IR 05000498/2013301
| ML13337A368 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 12/03/2013 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV |
| To: | Koehl D South Texas |
| References | |
| IR-13-301 | |
| Download: ML13337A368 (16) | |
Text
UNITE D S TATE S NUC LEAR RE GULATOR Y C OMMI S SI ON ber 3, 2013
SUBJECT:
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC EXAMINATION REPORT 05000498/2013301; 05000499/2013301
Dear Mr. Koehl:
On October 7, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an initial operator license examination at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2.
The enclosed report documents the examination results and licensing decisions. The preliminary examination results were discussed on October 7, 2013, with Mr. G. Powell, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. A telephonic exit meeting was conducted on November 6, 2013, with Mr. J. Mertink, Manager, Training, and other members of your staff.
The examination included the evaluation of nine applicants for reactor operator licenses, five applicants for instant senior reactor operator licenses, and six applicants for upgrade senior reactor operator licenses. The license examiners determined that 18 of the 20 applicants satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55, and the appropriate licenses have been issued.
There were four post examination comments submitted by your staff. Enclosure 1 contains details of this report and Enclosure 2 summarizes post examination comment resolution.
During the validation of this examination, the NRC identified one self-revealing finding that was evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance (Green). The NRC has determined that a violation is associated with this finding.
Because of the very low safety significance and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this self-revealing finding as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the non-cited violation or the significance of the non-cited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 1600 E. Lamar Blvd, Arlington, Texas, 76011-4125; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility. If you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assignment, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, and the NRC resident inspector at the South Texas Project.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Vincent Gaddy, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Dockets: 50-498; 50-499 Licenses: NPF-76; NPF-80 Enclosures:
1. NRC Examination Report 05000498/2013301; 05000499/2013301 2. NRC Post Examination Comment Resolution
ML13337A368 ADAMS: No Yes SUNSI Review Complete Reviewer Initials: VGG Publicly Available Non-Sensitive
. Non-publicly Available Sensitive OB/SOE OB/OE PSB:SRI OB/OE DRP/B C:
COsterholtz MBloodgood JDrake DStrickland BTindall VGaddy
/RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
11/25/13 12/1/13 11/21/13 11/21/13 11/25/13 12/3/13
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Dockets: 50-498, 50-499 Licenses: NPF-76, NPF-80 Report: 05000498/2013301; 05000499/2013301 Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Dates: September 26, 2013 - November 6, 2013 Inspectors: C. Osterholtz, Chief Examiner M. Bloodgood, Operations Engineer J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector D. Strickland, Operations Engineer B. Tindell, Senior Resident Inspector Approved By: Vincent Gaddy, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety-1- Enclosure 1
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
ER05000498/2013301; 05000499/2013301; September 26, 2013 - November 6, 2013; South
Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2; Initial Operator Licensing Examination Report.
NRC examiners evaluated the competency of nine applicants for reactor operator licenses, five applicants for instant senior reactor operator licenses and six applicants for upgrade senior reactor operator licenses at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2.
The licensee developed the examinations using NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 9, Supplement 1. The written examination was administered by the licensee on September 26, 2013. NRC examiners administered the operating tests on the week of September 30, 2013.
The examiners determined that 18 of the applicants satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55 and the appropriate licenses, as well as two denial letters, have been issued.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- Green.
A self revealing Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests, was identified for the failure of operations training personnel to ensure the integrity of an operating test scheduled for administration for an initial licensing examination scheduled for the week of September 30, 2013. This failure resulted in a potential compromise of examination integrity, but did not lead to an actual compromise of the administered examination.
This finding was more than minor because it would have affected examination integrity had it not been detected. However, because no actual compromise of examination integrity occurred, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the licensee did not properly self- and peer check to ensure a potential compromise of examination materials would not occur H.4(a)
(Section 4OA5.5).
Licensee-Identified Violations
None
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA5 Other Activities (Initial Operator License Examination)
.1 License Applications
a. Scope
NRC examiners reviewed all license applications submitted to ensure each applicant satisfied relevant license eligibility requirements. The examiners also audited two of the license applications in detail to confirm that they accurately reflected the subject applicants qualifications. This audit focused on the applicants experience and on-the-job training, including control manipulations that provided significant reactivity changes.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Examination Development
a. Scope
NRC examiners reviewed integrated examination outlines and draft examinations submitted by the licensee against the requirements of NUREG-1021. The NRC examination team conducted an onsite validation of the operating tests.
b. Findings
NRC examiners provided outline, draft examination and post-validation comments to the licensee. The licensee satisfactorily completed comment resolution prior to examination administration.
NRC examiners determined that the operating tests initially submitted by the licensee were within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination.
.3 Operator Knowledge and Performance
a. Scope
On September 26, 2013, the licensee proctored the administration of the written examination to all twenty applicants., The licensee staff graded the written examinations, analyzed the results, and presented their analysis to the NRC on October 11, 2013.
