IR 05000400/1992008
| ML18010A655 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1992 |
| From: | Christensen H, Shannon M, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18010A654 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-92-08, 50-400-92-8, NUDOCS 9206230160 | |
| Download: ML18010A655 (18) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/92-08 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P.
O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
Licensee No.:
NPF-63 ident Inspector Inspection Conducted: April 18
- May 22, 1992 Inspectors: J.
Tedrow, Senior m ag/gz Date Signed M. Shanno Reside Approved by:
spector Chris.stensen, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects Date Signed w ~P 5'~
Date igned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, radiological controls, security, fire protection, surveillance observation, maintenance observation, design changes and modifications, licensee event reports, special reports, and licensee action on previous inspection items.
Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed.
Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
General area radiation levels near residual heat removal system piping in the reactor auxiliary building (RAB) have decreased, paragraph 2.b.(4).
Detailed planning and use of mockups for maintenance work on a containment isolation valve were effective in limiting personne'l exposure, paragraphs 2.b.(4)
and 4.
9206230160 920529 PDR ADOCK 05000400 Q
Contamination of RAB and waste processing building ventilation air ducts is discussed in paragraph 2.b.(1)(a).
Motion restraint bolts for emergency diesel lube oil piping were noted to be loose, paragraph 2.b.(1)(b).
Performance of operating rounds was satisfactory, paragraph 2.b. (2).
Two start failures on the
"A" emergency diesel generator have resulted in increased test frequency, paragraph 3.b.
Good management and technical support involvement was evident for the screen wash pump work, paragraph REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. Collins, Manager, Operations
- J. Cribb, Manager, Quality Assurance
- C. Gibson, Manager, Programs and Procedures
- C. Hinnant, General Manager, Harris Plant
- D. Knepper, Manager, Site Engineering B. Meyer, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Monitoring
- T. Morton, Manager, Maintenance J. Moyer, Manager, Project Assessment
- J. Nevill, Manager, Technical Support C. Olexik, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
- A. Powell, Manager, Harris Training Unit H. Smith, Manager, Radwaste Operation
- G. Vaughn, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project E. Willett, Manager, Outages and Modifications
- W. Wilson, Manager, Spent Nuclear Fuel
- L. Woods, Manager, System Engineering Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation and corporate personnel.
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
The plant continued in power operation (Mode 1) for the duration of this inspection period.
a ~
Shift Logs and Facility Records The inspectors reviewed records and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Specifications and the licensee's administrative procedures.
The following records were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor's Log; Control Operator's Log; Night Order Book; Equipment Inoperable Record; Active Clearance Log; Jumper and Wire Removal Log; Temporary Modification Log; Chemistry Daily Reports; Shift Turnover Checklist; and selected Radwaste Logs.
In addition, the inspectors independently verified clearance order tagouts.
The inspectors found the logs to be readable, well organized, and provided sufficient information on plant
status and events.
Clearance tagouts were found to be properly implemented.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Facility Tours and Observations Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations, surveillance, and maintenance activities in progress.
Some of these observations were conducted during backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings were attended by the inspectors to observe planning and management activities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator building; reactor auxiliary building; waste processing building; turbine building; fuel handling building; emergency service water building; battery rooms; electrical switchgear rooms; and the technical support center.
During these tours, the following observations were made (1)
Monitoring Instrumentation
- Equipment operating status, area atmospheric and liquid radiation monitors, electrical system lineup, reactor operating parameters, and auxiliary equipment operating parameters were observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode.
(a)
During a routine tour of the RAB, the inspector noticed that a contaminated drip bag container had been placed under a ventilation duct register.
The specific drip bag was located on the 190 foot north elevation area in the containment spray pump/RHR pump room on the RAB ventilation exhaust duct.
This situation was considered to be unusual since ventilation ducts were not designed to contain water or contaminated liquids.
This matter was discussed with licensee health physics personnel who stated that the drip bag had been installed on March 26, 1992, to contain water from the packing leakoff from valve 1SI-326.
The valve packing leakoff was directed to a header in the equipment drain system.
The system was designed such that one end of this header was directed to the ventilation duct to allow gases to escape while the other end
of this header was directed to the drain system.
Further investigation revealed that the as-built piping was not in accordance with design, which had provided for a water trap between the ventilation duct and the drain header.
A work request was generated to return the system to original design.
(b)
The inspectors were also informed of additional ventilation contamination problems which occurred during reactor coolant/seal injection filter backflush evolutions.
