IR 05000395/1987018
| ML20236L834 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1987 |
| From: | Conlon T, Harris J, Madden P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236L812 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-87-18, NUDOCS 8708100373 | |
| Download: ML20236L834 (17) | |
Text
. _. _. _
_
. _ _ _ _ _ _.
_ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _
_
_
_ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,
n UWITED STATES
[a Rfou,Do NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[
/p REGION 11 g.
j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
- ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
%,*****.e
'
Report No.:
50-395/87-18 i
Licensee:
South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Columbia, SC 29218 Docket No.:
50-395 License No.:
NPF-12 Facility Name:
Summer Inspection Conducted:
July 6-10, 1987 P. M. Madden
'
du, 7' F / - E 7
/bfe[ <,.
Inspectors:
c
/
Date Signed Y / b 4 b:-n -
7~ ~ Yl~S I O
K J. R. Harr'is ~
" ~ '
-
I Date Signed Approved b r#fs>7/ fopC2 7 8/ !F 7
'
T. E. Conlon, Chief, Plant Systems Section
'Date Signed Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of Fire Protection / Prevention and Follow-up on Previously Identified Inspection Items.
,
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8708100373 870B03 ADDCK 0500
gDR
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
.
.
_ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _
_ __
_
_____ _ - __ _ _____ ___ _ _ ____ _ _ _ __
l
-
l l
c
.
l REPORT DETAILS l
1.
Persons Contacted I
Licensee Employees
>
0. S. Bradham, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
- H. I. Donnelly, Senior Licensing Engineer
- W. R. Higgins,. Associate Manager REG. Compliance
- T. J. Keckeisen, Nuclear Engineer
- L. W. Lunden, Nuclear Engineer
- G. Moffatt, Associate Manager, Project Engineering
- H. P1emmons, Senior fire Protection Technician
- W. L. Safley, Site Fire Protection Coordinator J. L. Skolds, Deputy Di.ector, Operations and Maintenance j
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- R. C. Prevatte
- P. C. Hopkins
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 10, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the
,
i areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
I The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materiais provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-395/85-26-01), Review resolution of Summer's Appendix R Re-analysis issues regarding revised shutdown schemes, associated circuits and demonstrating compliance with Appendix R Sections III.G and III.L by NRR.
By letter, dated May 22, 196i, NRC's office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) issued their Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which concluded that the licensee's Appendix R re-analysis was acceptable, therefore, this item is closed.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ -
____ --_ _______
_
-
,
b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-395/85-26-02), Review resolution of fire induced spurious signal and safe shutdown system modifications by NRR.
By letter, dated May 22, 1986, NRC's NRR office issued their SER which concluded that the licensee's proposed modifications to resolve the spuricus signal concerns were acceptable.
The inspectors performed a field verification of these modifications and determined that the licensee has met the conditions of the SER.
This item is closed.
c.
(Closed) Violation Item (50-395/85-26-03), Failure to meet the i
requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G with regard to maintaining one train of hot standby systems free from fire damage.
In the event of a fire in the southwest corner of elevation 412'-0" of the intermediate building, fire area 18-25, near column line 7.5/G.4, redundcnt cabling required for systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions could be damaged.
Tray 3088 which contains Train"A" DC control power to all essential safe shutdown systems interacts with Tray 4149 which contains Train "B" control power for the chilled water system and the component cooling water system.
In addition, conduit VUC-28 which contains Train"B" control power cabling for the chilled water system and trays 1025, 2058 and 3128 which contain Train "B" power to the chilled water system and
~ component cooling water system also interact with cable tray 3088.
Since the chilled water system provides cooling for bearings of the charging pumps, a fire in this area affecting the chilled water system could possibly render both charging pumps inoperable.
The inspectors verified the licensee has enclosed cable tray 3088 in a one hour fire barrier through fire area 18-25, therefore, this item is closed.
d.
(Closed) Violation Item (50-395/85-26-04), Failure to meet the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G with regard to providing separation for nuclear instrumentation required to support safe shutdown.
