IR 05000458/1990010
| ML20043C014 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1990 |
| From: | Constable G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043C013 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-90-10, NUDOCS 9006010184 | |
| Download: ML20043C014 (11) | |
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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-458/90-10 Operating License: NPF-47 l
Docket:
50-458 Licensee: GulfStatesUtilitiesCompany(GSU)
P.O. Box 220 l
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St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775
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Facility Name: -RiverBendStation(RBS)
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Inspection At:
RBS, St. Francisville, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: -April 1-30, 1990
Inspectors:
E. J. Ford, Senior Resident Inspector W. B. Jones, Resident Inspector R. V. Azua Project Engineer Approved:
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G;T.Mable, Chief. Project Section = C Da'te/
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Division of Reactor Projects
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p Inspection Summary
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50-458/90-10)
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Inspection Conducted April 1-30, 1990 (Report i'
l Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced. inspection of events, operational
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safety verification, maintenance observation, surveillance' test observation, and a
followup of previously reported items.
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Within the areas inspected, no viol'tions or deviations were identified.
y Results:
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A reactor scram (SCRAM 90-02) occurred during main turbine valve testing due to problems with the test portion of the electrohydraulic control (EHC)
l circuitry. After preliminary troubleshooting and repair efforts, an engineering evaluation was performed and the vendor was' consulted to formulate
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additional corrective actions which would preclude a recurrence of the-
malfunction (paragraph 3).
j Subsequent.to the return to power, a management' decision was made to reduce reactor thermal power to approximately 15 percent to implement the EHC system
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modification (paragraph 5). The scram recovery and the EHC work received considerable mar ement attention.
-Observed elevated off gas activity indicated a possible fuel pin leak (paragraph 3).
2006010184 900530 i
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- J. E. Booker, Manager - Nuclear Industry Programs
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- G. A. Bysfield, Supervisor, Control Systems
- E. M. Cargill, Director, Radiological Programs
- J. W. Cook, Technical' Assistant
- T. C. Crouse, Manager, Administration
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- W. L. Curran Site Representative, Cajun
- R. G. Easlick. Supervisor, Radwaste
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- L. A.- England. Director, Nuclear Licensing
- A. O. Fredieu.-Supervisor, Operations
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- P. D. Graham, Plant ~ Manager
- G. K. Henry, Director,- Quality Assurance Operations K. C. Hodges, Supervisor, Chemistry
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- G. R. Kimmell, Director. Quality Services
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A. Kugler, Supervisor, Process Systems
- D. N. Lorfing,' Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
- J. C. Maher, Licensing Engineer
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T. F. Plunkett, General Manager
' Business Systems & Oversight J. P. Schippert, Assistant Plant Manager - Operations, Radwaste and l
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J. Venable, Assistant Operations Supervisor R. G. West, Assistant Plant Manager - Systems Engineering-l The inspectors also interviewed additional licensee personnel during the inspection period.
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- Denotes those persons that attended the exit interview conducted on l-
.May 11, 1990.
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Plant Status
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The unit operated at' essentially.100-percent thermal power during this inspection period with the exceptinn of power reductions for scheduled-'
.L weekly main turbine valve testing, a reactor scram, and a subsequent power reduction to modify.the electrohydraulic. control (EHC) system. On-
- April 7,1990, while' at reduced power for turbine valve; testing, the reactor scrammed (SCRAM 90-02).
Subsequent investigation revealed a q
problem during' the closure of the turbine combined intermediate r
valves (CIV). A reactor startup was commenced on April-8, _1990, to enable.
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further testing and repair of the'EHC test circuitry. Power was reduced:
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again on April-17, 1990, for modifications to the EHC system.and the'
plant was subsequently returned _to ful.1 power operations' for the remainder
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of-the month.
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Followup of Events (93702)
During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed licensee condition reports (CRs) and 10 CFR 50.72 reports and held discussions with various plant personnel to ascertain the safety significance, sequence of events, cause, and corrective actions taken for plant events.
