IR 05000458/1990003
| ML20012B480 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 03/06/1990 |
| From: | Constable G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20012B479 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-90-03, NUDOCS 9003150065 | |
| Download: ML20012B480 (9) | |
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APPENDIX i
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO E SSION
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. REGION IV-
NRC Inspection Report:
50-458/90-03 Operating License:
- F,' ; Docket:.50-458 Licensee: Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU)
'P.O. Box ?20 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775
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. Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)
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Inspection At: RBS, St..- Francisv111e, Louisiana
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f Inspection Conducted::-January 1-31, 1990
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SInsyctors:.E.J. Ford,SeniorResidentInspector
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W. B. Jones, Resident Inspector
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! Approved:-
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R20nstablerCfilef, Project Section C-Date /
Division'of Reactor Projects t
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Inspection' Summary
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Inspection' Conducted January 1-31,1990-(Report 50-458/90-03)-
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Araas Inspected:.' Routine unannounced inspection including followup of an'
i event, licensee event report: review,' operational _ safety verification, maintenance observation, review of modification request package, and u
surveillance test observation.-
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Results: ' Within the areasiinspected, one--noncited violation was, identified
concerning:the functional testing.of the upper containment airlock. Although
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, -the surveillance test required by the RBS Technical-Specifications was not;
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. performed, the leakage rate through the airlock was within the Technical o
Specification limit for the airlock and total containment ' leakage.
-The resin spill-on January 24, 1990, indicates that the plant staff may-not fully understand the potential ~for radiological consequences which may result from working on nonsafety-related systems. The reliance on a postmaintenance
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functional' test to determine if a valve and actuator were properly aligned was
unacceptable;in this case. GSU should consider minimizing the time between the release of a component from a clearance to the time it is actually-proven
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- Radiological protection personnel-demonstrated an excellent knowledge of radiological control practices and minimized personnel exposure during the y
' cleanup.' inspections, and repair of components associated with the resin spill.
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-3-DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
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J. E. Booker, Manager, Oversight E. M. Cargill, Director, Radiation Programs-
- J. W. Cook, Lead Environmental Analyst, Nuclear Licensing
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- T. C. Crouse, Manager, Quality Assurance (QA)
- J. C. Deddens Senior Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Group D. R. Derbonne, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance
R. G. Eas11ck, Supervisor Radwaste L. A. England,- Director, Nuclear Licensing
- M. S. Feltner, Licensing Engineer A. O. Fredieu, Supervisor,' Operations
- P. D. Graham,. Executive Assistant
- J. R. Hamilton, Director, Design Engineering
- G. K. Henry, Director, Quality Assurance Operations
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- G. R. Kimell, Director, Quality Services
- W. H. Odell, Manager, Administration
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- T. F. Plunkett,. Plant Manager
- J. P. Schippert, Assistant Plant Manager, Operation and Rad Waste
- K. E. Suhrke, Manager, Project Management
- R. G. West, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Services
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The NRC also interviewed additional licensee personnel during the inspection period.
- D3 notes those persons that attended the exit interview conducted
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on February 9,1990.
2.
Plant Status n-
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.The licensee operated the reactor at-essentially 100 percent power
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throughout the inspection period.
3..
Followup of Event (93702)
During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed licensee condition l
reports (CRs). and 10 CFR 50.72 reports and held discussions with various
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plant personnel to ascertain the sequence, cause, and corrective actions C
taken for plant events. Discussion of a selected event is given below:
Ultrasonic' Resin Cleaning (URC) Room Resin Spill
On January 24,1990, at 3:40 p.m., a spill of approximately
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9,000 gallons of ultrasonically cleaned resin occurred in the URC
room.. This room'is located in the basement of the turbine building.
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-The licensee was transferring cleaned resin from Resin Mixing
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Tank (RHT) 2B to Condensate Demineralizer 1J in accordance with
- Station.0perating Procedure SOP-0093, " Condensate Demineralizer System i
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(Systemf608)," Revision 3.
When the resin transfer program reached Step 5.2.9.b of SOP-0093 for transfer and drain, the recovered.<ater sump level indicated offscale high and the control room received a low condenser hotwell level alarm. The auxiliary operator quickly took manual control of the resin transfer progranner and isolated
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Condensate _Demineralizer IJ. This action by the auxiliary operator limited the spill to the URC room.
The airborne radioactivity within the turbine building increased from
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5.67 E10-10 microcuries per milliliter to 6.57 E10-10 microcuries per milliliter as measured by the digital radiation monitor system (DRMS).
