IR 05000483/1981026
| ML20039B412 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1981 |
| From: | Konklin J, Neisler J, Ring M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039B411 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-81-26, NUDOCS 8112220698 | |
| Download: ML20039B412 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIo.:
REGION III-
Report No. 50-483/81-26 Docket No. 50-483 License No. CPPR-139 Li'ensee: Union Electric Company P. O. Box 149
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St. Louis, MO 63166
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Facility Name: Callaway Plant, Unit 1 Inspection At: Callaway Site, Reform, M0
Inspection Conducted: November 16-20, 1981
. Inspectors:
J. H. Neisler f
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Accompanied By:
I. N. Jackiw-(11/19 and 20, 1981)
Approved By:
nith ^rc ng Chief YB)
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j Reactor Projects Section 2A l
Inspection Summary Inspect'c.n on November 16-20, 1981 (Report No. 50-483/81-26)
Areas lapected:
Installation of safety related work, heat exchangers and tanks, safety related instrumentation installation, preoperational testing program and procedures, followup of previously reported items.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified during
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this inspection.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
Principle Licensee Employees
- W. H. Weber, Manager, Nuclear Construction J. Davis, QA Supervisor, Operations J. Schottel, QC Supervisor. Operations
- J. Kaelin, Startup Superintendent
- E. H. Smith, Assistant Startup Superintendent S. M. Hogan, QA Engineer
- C. J. Plows, 0A Consultant
- J. L. Marden, QA Consultant
- R. Veatch, Assistant QA Engineer
- W. H. Stahl, Test Programs Coordinator C. Callahan, T. PC Staff R. K. Cothren, Engineering Coordinator, Startup M. E. Sullivan, Assistant Test Programs Coordinator
- J. A. McGraw, Supervisory Engineer
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J. Jones, Warehouse Supervisor Contractor and other Personnel
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J. Starr, Project Manager, Daniel Ir.ternational Corporation
- A. D. Arnold, Project Quality Manager, Daniel International Corporation M. K. Smith, Audit Response Coordinator, Daniel International Corporation R. Plautz, Supervisory Civil Engineer, Daniel International Corporation K. Distel, Instrument Engineer, Daniel International Corporation
- Denotes those persons attending the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously Reported Items (Closed) Noncompli_ ace (50-483/80-05-02): Class 1E cable tray attached to and hanging under a non-seismic Category I stairwell.
The hanger attachment is changed from the stairwell per DCN 7-1 to C-05-1019 and DCN 3-1 to C-051020 chsnged the stairwell from no seismic to II/I category. QC has completed the inspection of weld-ments on the stairwell to II/I criteria. Design and procurement of materials were in accordance with SNUPPS QA Manual Table 17D-0-1.
This item ic considered closed.
3.
Program or Functional Areas Inspecced During this inspection, the Essential Service Water Pump House was inspected. On August 3, 1981, a crane boom collapsed on the Essential Service Water Pump House. Subsequently, an investigation was con-ducted to determine the extent of damages to the pump house, com-ponents inside the pump house, and the ultimate heat sink pond. The inspector examined the results of the investigation performed by-2-
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Daniel International of damages to the pump house and observed the repairs that had been made to the chipped concrete. The equipment inside the pump house suffered no apparent damages since no crane boom components fell on the equipment. Dames and Moore performed an inspection of the underwater apron and wall, rip rap, slopes and bottom of the ultimate heat sink pond. The inspection showed a small chip in the concrete of one wing wall. The results of the investigation revealed no damage to structural or supporting members and the inspector's observations indicate damages were superficial or Category I structures and would not effect the seismic integrity of '_Le pumo house.
4.
Safety Related Components The inspector examined the installation of safety related heat exchangers and tanks. Component installation" inspected were the following:
Regenerative heat exchanger Letdown heat exchangers.
