Letter Sequence Response to RAI |
---|
EPID:L-2018-LLA-0140, License Amendment Request: Vital Instrument Bus Inverter Allowed Outage Time (AOT) Extension (Approved, Closed) |
|
|
Similar Documents at Salem |
---|
Category:Letter type:LR
MONTHYEARLR-N23-0079, Special Report 23-02-00 Pursuant to the Requirements of Salem Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.3.3.7, Action 10, for the Unit 1 Main Steam Line Rad Monitor Inoperable for Greater than Seven Days2023-12-0707 December 2023 Special Report 23-02-00 Pursuant to the Requirements of Salem Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.3.3.7, Action 10, for the Unit 1 Main Steam Line Rad Monitor Inoperable for Greater than Seven Days LR-N23-0077, Loss of Coolant Accident Peak Cladding Temperature Margin Tracking - Annual Report 2023 & 30 Day Report for Salem Unit 1 Upflow Conversion2023-11-29029 November 2023 Loss of Coolant Accident Peak Cladding Temperature Margin Tracking - Annual Report 2023 & 30 Day Report for Salem Unit 1 Upflow Conversion LR-N23-0072, Core Operating Limits Report Cycle 302023-11-0101 November 2023 Core Operating Limits Report Cycle 30 LR-N23-0045, and Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 - Notice of Proposed Amendment to Decommissioning Trust Agreement2023-09-0808 September 2023 and Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 - Notice of Proposed Amendment to Decommissioning Trust Agreement LR-N23-0055, Special Report 272/23-01-00, Pursuant to the Requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.3.1, Action 23, for the Vent Noble Gas Rad Monitor Inoperable for Greater than Seven Days2023-08-0303 August 2023 Special Report 272/23-01-00, Pursuant to the Requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.3.1, Action 23, for the Vent Noble Gas Rad Monitor Inoperable for Greater than Seven Days LR-N23-0054, In-Service Inspection Activities2023-07-26026 July 2023 In-Service Inspection Activities LR-N23-0046, Emergency Plan Document Revisions Implemented June 28, 20232023-07-10010 July 2023 Emergency Plan Document Revisions Implemented June 28, 2023 LR-N23-0005, License Amendment Request to Amend Technical Specifications (TS) 6.8.4.f for Permanent Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies2023-06-23023 June 2023 License Amendment Request to Amend Technical Specifications (TS) 6.8.4.f for Permanent Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies LR-N23-0035, 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report (ARERR)2023-04-27027 April 2023 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report (ARERR) LR-N23-0034, 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report (AREOR) - Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 and Hope Creek Generating Station2023-04-27027 April 2023 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report (AREOR) - Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 and Hope Creek Generating Station LR-N23-0033, Core Operating Limits Report Cycle 272023-04-26026 April 2023 Core Operating Limits Report Cycle 27 LR-N23-0010, License Amendment Request Revision of Technical Specification (TS) to Delete TS Section 5.5 - Meteorological Tower Location2023-04-21021 April 2023 License Amendment Request Revision of Technical Specification (TS) to Delete TS Section 5.5 - Meteorological Tower Location LR-N23-0006, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations2023-03-24024 March 2023 Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations LR-N23-0019, and Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 - Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums2023-03-21021 March 2023 and Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 - Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums LR-N23-0016, and Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 - Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments2023-02-28028 February 2023 and Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 - Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments LR-N23-0012, Annual Property Insurance Status Report2023-02-24024 February 2023 Annual Property Insurance Status Report LR-N23-0014, Stations Submittal of 2022 Annual Report of Fitness for Duty Performance Data Per 10 CFR 26.203(e) and 10 CFR 26.7172023-02-23023 February 2023 Stations Submittal of 2022 Annual Report of Fitness for Duty Performance Data Per 10 CFR 26.203(e) and 10 CFR 26.717 LR-N23-0003, Response to Requests for Additional Information Salem Unit 2 Relief Request S2-I4R-2112023-02-0101 February 2023 Response to Requests for Additional Information Salem Unit 2 Relief Request S2-I4R-211 LR-N22-0096, and Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 - Request for Threshold Determination2023-01-0505 January 2023 and Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 - Request for Threshold Determination LR-N22-0095, Loss of Coolant Accident Peak Cladding Temperature Margin Tracking - Annual Report 20222022-12-20020 December 2022 Loss of Coolant Accident Peak Cladding Temperature Margin Tracking - Annual Report 2022 LR-N22-0094, Emergency Plan Document Revisions Implemented November 21, 20222022-12-14014 December 2022 Emergency Plan Document Revisions Implemented November 21, 2022 LR-N22-0092, Response to Final Iolb Request for Additional Information for Salem LAR to Revise TS to Extend Allowed Outage Time for Inoperable EDG2022-12-0909 December 2022 Response to Final Iolb Request for Additional Information for Salem LAR to Revise TS to Extend Allowed Outage Time for Inoperable EDG LR-N22-0091, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Report of 10 CFR 72.48 Changes, Tests, and Experiments2022-12-0202 December 2022 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Report of 10 CFR 72.48 Changes, Tests, and Experiments LR-N22-0084, Response to Final Request for Additional Information for Salem LAR to Revise TS to Extend Allowed