Discussion of'
selected events are given below:
Scram 90-02
On April 7,1990, the reactor scransned from approximately 75 percent -
power. Two hours earlier, power had.been reduced from 100 percent power
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to conduct scheduled main turbine valve testing. The initial scram signal was caused by a loss of. EHC emergency trip system (ETS). pressure
during testing. With ETS oil pressure less than 530 psig, a reactor scram is initiated.
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The main turbine bypass valves opened as expected to control reactor-vessel pressure. No safety relief-valve actuation was needed to control-the pressure transient immediately following the reactor scram. The.
t engineering analysis of the scram concluded that it was a mild ~ transient in comparison to the analyzed (turbine trip with bypass) event discussed
L in the RBS Updated Safety Analysis Report. The engineering report states
that the plant responded as expected (i.e...the recirculation pumps-
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transferred to low speed, the turbine bypass valves opened,'and the-emergency core cooling systems and reactor core isolation cooling did not initiate).
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The inspector monitored the postscram activities, interviewed ~ licensee.
personnel, and reviewed scram-related documentation. The inspector noted that there was extensive senior management, engineering, and operations personnel involvement in the troubleshooting activities.
Loss of Alternate Power to Reactor Protection System (RPS) Bus "B" On April 9 1990, with the plant at 28 percent, power, the plant.
experienced a Division II Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation due to a loss of power to RPS Bus "B."
At the time, the RPS Bus "B" was powered from its alternate supply when the output breaker opened. There were no other activities going on at the time.
All systems performed as designed. There was no change in reactor power
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as a result of the event. The operators reset the ESF trip signals and t
returned. the equipment to a normal. lineup after making a determination
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that plant conditions did not warrant an ESF response.
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The licensee was maintaining alternate power to RPS. Bus "B" at the time of the event while completing documentation for work performed on~ the normal power supply (motor generator (MG) "B") because of an earlier problem with the NG. Repairs had recently been completed on the MG and
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it was used to power RPS Bus "B" after the alternate supply was interrupted. This event will receive additional review when the licensee event report (LER) is issued.
Control Building Emergency Ventilation System Actuation On April 14,'1990, with the plant at 100 percent power, a voltage l
transient occurred on the local grid. The transient occurred during a lightning storm when an offsite breaker tripped on a 500 KV line. The
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voltage transient caused a spike on one of the two process radiation-
'l monitors for the main control room local air. intake. This caused the as-designed automatic start of main control room Filter Train 1 HVC*FLT 38.
q After verifying that no actual high radiation condition existed, the operators restored the air handling system to its normal lineup..
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Power Reduction to 15 Pegent for Modification to EHC System On April 17, 1990, the licensee reduced reactor power to approximately 15 percent to implement a modification to the EHC system. This -
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modification involved the installation of relays and test switches'and the i
replacement of the electrical trip solenoid _ valve in the_ emergency trip i
system.
The purpose of the modification was to correct a condition in the EHCl system which resulted in the reactor scram on April 7,1990, while operstors were conducting a scheduled test on the main turbine valves.-
Since this test is required to be perfonned _on a weekly basis by the RBS J
Technical Specifications,.the licensee installed the modification in an effort to preclude any more scrams and minimize the challenges to the system. This work effort was monitored by the inspector'_(see paragraph 5).
Elevated Offgas Pretreatment Samples - Possible Fuel Leakage-Weekly offgas system pretreatment samples taken on April 24, 1990, L
indicated a rate of 441 microcuries per second (uci/second). This was-higher than previous weekly samples, which have-been a nominal
_i 60-75 uci/second. The licensee's procedures require that samples be taken more frequently (initially this was every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />)-if offgas, activity-exceeds 300 uci/second. A _following sample indicated a. release rate of'
462 uci/second. The licensee reported that preliminary isotopic analysis
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of the offgas data indicated _ an' equilibrium distribution of gaseous-activity which is characteristic of a pin-hole leak in the fuel cladding.-
No particulate activity was observed.
