determining the completion time for the supported SSCs.

== Conclusions:== The LCO 3.3.5.1 Required Actions should be performed, as well as those for all the inoperable supported systems. The SFDP will not be entered, because LCO 3.0.6 cannot be used. SCENARIO NO. 4-A: At 0100, with Unit 2 in MODE 1, the Unit 2 RHRSW A Pump becomes inoperable. The RHRSW crosstie valves are tagged for maintenance. No other TS SSC inoperabilities exist. The RHRSW system is a support SSC, addressed by TS LCO 3.7.1. Required Action A for one inoperable RHRSW pump is to restore the pump to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The bases for this specification state that an RHRSW subsystem is considered operable when 2 pumps are OPERABLE with an OPERABLE flow path. With the A pump inoperable, the A subsystem of RHRSW is inoperable. The following is the loss of function determination for the supported systems: RHR Suppression Pool Cooling: LCO 3.6.2.3 requires two subsystems to be OPERABLE for suppression pool cooling. The Bases for this LCO state that an RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is OPERABLE with one RHR pump, the heat exchanger, and associated piping. Therefore, the inoperability of RHRSW subsystem A causes suppression pool cooling subsystem A to be inoperable. This is Condition A, with a Required Action Completion Time of 7 days. However, because suppression pool cooling subsystem B is OPERABLE, no loss of safety function exists. The Completion Time for suppression pool cooling may be extended to 30 days (from the time of discovery of RHRSW pump A being inoperable; i.e., 0100). RHR Suppression Pool Spray: LCO 3.6.2.4 requires 2 subsystems to be OPERABLE for suppression pool spray. The Bases for this LCO state that an RHR suppression pool spray subsystem is OPERABLE with one RHR pump, the heat exchanger, and associated piping. Therefore, the inoperability of RHRSW subsystem A causes suppression pool spray subsystem A to be inoperable. This is Condition A, with a Required Action Completion Time of 7 days. However,

HATCH UNIT 1 TRM T 12.0-9 Revision 35 because subsystem B is operable, no loss of safety function exists. The Completion Time for suppression pool spray may be extended to 30 days. SCENARIO 4-B: At 29 days, 2 hours after the initial inoperability of RHRSW pump A, with the pump remaining inoperable, RHRSW pump C is found to be inoperable. At 29 days 6 hours, RHR SW pump A is restored to OPERABLE status. RHRSW pump C remains inoperable. With the second RHRSW pump inoperability, Condition C has been entered for LCO 3.7.1. Note that the Completion Time clock for Condition A is still running. Condition C requires that the RHRSW subsystem be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The two SSCs supported by RHRSW continue to have their B subsystems OPERABLE, so no loss of safety function exists. When the RHRSW pump A is restored to OPERABLE status, the LCO 3.7.1 Condition C is exited, but the Condition A clock is still running due to the inoperability of RHRSW pump C. Under the provisions of Section 1.3 of the Technical Specifications, the Completion Time for RHRSW pump C is 31 days from the initial inoperability, i.e., the inoperability of pump A. Therefore, the Completion Times for the supported SSCs may also be extended to 31 days measured from the same starting point.

HATCH UNIT 1 TRM C-i TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL APPENDIX C HNP UNITS 1 AND 2 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL SPECIFICATIONS ACTIVE PAGE LIST Page Version No. 2-1 26 2-2 26 2-3 26 2-4 26 2-5 26 2-6 26 3-1 26 3-2 26 3-3 26 3-4 26 3-5 26 3-6 26 3-7 26 3-8 26 3-9 26 10-1 26 10-2 26 10-3 26 10-4 26 10-5 26 10-6 26 10-7 26

