IR 05000395/1993006
| ML20035A840 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1993 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Haag R, Keller L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035A839 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-93-06, 50-395-93-6, NUDOCS 9303300032 | |
| Download: ML20035A840 (13) | |
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g UNITED STATES o
yg NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslOM o
REGION II
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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Report No.:
50-395/93-06 i
Licensee:
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company
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Columbia, SC 29218 Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12 Facility Name: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Inspection Conducted:
February 8-28, 1993 Inspectors: /7
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.$4'D R.C.gaag,Seior #s dent Inspector Date Signed j
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%y M 3 -//- 93 L.A/Kel)
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t, Inspector Date Signed
/M93 Approved by:
ft y Flofd S. Cantrell, piief, Dhte Signed
Reactor Projects Section IB Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors onsite in the areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance observations,
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operational safety verification, fire protection / prevention program review,-
evaluation of licensee self-assessment capability,10 CFR Part 21 inspection
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and onsite follow-up of written reports of nonroutine events at power reactor-
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facilities. Selected tours were conducted on backshift or weekends. These i
tours were conducted on seven occasions.
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Results:
I A non-cited violation was identified for three recent failures to meet 10 CFR 21.21 reporting requirements.
The identification of abnormal amounts of wear particles in the "A" charging pump' motor's outboard bearing was considered indicative of a strong lube oil analysis program (paragraph 4).
The change-out of a 7300 process rack primary power supply was well planned j
and executed (paragraph 4).
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9303300032 930315 PDR ADDCK 05000395 G
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I A concern was identified with signoffs being made prior to the work actually being completed during a circuit breaker maintenance activity (paragraph 4).
l Several minor concerns were identified in the cable spreading room, including
uncontrolled drawings (paragraph 5).
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
'l F. Bacon, Manager, Chemistry i
W. Baehr, Manager, Health Physics
- C. Bowman, Manager, Maintenance Services
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- M. Browne, Manager, Design Engineering
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- B. Christiansen, Manager, Technical Services
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- M. Fowlkes, Manager, Nuclear Licensing & Operating Experience i
S. Furstenberg, Associate Manager, Operations
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- A. Koon, Nuclear Operations Project Coordinator
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- D. Lavigne, General Manager, Nuclear Safety
- K. Nettles, General Manager, Station Support l
H. O'Quinn, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services J. Parks, Supervisor, Fire Protection l
- M. Quinton, General Manager, Engineering Services
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J. Skolds, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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- G. Taylor, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- A. Torres, Associate Manager, Quality Control
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- B. Williams, Manager, Operations R. White, Nuclear Coordinator, South Carolina Public Service Authority i
Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, j
operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
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- Attended exit interview
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
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i 2.
Plant Status j
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The plant operated at or near 100 percent power until February 27, 1993, l
when reduced power operations began due to end of cycle fuel burnup. At the end of the inspection period, power was at 98 percent.
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Other inspections or meetings:
During the week of February 22, 1993, a regional inspection in the
a area of radiological effluent monitoring was performed (IR 395/93-05).
i 3.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
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I The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related
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systems and components listed below to ascertain that these activities l
were conducted in accordance with license requirements. The inspectors l
verified that required administrative approvals were obtained prior to
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initiating the test, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in
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accordance with an approved test procedure, test instrumentation was
calibrated, and limiting conditions for operation were met. Upon l
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t completion of the test, the inspectors verified that test results
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conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements, any
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deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved and the systems were properly returned to service.
Specifically, the inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:
Solid state protection system test for train "A" (STP 345.037). The f
inspector closely monitored the testing of the reactor trip and reactor trip bypass breakers. All equipment operated as expected.
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Service water system pump test for "A" train (STP 223.002A).
The
inspector observed portions of the test for the
"A" SW booster pump.
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The inspector verified that flow through the RBCU was within limits
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(greater than 2000 gpm) and that the stroke times for the valves tested were satisfactory.
Procedural compliance and communications
between operators and the test unit were good.
