Susceptibility of Containment Sump Recirculation Gate Valves to Pressure Locking ML031060320 Person / Time Site:
Beaver Valley , Millstone , Hatch , Monticello , Calvert Cliffs , Dresden , Davis Besse , Peach Bottom , Browns Ferry , Salem , Oconee , Mcguire , Nine Mile Point , Palisades , Palo Verde , Perry , Indian Point , Fermi , Kewaunee , Catawba , Harris , Wolf Creek , Saint Lucie , Point Beach , Oyster Creek , Watts Bar , Hope Creek , Grand Gulf , Cooper , Sequoyah , Byron , Pilgrim , Arkansas Nuclear , Braidwood , Susquehanna , Summer , Prairie Island , Columbia , Seabrook , Brunswick , Surry , Limerick , North Anna , Turkey Point , River Bend , Vermont Yankee , Crystal River , Haddam Neck , Ginna , Diablo Canyon , Callaway , Vogtle , Waterford , Duane Arnold , Farley , Robinson , Clinton , South Texas , San Onofre , Cook , Comanche Peak , Yankee Rowe , Maine Yankee , Quad Cities , Humboldt Bay , La Crosse , Big Rock Point , Rancho Seco , Zion , Midland , Bellefonte , Fort Calhoun , FitzPatrick , McGuire , LaSalle , Fort Saint Vrain , Shoreham , Satsop , Trojan , Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant , Crane Issue date:
02/28/1995 From:
Grimes B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation To:
References IN-95-014 , NUDOCS 9502270218Download: ML031060320 (8)
Similar Documents at
Beaver Valley ,
Millstone ,
Hatch ,
Monticello ,
Calvert Cliffs ,
Dresden ,
Davis Besse ,
Peach Bottom ,
Browns Ferry ,
Salem ,
Oconee ,
Mcguire ,
Nine Mile Point ,
Palisades ,
Palo Verde ,
Perry ,
Indian Point ,
Fermi ,
Kewaunee ,
Catawba ,
Harris ,
Wolf Creek ,
Saint Lucie ,
Point Beach ,
Oyster Creek ,
Watts Bar ,
Hope Creek ,
Grand Gulf ,
Cooper ,
Sequoyah ,
Byron ,
Pilgrim ,
Arkansas Nuclear ,
Braidwood ,
Susquehanna ,
Summer ,
Prairie Island ,
Columbia ,
Seabrook ,
Brunswick ,
Surry ,
Limerick ,
North Anna ,
Turkey Point ,
River Bend ,
Vermont Yankee ,
Crystal River ,
Haddam Neck ,
Ginna ,
Diablo Canyon ,
Callaway ,
Vogtle ,
Waterford ,
Duane Arnold ,
Farley ,
Robinson ,
Clinton ,
South Texas ,
San Onofre ,
Cook ,
Comanche Peak ,
Yankee Rowe ,
Maine Yankee ,
Quad Cities ,
Humboldt Bay ,
La Crosse ,
Big Rock Point ,
Rancho Seco ,
Zion ,
Midland ,
Bellefonte ,
Fort Calhoun ,
FitzPatrick ,
McGuire ,
LaSalle ,
Fort Saint Vrain ,
Shoreham ,
Satsop ,
Trojan ,
Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant ,
Crane Category:NRC Information Notice
[Table view] The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] OR [[:Crane]] </code>.
