Summary of Licensed Operator Requalification Inspection Program FindingsML031060193 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Issue date: |
04/25/1995 |
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From: |
Grimes B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
|
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References |
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IN-95-024, NUDOCS 9504190049 |
Download: ML031060193 (12) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
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Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 April 25, 1995 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 95-24: SUMMARY OF LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION
INSPECTION PROGRAM FINDINGS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to alert addressees to deficiencies and weaknesses uncovered while
conducting its licensed operator requalification inspection program. It is
expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to
their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar
problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not
NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is
required.
Background
Effective March 11, 1994, the NRC amended Part 55, "Operators' Licenses," of
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) to eliminate the
requirement for licensed operators to pass a comprehensive requalification
written examination and an operating test conducted by the NRC during the term
of the operator's license. The amendment enabled the NRC to shift its focus
from examining individual operators for the purpose of license renewal to
evaluating the effectiveness with which facility licensees conduct their
requalification programs.
The NRC developed an inspection procedure (IP 71001), "Licensed Operator
Requalification Program Evaluation," to implement the new requalification
oversight program and to guide inspectors as they review the subject programs.
The procedure includes assessments of facility licensee effectiveness in:
- evaluating trainee (operator and crew) mastery of the training
objectives as required by 10 CFR 55.59(c) and by element 4 of a systems
approach to training (SAT)-based program as defined in 10 CFR 55.4;
- evaluating and revising the requalification program based on operator
performance as required by 10 CFR 55.59(c) and by element 5 of a SAT-
based program;
- ensuring the integrity of requalification examinations and tests as
required by 10 CFR 55.49; and
950419q049 Pf tcA-*c-e, q
11
I
IN 95-24 April 25, 1995 - ensuring that licensed operators satisfy the conditions of their
licenses as specified in 10 CFR 55.53.
The NRC is using the inspection procedure to evaluate each licensed operator
requalification program at least once per Systematic Assessment of Licensee
Performance (SALP) cycle.
Discussion
During the period that the NRC conducted requalification examinations for the
purpose of renewing operator licenses (i.e., 1987 to 1993), the staff noted
significant improvements in the performance of the individual operators and
the quality of facility licensee evaluators and testing materials. As noted
in the March 1994 rule change, the NRC discontinued conducting routine
requalification examinations because licensees had established a high standard
of performance under the regulations and NRC examiners were largely
duplicating tasks that were required of, and routinely performed by, facility
licensees. The NRC resolved that it would not duplicate facility licensee
efforts to examine operators as long as the NRC staff remained confident that
the requalification program was maintaining licensed operator competence.
Facility licensees are expected to comply with the 10 CFR Part 55 requirements
for licensed operator requalification training and testing and with the
commitments contained in their respective NRC-approved requalification
programs. Facility licensees having SAT-based requalification programs are
required by the NRC regulations to implement five program elements (i.e., Job
analysis, objective development, training design and implementation, trainee
evaluation, and program evaluation and revision) to ensure that licensed
operators and crews maintain the job performance standards necessary for
continued safe plant operation. Furthermore, facility licensees must ensure
that operators comply with their 10 CFR Part 55 license conditions. As noted
earlier, the requalification program inspections conducted in accordance with
IP 71001 focus on many of these elements and factors. When necessary, the NRC
may inspect additional training program elements in accordance with IP 41500,
"Training and Qualification Effectiveness."
Since January 1993, the NRC has completed more than 50 requalification program
inspections using IP 71001 or its predecessor, Temporary Instruction 2515/117.
A number of specific findings, some of which were observed at several
facilities, are listed in Attachment 1.
The findings in Attachment 1 suggest that some facility licensees are relying
largely on the guidelines in NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examiner
Standards,' for the development and administration of their requalification
examinations. NUREG-1021 provides instructions for conducting NRC
examinations only; it is not intended to be guidance on how to implement a
SAT-based training program or to ensure compliance with all the regulations
applicable to requalification examinations. For example, the crew-based
dynamic simulator evaluation procedure in NUREG-1021 does not ensure that each
licensed operator will be individually evaluated during an operating test as
required by 10 CFR 55.59(a).
