Information Notice 1990-37, Sheared Pinion Gear-To-Shaft Keys in Limitorque Motor Actuators
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
May 24, 1990
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-37: SHEARED PINION GEAR-TO-SHAFT KEYS IN
LIMITORQUE MOTOR ACTUATORS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
This information notice alerts addressees to potential problems related to
sheared pinion gear-to-shaft keys in Limitorque motor actuators. It is ex- pected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their
facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute
NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of-Circumstances:
On April 27, 1990, the Public Service Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G) submitted
a 10 CFR Part 21 report to the NRC regarding a materials misapplication in valve
motor actuators supplied by the Limitorque Corporation at its Salem Nuclear Power
Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. PSE&G reported that it had discovered that
the pinion gear-to-shaft keys in the motor actuators of six service water valves
(three per unit) were sheared or severely deformed. These keys had failed under
conditions of normal operation, and one of them showed significant deformation
after only 15 valve cycles. The valve units use high-speed (3600 rpm) Limitorque
SMB-O actuators with 25 ft-lb of torque that operate 30-inch Jamesbury butterfly
valves. At Salem this type of valve is only used for the fast isolation (closing
within 10 secondsl of non-safety thermal loads in the turbine building from the
safety-related service water system load during accident conditions.
These keys
failed after the licensee had replaced the original valves with the subject
Jamesbury valves in a recent upgrade program during the last fuel cycle. The
original valves manufactured by the Henry Pratt Company had Limitorque SMB-1 actuators.
The failure identified by PSE&G indicated that the failed keys had wedged
between the motor shafts and the pinion gears at the key-slots. These wedged
keys had allowed the valves to operate under low-flow conditions. However, during normal flow conditions, the failure of these keys could prevent the
valve units from operating reliably. PSE&G realized the magnitude of the
49t'180095
IN 90-37 May 24, 1990 problem after performing a thorough inspection following a second valve failure
during service water valve testing. The licensee did not initially realize the
magnitude of the problem because even during normal flow conditions, the valve
appeared to operate adequately, masking the potential for valve failure.
Discussion:
In the past, the NRC issued Information Notices 88-84, Defective Motor Shaft
Keys in Limitorque Motor Actuators;" 85-67, "Valve-Shaft-to-Actuator Key May
Fall Out of Place When Mounted Below Horizontal Axis;" and 81-08, "Repetitive
Failures of Limitorque Operator SMB-4 Motor-to-Shaft Key," regarding the failure
of keys in the actuators of motor-operated valves. These earlier failures
resulted either from use of improper materials or incorrect installations, whereas, the failure reported by PSE&G resulted from an apparent misappli- cation of material.
Although the licensee is continuing its investigation, the preliminary results
indicate that the failures resulted from the impact loading on the soft keyway
assemblies during fast valve closures. The licensee performed a hardness check
of a failed key and of 38 other keys in stock supplied by Limitorque. The
inspection confirmed that the material was within the ASTM-1018 range for
material hardness that was specified by Limitorque. The licensee also in- spected all 14 actuators supplied by Limitorque under the same purchase order
and found the remaining 8 actuators had no similar problems.-These-& actuators
are used for valves that are not required to close within 10 seconds and are
not subject to the same impact loading experienced in the failed service water
system valves.
PSE&G decided to replace the failed keys in the 6 valve actuators with keys
made from a harder material, such as ASTM-4140 stainless steel. The licensee
tested one valve with a key made from this new material with a hardness of 290
(Brinell) and found no apparent wear after it was operated for 60 valve cycles.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response.
If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. ossD rector
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts:
Peter C. Wen, NRR
(301) 492-1172
Paul D. Swetland, RI
(215) 337-5114 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Attachment
May 24, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
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Information
Date of
Notice No. -
Subject__
-- -Issuance
. --Issued-to.- .
-.-
90-36
90-35
90-34
Apparent Falsification of
State of Connecticut
Weight Certificates
Transportation of Type A
Quantities of Non-Fissile
Radioactive Materials
Response to False Siren
Activations
5/24/90
5/24/90
5/10/90
All holders of OLs
or CPs for nuclear
power reactors, and
10 CFR 70 licensees.
All U.S. NRC licensees.
All holders of OLs
or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
90-33
.. .. I
.;
..
....
.
90-32
Sources of Unexpected
Occupational Radiation
Exposures at Spent Fuel
Pools
Surface Crack and Subsurface
Indications in the Weld of
A Reactor Vessel Head
5/9/90
5/3/90
All holders of OLs
or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
~~. :.
~
~
.
- -
.