During this process contaminated liquid was entrained with nitrogen which was vented to the ventilation header.
No liquid drains were provided on this ductwork so significant amounts of water accumulated in the duct.
Once inside the ductwork the liquid would gradually evaporate.
The inspectors considered these situations to be potential contributors to higher airborne radioactivity levels which were experienced in the WPB and RAB during periods when the ventilation exhaust systems were shutdown.
Licensee personnel have installed drip bags to contain and route any duct overflow to the drain system and are evaluating possible plant modifications to correct the problem.
Also, portable monitors which measure local airborne radioactivity have been located in appropriate areas to detect adverse trends.
The inspectors will continue to follow the licensee's activities for this situation during subsequent routine inspections.
During a routine tour of the emergency diesel generator building, the inspector noted that the motion restraint bolts for a coupling on the lube oil piping were loose.
Upon being informed, the licensee performed a detailed inspection of all of these couplings on both diesels and found several other loose restraint bolts.
The licensee subsequently double nutted all of the motion restraints, as per the design drawing, to prevent the jam nuts from backing off the stop collaxs.
The licensee's evaluation of this condition revealed that equipment operability was not affected.
(2)
Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS
requirements and that control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner.
In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant information during these turnovers.
The inspector discussed NRC Information Notice 92-30, Falsification of Plant Records, with Operations management.
This information notice discussed the falsification of pl'ant records by several licensed operators and auxiliary operators during routine rounds to check operating equipment.
The licensee experienced a related problem concerning inappropriate performance of rounds by fire watch patrols in April and September, 1988.
In response to these problems, plant management instituted periodic checks of security access records to verify that fire technicians were entering required plant areas.
This action was discontinued when the fire prevention organization was absorbed into the plant Operations group.
Due to the recent industry events discussed in the information notice, security access records for a one week period were reviewed for seven auxiliary operators to verify proper performance of their rounds.
The results of this review indicated satisfactory performance.
The inspectors have also periodically checked the security records for operating personnel and have accompanied several operators during the performance of their rounds.
The performance of the operating staff was likewise found to be satisfactory.
Plant Housekeeping Conditions
- Storage of material and components, and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existed.
Radiological Protection Program
- Radiation protection control activities were observed routinely to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors also reviewed selected radiation work permits to verify that controls were adequat The inspectors observed mockup training for the work performed on RCS sample valve 1SP-949.
This work was performed in a high radiation area.
Licensee personnel utilized video cameras to allow remote monitoring of the job site and also shielded the radiation sources, lowering general area radiation levels by approximately two thirds.
These efforts were effective in limiting personnel radiation exposure.
(5)
(6)
As mentioned in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/92-04 significant amounts of corrosion 'products remained in the RHR system following shutdown cooling operation which increased general area radiation levels around the system piping.
Due to routine RHR system testing during which the system is lined up to recirculate water back to the RWST, and natural decay of the radioactive isotopes in the corrosion products, general area radiation levels have decreased substantially in the system allowing greater access to the RAB.
However, several
"hot spots" still exist in system piping.
Security Control
- The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities which included:
protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel, packages, and, vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts.
In addition, the inspector observed the operational status of closed circuit television monitors, the intrusion detection system in the central and secondary alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital area barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with operations and maintenance.
Fire Protection
- Fire protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and'hat fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
The inspectors found plant housekeeping and component material condition to be good.
The licensee's adherence to radiological controls, security controls, fire protection requirements, and TS requirements in these areas were satisfactory.
No violations or deviations were identifie c.
Review of Nonconformance Reports Adverse Condition Reports were reviewed to verify the following:
TS were complied with, corrective actions and generic items were identified and items were reported as required by 10 CFR 50.72 and
CFR 50.73.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS requirements were followed.
The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
~
FMP-101 Incore Thermocouple and Flux Mapping
~
FPT-3204 Fire Detection Functional Test Local Fire Detection Panel 4,
6 Month Interval
~
OST-1008 1A-SA RHR Pump Operability Quarterly Interval
~ Modes 1-2-3
~
OST-1013 1A-SA Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test Monthly Interval
~
OST-1073 1B-SB Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test Monthly Interval OST-1092 1B-SB RHR Pump Operability Quarterly Interval Mode 1-2-3
~
OST-1108 RHR Pump Operability Quarterly Interval Mode 4-5-6.