IN 95-24 April 25, 1995 The findings in Attachment 1 also indicate that the level of difficulty of
examinations at some facilities was questioned as to whether facility
licensees could determine that the operators had mastered their Job
performance requirements as stipulated by element 4 of a SAT-based training
program or whether the examinations would sufficiently require an operator to
demonstrate an understanding of and the ability to perform the actions
referenced by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)(ii). Simulator scenarios that verify
operator ability to implement the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) were
questioned as to whether they were at the level of difficulty necessary to
adequately complete the assessment.
The requalification inspections have identified a number of weaknesses and
deficiencies. 10 CFR 55.59(c) allows a facility licensee significant latitude
in the implementation of its requalification program if the licensee adopts a
systems approach to training. Many of the issues described in Attachment 1 are performance-based issues that raise questions regarding the effectiveness
of facility licensee training and testing programs.
Although the staff has not judged the findings at specific facilities to be of
sufficient concern, to date, to warrant NRC conducting requalification
examinations, it has concluded that the findings are sufficient in number and
significance to share them with the industry. If an NRC inspection determines
that a requalification program is ineffective or if the staff concludes that
the inspection process will not provide the insight necessary to confirm the
adequacy of the program, the NRC may exercise its discretion, per 10 CFR
55.59(a)(2)(iii), and conduct requalification examinations in accordance with
NUREG-1021.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
g 8 ia' K.%ric lrect
D vision of Projects Support
Off ice o Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Stuart Richards, NRR Mark Ring, R111
(301) 415-1031 (708) 829-9703 Glenn Meyer, RI John Pellet, RIV
(610) 337-5211 (817) 860-8159 Thomas Peebles, RII Neal Hunemuller, NRR
(404) 331-5541 (301) 415-1152 Attachments:
1. Program Deficiencies Identified by Inspections
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
0-dt41 61GCI-jz~~
Attachment 1 IN 95-24 April 25, 1995 PROGRAM DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED BY INSPECTIONS
Trainee Evaluation
- The dynamic simulator scenario banks at some facilities did not contain
any shutdown scenarios or failed to adequately exercise the contingency
actions of the EOPs.
- Some of the dynamic simulator scenarios consisted of unrelated events or
had critical tasks that could not discriminate between acceptable and
unacceptable operator performance because they were impossible to fail.
- In one instance, written test items were worded in such a way that the
person taking the test could possibly select the correct answer based
solely on question construction.
- The Job performance measures were sometimes overly simple and had little
evaluative merit (e.g., push one button) or they had procedural
verification steps that were inappropriately identified as critical to
task completion.
Some facility licensees were not able to explain their SAT-based
rationale for selecting the control manipulations that were included in
their training syllabus, the appropriate mode of completion (i.e.,
performance, supervision, or observation), or the method for evaluating
whether the operators had mastered the job performance requirements.
The written examinations and operating tests (walk-through and dynamic
simulator) at some facilities were so basic that it was questionable
whether the examinations and tests could adequately evaluate operator
performance or the effectiveness of the training or identify areas
needing improvement. The questions, job performance measures, and
scenarios did not test the operators at the comprehension and analysis
levels of knowledge, but strictly at the memorization level.
Some facilities did not sufficiently control how many test items were
repeated between practice and comprehensive examinations or among
successive examinations (i.e., week-to-week or year-to-year). Other
facilities attempted to avoid duplication by revising their dynamic
simulator scenarios between administrations, but the revisions were so
superficial that the types and sequence of malfunctions and the required
operator actions and mitigation strategies were essentially unchanged.
One facility that almost always operates with only two reactor operators
(ROs) on a control room crew, used three ROs on some of its dynamic
simulator examination crews in order to reduce the number of scenarios
required to conduct the examinations.
The operators at some facilities were given little or no retraining on
weak areas unless they failed the examination. Sometimes retesting did
not sufficiently address areas identified as weak.
