IR 05000334/2020002

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Integrated Inspection Report 05000334/2020002 and 05000412/2020002
ML20226A214
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 08/13/2020
From: Matt Young
NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5
To: Penfield R
Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp
Young M
References
IR 2020002
Download: ML20226A214 (24)
v • d • e


Text

August 13, 2020

SUBJECT:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2020002 AND 05000412/2020002

Dear Mr. Penfield:

On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On July 14, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, X /RA/

Signed by: Matthew R. Young

Matthew R. Young, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 05000334 and 05000412 License Nos. DPR-66 and NPF-73

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000334 and 05000412

License Numbers:

DPR-66 and NPF-73

Report Numbers:

05000334/2020002 and 05000412/2020002

Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0018

Licensee:

Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.

Facility:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2

Location:

Shippingport, PA

Inspection Dates:

April 1, 2020 to June 30, 2020

Inspectors:

E. Burket, Senior Reactor Inspector

S. Elkhiamy, Senior Resident Inspector, Acting

S. Horvitz, Resident Inspector

R. Rolph, Resident Inspector

Approved By:

Matthew R. Young, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 5

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.

Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Correct Relief Valve Settings Leads to Inoperability of Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000334/2020002-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71153 The inspectors identified a self-revealing Green finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, when the licensee did not correct improper guide ring settings that were identified on a Unit 1 A low head safety injection (LHSI)discharge relief valve in 2012.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000334/2019-001-00 LER 2019-001-00 for Beaver Valley, Unit 1, Low Head Safety Injection Discharge Relief Valve Did Not Reseat During Surveillance Test 71153 Closed

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at operated at or near rated thermal power. On May 15, 2020, Unit 1 reduced power to 28 percent to perform planned maintenance on the C main feedwater regulating valve. Unit 1 returned to rated thermal power on May 16, 2020, and remained at or near full power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period in end-of-cycle coastdown operations. On April 12, 2020, Unit 2 was shutdown for a planned refueling outage (2R21). On May 6, 2020, operators commenced a reactor startup. Unit 2 reached rated thermal power on May 9, 2020, and remained at or near full power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. As a result, at the beginning of the inspection period, resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities; and completed other onsite inspection activities as appropriate to the COVID-19 conditions onsite. During the remainder of the inspection period, required resident and regional baseline inspection samples were continually evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the requirements associated with each IP could be met through remote inspection or required onsite inspection activities. Based on this evaluation, and an ongoing assessment of the COVID-19 conditions onsite, inspection activities were completed remotely or onsite as appropriate. Unless otherwise noted, the inspection samples documented below met all the requirements of the applicable IP.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions for a severe thunderstorm warning condition on June 10, 2020.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 2 A and B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps during turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump unavailability on May 4, 2020
(2) Unit 1 B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump during A motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump unavailability on May 18, 2020
(3) Unit 1 B low head safety injection system following testing on June 5, 2020
(4) Unit 2 B low head safety injection system following testing on June 23, 2020

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Unit 2 west cable vault, fire compartment 2-CV-1, on April 11, 2020
(2) Unit 2 reactor containment building, fire compartment 2-RC-1, on April 16, 2020
(3) Unit 2 main feedwater regulating valve room, fire compartment 2-SB-5, on April 22, 2020
(4) Unit 2 service water train A valve pit, fire compartment 2-VP-1, on April 22, 2020
(5) Unit 2 east cable vault, fire compartment 2-CV-2, on May 28, 2020

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Cable Degradation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in:

(1) Manholes 1EMH8A and 1EMH8B on May 7, 2020

71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance

Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

(1) Unit 2 2-1 emergency diesel generator intercooler heat exchanger, 2EGS-E21A, on April 23, 2020

===71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR)

PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)===

Main article: IP 71111.08
(1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from April 20, 2020 to May 1, 2020:

03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.

  • Repair activities associated with indications found on Unit 2 reactor vessel head penetrations 27 and 37

03.01.b - Pressurized-Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Examination Activities.

03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities.

