IR 05000458/1990004
| ML20033G965 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 03/28/1990 |
| From: | Constable G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033G963 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-90-04, 50-458-90-4, NUDOCS 9004130200 | |
| Download: ML20033G965 (10) | |
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L, APPENDIX-
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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REGION IV-J
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NRC' Inspection Report: '50-458/90-04 Operating License: NPF-47 I
Docket:
50-458
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Licensee:. Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU)
j P.O. Box 220
.1 St. Francisv111e, Louisiana 70775 j
Facility Name: RiverBendStation(RBS)
Inspection At:
RBS, St. Francisville, Louisiana
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Inspection Conducted:
February 1-28, 1990 I
Inspectors:: E. J. Ford, Senior Resident Inspector
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W.'B. Jones, Resident Inspector
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Approved:'
7/4f/kP6
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% r. ionstable, Unter, Project section c pate '
Division of Reactor Projects
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Inspection Summary
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- Inspection Conducted February 1-28, 1989. (Report 50-458/90-04)
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Areas' Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection in the areas of event followup, operational safety verification, emergency preparedness exercise,
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surveillance observation, and maintencnce observation.
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Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were ident1fied.-
The licensee has implemented company-wide organization changes.
The major
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changes at River Bend Stati m cave been the creation of two new positions at
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the General Manager level (paragraph 3).
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While at power the unit experienced a partial ennineered safety feature
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factuation following an equipment problem with a Topaz inverter. The actuation
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P resulted in the Division II low pressure coolant injection valves unexpectedly stroking.open.. This was a significant event which was mitigated by the proper i
- dispatched to investigate the incident (paragraph 4)pection Team was operation of in line check valves. An Augmented Ins
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Problems with both divisions of the control building chilled water system
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resulted in a need for enforcement discretion which was granted by the NRC
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i staff. The licensee's actions were considered to be properly conservative in
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their declaration of system status. The operation staff displayed a good l
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knowledge of the affected system (paragraph 5).
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i The annual emergency exercise was conducted on February 21, 1990.
Weaknesses
observed during a previous drill were corrected (paragraph 6).
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L DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- J. E. Booker, Manager, Nuclear Industry Relations i
E. M. Cargill, Director, Radiological Programs f
J. W. Cook, Technical Assistant
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- T. C. Crouse Manager, Administration
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- J. C. Deddens Senior Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Group D. R. Derbonne, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance l
- L. A. England, Director, Nuclear Licensing i
A. O. Fredieu Supervisor, Operations u
- P. D. Graham, Plant Manager
J. R. Hamilton, Director. Design Engineering
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- G. K. Henry, Director, Quality Assurance Operations D. E. Jernigan, General Maintenance Supervisor
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- L. G. Johnson, Site Representative, Cajun
- G. R. Kimmell, Director. Quality Services
- D. N. Lorfing, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
- J. C. Maher, Licensing Engineer
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I. M. Malik, Supervisor, Quality Operations
- J. F. Mead Supervisor Electrical Design
- W. H. Odell, Manager, Oversight
- T. F. Plunkett, General Manager, Business Systems and Oversight
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M. F. Sankovich, Manager, Engineering J. P. Schippert, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations, Radwaste. Chemistry
- K. E. Suhrke, General Manager, Engineering and Administration J. Venable Assistant Operations Supervisor
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- R. G. West, Assistant Plant Manager, System Engineering The NRC inspectors also interviewed additional licensee personnel during
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the inspection period.
- Denotes those persons that attended the exit interview conducted on March 2, 1990.
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Plant Status The licensee operated at essentially 100 percent thermal power throughout the inspection period.
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Organizational Changes The licensee announced a significant reorganization of the River Bend i
Nuclear Group (RBNG) on February 1, 1990. The management positions which now report directly to the Senior Vice President RBNG are the Plant Manager, General Manager-Engineering and Administration, General
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Manager-Business and Oversight, and the Manager-Nuclear Industry j
Relations. 'The general manager positions are newly created positions.
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The Plant Manager oversees operations, radiological waste, chemistry, i
maintenance, radiological programs, systems engineerir.g. and outage
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management.
The General Manager-Engineering and Administration is responsible for the I
engineering programs including design engineering, performance programs
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and testing, engineering analysis, process engineering, computer systems, and fuels. He also is responsible for administrative services, security.
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training, and emergency planning.
The General Manager-Business and Oversight is responsible for business
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systems including financial, accounting, contracts, materials, and l
planning and scheduling.
In addition, he is responsible for oversight activities including quality assurance / quality control, the inservice i
inspection program, licensing, environmental, and nuclear safety.
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The Manager-Nuclear Relations will perform nuclear review board
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activities and provide an interface with other utilities and industry groups as the Senior Vice President's representative.