Attachment 1 IN 95-24 April 25, 1995 Trainee Evaluation
- The dynamic simulator scenario banks at some facilities did not contain
any shutdown scenarios or failed to adequately exercise the contingency
actions of the EOPs.
- Some of the dynamic simulator scenarios consisted of unrelated events or
had critical tasks that could not discriminate between acceptable and
unacceptable operator performance because they were impossible to fail.
- In one instance, written test items were worded in such a way that the
person taking the test could possibly select the correct answer based
solely on question construction.
- The Job performance measures were sometimes overly simple and had little
evaluative merit (e.g., push one button) or they had procedural
verification steps that were inappropriately identified as critical to
task completion.
Some facility licensees were not able to explain their SAT-based
rationale for selecting the control manipulations that were included in
their training syllabus, the appropriate mode of completion (i.e.,
performance, supervision, or observation), or the method for evaluating
whether the operators had mastered the job performance requirements.
The written examinations and operating tests (walk-through and dynamic
simulator) at some facilities were so basic that it was questionable
whether the examinations and tests could adequately evaluate operator
performance or the effectiveness of the training or identify areas
needing improvement. The questions, job performance measures, and
scenarios did not test the operators at the comprehension and analysis
levels of knowledge, but strictly at the memorization level.
Some facilities did not sufficiently control how many test items were
repeated between practice and comprehensive examinations or among
successive examinations (i.e., week-to-week or year-to-year). Other
facilities attempted to avoid duplication by revising their dynamic
simulator scenarios between administrations, but the revisions were so
superficial that the types and sequence of malfunctions and the required
operator actions and mitigation strategies were essentially unchanged.
One facility that almost always operates with only two reactor operators
(ROs) on a control room crew, used three ROs on some of its dynamic
simulator examination crews in order to reduce the number of scenarios
required to conduct the examinations.
The operators at some facilities were given little or no retraining on
weak areas unless they failed the examination. Sometimes retesting did
not sufficiently address areas identified as weak.
Attachment 1 IN 95-24 April 25, 1995 The evaluators at some facilities did not identify areas in which
retraining was needed to upgrade licensed operator knowledge because
they graded their operators exclusively on the basis of completing
critical tasks and did not conduct any individual competency evaluations
unless an operator failed.
Program Evaluation and Revision
Some licensed operator requalification training programs did not always
close the feedback loop by informing the originators of training
comments how their concerns were resolved.
Examination and Test Integrity
Some facility licensees permitted training personnel who had specific
knowledge of the examination content to continue their routine training
activities, thereby introducing the appearance of impropriety and the
possibility that examination integrity could be compromised.
Some facility licensees took minimal action to keep their operators
separated while individual examinations were in progress or to review
the examination results for possible indications that security had been
compromised.
Compliance with Operator License Conditions
One facility licensee failed to ensure that all of its licensed
operators completed the requalification training required by
10 CFR 55.53(h) and 55.59(a)(1).
Some licensees were in violation of 10 CFR 55.53(e) and (f) because they
performed or directed licensed activities without meeting the
requirements for maintaining an active license or because they returned
to licensed duties before completing the required reactivation training.
Some licensees were in violation of 10 CFR 55.53(i) because they did not
receive the required biennial medical examination.
In some instances, facility licensees neglected to inform the NRC of
permanent changes in licensed operator medical status (e.g., a medical
defect that might necessitate a conditional license or disqualify the
operator) as required by 10 CFR 55.25.
KY_
4tiachment 2 IN 95-24 April 25, 1995 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
95-23 Control Room Staffing 04/24/95 All holders of OLs or CPs
Below Minimum Regulatory for nuclear power reactors
Requirements and all licensed operators
and senior operators at
those reactors.
95-22 Hardened or Contaminated 04/21/95 All holders of OLs or CPs
Lubricants Cause Metal for nuclear power reactors.
Clad Circuit Breaker
Failures
95-21 Unexpected Degradation 04/20/95 All holders of OLs or CPs
of Lead Storage Batteries for nuclear power reactors.