  • Evaluation performed for 2018-09885, High Head Safety Injection Hot Leg Isolation, 2SIS-MOV869A

03.01.d - Pressurized-Water Reactor Steam Generator Tube Examination Activities.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated Unit 2 licensed operator performance in the control room during reactor startup and core design verification on May 5, 2020.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a crew of licensed operators in the Unit 1 simulator during licensed operator requalification exams on June 2, 2020.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater system on June 10, 2020
(2) Unit 1 main steam system on June 30, 2020

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Unit 2 planned yellow shutdown risk for decay heat removal while reactor coolant system level was lowered to below vessel flange on April 16, 2020
(2) Unit 1 planned maintenance on the A cooling tower pump on April 21, 2020
(3) Unit 2 planned yellow shutdown risk for decay heat removal while reactor coolant system level was lowered to below vessel flange on April 28, 2020
(4) Unit 2 elevated risk due to planned turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump unavailability on May 4, 2020
(5) Unit 1 elevated risk due to planned A auxiliary bay cleaning and 1AE emergency bus degraded voltage relay calibration on May 12, 2020
(6) Unit 1 elevated risk due to planned A solid state protection testing and A outside recirculation spray pump suction and discharge valve reach rod inspections on May 21, 2020

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 1 missed surveillance requirement for seismic monitoring instrument on April 8, 2020
(2) Unit 2 main steam safety valve 101C failed as-found test on April 11, 2020
(3) Unit 2 turbine auto-stop oil pressure switch, channel 1, found out of tolerance on April 17, 2020
(4) Unit 2 2-2 emergency diesel generator service water supply valve, 2SWS-MOV113D, disc erosion on April 23, 2020
(5) Unit 2 B residual heat removal system pump degraded bearing on May 13, 2020
(6) Unit 2 low emergency diesel generator lube oil inventory discovered on May 17, 2020
(7) Unit 2 A quench spray pump check valve trend on May 20, 2020

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Engineering Change Package 18-0172 - Manual operation of Unit 2 fuel handling crane new fuel hoist on April 22, 2020
(2) Engineering Change Package 16-0305 - Allow acceptance of low sulfur diesel and ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel oil for Unit 2 emergency diesel generators on May 14, 2020

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the post maintenance testing conducted to verify system operability and functionality after the following maintenance activities:

(1) Unit 2 new fuel elevator cable repairs on March 31, 2020 and April 3, 2020
(2) Unit 1 containment isolation valve TV-1DA-100B limit switch repair on April 13, 2020
(3) Unit 2 2-1 emergency diesel generator maintenance on April 28, 2020
(4) Unit 1 A cooling tower pump repairs and startup on April 30, 2020
(5) Unit 2 north safeguards service water system leak repair on May 1, 2020
(6) Unit 1 C main feedwater regulating valve controller replacement on May 16, 2020
(7) Unit 2 relay replacement on 2-1 emergency diesel generator starting air compressor on June 11, 2020
(8) Unit 2 fuse and diode replacement on 2-2 inverter on June 24, 2020

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 2 refueling outage (2R21) activities from April 12, 2020 through May 8, 2020.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

Main article: IP 71111.22
(1) Unit 2, 2OST-36.3, 2-1 emergency diesel generator autoload test on April 12, 2020
(2) Unit 1, 1MSP-6.38-I, T-RC412 delta-T Tavg protection instrument channel I calibration on April 15, 2020
(3) Unit 2, 2OST-11.14A, low head safety injection full flow test on April 18, 2020

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2, 2-MSP-M-21-300, trevitest method for main steam safety valve setpoint check on April 11, 2020

Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2, 2OST-47.111, type C leak test of penetration 19 on April 20,

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated radiological protection-related instructions to plant workers.

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material.

(1) Observed personnel and equipment being surveyed at the radiologically controlled area control point during the Unit 2 refuel outage.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===

Main article: IP 71151
(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)

MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Condition Report 2019-05088, Unit 1 licensing basis nonconformance identified regarding manual action credited for locked rotor accident

71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

Main article: IP 71153

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 2019-001-00, Low Head Safety Injection Discharge Relief Valve Did Not Reseat During Surveillance Test (ADAMS Accession No. ML20003D859).

INSPECTION RESULTS

Minor Violation 71152 Minor Violation: The inspectors identified a minor violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, because when the licensee revised the Unit 1 locked rotor analysis to reduce anticipated containment radiation levels to within the limits that support manual operation of the residual heat removal system during a locked rotor event (see Observation below), it used moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) values that were not consistent with core operating limits report (COLR).

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The performance deficiency did not adversely affect the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined that the MTC limits used in the revised analysis were still within the bounds of the COLR and, although the COLR allowed operation outside the MTC limits assumed in the revised locked rotor analysis, the plant did not operate outside the revised lock rotor analysis limits for the period of the violation. Therefore, the residual heat removal system remained capable of performing its function for the locked rotor event during the period of the violation.

