IR 05000410/1997002
| ML18040A264 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/16/1997 |
| From: | ABBOTT R B NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 50-410-97-02, 50-410-97-2, NMP2L-1711, NUDOCS 9706250170 | |
| Download: ML18040A264 (14) | |
Text
NlARAMOHAWKCENERATIONBUSINESSCROUPRICHARDB.ABBOTTVicePresidentandGeneralManager-NuclearNINEMILEPOINTNUCLEARSTATION/LAKEROAD.P.O.BOX63,LYCOMING.NEWYORK13093/TELEPHONE(315)349-1812FAX(315)349.4417June16,1997NMP2L1711U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,DC20555JRE:NineMilePointUnit2DocketNo.50-410Subject:ReplytoaNoticeofViolationDatedMay16,I997Gentlemen:ThisletterrespondstotheNoticeofViolationdatedMay16,1997regardingthefailureatNineMilePointUnit2(NMP2)toadequatelyperformresponse-timetestinginaccordancewithTechnicalSpecifications(TS)andtocomplywithwrittenprocedurespertainingtothecontrolroomdeficiencyprogram.TheattachmenttothisletteraddressesthespecificitemsrequiredbytheNoticeofViolation(NOV).MuchoftheinformationprovidedintheattachmentwithrespecttoNOV97-02-02waspreviouslyprovidedtotheNRCinNMP2LicenseeEventReport(LER)97-01whichwassubmittedonApril25,1997.
Sincerely,R.B.AbbottVicePresidentandGeneralManager-NuclearRBA/TWP/cmkAttachmentn"gV~~~xc:Mr.H.J.Miller,RegionalAdministrator,RegionIMr.B.S.Norris,SeniorResidentInspectorMr.A.W.Dromerick,ActingDirector,ProjectDirectorateI-l,NRRMr.D.S.Hood,SeniorProjectManager,NRRRecordsManagement.580gO40/IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII[IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII F0 NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporationNineMilePointUnit2DocketNo.50-410NPF-69REPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATIONDATEDMAY16,1997ASCONTAINEDININSPECTIONREPORT50-220/97-02AND50-410/97-02Unit2TechnicalSpecifications,Section4.3.3.3,requirestheresponse-timeofeachemergencycorecoolingsystem(ECCS)tobedemonstratedatleastonceper18months.Eachtestistoincludeatleastonechannelpertripsystem,sothatallchannelsaretestedatleastonceper"Ntimes18months,"where"N"isthetotalnumberofredundantchannelsinaspecificECCStripsystem.Unit2TechnicalSpecifications,Section1.12,definesECCSresponsetimeasthattimeintervalfromwhenthemonitoredparameterexceedsitsactuationsetpointatthesensor,untiltheECCSequipmentiscapableofperformingitssafetyfunction(i.e.,thevalveachievestherequiredposition,pumpdischargepressurereachestherequiredvalue,etc.).Whereapplicable,timesaretoincludedelaysassociatedwiththedieselgeneratorstartingandsequenceloading.Theresponsetimemaybemeasuredbyaseriesofsequential,overlapping,ortotalsteps,suchthattheentireresponsetimeismeasured.Contrarytotheabove,onorbeforeMarch26,1997,theresponsetimeofthehighpressurecorespray(HPCS)system(arequiredECCSsystem),wasnotdemonstratedatleastonceper18months.Specifically,response-time-testingforHPCSactuationinstrumentationwaslastperformed:Channel1drywellpressure-highChannel1reactorwaterlevel-low/low"Channel2drywellpressure-highChannel2reactorwaterlevel-low/lowNovember16,1990September28,1990April19,1992April17,1992Additionally,onerelay(E22A-Kl1)downstreamofthetripunitsforreactorwaterlevel-low/lowhadnotbeenresponse-time-testedforanunknownperiodoftimepriortoJune21,1993.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(Supplement1).