94-64, Reactivity Insertion 04/06/95 All holders of OLs or CPs
Supp. 1 Transient and Accident for nuclear power reactors
Limits for High Burnup
Fuel
95-18, Potential Pressure-Locking 03/31/95 All holders of OLs or CPs
Supp. 1 of Safety-Related Power- for nuclear power reactors.
Operated Gate Valves
95-20 Failures in Rosemount 03/22/95 All holders of OLs or CPs
Pressure Transmitters for nuclear power reactors.
due to Hydrogen Per- meation into the Sensor
Cell
95-19 Failure of Reactor Trip 03/22/95 All holders of OLs or CPs
Breaker to Open Because for nuclear power reactors.
of Cutoff Switch Material
Lodged in the Trip Latch
Mechanism
95-18 Potential Pressure-Locking 03/15/95 All holders of OLs or CPs
of Safety-Related Power- for nuclear power reactors.
Operated Gate Valves
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 95-24 April 25, 1995 The findings in Attachment I also indicate that the level of difficulty of
examinations at some facilities was questioned as to whether facility
licensees could determine that the operators had mastered their Job
performance requirements as stipulated by element 4 of a SAT-based training
program or whether the examinations would sufficiently require an operator to
demonstrate an understanding of and the ability to perform the actions
referenced by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)(ii). Simulator scenarios that verify
operator ability to implement the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) were
questioned as to whether they were at the level of difficulty necessary to
adequately complete the assessment.
The requalification inspections have identified a number of weaknesses and
deficiencies. 10 CFR 55.59(c) allows a facility licensee significant latitude
in the implementation of its requalification program if the licensee adopts a
systems approach to training. Many of the issues described in Attachment 1 are performance-based issues that raise questions regarding the effectiveness
of facility licensee training and testing programs.
Although the staff has not Judged the findings at specific facilities to be of
sufficient concern, to date, to warrant NRC conducting requalification
examinations, it has concluded that the findings are sufficient in number and
significance to share them with the industry. If an NRC inspection determines
that a requalification program is ineffective or if the staff concludes that
the inspection process will not provide the insight necessary to confirm the
adequacy of the program, the NRC may exercise its discretion, per 10 CFR
55.59(a)(2)(iii), and conduct requalification examinations in accordance with
NUREG-1021.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
orig /s/'d by BDLiaw/for
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Projects Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Stuart Richards, NRR Mark Ring, RIII
(301) 415-1031 (708) 829-9703 Glenn Meyer, RI John Pellet, RIV
(610) 337-5211 (817) 860-8159 Thomas Peebles, RII Neal Hunemuller, NRR
(404) 331-5541 (301) 415-1152 Attachments:
1. Program Deficiencies Identified by Inspections
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: 95-24.IN
- See previous concurrence 'N* No copy
To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box 'C' - Copy without attachmentlenclosure '-
- Copy with attachmentjenclosure
OFFICE l*HOLB/DRCH *HOLB/DRCH *HOLB/DRCH I *TECH/ED *DIR/DRCH
NAME jFGuenther:rc AMendiola SRichards / / RSanders BBoger
DATE 101/23/95 01/26/95 01/ 2N 9 01/23/95 03/17/95 OFFICE *OECB/DOPS *C/OECB/DOPS p/DO W, l III
NAME RKiessel AChaffee H BKGri _ _ _
DATE 3/28/95 3/31/95 104/___/_5
IN 95-XX
April xx, 1995 If
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. contact
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please
of
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Projects Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Stuart Richards, NRR Mark Ring, RIII
(301) 415-1031 (708) 829-9703 Glenn Meyer, RI John Pellet, RIV
(610) 337-5211 (817) 860-8159 Thomas Peebles, RII Neal Hunemuller, NRR
(404) 331-5541 (301) 415-1152 Attachments:
1. Program Deficiencies Identified by Inspections
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\NKH\INFONOTE.95
- See previous concurrence aI7/1.