Outage Time for Inoperable EDG (EPID L- 2022-LLA-0095)2022-11-17017 November 2022 Response to Final Request for Additional Information for Salem LAR to Revise TS to Extend Allowed Outage Time for Inoperable EDG (EPID L- 2022-LLA-0095) LR-N22-0090, Supplement to Submittal of Salem Generating Station Updated FSAR, Revision 33, 10 CFR 71.106 Review Results and 10 CFR 54.37(b) Review Results for Salem2022-11-10010 November 2022 Supplement to Submittal of Salem Generating Station Updated FSAR, Revision 33, 10 CFR 71.106 Review Results and 10 CFR 54.37(b) Review Results for Salem LR-N22-0065, Submittal of Relief Request Associated with the Fourth Inservice Inspection (ISI) Interval Limited Examinations2022-09-27027 September 2022 Submittal of Relief Request Associated with the Fourth Inservice Inspection (ISI) Interval Limited Examinations LR-N22-0074, Emergency Plan Evacuation Time Estimate2022-09-15015 September 2022 Emergency Plan Evacuation Time Estimate LR-N22-0066, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Relocate Technical Specifications (TS) Requirements for Reactor Head Vents to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM)2022-08-31031 August 2022 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Relocate Technical Specifications (TS) Requirements for Reactor Head Vents to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) LR-N22-0063, Spent Fuel Cask Registration2022-08-10010 August 2022 Spent Fuel Cask Registration LR-N22-0068, In-Service Inspection Activities - 90-Day Report2022-08-10010 August 2022 In-Service Inspection Activities - 90-Day Report LR-N22-0012, License Amendment Request to Amend the Technical Specifications to Revise and Relocate the Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Limits and Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System Limits to a Pressure and Temperature2022-08-0707 August 2022 License Amendment Request to Amend the Technical Specifications to Revise and Relocate the Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Limits and Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System Limits to a Pressure and Temperature LR-N22-0062, Spent Fuel Cask Registration2022-07-21021 July 2022 Spent Fuel Cask Registration LR-N22-0006, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Amend Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) to Extend the Allowed Outage Time for an Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator from 72 Hours to 14 Days2022-06-29029 June 2022 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Amend Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) to Extend the Allowed Outage Time for an Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator from 72 Hours to 14 Days LR-N22-0051, License Amendment Request to Relocate Technical Specification Facility/Unit Staff Qualification Requirements to Quality Assurance Topical Report2022-06-22022 June 2022 License Amendment Request to Relocate Technical Specification Facility/Unit Staff Qualification Requirements to Quality Assurance Topical Report LR-N22-0044, Emergency Plan Document Revisions Implemented November, 20212022-05-19019 May 2022 Emergency Plan Document Revisions Implemented November, 2021 LR-N22-0043, Core Operating Limits Report - Cycle 292022-05-0909 May 2022 Core Operating Limits Report - Cycle 29 LR-N22-0041, 2021 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report (Rerr)2022-04-28028 April 2022 2021 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report (Rerr) LR-N22-0040, 2021 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report2022-04-28028 April 2022 2021 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report LR-N22-0039, Emergency Plan Document Revisions Implemented March 24, 20222022-04-21021 April 2022 Emergency Plan Document Revisions Implemented March 24, 2022 LR-N21-0052, Request for Relief from ASME Code Defect Removal for Service Water Buried Piping2022-04-0707 April 2022 Request for Relief from ASME Code Defect Removal for Service Water Buried Piping LR-N22-0023, Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums2022-03-21021 March 2022 Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums LR-N22-0022, Response to Request for Additional Information Relief Request S1-14R-210, Alternative Examination of Welds2022-03-21021 March 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Relief Request S1-14R-210, Alternative Examination of Welds LR-N22-0017, Submittal of 2021 Annual Report of Fitness for Duty (FFD) Performance Data2022-02-25025 February 2022 Submittal of 2021 Annual Report of Fitness for Duty (FFD) Performance Data LR-N22-0016, Radiological Survey of Site Property to Be Used for Offshore Wind Port Facility2022-02-24024 February 2022 Radiological Survey of Site Property to Be Used for Offshore Wind Port Facility LR-N22-0013, In-Service Inspection Activities - 90-Day Report2022-02-10010 February 2022 In-Service Inspection Activities - 90-Day Report LR-N22-0007, Request for Exemption from Specific Requirements of 10 CFR Part 26, Fitness for Duty Programs2022-01-0505 January 2022 Request for Exemption from Specific Requirements of 10 CFR Part 26, Fitness for Duty Programs LR-N21-0061, Annual Report of Specific Activity Analysis - TS 6.9.1.5c2021-12-0909 December 2021 Annual Report of Specific Activity Analysis - TS 6.9.1.5c LR-N21-0083, Loss of Coolant Accident Peak Cladding Temperature Margin Tracking - Annual Report 2021 & 30 Day Report for Salem Unit 2 Upflow Conversion2021-11-24024 November 2021 Loss of Coolant Accident Peak Cladding Temperature Margin Tracking - Annual Report 2021 & 30 Day Report for Salem Unit 2 Upflow Conversion LR-N21-0078, Hope and Creek Generating Station, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Delete Definitions Found in 10 CFR Part 20 and Delete Figures of the Site and Surrounding Areas from TS2021-11-18018 November 2021 Hope and Creek Generating Station, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Delete Definitions Found in 10 CFR Part 20 and Delete Figures of the Site and Surrounding Areas from TS LR-N21-0066, Submittal of Relief Request Associated with the Fourth Inservice Inspection (ISI) Interval Limited Examinations2021-11-10010 November 2021 Submittal of Relief Request Associated with the Fourth Inservice Inspection (ISI) Interval Limited Examinations 2023-09-08