UNITED STATES
Contents
1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
2 February 28, 1995
3 SUSCEPTIBILITY OF CONTAINMENT SUMP
4 Addressees
5 Purpose
6 Description of Circumstances
6.1 At Millstone Unit 2, failure of both of these valves
6.2 The sump piping
6.3 The Millstone Unit 2 containment sump
6.4 Therefore, it might
6.5 Several generic
6.6 The NRC staff
6.7 In addition to pressure
6.8 Related NRC generic communications are
6.9 Related Generic Communications
6.10 Brian K. Grimes, Director
6.11 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
6.12 Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR
6.13 Chu Y. Liang, NRR
6.14 Eugene M. Kelly, Region I
6.15 List of Reently Issued NRC Information Notices
6.16 February 28, 1995 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
6.17 Potential for Data
6.18 Affect Protection System
6.19 Potentially Nonconforming
6.20 Failure of Condensate
6.21 Straightening Device
6.22 Automatic Engineered
6.23 Potential for Loss of
6.24 Safety Features
6.25 Use of Inappropriate
6.26 Pipe Support Evaluation
6.27 Inaccurate Data Obtained
6.28 Flow Measurement Instruments
6.29 Breakage during Preparation
6.30 All holders of OLs or CPs
6.31 All holders of OLs or CPs
6.32 All holders of OLs or CPs
6.33 All holders of OLs or CPs
6.34 All holders of OLs or CPs
6.35 All holders of OLs or CPs
6.36 All USNRC medical licensees
6.37 February 28, 1995
6.38 Brian K. Grimes, Director
6.39 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
6.40 Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR
6.41 Chu Y. Liang, NRR
6.42 Eugene M. Kelly, Region I
6.43 List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
6.44 Casto, Region II
6.45 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
6.46 February xx, 1995
6.47 Brian K. Grimes, Director
6.48 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
6.49 Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR
6.50 Chu Y. Liang, NRR
6.51 Eugene M. Kelly, Region I
6.52 Casto, Region II
6.53 Westerman, Region IV
6.54 LUsIcoIncurn
6.55 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
6.56 February xx, 1995
6.57 Brian K. Grimes, Director
6.58 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
6.59 Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR
6.60 Eugene M. Kelly, Region I
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON , D.C.
20555-0001
February 28, 1995
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 95-14:
SUSCEPTIBILITY OF CONTAINMENT SUMP
RECIRCULATION GATE VALVES TO PRESSURE LOCKING
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to alert addressees to the potential susceptibility of containment sump
recirculation gate valves to pressure locking at nuclear plants.
It is
expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to
their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar events
or problems.
However, suggestions contained in this information notice are
not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is
required.
Description of Circumstances
On January 26, 1995, Northeast Nuclear Energy Co., the licensee for Unit 2 of
the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, determined that both containment sump
recirculation motor-operated gate valves may experience pressure locking
during a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA ) and fail in the closed
position.
This condition was discovered by the licensee after re-evaluation
of all Unit 2 valves to address weaknesses in their previous evaluation
criteria identified by the NRC Motor-Operated Valve Inspection at Millstone
Unit 1 in March 1994.
At Millstone Unit 2, failure of both of these valves
would make a water source for the emergency core cooling system (ECCS ) and
containment spray unavailable during the recirculation phase of the LOCA (the
recirculation phase occurs not sooner than about 45 minutes after the start of
an event).
Millstone Unit 2 is a pressurized water reactor with two containment sump
recirculation valves (one in each of two parallel paths).
The sump piping
paths join piping from the refueling water storage tank (RWST ) leading to low
pressure safety injection pump suction.
The Millstone Unit 2 containment sump
recirculation valves are parallel-wedge gate valves that are normally closed, leaving the containment sump side of the valve dry and exposed to the
containment.
The pump side of each valve is normally pressurized to
approximately 345 kPa [35 psig] due to the static head of the RWST .
The RWST
water may leak past the pumpside gate valve disc and may fill the valve bonnet
with water.
9502270218
3/I HS
q-rc
9502270218
\\
31Jq
IN 95-14 February 28, 1995 During a postulated LOCA at Millstone Unit 2, the sump side of each
containment sump recirculation valve could be exposed to sump water (reactor
coolant) with temperatures as high as 143 'C [289 OF] for some time prior to
the valve being required to open to allow ECCS and containment spray
recirculation cooling. Heating of the valve could heat the water trapped in
the water-filled valve bonnet . A pressure increase of 410 kPa per 0C [33 psi
per OF] is predicted.
The licensee has determined that a bonnet pressure of
1138 kPa [150 psig] (requiring only about a 3 'C [5 OF] temperature rise in a
water solid bonnet ) may prevent the valve from opening.
Therefore, it might
not be possible to establish recirculation cooling following a LOCA .
Millstone Unit 2 has been in a cold shutdown condition since October 1994.