HNP ODCM 2-1 Version 26 2/20 CHAPTER 2 LIQUID EFFLUENTS 2.1 LIMITS OF OPERATION The following Liquid Effluent Controls implement requirements established by Technical Specifications Section 5.0. Terms printed in all capital letters are defined in Chapter 10. 2.1.1 Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Control In accordance with Technical Specification 5.5.4.a, the radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 2-1 shall be OPERABLE with their alarm/trip setpoints set to ensure that the limits specified in Section 2.1.2 are not exceeded. The alarm/trip setpoints of these channels shall be determined in accordance with Section 2.3. 2.1.1.1 Applicability As shown in Table 2-1. 2.1.1.2 Actions With a radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channel alarm/trip setpoint less conservative than required by the above control, immediately suspend the release of radioactive liquid effluents monitored by the affected channel, declare the channel inoperable, or change the setpoint to a conservative value. With less than the minimum number of radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channels OPERABLE, take the ACTION shown in Table 2-1. NOTE: One instrument channel may be inoperable for up to 6 hours to perform required surveillances prior to entering other applicable ACTIONS. Otherwise, restore the inoperable instrumentation to OPERABLE status within 30 days and, if unsuccessful, explain in the next Radioactive Effluent Release Report, per Technical Specification 5.6.3, why this inoperability was not corrected in a timely manner. Entry into an Operational Mode or other specified CONDITION shall be made if, as a minimum, the requirements of Technical Specifications LCO 3.0.4 are met. 2.1.1.3 Surveillance Requirements Each radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, SOURCE CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations at the frequencies shown in Table 2-2.

HNP ODCM 2-2 Version 26 2/20 2.1.1.4 Basis The radioactive liquid effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents during actual or potential releases of liquid effluents. The Alarm/Trip Setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in Section 2.3 to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of Section 2.1.2. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

HNP ODCM 2-3 Version 26 2/20 Table 2-1 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Instrument OPERABILITY Requirementsa Minimum Channels OPERABLE Applicabilityb ACTION

1. Gross Radioactivity Monitors Providing Automatic Termination of Release Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line 1

(1) 100

2. Gross Radioactivity Monitors not Providing Automatic Termination of Release Service Water System Effluent Line 1

(2) 101

3. Flowrate Measurement Devicesc

a. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line 1

(1) 102

b. Discharge Canal 1

(1), (2) 102

4. Differential Pressure Measurement Devices Service Water System to Closed Cooling Water System 1

At all times 103

5. Groundwater Outfall Instrumentation

a. Auto Sampler at Y22N008A 1

At all times 104

b. Flow Totalizer at Y22N008A 1

At all times 105

a.

All requirements in this Table apply to each unit.

b. Applicability of requirements is as follows:

(1) Whenever the radwaste discharge valves are not locked closed. (2) Whenever the Service Water System pressure is below the Closed Cooling Water System pressure, or P indication is not available.

c. Pump curves may be used to estimate flow; in such cases, ACTION statement 102 is not required.

HNP ODCM 2-4 Version 26 2/20 Table 2-1 (contd) Notation for Table 2 ACTION Statements ACTION 100 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases may continue provided that prior to initiating a release:

a.

At least two independent samples are analyzed in accordance with Section 2.1.2.3, and

b.

At least two technically qualified individuals independently verify the discharge line valving and verify the release rate calculations. Otherwise, suspend release of radioactive effluents via this pathway. If the channel remains inoperable for over 30 days, an explanation of the circumstances must be included in the next Radioactive Effluent Release Report. ACTION 101 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue, provided that once per shift grab samples are collected and analyzed for gross radioactivity at a MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION no higher than 1 10-7 Ci/mL. If the channel remains inoperable for over 30 days, an explanation of the circumstances must be included in the next Radioactive Effluent Release Report. ACTION 102 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue, provided that the flowrate is estimated at least once per 4 hours during actual releases. If the channel remains inoperable for over 30 days, an explanation of the circumstances must be included in the next Radioactive Effluent Release Report. ACTION 103 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, assure that the Service Water System effluent monitor is OPERABLE. ACTION 104 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, obtain daily grab samples and composite for weekly tritium, monthly gamma, and quarterly Sr 89/90 analyses. ACTION 105 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, estimate outfall flow rate daily. If the channel remains inoperable for over 30 days, an explanation of the circumstances must be included in the next Radioactive Effluent Release Report.

HNP ODCM 2-5 Version 26 2/20 Table 2-2 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements INSTRUMENT Surveillance Requirementsa CHANNEL CHECK SOURCE CHECK CHANNEL CALIBRATION CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST

1. Gross Radioactivity Monitors Providing Automatic Termination of Release Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Db Pe R

SAc

2. Gross Radioactivity Monitors not Providing Automatic Termination of Release Service Water System Effluent Line Db M

R SAf

3. Flowrate Measurement Devices

a. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Db,d NA 18 M SA

b. Discharge Canal Db,d NA 18 M SA

4. Differential Pressure Measurement Devices Service Water System to Closed Cooling Water System D

NA R NA

5. Groundwater Outfall Instrumentation

a. Auto Samplers at (1) Y22N008A Wg NA NA NA

b. Flow Totalizer at Y22N008A Wg NA NA NA

a.

