IR 05000416/2011002

Errata for Grand Gulf - Integrated IR 05000416-11-002, Grand Gulf, Page 34

ML111600325
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	06/08/2011
From:	Vincent Gaddy NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C
To:	Mike Perito Entergy Operations
References
IR-11-002
Download: ML111600325 (3)

Text

ERRATA UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGI ON I V 612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125 June 8, 2011 Mr. Mike Perito Vice President Operations Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 756 Port Gibson, MS 39150 Subject: ERRATA FOR GRAND GULF - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2011002

Dear Mr. Perito:

Please remove Page 34 of the Grand Gulf - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000416/2011002 and replace it with the page enclosed with this letter. The purpose of this change is to correctly identify that leakage from the mitigation monitoring system did not impact the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if you choose to provide one for cases where a response is not required, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary, information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Vincent Gaddy, Chief Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-416 License No. NPF-29 Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000416/2011002 ERRATA, Page 34 Distribution via Listserv

Entergy Operations, Inc. -2-Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov)

Deputy Regional Administrator (Art.Howell@nrc.gov)

DRP Director (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov)

DRP Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)

DRS Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)

Senior Resident Inspector (Rich.Smith@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRP/C (Vincent.Gaddy@nrc.gov)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/C (Bob.Hagar@nrc.gov)

Project Engineer, DRP/C (Rayomand.Kumana@nrc.gov)

GG Administrative Assistant (Alley.Farrell@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov)

Project Manager (Alan.Wang@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)

RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)

Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)

RIV OEDO/ETA (Stephanie Bush-Goddard@nrc.gov)

OEMail Resource ROP Reports File located: R:\_REACTORS\_GG\Errata GG 2011002 RP-RLS-vgg.docx SUNSI Rev Compl. Yes No ADAMS Yes No Reviewer Initials VGG Publicly Avail Yes No Sensitive Yes No Sens. Type Initials VGG C:DRP/C VGaddy 6/8/2011 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

observed control room indications used to identify abnormal conditions in the containment building. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the attachment.

b. Findings Introduction. The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, Green finding of EN-DC-115, Engineering Change Process, involving the failure to maintain adequate design control measures associated with the installation of the mitigation monitoring system.

Description. On November 8, 2010, at approximately 5:30 am, a failure occurred at the skid mounted Online Noble Chemical - Mitigation Monitoring System pump inside primary containment. The positive displacement sample pump ejected the pump piston from the housing resulting in an approximate 7 gpm leak of reactor coolant. The leak was not detected for approximately 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, resulting in the release of approximately 2,000 gallons of reactor coolant which flashed directly to steam. The steam leak resulted in a reactor recirculation system flow control valve lockup (due to HPU motor failure)

and approximately 15,000 square feet of contaminated area in the primary containment structure.

The inspectors reviewed the mitigation monitoring system modification documentation and found that the design documentation did not appropriately address the design requirements for the installation of the mitigation monitoring system pump. The licensee failed to ensure proper validation testing for the pump prior to installation in the plant.

Specifically, they did not ensure that the pump would be able to withstand the system operating pressures and temperatures in which it was installed. They failed to validate the design, which had a single point vulnerability, that resulted in the piston injecting from the pump and caused the leakage and contamination of the containment. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the root cause analysis of the event and found that the licensee failed to apply the appropriate oversight of the engineering vendor due to weaknesses in the procedure EN-DC-114, "Vendor Quality Management/Oversight."

The licensee entered this event into their corrective actions program as condition report CR-GGN-2010-07852. The licensee has currently removed the mitigation monitoring system pump from the plant, and isolated the mitigation monitoring system skid from the reactor water cleanup system. They are evaluating the design to make appropriate changes to ensure a repeat of this event will not occur.

Analysis. The failure to implement adequate design control measures for modifications to the plant, is a performance deficiency. Specifically procedure EN-DC-115, Engineering Change Process, step 5.1[1], requires during the engineering change development a choice of new technology or application is an error precursor which will need to have defensive functions built into the design, testing and maintenance, includingdeveloping in-house expertise. Contrary to this, the engineering change package that implemented this design change failed to ensure proper validation testing was performed prior to installation in the plant. The finding is more than minor because it affects the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers

- 34 - Enclosure