I The licensn nas implemented a draft failed fuel action plan which H
delineates required actions for further elevation of release rates.
Formal review of the action plan is in progress and is expected to be j
complete by the end of May 1990.
In addition, RBS Technical Specification 3.11~.2.7 limits the release rate (the sum of the activities
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from the noble gases measured prior to the holdup pipe).to less than 290 millicuries /second.
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The inspector monitored the pretreatment sample results on a daily basis.
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and they were noted to be in the 450-550 uci/second range through the remainder of the month. At the end _of the inspection period..there were no significant increases in isotopic iodines observed in the reactor coolant systep.
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Design Error in the Feedwater Control System logic-
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On April 23, 1990, the licensee discovered an error in the vendor-supplied Level-8 trip logic of the feedwater control system during'a review of that-system. There are three level transmitting channels for the.feedwater I
control system. The "B" and "C". channels each contained a set of contacts j
from relays in the other circuit. "A' trip. in the "B" channel: would cause
a trip in the "C" channel and vice-versa.
Thus, a single trip-signal would.
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satisfy the two-out-of-three reactor vessel' high: level coincidence to -
cause a trip of the main turbine and. reactor. feed pumps. This circuitry is nonsafety-related and is fed from the narrow range level 1 instrumentation a
on the reactor vessel. - The emergency core cooling system functions are l
fed from the wide range levelEinstrumentation,.which is safety-related.
3ased on licensee discussions-with the vendor, the error apparently has been in place since the original-design of the system. The licensee evaluated the situation and, as a conservative measure;. restored the.
reactorcoreisolationcooling(RCIC)systemwhichhadbeentakenoutof service for a scheduled preventative maintenance outage. :This was tol assure that the high~ pressure coolant injection system would have a backup -
i in the event that there was a loss.of main feedwater. The inspector is
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monitoring the licensee's plans to resolve the: problem and will discuss
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the results in a subsequent inspection report.
l Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) Isolation and Related APRM 1/2 Scram'
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On April 25, 1990, shortly after the licensee completed channel checks' on
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the Riley Trip Units used for the RWCU differential-temperature leak
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detection logic, Trip Unit E31-N615A tripped.. This caused the RWCU' system ~'m I
toisolate(1-out-of-1 logic)withall~equipmentresponding-asexpected.
Trip Unit E31-N615A tripped and reset four times:within the 22 minutes following the. isolation. Actual * RWCU temperatures were verified to be approximately 27'F below the differential temperature trip setpoint of 46*F. The licensee. suspected the trip unit to' be faulty and replaced it.
Following subsequent-tests, the. licensee determined that the cause of-the
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trip had been identified and corrected.
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A) proximately 4. hours '1ater, while restoring the RWCU system to operation, t1e RWCU valve to the "B" recirculation loop was opened and an
'4 instantaneous decrease in the "B" recirculation loop flow was detected.
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The "B" recirculation loop flow decreased approximately 15 percent, with a corresponding decrease in the core plate differential pressure.
Recirculation loop flow returned to normal almost instantly. The decrease-
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in the "B" recirculation loop flow caused 'a 1/2 scram on. Division II RPS, from the "B" and "F" average power range monitors' (APRMs) flow-biased
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trips. The APRMs received an upscale tripidue to the' decreased.
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recirculation loop flow. Four. APRMs receive flow indications from the "A" recirculation loop and the remaining four APRMs from the "B" recirculation loop.
Additional review will' be conducted during the LER closeout.
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'No; violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Operationa'l Safety Verification (71707)
L Throughout the inspection period the inspectors observed operational activities and monitored operational events. ' The conduct.of control room activities-and' access to the control-room.was properly controlled in-
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accordance with. administrative requirements. Control room staffing met.
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.or-exceeded minimum requirements. Several shift briefings were observed
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by the inspectors.
It was noted that detailed information concerning-plant status and pending special. tests or plant evolutions were covered.