All requirements in this Table apply to each unit.

b.

During releases via this pathway.

c.

In addition to the basic functions of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST (Section 10.2), the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that automatic isolation of this pathway and control room alarm annunciation occur if any of the following conditions exists: (1) Instrument indicates measured levels above the alarm/trip setpoint; (2) Instrument indicates an isolation on high alarm; or (3) Instrument controls are not set in operate mode.

d.

CHANNEL CHECK shall consist of verifying indication of flow during periods of release. CHANNEL CHECK shall be made at least once daily on any day on which CONTINUOUS, periodic, or BATCH releases are made.

e.

The SOURCE CHECK shall consist of verifying that the instrument is reading on scale.

Hatch ODCM Table 2-2 (contd) Notation for Table 2 Surveillance Requirements 2-6 Version 26 2/20

f.

In addition to the basic functions of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST (Section 10.2), the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exists: (1) Instrument indicates measured levels above the alarm setpoint; (2) Instrument indicates a downscale failure; or (3) Instrument controls are not set in operate mode.

g.

CHANNEL CHECK shall consist of verifying indication of operability at least once weekly during sample collection.

HNP ODCM 3-1 Version 26 2/20 CHAPTER 3 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS 3.1 LIMITS OF OPERATION The following Limits of Operation implement requirements established by Technical Specifications Section 5.0. Terms printed in all capital letters are defined in Chapter 10. 3.1.1 Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Control In accordance with Technical Specification 5.5.4., the radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3-1 shall be OPERABLE with their alarm/trip setpoints set to ensure that the limits of Section 3.1.2.a are not exceeded. The alarm/trip setpoints of these channels shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.3. 3.1.1.1 Applicability These limits apply as shown in Table 3-1. 3.1.1.2 Actions With a radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channel alarm/trip setpoint less conservative than required by the above control, immediately suspend the release of radioactive gaseous effluents monitored by the affected channel, declare the channel inoperable, or restore the setpoint to a value that will ensure that the limits of Section 3.1.2.a are met. With less than the minimum number of radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channels OPERABLE, take the ACTION shown in Table 3-1. NOTE: One instrument channel may be inoperable for up to 6 hours to perform required surveillances prior to entering other applicable ACTIONS. Otherwise, restore the inoperable instrumentation to OPERABLE status within 30 days and, if unsuccessful, explain in the next Radioactive Effluent Release Report, per Technical Specification 5.6.3, why this inoperability was not corrected in a timely manner. Entry into an Operational Mode or other specified CONDITION shall be made if, as a minimum, the requirements of Technical Specifications LCO 3.0.4 are met. 3.1.1.3 Surveillance Requirements Each radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, SOURCE CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations at the frequencies shown in Table 3-2.

HNP ODCM 3-2 Version 26 2/20 3.1.1.4 Basis The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during actual or potential releases of gaseous effluents. The Alarm/Trip Setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in Section 3.3 to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of Section 3.1.2.a. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

HNP ODCM 3-3 Version 26 2/20 Table 3-1 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Instrument Minimum Channels OPERABLE Applicability ACTION

1. Reactor Building Vent Stack Monitoring System (Each Unit)

a. Noble Gas Activity Monitorc 1

(a) 105

b. Iodine Sampler Cartridge 1

(a) 107

c. Particulate Sampler Filter 1

(a) 107

d. Effluent System Flowrate Measurement Device 1

(a) 104

e. Sampler Flowrate Measurement Device 1

(a) 104

2. Recombiner Building Ventilation Monitoring System

a. Noble Gas Activity Monitorc 1

(a) 105

b. Iodine Sampler Cartridge 1

(a) 107

c. Particulate Sampler Filter 1

(a) 107

d. Effluent System Flowrate Measurement Device 1

(a) 104

e. Sampler Flowrate Monitor 1

(a) 104

3. Main Stack Monitoring System

a. Noble Gas Activity Monitorc 1

(a) 105

b. Iodine Sampler Cartridge 1

(a) 107

c. Particulate Sampler Filter 1

(a) 107

d. Effluent System Flowrate Measurement Device 1

(a) 104

e. Sampler Flowrate Measurement Device 1

(a) 104

4. Condenser Offgas Pretreatment Monitor (Each Unit)

a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor 1

(b) 108

a. During radioactive releases via this pathway.

b. During operation of the main condenser air ejector.

c. Monitor must be capable of responding to a MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION of 1 10-4 Ci/mL.