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Leak test of "B" emergency diesel generator support system (STP
150.009).
Five minor leaks in the diesel air start system were s
identified. Three of the leaks exceeded the specified leakage limits; however, the licensee's evaluation concluded that the leaks
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had no effect on operability of the diesel. Work requests were
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written to repair the leaks during the upcoming refueling outage.
The observed tests were performed in accordance with procedural
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requirements and demonstrated acceptable results.
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4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities for the safety-related systems and i
components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides,
and industry codes or standards and in conformance with TS.
l The following items were considered during this review:
that limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the l
work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service,
activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, parts and
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materials used were properly certified, and radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority i
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was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance that may affect system performance. The following maintenance activities were
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observed:
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RHR pump "A" post maintenance run (PMTS P0164091).
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i observed vibration readings 'aken on the pump. No discrepancies were noted, i
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Investigation of RHR pump "A" trip annunciator (MWR 9303231).
- Immediately after securing the "A" RHR pump from it's post maintenance run, the control room received the pump trip annunciator (XCP 610 window 1-1).
This annunciator should only come in as the result of the feeder breaker (XSWlDAl 06A) tripping on overcurrent.
The electricians verified that the breaker's local overcurrent trip indicator was in the tripped condition which would normally indicate it was a valid alarm. The electricians reset the local trip indicator and the annunciator in the MCR cleared. Operations subsequently re-started and secured the pump with no repeat occurrence of the annunciator. The licensee was unable to determine the cause of the overcurrent trip actuation, however they felt the probable cause was vibration due to the breaker closing. The inspector noted that the breaker would still close without resetting the local trip indicator, and that spurious actuation of the trip
indicator due to vibration would not cause the breaker to trip.
Replacement of insulation and filters for the control room AHU
(92M0134).
Calibration of an Agastat timing relay in the control room
ventilation circuitry (PMTS P0156000). This relay (62-AH21)
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provides automatic ventilation s; stem actuations upon a high
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radiation signal from the CR radiation monitor (RMA-1). The "as-found" data was within limits, therefore no adjustments were
necessary.
Clean, inspect, and lubricate AHU for "B" RHR/ spray pump rooms (PMTS
P0163898).
Inspector verified the correct lubricant was used per
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the licensee's lube manual.
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Investigation of increased ferrous in the
"A" charging pump motor
outboard bearing (MWR 9303196). On February 1,1993, lube oil analysis for the
"A" CCP motor outboard bearing revealed increased
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ferrous material relative to previous samples. On February 2,1993,
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the oil was changed and the pump run for two hours. A sample was then drawn which indicated that the amount of ferrous material had decreased but was still slightly higher than normal. At this point the licensee stated that they felt that there was slightly increased
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wear taking place within the outboard bearing, but they did not
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believe there was an immediate operability concern due to normal
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operating temperatures and vibrations. The bearing reservoir was j
subsequently drained, cleaned, and refilled with new oil.
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i On February 16, 1993, the pump was run in excess of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Oil samples were taken immediately after the motor was shut down. All samples showed abnormally high levels of ferrous material but the pump was still considered operable. The wear particles were
identified as cast iron.
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On February 18, 1993, the motor was partially disassembled for
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inspection. The top and bottom sleeves were found to be pitt2d and
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i the inner race where the slinger ring comes in contact with the bearing had some gouged areas. However, both of these areas were i
lead / tin babbitt material. The licensee believed the cast iron was coming from the outer area of the bearing adjacent to the slinger
ring groove, due to contact with the slinger ring. The bearing assembly was replaced and all subsequent oil samples have indicated l
normal amounts of ferrous material.
The inspector felt the identification of wear particles, analysis of
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the particles, and subsequent recommendations by the oil lab personnel to be a program strength.
Licensee management was proactive and conservative in replacing the bearing assembly prior
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to the upcoming outage.
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Replacement of primary power supply XPN 7003 (MWR 9313055). XPN
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7003 is the "B" train primary power supply for protection set three.