Enforcement:

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 3, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in § 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Contrary to this requirement, from October 2019 to June 2020 adequate measures were not established to assure that the design basis was correctly translated into specifications drawings, procedures, and instructions. The station documented the issue in CR 2019-10518 and corrected the condition. This failure to comply with the design requirements constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.

Observation: Condition Report 2019-05088, Unit 1 Licensing Basis Nonconformance Identified Regarding Manual Action Credited for Locked Rotor Accident 71152 The licensee identified that the existing Unit 1 locked rotor analysis credits the residual heat removal system being placed in service to terminate the radioactive release following an accident. However, a single active failure of an isolation valve on the common suction line to the residual heat removal pumps would require a local manual operator action to open the valve and place the system in service. Since the analysis shows up to 20% of the fuel rods going into departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) and therefore a fuel cladding failure, the resulting radiation levels would preclude containment entry and fulfillment of the operator action. To address this condition adverse to quality the licensee revised the analysis to more closely reflect expected operating conditions by reducing the conservative assumptions used as inputs in the original analysis. The revised analysis determined no rods would go into DNB, which reduced the anticipated dose field for the locked rotor accident. A reduction in the anticipated dose field allows containment entry to perform actions to place residual heat removal in service and terminate the radioactive release following a locked rotor accident.

The inspectors reviewed the revised Unit 1 locked rotor analysis and determined that the corrective actions did not adequately address the identified condition adverse to quality because the licensees revised analysis used moderator temperature coefficient values that were not consistent with the COLR. The inspectors determined this was a minor violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, that is dispositioned above.

Failure to Correct Relief Valve Settings Leads to Inoperability of Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems

Green NCV 05000334/2020002-01 Open/Closed

None (NPP)71153 The inspectors identified a self-revealing Green finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, when the licensee did not correct improper guide ring settings that were identified on a Unit 1 A low head safety injection (LHSI)discharge relief valve in 2012.

Description:

On November 2, 2019, while performing a Unit 1 quarterly surveillance test on the 'A' LHSI pump during the 1R26 refueling outage, RWST level began to drop and caused a low level alarm. It was later determined that approximately 850 gallons of water from the RWST was transferred to the safeguards building sump, resulting in the RWST being declared inoperable due to low level. The 'A' LHSI pump was secured to prevent further leakage and declared inoperable. Makeup to the RWST was initiated to raise tank level and return it to operable status.

The licensee determined that during the surveillance test on November 2, 2019, the 'A' LHSI discharge relief valve (RV-1S1-845A) lifted due to a pressure pulse on pump start and did not reseat as expected when system pressure dropped below the valves design blowdown pressure. The valve remained open during the performance of the surveillance, resulting in the discharge of 850 gallons from the RWST to the safeguards sump. It did not reseat until operators identified it was open and secured the A LHSI pump.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees investigation and corrective actions for this event.

The licensee identified a number of similar relief valve events at Beaver Valley including a similar condition that occurred in 2010 that caused the 'B' LHSI discharge relief valve (RV-1SI-845B) to lift and fail to reseat. For that event, the licensee determined that the valves guide ring settings were incorrect because no process or procedural controls were in place to ensure the relief valve had the correct settings. The licensee also determined that the extent of condition for the issue involved a population of approximately 15 commercial valves, which included the valve installed as the A LHSI relief valve (RV-1S1-845A) that failed on November 2, 2019. The licensee determined that corrective actions assigned in 2012 in response to the 2010 'B' LHSI discharge relief valve (RV-1SI-845B) failure were not implemented, which resulted in the 'A' LHSI discharge relief valve (RV-1S1-845A) valve being improperly installed and failing to reseat during the surveillance test on November 2, 2019.

The inspectors determined that the improper guide ring settings on the A LHSI discharge relief valve was a condition adverse to quality that should have been corrected after it was identified in 2012 as part of the extent of condition following the 'B' LHSI discharge relief valve (RV-1SI-845B) failure in 2010.

Corrective Actions: The 'A' LHSI discharge relief valve, RV-1SI-845A, was isolated, and a temporary gag was placed on it through the stations temporary modification process. The gag will be removed, and the valve will be replaced during the next refueling outage. The stations planned corrective actions also include sending out all applicable relief valves with undocumented blowdown ring settings to a qualified vendor for refurbishment, testing, and reset of the ring settings. Additionally, the station plans to validate and document the final blowdown ring settings from the vendor report.

