Information Notice 1995-26, Defect in Safety-Related Pump Parts Due to Inadequate Treatment
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.-C, -20555-0001---
-
May 31, 1995
DEFECT IN SAFETY-RELATED PUMP PARTS DUE TO
INADEQUATE HEAT TREATMENT
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to alert addressees to a potential for pump failure as a result of
inadequate heat treatment of pump parts. It is expected that recipients will
review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider
actions, as appropriates to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions
contained-in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no
specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
On October 19, 1994, Westinghouse issued a written report pursuant to Part 21 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (Part 21) (Accession No.
9411010251), regarding a defect found in the "JHF" model safety injection
pumps that were manufactured by Ingersoll-Dresser Pump (IDP) Company.
The
defect comprises several axial cracks in the pressure-reducing sleeve locknut, which is made of Type 416 stainless steel.
The failure mechanism was
attributed to stress corrosion cracking which primarily was caused by a
martensite phase hardness of 47 Rc (Rockwell Scale C).
It is known that 400
series stainless steel with a hardness in excess of 40 Rc is highly
susceptible to intergranular stress corrosion cracking in aqueous
environments. The heat treatment for this pump part was specified to be
27-32 Rc.
Although the problem was at first thought to be limited to the locknut on the
pressure-reducing sleeve within the IDP pump, Westinghouse and IDP have
determined that other pump parts may be affected by the same problem. On
February 20, 1995, Westinghouse issued a final Part 21 report which indicated
that (1) in addition to the subject locknut, other pump parts could be
affected by the same problem and (2) the problem is limited to IDP pump parts
that were made of Type 416 stainless steel, processed under heat treatment
process "HT 21," and that were taken from heat numbers 15899 and 28144.
The detailed Westinghouse final Part 21 report (Accession No. 9503020053) on
this issue is attached (Attachment 1).
PDR Tsk
joI4e ?s-O26 f5'd
An
9505240309 I'\\
- )
<_IN
95-26
May 31, 1995 Discussion
As noted in the attached Westinghouse Part 21 report, the suspect parts are
used in intermediate-head safety injection pumps, auxiliary feedwater pumps, and charging/high-head safety injection pumps in various plants.
The defect
in these pump parts, if not corrected, could result in pump failure.
The loss
of these pumps during a design-basis accident could affect accident
mitigation.
Some of these affected pumps have been in operation for more than 10 years.
Because of the importance of these pumps to plant safety, Westinghouse has
recommended that the affected pump parts be replaced with the parts currently
recommended by IDP.
An IDP safety injection pump (model "JTCH") failed during a post-maintenance
test at Indian Point Unit 3 on February 19, 1995.
Inspection of the internal
components of the pump revealed that the locknut on the outboard shaft had
backed off about 6.35 mm [0.25 inch].
The loosened locknut allowed the pump
impellers to move axially, and allowed them to rub against the stationary
diffusers and the casing, and ultimately resulted in pump failure.
Although
the root cause of this failure is unrelated to the problem reported by
Westinghouse, a similar pump failure could occur if the locknut on the
pressure-reducing sleeve, mentioned in the Westinghouse Part 21 report, failed.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response.
If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Project Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts:
James
(301)
A. Davis, NRR
415-2713 Peter
(301)
C. Wen, NRR
415-2832 Attachments:
1. Westinghouse Part 21 Report, February 20, 1995
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
FEB 20 '95
11:Z?
FE ~~51127 FRMI
OPL LICENSING
TO enzime1ssisi.
Attachment 1
IN 95-26 FAXED 2/20/95 301/816-5151
May 31, 1995
NTD-NRC-95403 WevtlaOuse
EMr Sms
c,
.0t
wihf
Bectric Cpoaton
lo gn5 P:--JwfP PtmaWlli 15230-M5
Fabnrzy 20, 1995
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Atm: Documeat Corol Desk
Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Update to IOCFR21 Report Coutained an WeStitghouse Lae NTD-NRC-94-4320, dazed
10/19194 and Stats Report Contai
in Westinghouso Letter NTD.NRC-94-4361. dated
12/21/94 Reftence:
1.
Loner NTD-NRC-944320. N. I. Upanulo to Document control Dsk,
10/19194
2.
Ier ND-NRC-94-4361, N. J. Liparo to Document Control Desfk,
12/21194
3.
Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Ler, NSAL094-23. lO26)94 The following infmoo
is provided as an update to the 10 CFR 21 report that was previously
identified to You in References I and 2.
Reference I identified a defect, as defined under 1OCFR21, regarding the pressure reducing sleeve
locknut of the JHF Model Safety Lnjection Pump that was manfactured by Wersoll Dresser Pump
(DP) Company and supplied to seera nudear power plants by Westinghouse and tlP.
Westinghouse also notified the affeced licensees about the defe
via Reference 3.
Reference I Indicated that MIP would perform a review of dte applicable 400 series stainless steel
parts
applicable heat amets on other safety related pumps it Supplied to the nuclear power
industry to determine whether ths sisation could apply to other parts on other safety relazed pums.
Tbis review was completed on December IS, 1994.
Westinghouse dffed the NRC about the results of this review via Reference 2. The results of the
review indicated tda the failure mechanism appers to be limited to I)p pump par ta consist of
416 SS, processe
uder IIP heat teatent proces 'HT 21 and taken from [DP heat numbers
115899 and 28144. Aow. the review Indicated that additional pump parts may be susceptible to the
same ilure mechanism. Referece 2 indicted dt IDP would determine whether the failure of the
additional pump parts would prevent the applicable pump from performing its intended safey
funiction.
Mi review has been completed and ndictes tha some of the additional pump paru may also
constitute a defect, as defined in 10 CPR 21, whih could crae a Substantial safetr azard.
e
following repo provides more Inormation about thee additionat pump parts.
15rt.Jl-nm
INrf.
FEB 20 '95
11:27?
LR tPL LICENSIS
T
I'3018165151 P.9034O12
'
'
K~'
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EYALUA
IDP's evaluation results Indicate ho all 416 SS pars processed under EDP beat numbers OI899 and
n8144 are susceptible to the sae failure mechanism as the pressu reducing sleeve locimuts.
These pas hve been dvided ko three categories.
The firt categoy Includes pat which were supplied with the origil pump assembly and whose
fuilure could prevent the pump from peformhg Its
- neded safety fnction. These paut and the
applicable plants are Identified to Table 3. Also, now that dies. parts Include the pressure reducing
sleeve locknuts thar were the parts originly Identified In Referenice ,
Tbe second caegory includes pars which were ulied with the original pump and whose fillure
would n prevem the pump from performing its intended safety union. These pam are dif d
in Table 4. The pans should be replaced as a pruiden manean
activity. [t should be exmphasized
dtt the parts do not constitute defects pursuant to 10 CFR 21 since the faiure of the parts should
cot prevent the pump from performnig its Intended safety function. Howev, they are Included In
this letter to identify the results of the evaluations that are mentioned in References I and 2.
The third category Includes the parts which were supplied as replacemet pump pars and whose
failure could prevent the pump from performing its intended safety funcion. Most of the replacement
parts were supplied directly to the utilities by IDP. These parts and the applicable plants are
Identified in Table S. Please note da Table S has been divided into two lists. One list (Parts from
Identified Material') includes the replacement parts that are known to have been taken from beat
IS899 and 02814. The other list (-Paxts from Unidentifled Material-) includes those -wus
which
could have been manufaaured from either heam 1IS89 or 121844, based on the time of tanufacture, original maial specification and part size. However, there is no documentation to spifically
identify the bear number from which the pan was taken. Therefore, It was assumed that the parts
were taken from heat #15899 and 21844.
Tbe identification of the parts in Tables 3. 4 and S Is based on several reported part failures, a failure
analysis of failed parts and engineering Judgetnent. Duke Power Company reported two separate
failures (crackig of the pressure reducing sleeve locknuts on JHF model safety Injection pumps.
Both locknuts consisted of 416 SS and were processed under heat 11S899. Duke Power performed a
failure analysi on each locnt. The failure analysis indicated that the allure mechanism was stress
corrosion cracking. The analysis also indicated that each lout's susceptibility to stress corrosion
cracking was increased by a relatively high martenske phase hards which allegedly resulted from
a Insufficient tempering operation. A comparison of the Duke Power Failure analysis report and the
IDP beat trearmea specification an beat material certification Is provided In Table 1.
Table 1: Prauur Reducn Sleree Locknut - Comparison of Dukc Power Compaay Faiue
A&LysIs to MP Set Tretment SpodricatIon and Material C
cation
Hardness Mc)
First Locknu
Second Locknut
Falure Analysis - Bulk PhMse
35
32-33 Failure Analysis- Microhardness
4549
42-44 Heat Tremen 'H721 Specification
27-32 Heau #15899 MaerIl Certification Bulk Phase Hardness
27
.. £i _u
-.