A fire in the north cable chase of the control building on elevation 436'-0" could damage all available source range nuclear instruments.
In order to preclude the lose of all three source range instruments due to a fire in fire area CB-1, the licensee has enclosed one train of source range cabling in a one-hour fire barriers.
This item is closed.
e.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-395/85-26-07), Review resolution of the licensee's associated circuit methodology with regard to the sample size and circuits analyzed for overcurrent protection by NRR.
By
!
letter, dated May 22, 1986, NRC's NRR office issued their SER which concluded that the licensee's methodology for analyzing associated circuits was acceptable.
Therefore, this item is closed.
f.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-395/85-26-08), Correct inadequacies identified in procedure FEP 1.0 based on review and approval of the licensee's Appendix R Reanalysis by NRR.
The licensee has revised
- _ _ __ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
._
_ _--
.'
.#
I procedure FEP 1.0 control' room evacuation due to fire to incorporate their implementation of their Appendix R plant modifications.
In addition, the. licensee incorporated the procedure concerns identified by the NRC during the Appendix R inspection.
Therefore, this item is closed.
g.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-395/85-26-09), Provide limiting.
times / assumptions -to arrive at operator action time-lines to NRR for review.
The licensee has developed time-lines for isolating and securing the primary and secondary volumes and ensuring water to the reactor coolant pumps seals.
These time-lines have been incorporated into FEP 1.0, therefore, this item is' closed, h.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-395/85-26-10), Identify / Issue procedures to accomplish Appendix R,Section III.L, requirements..and performance goals which are based on the Appendix R re-analysis approved by NRR.
For fires which occur outside the control room, cable spreading rooms and relay room the licensee, depending on which fire area / zone the fire i.s in, will initiate a controlled plant shutdown utilizing one or.'more of the following procedures:
FEP-2.0, A Train plant shutdown to hot standby due to fire, Revision 0, May 6, 1987 FEP-2.1, A Train shutdown to cold shutdown due to a fire, Revision 0, May 6, 1987 FEP-3.0, B Train plant shutdown to hot standby due to fire, Revision 0, May 29, 1987
<
FEP-3.1, B Train shutdown to cold shutdown due to fire, Revision 0, May 6, 1987 FEP-4.0, FEP selection, Revision 0, May 7, 1987 l
These procedures -have been issued and implemented on site therefore, this item is closed, i.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-395/85-26-12), Inadequate number of i
8-hour battery powered emergency lighting units provided for areas
!
needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment.
By letter, dated
.
May 22, 1986, NRC's NRR office issued their SER which granted the
'
licensee a deviation from the Appendix R,Section III.J rerairements with respect to the yard lighting between the turbine building, the service water pumphouse and the circulating water pumphouse.
Therefore, based on this deviation approval, this item is closed.
j.
(Closed) Violation Item (50-395/85-26-13), Inadequate fire barrier between fire areas 18-20 and IB-25.6.
Upon discovery of the fire barrier breach, the licensee, on June 6,1985, established a fire watch in the area of the inadequate fire barrier.
On June 24, 1985,
-_ ___ _ _ _ -__
__Q
_ - ___ _-__ -
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
i
'
the, licensee issued Nonconformance Report 1986.
On November 12, 1985, the licensee ' closed out 'Nonconformance Report 1986 and -
indicated that the fire barrier breach had been corrected.
,
The inspectors inspected the fire barriers between fire area / zones I8-20 and IB-25.6 and found them to be satisfactory.
Therefore, this item is closed.
k.
(Closed) Violation Item (50-395/85-26-14), Nonfunctional fire barrier for raceway VUL 34B in Fire Zone 18-23.2.
The. licensee, upon discovery, established a fire watch in the area of the inadequate fire barrier.
They completed the repairs to the damaged raceway fire barrier and the fire barrier was fully functional on June 10, 1985.
,
I The licensee's corrective actions are considered to. be adequate, therefore, this item is closed.