[Table view] Category:Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARLR-N23-0003, Response to Requests for Additional Information Salem Unit 2 Relief Request S2-I4R-2112023-02-0101 February 2023 Response to Requests for Additional Information Salem Unit 2 Relief Request S2-I4R-211 LR-N22-0092, Response to Final Iolb Request for Additional Information for Salem LAR to Revise TS to Extend Allowed Outage Time for Inoperable EDG2022-12-0909 December 2022 Response to Final Iolb Request for Additional Information for Salem LAR to Revise TS to Extend Allowed Outage Time for Inoperable EDG LR-N22-0084, Response to Final Request for Additional Information for Salem LAR to Revise TS to Extend Allowed Outage Time for Inoperable EDG (EPID L- 2022-LLA-0095)2022-11-17017 November 2022 Response to Final Request for Additional Information for Salem LAR to Revise TS to Extend Allowed Outage Time for Inoperable EDG (EPID L- 2022-LLA-0095) LR-N22-0022, Response to Request for Additional Information Relief Request S1-14R-210, Alternative Examination of Welds2022-03-21021 March 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Relief Request S1-14R-210, Alternative Examination of Welds JAFP-21-0087, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Approval of Transfer of Licenses and Conforming Amendments2021-09-16016 September 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Approval of Transfer of Licenses and Conforming Amendments JAFP-21-0044, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Approval of Transfer of Licenses and Conforming Amendments2021-06-11011 June 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Approval of Transfer of Licenses and Conforming Amendments LR-N21-0024, Response to Request for Additional Information for Proposed Alternative for Examination of ASME Section XI, Examination Category 8-8, Item Number 82.11 and 82.122021-04-12012 April 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information for Proposed Alternative for Examination of ASME Section XI, Examination Category 8-8, Item Number 82.11 and 82.12 LR-N21-0031, Response to Request for Additional Information, Revise and Relocate Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System Limits to Pressure and Temperature Limits Report2021-04-0101 April 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information, Revise and Relocate Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System Limits to Pressure and Temperature Limits Report LR-N21-0019, Response to Request for Additional Information (Rai), Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report (ML20261 H589)2021-02-25025 February 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information (Rai), Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report (ML20261 H589) LR-N20-0058, Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request Re Application of Leak-Before-Break for Accumulator, Residual Heat Removal, Safety Injection and Pressurizer Surge Lines2020-09-16016 September 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request Re Application of Leak-Before-Break for Accumulator, Residual Heat Removal, Safety Injection and Pressurizer Surge Lines ML19308A5952019-11-0404 November 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information, License Amendment Request for Approval of Changes to Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements ML19280A0002019-10-0303 October 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Hope Creek, Salem 1 and 2 - Final RAI Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements (L-2019-LLA-0145) LR-N19-0066, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements.2019-06-11011 June 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements. LR-N18-0116, Response to Request for Additional Information, License Amendment Request: Inverter Allowed Outage Time (AOT) Extension2018-10-30030 October 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information, License Amendment Request: Inverter Allowed Outage Time (AOT) Extension LR-N18-0112, Response to Request for Additional Information, License Amendment Request: Inverter Allowed Outage Time (AOT) Extension2018-10-20020 October 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information, License Amendment Request: Inverter Allowed Outage Time (AOT) Extension LR-N18-0108, Response to Request for Additional Information, License Amendment Request: Inverter Allowed Outage Time (AOT) Extension2018-10-18018 October 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information, License Amendment Request: Inverter Allowed Outage Time (AOT) Extension LR-N18-0070, Response to Request for Additional Information (Rai), Implementation of WCAP-14333 and WCAP~15376 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation System Instrumentation Test Times and ..2018-07-17017 July 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information (Rai), Implementation of WCAP-14333 and WCAP~15376 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation System Instrumentation Test Times and ... RS-18-061, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Decommissioning Funding Plans for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (Isfsis)2018-05-0202 May 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Decommissioning Funding Plans for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (Isfsis) LR-N17-0140, Response to Request for Additional Information (Rai), Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specifications (CACs MF8859 and MF8860)2017-10-18018 October 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information (Rai), Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specifications (CACs MF8859 and MF8860) LR-N17-0263, Response to Request for Additional Information, Salem Units 1 and 2 - Containment Fan Coil Unit Allowed Outage Time Extension Amendment Request2017-09-14014 September 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information, Salem Units 1 and 2 - Containment Fan Coil Unit Allowed Outage Time Extension Amendment Request LR-N17-0125, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request to Adopt Emergency Action Level Scheme Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 6, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors2017-08-11011 August 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request to Adopt Emergency Action Level Scheme Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 6, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors LR-N17-0115, Response to RAI Re Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2017-08-0707 August 2017 Response to RAI Re Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report LR-N17-0118, Response to Request for Additional Information (Rai), Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specifications2017-08-0707 August 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information (Rai), Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specifications LR-N17-0102, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Relief Request SC-14R-171, Use of Code Cases N-695-1 and N-696-12017-06-0505 June 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Relief Request SC-14R-171, Use of Code Cases N-695-1 and N-696-1 LR-N17-0091, Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Containment Fan Cooler Unit (Cfcu) Allowed Outage Time (AOT) Extension2017-05-0404 May 2017 Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Containment Fan Cooler Unit (Cfcu) Allowed Outage Time (AOT) Extension LR-N17-0079, Supplemental Information for Response to Request for Additional Information, Aging Management Program Plan for Reactor Vessel Internals2017-05-0303 May 2017 Supplemental Information for Response to Request for Additional Information, Aging Management Program Plan for Reactor Vessel Internals LR-N17-0001, Supplemental Information for Response to Request for Additional Information, RAI-8- RAI-11, Aging Management Program Plan for Reactor Vessel Internals2017-01-13013 January 2017 Supplemental Information for Response to Request for Additional Information, RAI-8- RAI-11, Aging Management Program Plan for Reactor Vessel Internals LR-N16-0226, Response to Request for Additional Information, Regarding Removing Certain Training Requirements2016-12-19019 December 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information, Regarding Removing Certain Training Requirements LR-N16-0094, Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2016-12-0606 December 2016 Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML16305A2412016-10-31031 October 2016 Response to NRC Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools. LR-N16-0127, Response to Request for Additional Information, RAI-8- RAI-11, Aging Management Program Plan for Reactor Vessel Internals2016-10-0505 October 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information, RAI-8- RAI-11, Aging Management Program Plan for Reactor Vessel Internals LR-N16-0159, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Chilled Water System Modifications2016-08-30030 August 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Chilled Water System Modifications LR-N16-0153, Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning Request for an Extension to Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 12-0012016-08-18018 August 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning Request for an Extension to Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 12-001 LR-N16-0134, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Chilled Water System Modifications2016-08-12012 August 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Chilled Water System Modifications LR-N16-0130, Response to RIS 2016-09, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2016-08-0202 August 2016 Response to RIS 2016-09, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations LR-N16-0109, and Hope Creek Generating Stations - Cover Letter for Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Review of Security Plan, Revision 172016-06-15015 June 2016 and Hope Creek Generating Stations - Cover Letter for Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Review of Security Plan, Revision 17 LR-N16-0055, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Chilled Water System Modifications2016-03-31031 March 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Chilled Water System Modifications ML16083A1942016-03-23023 March 2016 Transmittal of Response to Request for Additional Information, RAI-4, Aging Management Program Plan for Reactor Vessel Internals LR-N16-0012, Supplemental Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request Regarding Replacement of Source Range and Intermediate Range Neutron Monitoring Systems2016-02-10010 February 2016 Supplemental Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request Regarding Replacement of Source Range and Intermediate Range Neutron Monitoring Systems LR-N15-0239, Compliance with March 12, 2012 NRC Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051) and Responses to Requests for Additional Information2016-01-25025 January 2016 Compliance with March 12, 2012 NRC Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051) and Responses to Requests for Additional Information LR-N15-0255, High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information, Per 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi..2015-12-23023 