Information Notice 1995-24, Summary of Licensed Operator Requalification Inspection Program Findings
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001
April 25, 1995
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 95-24: SUMMARY OF LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION
INSPECTION PROGRAM FINDINGS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to alert addressees to deficiencies and weaknesses uncovered while
conducting its licensed operator requalification inspection program.
It is
expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to
their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar
problems.
However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not
NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is
required.
Background
Effective March 11,
1994, the NRC amended Part 55, "Operators' Licenses," of
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) to eliminate the
requirement for licensed operators to pass a comprehensive requalification
written examination and an operating test conducted by the NRC during the term
of the operator's license. The amendment enabled the NRC to shift its focus
from examining individual operators for the purpose of license renewal to
evaluating the effectiveness with which facility licensees conduct their
requalification programs.
The NRC developed an inspection procedure (IP 71001), "Licensed Operator
Requalification Program Evaluation," to implement the new requalification
oversight program and to guide inspectors as they review the subject programs.
The procedure includes assessments of facility licensee effectiveness in:
-
evaluating trainee (operator and crew) mastery of the training
objectives as required by 10 CFR 55.59(c) and by element 4 of a systems
approach to training (SAT)-based program as defined in 10 CFR 55.4;
-
evaluating and revising the requalification program based on operator
performance as required by 10 CFR 55.59(c) and by element 5 of a SAT-
based program;
-
ensuring the integrity of requalification examinations and tests as
required by 10 CFR 55.49; and
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11
I
IN 95-24 April 25, 1995 -
ensuring that licensed operators satisfy the conditions of their
licenses as specified in 10 CFR 55.53.
The NRC is using the inspection procedure to evaluate each licensed operator
requalification program at least once per Systematic Assessment of Licensee
Performance (SALP) cycle.
Discussion
During the period that the NRC conducted requalification examinations for the
purpose of renewing operator licenses (i.e., 1987 to 1993), the staff noted
significant improvements in the performance of the individual operators and
the quality of facility licensee evaluators and testing materials. As noted
in the March 1994 rule change, the NRC discontinued conducting routine
requalification examinations because licensees had established a high standard
of performance under the regulations and NRC examiners were largely
duplicating tasks that were required of, and routinely performed by, facility
licensees. The NRC resolved that it would not duplicate facility licensee
efforts to examine operators as long as the NRC staff remained confident that
the requalification program was maintaining licensed operator competence.
Facility licensees are expected to comply with the 10 CFR Part 55 requirements
for licensed operator requalification training and testing and with the
commitments contained in their respective NRC-approved requalification
programs.
Facility licensees having SAT-based requalification programs are
required by the NRC regulations to implement five program elements (i.e., Job
analysis, objective development, training design and implementation, trainee
evaluation, and program evaluation and revision) to ensure that licensed
operators and crews maintain the job performance standards necessary for
continued safe plant operation.
Furthermore, facility licensees must ensure
that operators comply with their 10 CFR Part 55 license conditions. As noted
earlier, the requalification program inspections conducted in accordance with
IP 71001 focus on many of these elements and factors. When necessary, the NRC
may inspect additional training program elements in accordance with IP 41500,
"Training and Qualification Effectiveness."
Since January 1993, the NRC has completed more than 50 requalification program
inspections using IP 71001 or its predecessor, Temporary Instruction 2515/117.
A number of specific findings, some of which were observed at several
facilities, are listed in Attachment 1.
The findings in Attachment 1 suggest that some facility licensees are relying
largely on the guidelines in NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examiner
Standards,' for the development and administration of their requalification
examinations. NUREG-1021 provides instructions for conducting NRC
examinations only; it is not intended to be guidance on how to implement a
SAT-based training program or to ensure compliance with all the regulations
applicable to requalification examinations.
For example, the crew-based
dynamic simulator evaluation procedure in NUREG-1021 does not ensure that each
licensed operator will be individually evaluated during an operating test as
required by 10 CFR 55.59(a).
IN 95-24 April 25, 1995 The findings in Attachment 1 also indicate that the level of difficulty of
examinations at some facilities was questioned as to whether facility
licensees could determine that the operators had mastered their Job
performance requirements as stipulated by element 4 of a SAT-based training
program or whether the examinations would sufficiently require an operator to
demonstrate an understanding of and the ability to perform the actions
referenced by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)(ii). Simulator scenarios that verify
operator ability to implement the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) were
questioned as to whether they were at the level of difficulty necessary to
adequately complete the assessment.
The requalification inspections have identified a number of weaknesses and
deficiencies.
10 CFR 55.59(c) allows a facility licensee significant latitude
in the implementation of its requalification program if the licensee adopts a
systems approach to training. Many of the issues described in Attachment 1 are performance-based issues that raise questions regarding the effectiveness
of facility licensee training and testing programs.
