IR 05000400/1992017
| ML18010A901 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1992 |
| From: | Gibson A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Watson R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| EA-92-178, NUDOCS 9211180199 | |
| Download: ML18010A901 (52) | |
Text
November 5, 1992 Docket No. 50-400 License No.
NPF-63 EA 92-178 Carolina Power and Light Company ATTN:
Mr. R. A. Watson Senior Vice President Nuclear Generation P. 0., Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-400/92-17)
This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on October 14, 1992.
This meeting concerned potential escalated enforcement based on an apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI which requires, in part,.that measures be" established to ensure that prompt identification be made and corrective actions taken for conditions which are adverse to quality.
The meeting focused on activities authorized for your Shearon Harris'facility.
The issues discussed at this conference were related to the alternate miniflow portion of the high head safety injection system.
A list of attendees and a copy of your handout are enclosed.
Based on the information you provided at the conference, it was concluded that the actions you took to correct observed deficiencies in the alternate miniflow portion of the high head safety injection system were appropriate based on-the information available to you at that time.
Consequently, no further enforcement action related to this issue is planned.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,"
Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its encl.osures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact us.
Sincerely, Enclosures:
(See page 2)
(Original signed by A. F. Gibson)
Albert F. Gibson, Director Division of Reactor Safety 9211180199 921105 PDR ADOCK 05000400
III Carolina Power
& Light Co.
November 5, 1992 Enclosure:
1.
List of Attendees 2.
Licensee Handout cc w/encls:
G.
E.
Vaughn Vice President Harris Nuclear Project P. 0.
Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 C.
S. Hinnant Plant General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant PE 0.
Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 C.
S. Olexi k, Jr.,
Hanager Regulatory Compliance Harris Nuclear Project P. 0.
Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 H.
Ray Starling Vice President
- Legal Department Carolina Power and Light Co.
P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Dayne H. Brown, Director Division of Radiation Protection N. C. Department of Environment, Health
& Natural Resources P. 0.
Box 276B7 Raleigh, NC 27611-7687 Ms. Gayle B. Nichols Staff Counsel SC Public Service Commission P. 0.
Box 11649 Columbia, SC 29211 (bcc w/encls
- See page 3)
Carolina Power
& Light Co.
,3 November 5, 1992
,,bcc w/encls:
J., Lieberman, OE H. Christensen, RII N.. Le, NRR Document Control Desk NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route 1,
Box 315B New Hill, NC 27562
- FOR PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE -
SEE ATTACHED COPY RII:DRS RII:DRS
- JShackelford
- JCrlenjak 10/
/92 10/
/92 RII'DRS RII":ORA RI I:DRP
- TPeebles
.CE ans
- HChristensen 10/
/92 11/Y/92 10/
/92 RII:
RI
'D S
- Jenki s
AGi
)fl/~2 10/rP/92
,w( D-S~
~Do
November 5, 1992 bcc w/encls:
H. Christensen, RII N. Le, NRR Document Control Desk ( it b8~v NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route 1,
Box 315B New Hill, NC 27562 RI
.
S JSh kelford 10/
/92 RII:
Jen ns 10/~g/92 10/I /92 RII:DRS AGibson 10/
/92 RII:
R ee es 10//P /92 RII:DRY HChristensen 10/il /92
ENCLOSURE I LIST OF ATTENDEES
'arolina Power and Li ht Com an D. McCarthy, Manager, Nuclear Licensing R. Prunty, Manager, SHNPP Licensing M. Hamby, Project Engineer C. Olexik, Manager, Regulatory Compliance R.
Van Metre, Manager, SHNPP Engineering T. Clements, Manager, Transient Analysis C. Hinnant, General Manager, SHNPP R. Watson, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Generation G. Vaughn, Vice President, SHNPP Nuclear Re ulator Commission A. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region II S.
Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II T. Le, Project Manager,NRR J,
Jacobsen, NRR J
~ Shackelford, Region II H. Christensen, Section Chief, Region, II H. Shannon, Resident Inspector, Region II H. Hayfield, NRR G.-Lainas, NRR J.
Johnso'n, Deputy Director, DRP, Region II G. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordinator Staff, Region II G.
Imbro, NRR J.
Tedrow, Senior Resident Inspector, Region II B. Uryc, Region II
HARRIS NUCLEARPROSPECT HIGH HEAD Sl ALTERNATEMINIFLOW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE CAROLINAPOWER 8 LIGHT-OCTOBER f4, 1992
~
~
PRESENTATION OUTLINE.