HNP ODCM 3-4 Version 26 2/20 Table 3-1 (contd) Notation for Table 3-1. ACTION 104 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided the flowrate is estimated at least once per 4 hours. If the number of channels OPERABLE remains less than required by the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement for over 30 days, an explanation of the circumstances shall be included in the next Radioactive Effluent Release Report. ACTION 105 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided grab samples are taken daily and these samples are analyzed for gross activity within 24 hours. With the number of main stack monitoring system channels OPERABLE less than required by the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately suspend drywell purge. If the number of channels OPERABLE remains less than required by the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement for over 30 days, an explanation of the circumstances shall be included in the next Radioactive Effluent Release Report. ACTION 107 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue, provided samples are continuously collected with auxiliary equipment for periods on the order of 7 days and analyzed within 48 hours after the end of the sampling period. If the number of channels OPERABLE remains less than required by the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement for over 30 days, an explanation of the circumstances shall be included in the next Radioactive Effluent Release Report. ACTION 108 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided:

a.

The offgas treatment system is not bypassed; and

b.

The offgas post-treatment monitor (D11-K615) or the main stack monitor (D11-K600) is OPERABLE; and

c.

Perform Technical Specification SR 3.7.6.1 every 4 hours. Otherwise, enter Condition "A" of Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6. If the number of channels OPERABLE remains less than required by the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement for over 30 days, an explanation of the circumstances shall be included in the next Radioactive Effluent Release Report.

HNP ODCM 3-5 Version 26 2/20 Table 3-2 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements INSTRUMENT CHANNEL CHECK SOURCE CHECK CHANNEL CALIBRATION CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST

1. Reactor Building Vent Stack Monitoring System (Each Unit)

a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor Da M

R SAc

b. Iodine Sampler Cartridge Wa,d NA NA NA

c. Particulate Sampler Filter Wa,d NA NA NA

d. Effluent System Flowrate Measuring Device Da NA R

SA

e. Sampler Flowrate Measuring Device Da NA R

SA

2. Recombiner Building Ventilation Monitoring System

a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor Da M

R SAc

b. Iodine Sampler Cartridge Wa,d NA NA NA

c. Particulate Sampler Filter Wa,d NA NA NA

d. Effluent System Flowrate Measuring Device Da NA R

SA

e. Sampler Flowrate Measuring Device Da NA R

SA

3. Main Stack Monitoring System

a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor Da M

R SAc

b. Iodine Sampler Cartridge Wa,d NA NA NA

c. Particulate Sampler Filter Wa,d NA NA NA

d. Effluent Flowrate Monitor Da NA R

SA

e. Sampler Flowrate Monitor Da NA R

SA

4. Condenser Offgas Pretreatment Monitor (Each Unit)

a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor Db M

R SAc

a.

Requirement applies during releases via this pathway.

b.

Requirement applies during operation of the main condenser air ejector.

c.

In addition to the basic functions of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST (Section 10.2), the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exists: (1) Instrument indicates measured levels above the alarm/trip setpoint. (2) Circuit failure occurs. (3) Instrument indicates a downscale failure.

HNP ODCM 3-6 Version 26 2/20

d.

The CHANNEL CHECK shall consist of verifying sampler flow and the presence of the collection device (i.e., particulate filter or charcoal cartridge, etc.) at the weekly changeout. 3.1.2 Gaseous Effluent Dose Rate Control In accordance with Technical Specifications 5.5.4.c and 5.5.4.g, the licensee shall conduct operations so that the dose rates due to radioactive materials released in gaseous effluents from the site to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (see Figure 10-1) are limited as follows:

a.

For noble gases: Less than or equal to a dose rate of 500 mrem/y to the total body and less than or equal to a dose rate of 3000 mrem/y to the skin, and

b.