1.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-395/85-26-16), Verification that the "M" board fire barrier was reviewed and a deviation was granted for this
plant condition by NRR.
By letter, dated May 22, 1986, NRC's NRR
i office issued an SER that concluded, based on the licensee's modifications to the
"M" board fire barrier assembly over the "A" train service water pump, the level of fire protection in this plant area would afford a level of fire safety equivalent to that required by. Appendix R,.Section III.G.
The inspectors verified that the licensee had completed the
"M" board fire barrier modifications required by the SER.
The inspectors found the modifications to be acceptable, therefore, this item is closed.
'
m.
(Closed) Deviation Item (50-395/85-26-17), Failure to conduct fire watch patrol for Fire Area IB-25.
An error was made in the fire watch log with respect to a room required fnr the hourly Appendix R fire watch inspections.
Intermediate Suilding (IB) Room 12-07 was designated in the logs and inspected hourly instead of IB Room 12-02 as required.
Upon identification of this error by the NRC during the Appendix R inspection, this condition was immediately corrected by the licensee.
This item is closed.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Fire Protection / Prevention Program (64704)
a.
Fire Prevention / Administrative Control Procedures The inspectors reviewed the following Fire Prevention / Administrative Procedures:
FPP-003, Control of Transient Combustibles, Revision 6,
August 8, 1986
,
_ ____________ _ - ____________ Q
- _ _ _ _ _ _ - _.
-
_.
-
.
!
-
.
SAP-131, Fire Protection Program Plan, Revision 2, April 2, 1984
)
Based on this review, it appears that the above procedures meet the NRC guidelines of the document entitled " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls, and
!
Quality Assurance," dated June 1977.
b.
Fire Protection Surveillance Procedures The inspectors reviewed the following Fire. Protection System Surveillance Procedures:
Surveillance Test - Procedure - (STP) 128.001,. Electric Fire Pump -
Weekly, Revision 7, October 3,1985 STP 128.004, - Diesel Fire Pump Weekly, Revision'12,
-
Decer.iber 15, 1986 STP 128.021, Fire Service Annual Flow Test, Revision 5, March 6, 1987 STP 128.002, Fire Protection Monthly Valve Lineup Verification, Revision 12, March 12, 1987 STP 128.003, Fire System Annual Valve Test, Revision 9, June 26, 1987
'
STP 128.011, Yard Fire Hydrant Hose House Inspection, Revision 4, January.7,1985 STP 128.012, Yard Fire Hydrant Inspection, Revision 4, March 18, 1987 STP 128.023, Three Year Air Flow Deluge Sprinkler Test, Revision 4, December 18, 1985 STP 128.303, Auxiliary Building Preaction Sprinkler (XPN-098)
Operational Test, Revision 9, December 12, 1985 i
,
STP 128.009, Monthly Fire Hose Station Inspection, Revision 6, l
March 25, 1987
'
STP 128,010, Fire Hose Station Refueling Inspection, Revision 5, March 20, 1987 STP 128.015, Fire Hose Station Three-Year Inspection, Revision 3, April 9, 1987 STP 128.007, CO2 System Valve Lineup Verification, Revision 3, October 30, 1985
. - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
'
STP 128.049, Intermediate Building, Elv.426'-0",
423'-6",
423'-0" and 422'-0" Fire Barrier Inspection, Revision 0, April 15, 1986 STP 128.050, Intermediate Building, Elv. 412'-0" Fire Barrier Inspection, Revision 2, March 3, 1987 STP 128.014, Semiannual Fire Door Inspection, Revision 3, October 19, 1985 STP 128.061, Ventilation Fire Damper Inspection Units XAH-13A, XAH-138, XAH-158, XAH-8, XAH-21, and XAH-27, Revision 3, January 22, 1985 I
STP 128.064, Ventilation Fire Damper Inspection Units XAA-108, XAA-21A, XAA-47, XAA-10A, XAA-48, XAA-148, XAH-19B, XAH-7A, XAA-40A, XAA-41 and XAH-9A, Revision 4, February 4, 1986 The above surveillance procedures were reviewed to determine if the various test outlines and inspection instructions adequately implement the surveillance requirements of the plant's Fire Protection Technical Specifications.