I L
INTRODUCTION
- MEETING OBJECTEVE
- EEF POIlVTS
- POSITION
. ALTERNATE OW DISCUSSION
'
DESIGN BASIS
- 1991 FAIIUjRE
- TESTING ISSUE
.- ACR ISSUE SAjFETY
. SIGI.'GFICANCE COMICTI'VE ACTIONS 6. E. VAUGHN C. S. HINNANT T. B. CI EMENTS C. S. HINNANT G. E. VAUGHN,
MEETING OBJECTIVE
~
.ADDRESS THE APPARENT VIOLATION IDE D IN YOUR OCTOBER 1, 1992 LE'HITR.
FAILURE TO TAKEPROPER CORjRECTIVE ACTIONS FOLLOWINGTHE DRAINLINE EVENT OF MARCH 22, 1991.
'AXE FAILUjRETO PROPERLY TEST THE MINIFLOWSYSTEM AI'6) TO PROPERLY CLASSIFY AN ADVERSE CONDITION REPORT
- RELATED TO THE MARCH 1991 EVENT ARE CONSIDERED EXAMPLES OF THE APPAI&NT'IOLATIO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
~
HHSI MdF SYSTEM FAILUREIN EARLY 1991 WAS SIGNS'ICANT.
~
TWO SUCCESS PATHS EXISTED TO PREVENT CORE DAMAGE.
TESTING
~
1991 TESTING WAS REASONABLE AI'63 CONFORMED WITHINDUSTRY PRACTICE.
. ~
1992 FLOW'TESTING CONEIKMED WATER EGQVJMER PROBLEM CORRECTED BUT DID IDEN'HFY THAT RELIEF VALVECHATTER COULD OCCUR.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
~
1991 CORI&CTIVE.ACTIONSWERE BASED ON INFORMATION KNOWN AT THE 'IIMEAND HAS ELIMINATEDSOURCE OF WATER HAMMERWHICH WAS BELIEVED TO BE 'II'OOT CAUSE.
~
1992 ACTIONS HAVE BEEN PROACTIVE A2'6)
PROMPT INCLUDINGCPRL'S DECISION TO MODIFYAMF DESIGN TO ELIMINATETel RELIEF.
VAL'VES.
~
CP8rL'S EXPERIENCE EFFEC'ITVELY COIVMUNICATEDTO THE INDUSTR CPRL POSITION WHILEWE READILYACKNOWLEDGETIIE SIGNIFICANCE OF TIIE EVENT, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR RESPONSE HAS BEEN PROPER ANDTHATALEVELIHVIOLA.TION OR CIVILPENALTYIS NOT JUSTII1E.PRESENTATION OUTLINE IN'IRODVCTION
- MEETING OBJECTIVE
- KEY POINTS
- POSITION ALTERSTE MINIFLOW DISCUSSION G. E. VAUGHN
'C. S. HINNAlVT
- DESIGN BASIS
- X99X I"AILURE
- TESTING ISSUE
- ACR ISSUE SAFETY SIGNH<ICANCE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS T. B. CLEMENTS C. S. HINNANT G. E. VAUGHN
-
ALTERNATE DESIGN BASIS OW
~
ALLCSIP's SHALLBE PROTECTED FROM DEADHEADING(60 GPM)
~
OPERATOR'ACTION PRECLUDED FOR FIRST 30 S
~
RtLNGE OF CSIP's PERFORMANCE CURVES ASSUMED
~
CONSIDERATION FOR RELEASE OF-RADIOACTIVITY
~
THE MODIFICATIONSHALL ON SI SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ZE EFFECT
~
THE MODIFICATIONSHALLNOT AFFECT CKARGING SYSTEM OPERABILITY, RELIABILITYAZG) MAPTAINABILITY
TO Ore CAR 2165-0-050 (E18)
2CS-R557SN-I (tCS-744)
2CS-V757SA-I (ICS-746)
2CS-V758SA-I (ICS-745)
M M
. (~,
~ 178)
2CS" VI36SIt-I ~
(ICS-179)
i 2CS-V754SW-I (ICS-747)
LO.
t)
g 2t(S-Vl35)f-I
Sli,CHARGIWG PUMP IA-SA 2CS-U522SN-I 2CS-R558SN-I (ICS-755)
TE<T
'2CS-V752SN-I (ICS-748)
(ICS-750)
IM]
HM 2CS-V753SN-I.
(ICS-749)
2CS-V751SN-I (ICS-751 )
2CS-U521SW-I 2CS-U523SN-I 1 2(S-VI37$-I LJ TEST CS-V75958-I ICS-752)
CS-V760SA-I ICS-753)
LO.