Although the staff has not judged the findings at specific facilities to be of
sufficient concern, to date, to warrant NRC conducting requalification
examinations, it has concluded that the findings are sufficient in number and
significance to share them with the industry.
If an NRC inspection determines
that a requalification program is ineffective or if the staff concludes that
the inspection process will not provide the insight necessary to confirm the
adequacy of the program, the NRC may exercise its discretion, per 10 CFR
55.59(a)(2)(iii), and conduct requalification examinations in accordance with
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
g 8 ia' K.%ric
lrect
D vision of Projects Support
Off ice o Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Stuart Richards, NRR
Mark Ring, R111
(301) 415-1031
(708) 829-9703 Glenn Meyer, RI
John Pellet, RIV
(610) 337-5211
(817) 860-8159 Thomas Peebles, RII
Neal Hunemuller, NRR
(404) 331-5541
(301) 415-1152 Attachments:
1. Program Deficiencies Identified by Inspections
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
0-dt41
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Attachment 1
IN 95-24 April 25, 1995 PROGRAM DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED BY INSPECTIONS
Trainee Evaluation
-
The dynamic simulator scenario banks at some facilities did not contain
any shutdown scenarios or failed to adequately exercise the contingency
actions of the EOPs.
-
Some of the dynamic simulator scenarios consisted of unrelated events or
had critical tasks that could not discriminate between acceptable and
unacceptable operator performance because they were impossible to fail.
-
In one instance, written test items were worded in such a way that the
person taking the test could possibly select the correct answer based
solely on question construction.
-
The Job performance measures were sometimes overly simple and had little
evaluative merit (e.g., push one button) or they had procedural
verification steps that were inappropriately identified as critical to
task completion.
Some facility licensees were not able to explain their SAT-based
rationale for selecting the control manipulations that were included in
their training syllabus, the appropriate mode of completion (i.e.,
performance, supervision, or observation), or the method for evaluating
whether the operators had mastered the job performance requirements.
The written examinations and operating tests (walk-through and dynamic
simulator) at some facilities were so basic that it was questionable
whether the examinations and tests could adequately evaluate operator
performance or the effectiveness of the training or identify areas
needing improvement. The questions, job performance measures, and
scenarios did not test the operators at the comprehension and analysis
levels of knowledge, but strictly at the memorization level.
Some facilities did not sufficiently control how many test items were
repeated between practice and comprehensive examinations or among
successive examinations (i.e., week-to-week or year-to-year). Other
facilities attempted to avoid duplication by revising their dynamic
simulator scenarios between administrations, but the revisions were so
superficial that the types and sequence of malfunctions and the required
operator actions and mitigation strategies were essentially unchanged.
One facility that almost always operates with only two reactor operators
(ROs) on a control room crew, used three ROs on some of its dynamic
simulator examination crews in order to reduce the number of scenarios
required to conduct the examinations.
The operators at some facilities were given little or no retraining on
weak areas unless they failed the examination. Sometimes retesting did
not sufficiently address areas identified as weak.
Attachment 1
April 25, 1995 Trainee Evaluation
-
The dynamic simulator scenario banks at some facilities did not contain
any shutdown scenarios or failed to adequately exercise the contingency
actions of the EOPs.
-
Some of the dynamic simulator scenarios consisted of unrelated events or
had critical tasks that could not discriminate between acceptable and
unacceptable operator performance because they were impossible to fail.
-
In one instance, written test items were worded in such a way that the
person taking the test could possibly select the correct answer based
solely on question construction.
-
The Job performance measures were sometimes overly simple and had little
evaluative merit (e.g., push one button) or they had procedural
verification steps that were inappropriately identified as critical to
task completion.
Some facility licensees were not able to explain their SAT-based
rationale for selecting the control manipulations that were included in
their training syllabus, the appropriate mode of completion (i.e.,
performance, supervision, or observation), or the method for evaluating
whether the operators had mastered the job performance requirements.
The written examinations and operating tests (walk-through and dynamic
simulator) at some facilities were so basic that it was questionable
whether the examinations and tests could adequately evaluate operator
performance or the effectiveness of the training or identify areas
needing improvement. The questions, job performance measures, and
scenarios did not test the operators at the comprehension and analysis
levels of knowledge, but strictly at the memorization level.
Some facilities did not sufficiently control how many test items were
repeated between practice and comprehensive examinations or among
successive examinations (i.e., week-to-week or year-to-year). Other
facilities attempted to avoid duplication by revising their dynamic
simulator scenarios between administrations, but the revisions were so
superficial that the types and sequence of malfunctions and the required
operator actions and mitigation strategies were essentially unchanged.
One facility that almost always operates with only two reactor operators
(ROs) on a control room crew, used three ROs on some of its dynamic
simulator examination crews in order to reduce the number of scenarios
required to conduct the examinations.