Corrective Action References: CR 2019-09261

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action,"

requires that conditions adverse to quality be promptly identified and corrected. The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to correct improper guide ring settings on the Unit 1 A LHSI discharge relief valve that were identified in 2012 during the extent of condition for a 2010 failure of the Unit 1 'B' LHSI discharge relief valve.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The failure to correct the guide ring settings on the Unit 1 'A' LHSI discharge relief valve affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the 'A' LHSI discharge relief valve lifted and did not reseat as expected when system pressure dropped below the design blowdown pressure. The valve remained open during the performance of the surveillance, resulting in the discharge of 850 gallons of the RWST to the safeguards sump and subsequent RWST inoperability due to low level.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix G, Shutdown Safety SDP. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system that did not maintain its operability, but,

(1) did not represent a loss of system and/or function,
(2) did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time; and
(3) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensee's maintenance rule program for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," states that "Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected." Contrary to the above, in 2012 the licensee's corrective action program did not assure that a condition adverse to quality, improper guide ring settings on the A LHSI discharge relief valve, was corrected.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On July 14, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Rod Penfield and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.04

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR-2020-04851

71111.05

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR-2020-03372

CR-2020-03445

71111.06

Work Orders

200745516

71111.07A Miscellaneous

GL 89-13 2EGS-E21A Heat Exchanger Inspection Report

04/23/2020

Work Orders

200763022

71111.12

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2016-04310

CR-2016-12282

CR-2017-03050

CR-2017-11310

CR-2018-03984

CR-2018-07776

CR-2019-03817

CR-2019-05194

CR-2019-08973

CR-2019-09324

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR-2020-04996

Miscellaneous

(a)(1) Evaluation for CR-2015-07271

Revision 0

(9/21/2015)

(a)(1) Evaluation for CR-2015-07271

Revision 1

(3/3/2017)

(a)(2) Evaluation for CR-2015-07271

Revision 0

(12/18/2019)

(a)(1) Evaluation for CR-2019-09324

Revision 0

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

(2/6/2020)

(a)(2) Evaluation for CR-2013-16101

Revision 0

(12/15/2016)