Excess letdown beat exchangers Seal water heat exchanger Letdown reheat heat exchanger Spent fuel pool heat exchanger Boron injection tank Boric acid tank Volume control tank Diesel jacket water expansion tank TKJ01A Diesel lube oil expansion TKJ04A Accumulators During the inspection of the heat exchangers above, the inspector noted that lock nuts and washers were missing from the foundation bolts at the base plates of several of the heat exchargers. During discussions with licensee representatives the inspector was informed that all lock nuts and washers had not been received for these units, but were ordered and would be installed according to requirements when received. This item is unresolved (50-483/81-26-01).
5.
Plant Operations The inspector met with licensee representatives from the plant operations group. Areas discussed were quality assurance during operations, quality control staffing and procedures, and the receipt and warehousing of safety related components and materials. A tour of the operating department warehouse was performed. Space is available for Level A, B and D storage with plans for Level C items to be stored in the Level B area. Sections are set aside for the segregation of maiczials awaiting QC inspection and nonconforming items.
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6.
Preoperational Test Program
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A summary of some recent preoperations1 test problems encountered at other plants was discussed with the licensee (Attachment A).
The licensee agreed to review those problems and ensure administrative controls are in place to minimize the occurrence of similar problems at Callaway. This review is scheduled to be completed by December 20, 1981. This is an open item (50-483/81-26-02) pending further review by the inspector.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's description of the preopera-tional test program to determine that general areas of testing were identified and responsibilities have been assigned for the following:
Flushing and cleaning systems Hydrostatic testing Instrument calibratica System turnover Functional demonstration of equipment Electrical, mechanical and instrument and control testing During the course of this review, the inspectors determined that instructions had not yet been developed governing turnover of systems from the Startup organization to the Operations organiza-tion. This is an open item (50-483/81-26-03) pending licensee development and subsequent inspector review of these instructions.
In addition, the inspectors determined that hydrostatic testing procedures had not yet been developed for hydrostatic tests to
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be conducted by the Union Electric Startup Organization. This is an open item (50-483/81-26-04) pending licensee development and subsequent inspector review of thase procedures.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's test program to ensure that it includes requirements for testing consistent with FSAR commit-ments such that tests to be performed have been ioantified and sequenced.
The inspectors reviewed the program to ensure that for each of the identified tests the following was identified:
Test objectives Summary of the test Necessary prerequisites Acceptance criteria The Callaway FSAR, Union Electric Nuclear Construction Administrative Instructions (NCAI's) and Reg >tlatory Guide 1.68, Rev. 2, were the primary documents utilized in evaluating the licensee's program.
No items of noncompliance were noted.
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e 7.
Test Organization l
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's organization in order to determine * hat qualifications, responsibilities, method of appoint-ing, and lines af authority for key personnel were formally speci-fied in writing. Additionally, interfaces between organizations were examined to verify that organization responsibilities were clearly established. Callaway's FSAR, Organizational Charts, NCAI's, and individual resumes were utilized with the review.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Test Administration The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program to verify that methods have been established for the startup group to receive jurisdiction over systems from other organizations. The program was also reviewed i
to verify adainistrative procedures provide for control of system status and construction and construction work on systems or components for modification or air following turnover for testing. The Nuclear Construction Administration Instructions were utilized in the review.
No items 01 roncompliance were noted.
9.
Unresolved Items l
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 4.of this report.
l 10.
Exit Interview The inepectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in para-graph ') at the conclusion of the inspection on November 20, 1981.
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The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee acknowledged the findings as reported herein.
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ATTACHMENT A RECENT PREOPERATIONAL TEST PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AT OTHER PLANTS 1.
Turnover a.
No documentation included in turnover package for an air blow used to clean components in diesel generating air start system.
No specific acceptance criteria for cleanliness were used.
Subsequently, one set of air start motors failed due to dirt in an air valve.
b.
Several components turned over for pre-op testing were lacking blue tags indicating release for pre-op testing.
Components temporarily turned back to construction were not tagged to indicate the status.