In addition, these procedures were reviewed to determine if the inspection and test instructions followed general industry fire protection practices, NRC fire protection program guidelines and the guidelines of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Codes.
Based on this review, it appears that the above procedures are satisfactory.
c.
Fire Protection System Surveillance Inspections and Tests The ' spectors reviewed the following surveillance inspection and test records for the dates indicated:
STP 128.002, Fire Protection Monthly Valve Lineup Verification, June 10, 1987, May 11, 1987, April 8, 1987 and March 10, 1987 STP 128.003, Fire System Annual Valve Test, January 22, 1987 and January 2, 1986 STP 128. 001, Electric Fire Pump - Weekly Test, June 7,1987, June 14, 1987, June 21, 1987, June 28, 1987, May 31, 1987, May 24,1987, May 17,1987, May 10,1987, May 3,1987, April 5, 1987, and April 12, 1987 STP 128.009, Monthly Fire Hose Station Inspection, June 17, 1987, May 19, 1987, and April 22, 1987 STP 128.007, CO System Valve Lineup Verification - 31 DAY
Surveillance, June 15, 1987, May 18, 1987, April 21, 1987 and March 15, 1987
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ -
- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
'
STP 128.049, Intermediate Building Elevation 426'-0", 423'-6",
423'-0" and 422'-0" Fire Barrier Inspection, June 19, 1987 The surveillance test record data and testing frequency associated with the above fire protection system surveillance test / inspections were found to be satisfactory with regard to meeting the requirements of the plant's Fire Protection Technical Specifications.
d.
Fire Protection Audit The most recent audit reports of the V. C. Summer Fire Protection
Program were reviewed.
These audits were.
Professional Loss Control (PLC) Annual Audit Report, issued I
i October 14, 1985 SCE&G/QA Type II Surveillance Report No. II4-86-J Station Fire Protection, March 6, 1986 PLC, Triennial Fire Protection Audit issued September 29, 1986 These audits identified several fire protection program discrepancies and unresolved items, and recommended several program improvements.
The licensee has either implemented the corrective actions associated with these audit findings or a scheduled date for completion of the correction actions had been established.
The licensee appears to be taking the appropriate corrective actions on these audit findings.
e.
Fire Brigade (1) Organization The total station fire brigade is composed of approximately 71 personnel from the Operations and Maintenance staffs.
The on duty shift fire brigade leader is normally one of the Reactor Operators and the remaining four fire brigade members are composed of Reactor Operators and Maintenance personnel.
The inspectors reviewed the on duty shifts for the following dates and verified that sufficient qualified fire brigade personnel were on duty to meet the provisions of the plant's Technical Specification:
July 7, 1987 July 8, 1987 July 9, 1987
In addition, the inspectors verified that sufficient personnel were assigned to each shift to meet the minimum operating and fire brigade staff requirements of the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, it appears based on the review of the duty rosters
,
associated with the above dates, that there was sufficient j
i
- ___-____- _____-,_ - __-_ _ -
_ _ - - - - - - - _ _ _ _,
manpower on duty to meet both the operational and the fire brigade requirements of the plant's Technical Specifications.
(2) Training i
The inspectors reviewed the training and drill records for three brigade leaders and seven brigade members for the third quarter of 1986 through tne third quarter of 1987.
The records reviewed l
indicated that each of these leaders and members had received an i
annual medical review, attended the required training and
participated into the required number of drills.
The inspectors also verified that a fire brigade drill had been conducted every 92 days for each shift for 1986.
The fire brigade training records which were inspected were found satisfactory.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's initial fire
.
brigade training program to verify that the following training topics are being covered:
Indoctrination of the plant fire fighting plan with
-
specific identification of each individuals'
responsibilities.
Identification of the type and location of fire hazards and
-
associated types of fires that could occur in the plant.