71111.13

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2020-03349

Miscellaneous

Beaver Valley Key Shutdown Defense-in-Depth Turnover

Checklist

04/16/2020

Defense-in-Depth Protected Equipment

04/16/2020

Beaver Valley Unit 1 Week 04/20/2020, T-0 ICDP Profile

Revision 0

Risk Management Plan for WO 200817701 & 200819238

Beaver Valley Unit 2 Week 5/4/2020, T-0 ICDP Profile

Revision 2

Risk Management Plan for WO 200821883

Beaver Valley Key Shutdown Defense-in-Depth Turnover

Checklist

04/28/2020

Defense-in-Depth Protected Equipment

04/28/2020

Beaver Valley Unit 1 Week 5/11/2020, T-0 ICDP Profile

Revision 0

Beaver Valley Unit 1 Week 5/18/2020, T-0 ICDP Profile

Revision 0

71111.15

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2020-03001

CR-2020-03101

CR-2020-03321

CR-2020-03373

CR-2020-03394

CR-2020-03575

CR-2020-04316

CR-2020-04670

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR-2020-03568

Miscellaneous

EER 601274486

Work Orders

200707844

200708153

200764245

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.18

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2020-03760

Work Orders

200784702

71111.19

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2020-01108

CR-2020-02197

CR-2020-02845

CR-2020-03186

CR-2020-03316

CR-2020-03418

CR-2020-03619

CR-2020-03675

CR-2020-03729

CR-2020-03732

CR-2020-03775

CR-2020-04753

CR-2020-05226

CR-2020-05297

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR-2020-05253

Engineering

Changes

ECP 20-0031-000 Permanent Code Repair of Piping Line Number 2-SWS-024-

77-3

Revision 2

ECP 20-0031-001 Repair of Through Wall Leak in Piping Line Number 2-SWS

24-077-3

Revision 1

Engineering

Evaluations

EER 601270345

Work Orders

200736789

200765785

200816250

200816251

200816806

200817699

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

200817701

200819238

200819267

200819661

200820658

200820987

200820999

200821185

200826242

71111.20

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR-2020-03568

CR-2020-03618

71111.22

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2020-03101

CR-2020-03139

CR-2020-03425

CR-2020-03426

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR-2020-04176

Work Orders

200740190

200743249

71124.01

ALARA Plans

20-2-5015

2R21 Secondary Side Steam Generator Sludge Lancing and

FOSAR and TEDE ALARA DAC Evaluation

20-2-5016

Primary Side Steam Generator Set Up and Demob and

TEDE ALARA DAC Evaluation

20-2-5017

Steam Generator Primary Side Channel Head / Platform

Work and TEDE ALARA DAC Evaluation

20-2-5018

2R21 RBC Reactor Disassembly / Reassembly / Preps /

Inspections and TEDE ALARA DAC Evaluation

20-2-5028

Scaffolding RBC and TEDE ALARA DAC Evaluation

Corrective Action

20-02142

Respirator qualifications unable to be verified in HIS-20

4/10/2020

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Documents

20-02681

Insufficient controls for COVID-19

3/27/2020

20-02762

Individuals who attended SCBA Practical Training did not

meet requirement to be Clean Shaven

3/30/2020

20-02977

COVID-19 Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM-2)

Detector Efficiency Response to multiple sprays of VERI-

CIDE hospital disinfectant deodorant.

4/7/2020

20-02310

Upon restoration of RM-1VS-102A the monitor set-points did

not match the procedure.

3/16/2020

20-03344

Error occurred during TLD reader 8800 calibration

4/16/2020

Radiation

Surveys

347110 'B' Steam Generator Hot Leg Insert Removal

04/16/2020

@ 0330

347110 'B' Steam Generator Cold Leg Insert Removal

04/16/2020

@ 0325

203207B 'B' Steam Generator Primary Side Platform

04/16/2020

@ 1405

203401 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment 767'

04/12/2020

@ 0050

203415A Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment

Pressurizer 767'

04/12/2020

@ 0130

203301 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment 738'

04/12/2020

@ 0130

203315 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment Pressurizer

738' 10"

04/12/2020

@ 0145

203310 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment 'C' Motor

Cubicle 738' 10"

04/12/2020

@ 0110

203320 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment 'B' Motor

Cubicle 738' 10"

04/12/2020

@ 0055

203330 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment 'A' Motor

Cubicle 738' 10"

04/12/2020

@ 0045

203305 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment Incore

Instrument Room 738' 10"

04/12/2020

@ 0135

203201 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment 718' 6"

04/12/2020

@ 0200

203205 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment 'C' Steam

4/12/2020 @

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Generator Cubicle 718' 6"

215

203210 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment Pressurizer

Relief Tank 718' 6"

04/12/2020

@ 0240

203215 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment 'B' Steam

Generator Cubicle 718' 6"

04/12/2020

@ 0245

203220 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment 'A' Steam

Generator Cubicle 718' 6"

04/12/2020

@ 0315

203103 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment 692' 11"

04/12/2020

@ 0130

203104 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment 692' 11"

04/12/2020

@ 0130

203102 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment 692' 11"

04/12/2020

@ 0130

203110 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment 707' 6"

04/12/2020

@ 0155

347148 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment Transfer

Canal 727'