-
.
FEB 20 '95
11-28 FROM OPL LCENSING
T0 813016165151
PMGE.0044012 The existne of two fures and the data In Table I provide a basis to condude that the locknuts are
defects as defined in 10 CFR 21. First, it should be nated diat 400 series SS with a hardness of
grea than 40 Rc Is very susccpdble to Wtergar sares corrosion cracig In aqueous
environment.
Table I indicates to for both lockuts die microbardness was higher than 40 Rc.
Also. Table I Indicates th for both lockmuts. the bulk phase hardness measured in the fallure
analysis was s*ifficandy hgher than tie bulk phase hardness provided on the material certification
sheer. It could n be determned why tese bulk phase hardness values are differect. Since, the
micbardoesi s sw aer than 40 Re, the bulk phase hardness diffae
ce could not be acribuced to
any specific reason. However, since the cracking was observed on each locknut. It was determlned
thar a1 parts from beat M15899 could be susceptible to the same failure.
In addition to the above, Duke Power Company recatdy discovered cracking on a spacer sleeve in
anther
IHF model safety Injection pump. The sc
sleeve consisted of 416 SS and was processed
under MDP bea treatment specfficaion HT 21". However, the spacer sleeve was taken from a
differe
beat. which was beat 128144. Duke Power performed a failure analysis on the spacer sleeve
and determined that the failure mechanism was also sress corrosion cracking. Also, the failure
anuJysis indicated that the spacer sleeve's hardness made the sleeve marginally acceptable for service
In aqueous environments. A comparison of the Duke Power Failur analysis report and the IDP heat
treatm specification and beat material cerificadion for the spacer sleeve Is provided in Table 2.
Table 2: Inpeller Spac Sleve - Comparison of Duke Pawer Company Failure Analysis
to IDP
ealt Treatment Specification and Mterial Certification
Hardness (Rc)
Failure Analysis - Bulk Phase
Failure Analysis - Microhardoess
33-39 Heat Treatment 'H12 I Specification
27-32 Heat 2n I" Material Cerification- Bulk Phase Hard
27
'he existence of the caced spacer sleeve ad the data in Table 2 provide a basis to condude dta the
space sleeve is a defect as defined In 10 CFR 21. Fist, the measured microhardness of 33.39 Rc is
higher than the material certification value of 27 Rc. It Is less than 40 Rc. but oonetheless Is
marginally sugtible to strs corrosion cacking In aqueous enviromens. The bulk phase
hardness tinge Is somewhat higher than the material ceruficadon value, but it Is still widhin the heat
treatment specification tange of 27-32 Rc. Based on this information, It was concluded that all parts
used from heat 028144 could be susceptible to the same failure mechanism.
Rially, and as mentioned. Tabes I and 2 IndIca that there Is some difference between the bulk
phase hardness value and the material certification values. There are no apparent reasons for tise
differences. Furthermore, Tables I and 2 indicate that tee are sifican differences between the
bulk hardness and the m icardoes values. tere are no appaeu reasons for these differences;
however, It may be postulated that the differences ar attributable to Insufficient tempering. IDP has
lu This value was determined from the uncracded spacer sleva on the same pump. Both the
ucracked and cacked sleaves were taken from Het M814.
LS47CTWF-.3M0W
FEB 20 '95
11:28 FROM tPL LICENS IN
TO 13s611sis1
PFOE.005l102 not received say additional repoq
s of pat fillures iavolving 416 SS uader het treatment specification
iHi
l'. Therefore. It was concluded that the filures should be limited to only those pars hi were
taken from beas #S899 and 121844.
Table 3 identfie Al pump pars that were orig
lly supplied with a pump. aken from heat #IS899 and 28144 ad wbose faillre could prevent the applicable pump from petforming us Ided safety
function. Table 4 Ideifies the pan that were orig
ly supplied with a pump, taken from beah
IS899 and 128144 and whose failure
,
preyeat the pump from performing its Intended
safety function. However, It Is ro
ended that the pas in Table 4 be replaced as a prudent
maintace practe. Finlly. Table S identifies the replacement pump parts that were either supplied
or believed to have ben suplied from heat 15899 and 028144 and whose failure could prevent the
applicable pump from pedoazfoig Is inded safety fucion.