All holders of OLs
or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
90-31
90-30
90-29
Update on Waste Form and
High Integrity Container
Topical Report Review
Status, Identification
of Problems with Cement
Solidification, and
Reporting of Waste Mishaps
Ultrasonic Inspection
Techniques for Dissimilar
Metal Welds
Cracking of Cladding and
Its Heat-Affected Zone in
the Base Metal of a Reactor
Vessel Head
5/4/90
5/1/90
4/30/90
All holders of OLs
or CPs for nuclear
power reactors, fuel
cycle licenses, and
certain by-product
materials licenses.
All holders of OLs
or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
All holders of OLs
or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
-__ ___
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 90-37 May 24, 1990 problem after performing a thorough inspection following a second valve failure
during service water valve testing. The licensee did not initially realize the
magnitude of the problem because even during normal flow conditions, the valve
appeared to operate adequately, masking the potential for valve failure.
Discussion:
In the past, the NRC issued Information Notices 88-84, "Defective Motor Shaft
Keys in Limitorque Motor Actuators;" 85-67, "Valve-Shaft-to-Actuator Key May
Fall Out of Place When Mounted Below Horizontal Axis;" and 81-08, Repetitive
Failures of Limitorque Operator SMB-4 Motor-to-Shaft Key," regarding the failure
of keys in the actuators of motor-operated valves. These earlier failures
resulted either from use of improper materials or incorrect installations, whereas, the failure reported by PSE&G resulted from an apparent misappli- cation of material.
Although the licensee is continuing its investigation, the preliminary results
indicate that the failures resulted from the impact loading on the soft keyway
assemblies during fast valve closures. The licensee performed a hardness check
of a failed key and of 38 other keys in stock supplied by Limitorque. The
inspection confirmed that the material was within the ASTM-1018 range for
material hardness that was specified by Limitorque. The licensee also in- spected all 14 actuators supplied by Limitorque under the same purchase order
and found the remaining 8 actuators had no similar problems. These 8 actuators
are used for valves that are not required to close within 10 seconds and are
not subject to the same impact loading experienced in the failed service water
system valves.
PSE&G decided to replace the failed keys in the 6 valve actuators with keys
made from a harder material, such as ASTM-4140 stainless steel. The licensee
tested one valve with a key made from this new material with a hardness of 290
(Brinell) and found no apparent wear after it was operated for 60 valve cycles.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Peter C. Wen, NRR
(301) 492-1172
Paul D. Swetland, RI
(215) 337-5114 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCE
Document Name: IN LIMITORQUE KEY FAILURE
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR *RI
- RPB:ADM
- C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
PCWen
PSwetland
TechEd
CHBerlinger
05/15/90
05/15/90
05/16/90
05/17/90
05//90
IN 90-XX
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May xx, 1990 of the problem after it performed a thorough inspection following a second
valve failure during service water valve testing. The licensee did not ini- tially realize the magnitude of the problem because, even during normal flow
conditions, the valve appeared to operate adequately, masking the potential for
valve failure.
Discussion:
In the past, the NRC issued Information Notices 88-84, "Defective Motor Shaft
Keys in Limitorque Motor Actuators," 85-67, "Valve-Shaft-to Actuator Key May
Fall Out of Place When Mounted Below Horizontal Axis," and 81-08, "Repetitive
Failures to Limitorque Operator SMB-4 Motor-to-Shaft Key," regarding the
failure of keys in the actuators of motor-operated valves. These earlier
failures resulted either from use of improper materials or incorrect installa- tions, whereas, the failure reported by PSE&G resulted from an apparent misap- plication of material.
Although the licensee is continuing its investigation, the preliminary results
indicated that the failure resulted from the impact loading on the soft keyway
assemblies during the fast valve closure. The licensee performed a hardness
check of a failed key and of 38 other keys in stock supplied by Limitorque.
The inspection confirmed that the material was within the ASTM-1018 range for
material hardness that was specified by Limitorque. The licensee also in- spected all 14 actuators supplied by Limitorque under the same purchase order
and found the remaining 8 actuators had no similar problems. These 8 actuators
are used for valves that are not required to close within 10 seconds and are
not subject to the same impact loading experienced in the failed service water
system valves.
PSE&G decided to replace the failed keys in the 6 valve actuators with keys
made from a harder material, such as ASTM-4140 stainless steel.
The licensee
tested one valve with a key made from this new material with a hardness of 290
(Brinell), and found no apparent wear after it was operated for 60 valve
cycles.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Peter C. Wen, NRR
(301) 492-1172
Paul D. Swetland, RI
(215) 337-5114 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
X ciJ Document Name: IN LIMITORQUE KEY FAILURE
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GCB:DOEA:NRd RI
RPB:ADM
C/OGIX :OEA ANRR
D/DOEA:NRR
PCWen
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TechEd :7i9lli CHBerlinger
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05//5/90
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