The licensee is considering various modifications to the valves to prevent
pressure locking to be implemented prior to restart.
Discussion
Pressure locking may occur in flexible-wedge and parallel-wedge gate valves
when fluid becomes pressurized within the valve bonnet and the actuator is not
capable of overcoming the additional thrust requirements resulting from the
differential pressure created across both valve discs by the pressurized
fluid.
For example, the fluid may enter the valve bonnet (1) during normal
open and close valve cycling, (2) when a fluid differential pressure across a
disc causes the disc to move slightly away from the seat, creating a path to
either increase the fluid pressure or fill the bonnet with fluid, or (3) for a
steamline valve, when differential pressure exists across the disc and the
valve orientation permits condensate to collect and enter the bonnet .
Pressure locking can cause a power-operated valve to fail to open, resulting
in an inability of the associated safety train or system to perform its safety
function.
Pressure locking represents a potential common-cause failure mode
that can render redundant trains of certain safety-related systems or multiple
safety systems incapable of performing their safety functions.
The industry has issued several event reports describing safety-related gate
valves failing to operate because of pressure locking .
Several generic
industry communications have given guidance for identifying susceptible valves
and for performing appropriate preventive and corrective measures.
In March 1993, the NRC issued NUREG-1275 , Volume 9, "Pressure Locking and
Thermal Binding of Gate Valves." Further, the NRC staff held a public
workshop on February 4, 1994, to discuss the subject. A summary of the public
workshop is available in the NRC Public Document Room and contains both
information on evaluating the potential for pressure locking and actions taken
in response to the identification of susceptible valves.
The NRC staff
presentation at the workshop identified containment sump recirculation valves
as potentially susceptible to pressure locking .
In addition to pressure
locking events at U.S. nuclear power plants, the French experience was
documented in NUREG/CP-0137 , "Proceedings of the Third NRC/ASME Symposium on
Valve and Pump Testing," in July 1994.
Related NRC generic communications are
listed later in this notice.
IN 95-14 February 28, 1995 The two primary safety issues related to the pressure locking scenario
described above are the potential loss of access to a water source for long- term reactor core cooling and the potential loss of a water source for
containment spray . During a postulated large-break LOCA or under some small- break LOCA scenarios, the opening of the sump valves is relied on to set up a
flow path from the sump to the safety injection and containment spray pumps.
In this alignment, the safety injection pumps recirculate the water between
the sump and the reactor for long-term core cooling and the containment spray
pumps draw water from the sump to provide containment spray for the control of
containment pressure, temperature, and fission products. If the sump valves
are unable to open due to pressure locking , the core may be damaged in a short
time. The containment pressure and temperature may also increase upon loss of
containment spray .
This could lead to containment failure.
The loss of
containment spray would also cause reduction of fission product scrubbing
inside the containment. Additionally, the safety injection and containment
spray pumps may be damaged by pump cavitation if the sump valves remain closed
and the RWST is emptied.
Related Generic Communications
On April 2, 1992, the NRC staff issued Information Notice (IN) 92-26 ,
"Pressure Locking of Motor-Operated Flexible Wedge Gate Valves."
IN 92-26 referenced earlier NRC staff documents on pressure locking .
In Enclosure 1 to Supplement 6 (March 8, 1994) of Generic Letter (GL) 89-10 ,
"Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," the NRC staff
alerted licensees to the issue of pressure locking of gate valves.
The staff
also described an acceptable approach for licensees to address the potential
for pressure locking of motor-operated gate valves as part of their GL 89-10
programs.
IN 95-14 February 28, 1995 This information notice requires no specific action or written response.
If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR ) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Project Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts:
Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR
(301) 415-2794
Chu Y. Liang, NRR
(301) 415-2878
Eugene M. Kelly, Region I
(610) 337-5111 Attachment:
List of Reently Issued NRC Information Notices
Koe
Attachment
IN 95-14
February 28, 1995 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issuance
Issued to
95-13
95-12
95-11
95-10
Supp. 1
95-10
95-09
95-08
Potential for Data
Collection Equipment to
Affect Protection System
Performance
Potentially Nonconforming
Fasteners Supplied by
A&G Engineering II, Inc.
