IR 05000528/2020003
| ML20303A347 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/2020 |
| From: | John Dixon NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D |
| To: | Lacal M Arizona Public Service Co |
| References | |
| IR 2020003 | |
| Download: ML20303A347 (21) | |
Text
October 30, 2020
SUBJECT:
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 -
INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000528/2020003, 05000529/2020003, AND 05000530/2020003
Dear Mrs. Lacal:
On September 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000528, 05000529, and 05000530 License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51, and NPF-74
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000528, 05000529 and 05000530
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000528/2020003, 05000529/2020003 and 05000530/2020003
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-003-0001
Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company
Facility:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3
Location:
Tonopah, AZ
Inspection Dates:
July 1, 2020 to September 30, 2020
Inspectors:
C. Peabody, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Bywater, Resident Inspector
J. O'Donnell, Senior Health Physicist
D. Antonangeli, Health Physicist
Approved By:
John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief
Reactor Projects Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,
Units 1, 2, and 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Inadequate Procedure for Transport of the Containment Hydrogen Recombiners Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000529,05000530,05000528/2020003-01 Open/Closed
[H.6] - Design Margins 71111.04 The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a,
Procedures, for the licensees failure to maintain an appropriate procedure for changing the mode of operation of the containment hydrogen recombiner system during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) in Unit 2 or Unit 3. Specifically, hydrogen recombiner B, shared among the three units, was not physically capable of being moved out of its normal location in Unit 1, or installed in Unit 2 or Unit 3, without removing permanently-installed plant equipment obstructing the transport path of the recombiner, and necessary steps to remove the equipment were not addressed in the licensees procedure.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000530/2020-001-00 LER 2020-001-00 for Palo Verde, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Inoperable Spray Pond Pump 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Units 1, 2, and 3 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident and regional inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week, increasing the amount of time on site as local COVID-19 conditions permitted. As part of their onsite activities, resident inspectors conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions for monsoon thunderstorms on August 3, 2020.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 high-pressure safety injection system B during planned maintenance on high pressure safety injection system A on July 29, 2020
- (2) Unit 1 containment hydrogen recombiner B on September 8, 2020
- (3) Unit 1 diesel generator A during planned maintenance on diesel generator B on September 24, 2020
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system on September 10, 2020.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 3 engineered safety features A pump rooms, Fire Area 13, on July 20, 2020
- (2) Unit 1 upper cable spreading room, Fire Area 60, on July 21, 2020
- (3) Unit 1 lower cable spreading room, Fire Area 44, on July 21, 2020
- (4) Unit 2 auxiliary building 120 elevation, Fire Zone 52D, on July 30, 2020
- (5) Unit 2 lower cable spreading room, Fire Zones 12, 13, and 14, on August 31, 2020
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Cable Degradation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in:
- (1) Diesel fuel oil vault B on September 22, 2020
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated control room activities during supplementary protection system functional testing on August 6, 2020.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated annual simulator examinations on September 4, 2020.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Radioactive drains level switch failures due to ground water intrusion events trend review on July 9, 2020
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 2 planned maintenance of high-pressure safety injection pump B with steam generator FLEX makeup pump contingency on July 9, 2020
- (2) Unit 3 high-pressure safety injection, low pressure safety injection, and containment spray (train B equipment) planned maintenance on July 22, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 emergent work controls balance of plant engineered safety features actuation system A power supply replacement on August 12, 2020
- (4) Unit 1 emergent work controls related to plant protection system half-leg trips for recirculation actuation signal on September 11, 2020, and main steam isolation signal on September 12, 2020
- (5) Unit 3 main turbine electro-hydraulic control system troubleshooting on September 30, 2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 1 operability of emergency generator B with oil leakage on July 16, 2020
- (2) Unit 3 operability of core protection calculator D with loss of indication and intermittent spiking on July 29, 2020
- (3) Unit 1 operability of reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve SIB-V532 after failure of leakage monitoring pressure transmitter SIN-PIT-391 on August 12, 2020