December 2015 High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information, Per 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi.. LR-N15-0235, Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request Regarding Replacement of Source Range and Intermediate Range Neutron Monitoring Systems (CAC Nos. MF6065 and MF6066)2015-11-27027 November 2015 Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request Regarding Replacement of Source Range and Intermediate Range Neutron Monitoring Systems (CAC Nos. MF6065 and MF6066) LR-N15-0224, Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Isolate Unborated Water Sources and Use Gamma-Metrics Post-Accident Neutron Monitors During Mode 6 (Refueling)2015-11-25025 November 2015 Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Isolate Unborated Water Sources and Use Gamma-Metrics Post-Accident Neutron Monitors During Mode 6 (Refueling) ML19031A6581997-03-30030 March 1997 03/30/1997 Letter Response to Request for Evaluation Re Refueling Accident Inside Containment ML19031A5031979-03-23023 March 1979 Generation Station, Unit 2 - Responses to Requests for Additional Information. Provides 60 Copies of Additional Seismic Qualification Information as Identified During 02/26-28/1979 Meeting ML19031A3811979-01-18018 January 1979 Response to Request for Additional Information on Quality Assurance & Subcompartment Analysis, Which Will Be Incorporated Into Fasr in Amendment to Application ML19030A6551978-08-22022 August 1978 08/22/1978 Response to Request for Additional Information Increased Capacity Spent Fuel Racks ML19031C3721978-08-0707 August 1978 08/07/1978 Letter Response to IE Bulletin No. 78-08 on Radiation Levels from Fuel Element Transfer Tubes ML19030A6651978-08-0202 August 1978 08/02/1978 Response to Request for Additional Information Diesel Generators ML19030A6601978-07-31031 July 1978 07/31/1978 Response to Request for Additional Information Increased Capacity Spent Fuel Racks 2023-02-01
[Table view] |
Text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P. 0, Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 PSEG NudearLLC 10 CFR 50.90 LR-N18-0112 LfiEfJ8D0to1a U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos.DPR-70 and DPR-75 NRC Docket Nos.50-272 and 50-311
Subject:
Response to Request for Additional Information, Re: License Amendment Request: Inverter Allowed Outage Time (AOT) Extension
References:
- 1. PSEG letter to NRC, "License Amendment Request: Vital Instrument Bus Inverter Allowed Outage Time (AOT) Extension," dated May 16, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No.ML18136A866)
- 2. NRC email to PSEG, "Salem 1 and 2 - Final RAI from PRA Branch RE:
Inverter AOT Extension," (EPID: L-2018-LLA-0140) dated September 21, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No.ML18267A171)
In the Reference 1 letter, PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) submitted a license amendment request for Salem Generating Station Unit 1 and Unit 2. The proposed amendment would increase the Vital Instrument Bus (VIB) Inverters allowed outage time (AOT) from 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for the A, B and C inverters to 7 days and from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for the D inverter to 7 days. In Reference 2, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requested PSEG to provide additional information in order to evaluate the proposed License Amendment Request to revise Technical Specifications. The response due date was subsequently extended to October 24, 2018 at PSEG's request. to this letter provides a restatement of the RAI questions followed by our responses.PSEG has determined that the information provided in this submittal does not alter the conclusions reached in the 10 CFR 50.92 no significant hazards determination previously submitted. In addition, the information provided in this submittal does not affect the bases for concluding that neither an environmental impact statement nor an environmental assessment needs to be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, "Notice for public comment; State consultation," paragraph (b), PSEG is providing a copy of this response, with attachments, to the designated State of New Jersey Official.
Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Lee Marabella at 856-339-1208.
ocr 2 o zo1a Page 2 LR-N18-0112 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on (Date)
Sincerely, Charles V. McFeaters Site Vice President Salem Generating Station Attachments:
- 1. Response to Request for Additional Information - License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.2.1 Regarding Alternating Current Inverters cc: Administrator, Region I, NRC Mr. J. Kim, Project Manager, NRC NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Salem Mr. P. Mulligan, Chief, NJBNE Salem Commitment Tracking Coordinator Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator
LR-N18-0112 Attachment 1 Response to Request for Additional Information - License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.2.1 Regarding Alternating Current Inverters
LR-N18-0112 By letter dated May 16, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML18136A866), PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG, the licensee), requested an amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75 for Salem Generating Station (Salem) Units 1 and 2. This license amendment request proposes changes to Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.2.1, "A. C. Distribution - Operating." The proposed change would increase the Vital Instrument Bus (VIB) Inverters allowed outage time (AOT) from 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for the A, B and C inverters to 7 days and from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for the D inverter to 7 days.
Below is a restatement of the questions followed by our responses.
