IR 05000395/1987017
| ML20235T965 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 07/10/1987 |
| From: | Dance H, Hopkins P, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235T943 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-87-17, NUDOCS 8707220318 | |
| Download: ML20235T965 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISClOM
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ATLANTA, GEORGt A 30323
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Report No.:
50-395/87-17 Licensee:
South Carolina Electric and G.25 Company Columbia, SC 29218,,
Docket No.:
50-395 License No.: NPF-12 Facility Name : V. C. Summer
Inspection Conducte : June 1-July 6, 1987
/d !I7 Inspectors:
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Approved bys
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H0ghC./ Dance,SectionChief pate Signed Division of Reactor Projects
$UMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors onsite, in the areas of licensee actic7 on previous inspection findings, onsite followup of events and subsequent written reports, monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety vert fication, plant startup from refueling and maintenance program implementa-tiocs Results: No violations or deviations were identiffed,
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REPORT DETAILS 3,
1.
Persons Contacted'
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Licensee Employees D. Nauman, Vice. President, Nuclear Operations:
0. Bradham, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations J. Skolds, Deputy' Director, Operations and Maintenance-
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G. Soult, Manager, Operations M. Browne,, Group Manager, Technical.and Support Services M. Quinton, Manager, Maintenance Services A. Koon, Manager, Technical Support G. Putt, Manager, Scheduling and Materials Management K. Woodward, Manager,. Nuclear. Education and Training L. Blue, Manager,. Support Services S. Hunt, Manager, Quality Assurance Surveillance. Systems K. E. Beale, Manager. Nuclear Protection Services-W. Higgins, Associate Manager, Regulatory, Compliance B. Williams, Supervisor, Operations Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview (30702,30703)
The' inspection scope and findings. were summarized on July 6,1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings.
No violations or deviations were identified in this report.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
-i (Closed) Open Item 87-05-00,. No items identified for inspection period i
2/23-27/87.
This item was added to the open items list through an administrative error.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirements. The inspectors observed portions of selected surveillance tests including all aspects of one major surveill-ance test involving safety related systems. The inspectors also verified that the required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiat-ing the test, that the testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, j
that required test instrumentation was properly calibrated, that data met
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Technical: Specification (TS) requirements, that test discrepancies were rectified, and that the systems were. properly returned to service. The-
following specific surveillance activities were observed:
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'STP 401.002 Main Steam 1.ine Code Safety Valves ASME-Section XI Test
- STP 105.006 Safety Inspection (SI) and Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
' Monthly Flowpath Verification Test
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STP 150.021 Nuclear Sampling System Leak-Test
STP 115.008 SI and RHR System Valve Leakage Test STP 115.030 SI Accumulator Check Valve Leak Test STP 150.012-Main Steam / Steam Generators Leak-Test STP 150.003 Safety Injection System Leak Test STP 150.011 Feedwater (Nuclear) System Leak Test STP 150.001 Reactor Coolant System Leak Test STP 120.002 Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Test STP 360.035 Main Plant Exhaust Atmospheric Radiation Monitor (RM-A3)
Calibration STP 105.001 Charging /SI Pump Test STP 108.001 Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio STP 109.001 Reactor Building Closeout Inspection STP 360.032 Control Room Supply Air Atmospheric Radiation Monitor (RM-A1) Operational Test STP 212.001 Reactor Core Flux Mapping REP 107.003 Beginning of Cycle Dilution to Criticality
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STP 142.002 Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Alignment Verification l-STP 102.001 Source Range Analog Channel Operational Test (N-31, N-32)
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STP 102.003 Intermediate Range Analog Chanhel Operational Test (N-35,
N-36)
STP 345.037 Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master
Relay Test for Train "A"