- (4) Unit 1 operability of diesel generator B with lube oil heat exchanger inlet partially blocked with duct tape on September 23, 2020
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Temporary modification 19-09102-004 to remove sub-synchronous resonance generator protection trips
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
(1)73ST-9SI10, Unit 2 high pressure safety injection pump A test following planned maintenance on July 9, 2020 (2)73ST-9CH06, Unit 1 charging pump A test following corrective maintenance on August 5, 2020 (3)40OP-9SA01, Unit 2 balance of plant engineered safety features actuation system A autotest following corrective maintenance on August 28, 2020 (4)73DP-9ZZ25, Unit 3 motor-operated valve testing of low pressure safety injection SI-615 following periodic valve operator and breaker inspections on September 18, 2020 (5)32MT-9ZZ82, Unit 1 essential chiller B Agastat relay testing following planned maintenance on September 21, 2020 (6)32MT-9PE01, Unit 1 diesel generator B governor overspeed test following planned governor replacement on September 29, 2020 (7)73ST-9DG08, Unit 1 diesel generator B single largest load rejection test following planned maintenance on September 29, 2020
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Unit 2 essential chilled water pump B comprehensive test on September 10, 2020
- (2) Units 1, 2, and 3 ex-core linear (power) calibration surveillance test risk-informed documented evaluation (STRIDE) to extend frequency from monthly to quarterly under the surveillance frequency control program on September 21, 2020
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 3 auxiliary feedwater pump A inservice test on July 27, 2020
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated an emergency preparedness drill and training evolution on August 25, 2020.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated an emergency preparedness training evolution as part of the licensed operator continuing training simulator examinations on September 4,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.02 - Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls
Radiological Work Planning (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the integration of as low as is reasonably achievable planning into the following work activities:
- (2) Primary side steam generator maintenance under RWP #1-3306
- (3) Reactor destack and restack under RWP #3-3002
Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated dose estimates and exposure tracking.
- (2) Primary side steam generator maintenance under RWP #1-3306
- (3) Reactor destack and restack under RWP #3-3002
71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment
Source Term Characterization (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to radioactive source term characterization.
External Dosimetry (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to external dosimetry that is used to assign occupational dose.
Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following internal dose assessments for actual internal exposures:
- (1) A radiation workers potential airborne exposure evaluation dated April 25, 2020, Evaluation No. 20-05801-001
- (2) A radiation worker alarmed the personnel contamination monitor exiting the radiologically controlled area on April 30, 2020, Evaluation No. 20-06101-001
Special Dosimetric Situations (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following special dosimetric situations:
- (1) Dose assessment for three declared pregnant workers
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10)===
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020)
- (3) Unit 3 (July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020)
- (3) Unit 3 (July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020)
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Shift technical advisors assigned dual-role as emergency notification system communicators contrary to emergency plan requirements on September 8, 2020
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000530/2020-001-00, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications due to Inoperable Spray Pond Pump (ADAMS Accession No. ML20120A607). An inspection finding pertaining to this event was previously dispositioned in Palo Verde Inspection Report 2020-001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20133K115) as NCV 05000528, 05000529,05000530/2020001-01 Failure to Incorporate Vendor Recommendations into GE Magne-Blast Medium Voltage Circuit Breaker Maintenance and Overhaul Procedures. This LER is closed with no further performance deficiencies identified.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Inadequate Procedure for Transport of the Containment Hydrogen Recombiners Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity
Green NCV 05000529,05000530,05000528/2020003-01 Open/Closed
[H.6] - Design Margins 71111.04 The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the licensees failure to maintain an appropriate procedure for changing the mode of operation of the containment hydrogen recombiner system during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) in Unit 2 or Unit 3. Specifically, hydrogen recombiner B, shared among the three units, was not physically capable of being moved out of its normal location in Unit 1, or installed in Unit 2 or Unit 3, without removing permanently-installed plant equipment obstructing the transport path of the recombiner, and necessary steps to remove the equipment were not addressed in the licensees procedure.