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4.
Followup of Events (93702)
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During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed licensee conditions reports (CRs) and 10 CFR 50.72 reports and held discussions with various plant personnel to ascertain the-sequence, cause, and corrective actions taken for plant events. Discussion of a selected
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event is given below:
INADVERTENT ESF ACTUATION - AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM (AIT) RESPONSE On February 11, 1990, at 11:09 a.m., with the reactor at 100 percent power, the unit experienced a partial engineered safety features (ESF)
actuation of the Division II diesel generator (DG), Containment Unit
Cooler IB, and associated service water supply valves, an autostart of
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the Control Building Filter B, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)
initiation logic, and the opening of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) B and C injection valves.
The event occurred when scheduled electrical preventative maintenance was being performed on the Division II battery charger (ENB*CHGR 18). When the electrician switched to the equalize position on the charger, a high voltage spike was experienced which caused the Topaz inverter (powered by the charger's 125 Vdc bus) to trip. Prior to lowering the battery output voltage to below the inverter's reset voltage (132 Vdc), the operators racked out the Division 11 RHR pump breakers to prevent an inadvertent J
initiation and defeated the. Division II automatic depressurization system (ADS) trip logic and solenoids. Also, the RCIC system was isolated to prevent injection. However, in the absence of a load list for the inverter, it was not recognized that the Division II DG and the other previously mentioned components would receive an initiation signal upon l
resetting the inverter.
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Immediate operator investigation detemined that there was no significant
backflow as a result of the RHR injection valves opening. The inspector
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was notified by the licensee and, after discussing the event with
licensee system engineers and operators, the inspector verified the
licensee's reports by direct observation.
The licensee suspended further use of the procedure involved and tagged out the charger (s) in the float position pending the results of an
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engineering investigation. The investigation is expected to be completed during the mid-cycle outage commencing March 15, 1990.
The plant remained at 100 percent power throughout the event.
- I The NRC dispatched an AIT to followup on the event. Details of that effort are documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/90-05, j
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspector conducted a walkdown of the high pressure core spray (HPCS)
system and all emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) valves in the auxiliary building (Elevation 70) crescent area. All valves were in the required position. The inspector observed the associated power supply for each major flow path valve and pump to be properly aligned. No conditions were noted which would indicate that the associated system would not perform its intended safety function.
On February 2,1990, at approximately 9:10 a.m., a licensed operator
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attempted to transfer the control building chilled water system from Division II Chiller 1HVK*CHLID to Division I Chiller 1HVK*CHL1A. The system did not transfer as expected, and a subsequent attempt to transfer back to the Division II chiller at 9:20 a.m. was then unsuccessful. At
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9:56 a.m., a second attempt to restart the Division II chiller also
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failed. The licensee declared both divisions of the control building chilled water system inoperable and entered into RBS Technical Specification (TS)3.0.3.
The control building chilled water system is composed of two divisions, each of which has two redundant chiller units. Division I consists of Chiller Units 1HVK*CHLIA and 1HVK*CHLIC. Division 11 consists of l
Chiller Units 1HVK*CHL1B and 1HVK*CHL10. Each one of the above chillers 1s capable of handling the control building heat load during normal and accident conditions.
On February 2,1990, the 1HVK*CHLIC was out of service awaiting completion of modification documentation.
1HVK*CHLIB was out of service for normally scheduled preventive maintenance.
The ir.spector was observing control room personnel performance when the above control building chilled water system failure occurred. The unit operator had attempted to start 1HVK*CHLIA in accordance with Station Operating Procedure 50P-0066, " Plant and Control Building HVAC Chilled
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Water System," Revision 6B. Chiller 1HVK*CHLIA failed to start.
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minutes later, the unit operator unsuccessfully attempted to restart
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IHVK*CHLID. The inspector discussed the plant status with the shift supervisor and control operating foreman. The operators indicated that I
there was a 20-minute timer associated with each chiller that prevented restarting the chiller after a trip.
The inspector remained in the
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control room to verify that at least one control building chilier was operable.
RBS TS 3.7.2 requires the main control room air conditioning
system, with two independent air handling unit / filter train subsystems, l
be operable with the reactor in power operation. Operations may continue i
for up to 7 days with one division inoperable. With both divisions inoperable, RBS TS 3.0.3 becomes applicable when the limiting condition i
for operation established in RBS TS 3.7.2 cannot be met.
RBS TS 3.0.3 requires actions be initiated within I hour to place the unit into a
condition in which the specification does not apply.
In this case, the
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licensee would be required to be in STARTUP within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, HOT SHUTDOWN l
within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
At 9:56 a.m., preparations were made to begin an orderly plant shutdown.
includir.9 bringing an additional control operating foreman on duty.