The toxic and corrosive characteristics of expected
-
products of combustion.
Identification of the location of fire fighting equipment
-
for each fire area and familiarization with the layout of the plant, including access and egress routes to each area.
The proper use of available fire fighting equipment and the
-
correct method of fighting each type of fire.
The types of fires include; fires in energized electrical equipment, fires in cables and cable trays, hydrogen fires, fires involving flammable and combustible liquids or hazardous l
process chemicals, fire resulting from construction or
modifications (welding), and record file fires.
The proper use of communication, lighting ventilation and
-
emergency breathing equipment.
The pNger method for fighting fires inside buildings and
-
confined spaces.
-
The direction and coordination of the fire fighting activities (fire brigade leaders only).
Detailed review of fire fighting strategies and procedures.
-
_______________a
- - _ _ _
__-
.4
Review of-the. latest plant modifications and corresponding
--
changes in fire fighting plans.
Based on this review, it appears that the licensee's initial
.
fire brigade training program covers the above required training topics.
In. addition, it appears that the-licensee's fire brigade training program repeats the basic fire fighting-skills of the initial program to qualified fire brigade members every two years.
(3) Fire Brigade Fire Fighting Strategies The inspectors reviewed the following plant fire fighting strategies:
FPP-3002, Diesel Generator Buf1 ding Elv. 436/437, Fire Area / Zone 1.2 and 2.2, Revision 1, May 13, 1985 FPP-5004, Auxiliary Building Elv. 400'-0", Revision 0, May 17, 1985 FPP-5005, Auxiliary Building Elv. 412'-0", Revision 0, May 29, 1985 FPP-5008, Auxiliary Building Elv. 452'-0", Revision 0, May 1, 1985
'
'
e-FPP-6002, Lower Cable Spreading Room CB 25.02, CB 20.01 Control Building Elv. 425'-0", Revision 0, May 16, 1985-Based on this review, the inspectors determined that the above fire fighting strategies aat.quately addressed the fire hazards in the area, the type of fire extinguishants to be utilized, the direction of attack, systems in the room / area to be managed in order to reduce fire damage, heat sensitive equipment in the room / area, and specific fire brigade duties with regard to smoke control and salvage.
(4) Fire' Brigade Drill During this inspection, the inspectors witnessed an unannounced
,
fire brigede drill.
The drill fire scenario was a fire in the
'
Turbine Building Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit which was apparently caused by a broken flange.
The proximate cause of ignition was unknown.
Five fire brigade members responded to the pending fire emergency.
The brigade assembled adjacent to the area in full protective firefighting turnout clothing and self-contained breath apparatus.
An initial size-up of the fire condition was made by the fire brigade leader and two 1-1/2 inch fire attack
-_-___--____ _ _ -
.
. - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - - _
- - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -_. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _
_ _ _
- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
l l
.
'
j
1
hose lines and a foam hose line were advanced into the area of l
the seal oil unit.
The fire attack hose lines were placed-in L
service on the fire and the fire was placed under control in 20 minutes.
In addition, the fire brigade initiated fire victim search and rescue, smcke control, and water control operations.
!
l l
The fire brigade utilized proper manual firefighting methods and i
reacted to the fire drill scenario in an. effective and efficient j
manner.
f.
Plant Tour and Inspection of Fire Protection Equipment (1)
Inspection of, Fire Brigade Manual Fire Fighting Equipment The inspectors performed an inspection of. the fire brigade equipment, consisting of fire hose, nozzles, tools, -and miscellaneous ~ equipment, stored at the fire brigade equipment response location located in the Turbine Building.
A total of 10 sets of turnout gear.(coats, boots, helmets, etc.), five -sets of self-contained breathing apparatus, and 10 spare air cylinders are stored at this fire brigade equipment responses location.
Based on this inspection, the designated fire brigade equipment appeared to be properly maintained and stored in a ready condition.