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General area contamination in the room was approximately
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50,000 disintegrations per minute per 100 tquare centimeters (dpm/100cm2)withahighto 200,000 dpm/100 cm2 beta and gamma.
'The licensee's investigation of this event revealed that Isole': ion Valves ICND-A0V12K and ICND-A0V13K were open, although they indicated closed. These valves provide protection of the low pressure resin
' transfer header from the high pressure condensate system on Condensate Demineralizer 'K."
A piping diagram of this system can be found on-Figure 10.4-5 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report. The.
transfer of cleaned resin from RMT-2B to Condensate Demineralizer J required the opening of ICND-A0V478 on the resin transfer header.
This valve had provided isolation of the RMT-28 from the condensate system up to the time the resin transfer was initiated. When the valve was opened..the high pressure condensate system fed back into RMT-2B rupturing the. gaskets around the three sight glasses on the tank.-
y The licensee had perfomed corrective maintenance on:ICND-A0V12K and
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-1CND-A0V13K.as authorized by Maintenance Work Orders (MW0s)-135267.
and 129115, respectively. These MW0s had been initiated:to rework the flanged ball valves and their seats. MWO 135267 was released for.
j work on' January 17,-1990, and MWO--129115 was. released for work on=
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. January 11, 1990. As part of.the maintenance activity, the.
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associated actuators were removed.
Following rework of the ball valves, the valves were reinstalled in the open position. However, s,
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the actuators were: reinstalled back on the ball valves in the closed
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position.: No verification that the actuators and ball valves were.
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properly sligned was performed.
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On January 21, 1990, the associated clearance, RB-1-90-0051, was
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released and. Condensate Demineralizer "K" was retured to service.
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The operational leakage test for both valves was completed
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ti satisfactorily at this time. At the time the system was returned to
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(service, high pressure was sensed between ICND-A0V12K and ICND-A0V13K and M alarm annunciated in the auxiliary control room. The same alarm associated with Condensate Demineralizer "J"'also annunciated.
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No other operability test was performed on the two valves until after y/y the resin spill on January 24, 1990. These two unexpected alarms 1,f t
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should have resulted in.a thorough investigation to determine if the
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boundary between a high pressure and low pressure system had been
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breached, i
The licensee subsequently reworked the two valves on January 25, 1990, and identified that the ball valves and actuators were 90 degrees out of position. This had resulted in the valves
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indicating closed as-required by SOP-0093 for the transfer of resin
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l to a conaensate demineralizer..at this time, the licensee also
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. identified that the relief valve (RV-621 B) had been installed backwards. Thus, no pressure protection of the-resin transfer line was provided. This valve would have provided indication that the resin header was pressurized f rom January 21-24, 1990, by relieving to the-dirty waste sump if it had not been installed backwards.
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addition, the internals for the check valve located downstream of l
L RMT-2B, which would have protected the tank from condensate system pressure, had been removed prior to initial fuel load. No documentation of thi, modification has been identified.
Although the condensate system is nonsafety-mlated, the NRC staff
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.still considers proper modification and maintenance control over l
similar systems to be important to the safety of the plant and plant personnel. The staff considers the mliance on the two isolation
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valves for protection of the ~ low pressure resin transfer piping and components, without having perfonned proper functional testing, to be a poor maintenance and operational practice.
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Licensee Event Report Review The: Inspector reviewed the circumstances and subsequent licensee corrective actions which resulted in the issuance of Licensee Event L
Report (LER) 89-0039, " Missed STP on Upper Containment Airlock Due to Personnel Error." This event, which occurred in February 1989, was
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. identified by the licensee-in November 1989 during an investigation of a CR relating to the upper containment airlock.
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The-licensee had initiated MWO 9133511 to repair / replace the upper airlock
' inner door seal'. This activity was completed on February 5,1989
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. leakage test was then performed on the airlock door between the replaced seals. This test consisted of a seal accumulator surveillance test.
- However, the correct surveillance test should have consisted of an overall airlock leakage test. Although the correct surveillance test had been specified on the MWO, a planner changed the test requirement because he believed the between-the-seals test was correct. The overall upper airlock.' leakage test was satisfactorily perfonned on March 15, 1989. The i
~ licensee believes that although the correct surveillance test was not
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. performed at the time-tht: airlock was returned to service, the satisfactory
perfonnance of the between-the-seals leakage test and the subsequent satisfactory perfonnance of the overall leakage test indicated that primary containment integrity was not compromised.