The operators at some facilities were given little or no retraining on
weak areas unless they failed the examination.
Sometimes retesting did
not sufficiently address areas identified as weak.
Attachment 1
IN 95-24 April 25, 1995 The evaluators at some facilities did not identify areas in which
retraining was needed to upgrade licensed operator knowledge because
they graded their operators exclusively on the basis of completing
critical tasks and did not conduct any individual competency evaluations
unless an operator failed.
Program Evaluation and Revision
Some licensed operator requalification training programs did not always
close the feedback loop by informing the originators of training
comments how their concerns were resolved.
Examination and Test Integrity
Some facility licensees permitted training personnel who had specific
knowledge of the examination content to continue their routine training
activities, thereby introducing the appearance of impropriety and the
possibility that examination integrity could be compromised.
Some facility licensees took minimal action to keep their operators
separated while individual examinations were in progress or to review
the examination results for possible indications that security had been
compromised.
Compliance with Operator License Conditions
One facility licensee failed to ensure that all of its licensed
operators completed the requalification training required by
10 CFR 55.53(h) and 55.59(a)(1).
Some licensees were in violation of 10 CFR 55.53(e) and (f) because they
performed or directed licensed activities without meeting the
requirements for maintaining an active license or because they returned
to licensed duties before completing the required reactivation training.
Some licensees were in violation of 10 CFR 55.53(i) because they did not
receive the required biennial medical examination.
In some instances, facility licensees neglected to inform the NRC of
permanent changes in licensed operator medical status (e.g., a medical
defect that might necessitate a conditional license or disqualify the
operator) as required by 10 CFR 55.25.
KY_
4tiachment 2 IN 95-24
April 25, 1995 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issuance
Issued to
95-23
95-22
95-21
94-64, Supp. 1
95-18, Supp. 1
95-20
Control Room Staffing
Below Minimum Regulatory
Requirements
Hardened or Contaminated
Lubricants Cause Metal
Clad Circuit Breaker
Failures
Unexpected Degradation
of Lead Storage Batteries
Reactivity Insertion
Transient and Accident
Limits for High Burnup
Fuel
Potential Pressure-Locking
of Safety-Related Power-
Operated Gate Valves
Failures in Rosemount
Pressure Transmitters
due to Hydrogen Per- meation into the Sensor
Cell
04/24/95
04/21/95
04/20/95
04/06/95
03/31/95
03/22/95
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors
and all licensed operators
and senior operators at
those reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
95-19
Failure of Reactor Trip
Breaker to Open Because
of Cutoff Switch Material
Lodged in the Trip Latch
Mechanism
03/22/95
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
95-18 Potential Pressure-Locking
of Safety-Related Power-
Operated Gate Valves
03/15/95
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 95-24 April 25, 1995 The findings in Attachment I also indicate that the level of difficulty of
examinations at some facilities was questioned as to whether facility
licensees could determine that the operators had mastered their Job
performance requirements as stipulated by element 4 of a SAT-based training
program or whether the examinations would sufficiently require an operator to
demonstrate an understanding of and the ability to perform the actions
referenced by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)(ii). Simulator scenarios that verify
operator ability to implement the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) were
questioned as to whether they were at the level of difficulty necessary to
adequately complete the assessment.
The requalification inspections have identified a number of weaknesses and
deficiencies.
10 CFR 55.59(c) allows a facility licensee significant latitude
in the implementation of its requalification program if the licensee adopts a
systems approach to training. Many of the issues described in Attachment 1 are performance-based issues that raise questions regarding the effectiveness
of facility licensee training and testing programs.
Although the staff has not Judged the findings at specific facilities to be of
sufficient concern, to date, to warrant NRC conducting requalification
examinations, it has concluded that the findings are sufficient in number and
significance to share them with the industry. If an NRC inspection determines
that a requalification program is ineffective or if the staff concludes that
the inspection process will not provide the insight necessary to confirm the
adequacy of the program, the NRC may exercise its discretion, per 10 CFR
55.59(a)(2)(iii), and conduct requalification examinations in accordance with
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
orig /s/'d by BDLiaw/for
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Projects Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts:
Stuart Richards, NRR
Mark Ring, RIII
(301) 415-1031
(708) 829-9703 Glenn Meyer, RI
John Pellet, RIV
(610) 337-5211
(817) 860-8159 Thomas Peebles, RII
Neal Hunemuller, NRR
(404) 331-5541
(301) 415-1152 Attachments:
1. Program Deficiencies Identified by Inspections
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: 95-24.IN
- See previous concurrence
To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box 'C'
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'-
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OFFICE l*HOLB/DRCH
- HOLB/DRCH
- HOLB/DRCH
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NAME
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AMendiola
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DATE
101/23/95
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01/ 2N 9
01/23/95
03/17/95 OFFICE
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NAME
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DATE
3/28/95
3/31/95
104/___/_5
IN 95-XX
April xx, 1995 This information notice requires no specific action or written response.