Description:
The containment hydrogen control system includes two 100 percent capacity redundant safety-related trains of hydrogen recombiners and a single-train nonsafety-related hydrogen purge system that is a backup system to the recombiners. The design requirement is to maintain containment hydrogen concentration less than 4.0 volume percent following a LOCA. The hydrogen recombiners and the hydrogen purge system are shared among the three units. The equipment is installed in the Unit 1 auxiliary building and each component is intended to be transportable to Units 2 or 3 if there was a LOCA in one of those units. The hydrogen recombiner skids are each approximately 5.5 feet wide, 10.5 feet long, and weigh 11,000 pounds. The cylindrical recombiner body on the skid is approximately 5.3 feet in diameter and 8.5 feet tall. By design the recombiners are required to be installed within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the initiation of a LOCA, warm-up for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and then placed in service within 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> of the initiation of a LOCA.
On June 3, 2020, while hydrogen recombiner A was nonfunctional due to a corrective maintenance item, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the hydrogen control system and identified a potential lack of clearance for transport of the hydrogen recombiner B skid out of the Unit 1 auxiliary building. The path of travel for the B skid was blocked by emergency lighting battery bank 1QDN-N08. The inspector reviewed Procedure 31MT-9HP01, Hydrogen Recombiner/Hydrogen Purge Exhaust Air Filtration Unit Removal and Installation, Revision 8. This procedure provided instructions for the transport of the hydrogen recombiners following a LOCA. The procedure did not identify the obstruction or provide steps to remove it. The licensee confirmed the inspectors observation and initiated Condition Report 20-07585. The licensee concluded the hydrogen recombiner B remained functional because removal of battery bank 1QDN-N08 was estimated to only require 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of time, leaving ample time available to move and install the skid in Unit 2 or Unit 3.
On June 8, 2020, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the hydrogen recombiner B transport path in Units 2 and 3. The inspector identified other potential obstructions that would prevent the hydrogen recombiner skid from being moved to its required location. These permanently installed components included fire panel 2EFPNJ22J in Unit 2 and fire panel 3EFPNJ32J in Unit 3. These interferences were also not addressed by Procedure 31MT-9HP01. The licensee confirmed these observations and added them to Condition Report 20-07585 for evaluation. The licensee completed additional walkdowns and concluded these fire panels and some other miscellaneous light fixtures and minor obstructions would require removal to allow transport and installation of the hydrogen recombiner B skid. The licensee updated its functionality assessment with information that 12-18 hours would be required to remove the additional obstructions and this work could be performed in parallel with the removal of the hydrogen recombiner B skid from the Unit 1 auxiliary building. The licensee concluded there was still sufficient time available to install the recombiner within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and, therefore, the hydrogen recombiner B remained functional. The licensee initiated a procedure change request to revise Procedure 31MT-9HP01 to include the required plant modifications to support removal and installation of the hydrogen recombiner B skid.
Due to differences in equipment layout in the auxiliary buildings, the inspectors did not have a concern with transportability of the hydrogen recombiner A skid out of Unit 1 and into Unit 2 or Unit 3.