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Plant thermal power was reduced to 98 percent at 10:32 o.m.
The operators had restarted 1HVK*CHLIA at 10:27 a.m., however, since the
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shift supervisor had not been assured that the chiller would perfom as required under all plant conditions specified in the Updated Safety i
Analysis Report, the plant remained in RBS TS 3.0.3.
The licensee then began an investigation as to why the two chillers had failed to start. Concurrent with this effort, the licensee requested enforcement discretion from the NRC staff to extend the time required to enter the STARTUP mode.
This request was based on the time the licensee needed to complete the modification documentation for 1HVK*CHLIC and the
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fact that 1HVK*CHL1 A was running.
In addition, the operators
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demonstrated, on two occasions, that they could restart 1HVK*CHLIA. This would have been required in the event of loss of power to the Division I bus. At 12:15 p.m., a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> enforcement discretion was granted.
The licensee subsequently determined that 1HVK*CHLIA was not receiving I
sufficient chilled water flow during the auto start sequence. The I
control building equipment room and switch gear room temperature control valves were opened further to ensure adequate chilled water flow during the start sequence. The chiller was subsequently tested satisfactorily and the Division I chilled water system declared operable at 1:30 p.m.
l The plant then exited TS 3.0.3.
The licensee continued to troubleshoot Division II 1HVK*CHL1D. On February 3,1990, the engineers identified a faulty relay in the 480 Vac breaker which supplies the chiller.
The breaker was replaced and the chiller tested satisfactorily. At 10:52 a.m. the Division II 1HVK*CHL1D was declared operable.
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The inspector found the licensees' actions to be conservative. The l
o>erating crew demonstrated a good knowledge of the control building
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c1111ed water system and immediately requested engineering support to
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troubleshoot the chiller units. Managenent support was evident
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,throughout the period the chillers were inoperable.
The inspector observed security personnel perfom their duties of
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personnel and package search. Vehicles were properly authorized and controlled or escorted within the protected area (PA),
Personnel access
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was observed to be controlled in accordance with established procedures.
The inspector conducted site tours to ensure that compensatory posts were
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properly implemented as required following an equipment failure or degradation.
The PA barriers were adequately illuminated and the i
isolation zones were free of transient materials.
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On February 19, 1990,ty incident had occurred.the inspector was onsite ind was notified
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The incident involved the NRC reportable securi discovery by x-ray machine of anununition in a security officer's duffel bag as he reported for work.
The six rounds of 0.38 caliber anununition were retained by security for safekeeping and the individual was denied access. An investigation was conducted by the licensee. No intent was
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established by the investigation and the individual had access restored i
after appropriate disciplinary neasures. The inspector reviewed the incident with security management.
It was noted by the inspector that i
the incident was properly documented on CR 90-0135 and that it was
subsequently downgraded to a log incident. The inspector considers this
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to be a good example of security officer alertness and a proper programmatic response by the security organization.
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On February 26, 1990, the inspector reviewed licensee CR 90-0147 which
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documented the discovery of two small control room penetrations which did
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not fully satisfy security requirenents.
During subsequent daily tours of
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the affected areas, the inspector verified the posting of compensatory
security officers.
It was also noted by the inspector that corrective work on the barriers commenced on February 28, 1990. The inssector considers the licensee's posting of compensatory officers to be appropriate and their corrective actions to be prompt.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency preparedness Exercise (82310)
On February 21, 1990, the licensee held an emergency preparedness exercise to demonstrate their ability to assess, control, and recover from a postulated accident. The drill involved initial assessment of the
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l-event in the simulator with subsequent activation of the technical support center (TSC), operational support center (OSC), emergency operations facility (EOF), and establishing communications with offsite I
local and state authorities. The inspector observed the emergency L
exercise from the TS f.
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Within 10 minutes of the alert declaration, preliminary TSC staffing commenced and TSC status boards displayed initial infon9ation. Prior to the arrival of the energency director, the TSC manager was properly overseeing and controlling the escalating TSC activities. Consnunications between the TSC and simulator control room were promptly established and properly maintained throughout the drill. One exception was a communication breakdown which resulted in a delayed (approximately 30-minute) message to the control room to announce a (drill) plant evacuation. After the arrival of the emergency director and fonnal activation of the TSC, TSC communications continued to be timely and adequate.
Positive control of TSC activities by the TSC manager and support to the plant was evident throughout the drill. The positive attributes described above effectively renedy the weaknesses observed
.in the TSC during last years drill (March 1,1989). The results of the emergency drill are described further in NRC Inspection
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Report 50-458/90-06.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection.