The sfety sgniflcance for the failure of each par identified In Tables 3, 4 and 5 Is provided as
follows. The failure of the pats in Tables 3 and S could prevent the pump from operating. For
Table 4. the part failure should ot prevent the pump from operating. More deiled Information for
the pans identified in Tables 3, 4 and S will be provided directly to each utility.
The pumps identified in Table 3 are all JHIF model safety injection pumps. These pumps are used in
the intermediate head safety ijection system for the applicable plants. The loss of these pumps
during the shor torm mitigation period of a loss of coolant accident (LCA) would impair the plant's
ability to mitigate the consequences of the LOCA. The loss of the pump (or pumps) would reduce
the overall flow to the core, which could create a condition that Is a substanzial safety hazard.
The pumps Identified in Table S include the Iltermediate head safety injection, auxiliary feedwater, and charging/safety iWection pumps. The Intermediate head pumps are discussed above. 'he
auxiliary feedwater pumps are used to provide feedwa;er to the steam generazors during certain
accident conditions. The loss of these pumps during a feedwater line break accident would impair the
plant's ability to recover from the break. The loss of the pump (or pumps) would reduce the
available secondary side cooling, which could create a condition that is a substantial safety hazard.
The chargWsafety injection pumps are used In the high head safety Injection system for the
applicable plants. 'Me loss of these pumps during the short tamn
itgation phase of a LOCA
would
impair the plant's ability to mtigate the consequences of the LOCA, especiaUy for a small break
LOCA. The loss of the pump (or pumps) would reduce the overall flow to the core, which could
create a condition tha Is a substanial safety hazard.
The folowing recotmiors are provided for this Issue.
1.
Review Tables 3, 4 and S to daermine whether the plant has any parts that could be affected
by this failure meancsm. The parts Identified in Table 3 ad S are considered Wdecs as
defined in 10 CFR 21. Although the pans In Table 4 are not considered defects pursuant to
10 CFR 21, the pats in Table 4 should eventually be replaced as a prudent maintenance
practice since these pam are susceptible to the same fillure mechanism.
2.
Compare the information for the part In Tables 3, 4 and S to determine whether the pan is
currea
y installed on the pump. In me cae, this pan may have bern changed after the
par was supplied.
..
_.
_ . __,..
FEB 20 '95
11:29 FROM: OL LICENSING
T0 813018165151
PfiGE.
06/12
3.
For paru in Table 3 ad 5, if it is determined da the pump part Is currectly insuloed on the
pump, de the folowi
shoduld be considered. First. as Indicatd in Table s, if dte affected
part is a shaft sleeve compressio mm or a shaft sleeve collar, the part can be Wnspected for
cracifg without diassemby of the pump.
Alternatively. if the affected part can not be ispected without dissembly of dhe pump ad
it is ot practical to immediately disasumble the pump, then th pump operating history
should be reviewed relative to the
edanism for sws corosion crackig. Te mechanism
for nress corrosion crackig is dependent upon several fictors including, but ao limited to.
the amounr of sress placed on the part, the time the part is exposed to that stress, the time
exposed to an aqueous enviromen agd die physica dimensions of the part. By reviewing
these (aors. it may be possible to deaonsate dutt the pat filure is not imminent andlor
dt
the part will not fai In a manner hat will preven the pump from performng ts Intended
safety function. However, It Is ultimately recommended that the pan be replace with the
part curreay
rommded by IDP.
The above information is being concurrently trasmitted to affected utilities via supplement to
Westinghouse letter NSAL.94-023.
If you have any questions regarding this trmsiltal. please contact H. A. Sepp of my staff on
412/374-SS82.
Very truly yours.
.
Lparulo. Manager
Nuclear Safety Regulatory and Licensing Activities
"WF/P
cc:
R. E. IoinesrlDP
G. MorrisseyfiDP
LUXAW-1=f95
TABLDE 3 ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION PUMP PARKS FROM HEAT NISISS
AND M2144 I
_a
uF11I5lY
VINU
Ibntv Mod~d a
P -_
....
..
_
__=____-
run
Year Shipped
KalI
gPI2*.
Di~
v
. v ^
flia mu
eiutgc 'UTmnned=Me
Head Safety Injecdon)
49347
49348
49349
49350
Impeller Locmi
Preftwe Reducing
Sleeve Locknut
of-
4 9350=
i
---
-
-
-
-
i_
-l'WA
_w.