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STP 134.001 Shutdown Margin Calculation
'No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in I
accordance with approved procedures, TS and appropriate industry codes and standards. The inspectors also determined that the procedures used were adequate to control the activity, and that these activities were accomp-lished by qualified personnel. The inspectors independently verified that equipment was properly tested before being returned to service. Addition-ally, the inspectors reviewed several outstanding job orders to determine that the licensee was giving priority to safety related maintenance and a backlog which might affect its performance was not developing on a given system. The following specific maintenar;ce activities were observed:
I MWR 87Q0095 Replace missing clips on cover of the auxiliary transfer pump panel for "C" charging pump MWR 8700645 Repair operator on service water booster pump valve XVB03105A-SW MWR 8601783 Repair swage lock fitting to prevent leak on the pressurizer liquid steam sample cooler XCE0001-SS MWR 8501695 Investigate and repair gasket on the speed control governor valve on the emergency feedwater pump turbine XVM11025 MWR 8700519 Repair leak and hydro component cooling heat exchanger "B" service water return valve XVB03123B-SW MWR 8701116 Repair valve diaphragm on the moisture separator level transmitter on the waste gas compressor ILT01030-WG MWR 8700053 Replace flange gasket on spent fuel cooling piping above snubber SFH0044 per NCN 2603 MWR 8710125 Remove and replace level check plug on the main plant exhaust vent radiation monitor RMA3-PP2 pump number 2 MWR 8700926 Repair transducer on feed water isolation valve "B" operator MWR 87M0393 Repair as necessary feed water isolation valve XVG01611B MWR 87T0157 Repair of HVAC fuel handling building charcoal plenum XAA0021A and replace HEPA filters MWR 87G0053 Repair of HVAC fuel handling building charcoal plenum XAA00218 and replace HEPA filters
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MWR 87M0054 Repair of HVAC fuel handling building charcoal plenum XAA0021C and replace HEPA filters MWR 8701087 Repair operator on reactor coolant drain tank level j
control valve LCV01003-WL q
MWR 86M0219 Inspect and clean tubes on "A" component cooling water heat exchanger XHE0002A l
MWR 86M0220 Inspect and clean tubes on "B" component cooling water heat exchanger XHE0002B No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors toured the control room, reviewed plant logs, records and held discussions with plant staff personnel to verify that the plant was being operated safely and in conformance with applicable requirements.
Specific items inspected in the control room included:
adequacy of staffing and attentiveness of control room personnel, TS and procedural adherence, operability of equipment and indicated control room status, control room logs, tagout books, operating orders, jumper / bypass controls, computer printouts and annunciators.
Tours of other plant areas were conducted to verify equipment operability, control of ignition sources and combustible materials, the condition of fire detection and extinguishing equipment, the control of mainter,ance and surveillance activities in progress, the implementation of radiation protective controls and the phycical security plan. Tours were conducted during normal and random off hour periods.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Plant Startup from Refueling (71711)
The inspectors observed the critical evolutions associated with plant startup from the refueling outage.
These included testing of the Rod Control System, Rod Position Indication, Reactor Trip Breakers, Resistance Temperature Detector Cross-Calibration Checks and observations of selected portions of other surveillance and reactor physics tests conducted during plant startup.
The inspectors observed the initial startup dilution to criticality and monitored the ascension to power operation. These events appeared to be well planned and accomplished in an orderly and controlled manner while insuring that each event was conducted in accordance with approved procedures and TS requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Onsite Followup' of' Events and Subsequent W' itten Reports (92700, 93713,
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'The inspectors reviewed the following Part 21 Reports,. Licensee Event-i E
Reports (LERs) and. Special Procedures: Reports (SPRs). to ascertain
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whether the -licensee's review, corrective action and report ~ of the a
, identified event or deficiency was in cnnformance with: regulatory
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- requirements, technical specifications, ' license conditions, and licensee procedures. and controls.
Based upon - this.. review the following items are closed.
l LER 87-004 Conflict between TS and FSAR SPR 87-004 Inoperable fire barrier.