Failure of Condensate
Piping Because of Erosion/
Corrosion at a Flow-
Straightening Device
Potential for Loss of
Automatic Engineered
Safety Features
Actuation
Potential for Loss of
Automatic Engineered
Safety Features
Actuation
Use of Inappropriate
Guidelines and Criteria
for Nuclear Piping and
Pipe Support Evaluation
and Design
Inaccurate Data Obtained
with Clamp-On Ultrasonic
Flow Measurement Instruments
Radiopharmaceutical Vial
Breakage during Preparation
02/24/95
02/21/95
02/24/95 Al 1 for
holders of OLs or CPs
nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
02/10/95
02/03/95
01/31/95
01/30/95
01/27/95
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All USNRC medical licensees
authorized to use byproduct
material for diagnostic
procedures.
95-07 OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 95-14
February 28, 1995
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR ) project manager.
Snalfstdned by Beran IC .
Grimes
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Project Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts:
Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR
(301) 415-2794
Chu Y. Liang, NRR
(301) 415-2878
Eugene M. Kelly, Region I
(610) 337-5111 Attachments:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: 95-14.in
E-mailed to
E-mailed to
E.
E.
C.
J.
Kelly of Region I on 2/23/95 for review and comment.
Brown, AEOD , on 2/23/95 for review and comment.
Casto, Region II
Jacobson, Region III
T. Westerman, Region IV
OFFICE
OECB:DOPS
ADM:PUB
SC/OECB:DOPS
C/SRXB:DSSA
NAME
EBenner
RSanders*
EGoodwin*
RJones*
DATE
2/23/95
2/23/95 J
2/24/95
2/24/95 OFFICE
EMEB:DE
C/EMEB:DE
OECB:DOPS
C/OECB:DOPS
NAME
TScarbrough*
RWessman*
RKiessel*
AChaffee*
DATE
2/24/95
2/24/95
2/24/95
2/24/95 OFFICE
D/ t S/ /
NAME
1 DATE
7-/
7 /95
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 95-XX
February xx, 1995
This information notice requires no specific action or written response.
If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR ) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Project Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts:
Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR
(301) 415-2794
Chu Y. Liang, NRR
(301) 415-2878
Eugene M. Kelly, Region I
(610) 337-5111 Attachments:
1. Figure 1, Pressure Locking Flexible-Wedge Gate Valve
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\EJB1\\PRESSLOC.IN
E-mailed to
E-mailed to
E .
E .
C .
J .
Kelly of Region I on 2/23/95 for review and comment.
Brown, AEOD , on 2/23/95 for review and comment.
Casto, Region II
Jacobson, Region III
Westerman, Region IV
T.
C.
I-
-
'See previo
LUsIcoIncurn
OFFICE
OECB:DOPS
ADM:PUB
SC/OECB:DOPS
C/SRXB:pF A
NAME
EBennerI
l
RSanders*
EGoodwin 0#
RJones m
A
l DATE
2/23/95 '
2/23/95
_/_2__/95
2_ /95 OFFICE
-EV!;
IE
hC
EB:DE
OECB:DOPS X d
ClOux:
NAME E
FScarbrough
RWeW
ea"
RKiessel
A C f
ge fn
lDT
/.2 I/95
-L/Z4- /95
21/2 f/95
i/95 OFFICE
D/DOPS
,
NAME
BGrimes
DATE
I /
/95
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Y
IN 95-XX
February xx, 1995
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR ) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Project Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts:
Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR
(301) 415-2794
Eugene M. Kelly, Region I
(610) 337-5111 Attachments:
1. Figure 1, Pressure Locking Flexible-Wedge Gate Valve
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME:
G:\\EJB1\\PRESSLOC.DBS
OFFICE
OECB:DOPS
ADM:PUB -
SC/OECB:DOPS
EMEB:DE
NAME
EBenner
J
' _I EGoodwin
TScarbrough
DATE
/
/95
/ 23 /95
/
/95
1 /
95 OFFICE
C/EMEB:DE
OECB:DOPS
C/OECB:DOPS
D/DOPS
NAME
RWessman
RKiessel
AChaffee
BGrimes
DATE
i
/
/I5
/
/95
/
/95 D /
/95 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