attachmentlenclosure IE = Copy with attachmentlenclosure N'
To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: I'C
OFFICE *HOLB/DRCH *HOLB/DRCH *TECH/ED [*DIR/DRCKA
SRichards RSanders BBover 'IO
NAME FGuenther:rc AMendiola
DATE 01/23/95 01/26/95 01/26/95 01/23/95 03/17 OFFICE *OECB/DOPS l *C/OECB/DOPS [
D/DOPS l1_
NAME RKiessel AChaffee BKGrimes _
DATE 13/28/95 3/31/95 / /95 _
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 95-XX
March xx, 1995 Pag of 4 This information notice requires no specific action or written esponse. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, lease contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropri e Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Gri es, Director
Division o Projects Support
Office o Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Stuart Richards, NRR Mark Ring, RIII
(301) 415-1031 (708) 829-9703 Glenn Meyer, RI John Pellet, RIV
(610) 337-521 (817) 860-8159 Thomas Peebles, RII Neal Hunemuller, NRR
(404) 331-5541 (301) 415-1152 Attachments:
1. Program Deficiencies Identified by Inspections
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\NKH\INFONOTE.95
Copy with attachment/enclosure N = No copy
To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: 'C - Copy without attachmentlenclosure 'Et d
[OFFICE *HOLB/DRCH *HOLB/DRCH I *HOLB/DRCH I *TECH/ED *DIR/DRCH I
NAME FGuenther:rc AMendiola - SRichards RSanders BBoger
DATE 01/23/95 01/26/95* 01/26/95 01/23/95 03/17/95 OFFICE ECB/DOPS fj1 D OPS I
NAME RKiessel /" _ACha_ __ BKGrimesSk 5 DATE =OFFICIAL
9
/ /R
OFFICI AL RECORD COPY
D COP
IN 95-XX
March XX, 1995 This information notice requires no specific action r written response.
However, you are encouraged to review your licens operator requalification
program to ensure it meets all applicable requi ments and commitments. If
you have any questions about the information this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project nager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Projects Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Stuart Richards, NRR Mark Ring, RIII
,"(301) 415-1031 (708) 829-9703 Glenn Meyer, RI John Pellet, RIV
(610) 337-5211 (817) 860-8159
/ Thomas Peebles, R11
(404) 331-5541 Attachments' List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT AAME: G:\GUENTHER\INFONOTE.95
- See previous concurrence 'E - Copy with attachmentlenclosure N
To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box 'C - Copy without attachnent/anclosure l-1i
I *TECH/ED 1 DDIR/DRCH J
[OFFICE
NAME
FGuenther:rc
AMendiola
I *HOLB/DRCH
ISRichards
01/26/95 j RSanders
01/23/95 Clrhomrs%* L
DATE 01/23/95 01/26/95* _
OFFICE DIR/DRCHIEjjjjZL OECB IZDOPSI
NAME BBoger/'7'V AChaffee BKGrimes
DATE 3 / /9/95 /95 /95 qt. OFFICIA L RECORD COPY
-
IN 95-XX
February XX, 1995 Secondly, the NRC is concerned, based on its observations to date, that the
level of difficulty of examinations at some facilities may degrade to the
point that the examinations will not be sufficiently challand
discriminatory to determine whether the operators ILve-fltereUm their job
performance requirements as required by e1em of a SAT-based training
program or will not sufficiently re uire-a operator to demonstrate an
understanding of the ability to pe actions referenced by
10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)(ii). In pa cular, the NRC is concerned that simulator
scenarios which verify an rator's ability to implement the EOPs could lack
the level of difficult ecessary to adequately complete the assessment.
Consistent with per r se r:0h
Ins, there is no regulatory
requirement which sp cifically defines the ap iate level of difficulty, however for reference licensees should note that 55 was amended to change
the NRC's involvement based largely on the level of pe ormance reached by the
industry in 1993, and in the area of simulator scenarios he level of
difficulty at that time was largely defined by the guidance ontained in
NUREG-1021.
Licensees are reminded that if an NRC inspection determines t at a
requalification program is ineffective or if the staff conc des that the
inspection process will not provide the insight nec to confirm the
adequacy of the program, the NRC may s discretion, per 10 CFR
55.59(a)(2)(iii), and cond ua ification examinations in accordance with
NUREG-1021.