For Iodine-131, Iodine-133, tritium, and for all radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days: Less than or equal to a dose rate of 1500 mrem/y to any organ. 3.1.2.1 Applicability This limit applies at all times. 3.1.2.2 Actions With a dose rate due to radioactive material released in gaseous effluents exceeding the limit stated in Section 3.1.2, immediately decrease the release rate to within the stated limit. Entry into an Operational Mode or other specified CONDITION shall be made if, as a minimum, the requirements of Technical Specifications LCO 3.0.4 are met. 3.1.2.3 Surveillance Requirements The dose rates due to radioactive materials in areas at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY due to releases of gaseous effluents shall be determined to be within the above limits, in accordance with the methods and procedures in Section 3.4.1, by obtaining representative samples and performing analyses in accordance with the sampling and analysis program specified in Table 3-3. 3.1.2.4 Basis This control is provided to ensure that gaseous effluent dose rates will be maintained within the limits that historically have provided reasonable assurance that radioactive material discharged in gaseous effluents will not result in a dose to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC in an UNRESTRICTED AREA, either within or outside the SITE BOUNDARY, exceeding the limits specified in Appendix I of 10 CFR Part 50, while allowing operational flexibility for effluent releases. For MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC who may at times be within the SITE BOUNDARY, the occupancy of the MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC will be sufficiently low to compensate for any increase in the atmospheric diffusion factor above that for the SITE BOUNDARY.

HNP ODCM 3-7 Version 26 2/20 The dose rate limit for Iodine-131, Iodine-133, tritium, and radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days specifically applies to dose rates to a child via the inhalation pathway. This control applies to the release of gaseous effluents from all reactors at the site.

HNP ODCM 3-8 Version 26 2/20 Table 3-3 Radioactive Gaseous Waste Sampling and Analysis Program Gaseous Release Type Sampling and Analysis Requirementsa Sampling FREQUENCY Minimum Analysis FREQUENCY Type of Activity Analysis MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION (MDC) (Ci/mL) Environmental Release Points

1. Main Stack

2. Reactor Building Vent (Each Unit)

3. Recombiner Building Ventb Mc Grab Sample Mc PRINCIPAL GAMMA EMITTERS H-3 1 E-4 1 E-6 CONTINUOUSe Wd Charcoal or Silver Zeolite Sample I-131 I-133 1 E-12 1 E-10 CONTINUOUSe Wd Particulate Sample PRINCIPAL GAMMA EMITTERS 1 E-11 CONTINUOUSe M

COMPOSITE Particulate Sample Gross Alpha 1 E-11 CONTINUOUSe Q COMPOSITE Particulate Sample Sr-89, Sr-90 1 E-11

a.

Terms printed in all capital letters are defined in Chapter 10. When unusual circumstances result in a MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION higher than required, the reasons shall be documented in the next Radioactive Effluent Release Report.

b.

The Recombiner Building Vent serves Unit 1. Sample analysis results and associated source terms must be assigned to Unit 1 for the purpose of release accountability and dose calculations.

c.

Sampling and analyses for PRINCIPAL GAMMA EMITTERS shall also be performed following shutdown, startup, or a THERMAL POWER change exceeding 15% of the RATED THERMAL POWER within a one-hour period. The more frequent sampling and analysis requirement applies only if analysis shows that the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 concentration in the primary coolant and the Main Stack Noble Gas Activity Monitor reading have both increased by a factor of 3.

HNP ODCM 3-9 Version 26 2/20 Table 3-3 (contd) Notation for Table 3-3

d.

Sampling shall be performed weekly, and analyses completed within 48 hours of changing (or after removal from sampler). Sampling shall also be performed once per 24 hours for 7 days following each shutdown, startup, or a THERMAL POWER change exceeding 15% of the RATED THERMAL POWER within a one-hour period, with analyses completed within 48 hours of changing. When samples collected for 24 hours are analyzed, the corresponding MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATIONs may be increased by a factor of 10. The more frequent sampling and analysis requirement applies only if analysis shows that the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 concentration in the primary coolant and the Main Stack Noble Gas Activity Monitor reading have both increased by a factor of 3.

e.

The ratio of the sample flowrate to the sampled stream flowrate shall be known for the time period covered by each dose or dose rate calculation made in accordance with controls specified in Sections 3.1.2, 3.1.3, and 3.1.4.