04/12/2020

@ 0215

203501 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment Polar Crane

04/12/2020

@ 0200

347110 'A' Steam Generator Hot Leg Insert Removal

04/15/2020

@ 1640

347110 'A' Steam Generator Cold Leg Insert Removal

04/15/2020

@ 1655

203207A 'A' Steam Generator Primary Side Platform

4/17/2020 @

0430

203205A 'A' Steam Generator EC Bull Pen

04/17/2020

@ 0430

203220B 'B' Steam Generator Eddy Current Bull Pen

04/16/2020

@ 1400

'B' Steam Generator Channel Head Survey

04/16/2020

'A' Steam Generator Channel Head Survey

04/15/2020

'C' Steam Generator Channel Head Survey

04/16/2020

347110 'C' Steam Generator Hot Leg Insert Removal

04/16/2020

@ 0830

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

347110 'C' Steam Generator Cold Leg Insert Removal

04/16/2020

@ 0830

203207C 'C' Steam Generator Primary Platform

04/16/2020

@ 1435

203205C 'C' Steam Generator Eddy Current Bull Pen

4/16/2020 @

1430

203402 Shutdown Survey Reactor Containment 737'

04/12/2020

@ 0215

20-0017

Breathing Zone Air Sample ID# 16772

04/16/2020

@ 0500

20-0018

Breathing Zone Air Sample ID# 21262

04/16/2020

@ 0330

20-0019

Breathing Zone Air Sample ID# 18849

04/16/2020

@ 0430

20-0020

Breathing Zone Air Sample ID# 21264

04/16/2020

@ 0330

20-0021

Breathing Zone Air Sample ID# 21262

04/16/2020

@ 0740

20-0022

Breathing Zone Air Sample ID# 21264

04/16/2020

@ 0645

20-0023

Breathing Zone Air Sample ID# 15716

04/16/2020

@ 0830

20-0024

Breathing Zone Air Sample ID# 21262

04/17/2020

@ 0150

20-0079

General Area Air Sample 'A' Steam Generator Cold Leg

04/15/2020

@ 2000

20-0080

General Area Air Sample 'A' Steam Generator Hot Leg

04/15/2020

@ 2045

20-0086

General Area Air Sample 'B' Steam Generator Hot Leg

04/16/2020

@ 0426

20-0087

General Area Air Sample 'B' Steam Generator Cold Leg

04/16/2020

@ 0450

20-0089

General Area Air Sample 'C' Steam Generator Platform

04/16/2020

@ 0757

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

20-0090

General Area Air Sample 'C' Steam Generator Inside Bowl

04/16/2020

@ 0825

20-0096

General Area Air Sample 'A' Reactor Coolant Pump Cubicle

04/16/2020

@ 1415

20-0108

General Area Air Sample 'B' Reactor Coolant Pump Cubicle

04/17/2020

@ 1325

20-0114

General Area Air Sample 'A' Steam Generator Platform

04/17/2020

@ 2145

20-0116

General Area Air Sample 'C' Steam Generator Platform

04/17/2020

@ 2140

20-0120

General Area Air Sample 'C' Steam Generator Platform

04/18/2020

@ 1311

BV-M-20200418-

203205A 'A' Steam Generator EC Bull Pen

04/16/2020

@ 1315

BV-M-20200418-

203207C 'C' Steam Generator Primary Platform

04/16/2020

@ 1430

BV-M-20200418-

203207A 'A' Steam Generator Primary Platform

04/17/2020

@ 1000

BV-M-20200418-

203207C 'C' Steam Generator Primary Platform

04/16/2020

@ 1435

BV-M-20200418-

203207A 'A' Steam Generator Primary Platform

04/17/2020

@ 2000

BV-M-20200420-

203205A 'A' Steam Generator EC Bull Pen

04/19/2020

@ 0915

BV-M-20200420-

203205C 'C' Steam Generator Eddy Current Bull Pen

04/18/2020

@ 1930

BV-M-20200420-

203207A 'A' Steam Generator Hot Leg Insert Removal

04/19/2020

@ 2050

BV-M-20200420-

203207B 'B' Steam Generator Primary Side Platform

04/19/2020

@ 2010

BV-M-20200420-

203207C 'C' Steam Generator Primary Platform

04/19/2020

@ 1300

BV-M-20200420-

203207A 'A' Steam Generator Primary Platform

04/14/2020

@ 1430

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

BV-M-20200420-

203207B 'B' Steam Generator Primary Side Platform

04/14/2020

@ 1000

Radiation Work

Permits (RWPs)

20-5015

Steam Generator Secondary Side Sludge Lancing and

Inspection

20-5016

Steam Generator Primary Side Setup and Demob

20-5017

Steam Generator Primary Side Eddy Current

20-5018

Reactor Disassemble / Reassemble

20-5028

Scaffolding

71151

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR-2020-05114

71152

Calculations

BV 1 US(P)-259

Loss of Flow/Locked Rotor Analysis for Beaver Valley Unit 1

Revision 2

Addendum 3

BV1 US(P)-259

Loss of Flow/Locked Rotor Analysis for Beaver Valley Unit 1

Revision 2

Addendum 4

Corrective Action

Documents

2019-04762

2019-09731

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

2019-10518

Miscellaneous

Immediate Functionality Assessment Input for the Locked

Rotor Event at BVPS U-1

06/10/2019

Beaver Valley Unit 1 Cycle 27 Reload Safety Evaluation,

January 2020

Revision 2

71153

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2012-06658

CR-2013-04094

Work Orders

200804225

200808446

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