SPR 87-005 Third inservice eddy current inspection of steam generat'r tubes
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LER 87-06 Steam generator tube eddy current examination-(Closed) 10 CFR 21 Report P2187-01, Failure of engineered safety features loading sequencer.
A service water pump failed during Engineered Safety Features Loading Sequencer (ESFLS) testing.
Licensee investigation identified the cause to be defective lug crimps -on the internal vendor wiring.
The ESFLS panels (Model Nos. 2544-1005), were manufactured by Automation Industries, Vitro Laboratories Division. The licensee reported the event as required, reworked the internal wiring in both ESFLS (MWR 8710331) panels and successfully tested the systems.
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(Closed) 10 CFR'21 Report 2186-04, Swing chiller control ci rcuit.
Gilbert Commonwealth reported this item to the NRC in a letter dated October 13, 1986. The plant has three (3) safety related chillers -
one for "A" train, one for "B" train and one " swing" chiller. The
" swing" chiller can be connected in place of either the
"A" or "B" chiller.
The " swing" chiller control circuit was found to have a-deficiency which would prevent the chiller from starting, when the
"A" train chil.ler has been taken out of service,
"B" chiller is operating, and the " swing" chiller is aligned to "A" train and a design basis event (DBE), such as a loss of coolant accident, is postulated simultaneously with the loss of "B" train DC control power as a single failure.,The DBE results in a safety injection signal which starts the swing chiller in the "A" loop in accordance with the design intent.
Should there also be a subsequent icss of offsite power, the design calls for the chiller to be tripped and then restarted in sequence with the onsite diesel generator supplying power. The design also calls for an override of the built in 20
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minute time delay for restart of the chiller.
However, with the events - postulated, it was determined that. false signals will be transmitted to the restart permissive control circuitry by the failure of the DC control power. These false signals will negate the
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restart override which will delay the restart of the chiller for up
to ~ 20' minutes while the design restart time is 5 minutes. With the
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chiller restart delayed 20 minutes, the chiller would experience excessive refrigerant pressure sufficient to burst a rupture disk and release the refrigerant.
This would have resulted in the simul-taneous unavailability of both connected chiller units. The licensee
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modified this circuitry during the refueling outage to correct this problem. All work has been completed and tested satisfactorily.
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While operating in Mode 1, at 100 percent power on June 16, 1987, at 8:00 p.m.,
Channel 4 inverter 5904,. failed resulting in a loss of power to the nuclear instrumentation-power range channel N44. Since N44 provides program water level to the steam generator this caused the' feed water regulating valves to close and resulted in a reactor trip on Lo Lo steam generator level. ' Licensee investigation revealed the cause of this event to be a failed capacitor in the inverter.
The capacitor was replaced and the unit was returned to power on June 17, 1987.
The failed capacitor had an anticipated life expectancy of four years and was scheduled for replacement in December 1987.
As a result of this failure, replacement of this capacitor in other inverters is being scheduled at a period of less than four years.
The licensee is currently preparing a LER on this event.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Maintenance Program Implementation (62700)
The inspectors continued the inspection of the maintenance program which began in March 1987. Report 87-08 identified the Maintenance Work Request (MWRs) that had been selected for this review.
These MWRs included failures, of a pressurizer spray valve, a main feedwater isolation valve and the main generator alterrex (exciter).
The failure of the pressurizer spray occurred on December 25, 1985.
In this case the spray valve failed open and resulted in a reactor trip and safety injection.
Investigation into this problem by the licensee revealed that during prior maintenance the pilot valve positioner had been reassembled incorrectly.
The top sleeve in the valve assembly had been installed upside down, allowing the stem to hang up on the small part of the sleeve. This error was attributed to difficult working conditions in the reactor building above the pressurizer, inadequate information and drawings in the vendors technical manual and personnel error.
After repairing the valve the licensee implemented corrective action that included additional training of maintenance personnel, changes to incor-porate more detailed information in the vendor's technical manual, and adding steps in the applicable maintenance procedure to insure the valve is assembled correctly.