When questioned by the inspectors, the operators we.re. aware of. plant configuration and why alarms'were lit.
Information obtained by-control
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board walkdowns and discussions with operators regarding' plant conditions
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.and events were adequately identified.in the' main control room' log.
The inspectors noted that the. operators appropriately considered inoperable-equipment for any applicable limiting conditions for operation and
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maintained tracking logs.
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The inspector performed a walkdown of portions-of the safety 6~ KY. Standby electrical distribution system on April 3,1990. For the 4.1
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Bus "A" (IENS*SWG1A) and Standby Bus B" (IENS*SWG18):the inspector
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verified by light indications and physical position that the:.
breaker charging motor switches were in the'"on" position,
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breaker mechanical position indicators were in the " racked:-in" i
position, and breaker status (CLOSED or OPEN) was appropriate for the supplied
load.
The inspector also verified proper breaker position for the loads on the-following 480 Vac Standby' Motor Control Centers:
1EHS*MCC 14A
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1EHS*MCC 14B 1EHS*MCC 8A 1EHS*MCC 8B
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'I These Division I and II components are located in Standby Switchgear i
Rooms 1A and 1B on Elevatior. 98 of the control building. While.in.
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Room 1A, the inspector observed the Control Operating. Foreman (C0F)
performing rounds and discussed the status of two. discharged breakers Mn
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each train of IEJS*LDC with him. The two breakers in question supplied IEHS*MCC 14 and 1EHS*MCC 8.
The C0F stated that the discharged state of-the breakers (1EJS*ACB048 and ACB055) was permissible'in that they were
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not remotely controllable and that an. operator would'have to be physically-present.at the breaker to investigate and reset in the event it tripped..
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The inspector subsequently discussed; this matter with other members of the-
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NRC staff and had no further questions.
of the Division III electrical The inspector.also verified the adequacy (HPCS)- electrical distribution'
lineup in the high pressure core' spray
room on Elevation 116 of the control building.
It was noted that the-individual cubicles of.ESF Division III.HPCS Motor Control Center-E22*S002
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now have-nomenclature tags clearly designating the cubicle number. This j
was the result-of a licensee action in response to an observation made by-the inspector to licensee management.
On April 16 and 18, 1990, the inspectors verified, by visual observation,.
the adequacy of battery water levels, interconnections and the generalc condition of batteries. -battery racks',:and battery room housekeeping.
-l The inspectors.also' verified the proper positioning:of switches.on' the
battery charger / inverters. The batteries and chargers are part of the j
.onsite standby 125-Yde systems.
It was noted that emergency eye wash canisters in the area were adequately charged and that_ room emergency
lighting = properly illuminated when operated by the licensee.
!a The inspector observed security personnel perform their. duties of
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personnel and package search. Vehicles were properly. authorized and controlled or escorted within the. protected area.(PA).. Personnel ' access:
was observed-to be controlled in accordance with established procedures.
The inspector conducted site tours on April. 3 and 19,e 1990,' to ensure
that compensatory posts were properly implementedias' required because of equipment failure,or degradation. During these' tours.. a walkdown of the
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fer.ce fabric was conducted to verify its integrity..No defects (tears or-
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holes)werenoted. The PA barriers were adequately illuminated and the
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isolation zones were free of transient materials
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i No violations or deviations were identified.
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Maintenance Observation (62703)
On April 17, 1990, the licensee reduced power to 14 percen't to install a.
modification to the EHC system. The. purpose of this modification'(MR
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No. 90-0070) was to install individual " Bypass-Enable" switches in the EHC CIV logic circuitry, which would prevent unintentional movement of CIVs during testing. As a result, while the CIV test button is depressed, the
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test function of the other CIVs, which are.not in test,.will be defeated.
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In addition, other functions such as turbine warming, CIV closure during.
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power load imbalance, and/or valve position will also be defeated. All other turbine safety features of CIV valve movement will remain as is.