The NRC examination team administered the various portions of the operating tests to all twenty applicants during the week of September 30, 2013.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Eighteen of the 20 applicants passed the written examination and all 20 applicants passed all parts of the operating test. The final written examinations and post-examination analysis may be accessed in the ADAMS system under the accession numbers noted in the attachment. There were four post-examination comments as indicated in the licensee submittal.
The examination team noted the following generic weaknesses:
- When filling the A train safety injection accumulator, the majority of the applicants did not recognize expected annunciators (Bypass Inoperable, Safety Injection Train A, and Misc. Test LN Valve Not Closed) when opening 1-SI-FV-3973, the train A accumulator fill valve. However, most applicants recognized that the annunciators were expected after they came in. The licensee indicated that this deficiency would be addressed in continuing operator training.
- The majority of senior reactor operator applicants demonstrated a weakness in the ability to diagnose and correctly apply Technical Specifications for a digital rod position indication failure. The licensee indicated that this deficiency would be addressed in continuing operator training.
- The majority of applicants demonstrated a weakness in ensuring the timely blocking of a stuck open pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) prior to receiving an automatic reactor trip. The licensee indicated that they intend to enhance their operating procedures to expedite isolating a stuck open PORV, and entered the deficiency in their corrective action program as CR 13-11609.
- The majority of applicants demonstrated a weakness in the ability to apply the annunciator response procedure for low essential cooling water pressure. The licensee indicated that they intend to enhance the annunciator response procedure to make the necessary operator actions more clear. This deficiency was entered in the corrective action program as CR 13-11610.
.4 Simulation Facility Performance
a. Scope
The NRC examiners observed simulator performance with regard to plant fidelity during examination validation and administration.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.5 Examination Security
a. Scope
The NRC examiners reviewed examination security during both the onsite preparation week and examination administration week for compliance with 10 CFR 55.49 and NUREG-1021. Plans for simulator security and applicant control were reviewed and discussed with licensee personnel.
b. Findings
Introduction.
A self-revealing Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests, was identified for the failure of operations training personnel to ensure the integrity of an operating test scheduled for administration for an initial licensing examination scheduled for the week of September 30, 2013. This failure resulted in a potential compromise of examination integrity, but did not lead to an actual compromise of the administered examination.
Description.
On August 28, 2013, during initial examination validation week, licensee personnel discovered a binder containing a validated scenario and three validated job performance measures (JPMs) was left unattended in an unsecure classroom. The potential compromise was not discovered through a licensee program or process specifically designed to prevent an exam compromise. The licensee immediately informed the NRC chief examiner, and the scenario and the three JPMs were removed from the proposed examination and replaced with new material. The licensee indicated that the binder had been inadvertently left in the classroom after validating administrative JPMs in the classroom the previous day. The licensee documented this issue in Condition Record (CR) 13-10034.
Analysis.
The failure of training personnel to maintain the integrity of examinations prepared for administration to initial licensed operator applicants was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it would have affected examination integrity had it not been detected. However, because no actual compromise of examination integrity occurred, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the licensee did not properly self-and peer check to ensure a potential compromise of examination materials would not occur H.4(a).
Enforcement.
Title 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of Examinations, requires, in part, that facility licensees shall not engage in any activity that compromises the integrity of any application, test, or examination required by this part. The integrity of a test or examination is considered compromised if any activity, regardless of intent, affected, or, but for detection, would have affected the equitable and consistent administration of the test or examination. This includes activities related to the preparation, administration, and grading of the tests and examinations required by this part.
Contrary to the above, on August 28, 2013, the licensee caused a potential compromise in examination integrity by leaving validated examination materials unattended in an unsecure classroom. However, the examiners determined that no actual compromise of the 2013 initial operating examination occurred. Because this violation is of very low
safety significance and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 13-10034, this violation was treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000498/05000499/2013301-1, Failure to Maintain Licensed Operator Examination Integrity.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
The chief examiner presented the preliminary examination results to Messrs. K. Struble, and other members of the staff on October 7, 2013. A telephonic exit was conducted on November 6, 2013, between Messrs. Clyde Osterholtz, Chief Examiner, and J. Mertink, Manager, Training, and other members of your staff.
The licensee did not identify any information or materials used during the examination as proprietary.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- G. Powell, Site Vice President
- T. Frahm, Operations Manager, Unit 2
- T. Frawley, Operations Manager
- S. Mason, Operations Training
- J. Mertink, Training Manager
- M. Murray, Regulatory Affairs Manager
- J. Page, Operations Training Supervisor
- L. Peter, Plant Manager
- J. Savage, Quality Auditor
- R. Savage, Licensing
- K. Struble, Operations Training Supervisor
- K. Taplett, Licensing Manager
NRC Personnel
- A. Sanchez, Senior Resident Inspector
- D. You, Resident inspector