Corrective Actions: The licensee completed walkdowns in all three units to identify obstructions requiring removal to support transport of the hydrogen recombiner and documented a functionality assessment of the hydrogen recombiner. The licensee also initiated a corrective action item to revise Procedure 31MT-9HP01.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 20-07585, 20-12271
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to maintain an adequate procedure for the removal of the hydrogen recombiner B skid from Unit 1 and installation in Unit 2 or Unit 3 following a LOCA was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the design control and procedure quality attributes of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and impacted the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Procedure 31MT-9HP01 only provided instructions for removal and installation of one hydrogen recombiner. Absent guidance to move both hydrogen recombiner skids following a LOCA, and absent an unobstructed travel path for hydrogen recombiner B, the inspectors concluded the time available to place a hydrogen recombiner in service was significantly challenged if there were a failure of hydrogen recombiner A.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated December 13, 2019. The inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment (valves, airlocks, etc.), failure of containment isolation system (logic and instrumentation), failure of containment pressure control equipment (including structures, systems or components credited for compliance with Order EA-13-109), failure of containment heat removal components; and, the facility does not have a containment design that uses hydrogen igniters (Exhibit 3, Section C).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.6 - Design Margins: The organization operates and maintains equipment within design margins. Margins are carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic and rigorous process. Special attention is placed on maintaining fission product barriers, defense-in-depth, and safety-related equipment. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the design margins component because the licensee failed to carefully guard and maintain design margin through a systematic and rigorous process. Specifically, emergency lighting battery banks were permanently installed in September 2018, June 2019, and July 2019 (for Units 1, 3, and 2 respectively) that obstructed the travel path of hydrogen recombiner B. This was not recognized, assessed, and included in the licensees procedure for removal, transport, and installation of a hydrogen recombiner during a LOCA. Ultimately, this resulted in loss of design margin for placing the hydrogen removal system in service. [H.6]
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering the applicable procedures listed in Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, Revision 2, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 3.v, states, in part, that instructions for startup, shutdown, and changing modes of operation should be prepared, as appropriate, for the hydrogen recombiner system.
Contrary to the above, prior to June 8, 2020, the licensee did not maintain an appropriate procedure for startup, shutdown, and changing the mode of operation of the hydrogen recombiner system during a loss-of-coolant accident in Unit 2 or Unit 3. Specifically, station Procedure 31MT-9HP01, Hydrogen Recombiner/Hydrogen Purge Exhaust Air Filtration Unit Removal and Installation, Revision 8, did not have appropriate instructions for transporting hydrogen recombiner B, shared among the three units, from its normal location in Unit 1, to Unit 2 or Unit 3 during a LOCA in one of those units. Previously unidentified, permanently-installed plant equipment created obstructions to the transport of the hydrogen recombiner B from Unit 1 to Unit 2 or Unit 3 following a LOCA, and removal of this equipment was not addressed in Procedure 31MT-9HP01.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On August 7, 2020, the inspectors presented the occupational radiation protection inspection results to Mr. B. Rash, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Regulatory, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On October 7, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mrs. M. Lacal, Executive Vice President/Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
Acts of Nature
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 20-07585, 20-12271
Drawings
01-M-HPP-001
Containment Hydrogen Control