If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Projects Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts:
Stuart Richards, NRR
(301) 415-1031
Mark Ring, RIII
(708) 829-9703
Glenn Meyer, RI
(610) 337-5211
Thomas Peebles, RII
(404) 331-5541
John Pellet, RIV
(817) 860-8159
Neal Hunemuller, NRR
(301) 415-1152 Attachments:
1. Program Deficiencies Identified by Inspections
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME:
G:\\NKH\\INFONOTE.95
- See previous concurrence
aI7/1.
To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: I'C
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OFFICE
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NAME
FGuenther:rc
AMendiola
SRichards
RSanders
BBover
DATE
01/23/95
01/26/95
01/26/95
01/23/95
03/17 OFFICE
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NAME
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AChaffee
BKGrimes
_
DATE
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3/31/95
/ /95
_
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
'IO
IN 95-XX
March xx, 1995
Pag
of 4 This information notice requires no specific action or written esponse. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, lease contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropri e Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Gri es, Director
Division o Projects Support
Office o Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Stuart Richards, NRR
Mark Ring, RIII
(301) 415-1031
(708) 829-9703 Glenn Meyer, RI
John Pellet, RIV
(610) 337-521
(817) 860-8159 Thomas Peebles, RII
Neal Hunemuller, NRR
(404) 331-5541
(301) 415-1152 Attachments:
1. Program Deficiencies Identified by Inspections
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\NKH\\INFONOTE.95
- See previous concurrence
To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: 'C -
Copy without attachmentlenclosure 'Et
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[OFFICE
- HOLB/DRCH
- HOLB/DRCH
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DATE
01/23/95
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03/17/95 OFFICE
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NAME
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DATE
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9
OFFICI AL RECORD COPY
IN 95-XX
March XX, 1995 This information notice requires no specific action r written response.
However, you are encouraged to review your licens
operator requalification
program to ensure it meets all applicable requi
ments and commitments.
If
you have any questions about the information
this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below
the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project
nager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Projects Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts:
Stuart Richards, NRR
Mark Ring, RIII
,"(301) 415-1031
(708) 829-9703 Glenn Meyer, RI
John Pellet, RIV
(610) 337-5211
(817) 860-8159
/
Thomas Peebles, R11
(404) 331-5541 Attachments' List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT AAME: G:\\GUENTHER\\INFONOTE.95
- See previous concurrence
To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box 'C
- Copy without attachnent/anclosure
'E
- Copy with attachmentlenclosure
N
- No copy
l-1i
[OFFICE
- HOLB/DRCH
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NAME
FGuenther:rc
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DATE
01/23/95
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01/26/95
01/23/95
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OFFICE
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NAME
BBoger/'7'V
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DATE
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/95 qt.
OFFICIA L RECORD COPY
-
IN 95-XX
February XX, 1995
Secondly, the NRC is concerned, based on its observations to date, that the
level of difficulty of examinations at some facilities may degrade to the
point that the examinations will not be sufficiently challand
discriminatory to determine whether the operators ILve-fltereUm their job
performance requirements as required by e1em
of a SAT-based training
program or will not sufficiently re uire-a operator to demonstrate an
understanding of the ability to pe
actions referenced by
10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)(ii). In pa
cular, the NRC is concerned that simulator
scenarios which verify an
rator's ability to implement the EOPs could lack
the level of difficult
ecessary to adequately complete the assessment.
Consistent with per r
se
r:0h
Ins, there is no regulatory
requirement which sp cifically defines the ap
iate level of difficulty, however for reference licensees should note that
55 was amended to change
the NRC's involvement based largely on the level of pe
ormance reached by the
industry in 1993, and in the area of simulator scenarios
he level of
difficulty at that time was largely defined by the guidance ontained in
Licensees are reminded that if an NRC inspection determines t at a
requalification program is ineffective or if the staff conc
des that the
inspection process will not provide the insight nec
to confirm the
adequacy of the program, the NRC may
s
discretion, per 10 CFR
55.59(a)(2)(iii), and cond
ua ification examinations in accordance with
This information notice re
o specific action or written response.
However, you are encouraged to rev e
ur licensed operator requalification
program to ensure it meets all applica le
irements and commitments. If
you have any questions about the information in is notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the a
opriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Projects Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regu ation
Technical Contacts:
Stuart Richards NRR
Mar
i i5~- M-
I(708)
829-9703 Glenn Meyer, RI
John Pellet, RIV
211
(817) 860-8159
Thomas Peebles
(404) 331-5541 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information
ices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\GUENTHER\\INFONOTE.95 To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: 'C -- Copy without attachrentlenciosure
E - Copy with att
ntlenciosure 'N'
No copy
OFFICE
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