This information notice re o specific action or written response.
However, you are encouraged to rev e ur licensed operator requalification
program to ensure it meets all applica le irements and commitments. If
you have any questions about the information in is notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the a opriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Projects Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regu ation
Technical Contacts: Stuart Richards NRR Mar
i i5~-M- I(708) 829-9703 Glenn Meyer, RI John Pellet, RIV
211 (817) 860-8159 Thomas Peebles
(404) 331-5541 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information ices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\GUENTHER\INFONOTE.95 To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: 'C -- Copy without attachrentlenciosure E - Copy with att ntlenciosure 'N' No copy
OFFICE HOLB/DRCH IC CH/ED #J DDIR/DRCH I
NAME Efieenther:Xw=r-- - VA!'n 1~'_4thdsk<<H
- _za7oma
DATE ______
Ot_ /95 0
/ I 5_5_U& CThomas
,_ /_95 / /95
_i_ _1_ 1 95____
OFFICE Dr/DRCH I I OPS I
NAME
DATE I BBoger
/ /95 I
AChaffee
_ _95 BKGrimesI
Ul-ILIIAL KLIUORV
, 95 COPY
PA/ _
'* Y'94'
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list | - Information Notice 1995-01, DOT Safety Advisory: High Pressure Aluminum Seamless and Aluminum Composite Hoop-Wrapped Cylinders (4 January 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-02, Problems With General Electric CR2940 Contact Blocks In Medium-Voltage Circuit Breakers (17 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-02, Problems With General Electric Cr2940 Contact Blocks In Medium-Voltage Circuit Breakers (17 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-02, Problems with General Electric CR2940 Contact Blocks in Medium-Voltage Circuit Breakers (17 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-03, Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventory and Potential Loss of Emergency Mitigation Functions While in a Shutdown Condition (18 January 1995, Topic: Packing leak, Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1995-04, Excessive Cooldown and Depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System Following Loss of Offsite Power (11 October 1996, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Shutdown Margin, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Troxler Moisture Density Gauge)
- Information Notice 1995-05, Undervoltage Protection Relay Settings Out of Tolerance Due to Test Equipment Harmonics (20 January 1985)
- Information Notice 1995-06, Potential Blockage of Safety-Related Strainers by Material Brought Inside Containment (25 January 1995, Topic: Foreign Material Exclusion)
- Information Notice 1995-07, Radiopharmaceutical Vial Breakage During Preparation (27 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-08, Inaccurate Data Obtained with Clamp-On Ultrasonic Flow Measurement Instruments (30 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-08, Inaccurate Data Obtained With Clamp-On Ultrasonic Flow Measurement Instruments (30 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-09, Use of Inappropriate Guidelines and Criteria for Nuclear Piping and Pipe Support Evaluation and Design (31 January 1995, Topic: Operability Determination)
- Information Notice 1995-10, Potential for Loss of Automatic Engineered Safety Features Actuation (3 February 1995, Topic: High Energy Line Break)
- Information Notice 1995-11, Failure of Condensate Piping Because of Erosion/Corrosion at Flow-Straightening Device (24 February 1995, Topic: Feedwater Heater)
- Information Notice 1995-12, Potentially Nonconforming Fasteners Supplied by A&G Engineering II, Inc (21 February 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-13, Potential for Data Collection Equipment to Affect Protection System Performance (24 February 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-14, Susceptibility of Containment Sump Recirculation Gate Valves to Pressure Locking (28 February 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-15, Inadequate Logic Testing of Safety-Related Circuits (7 March 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-16, Vibration Caused by Increased Recirculation Flow in a Boiling Water Reactor (9 March 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-17, Reactor Vessel Top Guide and Core Plate Cracking (10 March 1995, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking, Stress corrosion cracking)