HNP ODCM 10-1 Version 26 2/20 CHAPTER 10 DEFINITIONS OF EFFLUENT CONTROL TERMS The terms defined in this chapter are used in the presentation of the above chapters. These terms are shown in all capital letters to indicate that they are specifically defined. 10.1 TERMS SPECIFIC TO THE ODCM The following terms are used in the ODCM, but are not found in the Technical Specifications: BATCH RELEASE A BATCH RELEASE is the discharge of wastes of a discrete volume. Prior to sampling for analyses, each liquid batch shall be isolated and then thoroughly mixed by a method described in the ODCM to assure representative sampling. COMPOSITE SAMPLE A COMPOSITE SAMPLE is one which contains material from multiple waste releases, in which the quantity of sample is proportional to the quantity of waste discharged, and in which the method of sampling employed results in a specimen that is representative of the wastes released. Prior to analyses, all liquid samples that are to be aliquotted for a COMPOSITE SAMPLE shall be mixed thoroughly, in order for the COMPOSITE SAMPLE to be representative of the effluent release. When assessing the consequences of a waste release at the pre-release or post-release stage, the most recent available COMPOSITE SAMPLE results for the applicable release pathway may be used. CONTINUOUS RELEASE A CONTINUOUS RELEASE is the discharge of wastes of a non-discrete volume, e.g., from a volume within a system that has an input flow during the continuous release. FREQUENCY NOTATION The FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of surveillance requirements shall correspond to the intervals defined below, with a maximum allowable extension not to exceed 25% of the surveillance interval. NOTATION FREQUENCY S (Once per shift) At least once per 12 hours. D (Daily) At least once per 24 hours. W (Weekly) At least once per 7 days. M (Monthly) At least once per 31 days. Q (Quarterly) At least once per 92 days. SA (Semi-annually) At least once per 184 days. 18M At least once per 18 months. R (Refueling) At least once per 24 months. S/U (Startup) Prior to each reactor startup. NA Not Applicable. P (Prior) Completed prior to each release.

HNP ODCM 10-2 Version 26 2/20 GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM The GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM is the offgas holdup system designed and installed to reduce radioactive gaseous effluents by collecting primary coolant system offgases from the primary system and providing for delay or holdup for the purpose of reducing the total radioactivity prior to release to the environment. LIQUID RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM A LIQUID RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM is any system designed and installed to reduce radioactive materials in liquid effluents by systematic collection, retention, and processing through filtration, evaporation, separation and/or ion exchange treatment. This system consists of at least one collection tank, one evaporator or demineralizer system, one post-treatment tank and associated components providing for treatment flow and functional control. MAJOR CHANGES TO RADIOACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT SYSTEMS For the purposes of the ODCM, MAJOR CHANGES TO RADIOACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT SYSTEMS include the following changes to such systems: (1) Major changes in process equipment, components, structures, or effluent monitoring instrumentation as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or as evaluated in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (e.g., deletion of evaporators and installation of demineralizer); (2) Changes in the design of radwaste treatment systems that could significantly increase quantities of effluents released from those previously considered in the FSAR and SER; (3) Changes in system design which may invalidate the accident analysis as described in the SER (e.g., changes in tank capacity that would alter the curies released); or (4) Changes in system design that could potentially result in a significant increase in occupational exposure of operating personnel (e.g., use of temporary equipment without adequate shielding provisions). MEMBER(S) OF THE PUBLIC1 A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC shall be an individual in a controlled area or an UNRESTRICTED AREA. However, an individual is not a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC during any period in which the individual receives an occupational dose. This category may include persons who use portions of the site for recreational, occupational, or other purposes not associated with the plant. MILK ANIMAL A MILK ANIMAL is a cow or goat that is producing milk for human consumption. 1 The italicized terms in this definition, which are not otherwise used in this ODCM, shall have the definitions assigned to them by 10 CFR 20.1003.

HNP ODCM 10-3 Version 26 2/20 MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION The MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION (MDC) is defined, for purposes of the controls in this ODCM, as the smallest concentration of radioactive material in a sample that will yield a net count above system background and that will be detected with 95-percent probability, with only 5-percent probability of falsely concluding that a blank observation represents a "real" signal. For a particular measurement system, which may include radiochemical separation, the MDC for a given radionuclide is determined as follows (Reference 17): t 6 b s b s e Y 10 x 2.22 V E t 1 t 1 R 3.29 t 2.71 MDC