The inspector noted that there was a detailed plan for this activity
and that the operators were aware of the consequences to the plant i
if any problems developed with the backup power supply. This t
activity was well planned and executed.
Preventive maintenance testing of "B" RHR pump breaker XSWIDB1 05D
(PMTS P016437). On a previous PM for a similar style breaker, the inspector isoted that the electricians did not appear to have a good understanding of the test details. During performance of this PM, the electricians were very knowledgeable of the b'reaker and the
scope of the test. During the PM the inspector had the following observations.
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Step 7.1.8 of Electrical Maintenance Procedure, EMP 405.002,
"ITE Air Circuit Breaker Maintenance" requires the cleaning and i
relubrication of three items on the breaker. At the time the step was being completed, only two items were cleaned and lubricated. The signoff for the step was completed by the electrician and the QC inspector. During step 7.4.4, the third item was cleaned and lubricated. The QC inspector did not i
witness the last ?ubrication activity.
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Steps 7.3.2 through 7.3.7, which contain approximately four
sheets of instructions, were completed using the signoffs in the data sheet and the knowledge of the electricians.
J While these items did not impact on the performance of the PM they do question the implementation of programmatic controls.
The level of procedural compliance for EMP 405.002 is designated as
" Reference Use", which allows procedure segments to be performed from memory but the user must verify work following each segment.
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The inspector could not find a definition of " segment" to provide a better understanding of the intent for " Reference Use" procedure.
The inspector informed the licensee of the observation involving procedure usage and the completion of signoffs when the task had not I
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been completed. The involvement of the QC inspector in making the -
l signoff when all the work had not been performed was of particular
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concern'with the inspector. The licensee informed the inspector
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that they will review the comments on this PM task to determine if
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improvements are warranted.
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Except as indicated above, maintenance activities were well planned and executed.
5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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Plant Tour and Observations j
The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
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control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator
adherence to approved procedures, TS, and limiting conditions for i
operations; and review of control room operator logs, operating i
orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, and tags on
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components to verify compliance with approved procedures.
The inspectors conducted weekly inspections for the operability l
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verification of selected ESF systems by valve alignment, breaker
positions, condition of equipment or component (s), and operability l
of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performance. The chilled water system, control room
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ventilation system, and the fire service system were included in these inspections.
i Plant tours included observation of general plant / equipment l
conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of.-
i activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical
security controls, plant housekeeping conditions / cleanliness, and missile hazards.
Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed
to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was l
recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate
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actions were taken if required. Selected tours were conducted on backshifts or weekends cn seven occasions.
i In response to a regional initiative, the inspectors performed a walkdown inspection of the protected area security fence with specific attention given to gate openings. The inspectors noted i
the quantity of gates, the type of gate, the security device on j
the gates and the overall condition of the gates. During the
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inspection the following observations were made and the licensee was informed of these conditions:
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On four of the double gate locations, the ground bar (used to provide additional support at the point where the gates meet)
was not properly engaged.
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The remote opening function of a gate at warehouse "C" had been disbanded and the remote chain drive was the only securing device. The inspectors questioned why the gate was not secured with a. chain and padlock similar to all other manual gates.
The licensee corrected the ground bar installation, and installed a chain and padlock on the gate in question.
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Cable Spreading Room Deficiencies During a routine plant tour, the inspector noted the following
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items of concern in the cable spreading room
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Uncontrolled drawings. taped to the doors of electrical cabinets
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XPN 7238A and B.
Drawings were removed by the licensee.
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A metal plate lying across wires inside cabinet XPN 7238A.
This plate was unsecured and could have damaged the circuitry
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during a seismic event. The metal plate was removed by the
licensee.
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A formed length of sheet metal was propped under the dust cover
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for cable tray 5093. This piece of metal had sharp edges and
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was on top of cables in the cable tray. The cable tray dust
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cover was resting on top of this metal object, potentially forcing this object into the cables. The inspector was
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concerned that the sharp edges could damage cable insulation.
l Subsequent visual inspections by the licensee and inspector did
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not reveal any damage.