(W~.
2CS-V59658-I (ICS-192)
t 2fS-V138$ -I 2CS-V595SA8-I (ICS-206)
2CS-VI34SA8-I (ICS-205)
SIXCHARGIWG PUM PI lc-SA8 1538 2CS-VI3358-I (ICS-191)
I-PI 1528 SIQCHARGIttc PUMP 18-58 Sl-'ALTERNATE MINI-FLOVf PREVIOUS CONFIGURATION
FAILUaZ OF HHSr ALTERNATE OW APRIL 1991 T '
DUPING AN OUTAGE, BOTH RELIEF VALVESFAILEDTHE NORMAL SURVEILLANCETEST.,
- 1CS-755 SEAT LEAKAGEPREVENTED SET PRESSUjK'ETERMINATIONDUE TO TEST RIG LIMITATIONS.
- 1CS-744 SET PRESSUlRE WAS FOUM) TO BE LOW.
. ~
WELD FAILURE&OCCUImED ON A DRAIN LINE.
~
POTENTIALFOR THESE EVENTS HAVINGA COMMON CAUSE 326) THE AFFECT THIS HAD ON HHSI OPERABILITYWAS IDENTIFIEDAM)REPORTED.
I'-
~
THESE FAILUjRES WERE CAUSED BY SOME FORM OF WATER R.
~
VALVECHATTER WAS CONSIDERED 426)
DETERIVHM<D TO NOT BE THE CAUSE OF-THESE FAILURE BASIS FOR WATER R
CONCLUSION IN APRIL 1991
~
RELIEF VALVEDAMAGEIDE
- BROKEN BELLOWS
- -SEAT DM4AGE
'
- CRACKED SPMING
~
DRAINVALVEDAlNAGE IDE
- BROKEN %'ELD
- WELD PlDICATION
~
AllR VOID TIUB'PED BELOW RELIEF VALVE.
h
~
CSIP DISCHARGE PRESSUIRE COULD BE AS HIGH AS 2700 PSIG WjHEN ISOLATIONVALVEOPENS.
~
WATER R OR'ABNO PIPING VIBRATIONWAS LOWLYTO OCCUR FROM HIGH PRESSURE FLOW PRO AJK VOI. RELIEF VALVE CROSS SECTION
BASIS FOR'NO VALVE CHATTER DETE ATION IN. APRIL 1991
~
DESIGN REVJKWED WITHNQ VALVECHATTER PREDICTED.
~
CO D WITH WESTINGHOUSE THATINSTALLEDRELIEF VALVES WOULD NOT EXPERKNCE CHATIER.
~
RELIEF VALVEOPENS GRADUALLY VICE INSTAIWAjNEOUSIY.
'
FLOW THROUGH RELIEF VALVES DUIHNGMOV TESTING RESULTED IN NO IDE D CHATTE CORRECTIVE A'CTIONS APRIL 1991
~
SYSTEM PIPING AND HANGER WALKDOWN.
~
- DkUL% LIM<.S REPAIRED AI'6) SUPPORTED.
~
RELIEF VALVESREPAIjRED AI.'G) TESTED.
~
PROCEDUjRE WRITI'ENTQ FlXL AlVDVENT PIPING AFTER RELIEF VALVE INSTALLATION.
A
~
QUARTERLYTESTS PERFOKVIED TO ENSE'IPING IS FlE LED Aj%3 VALVE SETPOINT IS VERIjFIED.
~
OPERATORS W'ERE EVENT.
D ON TEE
BASIS FOR OPERABILITY CONCLUSION IN APRIL 1991 INITIATIONOF A SALTYINJECTION MGl THATTHE ALTERNATE OW SYSTEM WOULD FUNCTION AS REQUXRED.
BASED ON THESE COIURECTIVE ACTIONS, WE HAD COM<IDENCE THE RELIEF VALVESAND PIPING WOULDNOT BE DAMAGEDBY
BASIS FOR RELIEF VALVE TESTING PERFORMED
'
RELIEF VALVESARE FLOW TESTED AND CERTIFIED BY THE VENDOR.
~
NOKVBQ.P tDUSTRY A2'6) ASME RELIEF VALVEUSAGE Al'6) TEST 1CKTHODS %AS TO BENCH TEST RELIEF VALVESAND NOT FLOW TIIROUGHTHE RELIEF VALVE CODE RELIEF VALVE PRESSURE VESSEL
If ADVERSE CONDITIONREPORT D
LINE FAILURE
- ~
DRAINLINEFAILED-ACR WAS TED:
- SINGLE FAILUREDETE NOT.REPORTABLE D
REVIEWER REmMVIENDED CLASSIFICATIONOF ACR AS NONSIGNIFICANT.