D
J
e
I ,A
wit VW I Ia 2 JHF 10 Stage (lwermedaste
Head Safety Injection)
49351
493S2
49353
493534
Impellro Locknut
Prcsswe Reducing
Sift" Lftkm
SDm%& e.
_
-
QIIu
I
I.
'r"_
rMNeb*
..
I LADO%..
I
A
I
APUPW
U VWm
MUMICu
I C A
JHF 10 Stae (IUnw
edae
Head Safety Injectlo)
49355
49356
49357
_49358
I Impeller Locnut
Pressure Redocing
Sleeve Locknut
1975
1975
1975
1976
1978
( iC
r
I
mT
I-
1'
t
I
L -
nq..L
ft- D-
LUrw
Caawba I & 2
.
l _
_
nB
10 Stg (Intermediate
Head Safety Injection)
49359
49360
49361
49362
-
-
_I
_
Impdler LocKn
Pres
Redoucing
Sleeve Lmckve
_
,
.
.
9I
I
Spacer Sleeves
X '_^wfh
G_
DX^_]
l
^
^
E
hAO l bWsoU
lrfUWOO I & 2 J1F 10 Slage (Intennedlate
Head Sarety Injection)
49762
49763
49764
4976S
_
_
Impeller Lockt
PressMe Reduifng
Sleeve Locknut
Spacef sleeves
49765 L
.h
I
I
Spacer Sleeves
I
m~l7I~w.wpI:b.O215- I
TABLR 3 . contired
ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION PUMP PARTS pROM
C
t
HEAT 1589 AND 928144
I
-1
utlrty
UdsX
Pmnp WMnAyp.&li
I
U ." ,
P u ,,
"a
Ia9.I
. ____
~.77
--
I1 a
.
-
1 I %UAUWuu1WVu
rwsvn
BYM I &Z
JHF 10 Stage (Intmerndlate
Head Safety Injection)
49758
49759
49760
Pan
Impelcer Lockhd
PTec Redtcing
Sleeve Lodkn
Spacer Skee
W97r
1hpped
197 I
I
__
ft..6.12- in-49761 I
I rU1zC ;crnco of
I1dba
MSie tn
I h 2 JHP 10 Stage (Sevice
Uhm)
49754
49755
49756
52D79 tpeller Lockv"
Presurc Reducing
Sleeve Lockmnt
&%__
I
I
I
su-Pa
--
.--
-
--
-I
I
52079 o
r
I-J
I~da
0
VT U II
%
?
1 LR
Operating Compity
W E L V!CK
J1W II Stage (Internediate
Head Safety Injection)
51647 S164R
I
Spaer Sleeves
Aortei
hstofp 4
! h..AS.
A .
A
i
..-
_
-
_
--
_
1977
1976
.'
. -.- j. v,l
n
L#aIUF
u1urf
ruwqcr
Lab
JIff
IU sbtge (Service
Unknown)
40746
Impeller Lackut
_I
-
sPac
meefts
fli A ? S . w p f: Ib .6 5 5 -S
2
4.
TABLR 4 ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION PUMP PARTS FROM 1RAT II59 AND #284q,
RACEMENT OF PART IS NOT MANDATORY
1r
I
.
I
_
Y
wlry
uits
?P~m
Modetsrwia m
vb_
777---
-
-I I _
I YeaoSr
pped
1im
r
I
.11 nsit 0.--
,
,
--
__
-
.aw.
.
I r au owt
tgmcnn
e
Head Safety Iection)
49347
49341
49349
49350
Split Rings
1975
.
I
--
I-.-
I
---
I1 TI-
YIS
.D
- a
.
^
a V b
Wrms ow a c. A
n
to tsag (intmete
lead Sukty Injecfto)
49351
49352
49353
493S4 a_
S
Rings
197S
S.
C
.
r
c- wa
ED&
Id
i
-9354
_
..
.
_
.
.
.
^
WUUR
rUlm
MUA=n
I &Z
JHF 10 Stage (lotermevise
Head Safety nJecdon)
49355
49356
49357
49358 Split Rings
1975 t-
-
fI
I0
WL_
.... I
_
_
.