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-6-The licensee has revised Corrective Maintenance Procedure CMP-9249,
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" Personnel Air Locks Door Seal Replacement IJRB*DRA1 and DRA2, DRA3, DRA4," to require the overall leakage test (barrel test) prior to returning ~ the air lock to service.
The inspector found the licensee's conclusions to be well supported.
Because this incident was identified by)the licensee, properly reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)(B, and prompt corrective action
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taken, no violation will be issued for the'above incident in accordance with Appendix C, paragraph V.G.1 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice " Part 2 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations.
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5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors observed operational activities throughout the inspection period and monitored operational events. Control room conduct and activities were observed to be controlled. Proper control room staffing.
was maintained and access to the control room was controlled in accordance
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with administrative requirements. Selected shift turnover meetings were observed and it was found that detailed information concerning plant
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status was being covered. Several control board walkdowns were conducted by the inspectors.
In all cases, the responsible operators were cognizat.t
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as to-why an alarm was lit and the reason for each plant configuration.
Operational conditions and events identified through discussion with the reactor operators and review of shift tornover logs were identified in the main control. room log. The inspectors noted that inoperable equipment identified during main-control board walkdowns and tours of the facility -
L were appropriately considered by the operators for any applicable -limiting l'
condition for operation.
ing during a resin spill occurred in the turbine buil(g tank to On January 24, 1990, a transfer of ultrasonically cleaned resin from the resin mixin Condensate Derineralizer J.
Quick action by the auxiliary conti-ol room I
operator limitad the spill to the ultrasonic resin cleaning (URC) room.
-The inspector reytewed the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) review which was conducted by radiological protection personnel. The review was performed prior to allowing cleanup inspection and repair of the resin
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transfer system.
Initial decontamination efforts resulted in reduction of surface contaminates from a high ofl200,000'dpm/100 cm2 to 50,000 dpm/100 cm2. Dose rates near areas where maintenance and inspection
' activities were to be perfonned, were significantly reduced through l
flushing and other decontamination efforts. Separate radiological work
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the initial inspection efforts p(ermits (RWPs) were initiated for: cleanup of resin debris (RWP 80-0041); repair l
RWP-90-0040);
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inspection of relief valve, sight glass and check valve (RWP 90-0042); and inspection of the condensate demineralizer (RWP 90-0043). Prior to beginning the cleanup inspection and repair activities, extensive ALARA briefings were perfonned. An ALARA postjob review was also performed h
which evaluated possible means of further_ exposure reduction during future L
job activities. Because of the ALARA practices invoked, the actual man-rem expended we approximately 37 percent less than the estimated 1.627 man-rem desp!te an increase in man-hours from 48 to 217.
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The inspectors conducted several' tours of accessible areas of the facility during.this inspection period. General housekeeping practices were found to be adequate. Significant improvement was noted in the the high pressure core spray room and the areas of the reactor plant closed cooling water pump and heat exchangers as a result of the painting / preservation program.
The inspector conducted walkdowns of the low pressure core spray and the residual heat removal systems. Major flow path valves were verified to be i
in the required standby position. The inspector observed the associated power supply for each major flow path valve and pump to be properly 611gned. No conditions were noted which would indicate that the
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associated system would not perform its intended safety function.
The inspector observed security personnel perform their duties of
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personnel and package search. Vehicles were properly authorized and
controlled or escorted within the protected-area (PA).
Personnel access was observed to be controlled in accordance with established procedures. -
The inspector conducted site tours to ensure compensatory posts were properly implemented as required because of equipment failure or degradation. The PA barriers were adequately illuminated and the
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-isolation zones were free of transient materials.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.-
Maintenance Observation (62703)
During this inspection period the inspector reviewed two corrective
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maintenance activities associates with the rod control and information system, and the Division '. residual heat removal test return valve.
In addition, maintenance activities associated with the control building
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chiller were observed.
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On January 4,1990, Control Rod 44-41 drifted from Position 48 -(full out).
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to 22 as indicated on the main control bot.rd.
Prompt MWO R056383 was
. initiated to investigate and repair the apparent rod control and information system (RC&lS) failure. The rod drift stopped when RC&IS
" locked up."
The shift supervisor subsequently had RC&IS reset to allow full insertion of the control rod. This action was required to meet RBS Technical Specification 3/4.1.3.1.b for inserting and disabling the
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affected control rod.