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c.
Turnover package for diesel generator system did not identify jumpers which master jumper log and another jumper log identified
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as being installed.
(Jumpers were not installed.)
d.
Approximately 10% of tags on RHR and Reactor Protection System indicating release for pre-op testing were missing or mutilated.
e.
System release for pre-op testing did not include several components.
Tag identifying release for pre-op testing for a component was hung on piping vice the component and tag remained when component was removed for calibration.
f.
Two different revisions, each designated 01, to the RHR System pre-op test release were found to be in use.
g.
" Temporary" brackets were welded to, and removed from, the primary containment liner by subcontractors without instructions, procedures or drawings governing their installation.
No records of welding, removal and NDE verification of the liner following removal existed.
II.
Test Procedure a.
Licensee review of the integrated leak rate test was not adequace to uncover significant deficiencies.
b.
Test precedure measuring response time for turbine control valve fast closure did not include acceptance criteria listed in design documents.
c.
The 250VDC Rattery Test was terminated without making an approved change to tb-procedure and without completing the actions required'
by the procedure.
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-2-Procedure on reactor recirculation and flow control did not contain d.
precautions or limitations necessary to protect the reactor vesse; against thermal transients.
" Minor Change Request" was approved when the intent of the proce-e.
dure was changed.
f.
A change to the Startup Hanual was generated, reviewed, proofread, and approv.ed even though it listed the same criteria for major and minor procedure changes.
A test procedure acceptance criteria was written, approved, g.
performed and results reviewed and approved for the low level
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alarm on the diesel generator fuel stortge tanks which would allow the amount of stored fuel to fall below the minimum require-ments of the FSAR.
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h.
A test procedure involving reactor vessel level was performed,
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reviewed, and the results approved without noting a potential safety degradation through a malfunction of the system's trip switches.
1.
Vibration instrument was used which was not listed in the requi.ed test equipment section of the procedure.
Ill. Calibration Calibrations of entire instrument loops were not always being a.
performed prior to pre-op testing.
No program existed for conducting periodic calibrations'during the construction phase of the plant prior to acceptance of a system for operation.
b.
A procedural requirement to have all instruments "within current calibration intervals" was signed off even though the intervals had not bran determined.
A wattmeter for the diesel generator was not properly calibrated; c.
its calibration was not assured by the test engineer; and records of its calibration and the required correction factor were not kept.
As a result the diesel generator was inadvertently overloaded up to 126% of rated power during subsequent testing.
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Jumper and Temporary Power Control
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Removal of the electrical jumpers in a diesel generator panel a.
was not verified and documented in master jumper log.
Situation existed for four months.
b.
No procedure established for shif t engineer to control status of electrical power leads during station construction.
Originated with a personal injury accident.
V.
CleanIIness Lack of a program to maintain adequate cleanliness as evidenced by.a foreign substance high in chlorides found adhering to the inside of the reactor vessel wall, head core support plate and feed spargdr inlet box; dust, grit and debris such as cups,' cigarette packs and beer cans found in diesel generator, TIP machine and reactor control
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panels.
VI.
Document Control Motor operated valve torque switch setting lists issued by station nuclear engineering department were not controlled in that several incomplete, inconsistent or obsolete lists were being used at site.
Vll. Deficiency Documentation
Two weeks elapsed between the identification of a damaged thermocouple on reactor vessel bottom drain and the generation of a deficiency report.
One month elapsed between the time that recirculation loop suction temperature instruments were known to be giving inaccurate readings and the issuance of a deficiency report.
Vill. Valve Lineups Several valves which should have been shut (one should have been tagged shut) were lef t open and as a result high pressure core spray and condensate and low pressure core spray were cross-connected causing a rupture of the steam jet air ejector condenser.
IX.
Design The design of the diesel generators did not guarantee capability to supply reliable emergency power in required time would not be impaired during periodic testing of diesels.
Therefore, the preop test did include a demonstration of this capability.
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