I
~
HHSI DEG14U)ED CONDITION (RELIEF VALVES Al'G) DI4G1% LIIM)
IDE D.
'
PRIOR TO APPROVAL OF ORIGINAL ACR THE DRAINLPX FA'jE,USE WAS INTEGRATED P TO TIKEHHSI BEGETJ)ED CONDITIONACR..
f I
PRESENTATION OUTLINE INTRODUCTION
- MEETING OBJECTIVE
- KEYPOINTS
- POSITION ALTERNATE OW DISCUSSION
- DESIGN BASIS
- 1991 FAIIUVRE
- TESTING ISSUE
- ACR ISSUE SAEE1Y SIGNIFICANCE
COIUREC'ITVE ACTIONS G. E. VAUGHN C. S. HINNANT T. B. CLEME1VTS C. S. HINNANT G. E. VAUGHN
SAFETY SIGNIFICAgqcm
~
LICENSING BASIS
- ESTABI ISHED BY j.OCFR50.46 AZG) APPENDIX K.
- DID NOT MIEET AS REPORTED IN LER 91-008.
0 SAFETY SIGNB~ICANCE
- DETE D BY BEST ESTVBATE LOCA METHODOIOGY.
- BEST ESTIMATE LOCA MXTHODOIOGY IS CONSISTENT WITHIPE METHODOLOG SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
'RC SCREENING RESULTS
~
NRC's ACCIDENT SEQUENCE PRECURSOR PROGRAM CONDITIONAL CORE DAMAGEPROBABILITY WAS 6.3 X 10
.
- NO CREDIT FOR DEG146)ED SAFETY INJECTION FLOW.
- NO CREDIT FOR OPERATOR ACTION.
~
REPORTED CONDITIONALCORE DAjMAGEPROBABILITYIS APPROXIMATELYEQUAL TO PROBABILITYOF SMALLBREAK LOCA ( MAJOR CO UTOR ).
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE BEST ESTIMATE LOCA SUCCESS PATHS BEST ESTIMATE ASS ONS
- MORE REPRESENTA'1TVE DECAY HEAT
.
- CREDIT FOR DEG14Q)ED SAFETY INJECTION FLOW.
- CREDIT FOR OPERATOR ACTION.
~
AS FOUI%3 SAjFETY INJECTION WITH
~TW PUldP BELDERY.
- BEST ESTIMATE LOCA ANALYSIS SHOWS ACCEPTABLE RESULTS.
- VVOULDLIKELYPASS APPENDIX K LOCA ANALYSIS.
~
OPERATOR FOLLOWS EMXRGENCY-OPERATING PROCEDURES WITH KQ IIHSI.
- BEST ESTIMATE LOCA ANALYSIS SHOWS ACCEPTABLE RESULTS.
- AZWDELDZlRYIIHSIEXTENDS TI-IE TIjMEAVAILABLEFOR OPERATOR ACTIO Sl Flow to Intact Loops 1100 One Pump
's
~ Two Pumps As Found
9E)
O
e r
7KI O
300 350 Flow to Intact I.oops (GPM)
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
~
BASED 'ON TIIESE ANALYSES, APPENDIX K BOUNDS PREDICTED CORE DAMAGEIF:
- OPERATORS PERFORIMED AS DIRECTED BY EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES,
- BOTH CSIPs START AI%3 OPERATE
~
BASED ON PLAM'PECIFIC PRA, TILE PROBABILITYOF EITHER CSIP FAILINGOR THE OPERATORS NOT FOLLOQTVG TEE EOPs IS 1.5 X 10'.
SMtVL BREAK LOCA PROBABILITY 6X10'
PRA SHOWS LIKELIHOODOF CORE DMCAGE FROM A SIPED L BREAK LOCA WITHHHSI AS FOUl'6) IN 1991 WOULD BE:
(1.5 X 10 ) (6 X 10 ) = 9 X 10 6
~'
-
I P
PRESENTATION OUTLINE IN'IRODUCTION
- MEETING OBJECTIVE
- KEY POINTS
- POSITION ALTERNATE OW DISCUSSION
- DESIGN BASIS
- 1991 FAILUIW
'
TESTING ISSUE
- ACR ISSUE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE G. E. VAUGHN C. S. HII.'PlANT T. B. CLEMENTS COMMCTR%
A.CTIONS C. S. HINNAlVT G. E. VAUGHN
1992 A.CTIONS I
.~
AUGUST 1992 - CPRL DECIDED TO EMMNCETER'ELIABILITYOF ALT.