(2) Outside Fire Protection Walkdown The inspectors ~ verified that the two separate fire pump suction intake structures from the lake were in service and met the requirements of the Technical Specifications.
The two fire pumps were inspected and found to be in service.
The diesel fuel tank for the diesel driven fire pump was full of fuel which mot the requirements of the Technical Specifications.
The following sectional control valves in the outside fire protection water supply system were inspected and verified to be properly aligned and locked in position:
XVG-4015-FS, Fire Pump A&B Discharge Isolation Valve XVG-4014-FS, Fire Pump A&B Discharge Isolation Valve XVG-4013-FS, Fire Pump A&B Discharge Isolation Valve XVG-6947-FS, Yard Fire Hydrant 1M FS Supply Valve XVG-6948-FS, yard Fire Hydrant IN FS Supply Valve
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
_
__-
_
,
_
. _ _.
.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-
l
.
,
l The following fire hydrants and fire hydrant equipment houses were inspected:
Hydrant Hose House-1 Hydrant Hose House-2 Hydrant Hose House-3 The equipment houses contained the minimum equipment requirement of that specified by NFPA-24, Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances, and/or the FSAR commitments.
The equipment appeared to be adequately maintained.
A tour of the exterior of the plant indicated that sufficient clearance was provided between permanent safety-related buildings and structures and temporary buildings, trailers, and other transient combustible materials.
The general housekeeping of the areas adjacent to the permanent plant structures was satisfactory.
.
'
(3) Permanent Plant Fire Protection Features A plant tour was made by the inspectors.
During the plant tour, the following safe shutdown related plant areas and their related fire protection features were inspected:
Intermediate Building Elv. 412'-0" Fire Area / Zone IB-25.L1, 18-25.1.3 and 18-25.1.2 125V DC Battery "B" Room Fire Area / Zone IB-4 125V DC Battery "A" Room Fire Area / Zone IB-2 HVAC Equipment "B" Chiller Room Fire Area / Zone 18-9
]
HVAC Equipment "A" Chiller Room Fire Area / Zone 18-23.1 l
Water Chiller Pump Rooms Fire Area / Zone IB-7.1, IB-7.2 and IB-7.3 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Fire Area / Zone 18-25.2 Diesel Generator Room "A" Train Fire Area /Zont DG-1 Diecel Generator Room "B" Train Fire Area / Zone DG-2 7200/480V Switchgear Room "B" Train Fire Area / Zone 18-22.2 7200/480V Switchgear Room "A" Train Fire Area / Zone 18-20
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
-
.,
Control Room Evacuation Panel Rooms Fire Area / Zone 18-12, 18-13, 18-14, IB-15, 18-24 and 18-23.2 The: fire / smoke detection systems,. manual fire fighting equipment-(i.e., portable extinguishers, hose stations, etc.) and the fire area boundary walls, floors and ceiling associated for the above plant areas were inspected and verified to be in service or functional.
Based on this inspection, it appears that the fire protection features associated with the above plant areas are satisfactorily maintained.
The plant tour'also verified the licensee's implementation of the. fire prevention administrative procedures.
The control'of combustibles and flammable materials, liquids and gases, and the general housekeeping were found to be very good.in the areas inspected.
(4) Appendix R Fire Protection Features The inspectors visually inspected the fire rated raceway. fire barriers required for compliance with Appendix R,Section III.G.2 for the protection of the following safe shutdown raceway:
CCU 4XA SWU 5XA MSU 112XA XX 3810A XX 3811A VUL 52C VUL 848 T 3088 Based on the inspectors' observations of the above raceway fire barrier enclosures, it appears that the one hour-fire barrier integrity associated with the above fire barrier assemblies was-being properly maintained in a satisfactory condition.
The inspectors also visually inspected the one hour fire rated i
barriers separating the following mechanical equipment:
l Component Cooling Water Pumps Chiller Pumps
,
Service Water Pumps
'-
Based on this inspection, the inspectors determined that the one hour fire resistive integrity associated with the above equipment fire barriers was being properly maintained in a satisfactory condition.