Question 1 (APLA RAI-1)
In order to ensure efficiency in its reviews and prevent duplicate reviews of a licensees PRA technical acceptability, the NRC staff may utilize PRA information from the licensees previous risk-informed submittals. In the course of its review for this LAR, the staff utilized information from the licensees application for Salem containment fan cooler unit AOT extension dated March 6, 2017 (ADAMS Accession Number ML17065A241), as supplemented by letters dated May 4, 2017 (ADAMS Accession Number ML17125A051) and September 14, 2017 (ADAMS Accession Number ML17257A439). The method used by the licensee for estimating core damage frequency (CDF) for fire and seismic events in the supplemental letter dated May 4, 2017, differs from the method used in the current LAR dated May 16, 2018 (ADAMS Accession Number ML18136A866). The NRC staff performed a confirmatory calculation based on the method used in the May 4, 2017 letter. The resulting value for CDF for fires corresponded to Region II RG 1.74 acceptance criteria. As a result, the licensees conclusion in Section 3.2.3.2 of the current LAR that since the change in CDF is negligible, the large early release frequency (LERF) impact will also be negligible would not be valid per the confirmatory calculation, as a change in CDF corresponding to Region II of RG 1.74 is not considered negligible.
Alternate Fire Event Calculations for Salem Inverter D Calculation of CDFsurrogate:
CDFsurrogate = FIE-F x UAINV x PBU x (TAOT/TCYC) = 2.51E-06 / reactor-year where:
FIE-F = fire initiating event frequency = 4.62E-01 UAINV = Unavailability of inverter D = 1.0 PBU = Probability of backup power failure = 2.83E-04 TAOT = AOT duration = 7 days TCYC = cycle duration = 365 days TAOT/TCYC = Fractional Unavailability Per the NRC alternate calculations above, the values determined for CDFsurrogate correspond to Region II RG 1.74 acceptance criteria. This is a less conservative result than that reported in Section 3.2.3.2 of the licensees LAR dated May 16, 2018.
2
LR-N18-0112
RAI-1
Please provide a discussion explaining the use of the two different calculation methods and the rationale for the acceptability of the fire PRA approach used in the LAR dated May 16, 2018, as opposed to the method used in the letter dated May 4, 2017, and the basis for the determination that this approach is sufficiently conservative to support the proposed inverter AOT extension.
In addition, provide an evaluation of the LERF from fire events.
Response
The two different calculations are created specifically for each of the two situations being analyzed (i.e., CFCUs and inverters). Both calculations use similar overall approaches, but do have some differences to reflect the different functions and operational characteristics of the different components. In each case, the calculation is provided as a surrogate calculation to provide a bounding value for fire CDF/LERF. The overall approach is to combine the following factors into a surrogate calculation:
Frequency of fire events Probability that other components are unavailable that create the need for the analyzed component Probability that the analyzed component is unavailable For the two different calculations, all three of these values are slightly different. Each difference is described here.
Frequency of fire events The inverter calculation uses a more recent estimation of the overall plant fire ignition frequencies based on the current work-in-progress fire PRA, which uses fire ignition frequencies calculated from Supplement 1 of NUREG/CR-6850 (FAQ 08-0048) and NUREG-2169, as stated in the LAR. The value used for the inverter calculation is actually much greater than used for the CFCU (0.462 versus 0.05), and includes the very conservative assumption discussed in the LAR that every fire scenario is assumed to impact all but one inverter (and its backup power source). Note that the frequency of fire events for the CFCU calculation uses a reduced frequency based on one out of four fires would lead to a plant trip, and fail all but one train of safety-related auxiliary feed water (AFW), and all but one train of containment spray system (CSS).
Probability that other components are unavailable that create the need for the analyzed component Because the inverters and CFCUs provide different functions, the situations which create the need for the analyzed components are different. For CFCUs, this probability represents a scenario with the concurrent unavailability of multiple other decay heat removal systems which creates the scenario in which the CFCUs are relied upon as the remaining containment heat removal system. For an inverter, the inverter is the primary power supply to its train, but other components (alternate 230 VAC power sources) provide a redundant function to the inverter, so the failure probabilities of these backup components are quantified from the FPIE PRA to provide the probability value for this term in the equation.
3
LR-N18-0112 Probability that the analyzed component is unavailable This difference in the calculations is due to the different expected operating conditions for the CFCUs and inverters, and also appears to be the difference in the NRC calculation.
For the surrogate CFCU calculation, the newly requested condition (i.e., increased CFCU AOT) is expected to occur and the extended outage times are expected to be utilized by the plant on an assumed frequency of three times per operating cycle, so this frequency was used to calculate the expected increased unavailability for the CFCUs, represented by the "fractional exposure time" in the CFCU LAR supplement. This approach did not take credit for the baseline unavailability but instead assumed that the entire newly assumed unavailability would contribute to the CDF and LERF. The very conservative expectation is designed to bound the maximum maintenance activity (preventive and corrective), and is not based on the CFCU failure rate.