^
I
110151 rxywur
%aWua
I a A
JHF 10 Stage (ftnemcast
Head Safty Injection)
49359
49360
49361
49362 I _
Split Rings
1976
__
_I
it71 w.wo'f:Ib- Ol2 - 3
TABLE 4 - continued
ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION PUMP PARTS FROM
M13AT 15S199 AND 2h144,
R1BPLACEMENT OF PART IS NOT MANDATORY
Wily
_Ut
Pump Mode/rw
R"
Year Sh
ODIRnOfM2ith
Suuidwood I & 2 JtW 10 Stage (lntemedlgc
Splitng
pis
Edison
Bead Safety Injection)
49762
49763
49764
49765 I
.
a
r
',
commaweft
Edison .
Byro l &2
)HP 10 Stage (ltefmrvedlae
Read Safety Injection)
49738
49759
49760
49761 Split Rings
1978
_
_
_
_ .
.
_
_
I
_LZ
^
_]
^
..
...
^
.
.
.
^
^
Pubfbc S1ecoe Of
Inmdi
Marte Hl) I & 2 IHF tO Stage (Service
Unknown)
49754
49755
49756
52079
_
Split Rings
1978
8Id
Wolf Creek Nuclear
Wolf Creek I
JSI II Slage (Intenmediase
Split Rngs
Operidg Compan
Head Safety Injection)
51647
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _
_ _ _ _
_ _ _ _
_ _ _
_ _ _ _
_ _ _5
1 6 4 8 Aeljet Noclear
Beals Awomc Power
IHF 10 SMage (Servie
Split Rings
Lab
Unknown)
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_ _ _
_ _ _ _4
9 7 5 6 mMn7AMwwe.Ib42195" 4
I
.
0
19 TABLES
REPLACEMENT PUMP PARTS FROM fEAT #35899 AND #2144 I
a
.
=k".
.
I
Utiniy
I
lUnif
IPa
om Heal
Rem 15 ad 221d
Meemw IN
u
Pmp Medeuseri i
Pa
rA
_We
..
a
.
-
l
Cbmmoawalth
Z n1 I
ITCH 10 Stage (Auxion
Pedwater)
45796
Impelier Lochmt
Sha Sleeve
COmpresWon NuM Rod
shR
Nut nT
It118/75
( i I
TL-
&--
--
.
-
-
I
rm-m rmm uenmuje Materma] (See Nnfr 1f
A
_
_
._
_
_
___
I
.
_
__
__
_
_.I
'aummu row"
Futey 2 U II Suage (ChtsrgI4SafM
Ilijection)
AmF)f
Shaft Sleeve CoUlar
I(Vt3n
- -
1 qgIWt
Edwon
Zbo I
ITCH 10 Stage (Auxily
Peedwer)
AV70A
Impeller Locl
ntad
4sr7S
- %
-.
a &U
i'
ID
-
I.
Edb"
Zion I
ITCH I( Stae (Auxullly
45796 ACN
Impeller L ,zt
9a
_
0CD
rn
Consolidated Edl
Idm PoW
JMTCH 10 Siage (Safety
InJecdion)
I
43461 Slu
--
-
43466 co
Duquesnm Ugiw
Beaver Valley I
U (Charing/Safety Injecton)
Shl
, __ ..
46351 nPller Lom Red
I
VI 1m76 f
aft Sleeve
it Sleeve Collar
kft Sleeve Collar
t n
MPower
Cook 2 u (ChalgnolStey Injection)
_145607 b
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9W3t6--
orM76 mffurt36..,,..zInst5 S
e
TABLE 5 - coutwd
RMPLACEMM PUMP PARTS PROM HEAT ISM9 AND P23144
vihity
Unm
Pump M~tgetSeddg
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prmw~
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I (CIM00S1fety hieefts)
haft Sleeve C.Uela
Elemctic
43603 Pdftc Oas & flel:Fti
Dobfo Comyn
r2 nH 1o Stae (Sdty
Shift Sle
nw7 JCdC
.epcso
!I
SK?
__________
_________
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J~r-H 10 Stage St
ShW Sleeve
old an
Intitdon)
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Sftf
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45613 Pebtle Sdem Becol
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Shift Steo coihi
4560.
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mv as4493 S
kv
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fled inde
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mntult em :899 or28144. The NB
letnhd
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tNIDEN
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wforlVf nid hIse beeno
dQmetxeo
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f
wht
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pVW Shp, Ctc,* but fo~ wtulcb
ere I no dcuetdn cn thie mdnlria t1 wA736~i~mj.