Electricians had used this metal object
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to facilitate pulling cables for MRF 20951. The licensee indicated that the intent was for the metal object, called a
" top hat", to span the cable tray and therefore not come in t
contact with the cables.
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All identified discrepancies were corrected by the licensee. The
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inspectors were concerned that they can still find uncontrolled i
drawings in the plant.
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c.
Control Rod Urgent Failure Alarms
On February 7 and 8, 1993, the control room received two control rod urgent failure alarms. The first alarm was reset with no
additional corrective action, but after the second alarm I&C was
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called to troubleshoot the problem. The firing and regulation
circuit cards were identified as the most likely cause of the
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al arms. The ability of the rod to drop into the core in response to a reactor trip signal was ensured during the-troubleshooting
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t effort. The firing card was replaced; however, a replacement regulation card was not' available. 'After the firing card was replaced, a surveillance retest was performed and the system was declared operable. On February 11, 1993, the control rod urgent
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failure alarm was again received.
Investigation revealed the
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i problem was similar to the alarm condition received previously.
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The regulation card had.been ordered but had not been received at
the plant. The alarm was reset, a " rod operability" surveillance
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test was performed to demonstrate the ability to move the rods and
the control rod system was declared operable.
Later that day a
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new regulation card was installed.
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TS 3.1.3.1.c states that, "With more than one full-length rod i
inoperable due to a rod control urgent failure alarm or obvious
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electrical problem in the rod control system for greater than 72
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hours, be in HOT STANDBY within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />." Based on -
the repeated alarms and information from the troubleshooting i
effort, an obvious intermittent electrical problem existed with'
i the regulation card.
Since the alarm was not continuous and could i
be reset, the licensee made the decision that they were not in the j
TS action statement if the surveillance could be performed (
satisfactorily. The licensee's actions in this case appear to
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meet the minimum requirements of the Technical Specifications.
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Fire Protection / Prevention Program Review (64704)
j The inspectors continued the review of both programmatic and implementation aspects of the licensee's fire protection program.
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Based on the different areas included in this review and previous j
inspection results, the inspectors determined that the licensee has an
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effective fire prots.ction program.
.l The operability requirements, including surveillan a testing, for fire-i service equipment / systems was previously removed from TS~and placed in l
Station Administrative Procedure, SAP 131A.. The inspectors selected
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ten surveillance requirements in SAP 131A for-detection and suppression
equipment and verified that corresponding survei'llance test procedures i
(STPs) existed to accomplish the required testing. The STP data sheets
for the two previously completed tests associated with these
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surveillances were reviewed to ensure testing was performed within the
required frequency.
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Several safety-related cable trays in the control building cable i
spreading rooms (elevations 424 and 448) were inspected and verified to l
comply with applicable fire prevention requirements.
The inspectors
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did note that the overall appearance for some of the open cable trays could be improved. These trays contained undeterminated cables that had the leads taped and excess length rolled up in the tray.
Previously, the inspector had identified a cable penetration threugh the cable spreading room wall (elevation 448) that appeared degraded.
j The outer portion of the fire barrier contained several layers of Kaowool material with RTV sealing the joint where the conduit passed through the Kaowool. Since the conduit is flexible and the nearest support is approximately three feet from the penetration there was sufficient movement in the conduit to allow the seal with the Kaowool to be broken. The licensee repaired the seal between the conduit and '
Kaowool, and initiated hourly roving fire watches until engineering l
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could review the adequacy of the penetration design. The inspector
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noted that the RTV had again pulled away from the Kaowool after the.
repair had been completed. Engineering's review identified that the i
RTV seal is required per the applicable fire barrier drawing, however
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their evaluation stated that the barrier would perform satisfactorily
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in it's present condition. The inspector concluded that the j
configuration of the flexible conduit will prevent the fire barrier
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from meeting the design drawing requirement over an extended period of
time. However, based on the licensee's engineering evaluation, the j
barrier currently will be able to perform it's function.
l The inspector reviewed.the qualification and training program for the fire brigade. After interviewing three fire brigade members, the
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inspector determined that individuals are aware of their i
responsibilities to maintain fire brigade qualification.