For the surrogate inverter calculations, since the inverters are not expected to be voluntarily removed from service on a regular basis, a different approach is used to estimate the increase in unavailability. The approach in the LAR calculated an increased unavailability of an inverter by assuming that the same occurrence rate of unavailability would remain, but that the duration of each unavailability period would increase by a factor equal to the increase in allowed outage time (i.e., a factor of 7 for inverters 1A/B/C and a factor of 2.33 for inverter 1 D). This causes the formula for the calculation to appear different from the CFCU calculation, but the overall concept is the same, in that the inverter calculation refers to this value as an increase in unavailability, while the CFCU calculation refers to it as a fractional exposure time, both of which represent the total amount of time the components are expected to be unavailable. The correlation between the formula from the CFCU LAR and the formula from the Inverter LAR is shown in this figure:
CFCU CDF Surrogate Calculation Concurrent Unavailability of the Following: Site-Wide Fractional Surrogate (1) Single CSS Train in Recirculation Fire Ignition Unavailability Exposure ACOF (2) Turbine Driven AFW Pump Frequency ofCFCUs Time (1/yr)
(3) Unavailability of 4th AFW Pump (1/yr) 4.56E-o5 0.05 1.0 7.67E-Q2 1.7E-07 LJ.CDF = FIE-F X iJ.UAINv X Pau Inverter CDF Surrogate Calculation The inverter calculation could be modified to use a similar formula as the CFCU calculation, such that:
1J.CDF = F1t:-F x UA,Nv x Fractional Exposure Timex Pau which would produce the same results as the LAR, since the fractional exposure time is the expected amount of time each inverter is out of service, if the existing unavailability under the 4
LR-N18-0112 current license conditions is not included. The matching results are shown for the most conservative case in the Inverter LAR (Inverter A or C):
CDF = 0.462 x 1.0 x 1.20E-3 x 1.53E-4 = 8.48E-8 In the NRC calculation represented in APLA RAI-1 above, the different result appears to be due to a different assumption of the expected amount of time the inverter will be unavailable, called the fractional unavailability. The NRC calculation assumes that an inverter will be unavailable for seven days each year. While that amount of unavailability could theoretically occur, it is inconsistent with planned plant operation, and such an assumption is not directly tied to the extended outage time since multiple outages can occur so long as a single outage does not exceed the allowed outage time The CFCU calculation assumed three occurrences of the maximum outage time per 18-month cycle. For this calculation, we multiplied the existing failure rate by the requested outage time. This better represents the intent of PSEG to use the extended allowed outage time to troubleshoot and repair emergent failures. The total outage time during a year could be theoretically more or less than this seven days, under both current and requested license conditions. The approach used in the LAR assumes the existing PRA unavailability is increased by a factor equal to the extension factor and more fairly represents expected inverter unavailability based on historic and planned plant operation. This bounds the risk increase because other conservatisms involved in the calculation such as the overall plant fire ignition frequency and the underlying assumption that every maintenance action uses the entire AOT.
Since an inverter is not expected to be removed for maintenance unless it has failed, another approach would be to develop the unavailability or fractional exposure time based on the expected failure rates of the inverters. We can use the failure rates for inverters present in the Salem PRA model (5.6E-6 failures/hr) to estimate the number of expected failures per year that would allow the use of the increased outage time. Then assuming a seven-day outage for every inverter failure, the average unavailability of an inverter under the increased AOT would be:
Q = 5.6E-6 failures/hr
- 24 hr /day = 9.41E-4 In the NRC equation for CDFsurrogate, this value captures the purpose of the UAINV and (TAOT/TCYC) terms, so that CDF = 0.462/yr
- 2.83E-4 = 1.23 E-7/yr Assuming no CDF from the base case inverter unavailability, the maximum CDF is 1.23E-7/yr, with the assumption that all fires cause the worst-case failures of all other trains of inverters without failing the one inverter train with the worst-case backup system (inverter 1D). Within the uncertainties of these surrogate CDF calculations, this number is not essentially different from the calculation in the LAR that estimated 8.48E-8/yr.
This new estimated value (1.23E-7/yr) is within the Region III area of RG 1.174 for CDF, and would decrease below that level if any of the conservatisms were reduced or removed. For LERF, while this value is within Region II if all CDF is assumed to also be LERF, reduction or removal of any of the conservatisms would decrease the maximum possible impact from Region II to Region III. One such reduction would be the use of a reduced fire ignition frequency that accounts for the likelihood of reactor trip and other necessary failures, similar to what was accepted for the CFCU calculation. Another reduction comes from analytic experience.
Typically, for large dry containments and scenarios other than steam generator tube rupture or 5
LR-N18-0112 interfacing system LOCA, the LERF is much lower than the CDF. Either reduction would reduce the maximum estimated LERF into Region III as well. Therefore, either calculation for both CDF and LERF due to fire is sufficiently conservative to support the proposed inverter AOT extension.
In summary, the estimated maximum CDF due to fire for the inverter extension is shown to be within the Region III area of RG 1.174, and the LERF due to fire is expected be in the Region III area if the intentional conservatisms in all of the calculations are considered. The differences between the inverter calculation and the CFCU calculation are driven by the different operating conditions for the different components. PSEGs approach is to not schedule any online PM outage for inverters. The CFCU calculation assumes a number of intentional entries into the CFCU outage condition, while the inverter calculation assumes that an outage condition would only occur following an unexpected failure.