K>_
<_y Attachment 2 IN 95-26
May 31, 1995 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issuance
Issued to
94-61, Supp. 1
95-25
95-24
95-23
95-22
95-21
94-64, Supp. 1
95-18, Supp. 1
Corrosion of William
Power Gate Valve Disc
Holders
Valve Failure during
Patient Treatment with
Gamma Stereotactic
Radiosurgery Unit
Summary of Licensed
Operator Requalification
Inspection Program
Findings
Control Room Staffing
Below Minimum Regulatory
Requirements
Hardened or Contaminated
Lubricants Cause Metal
Clad Circuit Breaker
Failures
Unexpected Degradation
of Lead Storage Batteries
Reactivity Insertion
Transient and Accident
Limits for High Burnup
Fuel
Potential Pressure-Locking
of Safety-Related Power-
Operated Gate Valves
05/25/95
05/11/95
04/25/95
04/24/95
04/21/95
04/20/95
04/06/95
03/31/95
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Medical
Licensees.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors
and all licensed operators
and senior operators at
those reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
OL = Operating License
CP - Construction Permit
IN 95-26 K>
<
May 31, 1995 Discussion
As noted in the attached Westinghouse Part 21 report, the suspect parts are
used in intermediate-head safety injection pumps, auxiliary feedwater pumps, and charging/high-head safety injection pumps in various plants.
The defect
in these pump parts, if not corrected, could result in pump failure. The loss
of these pumps during a design-basis accident could affect accident
mitigation.
Some of these affected pumps have been in operation for more than 10 years.
Because of the importance of these pumps to plant safety, Westinghouse has
recommended that the affected pump parts be replaced with the parts currently
recommended by IDP.
An IDP safety injection pump (model "JTCH") failed during a post-maintenance
test at Indian Point Unit 3 on February 19, 1995.
Inspection of the internal
components of the pump revealed that the locknut on the outboard shaft had
backed off about 6.35 mm [0.25 inch].
The loosened locknut allowed the pump
impellers to move axially, and allowed them to rub against the stationary
diffusers and the casing, and ultimately resulted in pump failure. Although
the root cause of this failure is unrelated to the problem reported by
Westinghouse, a similar pump failure could occur if the locknut on the
pressure-reducing sleeve, mentioned in the Westinghouse Part 21 report, failed.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response.
If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. orig /s/'d by B K Grimes
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Project Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: James A. Davis, NRR
(301) 415-2713
Peter C. Wen, NRR
(301) 415-2832 Attachments:
1. Westinghouse Part 21 Report, February 20, 1995
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
DOCUMENT NAME: 95-26.IN
To receive a copy of this
document, Indicate In the box: 'C'
= Copy without attachmentienclosure
E'
Copy with attachmentlenclosure
Nt = No copy
OFFICE
OECB/DOPS
N C:DE/EMCB C DE/EMCB
I E C:DE/EMCB
I N
NAME
PCWen*
l
RFSanders*
MBanic*
RAHermann*
JRStrosnider*
DATE
03/27/95
04/
04/10/95
04/10/95
04/13/95 I'l
OFFICE
D:DE
IN SC:OECB/DOPS N OECB/DOPS E C:OECB/DOPS I
D:-
N l
NAME
BWSheron*
EFGoodwin*
RJKiessel*
AEChaffee*
DATE
104/17/95
04/19/95
05/10/95
05/15/95 Note:
In the 4/12/95 letter from AE Chaffee to J. Fasnacht, Westinghouse was informed of the
development of this IN. On 4/20/95, Mr. Fasnacht phoned P. Wen and he indicates that
Westinghouse has no technical comments.
Peter Wen 4/20/95
IN 95-XX
May xx, 1995 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Project Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts:
James A. Davis, NRR
(301) 415-2713
Peter C. Wen, NRR
(301) 415-2832 Attachments:
1. Westinghouse Part 21 Report, February 20, 1995
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
DOCUMENT NAME:
G:\\PETER\\WSIPUMP.IN
To receive a copy of this docunent. Indicate In the box: 'C"
- Copy without attachment/enclosure
'E' = Copy with attachment/enclosure
'N' - No copy
OFFICE
OECB/DOPS
i N C:DE/EMCB I C DE/EMCB
I E C:DE/EMCB
I N
NAME
PCWen*
RFSanders*
MBanic*
RAHermann*
JRStrosnider*
DATE
03/27/95
04/11/95
04/10/95
04/10/95
04/13/95 I
OFFICE
D:DEIN
SC:O CB/DOPS NOECB/DOPS E C:01 B/DOPS I
D:DOPS/NRR
NAME
BWSheron*
EFGoodwin*
RJKiessel*
AEKfee -re
IBKGrimes
DATE
04/17/95
04/19/95
05/10/95
5
/95
/95 AKI441d
Note:
In the 4/12/95 letter from AE Chaffee to J. Fasnacht, Westinghouse was informed of the
development of this IN. On 4/20/95, Mr. Fasnacht phoned P. Wen and he indicates that
Westinghouse has no technical comments.