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The inspector reviewed Modification Request (MR) No. 90-0070, dated April 9,1990, and verified that it had been reviewed and approved prior to use. The procedure had clear written instructions accompanied by detailed drawings to provide guidance to the electricians in installing this specific modification. The inspector found the MR instruction to be adequate for the task. The inspector also monitored the craftsman while they were installing part of the modification described in MR No. 90-0070.
When responding to questions posed by the, inspector, they appeared-te have a good understanding of the work being performed. _ Management oversight of
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this specific modification was apparent.
Testing equipment used to verify circuit continuity was within the.
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calibration due date. Work was well controlled and the procedure i
instructions were well implemented.
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No violations or deviations were identified.-
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Surveillance Test Observation (61726).
On April 17, 1990, the inspector observed portions of the performance of l
the following surveillance tests:
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STP-505-4251, Revision 5, "RPS/ Local Power. Range Monitor _1000 EFPH CHCAL APRM A thru H," dated April 18, 1989 STP-209-4204, Revision 4, "RCIC Actuation Condensate Storage-Tank Water Level-Low Monthly CHFUNCT,18 Month CHCAL,18 Month LSFT (E51-NO35A, E51-N635A) " dated January 19, 1989
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The inspector reviewed both procedures to determine adequacy and verify that they had been reviewed and approved.
The purpose of STP-505-4251 was to perform a channel calibration of the RPS/ local power range monitors as required by Technical Specification
l Section 4.3.1.1. Table.4.3.1.1-1.2, Note f.
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STP-209-4204, in part, was to perform a channel functional test and
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channel calibration of the RCIC actuation-condensate storage tank water
level-low instrumentation as required by Technical Specification
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Section 4.3.5.1. Table 4.3.5.1-Ic.
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The inspector, through. observations and discussions with the technicians, determined-that the required prerequisites for both procedures had been i
met, and authorization had been given to begin-the test. The technicians
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followed the instructions listed in the procedures and maintained proper control of lifted leads as stipulated in General Maintenance Procedure (GMP) 0042, " Circuit Testing and Lifted Leads and Jumpers." The inspector also verified that all of the test equipment being used was within the calibration due date.
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The inspector found both activities to be well controlled and properly conducted.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Followup of Previously Identified Items (92702)
(Closed)UnresolvedItem(458/8939-08): Observation of' security battery load performance, test.
The inspector cuserved the performance of the security battery load j
performance-test on December. 19. 1989. The-test was conducted.in i
accordance with the. test procedure and the licensee determined-that all i
the acceptance criteria were met. The observation of this test is i
documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/89-47-paragraph 4.
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violation of regulatory requirements was identified.
This unresolved-item is closed.
(Closed)UnresolvedItem(458/8803-10):
Location of documentation-associated with the corrective actions taken for the reactor scram of-July 7,1986, caused by the failure of the feedwater' reheater drain-
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receiver'TKIA (1DSR-TK1A) manway gasket. This event and the recommended l i
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corrective action was. documented in Memorandum QAM-86-099 '(T.- C. Crouse
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to J. C. Deddens) dated July 10, 1986.
The licensee has conducted an extensive' review to locate all the documents pertaining to the licensee's corrective hetion recommendations '
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documented in Nemorandum QAM-86-099. Although the licensee was notfable
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to locate the specific documents requested, the licensee' demonstrated q
that the subject areas had been reviewed for proper corrective action.
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Significant changes to the maintenance program, such as the. addition of
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torque values to a general maintenance procedure, have been made. No
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violation of regulatory requirements was identified.
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This unresolved item is closed.
(Closed) Violation (458/8822-01): This violation consisted of two parts.
The first was the failure to maintain both divisions of the fuel building ventilation charcoal filtration subsystem operable with the reactor in Mode 1.
The second. concerned the cancellation of an MR for the fuel building filtration system heaters. The-MR had been initiated as part of the corrective actions to a CR for alerting the operators to situations when the heaters may be deenergized.