The
inspectors also reviewed the tracking system for fire brigade
qualifications, how the system is updated, and used by the fire i
protection officer at each shift change to ensure the qualification of each fire brigade member.
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Portions of the main fire service system were inspected and valves were verified to be in the correct position. The inspector also inspected
the self-contained emergency breathing units located in the control
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room. Accomplishment of the monthly and weekly inspections / tests for.
the units was verified.
On February 18, 1993, the Integrated Fire and Security (IF&S) computer i
failed. The IF&S computer processes input from the detection equipment t
in the field and provides alarm monitoring functions. Abnormal Operations Procedure, AOP 509.1, " Loss of.IF&S Computer"'was entered and the applicable actions were implemented..Eight continuous fire
watches were posted and one hour roving watches were established in
areas monitored by the IF&S computer. The inspector verified i
establishment of three fire watches. The computer was restored to
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service after a loose cord in a local panel was reinserted. While the
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exact cause of the loose cord could not be determined, the licensee l
believes work performed in the panel earlier may have caused the i
computer failure.
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The inspector reviewed the triennial fire protection audit report l
completed in June,1992, and a combined annual and biennial fire
protection audit report completed on June 1991. A consultant was
involved in both audits. The inspector also reviewed eight quality v
assurance surveillance reports that were performed-in 1992. These
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reports covered various aspects of the fire protection program'.
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overall scope of the audits and report was adequate to allow a i
comprehensive assessment'of the program.
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Review of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability (40500)
l The inspector attended a meeting of the Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC) on February 10, 1993, and a meeting of the Nuclear Safety Review-l
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i Committee (NSRC) on February 11, 1993.
Both meetings were held to l
discuss and. approve the proposed.TS change request for the S/G interim
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plugging criteria. The technical content of the request change was
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presented in a manner which allowed all committee members to understand and comment on the proposal.
Based on the discussions during the meeting it was apparent that members had devoted time to review the
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proposal prior to the meetings. The inspector considered that the
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extent of review provided by the PSRC and the NSRC for this proposed TS l
I change request exceeded the requirements in the administrative controls
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section of TS.
.l 8.
10 CFR 21 Inspection (36100)
i The objective of this inspection was to provide assurance that the
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licensee had _ established procedures and program activities to
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effectively implement the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21, " Reporting of i
Defects and Noncompliance " This inspection was prompted by three
recent examples where the timeframes specified in 10 CFR 21.21 for evaluating nonconformances for reportability were exceeded.
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The inspector reviewed Station Administrative Procedure, SAP 1165,
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" Processing and Disposition of 10 CFR 21 Items" and Engineering i
Services Procedure, ES 407, " Disposition of Site Nonconformance". The
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inspector determined that the procedural guidance was adequate to meet _
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-the requirements of Part 21.
Section 6.5.1.H, of ES 407, states in part that, "The lead engineer shall meet the 60 day 10 CFR 21
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review / evaluation ^ requirements described in SAP 1141 and SAP 1165."
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accordance with this procedure, the lead engineer assigned to
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disposition the nonconformance is responsible for tracking the 60 day i
requirement. The licensee also relies on an individual in Design l
Engineering (DE) to prompt the lead engineer when the 60 day due date
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is approaching. Despite this program for ensuring timeliness of
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Part 21 evaluations, there have been three recent examples where the j
timeframes were exceeded, specifically:
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On October 22, 1992, Off-Normal Occurrence 92-070 was written to document the failure to meet the 60 day requirement for Part 21 i
for NCN 4511. The Part 21 evaluation was completed the following
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day and it was determined that the condition was not reportable
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under Part 21. The reason given for exceeding the 60 day l
requirement was the engineer's workload and the fact he was not
reminded of the due date. The corrective action taken to preclude
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recurrence consisted of establishing a computer tickler file to
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prompt design engineering to remind the lead engineer of the due
date for the Part 20 evaluation.