- Information Notice 1995-18, Potential Pressure-Locking of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves (15 March 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-19, Failure of Reactor Trip Breaker to Open Because of Cutoff Switch Material Lodged in the Trip Latch Mechanism (22 March 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-20, Failures in Rosemount Pressure Transmitters Due to Hydrogen Permeation Into Sensor Cell (22 March 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-21, Unexpected Degradation of Lead Storage Batteries (20 April 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-22, Hardened or Contaminated Lubricant Cause Metal-Clad Circuit Breaker Failures (21 April 1995, Topic: Hardened grease)
- Information Notice 1995-23, Control Room Staffing Below Minimum Regulatory Requirements (24 April 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-24, Summary of Licensed Operator Requalification Inspection Program Findings (25 April 1995, Topic: Job Performance Measure, License Renewal)
- Information Notice 1995-25, Valve Failure During Patient Treatment with Gamma Stereotactic Radiosurgery Unit (11 May 1995, Topic: Overdose)
- Information Notice 1995-26, Defect in Safety-Related Pump Parts Due to Inadequate Treatment (31 May 1995, Topic: Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking, Stress corrosion cracking)
- Information Notice 1995-27, NRC Review of Nuclear Energy Institute, Thermo-Lag 330-1 Combustibility Evaluation Methodology Plant Screening Guide. (31 May 1995, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Fire Barrier, Exemption Request, Fire Protection Program)
- Information Notice 1995-28, Emplacement of Support Pads for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations at Reactor Sites (5 June 1995, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Tornado Missile, Safe Shutdown Earthquake, Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1995-29, Oversight of Design and Fabrication Activities for Metal Components Used in Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems (7 June 1995, Topic: Nondestructive Examination)
- Information Notice 1995-30, Susceptibility of Low-Pressure Coolant Injection Valves to Pressure Locking (3 August 1995, Topic: Hydrostatic, Power-Operated Valves, Overspeed)
- Information Notice 1995-31, Motor-Operated Valve Failure Caused by Stem Protector Pipe Interference (9 August 1995, Topic: Overspeed)
- Information Notice 1995-32, Thermo-Lag 330-1 Flame Spread Test Results (10 August 1995, Topic: Fire Barrier, Overspeed)
- Information Notice 1995-33, Switchgear Fire and Partial Loss of Offsite Power at Waterford Generating Station, Unit 3 (23 August 1995, Topic: Overspeed)
- Information Notice 1995-34, Air Actuator and Supply Air Regulator Problems in Copes-Vulcan Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valves (25 August 1995, Topic: Overspeed)
- Information Notice 1995-35, Degraded Ability of Steam Generators to Remove Decay Heat by Natural Circulation (28 August 1995, Topic: Overspeed)
- Information Notice 1995-36, Potential Problems with Post-Fire Emergency Lighting (29 August 1995, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Emergency Lighting, Exemption Request, Overspeed, Manual Operator Action)
- Information Notice 1995-37, Inadequate Offsite Power System Voltages During Design-Basis Events (7 September 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-38, Degradation of Boraflex Neutron Absorber in Spent Fuel Storage Racks (8 September 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-39, Brachytherapy Incidents Involving Treatment Planning Errors (19 September 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy, Underdose)
- Information Notice 1995-40, Supplemental Information to Generic Letter 95-03, Circumferential Cracking of Steam Generator Tubes. (20 September 1995, Topic: Hydrostatic, Nondestructive Examination, Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-41, Degradation of Ventilation System Charcoal Resulting from Chemical Cleaning of Steam Generators (22 September 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-42, Commission Decision on Resolution of Generic Issue 23, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure. (22 September 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-43, Failure of Bolt-Locking Device on Reactor Coolant Pump Turning Vane (28 September 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-44, Ensuring Compatible Use of Drive Cables Incorporating Industrial Nuclear Company Ball-Type Male Connectors (26 September 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-45, American Power Service Falsification of American Society for Nondestructive Testing Certificates (4 October 1995, Topic: Commercial Grade, Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-46, Unplanned, Undetected Release of Radioactivity from the Exhaust Ventilation System of a Boiling Water Reactor (6 October 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-47, Unexpected Opening of a Safety/Relief Valve & Complications Involving Suppression Pool Cooling Strainer Blockage (30 November 1995)
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