The licensee has implemented a control board walkdown checklist for the i
unit operator to use as a guide when performing shift turnovers. This checklist, contained in OSP-002,." Shift Relief and Turnover," contains additional detail on system (s) condition including inservice /out-of-service equipment and limiting conditions for-operation.
In addition, Operations I
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Procedure OSP-0017. " Normal Control Board Lineups for Safety-Related Systems," has been developed to facilitate verification of system control'
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switch positions prior to plant startups.
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I MRs'
The licensee performed a review of cancelled MRs to identify an{veen which were written against safety-related CRs. These MRs have
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reviewed to ensure that the documentation clearly. identifies how
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corrective action is being taken or to justify why corrective action is no longer recuired.
Engineering Procedure ENG-03-006, " Modification Request," hac been revised to include a checklist for MRs that are to be cancelled.
This violation is closed.
(Closed)OpenItem.(458/8804-03):- Upgrade of each control building chiller unit from 50 to 100 percent capacity.
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The licensee completed the upgrade of each control building chiller unit to 100 percent capacity during<the~second refueling outage. This upgrade.
was conducted in accordance with MR 87-0719. The inspector observed the functional testing for one of the four control building chiller units when a
the MR was completed. The inspector noted that.the' acceptance criteria
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established within-the test procedure were met.. The licensee subsequently determined that each control building chiller would operate 'at.100 percenti i
capacity.
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This open item is closed, i
(Closed) Violation (458/8808-01): Two main control room alann response procedures (ARPs) were identified to be incorrect lin thatithe. alarm setpoints were incorrectly stated. The alarm setpoints involved the main steam tunnel ambient temperature high and main steam tunnel _ ventilation.
differential temperature high.
Thelicenseeinitiallyreviewedthe31high-temperature (leakdetection I
alarms. All identified errors were promptly corrected.
A. complete-review of all ARPs'was-then conducted inaccordance with Operations
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Procedure OSP-005, " Operations Procedure Review and Revision."' ~ This
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review was completed and all errors and discrepancies corrected-by March l-1989.
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(Closed)OpenItem(458/8720-01): Licensee control of personnel within
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I the "at-the-controls" (ATC) area and evaluation of control room access improvements.
The licensee has established guidance for control-room ATC area access in
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Administrative Procedure ADM-0022. " Conduct of Operations." Personnel
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are required to receive permission from an on-duty licensed operator i
within the ATC area prior to entry. The inspector has observed that this
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requirement is strictly adhered to. A work authorization area has been.
y established outside the ATC-area to minimize personnel entering the ATC
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L area. This setup has proven to be effective during normal plant
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operations. During extended outages, an additional work control station
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is established away from the ATC area, which further limits the number of1 personnel near the controls.
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This open item is closed.
I (Closed) Violation (458/8819-01):
Failure to perform surveillance test
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procedure (STP) steps in sequential order, resulting in an unplanned ESF activation.
The licensee counseled the involved technicians and )rovided. training on
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the need to perform STP steps in sequence unless aut1orized to deviate within the procedure.
In January 1990, the licensee conducted s
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surveillance of procedural errors which have occurred within the last:
year and determined that an. effort was needed~ to reduce procedural errors. Licensee management personnel-have taken a more active role'in monitoring personnel procedural compliance.
This violation is closed.
(Closed) Violation-(458/8823-01):-'Failuretofollowmaintenancework-order procedure for addition of lubricant to an emergency diesel generator and-replacement of the standby gas treatment charcoal filter.
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The licensee had discontinued the use of standby work orders for the I
addition of lubricants to safety-related equipment. The addition of
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lubricant is now controlled through the use of PMs or corrective
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maintenance procedures, j
This violation is closed.
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Exit Interview-i-
An exit interview was conducted with licensee representatives-identified in paragraph 1 on May 11,1990. During this interview, the inspector -
's reviewed the-scope and findings of the report. The licensee did.not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by..the
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