~
MST-I0126 Main Steam Line Pressure, Loop 1 (P-0475)
Operational Test
~
MST-I0204 Refueling Water Storage Tank Level (L-0990)
Operational Test
~
MST-I0206 Refueling Water Storage Tank Level (L-0992)
Operational Test The performance of these procedures was found to be satisfactory with proper use of calibrated test equipment, necessary communications established, notification/authorization of control room personnel, and knowledgeable personnel performed the task a
~
While reviewing surveillance procedures OST-1008, OST-1092, and OST-1108, the inspector noticed that the acceptance criteria valve stroke time for containment sump isol'ation valves 1SI-300, 1SI-301, 1SI-310, and 1SI-'311 exceeded that assumed in section 6.3.2.8 of the FSAR.
These valves automatically open on a low-low RWST level signal to allow switchover from safety injection ECCS operation to cold leg recirculation utilizing the containment sumps as a source of water for the ECCS pumps.
Table 6.3.2-9 of the FSAR specifies an opening time of 17.1 seconds for these valves to open.
The surveillance test procedures allowed a valve opening time of 24-27 seconds.
The inspector discussed this issue with inservice testing personnel who stated that the test procedure limits were based on twice the initial baseline values of valve operation.
Actual stroke time for the valves was researched, which showed operation in less than the 17.1 second FSAR limit.
Licensee personnel initiated appropriate procedure changes to revise the acceptance limits to concur with that specified by the FSAR.
This action will be reviewed during subsequent routine inspection activities.
b.
While performing monthly surveillance test OST-1013 on May 18, 1992, the
"A" emergency diesel generator tripped on overspeed.
The licensee found that the Woodward governor had failed and it was replaced with a new governor.
During subsequent maintenance testing an additional failure occurred, in that the operators at the local control panel lost speed load control for the diesel.
It was discovered that a relay in the speed/load control circuit had failed.
The relay was repaired and the
"A" diesel was subsequently returned to operable status.
A previous unrelated failure of the
"A" emergency diesel to start properly had occurred on April 5, 1992, when it was found that loose connectors in a governor control system fuse holder had inhibited proper operation.
Since two valid failures have occurred within the last 20 tests, the "A" diesel is presently on an increased weekly test frequency in accordance with TS 4.8.1.1.2.a.
No violations or deviations were observed.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspector observed/reviewed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed; and TS requirements were being followe Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the following maintenance activities:
~
Disassembly and repair of RCS hot leg sample containment isolation valve 1SP-949 in accordance with procedure CM-M0037, Target Rock 3/8" to 2" Solenoid Globe Valve Disassembly and Maintenance, and post maintenance testing in accordance with procedures OST-1038, Sampling, Chemical Addition, and Main Steam Drain Systems ISI Valve Test, and EST-212, Type C Local Leak Rate Tests.
~
ERFIS computer disk drive replacement.
~
Reposition inhibit switch in radiation monitor REM-3502A for electrical separation.
~
Inspection of the
"B" emergency service water screen wash pump and adjustment of the pump impeller clearance in accordance with procedure CM-M0195, Emergency Service Water Screen Wash Pump Disassembly, Inspection and Reassembly, and post maintenance testing in accordance with procedure OST-1215, Emergency Service Water System Operability Train B Quarterly Interval.
Lubrication of the emergency diesel generator auxiliary lube oil and keep warm pumps in accordance with procedure PM-11, Annual Lubrication Schedule.
Repair of leaks on the emergency diesel generator lube oil cooler and jacket water system.
~
Replacement of the emergency diesel generator lube oil filter cartridge.
~
Repair of the spent fuel radiation monitor after it spiked high.
The performance of work was satisfactory with proper documentation of removed components and independent verification of the reinstallation.
The inspector witnessed mock-up training conducted to support repair of RCS Sample Valve 1SP-949.
The licensee decided to conduct mock-up training due to the restricted work space and to reduce personnel exposure as the valve was located in close proximity to a high radiation area.
Training was conducted on a similar valve removed from stock.
The inspector witnessed the successful removal of the valve internals.
This work was well supported by health
physics personnel who utilized two video cameras to monitor the work remotely.
Inspection of the valve internals did not reveal any obvious cause for the valve to leak by.
The licensee had experienced similar problems with this valve in October 1989.
In the previous case the valve was also disassembled and inspected, but no problems were detected.
Licensee personnel have contacted the valve manufacturer about the recurrent problem with this type of valve and believe that the valve solenoid plunger may have bound, causing the valve to not seat properly.