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On October 16,1992, NCN 4542 was generated when anchor bolts for three storage tanks were found corroded. The 60 day timeframe for this NCN expired on December 16, 1992, without an interim report i
being sent to the NRC per 10 CFR 21.21. On February 26, 1993, the interim report for this NCN was completed.
The interim report
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gave the details of the nonconformance and stated that SCE&G i
expects to complete the evaluation by July 16, 1993.
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The reason the 60 day time limit expired without an interim report
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being generated was that engineering management did not provide
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adequate oversight after the lead engineer originally assigned to i
this NCN left the company during the 60 day timeframe.
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On November 3, 1992, NCN 4555 was initiated for the "A" train
reactor building recirculation sump protection chamber drain valve j
(XVT 0030A). The drain valve yoke nut was broken and therefore
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could not meet it's design function to hold the valve closed. The
60 day timeframe for this NCN expired on January 2, 1993, without l
an interim report being sent to the NRC. On February 26, 1993,
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the interim report for this NCN was completed.
The interim report stated that they expect to complete the Part 21 evaluation. for reportability prior to July 16, 1993. The timeframe for this
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interim report lapsed due to confusion on who the assigned lead j
engineer was for this NCN.
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The above three examples are identified as non-cited violation (NCV 93-l 06-01). This violation will not be subject to enforcement action
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because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the
violation meet the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the
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Enforcement Policy. The corrective action includes a weekly review of
NCN due dates by the manager of DE, which are subsequently stressed i
during the weekly engineering staff meetings. Other areas of the licensee's Part 21 program were reviewed and the inspector concluded that these other areas were adequate.
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Onsite follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power
Reactor Facilities (92700)
(Closed)
LER 91-10, Inadvertent Start of an Engineered Safety Feature.
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On November 6,1991, during maintenance of the "A" train ESF load i
sequencer, test equipment failure caused the sequencer to malfunction.
l The sequencer malfunction resulted in the emergency diesel generator i
(EDG) starting and all normally sequenced loads loaded on the EDG in i
one step (approximately 5000 kW in-rush and 2000 kW running).
All subsequent inspections and run data indicated that the engine and i
generator were not adversely affected by this event. The test i
equipment failure which initiated the event consisted of a conductor j
track on an extender board opening.
The extender board failure was an
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isolated event with no corrective action required.
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 3, 1993, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings.
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The licensee commented that they believed their actions regarding the control rod urgent failure alarms and TS compliance were appropriate considering the intermittent nature of the problem. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee was informed that LER 91-10, Inadvertent Start of an Engineered Safety Feature was closed.
Item Number Descriotion and Reference (NCV) 93-06-01 Part 21 Evaluations 11.
Acronyms and Initialisms AHU Air Handling Unit A0P Abnormal Operating Procedure CCP Centrifugal Charging Pump CR Control Room DE Design Engineering EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EMP Electrical Maintenance Procedure ES Engineering Services Procedure ESF Engineered Safety Feature GPM Gallons Per Minute I&C Instrumentation and Control
.
IF&S Integrated Fire and Security IR
Inspection Report
l
KW
Kilowatt
LER
Licensee Event Reports
,
Main Control Room
i
MRF
Modification Request Form
MWR
Maintenance Work Request
'
NCN
Nonconformance Notice
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Nuclear Safety Review Committee
Preventive Maintenance
PMTS
Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet
PSRC
Plant Safety Review Committee
Quality Control
RBCU
Reactor Building Cooling Units
Radiation Monitor Atmosphere
Radiation Work Permits
Station Administrative Procedure
SCE&G
South Carolina Electric and Gas
SPR
Special Reports
Surveillance Test Procedures-
TS
Technical Specifications