OW DESIGN BY MODIFYING THE SYSTEM TQ DELETE THE.RELIEF VALVES.
~
SEPTEMBER 1992 -.TESTED SYSTEM
.
- FOR WATER, R DVMNGRFO TO OBTLlWGENERIC P INDUSTRY P8'OKVIATION.
- TEST CO D THATWATER
.
R CORPXCTI'VE ACTION WAS EniECTI'VE.
- IDE D VALVECHATTER AS AN ADDITIONALDAMAGE MXCHAI.'ASM.
- CO D EARLIER DECISION TO ELIMtINATERELIEF VALVES FROM SYSTEM DESIGN.
~
A SYSTEM REVjKWHAS IDE NO OTHER RELIEF VALVESUSED FOR FLOW COMVROL FUNCTION ALTERNATEMINIFLOW MODIFICATION-DETAILS
~
RELIEF VALVES REPLACED BY FIXED FLOW ORIFICES.
~
LOGIC ADDED TO MOTOR OPERATED ISOLATIONVALVES.
~
MOV OPENS ON SI~ HIGH RCS PRESSUIM () 2300 PSIG).
~
MOV CLOSED ON LOW RCS PRESSURE (( 1750 PSIG) WITH SI.
~
POST MODIFICATIONTESTING
- LOGIC TESTjÃG
- $%JLL FLOW TEST
2CS-V757SA-I (ICS-746)
l,)
2)5 V1355f.I
2CS-V136511 1-i/
(ICS- ~ 179)
TO OWG CAR 2165-G-858 (E18)
Vm 2CS-V75858-I (ICs-745)
3X2REO.
[IA
[IA 2CS-U5285N-I 2CS-V7525N-I (ICS-748)
2CS-V7585N-I (IC5-758),
2CS" V754SN-I (ICS-747)
LO.
2CS-V753SN-I (ICS-749),
2CS-SBStl-I s H)
2CS-U52I St I.-I 2CS-U52 2SII -*I 2CS-59511-1 sgl SI,CIIARGIIIG PUMP
. IA-SA TEST i)
M]
[M]
2CS-U529SN-I d3 X 2 REO.
(TYP)
CS-V759SB-I ICS-752)
CS-V768SA-I ICS-753)
2CS-V751SN-I (ICS-751)
LO.
E 2CS-U5235tt-I 2CS-S18Stl-I 1'[
/t 2I:5-VI38)l-I
/
(ICS-207)
265-9595568-1 (ICS-286)
.SIiCIIARGltlG PU)AP I-1 5 I IC-SAB I538 2CS-V5965B-'I (ICS-192)
2CS-Vl33SB-I (ICS-I 9 1)
I-PI I52 9 SI %CHARGING PUMP IB-SB Sl-ALTERNATE MINI-FLOW NEW CONFIGURATION
PRESENTATION OUTLINE IN'IRODUCTION
- MEETING OBJECTIVE~
- KEY POINTS
- POSITION ALTERNATE OW DISCVSSION
- DESIGN BASIS
- 1991 FAILURE
- TESTING ISSUE
-'CR ISSUE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE G. E. VAUGHN C. S. HINNANT T. B. CLEMENTS CORRECTIVE ACTIONS C. S. HINNANT:
G. K VAUGHN
'I S
Y POSITION ON APPARENT VIOLATION
~ ~
1991 SYSTEM FAILUREWAS SIGNIFICANT.
IDENTH.ICATION, CLASSIFICATION, AND REPORTING WERE PROMPT.
.- FIRST SYSTEM OPE14&ILITY CONCERNS TO BE RAISED,
- PtDUSTRY STAIR)ARD DESIGN.
~
1991 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE PROMPT AND PROPER GIVEN WjM.T WAS COLLECTIVELYKNOWN AT THE TIME.
- WATER HAAlMERPOTENTIAL ELIMINATED.
- VALVECHAT'rER NOT PREDICTED.
~
SUBSEQUENT TESTING CONFORMED TO STAIGVZU)INDUSTRY PRACTICE WITH SATISFACTORY RESULTS.
TWO SUCCESS PATHS FOR AS FOUI'6)
CONDITION OF HHSI IN 1991 HAVE BEEN DEMONS'IRATED.
1992 CPRL ACTIONS HAVE BEEN PROMPT, PROACTIVE, AND EFP'ECTIVE IN RESOLVjNG THIS ISSUE.