The valve was subsequently reassembled and tested with satisfactory results.
The licensee plans to replace these solenoid operated valves with air operated globe valves in the future (PCR-5296, Sampling System Target Rock Valve Problems).
Good management and technical support were evident for the screen wash pump work.
The pump had failed the acceptance criteria for an inservice test which resulted in declaring the
"B" emergency service water and emergency diesel generator systems inoperable.
The technical support system engineer, and supervision from maintenance and technical support, were present during the pump inspection.
The impeller was adjusted satisfactory.
Due to continuing problems with work control at another licensee nuclear station, various aspects of the Harris work control process were reviewed.
The inspectors found that many similarities existed in the work control process, but for various reasons, the work control process was working fairly well at the Harris facility. It was noted that the licensee had an ongoing effort to improve the scheduling function of the work control process.
This was viewed as a
positive step to reduce the 2500 open work requests by increasing the productivity of the work force. It was also noted that the work request priority system had little meaning for plant personnel and therefore did not help in scheduling work.
These items were discussed with licensee management during a meeting on May 13, 1992, with NRC management.
During this meeting licensee management stated that proposed scheduling function improvements would be in place following the Fall 1992 Harris refueling outage.
Inspector Follow-up Item (400/92-08-01):
Follow the licensee's activities to improve the work control scheduling system.
Design Changes and Modifications (37828)
Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the changes were approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate approved procedures, that
subsequent testing and test results met acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary.
This review included selected observations of modifications and/or testing in progress.
The following modifications/design changes were reviewed:
~
PCR 6356 Troubleshooting FWH 4A Level Control Problems PCR 6348 FSAR Switchover Times for Cold Leg Injection and Recirculation Temporary modification PCR-6356 was reviewed which installed test equipment on the level control valves for the 4A feedwater heater.
The heater drain pump tripped on two prior occasions as a result of level perturbations in the heater.
Initial troubleshooting failed to identify the cause of the level problem so additional monitoring equipment was connected for assistance.
The safety evaluation for this modification was found to be satisfactory.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
The following LER was reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events that were reported immediately were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied.
LERs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Policy.
(Open)
LER 92-04:
This LER reported that a single failure could render the entire radiation monitoring system inoperable.
The system design allowed for communication between the non-safety related radiation monitoring computer and safety related individual radiation monitors in the field through inhibit switches.
The inhibit switches had been defeated which allowed the potential for a computer failure to affect all the radiation monitors.
This matter was verbally reported to the NRC Operations Center on Nay 1, 1992, as a condition which was outside the design basis of the plant.
The inhibit switches have been repositioned to prevent this failure.
Operating/test procedures, and the system operation as described in the PSAR, will be changed to reflect the new system configuration.
The LER will remain open pending completion of this actio.
Review of Special Reports (90713)
8.
A special report dated May 8, 1992, regarding the inoperability of the RCS subcooling monitor, was reviewed.
Due to the extension of a planned maintenance outage on the plant process computer, the subcooling monitor was inoperable for approximately 11 days.
The plant computer had been experiencing several reliability problems as discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/92-07.
These were subsequently corrected by replacing the system hard drives, several support circuit boards, and upgrading of the computer software operating system.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92702 E 92701)
,
(Closed) Violation 400/91-18-03:
Failure to document corrective actions.
The inspectors reviewed and verified completion of the corrective actions listed in the licensee's response letter dated October 2, 1991.
The inspectors also reviewed memorandum QAA/022-91-02 dated May 21, 1992, which provided the deficiency closeout actions in response to this violation.
The closeout actions by the licensee were considered to be acceptable.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on May 26, 1992.
During this meeting, the inspectors described the areas inspected and associated findings addressed below.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
D cri tion nd R feren e
400/92-08-01 IFI - Follow the licensee's activities to improve the work control scheduling system 10.
Acronyms ACR CFR ECCS ERFIS FSAR FWH and Initialisms Adverse Condition Report Code of Federal Regulations Emergency Core Cooling System Emergency Response Facility Information System Final Safety Analysis Report Feed Water Heater
IFI LER NRC PCR RAB RCS/RC RHR RWST TS WPB
Inspector Followup Item Licensee Event Report Nuclear Regulatory Commission Plant Change Request
'eactor Auxiliary Building Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Refueling Water Storage Tank Technical Specification Waste Processing Building