list Information Notice 1995-01, DOT Safety Advisory: High Pressure Aluminum Seamless and Aluminum Composite Hoop-Wrapped Cylinders (4 January 1995 , Topic : Brachytherapy )Information Notice 1995-02, Problems With General Electric CR2940 Contact Blocks In Medium-Voltage Circuit Breakers (17 January 1995 )Information Notice 1995-02, Problems with General Electric CR2940 Contact Blocks in Medium-Voltage Circuit Breakers (17 January 1995 )Information Notice 1995-02, Problems With General Electric Cr2940 Contact Blocks In Medium-Voltage Circuit Breakers (17 January 1995 )Information Notice 1995-03, Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventory and Potential Loss of Emergency Mitigation Functions While in a Shutdown Condition (3 July 2000 , Topic : Reactor Vessel Water Level , Water hammer )Information Notice 1995-04, Excessive Cooldown and Depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System Following Loss of Offsite Power (11 October 1996 , Topic : Safe Shutdown , Shutdown Margin , Probabilistic Risk Assessment , Loss of Offsite Power , Troxler )Information Notice 1995-05, Undervoltage Protection Relay Settings Out of Tolerance Due to Test Equipment Harmonics (20 January 1985 )Information Notice 1995-06, Potential Blockage of Safety-Related Strainers by Material Brought Inside Containment (25 January 1995 , Topic : Foreign Material Exclusion )Information Notice 1995-07, Radiopharmaceutical Vial Breakage During Preparation (27 January 1995 )Information Notice 1995-08, Inaccurate Data Obtained With Clamp-On Ultrasonic Flow Measurement Instruments (30 January 1995 )Information Notice 1995-08, Inaccurate Data Obtained with Clamp-On Ultrasonic Flow Measurement Instruments (30 January 1995 )Information Notice 1995-09, Use of Inappropriate Guidelines and Criteria for Nuclear Piping and Pipe Support Evaluation and Design (31 January 1995 , Topic : Operability Determination )Information Notice 1995-10, Potential for Loss of Automatic Engineered Safety Features Actuation (3 February 1995 , Topic : High Energy Line Break )Information Notice 1995-11, Failure of Condensate Piping Because of Erosion/Corrosion at Flow-Straightening Device (24 February 1995 , Topic : Feedwater Heater )Information Notice 1995-12, Potentially Nonconforming Fasteners Supplied by A&G Engineering II, Inc (21 February 1995 )Information Notice 1995-13, Potential for Data Collection Equipment to Affect Protection System Performance (24 February 1995 )Information Notice 1995-14, Susceptibility of Containment Sump Recirculation Gate Valves to Pressure Locking (28 February 1995 )Information Notice 1995-15, Inadequate Logic Testing of Safety-Related Circuits (7 March 1995 )Information Notice 1995-16, Vibration Caused by Increased Recirculation Flow in a Boiling Water Reactor (9 March 1995 )Information Notice 1995-17, Reactor Vessel Top Guide and Core Plate Cracking (10 March 1995 , Topic : Safe Shutdown , Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking , Stress corrosion cracking )Information Notice 1995-18, Potential Pressure-Locking of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves (15 March 1995 )Information Notice 1995-19, Failure of Reactor Trip Breaker to Open Because of Cutoff Switch Material Lodged in the Trip Latch Mechanism (22 March 1995 )Information Notice 1995-20, Failures in Rosemount Pressure Transmitters Due to Hydrogen Permeation Into Sensor Cell (22 March 1995 )Information Notice 1995-21, Unexpected Degradation of Lead Storage Batteries (20 April 1995 )Information Notice 1995-22, Hardened or Contaminated Lubricant Cause Metal-Clad Circuit Breaker Failures (21 April 1995 , Topic : Hardened grease )Information Notice 1995-23, Control Room Staffing Below Minimum Regulatory Requirements (24 April 1995 , Topic : Shift Technical Advisor )Information Notice 1995-24, Summary of Licensed Operator Requalification Inspection Program Findings (25 April 1995 , Topic : Job Performance Measure , License Renewal )Information Notice 1995-25, Valve Failure During Patient Treatment with Gamma Stereotactic Radiosurgery Unit (11 May 1995 , Topic : Overdose )Information Notice 1995-26, Defect in Safety-Related Pump Parts Due to Inadequate Treatment (31 May 1995 , Topic : Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking , Stress corrosion cracking )Information Notice 1995-27, NRC Review of Nuclear Energy Institute, Thermo-Lag 330-1 Combustibility Evaluation Methodology Plant Screening Guide (31 May 1995 , Topic : Safe Shutdown , Fire Barrier , Exemption Request , Fire Protection Program )Information Notice 1995-28, Emplacement of Support Pads for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations at Reactor Sites (5 June 1995 , Topic : Safe Shutdown , Tornado Missile , Safe Shutdown Earthquake , Earthquake )Information Notice 1995-29, Oversight of Design and Fabrication Activities for Metal Components Used in Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems (7 June 1995 , Topic : Nondestructive Examination )Information Notice 1995-30, Susceptibility of Low-Pressure Coolant Injection Valves to Pressure Locking (3 August 1995 , Topic : Hydrostatic , Power-Operated Valves , Overspeed )Information Notice 1995-31, Motor-Operated Valve Failure Caused by Stem Protector Pipe Interference (9 August 1995 , Topic : Overspeed )Information Notice 1995-32, Thermo-Lag 330-1 Flame Spread Test Results (10 August 1995 , Topic : Fire Barrier , Overspeed )Information Notice 1995-33, Switchgear Fire and Partial Loss of Offsite Power at Waterford Generating Station, Unit 3 (23 August 1995 , Topic : Loss of Offsite Power , Overspeed )Information Notice 1995-34, Air Actuator and Supply Air Regulator Problems in Copes-Vulcan Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valves (25 August 1995 , Topic : Loss of Offsite Power , Overspeed )Information Notice 1995-35, Degraded Ability of Steam Generators to Remove Decay Heat by Natural Circulation (28 August 1995 , Topic : Loss of Offsite Power , Overspeed )Information Notice 1995-36, Potential Problems with Post-Fire Emergency Lighting (29 August 1995 , Topic : Safe Shutdown , Emergency Lighting , Loss of Offsite Power , Exemption Request , Overspeed , Manual Operator Action )Information Notice 1995-37, Inadequate Offsite Power System Voltages During Design-Basis Events (7 September 1995 , Topic : Loss of Offsite Power )Information Notice 1995-38, Degradation of Boraflex Neutron Absorber in Spent Fuel Storage Racks (8 September 1995 , Topic : Loss of Offsite Power )Information Notice 1995-39, Brachytherapy Incidents Involving Treatment Planning Errors (19 September 1995 , Topic : Loss of Offsite Power , Brachytherapy , Underdose )Information Notice 1995-40, Supplemental Information to GL-95-03, Circumferential Cracking of Steam Generator Tubes (20 September 1995 , Topic : Hydrostatic , Nondestructive Examination )Information Notice 1995-41, Degradation of Ventilation System Charcoal Resulting from Chemical Cleaning of Steam Generators (22 September 1995 , Topic : Loss of Offsite Power )Information Notice 1995-42, Commission Decision on Resolution of Generic Issue 23, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure (22 September 1995 , Topic : Loss of Offsite Power )Information Notice 1995-43, Failure of Bolt-Locking Device on Reactor Coolant Pump Turning Vane (28 September 1995 )Information Notice 1995-44, Ensuring Compatible Use of Drive Cables Incorporating Industrial Nuclear Company Ball-Type Male Connectors (26 September 1995 )Information Notice 1995-45, American Power Service Falsification of American Society for Nondestructive Testing Certificates (4 October 1995 , Topic : Commercial Grade )Information Notice 1995-46, Unplanned, Undetected Release of Radioactivity from the Exhaust Ventilation System of a Boiling Water Reactor (6 October 1995 )Information Notice 1995-47, Unexpected Opening of a Safety/Relief Valve & Complications Involving Suppression Pool Cooling Strainer Blockage (30 November 1995 )... further results