_ -
_ _ - _ - -
_ - __.
-
.
The inspectors made a walkdown of the Appendix R related sprinkler protection in the following plant areas:
Intermediate Building Elevation 412'-0" Fire Area / Zones 18-25.12 and IB-25.1.3 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Fire Area / Zones IB-25.2
,
Diesel Generator Room "A" Train Fire Area / Zone DG-1 Diesel Generator Room "B" Train Fire Area / Zone DG-2 Service Water Pump House Fire Area / Zone SWPH Based on this walkdown, the inspectors determined that the sprinkler protection provided for the areas identified above l
provided sufficient protection with respect to controlling an exposure fire.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Inspector Follow-up Items (IFI)
a.
(Closed) IFI (50-395/82-41-08), Cable Tray Separation.
During a visit conducted by the NRC staff on June 2 and 3, 1982, certain cases involving cable separation were four.d to be unacceptable.
These were
cases where a non-class IE Cable failure such as a cable fire induced l
by a short circuit from a design basis event could affect Class IE
,
circuits that are located in cable trays in close proximity to
!
non-class IE cable trays.
The staff required that either a suitable
barrier be installed between non-class IE cable trays and class IE i
cable trays that are separated by less than the separation recommended by IEEE-Std 384(as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.75) or justify that an electrically initiated fire in a non-class IE cable tray will not occur to challenge cable routed in adjacent class IE cable trays.
In a letter, dated July 6,1982, South Carolina Electric and Gas l
Company (SCE&G) submitted a list of the non-class IE cable trays that
-
are not separated from Class IE cable trays as recommended by IEE-Std 384, and as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.75.
SCE&G
,
committed for the trays identified, prior to startup after the first refueling, to provide covers or barriers between the non-class IE cable trays and at least one of the Class IE cable trays or to
'
demonstrate that faults induced in non-class IE cable trays will not cause failure of cable in both adjacent, redundant Class IE cable trays.
Based on the staff review of the information provided by the applicant, the staff concluded that the applicants commitment was
'
.
. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. - _ _ _ - _ _
.
!
acceptable.. However, the staff required that if circuit protection is to be used in lieu of barriers, that the protective devices be periodically tested and the periodic testing requirements for these
' devices be included.in the Technical Specifications.
During this inspection, the NRC inspectors verified that this task has been accomplished by providing cable tray covers on some cable trays and by periodic testing of certain cable equipment protective devices via station electrical maintenance procedures.
The inspectors also verified that the requirements have been included in the Technical Specifications and FSAR.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) IFI-(50-395/85-26-05), Verify breaker coordination between XBCIA, DPNIHA, XMCIDB2X, and APNIFB-EM.
During the NRC Region II Appendix R, the inspectors noted that coordination was marginal between the battery breakers and the feeder breakers for the various DC panel boards fed from the main DC distribution boards XBCIA, DPNIHA and DPNIHAI respectively.
The license conducted a study to review the coordination of the incoming battery breakers and the main DC distribution panel breakers.
This study confirmed that the breakers and cables are properly sized with respect to peak loads and the maximum short-circuit current.
The licensee's study also concluded that by setting the incoming battery breakers to the maximum time delay on the long time setting for the present trip rating of 600 amps, therefore, the required coordination is achieved and the margin of overall plant safety is not degraded.
The licensee subsequently has checked the battery breakers settings and has reset them with the long time elements on the maximum time delay in lieu of the intermediate time delay.
The NRC inspectors during the Appendix R inspection were also concerned that the licensee's original fuse / breaker coordination study did not consider the cable which exists between the 150 amp fuse and circuit breaker number 25 of Panel APNIFB and by postulating a fault in this cable would invalidate the conclusion that adequate coordination exists.
The licensee determined that inadequate coordination did exist, however, panels APNIFB and APNIFA are not required for safe shutdown in the event of a fire within any fire area inside the plant.
The i
licensee has deleted these panels from the safe shutdown equipment list.