(10.1) where: MDC = the a priori MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION (Ci per unit mass or volume). Rb = the background counting rate, or the counting rate of a blank sample, as appropriate (counts per minute). ts = the length of the sample counting period (minutes). tb = the length of the background counting period (minutes). E = the counting efficiency (counts per disintegration) V = the sample size (units of mass or volume). 2.22 106 = the number of disintegrations per minute per Ci. Y = the fractional radiochemical yield, when applicable. = the radioactive decay constant for the given radionuclide (h-1). Values of used in effluent calculations should be based on decay data from a recognized and current source, such as Reference 26. t = for effluent samples, the elapsed time between the midpoint of sample collection and the time of counting (h); for environmental samples, the elapsed time between the end of sample collection and the time of counting (h). Typical values of E, V, Y, and t should be used in the calculation. It should be recognized that the MDC is defined as an a priori (before the fact) limit representing the capability of a measurement system, and not as an a posteriori (after the fact) limit for a particular measurement.

HNP ODCM 10-4 Version 26 2/20 PRINCIPAL GAMMA EMITTERS The PRINCIPAL GAMMA EMITTERS for which the MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION (MDC) limit applies include exclusively the following radionuclides: For liquid radioactive effluents: Mn-54, Fe-59, Co-58, Co-60, Zn-65, Mo-99, Cs-134, Cs-137, and Ce-141. Ce-144 shall also be measured, but with an MDC of 5 x 10-6 Ci/mL. For gaseous radioactive effluents: In noble gas releases, Kr-87, Kr-88, Xe-133, Xe-133m, Xe-135, Xe-138; and in particulate releases, Mn-54, Fe-59, Co-58, Co-60, Zn-65, Mo-99, Cs-134, Cs-137, Ce-141, and Ce-144. For environmental media: The gamma emitters specifically listed in Table 4-3. These lists do not mean that only these nuclides are to be considered. Other gamma peaks that are identifiable, together with those of the above nuclides, shall also be analyzed and reported in the Radioactive Effluent Release Report, the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, or other applicable report(s). OPERATIONAL CONDITION An OPERATIONAL CONDITION shall be any one inclusive combination of Mode Switch position and average reactor coolant temperature, as defined in Table 1.1-1 of the Technical Specifications. REACTOR MODE The REACTOR MODE is established by the Mode Switch position. The four Mode Switch positions are REFUEL, SHUTDOWN, START & HOT STANDBY, and RUN. (See Technical Specifications Table 1.1-1 for definitions of these MODES.) SITE BOUNDARY The SITE BOUNDARY shall be that line beyond which the land is not owned, leased or otherwise controlled by Georia Power Company as shown in Figure 10-1. SOURCE CHECK A SOURCE CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel response when the channel sensor is exposed to a source of increased radioactivity. UNRESTRICTED AREA The UNRESTRICTED AREA shall be any area access to which is neither limited nor controlled by the licensee, or any area within the SITE BOUNDARY used for residential quarters or for industrial, commercial, institutional, and/or recreational purposes.

HNP ODCM 10-5 Version 26 2/20 10.2 TERMS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The following terms are defined in the Technical Specifications, Section 1.1. Because they are used throughout the Limits of Operation sections of the ODCM, they are presented here for convenience. In the event of discrepancies between the definitions below and those in the Technical Specifications, the Technical Specification definitions shall take precedence. ACTIONS ACTIONS shall be that part of a Specification that prescribes Required Actions to be taken under designated Conditions within specified Completion Times. CHANNEL CALIBRATION A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output, such that it responds within the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter that the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel, including the required sensor, alarm, display, and trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. Calibration of instrument channels with resistance temperature detector (RTD) or thermocouple sensors may consist of an inplace qualitative assessment of sensor behavior and normal calibration of the remaining adjustable devices in the channel. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by any means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is calibrated. CHANNEL CHECK A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment, by observation, of channel behavior during operation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and status to other indications or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated or actual signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY, including required alarm, interlock, display, and trip functions, and channel failure trips. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is tested. DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 EQUIVALENT (microcuries/gram) that alone would produce the same Committted I-131 Effective Dose Equivalent as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Federal Guidance Report (FGR) 11, Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion, 1988. OPERABLE (or OPERABILITY) A system, subsystem, division, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified safety function(s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical power, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, division, component or device to perform its specified safety

HNP ODCM 10-6 Version 26 2/20 function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s). RATED THERMAL POWER RATED THERMAL POWER shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of 2804 MWt. THERMAL POWER THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.

HNP ODCM 10-7 Version 26 2/20 Figure 10-1 Site Map for Effluent Controls I I Ill 1. Ce Ii oe

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