Question 2 (APLA RAI-2)
The entry for item (l) in Table A-7 of Attachment 2 to the LAR dated May 16, 2018, notes that the Salem PRA Model of Record (MOR) (SA115A) was only completed for Salem Unit 1 and it relies on Unit 2 equipment for certain support functions.
RAI-2
Please provide justification that the cross-unit support functions, as well as the asymmetries, in the Salem PRA MOR (SA115A) are adequately accounted for such that application to Salem Unit 2 is appropriate.
Response
The following list provides a summary of the major differences noted between the two Salem units:
The Service Water (SW) air-operated valves (AOVs) that service the #12A and #12B Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchangers for Unit 1 require a control air dependency for successful operation whereas the #22 SW AOVs in Unit 2 do not. The equipment differences are small and the scenarios affected are not related to the inverters and their function to supply 115v AC power.
The power dependencies for the SW pumps and associated motor operated valves (MOVs) are not symmetric between the two units. For example, the 4kV AC vital bus A on Unit 1 powers the 15 and 16 SW pumps, while the A vital bus on Unit 2 powers the 21 and 22 SW pumps. The vital bus power supplies are symmetric on each unit, so there is no risk difference.
The Unit 2 chemical and volume control system (CVCS) pumps do not require CCW cooling for their mechanical seals while the Unit 1 CVCS pumps do during normal operation. However, this particular CCW dependency is not modeled in the PRA since it is not required for successful operation of the CVCS pumps during the injection phase of an accident condition since water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) is relatively cool.
The three Station Air Compressors (SACs) and Instrument Air system are shared between the two units, with SACs #1 and #3 powered from Unit 1 Group buses and SAC 6
LR-N18-0112 2 powered from a Unit 2 Group bus. All three SACs are physically located in the Unit 1 Turbine Building on the 100 elevation. The SACs are not credited in LOOP scenarios and the group buses are highly reliable in non-LOOP transient and LOCA scenarios.
The four Demineralized Water (DM) pumps are also physically located in the Unit 1 Turbine Building on the 100 elevation and provide DM water for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
The power supplies are such that the #1 and #3 pumps are powered from a Unit 1 Group bus while the #2 pump is powered from a Unit 2 Group bus. The Auxiliary DM pump is powered from a Unit 1 vital bus. These pumps are important to refill the AFW storage tank late in many scenarios; however the diverse power supplies to pumps and diverse water sources for steam generator (SG) cooling ensure that this arrangement does not affect risk calculations.
The Station Blackout (SBO) Air Compressor is located in the yard in close proximity to the Unit 2 Turbine Building and services the Control Air system for both units when required via a connection on the discharge side of the Unit 2 Emergency Control Air Compressor. This defense-in-depth feature relies on long term human actions that are appropriate for either plants risk profile.
Unit 2 contains a semi-automatic transfer of suction from the RWST to the containment sump, whereas Unit 1 requires manual manipulations based on visual indication in the control room to perform a swap over to sump recirculation. The Unit 1 configuration is modeled in the PRA, which is conservative with regard to the Unit 2 configuration because the probability of human failure is lower on Unit 2.
Operations personnel are trained such that, with the exception of the semi-automatic transfer of sump suction, no differences would exist with the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) between the two units.
The above noted differences between the two units are small and/or conservative, so model refinement is necessary to account for these unit differences.
The following summarizes the Unit 2 support systems that have been modeled in the PRA for Unit 1. Since a fully developed Unit 2 model with electrical power dependencies that includes logic for the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators was not available, power dependencies were developed to account for scenario-specific vital bus unavailability.
The Unit 1 PRA model logic for SW includes the ability to cross-tie the Unit 2 SW system for recovery of the Unit 1 SW headers should the Unit 1 SW supply become unavailable.
An event representing the unavailability of the Unit 2 SW system was used as a surrogate event to represent Unit 2 SW dependencies.
The control room ventilation model logic for Unit 1 also makes use of Unit 2 ventilation fans and other room cooling equipment, with electrical dependencies that include logic for specific Unit 2 bus failures. Electrical failures that include dependence on the Unit 2 emergency AC power sources were not modeled since a full Unit 2 PRA model was not available for use. However, non-vital electrical dependencies were modeled as being dependent on offsite power sources.
The Unit 1 to Unit 2 CVCS cross-tie for long-term use of Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal injection was modeled to support those scenarios in which the Unit 1 RCP seal injection capability was lost and long-term recovery via use of this cross-tie would be viable.
7
LR-N18-0112 As noted above for the Unit 1 to Unit 2 differences, the use of these Unit 2 support dependencies are adequately addressed by the Unit 1 model to fairly represent the as-built as-operated dual unit site with a single unit PRA model.
8