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Surveillance Test Observation (61726)
The inspector observed the performance of Surveillance Test STP-051-4549,
"ECCS Reactor Vessel Pressure Low /SRV Actuation Instrumentation Monthly Chfunct " on February 13, 1990. The purpose of this surveillance is to perform a channel functional test of the following instrumentation:
B21-N068E. B21-N668E, B21-N669E, B21-N670E, B21-N616E, B21-N618E.
B21-N697E, and B21-N698E. The STP was performed with the reactor in Operational Condition 1 and within the specified 31-day testing frequency required by RBS TS Section 4.3.3.1. Table 4.3.3.1 - 1. A.1.d (Reactor Vessel Pressure-Low LPCS/LPCI Injection Valve Pennissive), TS Section 4.4.2.1.2.a and -b (the relief valve pressure actuation instrumentation), and TS Section 4.4.2.2.1.a and -b (the low-low set pressure actuation instrumentation).
Prior to beginning the test, the technicians received authorization from the control operating foreman. The inspector observed that the procedure was being followed, that jumoers were controlled in accordance with General Maintenance Procedure GMP-0042, " Circuit Testing and Lifted Leads and Jumpers," and that test equipment was within the calibration due date.
The inspector noted spurious indications on channels other than those being tested during the perfonnance of the test. Upon questioning, the technicians stated that similar anomalies had been observed during previous testing and that a log for recording and trending them had been established by a "Rosemont Transient Task Force." This log is maintained by the operations staff for periodic review by engineering personnel.
However, when reviewed by the inspector, the log did not indicate current engineering review. This matter was discussed with the Assistant
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Operations Supervisor and an inquiry is in progress by engineering to f
detemine current status of the trended data. The inspector will review the results of the inquiry in a subsequent inspection.
On February 15, 1990, the inspector observed the performance of portions of STP-051-4225 "ECCS/RCIC - Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1; Low-Low, Level 2: Monthly Chfunct." The purpose of this test is to perform a channel functional test of the following instrunentation:
821-N091F, B21-N691F, and B21-N692F. This test satisfies TS
.Section 4.3.2.1. Table 4.3.2.1-1.6.d (RHR system isolation); TS Section 4.3.3.1.(Table 4.3.3.1-1.B.1.a and 1.B.2.a (Division !! Trip Systemsystem" for RHR D and C LPCI mode) and Automatic Depressurization tri)
February 16, 1990, the inspector observed the calibration of tie Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) E.
Surveillance Test Procedure STP 505-4251
"RPS/ Local Power Rang)e Monitor 1000 EFPH Chcal (APRM A through H)
(C51*K605A through H " was used to perform the calibration required by TS Section 4.3.1.1. Table 4.3.1.1-1.2, Note f.
For both of these observed surveillances, the technicians were adhering to the latast revision of the required procedure and had complied with the necessary prerequisites and administrative requirenents.
The inspector verified that jumpers in use had been placed in accordance with GMP-0042 requirements, and that test equipment indicated proper calibration. The ins)ector noted that technical requirements for the traversing in-core prose traces and gain adjustment factors had been satisfied prior to commencing the APRM calibration.
The inspector found the surveillance tests met the objectives established
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in the procedure and adequately fulfilled the applicable TS requirements.
Good communications were noted between the I&C technicians performing the
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tests and the operations crew in the main control room.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Maintenance Observation (62703)
On February 27, 1990, the inspector observed the performance of a
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preventive maintenance (PM) task on the penetration valve leakage control system (PVLCS). The purpose of this system is to prevent unfiltered release of fission products into the environment after a loss of coolant
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accident through process lines that penetrate containment. Upon manual L
initiation, the PVLCS supplies compressed air to inboard and outboard containment isolation valves for each process line. The air is injected
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between the double-disk gate valves and maintains that volume at a higher l
pressure than the line pressure. This seats the discs to minimize I
leakage through the valves. The PM task involved the replacement of the Brayco 853 hydraulic oil used in the electrohydraulic operator for Pressure Control Valve ILSV*PV10A. This oil is required to be replaced at the end of its qualified life. The work was properly authorized by Maintenance Work Order (MW0) R534418.
Clearance boundaries established i
I by RBS Clearance RB 1-90-00221 were verified by the inspector to be
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properly established.
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A control circuit fuse blew during a required stroking of the valve.
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was determined, through discussions with various licensee personnel, that
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this type of valve actuator has required frequent corrective neintenance.
The licensee is investigating the cause of the blown fuse and examining
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the maintenance history of this type of actuator. The inspector is
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monitoring the licensee's efforts and will review the issue during a
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subsequent inspection.
The inspector concluded that the individuals performing the PM had a good
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working knowledge of this type of actuator and were properly implementing administrative controls and the MW0.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection,
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Exit Interview An exit interview was conducted with licensee representatives identified
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in paragra)h 1 on March 2,1990. During this interview, the inspector reviewed t1e scope and findings of the report. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.
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