I0 NiagaraMohawkadmitstotheviolation.LER97-01,submittedApril25,1997,describedtheTSviolation,causeandcorrectiveactionstakenafterNiagaraMohawkidentifiedthisissue.AdditionalinformationbeyondthatdiscussedinthisresponsecanbefoundinthisLER.Therearetwoaspectstothisviolation.OnedealswiththelackofresponsetimetestingofrelayE22A-K11intheHPCSinitiationlogic.ApreviousevaluationwasperformedbyNMP2in1993todeterminewhichcomponentsoftheHPCSsystemlogicweresubjecttotheresponsetimetestingrequirementsofSurveillanceRequirement(SR)4.3.3.3.Atthattime,theHPCSresponsetimewasdeterminedbycombiningtheresponsetimesobtainedfromfourdifferentprocedurescoveringdifferentportionsofthelogicsystem.WhilethesubjectrelaywasactuatedduringthesetestsinordertodemonstrateanacceptableLogicSystemFunctionalTest,therelaywasnottimedinaccordancewithSR4.3.3.3.Theinterimdispositionofthis1993evaluationresultedinthetemporaryrevisionoftheprocedureandthesatisfactoryresponsetimetestingoftherelay.Duringthecourseoftheinvestigation,itwaslaterdeterminedthatrelayE22A-K11didnotrequireresponsetimetestingandthus,testingoftherelaywasnotpermanentlyincorporatedintotheprocedure.ThesecondaspectofthisviolationdealswiththefailuretoresponsetimetesttheHPCSactuationinstrumentation,inparticular,drywellpressure-highandreactorwaterlevel-low/low.The1993evaluationconcludedthatresponsetimetestingwasnotrequiredforeithertherelayortheactuationinstrumentation,basedoninformationcontainedintheNuclearSteamSupplySystem(NSSS)vendorspecificationandaccidentanalysis.Specifically,theNSSSinformationstatedthat"theHPCSsystemshallbecapableofstartinganddeliveringratedflowintothevesselwithin27secondsfollowingreceiptoftheinitiationsignal."ThisinformationwasalsonotedtobethebasisforthesystemresponsetimescontainedinTSTable3.3.3-3,"EmergencyCoreCoolingResponseTimes."FurtherinformationfromtheNSSSvendorindicatedthatthe27secondsassumedintheanalysisbeganwithactuationofthesystemlogicinitiationrelaysanddidnotincludeinstrumentationresponsetime.Consideringthisinformation,the1993evaluationincorrectlyconcludedthatresponsetimetestingforcomponentsupstreamofthesysteminitiationrelayswasnotrequired.ThecauseofthefailuretoresponsetimetestrelayE22A-K11priorto1993wasdeterminedtobeinadequatewrittencommunicationsinthatthetestproceduresdidnotprovideformeasurementoftheresponsetimeofthisrelay.Theinterimsurveillanceprocedures,developedandusedpriortoreceiptoftheinitial.operatinglicense,didprovideformeasurementoftheresponsetimeforrelayE22A-K11.Whentheprocedureswererevisedin1986,inadequatetechnicalreviewresultedintheproceduresfailingtoincludetheresponsetimemeasurementofthisrelay.ThecauseofthefailuretoresponsetimetesttheactuationinstrumentationandtonotpermanentlyincorporatethetestingofrelayE22A-K11intoprocedureswasdeterminedtobeinadequatemanagerialmethodsinthatthe1993evaluationofsurveillancerequirementswa incorrect.TheevaluatorsfailedtounderstandthesignificanceoftheTSdefinitionofECCSResponseTime,andincorrectlyconcludedthatitwasacceptabletodeviatefromthedefinitionsetforthinTSbecauseofthetotalsystemresponsetimeasstatedintheTSResponseTimeTable(Table3.3.3-3),theassumptionsinthesafetyanalysis,anBthediscussionsheldwiththeNSSSvendor.TheimmediatecorrectiveactionstakenincludeddeclaringtheHPCSsysteminoperable,.revisingthetestproceduresandperformingtheappropriateresponsetimetestingofrelayE22A-K11.Inaddition,theactuationinstrumentationwasalsotested,however,NMPClaterdeterminedthattheinstrumentationhadinfactbeenoperableasaresultofimplementingthetestingrequirementsofNEDO-32291in1996.TheHPCSsystemwasrestoredtoanoperablestatus.TheproceduresassociatedwithHPCSresponsetimetestingwerereviewedagainstthedesigndrawingstoensurethatnootheruntestedportionsofthecircuitexisted.NootherareasofTSnon-compliancewereidentified.TheDivision1and2ECCSresponsetimetestswerereviewedtoensurethatnosimilarproblemsexisted.NootherareasofTSnon-compliancewereidentifiedduringthesereviews.Preventiveactionshavealreadybeentakentoaddressinstancesofinadequatemanagerialmethods,relativetotechnicalprocedurepreparationandreview.Specifically,acorrectiveactiondescribedinLER94-003dealtwithupgradingspecificprogramswhosepurposeisnotonlytoensurethatadequateproceduresarewritten,butalsotoensurethereviewoftheseproceduresiscarriedoutinamannerthatshouldeliminateeventssuchasthese.Theseincluded,butwerenotlimitedto,thefollowingprocedurallycontrolledprograms:NIP-SEV-01,ApplicabilityReviewsandSafetyEvaluationsNIP-PRO-03,PreparationandReviewofTechnicalProceduresPWM-PRO-0105,TechnicalProcedureVerificationandValidationAsaresult,NMP2believesthatmechanismsareinplacetoensureadequatereviewofprocedures.FullcompliancewasachievedwhentheappropriateresponsetimetestingwascompletedandHPCSwasdeclaredoperableat1438hoursonMarch28,199 