01-M-SIP-001
Safety Injection & Shutdown Cooling System
01-M-SIP-002
Safety Injection & Shutdown Cooling System
Site Wide Status Control Program
Locked Valve, Breaker, and Component Control
Conduct of Operations
Conduct of Operations
System Status Control
Locked Valve, Breaker, and Component Tracking
140
Miscellaneous
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
20A
Procedures
Hydrogen Recombiner/Hydrogen Purge Exhaust Air
Filtration Unit Removal and Installation
Work Orders
215025, 213239
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 20-09313, 20-09674, 20-09686, 20-10991, 20-11197
Miscellaneous
PVGS Pre-Fire Strategies Manual
13-AN-0006
Specification for Field Installation of Presidential W Series
Steel Doors & Frames by Fenestra Corporation
UFSAR Sect 9B
Fire Hazards Analysis
Procedures
Semi-Annual Operational Test of Appendix R and Appendix
A Fire Door Closers
Functional Test of Appendix A Fire/HELB Doors
Drawings
01-E-DFB-001
Elementary Diagram Diesel Fuel Oil & Transfer System
Pump
01-E-DFF-001
Control Wiring Diagram Diesel Fuel Oil & Transfer System
Pump
Procedures
Cable and Raceway Control and Tracking System
71111.11Q Miscellaneous
Redacted
LOCT Simulator Examination Scenario
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
Management of Critical Evolutions and Risk Informed
Completion Times Programs
Supplementary Protection System Functional Test
Conduct of Operations
System Status Control
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 19-17214, 18-00819, 16-02466, 20-01185, 16-01780,
17-11615, 19-13541, 20-02505, 20-04319
Procedures
Maintenance Rule
Work Orders
4502099, 4642515, 4289178, 4507039, 4595269, 4808601,
204492, 4642799, 4581614, 5212017, 5139646, 5225802
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 20-10092, 20-10098, 20-10670, 20-11454, 20-11518,
20-11528, 20-12342
Drawings
13-N001-13.04-
Excore Safety Channel Interconnection Diagram
Miscellaneous
Schedulers Evaluation for PV Unit 1
09/11/2020
Schedulers Evaluation for PV Unit 1
09/12/2020
Unit 3 Operator Control Room Logs
07/22/2020
Schedulers Evaluation for PV Unit 3
09/30/2020
Schedulers Evaluation for PV Unit 2
07/09/2020
Schedulers Evaluation for PV Unit 2
08/28/2020
Schedulers
Evaluation for
Palo Verde
Unit 3
07/22/2020
Procedures
Online Integrated Risk
Management of Critical Evolutions and Risk Informed
Completion Times Programs
Excore Safety Channel Log Calibration
Panel B05A Alarm Responses
2a
Operations Department Online Nuclear Risk Management
Mode 1 and 2
4.16 kV Class 1E Power (PB)
33A
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Assessment and Management of Risk when Performing
Maintenance in Modes 1 and 2
Surveillance Testing
Work Orders
265280, 5061843, 5125779, 5126274, 5251558
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 19-10645, 20-09015, 20-09221, 20-10203, 20-09644,
20-09668, 20-11907
Drawings
01-M-SIP-002
Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System
2-M-AFP-001
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram: Auxiliary Feedwater
System
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram: Diesel Generator
System
Miscellaneous
13-MC-HD-0053
Diesel Generator Room Heat Load and Temperature
Calculation during Essential Condition
4699043
Engineering Evaluation
CORA Plant
Computer
Lube Oil Temperature and Pressure Data
CRDR 4452345
Unit 2 Main Feedwater Pump Turbine Fire Root Cause
Evaluation Report
DF/DG/PE DBM
Diesel Generator, Class 1E Standby Generation, Fuel Oil
Storage and Transfer System
Procedures
Site Wide Status Control Program
Panel B02B Alarm Responses
Conduct of Operations
System Status Control
Operations Condition Reporting Process and Operability
Determination/Functional Assessment
Leak Test of SI/RCS Pressure Isolation Valves
Work Orders
259529, 5265859
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 19-09102
Procedures
Panel B01C Alarm Responses
Design Change Process
IP-ENG-001
Standard Design Process
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 20-09705, 20-10092, 20-12189
Drawings
NN640-A00008
Pulsation Dampener Precharge Adapter
Procedures
Post-Maintenance Testing Development
Cleaning, Inspection, and Testing of Class 1E Emergency
Diesel Generator
Major Machine Post-Maintenance Monitoring
Charging Pump Suction Stabilizer and Discharge Pulsation
Dampener Operation
Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Program
Motor Operated Valve Testing Using QuikLook
Charging Pumps - Inservice Test
Class 1E Diesel Generator Load Rejection, 24 Hour Rated
Load and Hot Start Test Train B
HPSI Pumps Miniflow - Inservice Test