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l On June 29, 1986, Feedwater. Isolation Valve (XVG1611A) failed closed.
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'This resulted"in a reactor trip.
Trouble.. shooting of the Feedwater
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Isolation Valve (FWIV) revealed the root.cause of-failure to be 'a defec--
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tive - electrical-connector in ' the valve ' actuator.
The internal contact parts of the connector were discolored-and appeared to have been contami-nated with oi1', thus rendering it inoperable. - The connector;was cleaned
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and the'act'uator and valve was, tested satisfactorily. As a result of this-failure the connectors on the remaining FWIVs were' also cleaned. The-General Test Procedure, Surveillance Activity Tracking; and Triggering..
(GTP702) and St'ation Administration Procedure, Lubrication and Preventa-tive Maintenance.. Program (SAP 143) was revised to incorporate steps.to prevent recurrence of the problem.
The failure of the main generator alterrex occurred.on April 2, 1986, and resulted in a reactor trip from.100 percent power. Investigation revealed that a defective brush had caused excessive wear on all slip ring brushes..
Material analysis indicated that the brush was. made of a softer material
.than required.
All brushes were replaced, the component' was satis-factorily tested and the unit was returned to power. The licensee and vendor were unable to - determine how the softer ' grade brush had been supplied for this component.
The inspector conducted a review of the work packages associated with the above items and determined that in each case the licensee had evaluated the failure, determined the root cause, corrected the problem and taken adequate corrective action to prevent similar recurrences.
In addition to reviewing the above failures the inspectors used these failures as examples to. conduct an extensive review of the overall=
maintenance program. This included a review of six MWRs for specific work performed during the above events and e'ght' other MWRs for previously related work on the affected equipment.
The above MWRs-and associated work packages were reviewed to insure that administrative approval had been obtained, and limiting conditions for operation were met while work was being performed, approved procedures were used, inspections were performed as required and the component or system was tested prior to returning it to service.
It was additionally verified that replacement parts used were acceptable, that all measuring or test equipment (MT&E)
used was identified in the MWR and that the failure was reported if required.
The inspectors reviewed eight electrical maintenance procedures, six mechanical maintenance procedures, seven instrumentation and control maintenance procedures, five general maintenance procedures and thirteen surveillance test procedures that were used or referenced in the above MWRs. These procedures met the licensee administrative requirements, were current, approved and controlled.
The procedures contained sufficient detail for each activity,.were organized into logical steps, and contained requirements for post maintenance testing, hold points for inspection and controls for bypasses, lifted leads and jumpers.
Provisions were contained in each procedure for fire protection, cleanliness, housekeeping and special hazards.
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9 The licensee records for these' activities' and' all? other maintenance activities are kept up-to-date and tracked through the Computerized History and ' Maintenance PlanningL System (CHAMPS).
Completed records are generally transferred to Microfiche _ for long term storage.
Records-retention meet the requirements of the licensee's quality assurance program.
An equipment and record review was-performed on seven pieces of electrical and mechanical. MT&E and the associated records' used on safety and non-safety equipment.
This. review - indicated.' that MT&E equipment. was calibrated and the-calibration equipment standards used could be traced -
through records to a national standard.
In addition to _ the seven pieces
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selected, a general review of-the calibration-facility showed-that equipment was properly ' labeled with unique. identifying numbers,
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properly stored and controlled. MT&E records were well maintained and' met the requirements of the licensee procedures and applicable industry standards.
To determine.if the personnel performing the maintenance' activities were qualified for their assigned task, training and qualification records of 19 electrical, mechanical and instrumentation and control' personnel were reviewed. Interviews were also conducted with a representative sample of these personnel and with their respective supervisors to determine if the personnel were adequately trained to. perform their assigned task.
The results of the above indicated that the personnel are adequately trained and qualified for their work assignments.
The interviews clearly demonstrated that supervisor oversight was apparent in the maintenance program.
No violation or deviations were identified.
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