'nit2TechnicalSpecifications,Section6.8.1,whichreferencesNRCRegulatoryGuide1.33,"QualityAssuranceProgramRequirements(Operation),Revision2,requireswrittenprocedurestobeestablishedandimplemented.Unit2OperationsAdministrativeProcedureN2-ODP-OPS-0001,"ConductofOperations,"Revision4,Step3.3.7,requires:(1)thatwhenaworkorder(WO)isgeneratedforrepairofacontrolroomdeficiency,anactioncodeof"X"istobeusedtodenoteacontrolroomdeficiency;(2)atransparentgreendotbeplacedonorneartheaffectedcomponentorindication;(3)theStationShiftSupervisor(SSS)ensurethatthegreendotisremovedwhenthedeficiencyisrepairedandtheWOisclosed;and(4)aquarterlyreviewofcontrolroomdeficiencies.Contrarytotheabove,onMarch20,1997,(1)WO96-13381,associatedwiththedrywellradiationmonitorchartrecorderinthecontrolroom,wasnotcoded"X"toreflectthecontrolroomdeficiency;(2)transparentgreendotswerenotplacedonornearthecontrolroomdeficienciesforthecontrolrodanddetectordisplaymodulecoolingfan(2CEC~PNL603),orfortheturbinecontrolschartrecorder(2TMI-ZR136);(3)the,SSSdidnotremovethegreendotsforthedrywellareatemperaturechartrecorders(2CMS*TRY130and2CMS'TRX130)aftertheWOwasclosed;and(4)therewasnoindicationthatquarterlyreviewswereperformed.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(Supplement1).NiagaraMohawkadmitstotheviolation.Thecauseoftheviolationwasinadequatechangemanagementinthatdepartmentalinteractionswerenotconsideredwhenworkcontrolprocesschangesweremade.TheNMP2OperationsdepartmenthasutilizedtheNMP2workcontrolsoftware(WCMOSSE)totrackitemsidentifiedascontrolroomdeficienciessincetheimplementationofWCMOSSEatNMP2in1993.Overtime,opportunitiesforadditionaltrackingmechanismswere.identifiedbystationpersonnelandchangestoWCMOSSEwereimplementedtoallowotherworkgroupstoalsotrackworkcontrolitemsofinterest.AsWCMOSSEtrackingcodeswereexpandedandthesoftwarefortheworkcontrolprocesswasmodifiedtoallowthestationtotrackadditionalworkcontrolitems,stationpersonnelwereallowedtochangethetrackingcodes.Personnelroutinelychangedthetrackingcodestocategorizethenatureoftherepairrequiredtocorrectthedeficiencies.ThesepersonnelworkedoutsidetheOperationsdepartmentandthereforewerenotusingtheproceduralguidancedevelopedforOperationspersonnel(N2-ODP-OPS-0001)regardingcodingofcontrolroomdeficiencie Anadditionalcauseoftheviolationwasinadequatemanagerialmethodsinthatthemethodsforperiodicallyassessingcompliancewiththeprogramwerenotclearlydefined.Asaresult,assessmentswereinformalinnatureandnotsufficientlycriticaltoidentifyprogramimplementationdeficienciesforneededcorrectiveaction.Immediatecorrectiveactionwastoverifyallcontrolroomdeficiencieswereappropriatelycodedontheworkcontrolsoftwaresystemandwereidentifiedwithgreendots.Allnoteddeficiencieswerecorrected.Thefollowingactionsweretakentopreventrecurrence:Asaninterimmeasure,NMPCProcedureN2-ODP-OPS-0001wasrevisedtoaddaspecialtrackingcodeina"limitedaccess"WCMOSSEfieldtoensurethatcontrolroomdeficiencyidentificationisnotchangedintheworkcontrolprocess.Alloutstandingdeficiencieswereupdatedtoreflectthisadditionaltrackingcode.Appropriatestationpersonnelhavebeenverballyinstructedonthecontrolroomdeficiencyprogram,includingtheneedtoincludeastepintheapplicableworkordertoremovethegreendotwhenallworkiscomplete.Thequarterlyauditrequirementhasbeenreplacedbyamonthlyreview.Thefutureperiodicityofthisreviewwillbedeterminedbasedupontheeffectivenessofthecorrectiveactions.Controlroomdeficiencyreviewsarenowautomaticallyscheduledbytheworkcontrolcomputerprogramandarebuiltintothestationworkschedules.Inordertoverifythecompletionofthesereviews,theyhavealsobeenincludedinthestationsurveillancetrackingsystem.Anoff-shiftStationShiftSupervisorhasbeenassignedtheresponsibilityofevaluatingtheprogramandproposingcomprehensivechangestoensurecompliance.Thisevaluationisinprogressandanyresultantcorrectiveactionswillbeincorporatedintotheappropriateproceduresforbothunits.ThiswillbecompletedbyOctober15,1997.Overall,thecontrolroomdeficiencyprogramhasbeeneffectiveinreducingthenumberofdeficienciesandincreasingthefocusofresourcesontheimportanceoffunctionalcontrolsinthecontrolroo ~~IV.0FullcompliancewasachievedonMay20,1997aftertheprocedurewasrevisedandtheoutstandingcontrolroomdeficiencieswereupdatedtoreflecttheprocedurechanges.