Time Delay Relay Testing
Work Orders
4885966, 5262915, 5265280, 5143791, 5143800, 5145409,
29524, 4906601, 4906652, 5145344, 5145345, 5145354,
5145421
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 20-09579, 20-09581, 20-09677, 19-03338, 20-11518,
20-11454
Miscellaneous
Plant Review
Board
STRIDE PRB Approval Meeting for Excore Linear Power
Calibration Presentation
09/21/2020
PVN-E-0030
STRIDE to Extend Frequency for Excore Linear Power
Calibration
Procedures
Surveillance Test Risk Informed Documented Evaluation
(STRIDE) Process
Excore Linear Monthly Calibration
Surveillance Testing
Auxiliary Feedwater A - Inservice Test
Essential Chilled Water Pumps - Comprehensive Pump Test 10
Miscellaneous
Radiological Assessment Coordinator Quals
08/25/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
EP-0803 F
Protective Action Recommendation Flow Chart
EP-801 H
Emergency Action Level Classification Matrix - Hot
Conditions
Redacted
LOCT Simulator Examination Scenario
Procedures
Emergency Response Organization Position Checklists
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 19-05697, 19-13194, 19-14038, 20-05124
Miscellaneous
1R21 Radiological Safety Summary
3R21 Radiological Safety Summary
2R22 Radiological Safety Summary
Procedures
ALARA Program Overview
Managing Radiological Risk
Radiation Exposure and Access Control
Radiation Work Permits
ALARA Reports
ALARA Work Planning
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
2019-3002
Reactor DeStack and Restack
2019-3306
Primary Side Steam Generator Maintenance
2019-3502
Valve, Flange, Pump Maintenance and Inspections
20-3306
Primary Side Steam Generator Maintenance
20-3502
Valve, Flange, Pump Maintenance and Inspections
Self-Assessments
2019 Annual ALARA/Management Evaluation Report
Radiation Protection Integrated Performance Assessment
Report, First Half of 2019
08/24/2019
Radiation Protection Integrated Performance Assessment
Report, Second Half of 2019
03/12/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 18-01948, 18-07163, 18-13538, 18-16488, 18-17921,
18-18545, 18-18839, 19-06703, 19-08035, 19-13560,
19-15101, 20-04823, 20-05406, 20-05801, 20-05964,
20-06101, 20-07383, 20-07625, 20-08081
Miscellaneous
PVNGS Neutron Study
2009
Dosimetry Program Quality Manual
08/16/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
100536
Personnel Dosimetry Performance Testing
05/15/2020
115-02421-MWL
Minor Change to the EPD Geometry Factor Utilized at
09/17/2002
18-01948-001
Personnel Contamination Event 2-18-00001
03/18/2018
2-20-008
Personnel Contamination Event
04/28/2020
CRDR 4441719
ANI 11-02 Response
2/14/2014
U1 DAW
Database Summary for Waste Type for Unit 1 Dry Active
Waste (DAW) Sea Land
10/05/2019
U2 DAW
Database Summary for Waste Type for Unit 2 Dry Active
Waste (DAW) Sea Land
05/12/2020
U3 DAW
Database Summary for Waste Type for Unit 3 Dry Active
Waste (DAW) Sea Land
2/26/2019
Procedures
RP Program Overview
Radiation Exposure and Access Control
Exposure Evaluation for Lost, Damaged, or Abnormally
Indicating Dosimetry
Issue and Use of IPAM-TX External Alarming Device
Bioassay Analysis
Personnel Contamination Monitoring
Contamination Dose Evaluation
DAC-Hr Tracking
Radiological Air Sampling
Special Dosimetry
Radiation
Surveys
0-M-20200504-2
Annual Survey of TLD Storage in Security Building
05/04/2020
0-M-20200505-4
Annual Survey of TLD Storage in Building F
05/05/2020
Self-Assessments 2018-007
Nuclear Assurance Department Audit Plan and Report for
Radiation Safety
2/14/2018
2-03784
September 2018 Offsite Safety Review Committee Meeting
18- 002, Operations, Chemistry and Radiation Protection
Subcommittee Report
09/21/2018
2-03811
January 2019 Offsite Safety Review Committee (OSRC)
Meeting 19-001, Operations, Chemistry and Radiation
Protection Subcommittee Report
01/31/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2-03854
June 2020 Offsite Safety Review Committee Meeting 20-
001, Operations, Chemistry and Radiation Protection
Subcommittee Report
06/05/2020
71151
Miscellaneous
Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline
Procedures
Performance Indicator - Barrier Integrity Cornerstone: RCS
Leak Rate
ERFDADS (Preferred) Calculation for RCS Water Inventory
RCS Activity Performance Indicator
Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity Surveillance Test
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 20-08597, 16-11134, 20-12272
Miscellaneous
Operations News Flash
07/01/2020
Procedures
Conduct of Operations
Miscellaneous
530-2020-001
Licensee Event Report: Spray Pond Pump Inoperable
Greater than TS Allowed Outage Time
04/24/2020