Peter Wen 4/20/95
IN 95-xx
April xx, 1995 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Project Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts:
Merilee Banic, NRR
(301) 415-2771
Peter C. Wen, NRR
(301) 415-2832 Attachments:
1. Westinghouse Part 21 Report, February 20, 1995
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\PETER\\WSIPUMP.IN
To receive
- copy of this document, indicate In the box: IC, - Copy without attachment/enciosure
'E
. Copy with attachment/enclosure
OFFICE
OECB/DOPS
C TECH ED
N C:DE/EMCB I C DE/EMCB
IE C:DE/EMCB
N
NAME
PCWen*
RFSanders*
MBanic*
RAHermann*
JRStrosnider*
DATE
03/27/95
04/11/95
04/10/95
04/10/95
04/13/95 OFFICE
D:DE
IN
- OECB/DOPS
OIN
/DOPS C:
OPECB/DOPS
DDOPS/
NAME
BWSheron*
EFGoodwin*
RJKiessel
_
t
AEChaffee
BKGrimes
DATE
04/17/95
04/19/95
_
___/95
___
/ /95 Note: In the 4/12/95 letter from AE Chaffee to J. Fasnacht, Westinghouse was
informed of the development of this IN. On 4/20/95, Mr. Fasnacht phoned
P. Wen and he indicates that Westinghouse has no technical comments.
Peter Wen 4/20/95
4 IN 95-xx
April xx, 1995 This information notice requires no specific action or written response.
If
you have any questions about the Information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Project Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts:
Merilee Banic, NRR
(301) 415-2771
Peter C. Wen, NRR
(301) 415-2832 Attachments:
1. Westinghouse Part 21 Report, February 20, 1995
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\PETER\\WSIPUMP.IN
To receive a copy of tWis document, Indicate In the box: 'C'
-
Copy without attachmentlenclosure
1".
_
I zn
=E'
-Copy
with attachment/encbasur1 OFFICE lOECB/DOPS
TCR ED
C:DE/EMCB
C DE/EMCB
E :DE/EMCB v
NAME
1PCWen*
RFSanders
MBanic*
RAHermann*
Jbbwider
DATE
103_27/95 Itl/j
/95
04/10/95
04/10/95 I /13/95 OFFICE
I tj SC:OECB/DOPS
OECB/DOPS
C:OECB/DOPS
D:DOPS/NRR
NAME
Bi eron
EFGoodwin
RJKiessel
AEChaffee
BKGrimes
DATE
&L21
9
95
1
/5/95
/
/95 f/95 doAtc
K..'
-V
IN 95-xx
April xx, 1995 This information notice requires no specific action or written response.
If
you have any questions abobt the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Project Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts:
Merilee Banic, NRR
(301) 415-2771
Peter C. Wen, NRR
(301) 415-2832 Attachments:
1. Westinghouse Part 21 Report, February 20, 1995
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME:
G:\\PETER\\WSIPUMP.IN
To mcoive a copy of ths document, dicate In the box: 'C' - Copy without attachmentlenclosure
'N'
- No copy
'E'
- Copy with attachmentlenclosure
OFFICE
OECB/DOPS
JIJ TECH ED
C:DE/EMCB
l
l
j C:DE/EMCB
NAME
PCWen
RCJ&J
RFSanders
MBanic
jRAHermann
j
dR~n
DATE
.;
.l
/
9 5 I
/95
//09
/ b/95
1 / /95 OFFICE
D:DE
L SC:OECB/DOPS I
OECB/DOPS
C:OECB/DOPS
D:DOPS/NRR
NAME
1BWSheron
EFGoodwin
RJKiessel
AEChaffee
BKGrimes
DATE
I / /95 I
/ /95 I
/95 I
/95
/ /95