Therefore, this item is closed.
c.
(Closed) IFI (50-395/85-26-06), Review the affects of spurious valve operation for centrifugal charging pumps.
The NRC inspectors during the Appendix R inspection were concerned that a fira induced hot electrical short could close a charging pump suction or mini flow valve and cause pump damage.
The inspectors proposed that this
.
.....
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ -
- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
L l:
,
'
.
spurious actuation could occur concurrent with a loss of offsite power and Engineered' Safety Feature (ESF) load sequencer actuation.
l The charging pumps at Summer Station do not receive a start signal
'
from the ESF load sequencer nor do'the A or 8 train pumps receive a trip signal on a. loss of offsite power.
These pumps receive an auto-started signal only from the Solid State Protection System on a safety injection actuation..The C train (swing) pump only. starts on safety injection signal and does not start on a loss of offsite power unless it is the only pump aligned to a bus.
L A normal AC power system alignment would be that one charging pump is running, the opposite train pump is in the normal after stop. mode and o
the C pump is aligned on the running train.
A loss of offiste power with ESF load sequencer actuation only reenergizes the pump that was running before the loss of offsite power, therefore any detrimental spurious valve closure would damage only one pump.
The other pumps would be available when required for i
RCS makeup.
Therefore, this item is closed.
d.
(Closed) IFI.(50-395/85-26-11), Provide training for all FEP procedures to ' support Appendix R.
The inspector reviewed the Fire Emergency Procedure (FEP) lesson plan, dated April 1,1987 and the training records for 57 operations personnel.
The lesson plan and
':
the train records were found to be satisfactory.
The initial FEP training for the operations staff was completed on May 5, 1987.
This item is closed.
!
e.
(Closed) IFI (50-395/85-26-15), Review licensee's analysis for unprotected cable tray supports.
The licensee utilizing the criteria of Generic Letter 86-10, Enclosure 2, Question 3.3.4 perform an analysis of their one hour protected Appendix R raceway to determine if they will remain functionally supported during a fire with a ASTM E-119 one hour duration or a fire condition of 700 F for one hour.
The inspector reviewed the' licensee's analysis, G/C Report 2585, Revision 1, and determined that the analysis was satisfactory with respect to meeting the criteria of Generic Letter 86-10.
Therefore, this item is closed.
f.
(Closed) IFI (50-395/86-10-01), Transient fire load calculation does not follow industry fire protection practices.
The licensee's Fire Protection Procedure FPP-003, Control of Transient Combustibles, was revised to incorporate the fire load range criteria and the
]
calculation guidance provided in the National Fire Protection j
Associates (NFPA) fire protection handbook.
Therefore, this item is
'
closed.
g.
(Closed) IFI (50-395/86-10-02), Plastic materials are not properly evaluated with regard to transient combustible control.
The licensee's Fire Protection Procedure FPP-003, Control of
!
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ -. _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
_ _ _ - _ - - -.
_ - _ _.
- - _
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-_ _.
,
l
\\
'
i
'
.,
,
Combustibles, Attachment I, was revised to incorporate plastic materials, therefore, this item is closed.
h.
(Closed) IFI (50-395/86-10-03), Fire barrier inspection acceptance criteria for TSI.one-hour raceway fire barriers not incorporated into surveillance - procedurec.
The licensee revised surveillance test procedure STP-128.050, intermediate building elevation 412'-0" fire barrier inspection, to incorporate inspection acceptance c'riteria for the TSI one-hour raceway fire barriers.
The inspector reviewed L.is criteria and found it to be satisfactory, therefore, this item is closed.
7.
Licensee Event Reports (LER) and Special Reports (SPR)
i a.
(Closed) LER (85-017), Separation of vital power cable trays.
See
,
the closeout of Violation. Item (50-395/85-26-03) in Section 3 of this t
report.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) SPR (85-006), See the closecut of Violation Item (50-395/85-26-03) in Section 3 of this report.
This item is closed.
!
!
)
l
_ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
__ -__-___ -___________ a