The licensee's investigation subsequently determined that a' transponder i
card, which activates the' directional control valves, had failed. This card is located.at the control rod drive hydraulic control skid. The failure had resulted in a continuous insert signal until the RC&IS " locked r
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up" on rod position error. An overhead hydraulic control unit valve had experienced a previous packing leak. Water from the leak had apparently
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penetrated the J-box', which houses the transponder card, through a cut in the gasket.- The transponder card appears to have failed because of the water-intrusion into the J-Box. This failure would not have prevented the control rod from scramming if required.
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The review of this maintenance activity indicated that the activity was performed in accordance with the NWO and the clearance program. A proper functional test was performed prior to returning the control rod to
service.
On January 10, 1990, the licensee identified that the Division I residual
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heat removal (RHR) test return line valve, IE12*M0V0024A, to the suppression pool would not=close with the pump running. The licensee
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initiated prompt MWO R056366 to perform "0ATIS" signature testing on the valve. The valve perfonned satisfactorily during each signature test and stroked from full open to full closed within the time specified by the inservice testing-program. The MWO was then closed based on the
satisfactory performance of the valve. The valve has perfonned as required
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on several occasions since the failure. The signature testing was'
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l performed in accordance with the MWO, corrective maintenance procedure,
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. and plant engineering procedure. The inspectors will continue to monitor L
the performance of this valve.
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The inspector observed maintenance activities associated with inspection and cleaning of the Division II Control Building Chiller "B."
Swcifically, preventive MWO P537526 was observed for the inspection of tie chiller heat exchanger tube sheets and replacement of the oil and oil filters. The inspector noted that, although the maintenance activity had
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been carried out essentially in accordance with the preventive MWO,
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referenced Corrective Maintenance Procedure CMP-9159, " Control Building Chiller Unit Disassembly, Inspection, Rework and Reassembly," was not
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l-included in the MWO package. The respective clearance number was also not -
L indicated on the MWO.
l MWO R127569 was perfonned concurrent with the above' preventive maintenance task. 'This MWO provided the guidelines for hydrolazing the chiller heat exchanger tube sheets. The maintenance personnel were cognizant of the job guidelines and performed the m31ntenance activity in accordance with the job plan. The inspector noted the buildup of corrosion products on d
the service water side of the heat exchanger (tube side). These deposits were removed by the hydrolazing process.- The licensee has established an erosion / corrosion monitoring program for the service water system. The inspector also noted that the clearance number had not been specified on this MWO..
7.
Surveillance Test Observation (61726)
The inspector observed the performance of Surveillance Test STP-511-4209,
"RMS-Main-Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor Local Intake 18 Month CHCAL (1RMS*RE13A)," on January 30, 1990. This surveillance test meets the requirement to perform an 18-month channel calibration'on the RMS*RE13A local air intake as specified by Technical Specification 3/4.3.7, Table 4.3.7.1-1.1.a.
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. Prior to beginning the surveillance, the I&C technicians notified the control operating foreman of the intent of the procedure and the estimated
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time the monitor would be out of service. The inspector questioned the two I&C technicians and found then to be cognizant of the surveillance test requirements. The test was conducted in accordance with the surveillance procedure. The alarm and trip setpoints for actuation of the-control building emergency ventilation system were verified to be within the established acceptance range.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Main Steam Tunnel Temperature Detection Modification (37702)
' The inspector reviewed Modification Request (MR) 85-0926 which was
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initiated to relocate the main steam tunnel resistance thermal
detectors (RTDs) to provide a better bulk room average temperature
. indication. The licensee had found, during the initial plant startup in 1985, that the RTDs were located in dead air spaces and were indicating higher area temperatures than actually existed for the general area.
The inspector found that the justification for moving the RTDs had not been adaquately. addressed in the MR. No analysis or test data was provided to demonstrate that the locations the RTDs had been moved to were
. representative of the bulk area temperatures. This matter was discussed with the licensee during this inspection period. The licensee was subsequently able to provide test data that showed that the new locations for the RTDs were actually providing a representative bulk area temperature.
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The licensee has connitted to revising the MR to provide the proper justification for relocating the RTDs. The inspector noted that NRC Inspection Report 50-458/89-45 identified a similar finding that engi' eering packages contain insufficient detail to support the engineering conclusions made.
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The inspector noted that MR 85-0926 was field work completed on May 16, i
1986, however, the design data base (IS 217) has-not been updated. The licensee's quality assurance (QA) organization has identified a concern with the timely closecut of MRs. This concern is identified as QA Finding l
Report QAFR P-89-12-009. The inspector will review the engineering department response to this QAFR during a subsequent inspection.
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~ No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Exit Interview An exit interview was conducted with licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1 on February 9,1990. During this interview, the NRC g
inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee did L
not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by,
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the inspectors.
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